MGW10-LCP-Hard-Soft-Line-TOOLBOX

MGW10-LCP-Hard-Soft- - MGW 2010 B Hicks Soft/Hard Line Lingel/Coburn-Palo Hard Line Good(1/3 1 Turn hard-line approach key to a successful softline

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MGW 2010 Soft/Hard Line B. Hicks Lingel/Coburn-Palo Hard Line – Good (1/3) 1. Turn – hard-line approach key to a successful softline Heritage Foundation, 09 , (Kim Holmes, Many, if not most, Europeans credit "soft power" for the peace they've enjoyed for decades. Thinking their version of a Kantian universal peace arose from the committee chambers of the E uropean U nion - and not from the victories of the Western powers in World War II and the Cold War - they hold up soft power as a model for the rest of the world. In their view, bridging the of- ten hardened differences between states and shaping their decisions requires mainly negotiation and common understanding. The importance of our military strength is downplayed and some- times even seen as the main obstacle to peace. Even when its importance is acknowledged, it's a perfunctory afterthought. Many liberals are now pressing the U.S. government to adopt this vis - ion , too. But the futility of it can be seen everywhere, from the failure of negotiations to deter both Iran and North Korea from their nuclear programs over the past five years - a period in which their efforts have only matured - to the lackluster response to Russia's invasion of Georgian territory. The limits of soft power have not only bedeviled Mr. Obama but George W. Bush as well. After applying pressure on North Korea so diligently in 2006, the Bush administration relaxed its posture in early 2007, and North Korea concluded that it was again free to backslide on its commitments. Two years later, this effort to "engage" North Korea, which the Obama administration continued even after North Korea's April 5 missile test, has only led North Korea to believe that it can get away with more missile tests and nuclear weapons detonations. And so far, it ha s. The problem here is not merely an overconfidence in the process of "talking" and trying to achieve "mutual understanding" - as if diplomacy were merely about communications and eliminating hurt feelings. Rather, it is about the interaction and sometimes clash of hardened interests and ideologies. These are serious matters , and you don't take them seriously by wishing away the ne- cessity, when need be, of using the hard power of force to settle things. It's this connection of hard to soft power that Mr. Obama appears not to understand . In what is becoming a signature trait of saying one thing and doing another, Mr. Obama has argued that America must "combine military power with strengthened diplomacy." But since becoming president he has done little to demon - strate an actual commitment to forging a policy that combines America's military power with dip - lomatic strategies . For America to be an effective leader and arbiter of the international order, it must be willing to maintain a world-class military . That requires resources: spending, on average, no less than 4 percent of the nation's gross domestic product on defense. Unfortunately, Mr. Obama's next proposed defense
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This note was uploaded on 02/23/2012 for the course DEBATE 101 taught by Professor None during the Spring '12 term at University of California, Berkeley.

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MGW10-LCP-Hard-Soft- - MGW 2010 B Hicks Soft/Hard Line Lingel/Coburn-Palo Hard Line Good(1/3 1 Turn hard-line approach key to a successful softline

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