MGW10-LCP-US-Politics-Korea-LINKS

MGW10-LCP-US-Politics-Korea-LINKS - MGW 2010 Hegarty Korea...

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MGW 2010 Korea Politics Hegarty 6/30/10 1NC Politics Korea Link: Decreasing war efforts costs leaders political capital. Stanley, 09 (Elizabeth A., Assistant Professor at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and Department of Government at Georgetown University, Summer, “Ending the Korean War: The Role of Domestic Internally, entrapment may be the result of having to answer to hawkish constituencies or, more benignly, from having “spun up” the population to mobilize for war.50 Unless the war ends quickly, leaders must expend political capital to enact policies—such as demonizing the enemy and mobilizing the armed forces—to ease the process of waging war. The more political capital leaders expend, the more they convince their constituents that ª fighting the war is the right thing to do . But while manipulating perceptions helps to sustain the war effort, it hampers peacemaking. The leader is likely to pay a domestic political price—a domestic audience cost—if he backs down. 51 Even if the governing coalition wants to de-escalate, other political challengers can capitalize on enemy stereotypes and accuse the coalition of “being soft” on the adversary.52 Uniqueness: Obama cannot make meaningful changes to US policy in the Koreas without sacrificing anther part of his overloaded agenda. Shen, 09 (Dingli, Professor of International Relations, Executive Dean of the Institute of International Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai, & Director of Center for American Studies at Fudan University, October, “Cooperative Denuclearization toward North Korea”, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 32 No. 4, pg. 181, FT & RV) Washington has long viewed North Korea as an ‘‘axis of evil’’ or an ‘‘outpost of tyranny.’’8 Such terminology is unhelpful while trying to resolve problems with North Korea. In this regard, the Obama administration’s approach to dialogue, even with North Korea, has offered a better alternative to cope with the regime. Yet, the Obama administration seems to have taken a strange ‘‘benign neglect’’ stance toward North Korea under the generally positive framework of dialogue. The White House seems uninterested in engaging with North Korea further and would rather wait until either North Korea steps forward with a rational attitude or China twists its arm to act more forcefully.9 Though this stance was not responsible for North Korea’s second nuclear test_since Pyongyang seems adamant on acquiring nuclear weapons the current administration’s ‘‘benign neglect’’ produces the equivalent effect of the previous administration’s earlier refusal to engage bilaterally with North Korea. The Obama administration has rightfully been focusing more on the financial and economic crises, while tackling a loaded foreign policy agenda that includes resetting relations with Russia, codifying a
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MGW10-LCP-US-Politics-Korea-LINKS - MGW 2010 Hegarty Korea...

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