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MGW10-LCP-NFU-NEG - MGW 2010 Kevin Kim Joseph Behm Sean...

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MGW 2010 NFU Case Negative Kevin Kim, Joseph Behm, Sean Hammond Lingel/Coburn-Paolo NFU Case Negative NFU Frontline (1/6) ................................................................................................................................................................ 1 NFU Frontline (2/6) ................................................................................................................................................................ 3 NFU Frontline (3/6) ................................................................................................................................................................ 4 NFU Frontline (4/6) ................................................................................................................................................................ 5 NFU Frontline (5/6) ................................................................................................................................................................ 5 NFU Frontline (6/6) ................................................................................................................................................................ 6 NFU Bad Ext. ......................................................................................................................................................................... 7 Softline Fails ........................................................................................................................................................................... 8 Diplomacy Fails ...................................................................................................................................................................... 9 Negotiations Fail ................................................................................................................................................................... 10 NFU Doesn’t Solve ............................................................................................................................................................... 11 Deterrence Solves Ext. .......................................................................................................................................................... 12 Deterrence Solves Ext. .......................................................................................................................................................... 13 Deterrence Solves Ext. .......................................................................................................................................................... 14 Deterrence Solves Proliferation ............................................................................................................................................. 15 Hardline Solves ..................................................................................................................................................................... 16 Hardline Solves ..................................................................................................................................................................... 17 NFU = Proliferation .............................................................................................................................................................. 18 NFU = Proliferation .............................................................................................................................................................. 19 Impact Ext. ............................................................................................................................................................................ 20 NFU Frontline (1/6) NO solvency 100% of the risk of having to retaliate---threats of nuclear retaliation make North Korea increase their nuclear security--- 1
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MGW 2010 NFU Case Negative Kevin Kim, Joseph Behm, Sean Hammond Lingel/Coburn-Paolo Corr,04 (Anders Corr, Ph.D. in Government from Harvard University, August 11, 2004, “Retaliation Against Nuclear Terror: A Negligence Doctrine,” online: http://www.foreignpolicysociety.org/workingpapers/WP7-- Corr.pdf ) The loss of fissile material that is then used against another city, when that fissile material is not stored according to global standards, is a case of wanton and culpable negligence. Culpable negligence is “recklessness or carelessness resulting in injury or deat h, as imports a thoughtless disregard of consequences or a heedless indifference to the safety and rights of others.” Wanton negligence is “an intentional act of an unreasonable character in disregard of a risk know n, or so obvious that it must have been known, and so great as to make it highly probably that harm would follow. The act is usually accompanied by a conscious indifference to the consequences amounting almost to willingness that they shall follow.”6 These basic legal precepts should translate seamlessly to international law. While we would hope that those persons entrusted with nuclear proliferation decisions and storage facilities in Russia, North Korea, and Pakistan do not want their fissile material stolen and used against the United States or one of its allies, we cannot know for certain that this is not the case . The repeated proliferation and lax security of negligent states makes a strong argument for indifference and criminal liability, for which the state can be the only culpable party under international law. The threat of a nuclear response to nuclear terrorism is not unlike the threat of nuclear retaliation during the Cold War. Since 1949 when the Soviets detonated their first nuclear device, this threat chastened the actions of the great powers. A similar threat would chasten proliferators and those with insecure storage facilities. While not absolutely necessary, evidence of a particular state’s malfeasance would make the liability abundantly clear. 2
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MGW 2010 NFU Case Negative Kevin Kim, Joseph Behm, Sean Hammond Lingel/Coburn-Paolo NFU Frontline (2/6) Extending an NFU to North Korea will incentivize the transfer of materials to terrorists groups which will culminate to nuclear extinction. This makes our threats credible and accepted internationally.
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