CP AFF REVOKE CONSENT ANJALI 16

CP AFF REVOKE CONSENT ANJALI 16 - Whitman National Debate...

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Whitman National Debate Institute 1 AT: REVOKE CONSENT & COURTS COUNTERPLANS AT: Revoke Consent & Courts Counterplans
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No Solvency – Revoking Consent ( ) Iraq proves that consent is not necessary for military presence. Adam Roberts, “Transformative Military Occupation,” 100 A.J.I.L. 580, July 2006 There was a precedent, of sorts, in Iraq: the "safe haven" established in northern Iraq in 1991. The U.S.-led military intervention that began on April 17, 1991, resulting in the establishment of the zone, enjoyed neither the specific authorization of the UN Security Council, nor, initially, the consent of the Iraqi government, whose forces had only a few months before been repulsed from Kuwait. After the initial phase, northern Iraq was protected from Iraqi government incursions almost entirely through the establishment of a U.S.-initiated air exclusion zone. The history of this protected zone illustrates certain transformative possibilities of foreign military involvement. However, the zone never assumed the character of anything approaching a full occupation regime. Initiated to enable large numbers of refugees from the region to return home, it resulted in the application of enough coalition military pressure to keep Hussein's [*605] forces out of northern Iraq, enabling the Iraqi Kurds to develop their own administrative structures in the region. Here, indeed, was a transformation facilitated by a foreign military role: but that role took the form of a short-term military presence on the ground, followed by a more remote one in the air that could not be viewed as an occupation. Transformation as one basis of the decision to use force in Iraq. The military operations launched in Iraq on March 19-20, 2003, raised numerous issues relating to the jus ad bellum. These are not reviewed here, partly because of the familiar principle that the laws of war apply irrespective of the legality or otherwise of the original resort to force. However, one question must be briefly addressed: is transformation a legitimate reason for resorting to force? This question is distinct from whether transformation is a legitimate goal once force has (for whatever reason) been used. The case of Iraq confirms that a complex mixture of political motives may underlie intervention, and a no less complicated mixture of legal and other justifications. The U.S.-led invasion followed a prolonged and confused legal-cum-political debate, in which the stated purposes of intervention varied not just over time, but also within and between different U.S. agencies and participating states.
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Whitman National Debate Institute 3 AT: REVOKE CONSENT & COURTS COUNTERPLANS No Solvency – Revoking Consent ( ) Afghanistan proves that government consent is not necessary for military presence. Gordon
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This note was uploaded on 02/23/2012 for the course DEBATE 101 taught by Professor None during the Spring '12 term at University of California, Berkeley.

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CP AFF REVOKE CONSENT ANJALI 16 - Whitman National Debate...

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