MGW10-LCP-Korea-Threat-Construction-ADV

MGW10-LCP-Korea-Threat-Construction-ADV - MGW 2010 JHuang...

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Unformatted text preview: MGW 2010 JHuang BHicks Threat-Con Aff South Korea Threat Construction Affirmative South Korea Threat Construction Affirmative..................................................................................................................... 1 South Korea Threat Construction Affirmative......................................................................................................1 ****Advantage Modules****............................................................................................................................................. 5 ****Advantage Modules****....................................................................................................................................5 Threat-Con Advantage Troops (1/2)................................................................................................................................. 6 Threat-Con Advantage Troops (1/2).....................................................................................................................6 Threat-Con Advantage Troops (2/2)................................................................................................................................. 7 Threat-Con Advantage Troops (2/2).....................................................................................................................7 Threat-Con Advantage NFU (1/3).................................................................................................................................... 8 Threat-Con Advantage NFU (1/3).........................................................................................................................8 Threat-Con Advantage NFU (2/3).................................................................................................................................... 9 Threat-Con Advantage NFU (2/3).........................................................................................................................9 Threat-Con Advantage NFU (3/3).................................................................................................................................. 10 Threat-Con Advantage NFU (3/3).......................................................................................................................10 ****Troops Module****.................................................................................................................................................. 11 ****Troops Module****..........................................................................................................................................11 South Korea Troops 1AC (1/8).......................................................................................................................................... 12 South Korea Troops 1AC (1/8)...............................................................................................................................12 South Korea Troops 1AC (2/8).......................................................................................................................................... 13 South Korea Troops 1AC (2/8)...............................................................................................................................13 South Korea Troops 1AC (3/8).......................................................................................................................................... 14 South Korea Troops 1AC (3/8)...............................................................................................................................14 South Korea Troops 1AC (4/8).......................................................................................................................................... 15 South Korea Troops 1AC (4/8)...............................................................................................................................15 South Korea Troops 1AC (5/8).......................................................................................................................................... 16 South Korea Troops 1AC (5/8)...............................................................................................................................16 South Korea Troops 1AC (6/8).......................................................................................................................................... 17 South Korea Troops 1AC (6/8)...............................................................................................................................17 South Korea Troops 1AC (7/8).......................................................................................................................................... 18 South Korea Troops 1AC (7/8)...............................................................................................................................18 South Korea Troops 1AC (8/8).......................................................................................................................................... 19 South Korea Troops 1AC (8/8)...............................................................................................................................19 Inherency Ext. Kim Jong-Il Madman Justifies U.S. Troops............................................................................................ 20 1 MGW 2010 JHuang BHicks Threat-Con Aff Inherency Ext. Kim Jong-Il Madman Justifies U.S. Troops...........................................................................20 Inherency Ext. Cold War Logic Justifies U.S. Troops..................................................................................................... 21 Inherency Ext. Cold War Logic Justifies U.S. Troops.....................................................................................21 Impact Ext. Creation of Threats...................................................................................................................................... 22 Impact Ext. Creation of Threats..........................................................................................................................22 Solvency Ext. Troops Solve Tension.............................................................................................................................. 23 Solvency Ext. Troops Solve Tension...................................................................................................................23 ****NFU Module****..................................................................................................................................................... 24 ****NFU Module****..............................................................................................................................................24 South Korea NFU 1AC (1/8)............................................................................................................................................. 25 South Korea NFU 1AC (1/8)...................................................................................................................................25 South Korea NFU 1AC (2/8)............................................................................................................................................. 26 South Korea NFU 1AC (2/8)...................................................................................................................................26 South Korea NFU 1AC (3/8)............................................................................................................................................. 27 South Korea NFU 1AC (3/8)...................................................................................................................................27 South Korea NFU 1AC (4/8)............................................................................................................................................. 28 South Korea NFU 1AC (4/8)...................................................................................................................................28 South Korea NFU 1AC (5/8)............................................................................................................................................. 29 South Korea NFU 1AC (5/8)...................................................................................................................................29 South Korea NFU 1AC (6/8)............................................................................................................................................. 30 South Korea NFU 1AC (6/8)...................................................................................................................................30 South Korea NFU 1AC (7/8)............................................................................................................................................. 31 South Korea NFU 1AC (7/8)...................................................................................................................................31 South Korea NFU 1AC (8/8)............................................................................................................................................. 32 South Korea NFU 1AC (8/8)...................................................................................................................................32 ****2AC Extensions****................................................................................................................................................. 33 ****2AC Extensions****.........................................................................................................................................33 Harms Ext. Nuclear Threats Reinforce Nuclear Crisis.................................................................................................... 34 Harms Ext. Nuclear Threats Reinforce Nuclear Crisis...................................................................................34 Solvency Ext. NFU Solves NK Nuclearization............................................................................................................... 35 Solvency Ext. NFU Solves NK Nuclearization...................................................................................................35 Solvency Ext. NFU Solves Cold War Logic................................................................................................................... 36 Solvency Ext. NFU Solves Cold War Logic.......................................................................................................36 Solvency Ext. NFU Solves Relations.............................................................................................................................. 37 Solvency Ext. NFU Solves Relations...................................................................................................................37 2 MGW 2010 JHuang BHicks Threat-Con Aff ****A2 Realism****........................................................................................................................................................ 38 ****A2 Realism****.................................................................................................................................................38 Realism Doesn't Apply to Asia General......................................................................................................................... 39 Realism Doesn't Apply to Asia General.............................................................................................................39 Realism Doesn't Apply to Asia General......................................................................................................................... 40 Realism Doesn't Apply to Asia General.............................................................................................................40 Realism Doesn't Apply to Asia General......................................................................................................................... 41 Realism Doesn't Apply to Asia General.............................................................................................................41 Realism Doesn't Apply to Asia General......................................................................................................................... 42 Realism Doesn't Apply to Asia General.............................................................................................................42 Realism Doesn't Apply to Asia General......................................................................................................................... 43 Realism Doesn't Apply to Asia General.............................................................................................................43 Realism Doesn't Apply to Asia General......................................................................................................................... 44 Realism Doesn't Apply to Asia General.............................................................................................................44 Realism Doesn't Apply to Asia Statistics....................................................................................................................... 45 Realism Doesn't Apply to Asia Statistics............................................................................................................45 Realism Doesn't Apply to Asia Economies.................................................................................................................... 46 Realism Doesn't Apply to Asia Economies........................................................................................................46 Realism Doesn't Apply Mearsheimer Indict................................................................................................................... 47 Realism Doesn't Apply Mearsheimer Indict.....................................................................................................47 A2: Desperation/Madman Theory..................................................................................................................................... 48 A2: Desperation/Madman Theory..........................................................................................................................48 A2: Desperation Theory.................................................................................................................................................... 50 A2: Desperation Theory...........................................................................................................................................50 A2: Desperation Theory.................................................................................................................................................... 51 A2: Desperation Theory...........................................................................................................................................51 A2: China Balancing Theory South Korea...................................................................................................................... 52 A2: China Balancing Theory South Korea........................................................................................................52 A2: China Balancing Theory Vietnam............................................................................................................................ 53 A2: China Balancing Theory Vietnam...............................................................................................................53 A2: China Balancing Theory Southeast Asian States...................................................................................................... 54 A2: China Balancing Theory Southeast Asian States.......................................................................................54 A2: Nuclear Umbrella Checks Balancing.......................................................................................................................... 55 A2: Nuclear Umbrella Checks Balancing..............................................................................................................55 ****A2 Korean War****.................................................................................................................................................. 56 3 MGW 2010 JHuang BHicks Threat-Con Aff ****A2 Korean War****.........................................................................................................................................56 No Risk of Korean War Resources ................................................................................................................................ 57 No Risk of Korean War Resources ....................................................................................................................57 No Risk of Korean War West IR theory false................................................................................................................. 58 No Risk of Korean War West IR theory false...................................................................................................58 No Risk of Korean War Statistics................................................................................................................................... 59 No Risk of Korean War Statistics........................................................................................................................59 No Risk of Korean War Theories False ......................................................................................................................... 60 No Risk of Korean War Theories False .............................................................................................................60 No Risk of Korean War General..................................................................................................................................... 61 No Risk of Korean War General.........................................................................................................................61 4 MGW 2010 JHuang BHicks Threat-Con Aff ****Advantage Modules**** 5 MGW 2010 JHuang BHicks Threat-Con Aff Threat-Con Advantage Troops (1/2) The Cold War mindset was a framework which justified U.S. creation of post war South Korean police state Cumings 2005 (Bruce-, Professor of History University of Chicago, Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History, p. 209) ncp American policy, of course, never set out to create one of the worst police states in Asia. The Korean problem was what we would now call a Third World problem or a North-South problem, a conflict over how best to overcome the debilities of colonial rule and comparative backwardness. In the Cold War milieu of the time, however, it was always seen by Americans as an East-West problem. U.S. falsely asserts that North Korea is a threat, despite North Korea wanting rapprochement It is entrapped on the Cold War mentality. Kang 03 (David C., Sept. 03, Associate professor of government and adjunct associate professor at the Tuck school of Business at Dartmouth college, "International Relations Theory and the Second Korean War", International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 3, Date accessed: 5/18, JH) Most importantly, North Korea has been making overtures to the west for the past decade. Table 2 shows the series of diplomatic initiatives undertaken by the North since 1989. Note that these initiatives began at the end of the Cold War, when North Korea's international situation changed most drastically, and that these initiatives began before the nuclear crisis. Substantial progress was made until 1992 and the nuclear crisis, but with the Agreed Framework of 1994 these initiatives began again. This record shows that North Korea has been actively pursuing some type of rapprochement with the United States and the west for some time, and that it was the United States that was preoccupied with the potential nuclear and missile capabilities of the North. Table 2 is not intended to be a comprehensive chronology of all the mini-crises and issues surrounding U.S.-North Korea relations over the past decade. The table is focused only on showing North Korean diplomatic moves aimed at opening relations with the west. This "tit-for-tat" sequence of moves fell apart in the increasingly tense atmosphere following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. This is important for two reasons. First, North Korea has been the instigator of rapprochement: U.S. engagement has followed, rather than led, North Korea's initiatives (Sigal, 2002). Second, this is evidence that North Korea never fell into the bunker mentality that the desperation theorists rely upon to make their argument. Finally, and perhaps as significant as these large changes in North Korean foreign policy, there are the "quiet changes" that have taken place. International agreements and government negotiations tell one story, but the changing actions of the average North Korean is just as important a story. In 1995 English replaced Russian as the required foreign language in high school (Quinones, 2000). At the Northeast Asian Economic Forum in 1999 that included Russia, China, Mongolia, Japan, and the two Koreas, all representatives spoke in their own language, except the North Koreans who spoke English (Babson, 2000). Interpreters get daily articles from the Wall StreetJ ournal and other western newspapers. UN personnel have now visited almost every county in the North, and Chinese investors have begun to locate in the North. The World Food Program has foreigners living in every North Korean province, a previously unthinkable situation. CNN and BBC are available in Pyongyang. On a recent visit to Pyongyang, Ken Quinones, director of the Mercy Foundation, was asked by North Koreans to bring videos of The Titanic and The Little Mermaid. 6 MGW 2010 JHuang BHicks Threat-Con Aff Threat-Con Advantage Troops (2/2) Demonization and caricaturing of North Korea reflects and reify the marginalization of the Koreas, risking regional war and global holocaust Cumings 2005 (Bruce-, Professor of History University of Chicago, Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History, p. 48788) ncp The point is not that North Korea is a nice place, or that it is beyond suspicion, or that P'yongyang has a better media policy: quite the contrary, its policy for half a century has been to pile lie upon lie, exaggeration upon exaggeration, even when it would be more convenient and helpful to its cause to tell the truth. But that is what we have learned to expect from communist regimes. What is the excuse for a lemming-like, mimetic, and ultimately ignorant media in a raucous democracy like that in the United States, in spite of its many (regrettably post facto) protests about how the Pentagon herded the media like cattle during the Persian Gulf War? It is now commonplace to blame this media accommodation on the celebrity status of anchorpeople and op-ed level reporters and the fleeting sound bites of daily television, leading journalists to seek not just the access they need but power and glory to go with it, and to shrink their prose to acceptable (that is, unacceptable) brevity. But the greatest problem is simply the asymmetry of America and Korea, a general problem of incommensurability namely, that the United States for fifty years has meant everything to Korea, but Koreans mean so little to the United States. The media attention span for Korea is next to nil unless there is a crisis to discuss. Koreans who favor the South may think it is politically useful when North Korea is demonized and caricatured, but they shouldn't take much satisfaction: it is a disturbing fact that mainstream American journalism was no more help in understanding the North Korean nuclear problem than in explicating blackKorean relations during the 1992 Los Angeles riots. Does this not say something quite damning about how many Americans have come to any level of respect for Koreans and their history , fifty years after our daily involvement in Korean affairs began? (Distortions of the nuclear conflict are in fact more understandable, because the nature of the issue required deep knowledge of U.S.-Korean relations, the military balance on the peninsula, nuclear physics, and nuclear-capable weaponry.) Nor can Americans in general rest easy with a gullible and uninformed media: some fine morning they may wake up to find that their sons and daughters are fighting in Korea again, with no idea how the war might have started or what its real causes might have been; the Pentagon war machine would again deploy its democracy-blotting media regime ("Pentavision"), and this time no one will be sure that the war might not escalate to a regional if not a global holocaust. The plan is key Troop withdrawal necessary for South Korea to transcend U.S. Cold War driven imperialism Without withdrawal, Koreans not only lack agency, but are exposed to dangerous miscalculations and denied necessary security stability in Northeast Asia Cumings 2005 (Bruce-, Professor of History University of Chicago, Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History, p. 47071) ncp The Cold War was more frigid here than anywhere else in the world and has not ended: the peninsula is a museum of that world-ranging conflict. Added to that anachronism is a Second World War deep freeze: the Northeast Asian region remains locked in a 1940s settlement that easily outlived the end of the American-Soviet rivalry and is best evidenced by the 100,000 troops that continue to occupy Japan and South Korea. For these internal and external reasons, Korea cannot establish its own definitions of reality (and thus risks being misunderstood and misconstrued in the West, particularly in the United States), and the denouement to Korea's fractured history and its ultimate place in the world remain unresolved. 7 MGW 2010 JHuang BHicks Threat-Con Aff Threat-Con Advantage NFU (1/3) Longtime U.S. nuclear threats made North Korean nuclear proliferation inevitable Cumings 2005 (Bruce-, Professor of History University of Chicago, Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History, p. 47071) ncp If we assume that P'yongyang's real goal was to build weapons, it had solid justification for going nuclear: after all, it could easily have made the classic argument that it is merely engaged in deterrence that once both sides have nuclear weapons, the resulting Mexican standoff negates the possibility of use, and that a DPRK weapon returns the peninsula to the status quo ante 1991. Nearly all the American press commentary ignored this simple fact: the DPRK was the target of periodic nuclear threats and extended nuclear deterrence on the part of the United States for decades, yet until now it has possessed no such weapons itself . The US perceives North Korea as a rogue nation in an attempt to remain in Cold War logic. Bleiker, Ph.D. in international relations from the Australian National University, Jul 2003 (Roland, "A rogue is a rogue is a rogue: US foreign policy and the Korean nuclear crisis", International Affairs, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3569570 DA: 18/05/2010 pg. 14 jb, sob) Rogue states were among the new threat images that rose to prominence when Cold War ideological schism gave way to a more blurred picture of global politics.53 And North Korea became the rogue par excellence: the totalitarian state that disregards human rights and aspires to possess weapons of mass destruction ; the one that lies outside the sphere of good and is to be watched, contained and controlled. But there is far more to this practice of 'othering' than meets the eye. Robert Dujarric hits the nail on the head when identifying why some of the key rogue states, such as North Korea, Iraq, Iran or Libya, are constituted as 'rogue' by the US. It cannot be their authoritarian nature and their human rights violations alone, for many other states, including Saudi Arabia and Egypt, have an equally appalling record . Nor can it be that they possess or aspire to possess weapons of mass destruction. Otherwise states like India, Pakistan or Israel would be constituted as rogues too. Dujarric stresses that rogue states above all share one common characteristic: 'they are small or medium nations that have achieved some success in thwarting American policy.'54 The tendency to demonize rogue states considerably intensified following the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington of i I September 2001. For some policy-makers and political commentators, the American reaction to these events signified a fundamentally new approach to foreign policy. US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld heralds the arrival of 'new ways of thinking and new ways of fighting' .55 Stephen Walt, likewise, speaks of' he most rapid and dramatic change in the history of US foreign policy'.56 Significant changes did, indeed, take place. The inclusion of a preventive first-strike option, for instance, is a radical departure from previous approaches, which revolved around a more defense-oriented military policy. But at a more fundamental, conceptual level, there is far more continuity than change in the US position. Indeed, one can clearly detect a strong desire to return to the reassuring familiarity of dualistic and militaristic thinking patterns that dominated foreign policy during the Cold War. The new US foreign policy re-established the sense of order and certitude that had existed during the Cold War: an inside/outside world in which, according to the words of President George W. Bush, 'you are either with us or against us.'57 8 MGW 2010 JHuang BHicks Threat-Con Aff Threat-Con Advantage NFU (2/3) Demonization and caricaturing of North Korea reflects and reify the marginalization of the Koreas, risking regional war and global holocaust Cumings 2005 (Bruce-, Professor of History University of Chicago, Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History, p. 48788) ncp The point is not that North Korea is a nice place, or that it is beyond suspicion, or that P'yongyang has a better media policy: quite the contrary, its policy for half a century has been to pile lie upon lie, exaggeration upon exaggeration, even when it would be more convenient and helpful to its cause to tell the truth. But that is what we have learned to expect from communist regimes. What is the excuse for a lemming-like, mimetic, and ultimately ignorant media in a raucous democracy like that in the United States, in spite of its many (regrettably post facto) protests about how the Pentagon herded the media like cattle during the Persian Gulf War? It is now commonplace to blame this media accommodation on the celebrity status of anchorpeople and op-ed level reporters and the fleeting sound bites of daily television, leading journalists to seek not just the access they need but power and glory to go with it, and to shrink their prose to acceptable (that is, unacceptable) brevity. But the greatest problem is simply the asymmetry of America and Korea, a general problem of incommensurability namely, that the United States for fifty years has meant everything to Korea, but Koreans mean so little to the United States. The media attention span for Korea is next to nil unless there is a crisis to discuss. Koreans who favor the South may think it is politically useful when North Korea is demonized and caricatured, but they shouldn't take much satisfaction: it is a disturbing fact that mainstream American journalism was no more help in understanding the North Korean nuclear problem than in explicating blackKorean relations during the 1992 Los Angeles riots. Does this not say something quite damning about how many Americans have come to any level of respect for Koreans and their history , fifty years after our daily involvement in Korean affairs began? (Distortions of the nuclear conflict are in fact more understandable, because the nature of the issue required deep knowledge of U.S.-Korean relations, the military balance on the peninsula, nuclear physics, and nuclear-capable weaponry.) Nor can Americans in general rest easy with a gullible and uninformed media: some fine morning they may wake up to find that their sons and daughters are fighting in Korea again, with no idea how the war might have started or what its real causes might have been; the Pentagon war machine would again deploy its democracy-blotting media regime ("Pentavision"), and this time no one will be sure that the war might not escalate to a regional if not a global holocaust. Painting North Korea as an evil "rogue state" reinforces the nuclear crisis. Bleiker, Professor of International Relations at the University of Queensland, 2003 (Roland Bleiker, "A Rogue is a Rogue is a Rogue: US foreign policy and the Korean nuclear crisis" Accessed on JSTOR, pg. 13 jb, sob) Despite numerous and obvious signs, and despite detailed and insightful studies of North Korea's previous negotiation behaviour, in 2003 US decision-makers repeated exactly the same mistakes made during the first crisis: they believed that by demonizing North Korea as an evil rogue state they could force Pyongyang into concessions. Whether this policy resulted from ignorance or specific design remains open to debate. The bottom line is that the US position was firm: 'America and the world will not be blackmailed,' stressed President Bush in his 2003 State of the Union Address.5? The result was predictable: Pyongyang became more recalcitrant. A new nuclear crisis started to take hold of the Korean peninsula. 9 MGW 2010 JHuang BHicks Threat-Con Aff Threat-Con Advantage NFU (3/3) No first use policy solves It decreases North Korea's motivations to develop their nuclear program and increases relations. Cicconi, 10. (Martine Cicconi, Expected J.D. 2010, Stanford Law School, Last CHANGED: 03/11/10, "Nuclear Restraint Revisited: An Analysis of the Arguments For and Against No First Use Policies in the Late Cold War and Today," http://www.cdi.org/laws/nuclear_restraint_revisited.html, Lawyers Alliance for World Security [non-partisan, non-governmental organization advocating policies designed to reduce the dangers posed by nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction], Date Accessed: 06/27/10, CC) By pledging not to use nuclear weapons even in response to a chemical or biological attack, the United States.S. would also disincentivize development of WMDs. For states like Iran, Syria and North Korea, fear of U.S. aggression suggests that development of chemical, biological and even nuclear weapons is prudent. [80] Eliminating of the possibility of a nuclear attack would go far towards relieving the urgent need to build a WMD arsenal. Of course, the underlying security concerns of these states would have to be addressed. For example, in order to fully alleviate North Korea's fears, the U.S. would have to ensure the nation that it would not seek regime change, or even urge South Korea to invade. But a promise not to attack North Korea with nuclear weapons would improve the bilateral relationship, paving the way for credible commitments that could enhance the security of both nations. 10 MGW 2010 JHuang BHicks Threat-Con Aff ****Troops Module**** 11 MGW 2010 JHuang BHicks Threat-Con Aff South Korea Troops 1AC (1/8) Contention 1: Inherency The Cold War mindset was a framework which justified U.S. creation of post war South Korean police state Cumings 2005 (Bruce-, Professor of History University of Chicago, Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History, p. 209) ncp American policy, of course, never set out to create one of the worst police states in Asia. The Korean problem was what we would now call a Third World problem or a North-South problem, a conflict over how best to overcome the debilities of colonial rule and comparative backwardness. In the Cold War milieu of the time, however, it was always seen by Americans as an East-West problem. There is still a state of war 28,500 troops prove. Lasseter 10 (Tom, 6/21, Staffwriter, "Sixty years after war broke out, Korean peninsula still in limbo, accessed 6/21, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/06/21/96276/sixty-years-after-war-broke-out.html, JH) The conflict that began in 1950 with the North invading the South, and soon included the Cold War militaries of the U.S. and China pushing battle lines back and forth, ended in 1953 not far from where it had begun, with millions dead or wounded and no real resolution. Because a formal peace treaty was never signed, the war has never officially ended, and some 28,500 U.S. troops are still stationed in South Korea. There's little to suggest that the standoff will end soon. The regime of "Dear Leader" Kim Jong-il, who favors a bouffant hairdo and is considered mentally unstable by many, has made it clear that it won't surrender its power for any reason. For its part, the South enjoys a level of prosperity that could be shaken by a reunification that almost certainly would send hordes of Northerners over its borders. 12 MGW 2010 JHuang BHicks Threat-Con Aff South Korea Troops 1AC (2/8) Contention 2: Threat Construction U.S. falsely asserts that North Korea is a threat, despite North Korea wanting rapprochement It is entrapped on the Cold War mentality. Kang 03 (David C., Sept. 03, Associate professor of government and adjunct associate professor at the Tuck school of Business at Dartmouth college, "International Relations Theory and the Second Korean War", International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 3, Date accessed: 5/18, JH) Most importantly, North Korea has been making overtures to the west for the past decade. Table 2 shows the series of diplomatic initiatives undertaken by the North since 1989. Note that these initiatives began at the end of the Cold War, when North Korea's international situation changed most drastically, and that these initiatives began before the nuclear crisis. Substantial progress was made until 1992 and the nuclear crisis, but with the Agreed Framework of 1994 these initiatives began again. This record shows that North Korea has been actively pursuing some type of rapprochement with the United States and the west for some time, and that it was the United States that was preoccupied with the potential nuclear and missile capabilities of the North. Table 2 is not intended to be a comprehensive chronology of all the mini-crises and issues surrounding U.S.-North Korea relations over the past decade. The table is focused only on showing North Korean diplomatic moves aimed at opening relations with the west. This "tit-for-tat" sequence of moves fell apart in the increasingly tense atmosphere following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. This is important for two reasons. First, North Korea has been the instigator of rapprochement: U.S. engagement has followed, rather than led, North Korea's initiatives (Sigal, 2002). Second, this is evidence that North Korea never fell into the bunker mentality that the desperation theorists rely upon to make their argument. Finally, and perhaps as significant as these large changes in North Korean foreign policy, there are the "quiet changes" that have taken place. International agreements and government negotiations tell one story, but the changing actions of the average North Korean is just as important a story. In 1995 English replaced Russian as the required foreign language in high school (Quinones, 2000). At the Northeast Asian Economic Forum in 1999 that included Russia, China, Mongolia, Japan, and the two Koreas, all representatives spoke in their own language, except the North Koreans who spoke English (Babson, 2000). Interpreters get daily articles from the Wall StreetJ ournal and other western newspapers. UN personnel have now visited almost every county in the North, and Chinese investors have begun to locate in the North. The World Food Program has foreigners living in every North Korean province, a previously unthinkable situation. CNN and BBC are available in Pyongyang. On a recent visit to Pyongyang, Ken Quinones, director of the Mercy Foundation, was asked by North Koreans to bring videos of The Titanic and The Little Mermaid. 13 MGW 2010 JHuang BHicks Threat-Con Aff South Korea Troops 1AC (3/8) These assertions are predicated off of assumptions Authors create a caricature of the real Kim JongIl because no grounded evidence is available. Kang 03 (David C., Sept. 03, Associate professor of government and adjunct associate professor at the Tuck school of Business at Dartmouth college, "International Relations Theory and the Second Korean War", International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 3, Date accessed: 5/18, JH) If North Korea was so weak, why did so many scholars apply preventive war and power transition theories to the peninsula? The answer is that scholars smuggled a number of ancillary or ad hoc assumptions into the theory . Because the scholarly literature has paid such scant attention to understanding the theoretical under-pinnings of dissatisfied or revisionist states, this leaves ample room for poorly defined assumptions to be inserted into the argument. Evaluations of national capabilities and alliances are comfortably third-image and realist in nature, whereas evaluations of "satisfaction" and leadership rapidly probe into domestic politics and even the psychology of individual leaders. Often this link is not directly stated, which both allows the scholar to make the case without clearly delineating the causal linkage and the evidence, and also plays on a generalized "assumption of guilt" that surrounds countries such as North Korea . When we don't know much about a country it is easy to assume the worst. In the case of North Korea, these tended to be behavioral assumptions about the psychology of the North Korean leadership, and ranged from assuming that North Korean leaders had an intense preference for unifying the peninsula to assuming that Kim Il-Sung (and later, Kim Jong-il) was "impulsive and eccentric" (Thornhill and Ward, 2002). North Korea has been described as a nation of "paranoid survivalists " (Olsen, 1986:851) and "a renegade state" (Spector and Smith, 1991:8). Typical of this approach is a statement by John Perry (1990:188): Rhetorical style and financial irresponsibility pale beside the impact on international public opinion of the inexplicable spasms of violence perpetuated by North Korea. Much can be said against the erratic ferocity of such behavior. In 1992, James Pierce of the American embassy in Seoul said (1992) "Why would North Korea attack? Because Kim Il-Sung is not rational." The strong version of these psychological assumptions asserts that Kim Il-Sung and Kim Jong-il were truly irrational or paranoid. The weaker version of this argument emphasizes that leaders of authoritarian and secretive regimes may have different preferences or pressures from those of more widely understood countries. In both cases, however, if independent variables such as leadership truly matter, then scholars must incorporate them explicitly and consistently into their theories. In arguing that North Korea was unpredictable or irrational, scholars relied on these assump-tionsoften without evidence--to do the bulk of the analytic lifting. Yet even a cursory glance shows how untenable these assumptions are (Roy, 1994; Smith, 2000). 14 MGW 2010 JHuang BHicks Threat-Con Aff South Korea Troops 1AC (4/8) The US's rhetoric describing North Korea as "evil" makes negotiation impossible Bleiker, Ph.D. in international relations from the Australian National University, Jul 2003 (Roland, "A rogue is a rogue is a rogue: US foreign policy and the Korean nuclear crisis", International Affairs, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3569570 DA: 18/05/2010 pg.15 jb, sob) Once again, the world is divided into 'good' and 'evil'; once again, military means occupy a key, if not the only, role in protecting the former against the latter. 'The opposition between good and evil is not negotiable,' Allan Bloom noted at the time of Ronald Reagan's presidency. It is a question of principles, and thus 'a cause of war'.58 Expressed in other words, the rhetoric of evil moves the concept of rogue states into the realm of irrationality. 'Evil' is in essence a term of condemnation for a phenomenon that can neither be fully comprehended nor addressed other than through militaristic forms of dissuasion and retaliation. This is why various commentators believe that the rhetoric of evil is an 'analytical cul de sac' that prevents, rather than encourages, understanding. Some go as far as arguing that a rhetoric of evil entails an 'evasion of account-ability', for the normative connotations of the term inevitably lead to policy positions that 'deny negotiations and compromise'.59 How is it, indeed, possible to negotiate with evil without being implicated in it? The contradictions between the rhetoric of evil and the requirements for dialogue have become particularly evident during the most recent nuclear crisis in Korea. All top US officials publicly stressed one common theme: that 'there is no reason why discussion about confidence-building measures cannot take place with Pyongyang.'6? At the very same time, though, the projection of threats towards North Korea was carefully maintained, even intensified. 'All options are on the table,' including military action, stressed President Bush.6' Powell, likewise, under-lined that 'no military option's been taken off the table.'62 The assumption behind this approach is that including North Korea in an 'axis of evil' does not necessarily preclude the possibility of engaging it in dialogue. Indeed, the assumption is that threats will induce dialogue. William Safire expresses this strategy in blunt but entirely appropriate words: 'We make clear to weapons traders in the North that their illicit nuclear production is vulnerable to air attack from a nation soon to show its disarmament bona fides in Baghdad ... That readiness will bring about what diplomats call "fruitful, regional, multilateral negotiation".'63 15 MGW 2010 JHuang BHicks Threat-Con Aff South Korea Troops 1AC (5/8) Demonization and caricaturing of North Korea reflects and reify the marginalization of the Koreas, risking regional war and global holocaust Cumings 2005 (Bruce-, Professor of History University of Chicago, Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History, p. 48788) ncp The point is not that North Korea is a nice place, or that it is beyond suspicion, or that P'yongyang has a better media policy: quite the contrary, its policy for half a century has been to pile lie upon lie, exaggeration upon exaggeration, even when it would be more convenient and helpful to its cause to tell the truth. But that is what we have learned to expect from communist regimes. What is the excuse for a lemming-like, mimetic, and ultimately ignorant media in a raucous democracy like that in the United States, in spite of its many (regrettably post facto) protests about how the Pentagon herded the media like cattle during the Persian Gulf War? It is now commonplace to blame this media accommodation on the celebrity status of anchorpeople and op-ed level reporters and the fleeting sound bites of daily television, leading journalists to seek not just the access they need but power and glory to go with it, and to shrink their prose to acceptable (that is, unacceptable) brevity. But the greatest problem is simply the asymmetry of America and Korea, a general problem of incommensurability namely, that the United States for fifty years has meant everything to Korea, but Koreans mean so little to the United States. The media attention span for Korea is next to nil unless there is a crisis to discuss. Koreans who favor the South may think it is politically useful when North Korea is demonized and caricatured, but they shouldn't take much satisfaction: it is a disturbing fact that mainstream American journalism was no more help in understanding the North Korean nuclear problem than in explicating blackKorean relations during the 1992 Los Angeles riots. Does this not say something quite damning about how many Americans have come to any level of respect for Koreans and their history , fifty years after our daily involvement in Korean affairs began? (Distortions of the nuclear conflict are in fact more understandable, because the nature of the issue required deep knowledge of U.S.-Korean relations, the military balance on the peninsula, nuclear physics, and nuclear-capable weaponry.) Nor can Americans in general rest easy with a gullible and uninformed media: some fine morning they may wake up to find that their sons and daughters are fighting in Korea again, with no idea how the war might have started or what its real causes might have been; the Pentagon war machine would again deploy its democracy-blotting media regime ("Pentavision"), and this time no one will be sure that the war might not escalate to a regional if not a global holocaust. 16 MGW 2010 JHuang BHicks Threat-Con Aff South Korea Troops 1AC (6/8) Text: The United States federal government should withdraw all troops stationed in the Republic of Korea. 17 MGW 2010 JHuang BHicks Threat-Con Aff South Korea Troops 1AC (7/8) Contention 3: Solvency The plan is key Troop withdrawal necessary for South Korea to transcend U.S. Cold War driven imperialism Without withdrawal, Koreans not only lack agency, but are exposed to dangerous miscalculations and denied necessary security stability in Northeast Asia Cumings 2005 (Bruce-, Professor of History University of Chicago, Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History, p. 47071) ncp The Cold War was more frigid here than anywhere else in the world and has not ended: the peninsula is a museum of that world-ranging conflict. Added to that anachronism is a Second World War deep freeze: the Northeast Asian region remains locked in a 1940s settlement that easily outlived the end of the American-Soviet rivalry and is best evidenced by the 100,000 troops that continue to occupy Japan and South Korea. For these internal and external reasons, Korea cannot establish its own definitions of reality (and thus risks being misunderstood and misconstrued in the West, particularly in the United States), and the denouement to Korea's fractured history and its ultimate place in the world remain unresolved. Realism can't predict North Korea Empirical failure Kang professor at the Tuck school of Business at Dartmouth college 03 (David C., Sept. 03, Associate professor of government and adjunct associate professor at the Tuck school of Business at Dartmouth college, "International Relations Theory and the Second Korean War", International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 3, Date accessed: 5/18, JH & BH) Additionally, the Korean case highlights the difficulty realism has in dealing with actions short of war. Our theories of conflict are notoriously underspecified, and if war does not break out, realist theories have little to say about serious tensions that are potentially hostile and harmful. North Korea was far more hostile during the late 1960s than at present, but stopped well short of war. The past decade has also seen North Korea making unprecedented efforts to engage the west, most likely in hopes of improving its security in an altered geopolitical environment. Realist theories-with their emphasis on military force as the principal source of security and insecurity--provide little guidance for interpreting either of these strategies. If North Korea was so weak, why did so many people apply preventive war and power transition hypotheses to the peninsula? Here the North Korean case illustrates some general problems with any non-post facto application of these theories. Since North Korea was not powerful, scholars hypothesized extreme preferences to North Korean leaders. These ancillary and ad hoc hypotheses about preferences have been smuggled into the theory to make it fit the Korean case: from psychological assumptions about an irrational North Korean leadership to assumptions of an extremely strong preference for expansion or invasion . Preventive war and power transition theories focus on the material conditions of relative power, but the real analytic lifting has been done by behavioral assumptions about intent. As I will show, none of these assumptions is tenable. 18 MGW 2010 JHuang BHicks Threat-Con Aff South Korea Troops 1AC (8/8) The plan is key a complete withdrawal is the only way to ease tensions in the Korean peninsula. Scofield 04 (David, Staffwriter for the Asia Times, Feb 28, "Korean Peace requires US compromise, troop exit", http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/FB28Dg06.html, Date accessed: 6/28, JH) A new deal today would be tough, but it could be the only way. It would involve more rewards for continued bad behavior something the US says it will never grant - and aid for the North "re-freezing" what was supposed to have remained frozen through the last agreement. But with one crucial addition: the complete removal of US force presence on the peninsula - the United States maintains an estimated 37,000 troops in South Korea. That would be coupled with North Korea's acknowledgment of South Korea as a sovereign state - the North still does not recognize the national sovereignty of its brothers in the South. And there would be the signing of a peace treaty ending the 50-year-old ceasefire that has defined the peninsula since 1953. North Korea has argued for 50 years that peace is impossible as long as US troops remain in South Korea. But the US raison d'etre for staying - the protection of South Korea from the bellicose North - has become strikingly out of sync with contemporary South Korean perceptions of the region. And so the time is right to allow the Koreans to work out their own issues and for the region itself to take the lead in drafting conflict-resolution formulas. After all, a majority of South Koreans now view US President George W Bush as a greater threat to peninsular security than Kim Jong-il. It's time for the US to shift gears and focus on extricating itself from what has become its Korean quagmire. 19 MGW 2010 JHuang BHicks Threat-Con Aff Inherency Ext. Kim Jong-Il Madman Justifies U.S. Troops Kim Jong-Il is constructed as a madman to justify our continual deployments of troops stationed in South Korea. Cheng 1997 (Eva, May 7, 1997, Writer for the Green Left Weekly, "North Korea `demon' used by US war machine", http://www.greenleft.org.au/node/14892, Date accessed: 6/23, JH) Around the same time, James Woolsey, then director of the CIA, warned in a Senate hearing that the US must not reduce its war machine because the "jungle" was still filled with "poisonous snakes". He stressed North Korea was a key example. Powell's frank comment was an exception in Washington's propaganda campaign, which has demonised North Korea for over four decades. Also closer to the truth was the comment by the Center for Defense Information in the same issue of Defense Monitor: "The Pentagon uses Kim as the bogeyman to justify preserving the excessively large military forces of the Cold War and keeping 35,000 U.S. troops in South Korea". Later, the Congress approved US$260 billion for the US war budget for 1995, even higher than the Cold War average of about US$250 billion. To pay for the military increases, Clinton slashed US$10 billion from education, housing and environmental protection. The Howard government's plan to increase the Australian Defence Force's funding by $1 billion reveals a similar priority. Minister for defence Ian McLachlan said on April 27 that the new funding would enable the military to respond to "unexpected" challenges "anywhere in the world". That is, it can poke its nose into other countries' affairs, following the lead and within the "security" umbrella of the US. McLachlan stressed the danger that North Korea might start a war in the Korean peninsula , hinting that Australia might intervene. The threat of an aggressive North Korea is the central theme of the US propaganda campaign. Soviet occupation of the northern part of Korea in 1945 (by agreement with the US, to disarm Japanese troops) was portrayed as "aggression". Meanwhile, the US occupied the south, crushing a popularly elected government. Washington split Korea in 1948 by naked force, and the war of 1950-53 cemented the division at the cost of millions of Korean lives. Washington accused the north of starting the war, but both sides were in active war preparation. US bombing devastated the north, destroying not only its relatively stronger industrial base but also its meagre agricultural infrastructure. In the first three months alone, the US forces dropped 29.5 million litres of napalm, primarily in the north. Deliberate bombing of the dikes which provided water for 75% of North Korea's rice production and the resulting widespread flooding undermined the north's ability to meet its food needs. The north's harsh weather and mountainous terrain make food production difficult. It was no accident that Japan concentrated food production in the south during its 35-year rule over Korea. 20 MGW 2010 JHuang BHicks Threat-Con Aff Inherency Ext. Cold War Logic Justifies U.S. Troops The US searches for threats in an attempt to remain in Cold War logic. Bleiker, Ph.D. in international relations from the Australian National University, Jul 2003 (Roland, "A rogue is a rogue is a rogue: US foreign policy and the Korean nuclear crisis", International Affairs, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3569570 DA: 18/05/2010 pg. 14 jb, sob) Rogue states were among the new threat images that rose to prominence when Cold War ideological schism gave way to a more blurred picture of global politics.53 And North Korea became the rogue par excellence: the totalitarian state that disregards human rights and aspires to possess weapons of mass destruction ; the one that lies outside the sphere of good and is to be watched, contained and controlled. But there is far more to this practice of 'othering' than meets the eye. Robert Dujarric hits the nail on the head when identifying why some of the key rogue states, such as North Korea, Iraq, Iran or Libya, are constituted as 'rogue' by the US. It cannot be their authoritarian nature and their human rights violations alone, for many other states, including Saudi Arabia and Egypt, have an equally appalling record . Nor can it be that they possess or aspire to possess weapons of mass destruction. Otherwise states like India, Pakistan or Israel would be constituted as rogues too. Dujarric stresses that rogue states above all share one common characteristic: 'they are small or medium nations that have achieved some success in thwarting American policy.'54 The tendency to demonize rogue states considerably intensified following the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington of i I September 2001. For some policy-makers and political commentators, the American reaction to these events signified a fundamentally new approach to foreign policy. US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld heralds the arrival of 'new ways of thinking and new ways of fighting' .55 Stephen Walt, likewise, speaks of' he most rapid and dramatic change in the history of US foreign policy'.56 Significant changes did, indeed, take place. The inclusion of a preventive first-strike option, for instance, is a radical departure from previous approaches, which revolved around a more defense-oriented military policy. But at a more fundamental, conceptual level, there is far more continuity than change in the US position. Indeed, one can clearly detect a strong desire to return to the reassuring familiarity of dualistic and militaristic thinking patterns that dominated foreign policy during the Cold War. The new US foreign policy re-established the sense of order and certitude that had existed during the Cold War: an inside/outside world in which, according to the words of President George W. Bush, 'you are either with us or against us.'57 21 MGW 2010 JHuang BHicks Threat-Con Aff Impact Ext. Creation of Threats The "madman" approach justifies the creation of threats This means Korean violence can be created at the level of the state. Kang 03 (David C., Sept. 03, Associate professor of government and adjunct associate professor at the Tuck school of Business at Dartmouth college, "International Relations Theory and the Second Korean War", International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 3, Date accessed: 5/18, JH) If the strong version of irrationality is fairly easy to dismiss, the weaker version is just as problematic. A looser dependent variable would incorporate actions short of war. However, even if we grant that the two Kims' attitudes were important, the question becomes how much of their value systems and attitudes explain North Korean behavior ? This question rests on a counterfactual: if their attitudes and rationality have been important in explaining North Korean foreign policy, we should be able to believe that a different North Korean leader would have produced a different set of outcomes. What a focus on personality ignores, of course, is that we cannot infer actions from attributes if the situation also matters . As Waltz (1979:61) writes, 'Just as peacemakers may fail to make peace, so troublemakers may fail to make trouble. From attributes one cannot predict outcomes if outcomes depend on the situations of the actors as well as on their attributes. " Discussions of irrationality do not get us very far. First, if a ruler truly is irrational or paranoid, it is impossible to make any causal link between that psychological state and expected outcomes. Second, such an approach is unfalsifiable and allows the scholar to post-dictively prove any argument that he makes. By resorting to an irrational demagogue as an explanatory variable, analysts appeal to a deus ex machina by which any North Korean action can be post-dictively explained, and by which any possible North Korean action can be possible. Additionally, both Kim Il-Sung and Kim Jong-I1 have been very capable leaders. All the evidence points to their ability to make sophisticated decisions and to manage palace, domestic, and international politics with extreme precision. Kim Jong-I1 has kept power for seven years despite the widespread belief that he could not survive. There was speculation that a coup or instability could follow after his father's death in 1994, but that has not occurred (H. Ahn, 1994; Suh and Kim, 1994; Kim, 1995; Vantage Point, 1996). There has been no palace coup, no military coup, no extensive social unrest, no obvious chaos in the military, and no wholesale purge of various officials. Indeed, the transition from father to son was remarkably smooth. Kim Jong-il has remained in power through famine, flood, economic crisis, nuclear crisis, the loss of two major patrons in Russia and China, and U.S. pressure (VantageP oint, 1996; Oberdorfer, 1998). Military officials have become present at all levels of the government, but they have not vetoed the economic and diplomatic efforts made by the Pyongyang regime (S. Kim, 2000:152-54). Either Kim Jong-il is an extremely adroit leader, or the social and political fabric of North Korea is more resilient than we might think, or both. 22 MGW 2010 JHuang BHicks Threat-Con Aff Solvency Ext. Troops Solve Tension A decrease in US presence would directly increase North Korean relations Shinn, Analyst in Asian Affairs, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division 1993 (Rinn-Sup; North Korea: Policy Determinants, Alternative Outcomes, U.S. Policy Approaches (Rep. 93-612 F) Congressional Research Service, Report for Congress June 24 http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/93-612f.htm) The future of Pyongyang's relationship with Washington depends on the outcome of several unresolved issues . The most pressing now concerns Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program, the existence of which it denies while refusing to establish the veracity of its own claim by allowing IAEA inspections. Pyongyang argues that the nuclear issue can be resolved only through direct meetings between the DPRK and the United States. The U.S. position is that Pyongyang must comply with the IAEA special inspection because of the obligations it assumed under the nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT). A second issue involves the U.S. military presence in the South. The communist North wants U.S. troops out of the South, its argument being that the cold war is over and that the U.S. military presence is the primary source of threat to the North . However, given the triangular nature of ties among Washington, Seoul, and Pyongyang, the North's policy toward Washington is bound to affect its policy toward Seoul. This means that unless Pyongyang's resolve to coexist with Seoul becomes credible, its demand for U.S. withdrawal could be misconstrued in Seoul as a continuing attempt to undermine South Korea. In the short run, it can be argued that the U.S. presence can be in Pyongyang's own interest as the presence could become a potentially stabilizing force as the two Koreas strive for mutual reconciliation. 23 MGW 2010 JHuang BHicks Threat-Con Aff ****NFU Module**** 24 MGW 2010 JHuang BHicks Threat-Con Aff South Korea NFU 1AC (1/8) Contention 1: Inherency NFU policy not adopted currently. Global Security Newswire, 3/1. (March 1, 2010, organization staffed by a group of experts on international affairs, nonproliferation, security and military issues, public health, medicine and communications who have operational and international experience in their fields, "U.S. Seen Ruling Out "No First Use" Nuke Policy," http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20100301_8911.php, Date Accessed: 06/26/10, CC FS) The Obama administration has ruled out pledging in a forthcoming U.S. nuclear strategy review that the U nited States will never initiate a nuclear first strike against another power, the New York Times reported yesterday (see GSN, Feb. 17). (Mar. 1) - U.S. B-61 nuclear bombs. The Obama administration has reportedly dismissed calls to adopt a nuclear "no first use" policy in a pending U.S. nuclear strategy review (U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration photo). U.S. President Barack Obama was set to hear alternatives from Defense Secretary Robert Gates today for addressing remaining concerns over the Nuclear Posture Review, officials told the Times. The issues to be discussed included the possibility of redefining the purpose of the U.S. strategic arsenal by specifying situations in which the country might use its nuclear weapons. Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) and other ranking Democrats have called on the president to state in the review that the "sole purpose" of the nation's nuclear weapons is to prevent a nuclear strike. Defense Department officials and a large contingent of White House staffers, though, have sought language specifying deterrence of nuclear strikes more generally as the leading reason for the arsenal (Sanger/Shanker, New York Times, Feb. 28). Obama has reportedly hoped to rule out the initial use of nuclear weapons as well as the employment of nuclear weapons against nations that possess only conventional arsenals , according to theAtlantic magazine. U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden has opposed Gates' stance on making little change to the existing policy, while the State Department's position is "somewhere in-between," Foreign Policy reported. The remaining disputes are expected are to prevent the release of the Nuclear Posture Review until late this month, the Atlanticreported. "There are intense internal divisions over the core thrust of the NPR," said one administration official. 25 MGW 2010 JHuang BHicks Threat-Con Aff South Korea NFU 1AC (2/8) Contention 2: Threat Construction Longtime U.S. nuclear threats made North Korean nuclear proliferation inevitable Cumings 2005 (Bruce-, Professor of History University of Chicago, Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History, p. 47071) ncp If we assume that P'yongyang's real goal was to build weapons, it had solid justification for going nuclear: after all, it could easily have made the classic argument that it is merely engaged in deterrence that once both sides have nuclear weapons, the resulting Mexican standoff negates the possibility of use, and that a DPRK weapon returns the peninsula to the status quo ante 1991. Nearly all the American press commentary ignored this simple fact: the DPRK was the target of periodic nuclear threats and extended nuclear deterrence on the part of the United States for decades, yet until now it has possessed no such weapons itself . Despite North Korea wanting rapprochement, the US is preoccupied with the North's nuclear capabilities. Kang 03 (David C., Sept. 03, Associate professor of government and adjunct associate professor at the Tuck school of Business at Dartmouth college, "International Relations Theory and the Second Korean War", International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 3, Date accessed: 5/18, JH) Most importantly, North Korea has been making overtures to the west for the past decade. Table 2 shows the series of diplomatic initiatives undertaken by the North since 1989. Note that these initiatives began at the end of the Cold War, when North Korea's international situation changed most drastically, and that these initiatives began before the nuclear crisis. Substantial progress was made until 1992 and the nuclear crisis, but with the Agreed Framework of 1994 these initiatives began again. This record shows that North Korea has been actively pursuing some type of rapprochement with the United States and the west for some time, and that it was the United States that was preoccupied with the potential nuclear and missile capabilities of the North. Table 2 is not intended to be a comprehensive chronology of all the mini-crises and issues surrounding U.S.-North Korea relations over the past decade. The table is focused only on showing North Korean diplomatic moves aimed at opening relations with the west. This "tit-for-tat" sequence of moves fell apart in the increasingly tense atmosphere following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. This is important for two reasons. First, North Korea has been the instigator of rapprochement: U.S. engagement has followed, rather than led, North Korea's initiatives (Sigal, 2002). Second, this is evidence that North Korea never fell into the bunker mentality that the desperation theorists rely upon to make their argument. Finally, and perhaps as significant as these large changes in North Korean foreign policy, there are the "quiet changes" that have taken place. International agreements and government negotiations tell one story, but the changing actions of the average North Korean is just as important a story. In 1995 English replaced Russian as the required foreign language in high school (Quinones, 2000). At the Northeast Asian Economic Forum in 1999 that included Russia, China, Mongolia, Japan, and the two Koreas, all representatives spoke in their own language, except the North Koreans who spoke English (Babson, 2000). Interpreters get daily articles from the Wall StreetJ ournal and other western newspapers. UN personnel have now visited almost every county in the North, and Chinese investors have begun to locate in the North. The World Food Program has foreigners living in every North Korean province, a previously unthinkable situation. CNN and BBC are available in Pyongyang. On a recent visit to Pyongyang, Ken Quinones, director of the Mercy Foundation, was asked by North Koreans to bring videos of The Titanic and The Little Mermaid. 26 MGW 2010 JHuang BHicks Threat-Con Aff South Korea NFU 1AC (3/8) The US perceives North Korea as a threat in an attempt to remain in Cold War logic. Bleiker, Ph.D. in international relations from the Australian National University, Jul 2003 (Roland, "A rogue is a rogue is a rogue: US foreign policy and the Korean nuclear crisis", International Affairs, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3569570 DA: 18/05/2010 pg. 14 jb, sob) Rogue states were among the new threat images that rose to prominence when Cold War ideological schism gave way to a more blurred picture of global politics.53 And North Korea became the rogue par excellence: the totalitarian state that disregards human rights and aspires to possess weapons of mass destruction ; the one that lies outside the sphere of good and is to be watched, contained and controlled. But there is far more to this practice of 'othering' than meets the eye. Robert Dujarric hits the nail on the head when identifying why some of the key rogue states, such as North Korea, Iraq, Iran or Libya, are constituted as 'rogue' by the US. It cannot be their authoritarian nature and their human rights violations alone, for many other states, including Saudi Arabia and Egypt, have an equally appalling record . Nor can it be that they possess or aspire to possess weapons of mass destruction. Otherwise states like India, Pakistan or Israel would be constituted as rogues too. Dujarric stresses that rogue states above all share one common characteristic: 'they are small or medium nations that have achieved some success in thwarting American policy.'54 The tendency to demonize rogue states considerably intensified following the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington of i I September 2001. For some policy-makers and political commentators, the American reaction to these events signified a fundamentally new approach to foreign policy. US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld heralds the arrival of 'new ways of thinking and new ways of fighting' .55 Stephen Walt, likewise, speaks of' he most rapid and dramatic change in the history of US foreign policy'.56 Significant changes did, indeed, take place. The inclusion of a preventive first-strike option, for instance, is a radical departure from previous approaches, which revolved around a more defense-oriented military policy. But at a more fundamental, conceptual level, there is far more continuity than change in the US position. Indeed, one can clearly detect a strong desire to return to the reassuring familiarity of dualistic and militaristic thinking patterns that dominated foreign policy during the Cold War. The new US foreign policy re-established the sense of order and certitude that had existed during the Cold War: an inside/outside world in which, according to the words of President George W. Bush, 'you are either with us or against us.'57 Painting North Korea as an evil "rogue state" reinforces the nuclear crisis. Bleiker, Professor of International Relations at the University of Queensland, 2003 (Roland Bleiker, "A Rogue is a Rogue is a Rogue: US foreign policy and the Korean nuclear crisis" Accessed on JSTOR, pg. 13 jb, sob) Despite numerous and obvious signs, and despite detailed and insightful studies of North Korea's previous negotiation behaviour, in 2003 US decision-makers repeated exactly the same mistakes made during the first crisis: they believed that by demonizing North Korea as an evil rogue state they could force Pyongyang into concessions. Whether this policy resulted from ignorance or specific design remains open to debate. The bottom line is that the US position was firm: 'America and the world will not be blackmailed,' stressed President Bush in his 2003 State of the Union Address.5? The result was predictable: Pyongyang became more recalcitrant. A new nuclear crisis started to take hold of the Korean peninsula. 27 MGW 2010 JHuang BHicks Threat-Con Aff South Korea NFU 1AC (4/8) U.S. nuclear blackmail has been the source of North Korean militarization Cumings 2005 (Bruce-, Professor of History University of Chicago, Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History, p. 497) ncp From the Korean War onward, North Korea responded to this nuclear blackmail by building enormous facilities underground or in mountain redoubts, from troop and materiel depots to munitions factories, even to subterranean warplane hangars. American control of the air in that war illustrated a deterrence principle supposedly developed only with "smart" weapons namely, that "once you can see the target, it is already destroyed." The North Koreans have long known this and have acted upon the principle. In the mid-1970s P'yongyang faced more threats as the Park Chung Hee government sought to develop nuclear capabilities, ceasing the activity only under enormous American pressure, while retaining formidable potentialities. The ROK went ahead with its clandestine program to develop "indigenous ability to build ballistic missiles" capable of carrying nuclear warheads. South Korea also garnered a reputation as a "renegade" arms supplier to pariah countries like South Africa and to Iran and Iraq during their war. Much of this reads as if it were written about North Korea, not South Korea, and puts P'yongyang's activity into perspective: much of it was in response to U.S. pressure and ROK initiatives . The US's construction of North Korea as a rogue state creates a self fulfilling nuclear prophecy Bleiker, Ph.D. international relations from the Australian National University, Jul 2003 (Roland, "A rogue is a rogue is a rogue: US foreign policy and the Korean nuclear crisis", International Affairs, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3569570 DA: 18/05/2010 pg. 4 jb, sob) The central argument of this article is that the image of North Korea as a 'rogue state' severely hinders both an adequate understanding and a possible resolution of the crisis. The rhetoric of rogue states is indicative of how US foreign policy continues to be driven by dualistic and militaristic Cold War thinking patterns. The 'Evil Empire' may be gone; not so the underlying need to define safety and security with reference to an external threat that must be warded off at any cost. Rogues are among the new threat-images that serve to demarcate the line between good and evil. As during the Cold War, military means are considered the key tool with which this line is to be defended. In the absence of a global power that matches the US, this militaristic attitude has, if anything, even intensified. Look at Washington's recent promulgation of a pre-emptive strike policy against rogue states. The consequences of this posture are particularly fateful in Korea, for it reinforces half a century of explicit and repeated nuclear threats against the government in Pyongyang. The impact of these threats has been largely obscured, not least because the highly technical and specialized discourse of security analysis has enabled the US to present the strategic situation on the peninsula in a manner that misleadingly attributes responsibility for the crisis solely to North Korea's actions. 28 MGW 2010 JHuang BHicks Threat-Con Aff South Korea NFU 1AC (5/8) The US's rhetoric describing North Korea as "evil" makes negotiation impossible Bleiker, Ph.D. in international relations from the Australian National University, Jul 2003 (Roland, "A rogue is a rogue is a rogue: US foreign policy and the Korean nuclear crisis", International Affairs, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3569570 DA: 18/05/2010 pg.15 jb, sob) Once again, the world is divided into 'good' and 'evil'; once again, military means occupy a key, if not the only, role in protecting the former against the latter. 'The opposition between good and evil is not negotiable,' Allan Bloom noted at the time of Ronald Reagan's presidency. It is a question of principles, and thus 'a cause of war'.58 Expressed in other words, the rhetoric of evil moves the concept of rogue states into the realm of irrationality. 'Evil' is in essence a term of condemnation for a phenomenon that can neither be fully comprehended nor addressed other than through militaristic forms of dissuasion and retaliation. This is why various commentators believe that the rhetoric of evil is an 'analytical cul de sac' that prevents, rather than encourages, understanding. Some go as far as arguing that a rhetoric of evil entails an 'evasion of account-ability', for the normative connotations of the term inevitably lead to policy positions that 'deny negotiations and compromise'.59 How is it, indeed, possible to negotiate with evil without being implicated in it? The contradictions between the rhetoric of evil and the requirements for dialogue have become particularly evident during the most recent nuclear crisis in Korea . All top US officials publicly stressed one common theme: that 'there is no reason why discussion about confidence-building measures cannot take place with Pyongyang.'6? At the very same time, though, the projection of threats towards North Korea was carefully maintained, even intensified. 'All options are on the table,' including military action, stressed President Bush.6' Powell, likewise, under-lined that 'no military option's been taken off the table.'62 The assumption behind this approach is that including North Korea in an 'axis of evil' does not necessarily preclude the possibility of engaging it in dialogue . Indeed, the assumption is that threats will induce dialogue. William Safire expresses this strategy in blunt but entirely appropriate words: 'We make clear to weapons traders in the North that their illicit nuclear production is vulnerable to air attack from a nation soon to show its disarmament bona fides in Baghdad ... That readiness will bring about what diplomats call "fruitful, regional, multilateral negotiation".'63 Demonization and caricaturing of North Korea reflects and reify the marginalization of the Koreas, risking regional war and global holocaust Cumings 2005 (Bruce-, Professor of History University of Chicago, Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History, p. 48788) ncp The point is not that North Korea is a nice place, or that it is beyond suspicion, or that P'yongyang has a better media policy: quite the contrary, its policy for half a century has been to pile lie upon lie, exaggeration upon exaggeration, even when it would be more convenient and helpful to its cause to tell the truth. But that is what we have learned to expect from communist regimes. What is the excuse for a lemming-like, mimetic, and ultimately ignorant media in a raucous democracy like that in the United States, in spite of its many (regrettably post facto) protests about how the Pentagon herded the media like cattle during the Persian Gulf War? It is now commonplace to blame this media accommodation on the celebrity status of anchorpeople and op-ed level reporters and the fleeting sound bites of daily television, leading journalists to seek not just the access they need but power and glory to go with it, and to shrink their prose to acceptable (that is, unacceptable) brevity. But the greatest problem is simply the asymmetry of America and Korea, a general problem of incommensurability namely, that the United States for fifty years has meant everything to Korea, but Koreans mean so little to the United States. The media attention span for Korea is next to nil unless there is a crisis to discuss. Koreans who favor the South may think it is politically useful when North Korea is demonized and caricatured, but they shouldn't take much satisfaction: it is a disturbing fact that mainstream American journalism was no more help in understanding the North Korean nuclear problem than in explicating black-Korean relations during the 1992 Los Angeles riots. Does this not say something quite damning about how many Americans have come to any level of respect for Koreans and their history, fifty years after our daily involvement in Korean affairs began? (Distortions of the nuclear conflict are in fact more understandable, because the nature of the issue required deep knowledge of U.S.-Korean relations, the military balance on the peninsula, nuclear physics, and nuclear-capable weaponry.) Nor can Americans in general rest easy with a gullible and uninformed media: some fine morning they may wake up to find that their sons and daughters are fighting in Korea again, with no idea how the war might have started or what its real causes might have been; the Pentagon war machine would again deploy its democracy-blotting media regime ("Pentavision"), and this time no one will be sure that the war might not escalate to a regional if not a global holocaust. 29 MGW 2010 JHuang BHicks Threat-Con Aff South Korea NFU 1AC (6/8) PLAN TEXT UNDER CONSTRUCTION. 30 MGW 2010 JHuang BHicks Threat-Con Aff South Korea NFU 1AC (7/8) Contention 3: Solvency No first use policy solves It decreases North Korea's motivations to develop their nuclear program and increases relations. Cicconi, 10. (Martine Cicconi, Expected J.D. 2010, Stanford Law School, Last CHANGED: 03/11/10, "Nuclear Restraint Revisited: An Analysis of the Arguments For and Against No First Use Policies in the Late Cold War and Today," http://www.cdi.org/laws/nuclear_restraint_revisited.html, Lawyers Alliance for World Security [non-partisan, non-governmental organization advocating policies designed to reduce the dangers posed by nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction], Date Accessed: 06/27/10, CC) By pledging not to use nuclear weapons even in response to a chemical or biological attack, the United States.S. would also disincentivize development of WMDs. For states like Iran, Syria and North Korea, fear of U.S. aggression suggests that development of chemical, biological and even nuclear weapons is prudent. [80] Eliminating of the possibility of a nuclear attack would go far towards relieving the urgent need to build a WMD arsenal. Of course, the underlying security concerns of these states would have to be addressed. For example, in order to fully alleviate North Korea's fears, the U.S. would have to ensure the nation that it would not seek regime change, or even urge South Korea to invade. But a promise not to attack North Korea with nuclear weapons would improve the bilateral relationship, paving the way for credible commitments that could enhance the security of both nations. Realism can't predict North Korea Empirical failure Kang professor at the Tuck school of Business at Dartmouth college 03 (David C., Sept. 03, Associate professor of government and adjunct associate professor at the Tuck school of Business at Dartmouth college, "International Relations Theory and the Second Korean War", International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 3, Date accessed: 5/18, JH & BH) Additionally, the Korean case highlights the difficulty realism has in dealing with actions short of war. Our theories of conflict are notoriously underspecified, and if war does not break out, realist theories have little to say about serious tensions that are potentially hostile and harmful. North Korea was far more hostile during the late 1960s than at present, but stopped well short of war. The past decade has also seen North Korea making unprecedented efforts to engage the west, most likely in hopes of improving its security in an altered geopolitical environment. Realist theories-with their emphasis on military force as the principal source of security and insecurity--provide little guidance for interpreting either of these strategies. If North Korea was so weak, why did so many people apply preventive war and power transition hypotheses to the peninsula? Here the North Korean case illustrates some general problems with any non-post facto application of these theories. Since North Korea was not powerful, scholars hypothesized extreme preferences to North Korean leaders. These ancillary and ad hoc hypotheses about preferences have been smuggled into the theory to make it fit the Korean case: from psychological assumptions about an irrational North Korean leadership to assumptions of an extremely strong preference for expansion or invasion . Preventive war and power transition theories focus on the material conditions of relative power, but the real analytic lifting has been done by behavioral assumptions about intent. As I will show, none of these assumptions is tenable. 31 MGW 2010 JHuang BHicks Threat-Con Aff South Korea NFU 1AC (8/8) A "no first use" policy would convince North Korea to agree to denuclearization. Harrison, 4/6 (Selig S. Harrison, Director of the Asia Program at the Center for International Policy and a senior scholar of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, April 6, 2010, "Should U.S. keep `first use' option?" http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/forum/2010-03-30-column30_ST_N.htm, Date Accessed: 6/26/10, CC) An incompatible stance Asserting the right of first use is described as tough and realistic, but it is actually unrealistic. It is incompatible with the goal of non-proliferation. Article Six of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty provides for the reduction of existing arsenals in return for the non-nuclear powers remaining non-nuclear. But the non-nuclear states can hardly be expected to keep their promise if the nuclear powers threaten first use of the nuclear weapons still in their possession while reductions proceed at a glacial pace spread over decades. In the case of North Korea, where I have visited 11 times, the harsh reality is that the policies pursued by the U.S. will not work. Although the U.S. has unilaterally removed its tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea,it continues to deploy intercontinental ballistic missiles within striking range of North Korea. For this reason, when Pyongyang suspended its nuclear weapons program for eight years, it did so only after the U.S. formally pledged in a 1994 agreement to give assurances "against the threat or use of nuclear weapons."A similar pledge, together with a peace treaty ending the Korean War and steps to normalize relations, would be necessary now in return for new denuclearization measures by Pyongyang. But the Pentagon has resisted such a pledge. Barring last-minute intervention by the president, the review will accept the longstanding Pentagon premise that any restriction on first use would deny U.S. generals the necessary element of unpredictability and surprise in countering Pyongyang's possible use not only of nuclear weapons, but of chemical and biological weapons as well. An obvious objection to a "no first use" pledge is that it could be broken in a crisis. But "having one from you would be better than not having one," observed Alaeddin Boroujerdi, head of the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission of Iran's parliament, on my visit to Tehran in 2008. "It would be important in building confidence between us. After all, you come into the (Persian) Gulf with your ships, and for all we know, they have nuclear weapons." 32 MGW 2010 JHuang BHicks Threat-Con Aff ****2AC Extensions**** 33 MGW 2010 JHuang BHicks Threat-Con Aff Harms Ext. Nuclear Threats Reinforce Nuclear Crisis A no-first-use policy would dis-incentivize the continuation of the North Korean nuclear program Empirically proven. Feiveson and Hogendoorn 2003 (Harold A., Ernst Jan, Summer 2003, Harold is a senior research scientist at Princeton University, and Ersnt Jan is a Ph.D at the Woodrow Wilson School, "No First Use of Nuclear Weapons", http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/102feiv.pdf, Date accessed: 6/28, JH) Is the ratcheting up of a U.S. nuclear threat likely to deter such countries from developing chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons? Or, to look at matters the other way, is a strong no-first-use commitment by the United States likely to encourage countries to go ahead with programs to develop such weapons? Both propositions seem doubtful. The countries which have abandoned (at least for the time being) their quest for nuclear weapons, such as Argentina, Brazil, Germany, Japan, South Africa, South Korea, and Taiwan, are the countries least threatened by the United States. On the contrary, it is those countries that feel threatened by the use of nuclear weapons (particularly the so-called "Axis of Evil") which appears the most inclined to develop a nuclear deterrent. North Korea is a case in point. Although it already had embarked on nuclear weapons activities in violation of the NPT and of the Agreed Framework of 1994, well before President Bush's "Axis of Evil" speech, North Korea did signal that it was ready to negotiate with the United States and tellingly demanded, as part of such negotiations, that the United States agree to a nonaggression pact. 34 MGW 2010 JHuang BHicks Threat-Con Aff Solvency Ext. NFU Solves NK Nuclearization A no-first-use policy would dis-incentivize the continuation of the North Korean nuclear program Empirically proven. Feiveson and Hogendoorn 2003 (Harold A., Ernst Jan, Summer 2003, Harold is a senior research scientist at Princeton University, and Ersnt Jan is a Ph.D at the Woodrow Wilson School, "No First Use of Nuclear Weapons", http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/102feiv.pdf, Date accessed: 6/28, JH) Is the ratcheting up of a U.S. nuclear threat likely to deter such countries from developing chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons? Or, to look at matters the other way, is a strong no-first-use commitment by the United States likely to encourage countries to go ahead with programs to develop such weapons? Both propositions seem doubtful. The countries which have abandoned (at least for the time being) their quest for nuclear weapons, such as Argentina, Brazil, Germany, Japan, South Africa, South Korea, and Taiwan, are the countries least threatened by the United States. On the contrary, it is those countries that feel threatened by the use of nuclear weapons (particularly the so-called "Axis of Evil") which appears the most inclined to develop a nuclear deterrent. North Korea is a case in point. Although it already had embarked on nuclear weapons activities in violation of the NPT and of the Agreed Framework of 1994, well before President Bush's "Axis of Evil" speech, North Korea did signal that it was ready to negotiate with the United States and tellingly demanded, as part of such negotiations, that the United States agree to a nonaggression pact. 35 MGW 2010 JHuang BHicks Threat-Con Aff Solvency Ext. NFU Solves Cold War Logic The plan solves the Cold War mindset Adopting a NFU policy breaks down the last relic of the Cold War. The Economist 4/13 (Staffwriter, "Cold-war relics protest junking of cold-war relic", http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2010/04/nuclear_no-first-use, Date accessed: 6/27, JH) The fact that America has not, until now, had a no-first-use policy on nuclear weapons is, like so many elements of our defence policy, an anachronistic holdover from the cold war. Back when the forces of the Warsaw Pact were arrayed against America, iron upon iron and bastion upon bastion, and poised to pour through the Fulda Gap (whatever that is) and sweep across Western Europe, America reserved the option of using nuclear weapons first because the Russkies had an overwhelming superiority in conventional forces. This, to say the least, is no longer the case. America today, for better or worse, spends more on military forces than the rest of the world combined, and there is no conceivable opponent or array of opponents who could stand against our conventional forces, let alone pose a substantial threat to our territory or population , or those of our major allies. We certainly do not need to threaten retaliatory or preemptive nuclear strikes against nations that do not possess nuclear weapons. It's high time that America got rid of this cold-war policy relic ; and it's also entirely unsurprising that people who have never figured out how to adjust, intellectually or emotionally, to the end of the cold war should be upset at that prospect. 36 MGW 2010 JHuang BHicks Threat-Con Aff Solvency Ext. NFU Solves Relations We need to end our nuclear aggression with North Korea to rectify relationship Kim. 09. (Jack, journalist, September 30, 2009, "Fresh South Korea nuclear proposal "ridiculous": North,"http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSTRE58T1RS20090930 Accessed 6/26/10 FS) North Korea Wednesday rejected a proposal by South Korea's president for a fresh deal to end its nuclear arms program in return for massive aid, which he has said was possibly Pyongyang's last chance at survival. In separate comments, the North Korean foreign ministry pledged to end the country's nuclear ambitions but only on the condition that Washington stopped threatening its existence, repeating a long-standing justification for its atomic drive. South Korea and the United States have been consulting on a new and comprehensive package of incentives for the North that would consolidate measures to end Pyongyang's nuclear ambitions as laid out in a stalled 2005 disarmament deal. "The nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula should be settled between (North Korea) and the U.S. from every aspect as it is a product of the latter's hostile policy toward the former," the North's official KCNA news agency said. "(South Korean officials) are seriously mistaken if they calculate the DPRK (North Korea) would accept the ridiculous 'proposal' for 'the normalization of relations' with someone and for some sort of 'economic aid.'" South Korean President Lee Myung-bak said on the sidelines of a G20 summit last week that the existing process to disarm the reclusive state had been slow and was now defunct. "In order for us to really accurately assess North Korea's true intent, that is the reason I proposed a grand bargain, whereby we will really have to deal with this in a one-shot deal and to try to bring about a fundamental resolution," Lee said. "HOSTILE" POLICY North Korea has long said it was ready to drop its nuclear program if the United States ended what Pyongyang says is a hostile policy toward it. Washington has said it had no intention to attack the North. "We will as before strive to build a world without nuclear arms and to realize a Korean peninsula free of nuclear weapons in association with the U.S. hostile policy against us," the North's foreign ministry spokesman said in comments carried by KCNA. But the unnamed spokesman rejected a Security Council resolution adopted last week that called for global nuclear disarmament as "based on a double standard" that "did not reflect the hopes and will of the overall international community." The Security Council at a summit chaired by U.S. President Barack Obama unanimously approved a resolution for a nuclear-free world without naming either North Korea or Iran, which the West considers top atomic threats. 37 MGW 2010 JHuang BHicks Threat-Con Aff ****A2 Realism**** 38 MGW 2010 JHuang BHicks Threat-Con Aff Realism Doesn't Apply to Asia General Realism doesn't apply to the Korean peninsula Kang professor at the Tuck school of Business at Dartmouth college 03 (David C., Spring 2003, Associate professor of government and adjunct associate professor at the Tuck school of Business at Dartmouth college, "Getting Asia Wrong: The need for new analytical frameworks", International Security, Vol. 27, No. 4, Accessed 5/18/10, JH & BH) During this time Asia itself-sometimes defined as including China, India, Japan, and Russia and comprising perhaps half the world's population-had an occasional impact on the great powers, but it was never a primary focus. In the past two decades, however, Asia has emerged as a region whose economic, military, and diplomatic power has begun to rival and perhaps even exceed that of Europe. Its growing influence gives scholars a wonderful opportunity in the fields of international relations generally and Asian security specifically to produce increasingly rigorous and theoretically sophisticated work. Because Europe was so important for so long a period, in seeking to understand inter-national relations, scholars have often simply deployed concepts, theories, and experiences derived from the European experience to project onto and explain Asia. This approach is problematic at best. Eurocentric ideas have yielded several mistaken conclusions and predictions about conflict and alignment behavior in Asia. For example, since the early 1990s many Western analysts have predicted dire scenarios for Asia, whereas many Asian experts have expressed growing optimism about the region's future.4 It is an open question whether Asia, with its very different political economy, history, culture, and demo-graphics, will ever function like the European state system. This is not to criticize European-derived theories purely because they are based on the Western experience: The origins of a theory are not necessarily relevant to its applicability. Rather these theories do a poor job as they are applied to Asia; what I seek to show in this article is that more careful attention to their application can strengthen the theories themselves. 39 MGW 2010 JHuang BHicks Threat-Con Aff Realism Doesn't Apply to Asia General Traditional realist application flawed Asian countries significantly differ from Western policies. Kang professor at the Tuck school of Business at Dartmouth college 03 (David C., Spring 2003, Associate professor of government and adjunct associate professor at the Tuck school of Business at Dartmouth college, "Getting Asia Wrong: The need for new analytical frameworks", International Security, Vol. 27, No. 4, Accessed 5/18/10, JH & BH) There are two general ways in which Asian international relations might prove different. The first concerns the nature of the state. Although countries in Asia are superficially "Westphalian," they do not share the same process of development as countries in the West, nor are they designed to address the same pressures and issues that drove the development of the European nation-state system.91 Asia has different historical traditions, different geographic and political realities, and different cultural traditions. Thus it should not be sur-prising if nation-states in Asia do not necessarily function like states in the West or if they are preoccupied with issues that European nations for the most part resolved long ago, such as internal conflict or questions of legitimacy. On the one hand, many countries in Northeast Asia (e.g., China, Japan, and Korea) have centuries of experience as formal political units, and their histories as sovereign political entities often predate those in the West. Not only does this mean that their national identities may have deeper roots; it also means that Asian perspectives on nationalism and identity may be different, and that issues of legitimacy or nationalism may not be the most important issues for governments in Northeast Asia. On the other hand, many countries in South-east and South Asia (e.g., Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines) were not as formally organized-even by the mid-twentieth century. For these countries, the creation of modern nation-states has been a different process than it was in Europe, as they have had to establish their political and economic institutions while interacting with states that already have those institutions. These nation-states have been concerned with crafting legitimacy, incorporating ethnic fac-tions, and forging a sense of national identity. A second major difference is the historical path that Asian nations have taken as they became incorporated into the larger international system. The legacy of Western colonialism in Southeast Asia, and Japanese colonialism in East Asia, remains vivid and continues to influence relations between states in Asia and with the West. The Philippines has been indelibly altered because of its relations with the United States, from its political institutions to its passion for basketball. China, Japan, and Korea also have complex pasts that involve war and occupation, while Southeast Asia is one of the great crossroads of the world, where Indian, Muslim, and Chinese civilizations intersect. These coun-tries also have complex relations with their former colonial rulers and with each other. And although Asian countries were incorporated more recently as nation-states, they deal with situations not de novo but rather within a set of existing global alliances, conflicts, and institutions. This may mean that their foreign relations operate differently than those in the West. Given the very dif-ferent historical paths these states have taken, and the different set of issues and circumstances that they have faced, it would be surprising if their foreign relations did not include some differences as well. 40 MGW 2010 JHuang BHicks Threat-Con Aff Realism Doesn't Apply to Asia General Asian countries not realist Don't fear for survival Japan and China prove. Kang professor at the Tuck school of Business at Dartmouth college 03 (David C., Spring 2003, Associate professor of government and adjunct associate professor at the Tuck school of Business at Dartmouth college, "Getting Asia Wrong: The need for new analytical frameworks", International Security, Vol. 27, No. 4, Accessed 5/18/10, JH & BH) Following the end of the Cold War in 1991, some scholars in the West began to predict that Asia was "ripe for rivalry."'12T hey based this prediction on the following factors: wide disparities in the levels of economic and military power among nations in the region; their different political systems, ranging from democratic to totalitarian; historical animosities; and the lack of international institutions. Many scholars thus envisaged a return of power politics after de-cades when conflict in Asia was dominated by the Cold War tension between the United States and the Soviet Union. In addition, scholars envisaged a return of arms racing and the possibility of major conflict among Asian countries, almost all of which had rapidly changing internal and external environments. More specific predictions included the growing possibility of Japanese rearmament;'3 increased Chinese adventurism spurred by China's rising power and ostensibly revisionist intentions;'4 conflict or war over the status of Taiwan;'5 terrorist or missile attacks from a rogue North Korea against South Korea, Japan, or even the United States;16 and arms racing or even conflict in Southeast Asia, prompted in part by unresolved territorial disputes.7"More than a dozen years have passed since the end of the Cold War, yet none of these pessimistic predictions have come to pass. Indeed there has not been a major war in Asia since the 1978-79 Vietnam-Cambodia-China conflict; and with only a few exceptions (North Korea and Taiwan), Asian countries do not fear for their survival. Japan, though powerful, has not rearmed to the ex-tent it could. China seems no more revisionist or adventurous now than it was before the end of the Cold War. And no Asian country appears to be balancing against China. In contrast to the period 1950-80, the past two decades have witnessed enduring regional stability and minimal conflict. Scholars should directly confront these anomalies, rather than dismissing them. 41 MGW 2010 JHuang BHicks Threat-Con Aff Realism Doesn't Apply to Asia General Realism assumes a model not applicable to Asian states. Kang professor at the Tuck school of Business at Dartmouth College 04 (David C., Winter 03/04, Associate professor of government and adjunct associate professor at the Tuck school of Business at Dartmouth college, "Hierarchy, balancing, and empirical puzzles in Asian international relations", International Security, Vol. 28 No. 3, Accessed 5/18/10, JH & BH) In explaining his dependent variable--Cold War stability between two nu-clear superpowers-Waltz was correct to restrict his focus to the great powers. Small powers did not matter in the global struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union. A theory designed to explain the Cold War, however, may not explain why Asian states are not necessarily balancing China in the same way that the United States balanced the Soviet Union . Because the world is no longer made up of two superpowers and all the rest, scholars who want to explore other international systems or alternative reasons for state behavior need to move away from Waltz's truncated definition of which countries mat-ter and how anarchy interacts with hierarchy. If Thailand can start a global eco- nomic crisis, and if war in Afghanistan or Taiwan could have a direct impact on the United States, perhaps we should consider incorporating such countries and situations into our theories. 42 MGW 2010 JHuang BHicks Threat-Con Aff Realism Doesn't Apply to Asia General Realism is a failed theory that doesn't explain the Asian phenomenon. Kang professor at the Tuck school of Business at Dartmouth College 04 (David C., Winter 03/04, Associate professor of government and adjunct associate professor at the Tuck school of Business at Dartmouth college, "Hierarchy, balancing, and empirical puzzles in Asian international relations", International Security, Vol. 28 No. 3, Accessed 5/18/10, JH & BH) One response from realists is that differential power does not constitute a hi-erarchy and that the existence of balancing or bandwagoning behavior proves nothing.27 They argue that just because some states are weaker does not mean that they will not strive to maintain their independence, which the great pow- ers are largely able to achieve. If realism cannot predict state behavior, then realists ought to admit as much. Instead, they continue to predict over-whelmingly that states will balance in the face of predominant power. On the other hand, if balancing and bandwagoning are not predictions that derive from a Waltzian approach, then that only buttresses my point that scholars need to be more careful in explaining Asian state behavior. Scholarship that ignores Asian states' history and the role of preferences in favor of a purely structural formulation of international relations also ignores many of the theoretical advances of the past decade by individuals such as Robert Powell and James Fearon, among others.28 The most sophisticated theo-retical treatments of deterrence, spiral models, and power transitions contend that understanding preferences is vital for drawing any conclusions about state behavior. As Haggard notes, "In the absence of information on actors' preferences or a clear sense of the nature of the strategic interaction in ques-tion, we are unlikely to generate defensible expectations about state behavior or the propensity for conflict."29 In sum, the notion of hierarchy is well established in the international relations literature, and balancing should not be the default hypothesis in in-ternational relations theory. Balancing is the expected outcome under certain conditions (i.e., when there is a small number of great powers). Hierarchy and bandwagoning are the expected outcomes when one state is dominant in the system. The question then is, What is happening in Asia? 43 MGW 2010 JHuang BHicks Threat-Con Aff Realism Doesn't Apply to Asia General Realism fails Six warrants Kang professor at the Tuck school of Business at Dartmouth College 04 (David C., Winter 03/04, Associate professor of government and adjunct associate professor at the Tuck school of Business at Dartmouth college, "Hierarchy, balancing, and empirical puzzles in Asian international relations", International Security, Vol. 28 No. 3, Accessed 5/18/10, JH & BH) There are at least six empirical anomalies in contemporary Asian interna-tional relations that realist interpretations cannot explain. First, the main em-pirical anomaly, and the main problem with a theoretical view based on realism, is the focus of attention on the most powerful countries. For Asia, the biggest threats arise not from the most powerful country (the United States) or even the second most powerful country (Japan), but rather from the region's smallest and weakest states (Taiwan and North Korea, respectively).'4 This anomaly cannot be explained without first understanding these states' inter-ests and the nature of their interactions with other countries.42 Writing about different behavior across regions, Bennett and Stam note "It is not that the actors are not rational, even though a universal model may fail. Rather, they simply are not playing the same game with the same preferences."43 A second empirical anomaly concerns the thorny issue of Taiwanese sover-eignty.44 Taiwan is not recognized as a sovereign state, yet many international relations scholars treat it like one because it acts like one. This not only does the field of international relations a disservice, but it is also logically inconsis-tent with the Westphalian view that formal recognition is paramount. Al-though Acharya argues that China uses Westphalian concepts, Chinese scholars point out that when discussing Taiwan, Chinese know exactly when they want to use English words and meanings and when they want to use Chi-nese words and meanings, and so do the Taiwanese.45 Scholars need to con-front such realities, especially because of their such ramifications for both China and Taiwan."4 A third anomaly is the remarkable staying power of Asia's three Leninist states: China, Vietnam, and North Korea have survived despite the collapse of the European communist bloc more than a decade ago. Although China and Vietnam (and, to a lesser extent, North Korea) have engaged in some economic reforms, they remain authoritarian political regimes .47 It also bears mention that all thr ee are products of anti-Western, anticolonial movements. North Ko-rea, in particular, has survived much longer than almost anyone predicted.48 Although minuscule compared with any of its neighbors, North Korea is the country most likely to be at the center of conflict in Northeast Asia. A fourth anomaly concerns the attitude of South Korea and Japan to the Tai-wan-China conflict. A realist would argue that both countries should have much to fear from an aggressive China, and hence they should be eager to help the United States and Taiwan contain it, either through more active measures today or through promises to come to Taiwan's aid in the event of a Chinese at-tack. A liberal would assert that, as democracies, South Korea and Japan should be eager to defend democratic Taiwan against authoritarian China. Yet because of their perception of the Taiwan-China issue as more of an internal than an international matter, both countries have shown a reluctance to get involved. A fifth anomaly involves the ejection of U.S. bases from the Philippines after the Cold War. Given the tremendous security benefits that the Philippines en-joys as a member of the U.S. alliance system in Asia, why would it take such a seemingly self-defeating action?s" The standard realist explanation is that it reflected a surge in Filipino nationalism-an explanation that seems rather exceptionalist. As Yuen Foong Khong writes, "By 1989 it became obvious that the negotiations had become entangled with a fierce domestic political debate within the Philippines. The surge in Filipino nationalism derailed the negotia-tions.""' Realists, however, cannot so easily attribute the ouster of the U.S. bases to domestic politics. A more likely explanation is that the Philippines does not view China as the threat that realists believe it should. Sixth, despite seemingly every reason to be fully incorporated into the U.S. alliance system, South Korea clearly has a different perspective on the role of the United States in Northeast Asia.52 The idea that Seoul might not want to continue its close alliance with Washington was unthinkable even two years ago. But a resurgent Left in South Korea, combined with worries that the United States-not North Korea-is the destabilizing force in the the region has led many in South Korea to view the U.S. presence with some alarm. This has caused much consternation in Washington, which is beginning to take the threat to the alliance more seriously. Chung-min Lee writes, "For the first time since the bilateral alliance [with the United States] was forged more than a half-century ago, more Koreans are at least entertaining the specter of closer political, security, and economic ties with China.""53 There are deep divisions in South Korea concerning the utility of a continued alliance with the United States, U.S. policy toward North Korea, and South Korea's relations with the other powers in the region.54 Although differences over how to deal with North Korea are nothing new, in the past these differences were often tactical, resolved in large part because of the common perception that North Korea represented a serious security threat. In recent years, however, South Korean and U.S. security perceptions have begun to significantly diverge. 44 MGW 2010 JHuang BHicks Threat-Con Aff Realism Doesn't Apply to Asia Statistics Asian IR is different from Euro IR experts and 150 years of statistics prove Kang professor at the Tuck school of Business at Dartmouth College 04 (David C., Winter 03/04, Associate professor of government and adjunct associate professor at the Tuck school of Business at Dartmouth college, "Hierarchy, balancing, and empirical puzzles in Asian international relations", International Security, Vol. 28 No. 3, Accessed 5/18/10, JH & BH) That Asian international relations do not conform to the classical European balancing model has been empirically validated by research that examines the origins of war over the past 150 years . Scott Bennett and Allan Stam subjected the European model to empirical testing across regions and time and found that although it works well in Europe, "significant differences in preferences for conflict exist across regions." They also found "no support for the argu-ment that [Asian] behavior will converge on that of Europe. In fact, all of the regions outside of Europe appear to diverge from the European pattern [of classical balance of power]."'" 45 MGW 2010 JHuang BHicks Threat-Con Aff Realism Doesn't Apply to Asia Economies No link Asian economies are unique Kang professor at the Tuck school of Business at Dartmouth College 04 (David C., Winter 03/04, Associate professor of government and adjunct associate professor at the Tuck school of Business at Dartmouth college, "Hierarchy, balancing, and empirical puzzles in Asian international relations", International Security, Vol. 28 No. 3, Accessed 5/18/10, JH & BH) International relations scholars must take seriously the possibility that differ-ent regions of the world might indeed be different. Relatedly, critiques of this claim as somehow fundamentally exceptionalist misunderstand the nature of scholarly inquiry. It is good social science to be open to the possibility that evidence may not fit a theory, just as it is possible to note difference without resorting to caricature-a trap into which Acharya falls when criticizing some of my assertions as having an "exceptionalist ring" (p. 162). An example of how progressive research might occur is perhaps best demonstrated through a comparison of scholarship on Asian development with scholarship on Asian international relations. According to a number of criteria-theoretical sophisti-cation, attention to the empirical record, and impact on the wider field of social science-the study of Asian international relations lags far behind. A brief re-view of the intellectual history of Asia confirms this observation. Beginning in the late 1970s, scholars of Asian development challenged their colleagues in the fields of economics, political science, and sociology to move beyond the long-standing dichotomy between a neoclassical free market and a centrally planned economy in their study of economic development. Chalmers Johnson, for example, was particularly forceful when arguing that Japan's eco-nomic growth fit into neither category.2 And as Stephan Haggard has written, "Spearheaded by scholars outside the mainstream of North American econom-ics, this work began by underlining empirical anomalies: the myriad ways in which the East Asian cases failed to conform to the neoclassical view."3 In the 1980s, as Japan's economic rise continued, and South Korea and Taiwan be-came successful developers (i.e., newly industrialized countries, or NICs), the debate over the explanation for their success intensified. The dependent variable in all three cases was startlingly clear: Each was ex-periencing economic development that was historically unprecedented by world standards in both its pace and its depth.4 The issue was how to explain this growth. The debate began by focusing on whether state intervention was central to the NICs' economic success-the "state versus the market" debate.5 In surprisingly little time, it became obvious that the common variable was ex-tensive government intervention into the market. This finding made clear the need to recast the standard debate between the virtues of a neoclassical free market versus a centrally planned economy. 46 MGW 2010 JHuang BHicks Threat-Con Aff Realism Doesn't Apply Mearsheimer Indict Mearsheimer's theory false First, balancing theory should've occurred by now, and realist authors overlook key anomalies. Kang professor at the Tuck school of Business at Dartmouth college 03 (David C., Spring 2003, Associate professor of government and adjunct associate professor at the Tuck school of Business at Dartmouth college, "Getting Asia Wrong: The need for new analytical frameworks", International Security, Vol. 27, No. 4, Accessed 5/18/10, JH & BH) Two major problems exist with many of the pessimistic predictions about Asia. First, when confronted with the nonbalancing of Asian states against China, the lack of Japanese rearmament, and five decades of noninvasion by North Korea, scholars typically respond: Just wait. This reply, however, is intel-lectually ambiguous. Although it would be unfair to expect instantaneous na-tional responses to changing international conditions, a dozen years would seem to be long enough to detect at least some change. Indeed Asian nations have historically shown an ability to respond quickly to changing circum-stances. The Meiji restoration in Japan in 1868 was a remarkable example of governmental response to European and American encroachment, and by 1874 Japan had emerged from centuries of isolation to occupy Taiwan." More re-cently, with the introduction of market reforms in late 1978, when Deng Xiaoping famously declared, "To get rich is glorious," the Chinese have trans-formed themselves from diehard socialists to exuberant capitalists beginning less than three years after Mao's death in 1976.2( In the absence of a specific time frame, the "just wait" response is unfalsifiable. Providing a causal logic that explains how and when scholars can expect changes is an important as-pect of this response, and reasonable scholars will accept that change may not be immediate but may occur over time. Without such a time frame, however, the "just wait" response is mere rhetorical wordplay designed to avoid trou-bling evidence . A more rigorous response in the Chinese case would be to argue that condi-tions of balancing, not timing per se, are the critical factor. In this view, China's relatively slow military modernization and limited power projection capabili-ties suggest that its potential threat to other Asian countries is growing only slowly; thus the conditions necessary to produce costly all-out balancing efforts do not yet exist. Moreover, even though many of the conditions that theorists argue can lead to conflict do already exist in East Asia, the region has so far avoided both major and minor interstate conflict. Most significant, in less than two decades China has evolved from being a moribund and closed mid-dle power to the most dynamic country in the region, with an economy that not only will soon surpass Japan's (if it has not already) but also shows many signs of continuing growth. This dramatic power transition has evoked hardly any response from China's neighbors.2' By realist standards, China should be provoking balancing behavior, merely because its overall size and projected rate of growth are so high . Second, pessimistic predictions about Asia's future often suffer from incom-pletely specified evidentiary standards. Scholars will frequently select evi-dence that supports their arguments and dismiss contradictory evidence as epiphenomenal. For example, in his most recent book, John Mearsheimer ar-gues that although Japan (and Germany) have "the potential in terms of popu-lation and wealth to become great powers ... they depend on the United States for their security, and are effectively semi-sovereign states, not great powers."22 This begs a number of questions: For instance, why define Japan, which has the second largest economy in the world, as "semi-sovereign"? Indeed why would such an economically advanced state ever allow itself to remain "semisovereign"? Mearsheimer's book is focused on building a theory of offensive realism, but the logic of offensive realism would lead to the conclusion that Ja-pan should have rearmed long ago. The onus is on those predicting an increase in power politics in Asia to state clearly what evidence would falsify their ar-guments or challenge their assumptions, not to explain away objections or ig-nore contradictory evidence. A clearer explication of their hypotheses and the refutable propositions would be a genuine contribution to the field. More than a dozen years after the end of the Cold War, much of Asia bears little resemblance to the picture painted by the pessimists. Although the years 1950-80 saw numerous armed conflicts, since then there has been no major in-terstate war in either Northeast or Southeast Asia. Countries do not fear for their survival in either area. In Northeast Asia, rivalry and power politics re-main muted. Japan has not rearmed, China shows little sign of having revi-sionist tendencies, and North Korea has neither imploded nor exploded. Southeast Asia, as well, remains free of the kinds of arms races and power poli-tics that some have expected. As Muthiah Alagappa writes, "Viewed through the ahistorical realist lens, the contemporary security challenges could indeed suggest that Asia is a dangerous place. But a comprehensive historical view would suggest otherwise. Although Asia still faces serious internal and inter-national challenges, there are fewer challenges than before and most of the re-gion's disputes and conflicts have stabilized."23 The field of international relations would be better served if the pessimists not only admitted this reality but also asked why this might be the case. Because China has such an impor-tant influence on Northeast, Southeast, and even South Asia, I offer the tenta-tive outline of such an explanation in the following section. 47 MGW 2010 JHuang BHicks A2: Desperation/Madman Theory Desperation theory fails Untested and only speculative Threat-Con Aff Kang professor at the Tuck school of Business at Dartmouth college 03 (David C., Sept. 03, Associate professor of government and adjunct associate professor at the Tuck school of Business at Dartmouth college, "International Relations Theory and the Second Korean War", International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 3, Date accessed: 5/18, JH & BH) Additionally, pessimists rely on another ad hoc theory to predict war in Korea, one that is interwoven with preventive war and power transition theories but rarely elucidated as a distinct analytic argument. This approach-the "desperation" theoryargues that a country might rationally decide on war if the alternatives are even worse (Sagan, 1988; O'Hanlon, 1998; Cha, 2002). Countries falling to pieces have little to lose, so they may be tempted to launch a war even if the odds of success are very low, because the prospects for failure are certain with continued peace. However, this theory has never been systematically tested, and is based on speculative assumptions about how the North Korean leadership perceives the world. In fact, there are good reasons to think that, from a North Korean perspective, the alternatives may actually look the opposite of what scholars predict. With the examples of the Gulf War and the U.S. military action in Kosovo and their own crumbling military, North Korea may very well perceive certain destruction from an angry United States if they initiate war, but see numerous examples of regimes-such as Libya and Cuba-that have survived despite intense hardship and withering U.S. pressure. The flurry of North Korean diplomatic and economic initiatives in the past few years show thatfar from having given up hope and seeing inevitable economic collapse-the North Korean leadership is actively pursuing a strategy they hope will ease their domestic problems. The desperation thesis relies upon a number of heroic assumptions, and any discussion of the thesis should explicitly analyze North Korea's leadership perceptions and attitudes, rather than asserting them. 48 MGW 2010 JHuang BHicks Threat-Con Aff A2: Desperation/Madman Theory Coup lacks evidenciary support. The madman theory is based on misunderstood speculation. Kang professor at the Tuck school of Business at Dartmouth college 03 (David C., Sept. 03, Associate professor of government and adjunct associate professor at the Tuck school of Business at Dartmouth college, "International Relations Theory and the Second Korean War", International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 3, Date accessed: 5/18, JH & BH) The biggest problem with the desperation thesis is that it is based on scarce-and largely speculative--data about North Korea. Neither optimists nor pessimists have good data on North Korean attitudes, perceptions, or intentions. Thus we must be aware that we are inferring attitudes from little data, and be as self-conscious as possible about not imputing preferences through wishful thinking. Often the desperation thesis is merely asserted, without evidence that explains the psychological or perceptual bases of the North Korean leadership. Serious study must at a minimum be focused on what available evidence there is regarding the mindset of the North Korean leadership.8 Indeed, there is a compelling alternative hypothesis about the North Korean leadership's perceptions. North Korea, far from seeing its imminent demise and thus planning a desperate war against the South in hopes of survival, might well view its options in precisely the opposite manner from those who advocate the "desperation" thesis. That is, the North Korean regime might see a war against the U.S. as guaranteed suicide, but economic survival as a distinct possibility. The North knows that a war against the South, or an attack on the U.S.-either through attacking the South or by lobbing a missile at the Aleutian islands-would be suicide. The differential in capabilities is so vast that there can be no other conclusion, and given the obvious enmity with which the United States views the North, to attack the United States is to ask for certain and swift annihilation. In the past decade the North has seen the U.S. have its way with Iraq, and more recently watched the U.S. bomb Kosovo from bases in the United States. In event of a conflict, the U.S. would have complete air and sea superiority almost instantly, and would be able to bomb North Korean positions at will. North Korea is quite aware of the U.S. hostility toward it, and is also aware that a war would likely be conclusive--there would be little opportunity for a negotiated settlement once the fighting began.9 49 MGW 2010 JHuang BHicks Threat-Con Aff A2: Desperation Theory Desperation theory fails Untested and only speculative Kang professor at the Tuck school of Business at Dartmouth college 03 (David C., Sept. 03, Associate professor of government and adjunct associate professor at the Tuck school of Business at Dartmouth college, "International Relations Theory and the Second Korean War", International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 3, Date accessed: 5/18, JH & BH) Additionally, pessimists rely on another ad hoc theory to predict war in Korea, one that is interwoven with preventive war and power transition theories but rarely elucidated as a distinct analytic argument. This approach-the "desperation" theoryargues that a country might rationally decide on war if the alternatives are even worse (Sagan, 1988; O'Hanlon, 1998; Cha, 2002). Countries falling to pieces have little to lose, so they may be tempted to launch a war even if the odds of success are very low, because the prospects for failure are certain with continued peace. However, this theory has never been systematically tested, and is based on speculative assumptions about how the North Korean leadership perceives the world. In fact, there are good reasons to think that, from a North Korean perspective, the alternatives may actually look the opposite of what scholars predict. With the examples of the Gulf War and the U.S. military action in Kosovo and their own crumbling military, North Korea may very well perceive certain destruction from an angry United States if they initiate war, but see numerous examples of regimes-such as Libya and Cuba-that have survived despite intense hardship and withering U.S. pressure. The flurry of North Korean diplomatic and economic initiatives in the past few years show thatfar from having given up hope and seeing inevitable economic collapse-the North Korean leadership is actively pursuing a strategy they hope will ease their domestic problems. The desperation thesis relies upon a number of heroic assumptions, and any discussion of the thesis should explicitly analyze North Korea's leadership perceptions and attitudes, rather than asserting them. 50 MGW 2010 JHuang BHicks Threat-Con Aff A2: Desperation Theory Desperation theory is flawed Kim Jong-Il knows war is suicide and reform allows it to survive. Kang professor at the Tuck school of Business at Dartmouth college 03 (David C., Sept. 03, Associate professor of government and adjunct associate professor at the Tuck school of Business at Dartmouth college, "International Relations Theory and the Second Korean War", International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 3, Date accessed: 5/18, JH & BH) North Korean actions over the past five years do not lead to the conclusion that their leadership is desperate and increasingly paranoid. Rather, the North Korean leadership is active and interested in engaging the world. Economic stagnation, while clearly a cause for concern in North Korea, may not automatically result in a deleterious effect on the political prospects for the current regime. If the regime is coherent enough, and if the regime is willing to use repression and ideological indoctrination, revolt from below is unlikely to occur . More significant, the evidence shows that North Korea is interested in some opening and reform, however halting. Thus, although in theory the desperation thesis may be interesting in the abstract, the evidence points to the fact that the North Korean leadership knows that a war would be suicide, and also that it realizes some reform and opening may allow it to survive into the future . 51 MGW 2010 JHuang BHicks Threat-Con Aff A2: China Balancing Theory South Korea No Asian balancing South Korea proves Kang professor at the Tuck school of Business at Dartmouth college 03 (David C., Spring 2003, Associate professor of government and adjunct associate professor at the Tuck school of Business at Dartmouth college, "Getting Asia Wrong: The need for new analytical frameworks", International Security, Vol. 27, No. 4, Accessed 5/18/10, JH & BH) Given the lack of evidence of Japanese balancing, might other countries in Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia-particularly South Korea and Vietnam-seek to balance China? First, if forced to choose between the United States and China, it is unclear which state either country would support. Second, the im-portance of the United States in curtailing an Asian arms race may be over-stated. If the United States pulls out of the region, China could take a greater role in organizing the system, and the countries of Northeast Asia and South-east Asia would adjust-with order preserved. Realist theories would predict that both South Korea and Vietnam should welcome the United States and fear China. Yet this understates the historically complex relationship between these two countries and China. Both South Korea and Vietnam, while wary of China, are not obviously balancing against it. Historically, both have been forced to adjust to China even while attempting to retain autonomy, and this will most likely be true in the future as well. Both South Korea and Vietnam are known for their stubborn nationalism, gritty determination, and proud history as countries independent from China .72 From this perspective, it would probably be more surprising if they tried to balance against China by siding with the United States than it would be if they found a means of accommodating Beijing. North Korea has consistently had better diplomatic relations with China than with any of its other communist patrons. In addition, China has managed to retain close relations with North Korea despite Beijing's recognition of South Korea and the rapid development of cultural and economic ties between South Korea and China. South Korea has shown considerable deference to China, es-pecially in its reluctance to give full support to U.S. plans for theater missile defense (TMD).73 Moreover, South Korean military planning-even the distant planning for postunification defense-has focused on maritime threats, not on a possible Chinese land invasion. 74 The anti-American demonstrations in late 2002 over the U.S. bases in South Korea reveal the complexity of Seoul's rela-tionship with Washington. In addition, many in South Korea's business com-munity see their future in China and have increasingly oriented their strategies in this direction, rather than toward the United States. 52 MGW 2010 JHuang BHicks Threat-Con Aff A2: China Balancing Theory Vietnam No China balancing Vietnam proves Kang professor at the Tuck school of Business at Dartmouth college 03 (David C., Spring 2003, Associate professor of government and adjunct associate professor at the Tuck school of Business at Dartmouth college, "Getting Asia Wrong: The need for new analytical frameworks", International Security, Vol. 27, No. 4, Accessed 5/18/10, JH & BH) Regarding Vietnam, political scientist Ang Cheng Guan notes that "[in 1960] Ho Chi Minh appealed to Khrushchev to accede to the Chinese because, ac-cording to Ho, China was a big country.... Khrushchev retorted that the So-viet Union was by no means a small country. Ho replied, 'For us it is doubly difficult. Don't forget, China is our neighbor."'7" Political scientist Kim Ninh writes that although "China remains the biggest external security threat to Vietnam . . . Vietnam is doing its best to cultivate friendly bilateral relations and is engaging in talks over a number of contentious issues between the two countries."7' Like North and South Korea, Vietnam shows no obvious signs of preparing to balance against a rising China. Also like the Koreas, Vietnam has historically stood in the shadow of China, and its relationship with China is both nuanced and complex. Ninh writes, "This love-hate, dependent-independent relationship with China is a fundamental factor in the Vietnamese conception of security."77 Today Vietnam is neither arming nor actively defending its border against China.78 The past three decades have seen conflict between the two nations: Vietnam fought a short but bloody war with China in 1979, and in 1988 the two countries engaged in a brief naval clash over the Spratly Islands. Both clashes, however, occurred under vastly different domestic and international condi-tions, and unlike the "people's war" for independence fought against the French and the United States, neither was all encompassing. By the 1990s, bor-der incidents between Vietnam and China had mostly disappeared, and unofficial border trade began to develop.79 The major security concern between Vietnam and China is the unresolved is-sue of control over the Spratly Islands, a potentially oil-rich group of islands in the South China Sea. Yet Vietnamese and Chinese leaders have met annually since the normalization of relations between their countries in 1991, despite differences over the Spratlys, and relations have improved steadily over time. Ang Cheng Guan notes that "it is unlikely that the two countries [Vietnam and China] will engage in another military clash over their South China Sea dis-pute."s" In other areas, Vietnam has sought to take China's perspective into its decisionmaking calculus, as well. For example, when Vietnam joined ASEAN in 1995, Vietnam's deputy foreign minister explicitly told reporters that his country's entry should not worry China.8' The case of Vietnam shows that relations between dominant and secondary states do not necessarily have to be warm-accommodation can be grudging, as well. Since 1991, trade and other forms of economic cooperation have devel-oped steadily between China and Vietnam. By 1997, this trade totaled $1.44 bil-lion, and China had invested an estimated $102 million in Vietnam.2" In 1999 the two countries signed a tourism cooperation plapresen, allowing Chinese nation-als to enter Vietnam without visas.8" China also signed an economic agreement with Vietnam in 2000, providing $55.25 million to upgrade the Thai Nguyen Steel Company and other industrial plants in Vietnam."4 Thus indications are that Vietnam and China are developing a stable relationship. 53 MGW 2010 JHuang BHicks Threat-Con Aff A2: China Balancing Theory Southeast Asian States No China balancing Southeast Asian States prove Kang professor at the Tuck school of Business at Dartmouth college 03 (David C., Spring 2003, Associate professor of government and adjunct associate professor at the Tuck school of Business at Dartmouth college, "Getting Asia Wrong: The need for new analytical frameworks", International Security, Vol. 27, No. 4, Accessed 5/18/10, JH & BH) Nor do other Southeast Asian states seem to be balancing China. Although In-donesia, Malaysia, and Singapore all provide naval facilities to the United 79. States, these countries also have deep economic and cultural ties with China, and none has shown an inclination to balance against it. Goldstein writes that Vietnam and the Philippines have joined ASEAN and repaired relations with the United States to counter possible Chinese influence, although he admits that this is a far cry from what actual alliances would offer. He writes that "[the Philippines], like other ASEAN states, neither has embraced a simple-minded strategy that treats China as an implacable foe to be balanced at all costs. Instead, both simultaneously engage China while hedging their bets."85 A dozen years is perhaps too short a time to predict that no country in Asia will seek to balance against China. Although U.S. power in the region may be a complicating factor, there is ample evidence that, contrary to the expectations of some realists, other Asian nations do not fear China. Scholars must begin to address this seeming anomaly. As James Przystup writes, "It is highly unlikely that Japan or America's other allies in the region are prepared to join in a con-certed containment strategy aimed at China.... They have voiced their appre-hension that actions taken in Washington could cause them to be confronted with difficult choices ."86 The existence of a U.S. alliance system that helps to reassure Asian allies of their security is insufficient to explain the dynamics of the entire region, and scholarship that explores Sino-Asian relations promises to be a fruitful line of inquiry into perceptions, strategies, and alliances in the region.'7 54 MGW 2010 JHuang BHicks Threat-Con Aff A2: Nuclear Umbrella Checks Balancing Nuclear Umbrella argument contradicts realist theory. Should have occurred already & is not based on logical evidence. Kang professor at the Tuck school of Business at Dartmouth college 03 (David C., Spring 2003, Associate professor of government and adjunct associate professor at the Tuck school of Business at Dartmouth college, "Getting Asia Wrong: The need for new analytical frameworks", International Security, Vol. 27, No. 4, Accessed 5/18/10, JH & BH) The U.S. umbrella explanation is also unconvincing, for at least two reasons. First, it does not explain why the second largest economic power in the inter-national system would trust the world's only superpower to provide for its se-curity . Threats arise through the mere existence of capabilities-intentions can always change for the worse.57 As Robert Jervis writes, "Minds can be changed, new leaders can come to power, values can shift, new opportunities and dangers can arise."5" A weak, peaceful country may alter its goals as it be-comes stronger. Second, the umbrella explanation fails to account for why Japan did not doubt the U.S. commitment to its security in the past. Argu-ments about the U.S. umbrella implicitly assume that Japan is realist and would rearm if the United States departed the region. If this is true, and if there is no other factor that keeps Japanese foreign policy from becoming more as-sertive , then Japan should have rearmed at least a decade ago, when the Japa-nese economy was at its height and when Tokyo had many reasons to doubt the U.S. commitment to its defense. A Japanese policymaker in 1985 might have concluded that, given the previ-ous fifteen years or so of negative signals from Washington, the U.S. commit-ment to Japan was unlikely to endure. In 1969 President Richard Nixon had called for "Asia for Asians" and began a major drawdown of U.S. troops and commitments to the region." By 1985 Japan had seen the United States aban-don South Vietnam, withdraw recognition of Taiwan, and pull half of its troops out of South Korea. In the mid-1980s U.S. concern over Japanese trading and economic policies was at its peak. This concern manifested itself in intense U.S. pressure on Japan to alter some of its economic agreements, among them the 1985 Plaza Accords that attempted to devalue the yen relative to the dollar, and the 1988 Structural Impediments Initiative that sought to force changes in Japan's domestic economic practices."' In addition, the United States had be-gun to pressure Japan over "burden sharing" and attempted to make the Japa-nese pay more for the U.S. troops already deployed. All these indicators suggested that the United States would cease to be a reliable ally of Japan. In addition, Japanese economic growth was at its highest, national sentiment about Japan's future was increasingly optimistic, and Japan was by some mea-sures a better technological and manufacturing country than the United States. 55 MGW 2010 JHuang BHicks Threat-Con Aff ****A2 Korean War**** 56 MGW 2010 JHuang BHicks Threat-Con Aff No Risk of Korean War Resources No risk of a second Korean war No resources Kang professor at the Tuck school of Business at Dartmouth college 03 (David C., Sept. 03, Associate professor of government and adjunct associate professor at the Tuck school of Business at Dartmouth college, "International Relations Theory and the Second Korean War", International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 3, Date accessed: 5/18, JH & BH) Ever since the first Korean war in 1950, scholars and policymakers have been predicting a second one, started by an invasion from the North. Whether seen as arising from preventive, preemptive, desperation, or simple aggressive motivations, the predominant perspective in the west sees North Korea as likely to instigate conflict. Yet for fifty years North Korea has not come close to starting a war. Why were so many scholars so consistently wrong about North Korea's intentions? Social scientists can learn as much from events that did not happen as from those that did. The case of North Korea provides a window with which to examine these theories of conflict initiation, and reveals how the assumptions underlying these theories can become mis-specified. Either scholars misunderstood the initial conditions, or they misunderstood the theory, and I show that scholars have made mistakes in both areas. Social science moves forward from clear statement of a theory, its causal logic, and its predictions. However, just as important is the rigorous assessment of a theory, especially if the predictions fail to materialize. North Korea never had the material capabilities to be a serious contender to the U.S.-ROK alliance, and it quickly fell further behind. The real question has not been whether North Korea would preempt as South Korea caught up, but instead why North Korea might fight as it fell further and further behind. The explanation for a half-century of stability and peace on the Korean peninsula is actually quite simple: deterrence works. 57 MGW 2010 JHuang BHicks Threat-Con Aff No Risk of Korean War West IR theory false No risk of Korean war Western IR doesn't apply to the Korean peninsula Kang professor at the Tuck school of Business at Dartmouth college 03 (David C., Sept. 03, Associate professor of government and adjunct associate professor at the Tuck school of Business at Dartmouth college, "International Relations Theory and the Second Korean War", International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 3, Date accessed: 5/18, JH & BH) Science learns from surprise. Ever since the first Korean war in 1950 scholars and policymakers have been predicting a second one, started by an invasion from the North. The Defense Intelligence Agency (1997) has consistently considered a Korean war to be the primary near-term military concern of the United States, and with the revelations of a nuclear weapons program by North Korea in October 2002, the most recent worry is that North Korea may engage in a missile attack on the United States (The Economist, 1997; Ikle, 1998; Jordan, 1998; Eberstadt, 1999; Friedberg, 1999). A good example of this approach comes from Richard Betts (1994:66): Since the direct attack in 1950, Pyongyang has frequently demonstrated its risk propensity in more consistently reckless provocations than any other government in the world.... Today pessimists worry about a North Korean nuclear weapons program. Would any government be more willing to do wild and crazy things with such weapons than the one that so regularly perpetrates acts like those mentioned above? This is just the latest of a long series of dark predictions about an increasingly risk-acceptant North Korea. Earlier scenarios under which scholars have expected North Korea to invade include the 1961 military coup d'etat in South Korea by Park Chung-hee that followed a year of turmoil in the South, the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea under the Nixon doctrine of the early 1970s, the assassination of Park Chung-hee by his own security forces in 1979, the military coup d' tat by Chun Doohwan in 1980, the mass demonstrations for democracy in 1986-87, and the nuclear crisis of 1992-94.1 Whether seen as arising from preventive, preemptive, desperation, or simple aggressive motivations, the predominant perspective in the west sees North Korea as likely to instigate conflict. The theoretical underpinnings for these expectations come from theories of preventive war and power transitions (Cha, 1999a). Consider Norman Levin's (1990:42) assessment of North Korea: "the closing window of opportunity may cause an increasingly desperate North Korea to launch an attack before it's too late." This is hardly a new worry: fourteen years earlier, in 1978, Hakjoon Kim (1978:153) wrote that "the North is under increasing pressure to act soon. The Pyongyang regime might believe that if it fails to attack sooner or later, at least during the period when it enjoys the only real advantage over the South-its lead in military capability-it will inevitably lose in the long run." Yet for fifty years North Korea has not come close to starting a war. This raises a question: why were so many scholars so consistently wrong about North Korea's intentions? Social scientists can learn as much from events that did not happen as from those that did. The case of North Korea provides a window with which to examine these theories of conflict initiation, and reveals how the assumptions underlying these theories can become mis-specified . Either scholars misunderstood the initial conditions, or they misunderstood the theory, and I show that scholars have made mistakes in both areas. It is not surprising that the pessimists about North Korea have been wrong for the past thirty years because they misapplied power transition and preventive war theories to derive their pessimistic predictions. Upon closer examination, none of these theories was applicable to the Korean case. North Korea never had the material capabilities to be a serious contender to the U.S.- ROK alliance, and it quickly fell further behind. So the real question has not been whether North Korea would preempt as South Korea caught up, but instead why North Korea might fight as it fell further and further behind. To paraphrase William Wohlforth (1994:99), "theorists tended to concentrate on dynamic challengers and moribund defenders. But in Korea the North was the moribund challenger, and the South was the rising defender." 58 MGW 2010 JHuang BHicks Threat-Con Aff No Risk of Korean War Statistics No risk of war Most common measures agree with us Kang professor at the Tuck school of Business at Dartmouth college 03 (David C., Sept. 03, Associate professor of government and adjunct associate professor at the Tuck school of Business at Dartmouth college, "International Relations Theory and the Second Korean War", International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 3, Date accessed: 5/18, JH & BH) Thus the most common measures of power in international relations -economic size and defense spending-show quite clearly that North Korea was never larger than South Korea, has been smaller on both an absolute and a per capita basis than the South for at least thirty years, and continues to fall further behind . The onus is on power transition or preventive war theorists to explain the theoretical reasons that lead to the prediction that North Korea-having waited fifty years-would finally attack now that it is one-twentieth the size of the South. In military capabilities North and South Korea were in rough parity for the first two decades following the war, and then the North began to fall behind . Figure 4 shows the number of men in the armed forces from 1963 to 1998. Most interesting is that North Korea did not begin its massive expansion of its armed forces until well into the 1970s. This is most probably a response to its falling further behind the South. But for the past thirty years, North Korea's training, equipment, and overall military quality has steadily deteriorated relative to the South. The South Korean military is better equipped, better trained, and more versatile with better logistics and support than the North Korean military, and some assessments suggest that this may double combat effectiveness (Dupuy, 1990). Although the military has continued to hold pride of place in the North Korean economy, there have been increasing reports of reduced training due to the economic problems. Joong-Ang Ilbo, one of South Korea's major daily newspapers, quoted an unidentified Defense Ministry official as saying that North Korea's air force had made a hundred training sorties per day in 1996, down from three hundred to four hundred before the end of 1995, and that the training maneuvers of ground troops had also been reduced to a "minimum level."4 American military officials have noted that individual North Korean pilots take one training flight per month, far less than the ten flights per month that U.S. pilots take.5 This drastically degrades combat readiness. 59 MGW 2010 JHuang BHicks Threat-Con Aff No Risk of Korean War Theories False No war Theories make false assertions Kang professor at the Tuck school of Business at Dartmouth college 03 (David C., Sept. 03, Associate professor of government and adjunct associate professor at the Tuck school of Business at Dartmouth college, "International Relations Theory and the Second Korean War", International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 3, Date accessed: 5/18, JH & BH) When outright North Korean invasion began to appear unlikely, scholars fell back on preventive war, and then preemptive war, the madman hypothesis, and then the desperation hypothesis as reasons to view the North as the aggressor. Yet for fifty years the reality on the Korean peninsula has falsified these predictions one by one. Deterrence on the peninsula has been strong enough to swamp any other potential causes of war on the peninsula, and continues to be so today. This study has shown that scholars need to be self-conscious in their application of assumptions and causal logic. If a well-specified theory such as preventive war or power transition does not appear to be borne out by the empirical record, scholars should acknowledge this and attempt to understand why . Although North Korea is merely one case, it is an important case and one that has figured prominently in the scholarly literature. Preventive war and power transition theories actually predict that North Korea will not undertake adventurous actions. However, scholars have consistently misapplied these theories to the Korean peninsula. Scholars should pay closer attention to the antecedent conditions of the theories, and also be more self-conscious about the behavioral variables that implicitly carry the bulk of the argument. The literature has focused on measuring power, and less energy has been spent on measuring satisfaction with the status quo. If perceptions and intentions matter, then the theory should explicitly state how these behavioral variables relate to the timing, sequence, and intensity of the preventive motivation. Scholars should not let these variables sneak in and do the heavy lifting. 60 MGW 2010 JHuang BHicks Threat-Con Aff No Risk of Korean War General No risk of war If NK wanted nukes, they could've gotten it before Kang professor at the Tuck school of Business at Dartmouth college 03 (David C., Sept. 03, Associate professor of government and adjunct associate professor at the Tuck school of Business at Dartmouth college, "International Relations Theory and the Second Korean War", International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 3, Date accessed: 5/18, JH & BH) If North Korea is seeking accommodation with the rest of the world, why did they re-start their nuclear weapons program ? In a climate where the U.S. calls North Korea a terrorist nation and top U.S. officials such as Rumsfeld discuss war on the peninsula, it is no surprise that the North feels threatened. If North Korea really wanted to develop nuclear weapons, it would have done so long ago. Rather, it restarted its program as a deterrent to U.S. "preemptive action" against it. 61 ...
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This note was uploaded on 02/23/2012 for the course DEBATE 101 taught by Professor None during the Spring '12 term at Berkeley.

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MGW10-LCP-Korea-Threat-Construction-ADV - MGW 2010 JHuang...

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