Heg Good-Bad Updates - HEG GOOD/BAD WAVE 4 HEG GOOD/BAD WAVE

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Unformatted text preview: HEG GOOD/BAD WAVE 4 HEG GOOD/BAD WAVE 4................................................................................................................................... 1 A2: HEG UNSUSTAINABLE (GENERIC)............................................................................................................. 13 1. Short term loss of Hegemony outweighs the international system would become a global game of Calvinball with all countries seeking to project their own power guarantees world-wide conflicts that have no check for escalation......................................................................................................................................13 2. US hegemony is guaranteed economics and interdependence................................................................13 3. Declinism is exaggerated Our argument is empirically proven in the context of demographics ..............14 A2: IMPERIAL OVERSTRETCH.......................................................................................................................... 15 1. Short term loss of Hegemony outweighs the international system would become a global game of Calvinball with all countries seeking to project their own power guarantees world-wide conflicts that have no check for escalation......................................................................................................................................15 2. Heg is sustainable hegemonic cooperation................................................................................................15 3. Dominant sea power prevents balancing comprehensive historical studies prove...................................15 A2: ECONOMIC OPENESS................................................................................................................................. 16 1. We control the biggest internal link military power ensures other countries follow the US-led system the reason the global economy is in place is because the US has labored to create an economically liberal order...................................................................................................................................................................16 2. Interdependence maintains US power..........................................................................................................16 3. Other nations' economic competitiveness doesn't translate to major hegemonic threat Japan proves...16 4. Hegemony is sustainable even if the US declines economically..................................................................16 A2: ECONOMIC OPENESS................................................................................................................................. 17 A2: EXCESSIVE DEFENSE SPENDING................................................................................................................ 18 1. Short term loss of Hegemony outweighs the world would collapse into chaos as countries lose faith in international security there's always a risk that reforms to spending in the future can check.......................18 2. Heg is sustainable hegemonic cooperation................................................................................................18 3. Disproven by the past recessions the US always comes out on top.........................................................18 A2: EXCESSIVE DEFENSE SPENDING................................................................................................................ 19 4. If worse comes to worst, latent power will fill in.............................................................................................19 A2: DEBT/DEFICIT............................................................................................................................................ 20 1. Short term loss of Hegemony outweighs the world would collapse into chaos as countries lose faith in international security there's always a risk that reforms to spending in the future can check.......................20 2. Heg is sustainable hegemonic cooperation................................................................................................20 3. Disproven by the past recessions the US always comes out on top.........................................................20 A2: DEBT/DEFICIT............................................................................................................................................ 21 4. Recession is irrelevant--we control every sector and everyone needs us..................................................21 A2: DEMOGRAPHICS........................................................................................................................................ 22 1. Short term loss of Hegemony outweighs the world would collapse into chaos as countries lose faith in international security .........................................................................................................................................22 2. Demographics go our way.............................................................................................................................22 A2: DEMOGRAPHICS........................................................................................................................................ 23 3. Our argument is empirically proven ..............................................................................................................23 A2: ECONOMIC CRISIS..................................................................................................................................... 25 1. Hegemony is still credible in the Status Quo this is just an argument for why the maintaining it now is key - countries will see leadership in this crisis as a test case of US primacy.................................................25 2. Declinism is exaggerated the US will maintain hegemony .......................................................................25 -other countries are bandwagoning and distrust China.....................................................................................25 -the US will remain the largest economy..........................................................................................................25 -the US will maintain military superiority...........................................................................................................25 A2: ECONOMIC CRISIS..................................................................................................................................... 26 3. Our argument is empirically proven in the context of demographics ...........................................................26 4. Their evidence is from a Professor of Computer science citing an interview with Noam Chomsky who has an ideological bias prefer our qualified authors..............................................................................................27 A2: IRAN........................................................................................................................................................... 28 1. Hegemony is still credible in the Status Quo this is just an argument for why the maintaining it now is key - countries will see leadership in this crisis as a test case of US primacy.................................................28 2. US hegemony is guaranteed economics and interdependence ...............................................................28 3. Leadership will be maintained even if some non-great power defy us empirically proven by Iraq, Afghanistan, Vietnam, North Korea, and Cuba our evidence just speaks to preventing great power competition.........................................................................................................................................................28 4. Heg is sustainable hegemonic cooperation................................................................................................28 A2: LAUNDRY LIST........................................................................................................................................... 29 1. Short term loss of Hegemony outweighs it would cause global chaos as countries lose faith in international security makes tense relations like Indo-Pak and China-Taiwan spark into conflict ...............29 2. Declinism is exaggerated the US will maintain hegemony .......................................................................29 -other countries are bandwagoning and distrust China.....................................................................................29 -the US will remain the largest economy..........................................................................................................29 -the US will maintain military superiority...........................................................................................................29 A2: LAUNDRY LIST........................................................................................................................................... 30 3. Our argument is empirically proven in the context of demographics ...........................................................30 A2: LAUNDRY LIST........................................................................................................................................... 31 4. If worse comes to worst, latent power will fill in.............................................................................................31 A2: MIDDLE POWERS....................................................................................................................................... 32 1. Short term loss of Hegemony outweighs - it would cause global chaos as countries lose faith in international security makes tense relations like Indo-Pak and China-Taiwan spark into conflict ...............32 2. Heg is sustainable hegemonic cooperation................................................................................................32 3. There's a reason they're called "middle powers" our evidence speaks to great power competition as the main threat they're the only ones who can cause escalation........................................................................32 4. Dominant sea power prevents balancing comprehensive historical studies prove...................................32 A2: OBAMA WEAKNESS.................................................................................................................................... 33 1. Hegemony is still credible in the Status Quo this is just an argument for why the maintaining it now is key - countries will see leadership as a test case of US primacy.....................................................................33 2. Hegemonic cooperation maintains leadership..............................................................................................33 3. Economics and interdependence guarantee Hegemony.............................................................................33 A2: OBAMA WEAKNESS.................................................................................................................................... 34 3. Smart power approach will maintain Hegemony...........................................................................................34 A2: TRANSITION FROM MILITARY POWER......................................................................................................35 1. Spread of democracy, free trade, and economic liberalization shows that leadership is strong this is just an argument for why Hegemony can adapt .....................................................................................................35 2. US hegemony is guaranteed economics and interdependence ...............................................................35 A2: TRANSITION FROM MILITARY POWER......................................................................................................36 3. Smart power approach will maintain Hegemony...........................................................................................36 4. Dominant sea power prevents balancing comprehensive historical studies prove...................................36 A2: IRAQ/WOT................................................................................................................................................. 37 1. Hegemony is still credible in the Status Quo this is just an argument for why the maintaining it now is key - countries will see leadership as a test case of US primacy.....................................................................37 2. US hegemony is guaranteed economics and interdependence ...............................................................37 3. Vietnam proves that US leadership will be maintained in spite of an ill-perceived military occupation.......37 4. Dominant sea power prevents balancing comprehensive historical studies prove...................................37 A2: NO ECONOMIC POWER.............................................................................................................................. 38 A2: HISTORICAL EXAMPLES............................................................................................................................. 39 HEG SUSTAINABLE MORE EVIDENCE........................................................................................................... 40 Hegemony is sustainable no external force can collapse or balance against it............................................40 HEG SUSTAINABLE MORE EVIDENCE........................................................................................................... 42 Other nations will always perceive the U.S. as a hegemon..............................................................................42 HEG SUSTAINABLE MORE EVIDENCE........................................................................................................... 43 Hegemony is sustainable it's only a question of restraint..............................................................................43 Hegemony is sustainable military superiority and demographics - Their claims are exaggerated...............43 HEG SUSTAINABLE MORE EVIDENCE........................................................................................................... 44 Their evidence doesn't assume demographics America will maintain its lead..............................................44 Declinism is exaggerated Our argument is empirically proven in the context of demographics ..................44 **OFFSHORE BALANCING BAD**.................................................................................................................... 46 RUSSIAN CONFLICT......................................................................................................................................... 47 Offshore balancing causes U.S.-Russian conflict.............................................................................................47 Kagan, 08 -- Adjunct Professor of History at Georgetown University, Senior fellow at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Robert, "End of Dreams, Return of History", Hoover Institution, 2008, July 27th 2010, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6136, KONTOPOULOS)................................47 In Europe, too, the departure of the United States from the scene -- even if it remained the world's most powerful nation -- could be destabilizing. It could tempt Russia to an even more overbearing and potentially forceful approach to unruly nations on its periphery. Although some realist theorists seem to imagine that the disappearance of the Soviet Union put an end to the possibility of confrontation between Russia and the West, and therefore to the need for a permanent American role in Europe, history suggests that conflicts in Europe involving Russia are possible even without Soviet communism. If the United States withdrew from Europe -- if it adopted what some call a strategy of "offshore balancing" -- this could in time increase the likelihood of conflict involving Russia and its near neighbors, which could in turn draw the United States back in under unfavorable circumstances..................................................................................................................47 Extinction............................................................................................................................................................47 Bostrom, 02 -Ph.D. and Professor at Oxford University (Nick, March, www.transhumanist.com/volume9/risks.html)...................................................................................................47 A2: SOLVES ME INSTABILITY........................................................................................................................... 48 Offshore balancing doesn't solve Middle Eastern stability................................................................................48 Kagan, 08 -- Adjunct Professor of History at Georgetown University, Senior fellow at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Robert, "End of Dreams, Return of History", Hoover Institution, 2008, July 27th 2010, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6136, KONTOPOULOS)................................48 It is also optimistic to imagine that a retrenchment of the American position in the Middle East and the assumption of a more passive, "offshore" role would lead to greater stability there. The vital interest the United States has in access to oil and the role it plays in keeping access open to other nations in Europe and Asia make it unlikely that American leaders could or would stand back and hope for the best while the powers in the region battle it out. Nor would a more "even-handed" policy toward Israel, which some see as the magic key to unlocking peace, stability, and comity in the Middle East, obviate the need to come to Israel 's aid if its security became threatened. That commitment, paired with the American commitment to protect strategic oil supplies for most of the world, practically ensures a heavy American military presence in the region, both on the seas and on the ground......................................................................................................48 A2: SOLVES CONFLICT..................................................................................................................................... 49 The subtraction of American power from any region would not end conflict but would simply change the equation. In the Middle East, competition for influence among powers both inside and outside the region has raged for at least two centuries. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism doesn 't change this. It only adds a new and more threatening dimension to the competition, which neither a sudden end to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians nor an immediate American withdrawal from Iraq would change. The alternative to American predominance in the region is not balance and peace. It is further competition. The region and the states within it remain relatively weak. A diminution of American influence would not be followed by a diminution of other external influences. One could expect deeper involvement by both China and Russia, if only to secure their interests. 18 And one could also expect the more powerful states of the region, particularly Iran, to expand and fill the vacuum. It is doubtful that any American administration would voluntarily take actions that could shift the balance of power in the Middle East further toward Russia, China, or Iran. The world hasn 't changed that much. An American withdrawal from Iraq will not return things to "normal" or to a new kind of stability in the region. It will produce a new instability, one likely to draw the United States back in again. The alternative to American regional predominance in the Middle East and elsewhere is not a new regional stability. In an era of burgeoning nationalism, the future is likely to be one of intensified competition among nations and nationalist movements. Difficult as it may be to extend American predominance into the future, no one should imagine that a reduction of American power or a retraction of American influence and global involvement will provide an easier path...........................................................49 ECONOMIC COLLAPSE/NUKE WAR.................................................................................................................. 50 Offshore balancing fails and results in economic collapse and nuclear war....................................................50 Khalizad, 95 Former Ambassador to the U.N., Counselor at the Center for Strategic International Studies (Zalmay, "Losing the moment? The United States and the world after the cold war", The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 18, Issue 2, Spring 1995, July 27th 2010, KONTOPOULOS) PDF..........................................50 ECONOMIC COLLAPSE/NUKE WAR.................................................................................................................. 51 CONFLICTS....................................................................................................................................................... 52 Offshore balancing would immediately foster conflict across the globe Drezner, 03 Professor of international politics at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University (Daniel W., "The perils of hegemonic power", Danieldrezner.com, January 6th 2003, July 27th 2010, http://www.danieldrezner.com/archives/000450.html, KONTOPOULOS)..............................................52 **COUNTERBALANCING**............................................................................................................................... 53 2AC A2: COUNTERBALANCING LONG........................................................................................................... 54 1. No counter-balancing no country or group of countries can challenge the US.........................................54 2AC A2: COUNTERBALANCING LONG........................................................................................................... 55 3. Shared interests prove no country will balance.............................................................................................55 2AC A2: COUNTERBALANCING LONG........................................................................................................... 56 4. Even if there is a motive to balance, research on elite perceptions prove they still defer............................56 6. Statistical analysis of the past five hundred years prove our arguments......................................................56 7. Hegemony solves backlash from resentment...............................................................................................56 2AC A2: COUNTERBALANCING LONG........................................................................................................... 57 8. The methodology of the authors behind counter-balancing evidence is flawed and based on single indicators............................................................................................................................................................57 2AC A2: COUNTERBALANCING SHORT.........................................................................................................58 2. No counter-balancing no country or group of countries can challenge the US.........................................58 3. Even if there is a motive to balance, research on elite perceptions prove they still defer............................58 2AC A2: COUNTERBALANCING SHORT.........................................................................................................60 5. Statistical analysis of the past five hundred years prove our arguments......................................................60 A2: COUNTERBALANCING GENERIC.............................................................................................................. 61 Declinism is exaggerated the US will maintain hegemony ...........................................................................61 -other countries are bandwagoning and distrust China.....................................................................................61 -the US will remain the largest economy..........................................................................................................61 -the US will maintain military superiority...........................................................................................................61 A2: CHINA......................................................................................................................................................... 62 2. China's rise will result in other regional powers balancing against it............................................................62 3. China doesn't have the weapons and regional alliances aren't a threat......................................................62 A2: CHINA......................................................................................................................................................... 63 4. By the time China has the will or ability to challenge us, reform will change their calculus.........................63 5. China will not seek hegemony multiple warrants.......................................................................................63 A2: EU............................................................................................................................................................... 65 1. There are multiple constraints to EU balancing............................................................................................65 2. Your argument is both theoretically flawed and untrue.................................................................................65 A2: JAPAN......................................................................................................................................................... 66 1) Japan only has a defensive military that is limited by the constitution we wrote for them after World War II they could never overtake us militarily............................................................................................................66 2) Japan is not counter-balancing America.......................................................................................................66 3) No incentive to counter-balance doesn't fear U.S. power..........................................................................66 A2: INDIA.......................................................................................................................................................... 67 India won't counterbalance because they need us...........................................................................................67 A2: RUSSIA/CHINA ALLIANCE.......................................................................................................................... 68 2. Russia and China can't counter-balance the US...........................................................................................68 3. China and Russia won't prematurely balance against the US. ....................................................................68 A2: BRIC............................................................................................................................................................ 69 1) BRIC won't balance the U.S. internal competition, economic asymmetries, and differing interests........69 2) No risk of balancing little common interest or incentive to cooperate.......................................................69 A2: BRIC............................................................................................................................................................ 70 3) BRIC countries are actually drawing closer to the US or being balanced themselves................................70 4) BRIC is unable to balance the U.S................................................................................................................70 A2: ASEAN........................................................................................................................................................ 71 ASEAN will fail no established purpose and internal counterbalancing........................................................71 A2: WTO........................................................................................................................................................... 72 1) WTO fails and isn't cohesive no risk of balancing......................................................................................72 2) The WTO is already falling apart - it will die this year...................................................................................72 A2: SOFT BALANCING...................................................................................................................................... 73 2. Ignore soft balancing--it's not driven by hegemony.....................................................................................73 3. Soft balancing is a cheap cover-up for no balancing--there's no conceptual integrity or link to primacy...73 A2: INSTITUTIONS............................................................................................................................................ 75 International institutions fail--empirics, capability, people expect us to act.....................................................75 **HEG SOLVES**.............................................................................................................................................. 76 BENIGN............................................................................................................................................................. 77 LAUNDRY LIST.................................................................................................................................................. 78 WAR.................................................................................................................................................................. 79 SINOTAIWAN CONFLICT................................................................................................................................. 80 SINOTAIWAN CONFLICT................................................................................................................................. 81 EUROPE/RUSSIA............................................................................................................................................... 82 JAPAN NUKES................................................................................................................................................... 83 AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN................................................................................................................................ 84 KOREAN CONFLICT.......................................................................................................................................... 85 ECONOMY......................................................................................................................................................... 86 DEMOCRACY.................................................................................................................................................... 87 PROLIF.............................................................................................................................................................. 88 PIRACY.............................................................................................................................................................. 89 DISEASE............................................................................................................................................................ 90 WARMING......................................................................................................................................................... 91 ENVIRONMENT................................................................................................................................................. 93 Hegemony is key to multilateral environmental action a multipolar world doesn't elicit cooperation............93 **A2: HEG BAD IMPACT TURNS**................................................................................................................... 94 2AC A2: Heg > Nuke War (Alliances) ............................................................................................................ 95 1AR A2: Heg > Nuke War............................................................................................................................... 96 2AC A2: Heg > War........................................................................................................................................ 97 1AR A2: Heg > War........................................................................................................................................ 98 2AC A2: Heg > Preemptive Strikes................................................................................................................ 99 1AR A2: Heg > Preemptive Strikes.............................................................................................................. 100 2AC A2: Heg > Terrorism............................................................................................................................. 101 2AC A2: Heg > Terrorism............................................................................................................................. 102 1AR A2: Heg > Terrorism............................................................................................................................. 103 2AC A2: Heg > US China War....................................................................................................................... 104 2AC A2: Heg > US China War....................................................................................................................... 105 1AR A2: Heg > US China War....................................................................................................................... 106 2AC A2: Heg > Taiwan Draw In.................................................................................................................... 107 1AR A2: Heg > Taiwan Draw In.................................................................................................................... 108 2AC A2: Heg > Space Weaponization........................................................................................................... 109 1AR A2: Heg > Space Weaponization........................................................................................................... 110 2AC A2: Heg > North Korea Nuke War.........................................................................................................111 1AR A2: Heg > North Korea Nuke War.........................................................................................................112 2AC A2: Heg> Iraqi Instability...................................................................................................................... 113 2AC A2: Heg> Iraqi Instability...................................................................................................................... 114 1AR A2: Heg > Iraqi Instability..................................................................................................................... 115 2AC A2: Heg > Iran War............................................................................................................................... 116 2AC A2: Heg > Prolif.................................................................................................................................... 117 A2: Heg Destroys US Russia Relations........................................................................................................... 118 2AC A2: Heg> Disease.................................................................................................................................. 119 1AR A2: Heg > Disease................................................................................................................................. 120 A2: Heg Not Key to Middle East....................................................................................................................... 121 A2: Multipolarity Solves Peace......................................................................................................................... 122 Multipolarity alone is not enough for peace primacy key to shaping that world..........................................122 U.S. primacy key to the transition quick collapse doesn't access their multipolarity good arguments.......122 Military Power > Technology........................................................................................................................ 123 ***HEG BAD***.............................................................................................................................................. 124 **SUSTAINABILITY**..................................................................................................................................... 125 Sustainability AT: Best Military/Military Arguments/Defense Spending........................................................126 Sustainability AT: Best Military/Military Arguments/Defense Spending........................................................127 Sustainabiltiy AT: Best Air Force................................................................................................................... 129 Sustainability AT: Best Navy......................................................................................................................... 130 Navies are obsolete cruise missiles and submarines will take out the fleet................................................130 Burleson, 07 Columnist for Sea Classics Magazine (Mike, "An All-Submarine Navy", June 19th 2007, Sea Classics Magazine, http://www.opinioneditorials.com/guestcontributors/mburleson_20070619.html, KONTOPOULOS)............................................................................................................................................130 Sustainability AT: Soft Power........................................................................................................................ 131 Sustainability AT: Economic Power............................................................................................................... 132 Sustainability AT: Economic Power............................................................................................................... 133 Sustainability AT: Economic Power............................................................................................................... 134 Sustainability AT: Economic Power AT: Competitiveness/Tech Internals...................................................135 Multipolarity Inevitable................................................................................................................................... 136 Peaceful shift to multipolarity occurring now...................................................................................................136 **COUNTERBALANCING**............................................................................................................................. 137 GENERIC......................................................................................................................................................... 138 GENERIC......................................................................................................................................................... 139 RUSSIA/CHINA............................................................................................................................................... 141 CHINA............................................................................................................................................................. 142 CHINA............................................................................................................................................................. 143 4. US will lose its dollar hegemony deficits - China will fill in.......................................................................143 INDIA.............................................................................................................................................................. 144 IRAQ WAR....................................................................................................................................................... 145 MIDDLE EAST................................................................................................................................................. 146 IRAN................................................................................................................................................................ 147 ASIA................................................................................................................................................................ 148 TURKEY........................................................................................................................................................... 151 **OFFSHORE BALANCING**.......................................................................................................................... 155 Offshore Balancing Uniqueness........................................................................................................................ 156 Offshore balancing coming now and solves better than primacy...................................................................156 Mearsheimer, 08 Ph.D., Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, International Relations Theorist (John, "Middle East: Know the Limits of U.S. Power", Newsweek, November 29th 2008, June 30th 2010, http://www.newsweek.com/id/171261, KONTOPOULOS)....................................................................156 Offshore Balancing Solves Economy................................................................................................................ 157 Offshore balancing saves the US economy....................................................................................................157 Mearsheimer, 08 Ph.D., Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, International Relations Theorist (John, "Middle East: Know the Limits of U.S. Power", Newsweek, November 29th 2008, June30th 2010, http://www.newsweek.com/id/171261, KONTOPOULOS)....................................................................157 Offshore Balancing Solves Economy and Free Trade........................................................................................158 Free trade solves nuclear war.........................................................................................................................159 Copley News Service, 99 (December 1).........................................................................................................159 Offshore Balancing Solves Iran and Syria Proliferation....................................................................................161 Iranian proliferation causes runaway prolif and nuclear war...........................................................................161 Kurtz, 06 (Stanley, senior fellow at the Ethics and Public Policy Center, "Our Fallout-Shelter Future", National Review Online, 8/28, http://article.nationalreview.com/? q=OWU4MDMwNmU5MTI5NGYzN2FmODg5NmYyMWQ4YjM3OTU=)......................................................161 Offshore Balancing Solves Middle Eastern stability, Terrorism, Iran Proliferation............................................162 Offshore balancing would solve Middle Eastern Stability, Terrorism and Iranian proliferation......................162 Mearsheimer, 08 Ph.D., Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, International Relations Theorist (John, "Middle East: Know the Limits of U.S. Power", Newsweek, November 29th 2008, June30th 2010, http://www.newsweek.com/id/171261, KONTOPOULOS)....................................................................162 Offshore Balancing Solves Middle Eastern stability, Terrorism, Iran Proliferation............................................163 Iranian proliferation causes runaway prolif and nuclear war...........................................................................163 Kurtz, 06 (Stanley, senior fellow at the Ethics and Public Policy Center, "Our Fallout-Shelter Future", National Review Online, 8/28, http://article.nationalreview.com/? q=OWU4MDMwNmU5MTI5NGYzN2FmODg5NmYyMWQ4YjM3OTU=)......................................................163 Offshore Balancing Solves Middle Eastern Democracy.....................................................................................164 Offshore balancing abandons Middle Eastern democratization.....................................................................164 Layne, 07 Mary Julia and George R. Jordan Professor of International Affairs at Texas A&M's George Bush School of Government and Public Service, Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, LL.M. in International Law from Virginia Law, J.D. from USC, and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute (Christopher, "Who Lost Iraq and Why It Matters The Case for Offshore Balancing", International Security Review, MIT Press, November 30th 2007, June30th 2010, p. 10, KONTOPOULOS) PDF....................................................................................................................................164 Offshore Balancing Solves Middle Eastern Stability.........................................................................................165 Offshore balancing solves Middle East stability and terrorism.......................................................................165 Layne, 09 Mary Julia and George R. Jordan Professor of International Affairs at Texas A&M's George Bush School of Government and Public Service, Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, LL.M. in International Law from Virginia Law, J.D. from USC, and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute (Christopher, "America's Middle East grand strategy after Iraq: the moment for offshore balancing has arrived", Review of International Studies, 2009, June 30th 2010, Galileo, KONTOPOULOS) PDF....................................................................................................................................165 Offshore Balancing Solves Middle Eastern Stability.........................................................................................166 Offshore Balancing Solves Terrorism............................................................................................................... 167 Layne, 07 Mary Julia and George R. Jordan Professor of International Affairs at Texas A&M's George Bush School of Government and Public Service, Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, LL.M. in International Law from Virginia Law, J.D. from USC, and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute (Christopher, "Who Lost Iraq and Why It Matters The Case for Offshore Balancing", International Security Review, MIT Press, November 30th 2007, June 30th, 2010, KONTOPOULOS) PDF....................................................................................................................................167 Layne, 07 Mary Julia and George R. Jordan Professor of International Affairs at Texas A&M's George Bush School of Government and Public Service, Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, LL.M. in International Law from Virginia Law, J.D. from USC, and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute (Christopher, "Who Lost Iraq and Why It Matters The Case for Offshore Balancing", International Security Review, MIT Press, November 30th 2007, June30th 2010, p. 8, KONTOPOULOS) PDF....................................................................................................................................167 Offshore Balancing Solves Terrorism............................................................................................................... 168 Offshore Balancing Solves War........................................................................................................................ 169 Offshore balancing solves war best.................................................................................................................169 Layne, 09 Mary Julia and George R. Jordan Professor of International Affairs at Texas A&M's George Bush School of Government and Public Service, Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, LL.M. in International Law from Virginia Law, J.D. from USC, and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute (Christopher, "America's Middle East grand strategy after Iraq: the moment for offshore balancing has arrived", Review of International Studies, 2009, June 30th 2010, Galileo, KONTOPOULOS) PDF....................................................................................................................................169 Offshore Balancing Solves Transition Wars......................................................................................................170 Offfshore Balancing Solves USIran War.......................................................................................................... 171 Extinction..........................................................................................................................................................171 Offshore Balancing Best Available.................................................................................................................... 172 Offshore Balancing AT: Happening Now.......................................................................................................173 The US isn't acting as an offshore balancer now............................................................................................173 Layne, 09 Mary Julia and George R. Jordan Professor of International Affairs at Texas A&M's George Bush School of Government and Public Service, Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, LL.M. in International Law from Virginia Law, J.D. from USC, and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute (Christopher, "America's Middle East grand strategy after Iraq: the moment for offshore balancing has arrived", Review of International Studies, 2009, June 30th 2010, Galileo, KONTOPOULOS) PDF....................................................................................................................................173 Offshore Balancing AT: Impossible................................................................................................................ 174 Offshore Balancing AT: Primacy is Best.........................................................................................................175 Layne, 09 Mary Julia and George R. Jordan Professor of International Affairs at Texas A&M's George Bush School of Government and Public Service, Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, LL.M. in International Law from Virginia Law, J.D. from USC, and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute (Christopher, "America's Middle East grand strategy after Iraq: the moment for offshore balancing has arrived", Review of International Studies, 2009, June 30th 2010, Galileo, KONTOPOULOS) PDF....................................................................................................................................175 Offshore Balancing AT: Withdrawal Solves...................................................................................................176 Withdrawal doesn't solve.................................................................................................................................176 Layne, 07 Mary Julia and George R. Jordan Professor of International Affairs at Texas A&M's George Bush School of Government and Public Service, Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, LL.M. in International Law from Virginia Law, J.D. from USC, and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute (Christopher, "Who Lost Iraq and Why It Matters The Case for Offshore Balancing", International Security Review, MIT Press, November 30th 2007, June 30th, 2010, p.6, KONTOPOULOS) PDF....................................................................................................................................176 **A2: HEG GOOD**........................................................................................................................................ 177 A/T Hotspot Escalation Mod............................................................................................................................ 178 1- Empirically denied- Kagan cites George-Russia and China-Taiwan conflicts as being the scenario for nuclear escalation, south Ossetia war a year AFTER the card war written proves even if superpowers intervene it won't go nuclear............................................................................................................................178 2- We control the internal link to escalation:....................................................................................................178 U.S. withdrawal and a concurrent shift to multipolarity would prevent American involvement in major power wars..................................................................................................................................................................178 Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2006 "The Peace of Illusions" p 170.....................................................................................178 3- their kagan ev is horrible, in ununderlined parts it concedes other nations would diplomatically resolve their problems because of the nuclear deterrent offshore balancing would bring, and even if it was nuclear major powers wouldn't get drawn in................................................................................................................178 4- Heg doesn't solve war US lacks influence it used to have to influence conflicts....................................178 Mastanduno 9 (Michael, Professor of Government at Dartmouth, World Politics 61, No. 1, Ebsco, DB)......178 A/T Genocide Mod.......................................................................................................................................... 179 1- Empirically denied- their leiber evidence was written before the genocide in Darfur, and yet again, America did not do ANYTHING to stop the genocide. UN invervention proves there's only a risk MULTIPOLAR forums solve this back.............................................................................................................179 2- Genocide is only a pretense for American interventionism- heg doesn't access their terminal impact.....179 Lind, 2007 (Mike, Policy Director for New American Growth Foundation, Beyond American Hegemony, http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2007/beyond_american_hegemony_5381).......................179 3- the regional security forums fostered by multipolarity are net more likely to solve genocide, empirically proven with the UN...........................................................................................................................................179 A/T Rogue State Mod...................................................................................................................................... 180 1- they do not access this, thayer indicates that it is TROOP WITHDRAWALS that are the primary sense of empowerment for rogue states, this mod is inevitable because of the plan...................................................180 2- Rogue States are exaggerated to sell policies to the public- no risk of nuclear attack or WMD terrorism 180 Lind, 2007 (Mike, Policy Director for New American Growth Foundation, Beyond American Hegemony, http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2007/beyond_american_hegemony_5381).......................180 A/T Peace Process Mod................................................................................................................................... 181 1- Empirically denied, the bush necon regime failed to get a two-state solution, there is NO WAY that hegemony under obama will be enough to get the Israeli conservatives to compromise with the Palestinians. ..........................................................................................................................................................................181 2- Turn: Heg enables Israeli expansionism and kills the motivation for a peace process..............................181 Maher, 2010 (Stephen, Staff writer for the Electronic Intifada, U.S Hegemony, not "the lobby", behind complicity with Israel, http://electronicintifada.net/v2/article11232.shtml)......................................................181 3- US has no influence in the middle east cant mediate the conflict...........................................................181 A/T Asian Stability Mod.................................................................................................................................. 182 1- Empirically denied- American interventionism in places like Taiwan only make belligerence and escalation more likely- Korean war proves?.....................................................................................................................182 2- their leiber evidence indicates that it is US MILITARY PRESENCE that reaffirms the commitment needed for asian instability, the plan does the opposite. There's only a risk that the plan solves this better............182 3- Turn: Heg-based stability is unsustainable- multilateral regional alliances key to solve............................182 Khoo and Smith, 2002 (Nick and Michael, The Future of American Hegemony in the Asia-Pacific: A Concert in Asia or a clear Pecking Order?, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 56, No. 1, pp.6581, 2002) ..........................................................................................................................................................................182 A/T Korea Mod (1/2)...................................................................................................................................... 183 1- The sinking of the Chenoan after the lieber card was written proves- American hegemony only fosters beilligerence in North Korea, there's only a risk a shift would solve back the reason they feel threatened enough to attack...............................................................................................................................................183 2- Lieber indicates that the lynchpin of stability in korea is AMERICAN TROOP PRESENCE- they don't access this because the plan results in the global perception of american abandonment of its troop commitments abroad, only a risk of allied prolif and stability without multipolarity.........................................183 3- American hegemony in Asia ensures involvement in possibly nuclear war with North Korea...................183 A/T Korea Mod (2/2)...................................................................................................................................... 184 4- Multipolarity solves the impact.....................................................................................................................184 Khripunov, 2009 (Igor, Russian Staff Writer for The Korea Times, Multipolarity and Korean Crisis, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2009/06/137_47614.html)...................................................184 A/T NATO Mod............................................................................................................................................... 185 1- Their impact evidence assumes a nuclear armed and military capable that their i/l evidence specifically says has fallen apart, there is NO reason why NATO is key any longer to regional stability.........................185 2- Heg based alliances ensure US draw-in into multiple nuclear conflicts.....................................................185 3- NATO is no longer on the brink- total reformation has caused full recovery PREFER THIS, IT POSTDATES....................................................................................................................................................185 A/T Air/Space Mod......................................................................................................................................... 186 1- Their Kagan evidence doesn't assume 3 years of change in space power, the chinese are rapidly expanding and their impact is inevitable..........................................................................................................186 2- U.S. hegemony will force space weaponization which causes space racing resulting in extinction.........186 A/T Europe Mod.............................................................................................................................................. 187 1- Their impact evidence is from 1993, doesn't assume revitalized NATO or the EU, which significantly reduced the likliness of any future European war. The fractured Europe of '93 doesn't exist in any form today.................................................................................................................................................................187 2- Turn: Hegemony is spurring EU competition to U.S dominance................................................................187 Kerans 9- Strategic Cultural Foundation at Global Research ["Commercial Standards and the Decline of U.S. Hegemony" http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=14663] ............................................187 3- U.S. preponderance is spurring soft-balancing now these indirect efforts will turn into a hard-line counterweight unless the U.S. begins to withdraw..........................................................................................187 4- Only a risk American hegemony draws the U.S into a European war- and this time the French have nukes................................................................................................................................................................187 A/T Econ Mod................................................................................................................................................. 188 1- Their evidence doesn't assume the economic crisis of 2009, China bought even more U.S bonds, there's only a risk China rise would be less affected by american hegemonic decline because of the inter-conectivity of their financial markets..................................................................................................................................188 2- Turn: The economic system the U.S. has built and protected ensures rapid redistribution of power which hastens hegemonic decline.............................................................................................................................188 3- Their evidence doesn't assume a decline to peaceful multipolarity, US trade ensures that even if regional powers do emerge, they won't fight with the United States because of globalisation....................................188 4- No Impact- China is already surpassing the U.S in importance to the global economy............................188 A/T Terrorism Mod......................................................................................................................................... 189 1- Empirically Denied- Colonialism, 9/11 and recent terror attacks prove that American hegemony only provokes arab hatred and terrorist attack........................................................................................................189 2- Al-Qaeda was born because of US adventurism in Afghanistan against the Soviets, proves the "freedom fighters" we support today could be the "terrorists" of the next generation....................................................189 3- Terrorists attack due to US Heg .................................................................................................................189 4- Cross apply their terrorism impact- we have empirics on our side. Absent colonialism and american support for unpopular regimes abroad, terrorist organisations will no longer have the recruiting they need to remain terrorism...............................................................................................................................................189 5- Heg can't solve terrorism.............................................................................................................................189 A/T Terrorism Mod......................................................................................................................................... 190 A/T Democracy Mod........................................................................................................................................ 191 1- Empirically Denied- Karzai and the Saudis are all corrupt dictatorships sustained by American hegemony, proves they can never solve the case impacts................................................................................................191 2- Turn: Hegemony destroys democratic orders and stifles democratic movements to sustain dominion over the middle east.................................................................................................................................................191 Lockard, 2005 (Joe, Professor of English at Arizona State University, Hegemonic Democracy in the Middle East, http://www.tikkun.org/article.php/Lockard-hegemonic-democracy).......................................................191 3- Insert witty analytics you can think of off the top of your head...................................................................191 A2: HEG UNSUSTAINABLE (GENERIC) 1. Short term loss of Hegemony outweighs the international system would become a global game of Calvinball with all countries seeking to project their own power guarantees worldwide conflicts that have no check for escalation 2. US hegemony is guaranteed economics and interdependence Friedman 10 (George, Founder and CEO of STRATFOR, the World's Leading Private Intelligence and Forecasting Company, Media Expert, "The the twentieth century. After the debris of the European empire is cleared away, as well as what's left of the Soviet Next 100 Years," January, Originally Published January 27th 2009, p.4) Standing at the beginning of the twentyfirst century, we need to identify the single pivotal event for this century, the equivalent of German unification for Union, one power remains standing and overwhelmingly powerful . That power is the United States Certainly, as is . usually the case, the United States currently appears to be making a mess of things around the world. But it's important not to be too confused by the passing chaos. The U nited tates S is economically, militarily, and politically the most powerful country in the world, and there is no real challenger to that power. Like the Spanish American War, a hundred years from now the war between the United States and the radical Islamists will be little remembered regardless of the prevailing sentiment of this time. Ever since the Civil War, the U nited tates has been on an S extraordinary economic surge. It has turned from a marginal developing nation into an economy bigger than the next four countries combined. Militarily, it has gone from being an insignificant force to dominating the globe. Politically, the U nited tates S touches virtually everything, sometimes internationally and sometimes simply because of its presence. As you read this book, it will seem that it is Americacentric, written from an American point of view. That may be true, but the argument I'm making is that the world does, in fact, pivot around the United States. This is not only due to American power. It also has to do with a fundamental shift in the way the world works. For the past five hundred years, Europe was the center of the international system, its empires creating a single global system for the first time in human history. The main highway to Europe was the North Atlantic. Whoever controlled the North Atlantic controlled access to Europe and Europe's access to the world. The basic geography of global politics was locked into place. Then, in the early 1980s, something remarkable happened. For the first time in history, transpacific trade equaled Trans Atlantic trade. With Europe reduced to a collection of secondary powers after World War II, and shift in trade patterns, the North Atlantic was no longer the single key to anything. Now whatever country controlled both the North Atlantic and the Pacific could control , if it wished, the world's trading system, and therefore the global economy. In the twentyfirst century, any nation located on both oceans has al a tremendous advantage Given the cost of building naval power, and the huge cost of deploying it around the world, the power native to both . oceans became the preeminent actor in the intentional system for the same reasons that Britain dominated the nineteenth century: it loved on the sea it had to control. In this way, North America has replaced Europe as the center of gravity in the world, and whoever dominated North America is virtually assured of being the dominant global power . For the twentyfirst century, at least, that will be the U nited tates. S 3. Declinism is exaggerated Our argument is empirically proven in the context of demographics Kotkin 10 is a distinguished presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University, adjunct fellow at the Legatum Institute in London and serves as executive editor of newgeography.com, (Joel, "America on the Rise", http://www.forbes.com/2010/02/09/declinismchinaagingpopulationopinionscolumnistsjoelkotkin.html) Japan The ese experience best illustrates how wrong punditry can be. Back in the 1970s and 1980s it was commonplace for punditsparticularly on the left to predict Japan's ascendance into world leadership . At the time distinguished commentators like George Lodge, Lester Thurow and Robert Reich all pointed to Europe and Japan as the nations slated to beat the U.S. on the economic battlefield . "Japan is replacing America as the world's strongest economic power," prominent one scholar told a Joint Economic Committee of Congress in 1986. "It is in everyone's interest that the transition goes smoothly." This was not unusual or even shocking at the time. It followed a grand tradition of declinism that over the past 70 years has declared America illsuited to compete with everyone from fascist Germany and Italy to the Soviet Union . By the mid1950s a majority were convinced that we were losing the Cold War. In the 1980s Harvard's John Kenneth Galbraith thought the Soviet model successful enough that the two systems would eventually "converge." We all know how that convergence worked out. Even the Chinese abandoned the Stalinist economic model so admired by many American intellectuals once Mao was safely amoldering in his grave. Outside of the European and American academe, the only strong advocates of state socialism can be found in such economic basket cases as Cuba, North Korea and Venezuela. So given this history, why the current rise in declinism? Certainly it's a view many in the wider public share. Most Americans fear their children will not be able to live as well as they have. A plurality think China will be the world's most powerful country in 20 years. To be sure there are some good reasons for pessimism. The huge deficits, high unemployment, our leakage of industry not only to China but other developing countries are all worrisome trends. Yet if the negative case is easi to make, er it does not stand historical scrutiny . Let's just go back to what we learned during the "Japan is taking over the world" phase during the 1970s and 1980s. At the time Dai Nippon's rapid economic expansion was considered inexorable. Yet history is not a straightline project. Most countries go through phases of expansion and decline. The factors driving success often include a wellconceived economic strategy, an expanding workforce and a sense of national elan. In the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s Japanlike China today possessed all those things . Its bureaucratic state had targeted key industries like automobiles and electronics, and its large, welleducated baby boom population was hitting the workforce. There was an unmistakable sense of pride in the country's rapid achievements after the devastation of the Second World War. Yet even then, as the Economist's Bill Emmot noted in his 1989 book The Sun Also Sets things were not pretty once you looked , so a little closer. In the mid1980s I traveled extensively in Japan and, with the help of a young JapaneseAmerican scholar, Yoriko Kishimoto, interviewed demographers and economists who predicted Japan's eventual decline. By then, the rapid drop in Japan's birthrate and its rapid aging was already clearly predictable . But even more persuasive were hours spent with the new generation of Japanesethe equivalent of America's Xerswho seemed alienated from the selfabnegating, workobsessed culture of their parents . By the late 1980s it was clear that the shinjinrui ("the new race") seemed more interested in design, culture and just having fun their than forebears . They seemed destined not to become another generation of economic samurai. At the time though, the very strategies so critical to Japan's growthparticularly a focus on highend manufacturingproved highly susceptible to competitors from lowercost countriesfirst Taiwan, Korea and Singapore, and later China, Vietnam and more recently India. Like America and Britain before it, Japan exported its unique genius abroad. Now many companies, including America n ones, have narrowed the technological gap with Japan. Today Japan, like the E.U., lacks the youthful population needed to recover its mojo . It likely will emerge as a kind of megaSwitzerland, Sweden or Denmarkrenowned for its safety and precision. Its workforce will have to be ultraproductive to finance the robots it will need to care of its vast elderly population. Will China follow a similar trajectory in the next few decades? Countries infrequently follow precisely the same script as another. Japan was always hemmed in by its position as a small island country with very minimal resources. Its demographic crisis will make things worse. In contrast, China, for the next few decades, certainly won't suffer a shortage of economically productive workers But it could face greater problems. The kind of lowwage manufacturing strategy t hat has generated China's success already seems certainas occurred with Japan already is leading to backlash a across much of the world. China's very girth projects a more terrifying prospect than little Japan. At some point China will either have to locate much of its industrial base closer to its customers, as Japan has done, or lose its markets . More important still are massive internal problems . Japan, for all its many imperfections, was and remains a stable, functioning democracy, open to the free flow of information. China is a fundamentally unstable autocracy , led from above, and one that seeks to control informationas evidenced in its conflict with Google ( GOOG news people )in an age where the free flow of information constitutes an essential part of economic progress. China's social problems will be further exacerbated by a huge , largely illeducated restive peasant class still living in poverty Of course America too has many problemswith stunted . upward mobility, the skill levels of its workforce, its fiscal situation. But the U.S., as the Japanese scholar Fuji Kamiya once noted, possesses sokojikara, a selfrenewing capacity unmatched by any country. As we enter the next few decades of the new millennium, I would bet on more youthful, still a resourcerich and democratic America to maintain its preeminence even in a world where economic power continues to shift from its historic home in Europe to Asia. A2: IMPERIAL OVERSTRETCH 1. Short term loss of Hegemony outweighs the international system would become a global game of Calvinball with all countries seeking to project their own power guarantees worldwide conflicts that have no check for escalation 2. Heg is sustainable hegemonic cooperation Norrlof 10 (Carla, an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto) "America's Global Advantage US Hegemony and International Cooperation" p. 56 American hegemony, and the order it generates, is surprisingly stable. What makes the system stable is the hegemon's interest in achieving disproportionate gains through international cooperation and other Great Powers' interest in achieving gains above what they can achieve through unilateral action . A benevolent hegemon would not seek disproportionate benefits whereas an exploitative hegemon uses force to seek disproportionate benefits, and risks turning allies into balancers and adversaries. There is at present no prospect of this. Pax Americana persists, despite a gradual increase in American exceptionalism and a rising sense that the United States no longer carries the burden of underwriting global order in a manner commensurate with its size and role . This shifts our focus from the question of whether collective action will take place to how different forms of cooperation are connected (bilateral and multilateral) and how the gains from multilateral cooperation are distributed. In the following chapters we will see how this theoretical proposition rhymes with collaboration in the trade area (chapter 4), in monetary and financial affairs (chapter 5), and in the security field (chapter 6), and we also examine where today's collective action to circumvent American power might take us (chapter 7). Will it lead us to a new world order or right back to the Americancentered system in which we live? 3. Dominant sea power prevents balancing comprehensive historical studies prove Levy and Thompson 10 (Jack S., Board of Governors' Professor at Rutgers University and former president of both the International Studies Association and the Peace Science Society, & William R., Donald A. Rogers Professor of Political Science at Indiana University, former president of the International Studies Association, and Managing Editor of International Studies Quarterly) Summer " Balancing on Land and at Sea Do States Ally against the Leading Global Power?" http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Balancing_on_Land_and_at_Sea.pdf Contrary to traditional balance of power theory and its argument that states tend to balance against the strongest power in the system, particularly if that lead state is increasing in strength, hypothesis 1 predicts that there is no strong tendency for great powers to balance against the leading sea power in the system, even if it is signicantly increasing in strength. As the marginal frequencies in the right column of table 3 indicate, great power alliances have formed against the lead sea power in 88 cases out of a total of 544 possible opportuni ties, or about 16 percent of the time. This is strong evidence in support of H1 about the absence of a systematic tendency toward balancing against the leading sea power . In marked contrast, great power alliances formed against the leading land power in Europe about 43 percent of the time over the same time period.67 This comparison provides strong support for H1's implication that great powers are signicantly less likely to balance against the leading global sea power than against the leading European land power. A2: ECONOMIC OPENESS 1. We control the biggest internal link military power ensures other countries follow the USled system the reason the global economy is in place is because the US has labored to create an economically liberal order 2. Interdependence maintains US power Slaughter 9 Dean of Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University (February 2009, Anne, "America's Edge: Power in the Networked Century," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 88, Iss. 1; pg. 94, ProQuest) MORE PEOPLE, MORE PROBLEMS IN THIS CENTURY, global power will increasingly be defined by connections who is connected to whom and for what purposes. Of course, the world will still contain conflict. Networks can be as malign and deadly as they can be productive and beneficial. In addition, the gap between those who are connected to global networks and those who are excluded from them will sharply multiply existing inequities. But on the whole, the positive effects of networks will greatly outweigh the negative. Imagine , for example, a U.S. economy powered by green technology and green infrastructure. Communities of American immigrants from Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East will share this new generation of products and services with villages and cities in their home countries. Innovation will flow in both directions . In the United States, universities will be able to offer courses in truly global classrooms, relying on their international students and faculty to connect with educational institutions abroad through travel, the Internet, and videoconferencing. Artists of all kinds will sit at the intersection of culture, learning, and creative energy. U.S. diplomats and other U.S. government officials will receive instant updates on events occurring around the world. They will be connected to their counterparts abroad, able to quickly coordinate preventive and problemsolving actions with a range of private and civic actors. The global landscape will resemble that of the Obama campaign, in which a vast network brought in millions of dollars in donations, motivated millions of volunteers, and mobilized millions of voters. In a networked world, the United States has the potential to be the most connected country; it will also be connected to other power centers that are themselves widely connected. If it pursues the right policies, the United States has the capacity and the cultural capital to reinvent itself. It need not see itself as locked in a global struggle with other great powers; rather, it should view itself as a central player in an integrated world. In the twentyfirst century, the United States' exceptional capacity for connection, rather than splendid isolation or hegemonic domination, will renew its power and restore its global purpose. 3. Other nations' economic competitiveness doesn't translate to major hegemonic threat Japan proves 4. Hegemony is sustainable even if the US declines economically Haas 8 (Richard, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, former director of policy planning for the Department of State, former vice president and director of foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution, the Sol M. Linowitz visiting professor of international studies at Hamilton College, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a lecturer in public policy at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, and a research associate at the International Institute for Strategic Studies) April "Ask the Expert: What Comes After Unipolarity?" http://www.cfr.org/publication/16063/ask_the_expert.html US military power far outmatches all other states the US Navy is approximately the same size as the next 17 largest combined and far more technologically advanced. With 20%+ of global GDP, the US economy remains the world's largest and is likely to remain so for at least the next 20 yearsmaybe longer given the magnitude of problems facing China. Given the sheer magnitude of its Hard Power and the likely support of many Allies will the US really fade from being the unipolar power and be ranked alongside diverse centres, from corporations to drug cartels and religious movements to media outlets in a nonpolar world? Andy Trends, Oxford Richard Haass: The United States will continue to grow in absolute power and remain the world's strongest and wealthiest state for the forseeable future. But it will decline somewhat in power relative to others, especially in the economic realm. More important, the United States will encounter increasing difficulty in translating its power into influence given the emergence of other power centers, the hallmark of a nonpolar world. The challenge for US foreign policy will be to enlist others (not just states) in setting rules and establishing arrangements that will help order the modern world and tame the dark aspects of globalization. A2: ECONOMIC OPENESS 5. Globalization and rising prosperity don't hurt us--they can only bolster heg Ahrari 2008 professor of Security Studies at the AsiaPacific Center of Security Studies (5/20, Ehsan, Asia Times, "The mythical postAmerican era", http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/JE20Ad01.html, WEA) One can develop scenarios of irreversibility of the economic progress of China and India. But such scenarios must take into consideration the domestic milieu of both countries, which are characterized by large degrees of corruption, nepotism, religious tension (India), and ethnic tension (China), and most importantly, the acute absence of modern civilian infrastructure. However, one frequently misses (or ignores) those facts when one studies the subject of the rise of those countries in the coming decades from abroad. One tends to be impressed by repeating the frequently quoted statistics related to various aspects of their economic growth. However, when one visits those countries, one is overwhelmed with the "Third World" nature of their polities. This phrase describes corruption, inefficiencies, acute environmental pollution, casual attention to general hygienic conditions, and the unrelenting prevalence of illiteracy and poverty. Those are not characteristics that would make one highly optimistic about predicting the unimpeded rise of either China or India as great powers. But why, one wonders, is the subject of "post Americanism" becoming so popular in the world? Kishore Mahbubani, the dean of the Singaporebased Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, develops a thoughtful thesis of a power shift from the West to the East in his latest book, The New Asian Hemisphere. Newsweek International editor Fareed Zakaria talks about the postAmerican world in his latest book of the same title. But the theses of both books, approximately described, prove the success of Western ideas, such as modernization, rationalization of governance, and globalization, etc. In fact, Zakaria states that the chief challenge for the US is not that it is a fundamentally weak economy, "But that it has developed a highly dysfunctional politics." The suggestion of political inertia has been identified as a problem, and it is, indeed, becoming increasingly serious. However, no one presents any one idea that is typically Chinese, Indian or Eastern in origin. If these ideas are regarded as engines of the rise of China and India as great powers in the coming decades, then why is it that those very ideas are not going to help the United States to maintain its dominance? It is certainly true that China and India have created vibrant economies. However, there is no reason to believe there have emerged assorted irreversible structural dysfunctionalities that are pushing the US economy relentlessly toward permanent decline. The current signs of economic recession may have a lot to do with the George W Bush administration's misguided warrelated expenditures in Iraq. But that phenomenon may either disappear, or may undergo radical mutations in the aftermath of the forthcoming US presidential elections. The forces of globalization may be reducing the "developmental gap" between the US and China, the US and India, and China and India. However, they do not necessarily force one to conclude that the US has become a declining power. A2: EXCESSIVE DEFENSE SPENDING 1. Short term loss of Hegemony outweighs the world would collapse into chaos as countries lose faith in international security there's always a risk that reforms to spending in the future can check 2. Heg is sustainable hegemonic cooperation Norrlof 10 (Carla, an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto) "America's Global Advantage US Hegemony and International Cooperation" p. 56 American hegemony, and the order it generates, is surprisingly stable. What makes the system stable is the hegemon's interest in achieving disproportionate gains through international cooperation and other Great Powers' interest in achieving gains above what they can achieve through unilateral action . A benevolent hegemon would not seek disproportionate benefits whereas an exploitative hegemon uses force to seek disproportionate benefits, and risks turning allies into balancers and adversaries. There is at present no prospect of this. Pax Americana persists, despite a gradual increase in American exceptionalism and a rising sense that the United States no longer carries the burden of underwriting global order in a manner commensurate with its size and role . This shifts our focus from the question of whether collective action will take place to how different forms of cooperation are connected (bilateral and multilateral) and how the gains from multilateral cooperation are distributed. In the following chapters we will see how this theoretical proposition rhymes with collaboration in the trade area (chapter 4), in monetary and financial affairs (chapter 5), and in the security field (chapter 6), and we also examine where today's collective action to circumvent American power might take us (chapter 7). Will it lead us to a new world order or right back to the Americancentered system in which we live? 3. Disproven by the past recessions the US always comes out on top Lieber 9 Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown University (March 2009, Robert J., "Persistent primacy and the future of the American era," International Politics, Vol. 46, Iss. 23, pg. 119) The extraordinary financial crisis that has impacted the United States , Europe, large parts of Asia and much of the rest of the world has provided the impetus for renewed predictions of America's demise as the preeminent global power. Of course, present problems are very serious and the financial crisis is the worst to hit the United States and Europe since the great depression began some 80 years ago. The impact on real estate, banking, insurance, credit, the stock market and overall business activity is quite severe, and a painful recession is already underway. Yet by themselves, these developments do not mean that America will somehow collapse, let alone see some other country assume the unique role it has played in world affairs. Arguably, the impact of the crisis upon the US economy is actually less than for the major European powers. For example, the $700 billion bailout for financial firms approved by Congress amounts to about 5 per cent of the country's annual gross domestic product, significantly less as a percentage than the burdens borne by many countries. In addition, while the exchange rate of the euro declined sharply in the early months of the crisis, as did the British pound, the Russian ruble and many other currencies, the dollar rose sharply in value as foreign investors sought a safe haven for their funds. (Among the other G-8 currencies, only the Japanese yen experienced a substantial rise.) The United States will eventually surmount the present crisis, the excesses that helped to cause it will be corrected, and despite painful costs of adjustment, its economy and financial systems will sooner or later resume a more normal pattern of activity and growth. The new Obama administration will continue and even intensify cooperation with other leading countries in efforts to reform the international economic and financial systems. These may or may not produce a new 'Bretton Woods' system, but agreements will be reached and the United States necessarily will play a central role in this effort. A2: EXCESSIVE DEFENSE SPENDING 4. If worse comes to worst, latent power will fill in Wohlforth 7 Professor of Government at Dartmouth College and Chair of the Department of Government (Spring 2007, William, "Unipolar stability: the rules of power analysis," Harvard International Review 29.1, p.44, Academic OneFile) US military forces are stretched thin, its budget and trade deficits are high, and the country continues to finance its profligate ways by borrowing from abroad--notably from the Chinese government. These developments have prompted many analysts to warn that the United States suffers from "imperial overstretch." And if US power is overstretched now, the argument goes, unipolarity can hardly be sustainable for long. The problem with this argument is that it fails to distinguish between actual and latent power. One must be careful to take into account both the level of resources that can be mobilized and the degree to which a government actually tries to mobilize them. And how much a government asks of its public is partly a function of the severity of the challenges that it faces. Indeed, one can never know for sure what a state is capable of until it has been seriously challenged. Yale historian Paul Kennedy coined the term "imperial overstretch" to describe the situation in which a state's actual and latent capabilities cannot possibly match its foreign policy commitments. This situation should be contrasted with what might be termed "selfinflicted overstretch"a situation in which a state lacks the sufficient resources to meet its current foreign policy commitments in the short term, but has untapped latent power and readily available policy choices that it can use to draw on this power. This is arguably the situation that the United States is in today. But the US government has not attempted to extract more resources from its population to meet its foreign policy commitments. Instead, it has moved strongly in the opposite direction by slashing personal and corporate tax rates. Although it is fighting wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and claims to be fighting a global "war" on terrorism, the United States is not acting like a country under intense international pressure. Aside from the volunteer servicemen and women and their families, US citizens have not been asked to make sacrifices for the sake of national prosperity and security. The country could clearly devote a greater proportion of its economy to military spending: today it spends only about 4 percent of its GDP on the military, as compared to 7 to 14 percent during the peak years of the Cold War. It could also spend its military budget more efficiently, shifting resources from expensive weapons systems to boots on the ground. Even more radically , it could reinstitute military conscription, shifting resources from pay and benefits to training and equipping more soldiers . On the economic front, it could raise taxes in a number of ways, notably on fossil fuels, to put its fiscal house back in order . No one knows for sure what would happen if a US president undertook such drastic measures, but there is nothing in economics, political science, or history to suggest that such policies would be any less likely to succeed than China is to continue to grow rapidly for decades. Most of those who study US politics would argue that the likelihood and potential success of such powergenerating policies depends on public support, which is a function of the public's perception of a threat. And as unnerving as terrorism is, there is nothing like the threat of another hostile power rising up in opposition to the United States for mobilizing public support. With latent power in the picture, it becomes clear that unipolarity might have more built-in self-reinforcing mechanisms than many analysts realize. It is often noted that the rise of a peer competitor to the United States might be thwarted by the counterbalancing actions of neighboring powers. For example, China's rise might push India and Japan closer to the United States-indeed, this has already happened to some extent. There is also the strong possibility that a peer rival that comes to be seen as a threat would create strong incentives for the United States to end its selfinflicted overstretch and tap potentially large wellsprings of latent power. A2: DEBT/DEFICIT 1. Short term loss of Hegemony outweighs the world would collapse into chaos as countries lose faith in international security there's always a risk that reforms to spending in the future can check 2. Heg is sustainable hegemonic cooperation Norrlof 10 (Carla, an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto) "America's Global Advantage US Hegemony and International Cooperation" p. 56 American hegemony, and the order it generates, is surprisingly stable. What makes the system stable is the hegemon's interest in achieving disproportionate gains through international cooperation and other Great Powers' interest in achieving gains above what they can achieve through unilateral action . A benevolent hegemon would not seek disproportionate benefits whereas an exploitative hegemon uses force to seek disproportionate benefits, and risks turning allies into balancers and adversaries. There is at present no prospect of this. Pax Americana persists, despite a gradual increase in American exceptionalism and a rising sense that the United States no longer carries the burden of underwriting global order in a manner commensurate with its size and role . This shifts our focus from the question of whether collective action will take place to how different forms of cooperation are connected (bilateral and multilateral) and how the gains from multilateral cooperation are distributed. In the following chapters we will see how this theoretical proposition rhymes with collaboration in the trade area (chapter 4), in monetary and financial affairs (chapter 5), and in the security field (chapter 6), and we also examine where today's collective action to circumvent American power might take us (chapter 7). Will it lead us to a new world order or right back to the Americancentered system in which we live? 3. Disproven by the past recessions the US always comes out on top Lieber 9 Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown University (March 2009, Robert J., "Persistent primacy and the future of the American era," International Politics, Vol. 46, Iss. 23, pg. 119) The extraordinary financial crisis that has impacted the United States , Europe, large parts of Asia and much of the rest of the world has provided the impetus for renewed predictions of America's demise as the preeminent global power. Of course, present problems are very serious and the financial crisis is the worst to hit the United States and Europe since the great depression began some 80 years ago. The impact on real estate, banking, insurance, credit, the stock market and overall business activity is quite severe, and a painful recession is already underway. Yet by themselves, these developments do not mean that America will somehow collapse, let alone see some other country assume the unique role it has played in world affairs. Arguably, the impact of the crisis upon the US economy is actually less than for the major European powers. For example, the $700 billion bailout for financial firms approved by Congress amounts to about 5 per cent of the country's annual gross domestic product, significantly less as a percentage than the burdens borne by many countries. In addition, while the exchange rate of the euro declined sharply in the early months of the crisis, as did the British pound, the Russian ruble and many other currencies, the dollar rose sharply in value as foreign investors sought a safe haven for their funds. (Among the other G-8 currencies, only the Japanese yen experienced a substantial rise.) The United States will eventually surmount the present crisis, the excesses that helped to cause it will be corrected, and despite painful costs of adjustment, its economy and financial systems will sooner or later resume a more normal pattern of activity and growth. The new Obama administration will continue and even intensify cooperation with other leading countries in efforts to reform the international economic and financial systems. These may or may not produce a new 'Bretton Woods' system, but agreements will be reached and the United States necessarily will play a central role in this effort. A2: DEBT/DEFICIT 4. Recession is irrelevant--we control every sector and everyone needs us Singh 8 Professor, School of Politics and Sociology, Birkbeck College, University of London (Robert, International Politics, Vol. 45, Iss. 5, "The exceptional empire", ProQuest, WEA) Fourth, contrary to Cox's claim, it is not the case that American economic indicators are universally and intractably negative. Not only is the US the world's largest (estimates vary between 20 and 30% of world GDP) and most efficient economy but also the dollar remains the world's reserve currency despite the euro's rise. The Bush years have seen America continue to experience historically low levels of inflation, unemployment and interest rates and until this year strong rates of growth. The twin deficits of the federal budget (at some $250 billion) and current account (6% of GDP) do make the US the world's leading debtor, as it was previously at the end of Reagan's two terms as president. But the economic health of both China and Japan relies heavily on their continuing to purchase dollars and securities based on the dollar to keep their currencies weak and the US market for their exports strong. The US economy remains huge, robust and the world's most productive, competitive and innovative (not least in information technology), just as its research institutes and universities dominate those of other nations. American takeovers cause a tremendous productivity advantage over nonAmerican alternatives for firms outside the US 'as if the invisible hand of the American marketplace were somehow passing along a secret handshake to these firms' (Van Reenen et al. , 2007). America's strength rests on the fundamental soundness, openness and innovative energy of its dynamic economy. Consequently, as the end of the first decade of the 21st century approaches, the enormous, productive and flexible US economy remains central to the international economic system, the dominant source of its operating rules, and the best positioned to take advantage of coming changes precisely because it is so consistently adept at adjusting. Fifth, if these hard power resources of the US remain potent, those propelling the rise of its potential rivals are by no means clear, coherent or reliable. Much of the commentary on America's principal competitors effectively assumes their linear rise and an inevitable disharmony with US interests (and ideals) accompanying a concomitant erosion of American predominance. But such assumptions are not necessarily well founded. A2: DEMOGRAPHICS 1. Short term loss of Hegemony outweighs the world would collapse into chaos as countries lose faith in international security 2. Demographics go our way Kotkin 10 is a distinguished presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University, adjunct fellow at the Legatum Institute in London and serves as executive editor of newgeography.com, (Joel, "America on the Rise", http://www.forbes.com/2010/02/09/declinismchinaagingpopulationopinionscolumnistsjoelkotkin.html) For much of the past decade, "declinism"the notion that America is heading toward a deadly denouementhas largely been a philosophy of the left. But more recently, particularly in the wake of Barack Obama's election, conservatives have begun joining the chorus, albeit singing a somewhat different variation on the same tune. In a recent column in TheWashington Post George Will illustrates this conservative change of heart. Looking over the next few decades Will sees an aging, obsolescent America in retreat to a young and aggressive China. "America's destiny is demographic, and therefore is inexorable and predictable," he suggests, pointing to predictions by Nobel Prize economist Robert Fogel that China's economy will be three times larger than that of the U.S. by 2040. Will may be one of America's great columnists, but helike his equally distinguished liberal counterpart Thomas Friedmanmay be falling prey to a current fashion for sinophilia. It is a sign of the times that conservatives as well as liberals often underestimate the Middle Kingdom's problemsin addition to America's relative strengths. Rarely mentioned in such analyses is China's own aging problem. The population of the People's Republic will be considerably older than the U.S.' by 2050. It also has far more boys than girlsa rather insidious problem. Among the younger generation there are already an estimated 24 million more men of marrying age than women. This is not going to end wellexcept perhaps for investors in prostitution and pornography. In the longer term demographic trends actually place the U.S. in a relatively strong position. By the end of the first half of the 21st century, the American population aged 15 to 64essentially your economically active cohortare projected to grow by 42%; China's will shrink by 10%. Comparisons with other competitors are even larger, with the E.U. shrinking by 25%, Korea by 30% and Japan by a remarkable 44%. A2: DEMOGRAPHICS 3. Our argument is empirically proven Kotkin 10 is a distinguished presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University, adjunct fellow at the Legatum Institute in London and serves as executive editor of newgeography.com, (Joel, "America on the Rise", http://www.forbes.com/2010/02/09/declinismchinaagingpopulationopinionscolumnistsjoelkotkin.html) Japan The ese experience best illustrates how wrong punditry can be. Back in the 1970s and 1980s it was commonplace for punditsparticularly on the left to predict Japan's ascendance into world leadership . At the time distinguished commentators like George Lodge, Lester Thurow and Robert Reich all pointed to Europe and Japan as the nations slated to beat the U.S. on the economic battlefield . "Japan is replacing America as the world's strongest economic power," prominent one scholar told a Joint Economic Committee of Congress in 1986. "It is in everyone's interest that the transition goes smoothly." This was not unusual or even shocking at the time. It followed a grand tradition of declinism that over the past 70 years has declared America illsuited to compete with everyone from fascist Germany and Italy to the Soviet Union . By the mid1950s a majority were convinced that we were losing the Cold War. In the 1980s Harvard's John Kenneth Galbraith thought the Soviet model successful enough that the two systems would eventually "converge." We all know how that convergence worked out. Even the Chinese abandoned the Stalinist economic model so admired by many American intellectuals once Mao was safely amoldering in his grave. Outside of the European and American academe, the only strong advocates of state socialism can be found in such economic basket cases as Cuba, North Korea and Venezuela. So given this history, why the current rise in declinism? Certainly it's a view many in the wider public share. Most Americans fear their children will sure there are some good reasons for pessimism. The huge deficits, high unemployment, our leakage of industry not only to China but other developing countries are all worrisome trends. Yet if the negative case is easi to make, er it does not stand historical scrutiny . Let's just go back to what we learned during the "Japan is taking over the world" phase during the 1970s and 1980s. At the time Dai Nippon's rapid economic expansion was considered inexorable. Yet history is not a straightline project. Most countries go through phases of expansion and decline. The factors driving success often include a wellconceived economic strategy, an expanding workforce and a sense of national elan. In the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s Japanlike China today possessed all those things . Its bureaucratic state had targeted key industries like automobiles and electronics, and its large, welleducated baby boom population was hitting the workforce. There was an unmistakable sense of pride in the country's rapid achievements after the devastation of the Second World War. Yet even then, as the Economist's Bill Emmot noted in his 1989 book The Sun Also Sets things were not pretty once you looked , so a little closer. In the mid1980s I not be able to live as well as they have. A plurality think China will be the world's most powerful country in 20 years. To be economists who predicted Japan's eventual decline. By then, the rapid drop in Japan's birthrate and its rapid aging was already clearly predictable . But even more persuasive were hours spent with the new generation of Japanesethe equivalent of America's Xerswho seemed alienated from the selfabnegating, workobsessed culture of their parents . By the late 1980s it was clear that the shinjinrui ("the new race") seemed more interested in design, culture and just having fun their than forebears . They seemed destined not to become another generation of economic samurai. At the time though, the very strategies so critical to Japan's growthparticularly a focus on highend manufacturingproved highly susceptible to competitors from lowercost countriesfirst Taiwan, Korea and Singapore, and later China, Vietnam and more recently India. Like America and Britain before it, Japan exported its unique genius abroad. Now many companies, including America n ones, have narrowed the technological gap with Japan. Today Japan, like the E.U., lacks the youthful population needed to recover its mojo . It likely will emerge as a kind of megaSwitzerland, Sweden or Denmarkrenowned for its safety and precision. Its workforce will have to be ultraproductive to finance the robots it will need to care of its vast elderly population. Will China follow a similar trajectory in the next few decades? Countries infrequently follow precisely the same script as another. Japan was always hemmed in by its position as a small island country with very minimal resources. Its demographic crisis will make things worse. In contrast, China, for the next few decades, certainly won't suffer a shortage of economically productive workers But it could face greater problems. The kind of lowwage manufacturing strategy t hat has generated China's success already seems certainas occurred with Japan already is leading to backlash a across much of the world. China's very girth projects a more terrifying prospect than little Japan. At some point China will either have to locate much of its industrial base closer to its customers, as Japan has done, or lose its markets . More important still are massive internal problems . Japan, for all its many imperfections, was and remains a stable, functioning democracy, open to the free flow of information. China is a fundamentally unstable autocracy , led from above, and one that seeks to control informationas evidenced in its conflict with Google ( GOOG news people )in an age where the free flow of information constitutes an essential part of economic progress. China's social problems will be further exacerbated by a huge , largely illeducated restive peasant class still living in poverty Of course America too has many problemswith stunted . upward mobility, the skill levels of its workforce, its fiscal situation. But the U.S., as the Japanese scholar Fuji Kamiya once noted, possesses sokojikara, a selfrenewing capacity unmatched by any country. As we enter the next few decades of the new traveled extensively in Japan and, with the help of a young JapaneseAmerican scholar, Yoriko Kishimoto, interviewed demographers and millennium, I would bet on more youthful, still a resourcerich and democratic America to maintain its preeminence even in a world where economic power continues to shift from its historic home in Europe to Asia. A2: ECONOMIC CRISIS 1. Hegemony is still credible in the Status Quo this is just an argument for why the maintaining it now is key countries will see leadership in this crisis as a test case of US primacy 2. Declinism is exaggerated the US will maintain hegemony other countries are bandwagoning and distrust China the US will remain the largest economy the US will maintain military superiority Lee 9 foreignpolicy fellow at the Centre for Independent Studies in Sydney and visiting fellow at the Hudson Institute in Washington (John, interview with ABC "Sun yet to set on US 'empire'", http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/content/2009/s2660492.htm) JOHN LEE: Well growing economic power doesn't necessarily imply proportionate strategic influence or leadership in the region. In China's case, China is quite literally the most distrusted rising power in world history. If you look at China's strategic situation they have land disputes with Russia and India that are still outstanding, they have maritime disputes with Japan, the Philippines, with Indonesia, with Vietnam. China has very few genuine allies in the region, it's only allies are North Korea, Myanmar, two basket case countries. China is actually in a very poor strategic position and even though China presents enormous economic opportunities for the region, the region still views China as a potential strategic enemy in the future. ELEANOR HALL: It's understandable that other countries in the region would not want China to be a dominant power, but that doesn't necessarily mean that it won't succeed in being one, I mean it certainly has ambitions doesn't it? JOHN LEE: It certainly has ambitions and that's part of the worry to other Asian states have, however what you'll see is that as China rises, other countries like Japan, like India are already balancing against China and band wagoning with the Americans. Even smaller countries like Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia have all moved closer to Washington strategically, not further away. ELEANOR HALL: Let's just get a sense though of the relative economic and military power the US has been declining in the region and China has been growing give us some numbers on that. JOHN LEE: Right, there is a lot of talk about relative US decline visvis China, but if you look at economics for example, the US will still remain the largest economy by all measurements up until 2030, 2040. Militarily the US still spends more than the next 10 countries combined, and even up to 2050, 2060 the US will still be the preponderant power in Asia. So the relative decline of US is occurring but it's exaggerated. ELEANOR HALL: Is there any doubt that there's resentment in China about the US position in the region? JOHN LEE: Oh there's no doubt there's resentment in Beijing, however Beijing can do very little about it. The US has built up good will over 60 years as a dominant power in the region, as a provider of public goods, as the power that is what sometimes called "the coast guard" of Asia. In contrast, Beijing is distrusted, and the US will continue to remain the overwhelming preferred dominant power in the region. A2: ECONOMIC CRISIS 3. Our argument is empirically proven in the context of demographics Kotkin 10 is a distinguished presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University, adjunct fellow at the Legatum Institute in London and serves as executive editor of newgeography.com, (Joel, "America on the Rise", http://www.forbes.com/2010/02/09/declinismchinaagingpopulationopinionscolumnistsjoelkotkin.html) Japan The ese experience best illustrates how wrong punditry can be. Back in the 1970s and 1980s it was commonplace for punditsparticularly on the left to predict Japan's ascendance into world leadership . At the time distinguished commentators like George Lodge, Lester Thurow and Robert Reich all pointed to Europe and Japan as the nations slated to beat the U.S. on the economic battlefield . "Japan is replacing America as the world's strongest economic power," prominent one scholar told a Joint Economic Committee of Congress in 1986. "It is in everyone's interest that the transition goes smoothly." This was not unusual or even shocking at the time. It followed a grand tradition of declinism that over the past 70 years has declared America illsuited to compete with everyone from fascist Germany and Italy to the Soviet Union. By the mid1950s a majority were declinism? Certainly it's a view many in the wider public share. Most Americans fear their children will not be able to live as well as they have. A convinced that we were losing the Cold War. In the 1980s Harvard's John Kenneth Galbraith thought the Soviet model successful enough that the two systems would eventually "converge." We all know how that convergence worked out. Even the Chinese abandoned the Stalinist economic model so admired by many American intellectuals once Mao was safely amoldering in his grave. Outside of the European and American academe, the only strong advocates of state socialism can be found in such economic basket cases as Cuba, North Korea and Venezuela. So given this history, why the current rise in plurality think China will be the world's most powerful country in 20 years. To be sure there are some good reasons for pessimism. The huge deficits, high unemployment, our leakage of industry not only to China but other developing countries are all worrisome trends. Yet if the negative case is easi to make, er it does not stand historical scrutiny . Let's just go back to what we learned during the "Japan is taking over the world" phase during the 1970s and 1980s. At the time Dai Nippon's rapid economic expansion was considered inexorable. Yet history is not a straightline project. Most countries go through phases of expansion and decline. The factors driving success often include a wellconceived economic strategy, an expanding workforce and a sense of national elan . In the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s Japanlike China today possessed all those things . Its bureaucratic state had targeted key industries like automobiles and electronics, and its large, welleducated baby boom population was hitting the workforce. There was an unmistakable sense of pride in the country's rapid achievements after the devastation of the Second World War. Yet even then, as the Economist's Bill Emmot noted in his 1989 book The Sun Also Sets, things were not pretty once you looked so a little closer. In the mid1980s I traveled extensively in Japan and, with the help of a young JapaneseAmerican scholar, Yoriko Kishimoto, interviewed demographers and economists who predicted Japan's eventual decline. By then, the rapid drop in Japan's birthrate and its rapid aging was already clearly predictable . But even more persuasive were hours spent with the new generation of Japanesethe equivalent of America's Xerswho seemed alienated from the selfabnegating, workobsessed culture of their parents. By the late 1980s it was clear that the shinjinrui ("the new race") seemed more interested in design, culture and just having fun their than forebears . They seemed destined not to become another generation of economic samurai. At the time though, the very strategies so critical to Japan's growthparticularly a focus on highend manufacturingproved highly susceptible to competitors from lowercost countriesfirst Taiwan, Korea and Singapore, and later China, Vietnam and more recently India. Like America and Britain before it, Japan exported its unique genius abroad. Now many companies, including America n ones, have narrowed the technological gap with Japan. Today Japan, like the E.U., lacks the youthful population needed to recover its mojo . It likely will emerge as a kind of megaSwitzerland, Sweden or Denmarkrenowned for its safety and precision. Its workforce will have to be ultraproductive to finance the robots it will need to care of its vast elderly population . Will China follow a similar trajectory in the next few decades? Countries infrequently follow precisely the same script as another. Japan was always hemmed in by its position as a small island country with very minimal resources. Its demographic crisis will make things worse. In contrast, China, for the next few decades, certainly won't suffer a shortage of economically productive workers But it could face greater problems. The kind of lowwage manufacturing strategy t hat has generated China's success already seems certainas occurred with Japan already is leading to backlash across much of the world. China's very girth projects a more terrifying prospect than little Japan. At some point China a will either have to locate much of its industrial base closer to its customers, as Japan has done, or lose its markets . More important still are massive internal problems . Japan, for all its many imperfections, was and remains a stable, functioning democracy, open to the free flow of information. China is a fundamentally unstable autocracy , led from above, and one that seeks to control informationas evidenced in its conflict with Google ( GOOG news people )in an age where the free flow of information constitutes an essential part of economic progress. China's social problems will be further exacerbated by a huge , largely illeducated restive peasant class still living in poverty Of course America too has many problemswith stunted . upward mobility, the skill levels of its workforce, its fiscal situation. But the U.S., as the Japanese scholar Fuji Kamiya once noted, possesses sokojikara, a selfrenewing capacity unmatched by any country. As we enter the next few decades of the new millennium, I would bet on more youthful, still a resourcerich and democratic America to maintain its preeminence even in a world where economic power continues to shift from its historic home in Europe to Asia. 4. Their evidence is from a Professor of Computer science citing an interview with Noam Chomsky who has an ideological bias prefer our qualified authors A2: IRAN 1. Hegemony is still credible in the Status Quo this is just an argument for why the maintaining it now is key countries will see leadership in this crisis as a test case of US primacy 2. US hegemony is guaranteed economics and interdependence Friedman 10 (George, Founder and CEO of STRATFOR, the World's Leading Private Intelligence and Forecasting Company, Media Expert, "The Next 100 Years," January, Originally Published January 27th 2009, p.4) Standing at the beginning of the twentyfirst century, we need to identify the single pivotal event for this century, the equivalent of German unification for the twentieth century. After the debris of the European empire is cleared away, as well as what's left of the Soviet Union, one power remains standing and overwhelmingly powerful . That power is the United States Certainly, as is . usually the case, the United States currently appears to be making a mess of things around the world. But it's important not to be too confused by the passing chaos. The U nited tates S is economically, militarily, and politically the most powerful country in the world, and there is no real challenger to that power. Like the Spanish American War, a hundred years from now the war between the United States and the radical Islamists will be little remembered regardless of the prevailing sentiment of this time. Ever since the Civil War, the U nited tates has been on an S extraordinary economic surge. It has turned from a marginal developing nation into an economy bigger than the next four countries combined. Militarily, it has gone from being an insignificant force to dominating the globe. Politically, the U nited tates S touches virtually everything, sometimes internationally and sometimes simply because of its presence. As you read this book, it will seem that it is Americacentric, written from an American point of view. That may be true, but the argument I'm making is that the world does, in fact, pivot around the United States. This is not only due to American power. It also has to do with a fundamental shift in the way the world works. For the past five hundred years, Europe was the center of the international system, its empires creating a single global system for the first time in human history. The main highway to Europe was the North Atlantic. Whoever controlled the North Atlantic controlled access to Europe and Europe's access to the world. The basic geography of global politics was locked into place. Then, in the early 1980s, something remarkable happened. For the first time in history, transpacific trade equaled Trans Atlantic trade. With Europe reduced to a collection of secondary powers after World War II, and shift in trade patterns, the North Atlantic was no longer the single key to anything. Now whatever country controlled both the North Atlantic and the Pacific could control , if it wished, the world's trading system, and therefore the global economy. In the twentyfirst century, any nation located on both oceans has al a tremendous advantage Given the cost of building naval power, and the huge cost of deploying it around the world, the power native to both . oceans became the preeminent actor in the intentional system for the same reasons that Britain dominated the nineteenth century: it loved on the sea it had to control. In this way, North America has replaced Europe as the center of gravity in the world, and whoever dominated North America is virtually assured of being the dominant global power . For the twentyfirst century, at least, that will be the U nited tates. S 3. Leadership will be maintained even if some nongreat power defy us empirically proven by Iraq, Afghanistan, Vietnam, North Korea, and Cuba our evidence just speaks to preventing great power competition 4. Heg is sustainable hegemonic cooperation Norrlof 10 (Carla, an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto) "America's Global Advantage US Hegemony and International Cooperation" p. 56 American hegemony, and the order it generates, is surprisingly stable. What makes the system stable is the hegemon's interest in achieving disproportionate gains through international cooperation and other Great Powers' interest in achieving gains above what they can achieve through unilateral action . A benevolent hegemon would not seek disproportionate benefits whereas an exploitative hegemon uses force to seek disproportionate benefits, and risks turning allies into balancers and adversaries. There is at present no prospect of this. Pax Americana persists, despite a gradual increase in American exceptionalism and a rising sense that the United States no longer carries the burden of underwriting global order in a manner commensurate with its size and role . This shifts our focus from the question of whether collective action will take place to how different forms of cooperation are connected (bilateral and multilateral) and how the gains from multilateral cooperation are distributed. In the following chapters we will see how this theoretical proposition rhymes with collaboration in the trade area (chapter 4), in monetary and financial affairs (chapter 5), and in the security field (chapter 6), and we also examine where today's collective action to circumvent American power might take us (chapter 7). Will it lead us to a new world order or right back to the Americancentered system in which we live? A2: LAUNDRY LIST 1. Short term loss of Hegemony outweighs it would cause global chaos as countries lose faith in international security makes tense relations like IndoPak and ChinaTaiwan spark into conflict 2. Declinism is exaggerated the US will maintain hegemony other countries are bandwagoning and distrust China the US will remain the largest economy the US will maintain military superiority Lee 9 foreignpolicy fellow at the Centre for Independent Studies in Sydney and visiting fellow at the Hudson Institute in Washington (John, interview with ABC "Sun yet to set on US 'empire'", http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/content/2009/s2660492.htm) JOHN LEE: Well growing economic power doesn't necessarily imply proportionate strategic influence or leadership in the region. In China's case, China is quite literally the most distrusted rising power in world history. If you look at China's strategic situation they have land disputes with Russia and India that are still outstanding, they have maritime disputes with Japan, the Philippines, with Indonesia, with Vietnam. China has very few genuine allies in the region, it's only allies are North Korea, Myanmar, two basket case countries. China is actually in a very poor strategic position and even though China presents enormous economic opportunities for the region, the region still views China as a potential strategic enemy in the future. ELEANOR HALL: It's understandable that other countries in the region would not want China to be a dominant power, but that doesn't necessarily mean that it won't succeed in being one, I mean it certainly has ambitions doesn't it? JOHN LEE: It certainly has ambitions and that's part of the worry to other Asian states have, however what you'll see is that as China rises, other countries like Japan, like India are already balancing against China and band wagoning with the Americans. Even smaller countries like Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia have all moved closer to Washington strategically, not further away. ELEANOR HALL: Let's just get a sense though of the relative economic and military power the US has been declining in the region and China has been growing give us some numbers on that. JOHN LEE: Right, there is a lot of talk about relative US decline visvis China, but if you look at economics for example, the US will still remain the largest economy by all measurements up until 2030, 2040. Militarily the US still spends more than the next 10 countries combined, and even up to 2050, 2060 the US will still be the preponderant power in Asia. So the relative decline of US is occurring but it's exaggerated. ELEANOR HALL: Is there any doubt that there's resentment in China about the US position in the region? JOHN LEE: Oh there's no doubt there's resentment in Beijing, however Beijing can do very little about it. The US has built up good will over 60 years as a dominant power in the region, as a provider of public goods, as the power that is what sometimes called "the coast guard" of Asia. In contrast, Beijing is distrusted, and the US will continue to remain the overwhelming preferred dominant power in the region. A2: LAUNDRY LIST 3. Our argument is empirically proven in the context of demographics Kotkin 10 is a distinguished presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University, adjunct fellow at the Legatum Institute in London and serves as executive editor of newgeography.com, (Joel, "America on the Rise", http://www.forbes.com/2010/02/09/declinismchinaagingpopulationopinionscolumnistsjoelkotkin.html) Japan The ese experience best illustrates how wrong punditry can be. Back in the 1970s and 1980s it was commonplace for punditsparticularly on the left to predict Japan's ascendance into world leadership . At the time distinguished commentators like George Lodge, Lester Thurow and Robert Reich all pointed to Europe and Japan as the nations slated to beat the U.S. on the economic battlefield . "Japan is replacing America as the world's strongest economic power," prominent one scholar told a Joint Economic Committee of Congress in 1986. "It is in everyone's interest that the transition goes smoothly." This was not unusual or even shocking at the time. It followed a grand tradition of declinism that over the past 70 years has declared America illsuited to compete with everyone from fascist Germany and Italy to the Soviet Union. By the mid1950s a majority were declinism? Certainly it's a view many in the wider public share. Most Americans fear their children will not be able to live as well as they have. A convinced that we were losing the Cold War. In the 1980s Harvard's John Kenneth Galbraith thought the Soviet model successful enough that the two systems would eventually "converge." We all know how that convergence worked out. Even the Chinese abandoned the Stalinist economic model so admired by many American intellectuals once Mao was safely amoldering in his grave. Outside of the European and American academe, the only strong advocates of state socialism can be found in such economic basket cases as Cuba, North Korea and Venezuela. So given this history, why the current rise in plurality think China will be the world's most powerful country in 20 years. To be sure there are some good reasons for pessimism. The huge deficits, high unemployment, our leakage of industry not only to China but other developing countries are all worrisome trends. Yet if the negative case is easi to make, er it does not stand historical scrutiny . Let's just go back to what we learned during the "Japan is taking over the world" phase during the 1970s and 1980s. At the time Dai Nippon's rapid economic expansion was considered inexorable. Yet history is not a straightline project. Most countries go through phases of expansion and decline. The factors driving success often include a wellconceived economic strategy, an expanding workforce and a sense of national elan . In the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s Japanlike China today possessed all those things . Its bureaucratic state had targeted key industries like automobiles and electronics, and its large, welleducated baby boom population was hitting the workforce. There was an unmistakable sense of pride in the country's rapid achievements after the devastation of the Second World War. Yet even then, as the Economist's Bill Emmot noted in his 1989 book The Sun Also Sets, things were not pretty once you looked so a little closer. In the mid1980s I traveled extensively in Japan and, with the help of a young JapaneseAmerican scholar, Yoriko Kishimoto, interviewed demographers and economists who predicted Japan's eventual decline. By then, the rapid drop in Japan's birthrate and its rapid aging was already clearly predictable . But even more persuasive were hours spent with the new generation of Japanesethe equivalent of America's Xerswho seemed alienated from the selfabnegating, workobsessed culture of their parents. By the late 1980s it was clear that the shinjinrui ("the new race") seemed more interested in design, culture and just having fun their than forebears . They seemed destined not to become another generation of economic samurai. At the time though, the very strategies so critical to Japan's growthparticularly a focus on highend manufacturingproved highly susceptible to competitors from lowercost countriesfirst Taiwan, Korea and Singapore, and later China, Vietnam and more recently India. Like America and Britain before it, Japan exported its unique genius abroad. Now many companies, including America n ones, have narrowed the technological gap with Japan. Today Japan, like the E.U., lacks the youthful population needed to recover its mojo . It likely will emerge as a kind of megaSwitzerland, Sweden or Denmarkrenowned for its safety and precision. Its workforce will have to be ultraproductive to finance the robots it will need to care of its vast elderly population . Will China follow a similar trajectory in the next few decades? Countries infrequently follow precisely the same script as another. Japan was always hemmed in by its position as a small island country with very minimal resources. Its demographic crisis will make things worse. In contrast, China, for the next few decades, certainly won't suffer a shortage of economically productive workers But it could face greater problems. The kind of lowwage manufacturing strategy t hat has generated China's success already seems certainas occurred with Japan already is leading to backlash across much of the world. China's very girth projects a more terrifying prospect than little Japan. At some point China a will either have to locate much of its industrial base closer to its customers, as Japan has done, or lose its markets . More important still are massive internal problems . Japan, for all its many imperfections, was and remains a stable, functioning democracy, open to the free flow of information. China is a fundamentally unstable autocracy , led from above, and one that seeks to control informationas evidenced in its conflict with Google ( GOOG news people )in an age where the free flow of information constitutes an essential part of economic progress. China's social problems will be further exacerbated by a huge , largely illeducated restive peasant class still living in poverty Of course America too has many problemswith stunted . upward mobility, the skill levels of its workforce, its fiscal situation. But the U.S., as the Japanese scholar Fuji Kamiya once noted, possesses sokojikara, a selfrenewing capacity unmatched by any country. As we enter the next few decades of the new millennium, I would bet on more youthful, still a resourcerich and democratic America to maintain its preeminence even in a world where economic power continues to shift from its historic home in Europe to Asia. A2: LAUNDRY LIST 4. If worse comes to worst, latent power will fill in Wohlforth 7 Professor of Government at Dartmouth College and Chair of the Department of Government (Spring 2007, William, "Unipolar stability: the rules of power analysis," Harvard International Review 29.1, p.44, Academic OneFile) US military forces are stretched thin, its budget and trade deficits are high, and the country continues to finance its profligate ways by borrowing from abroad--notably from the Chinese government. These developments have prompted many analysts to warn that the United States suffers from "imperial overstretch." And if US power is overstretched now, the argument goes, unipolarity can hardly be sustainable for long. The problem with this argument is that it fails to distinguish between actual and latent power. One must be careful to take into account both the level of resources that can be mobilized and the degree to which a government actually tries to mobilize them. And how much a government asks of its public is partly a function of the severity of the challenges that it faces. Indeed, one can never know for sure what a state is capable of until it has been seriously challenged. Yale historian Paul Kennedy coined the term "imperial overstretch" to describe the situation in which a state's actual and latent capabilities cannot possibly match its foreign policy commitments. This situation should be contrasted with what might be termed "selfinflicted overstretch"a situation in which a state lacks the sufficient resources to meet its current foreign policy commitments in the short term, but has untapped latent power and readily available policy choices that it can use to draw on this power. This is arguably the situation that the United States is in today. But the US government has not attempted to extract more resources from its population to meet its foreign policy commitments. Instead, it has moved strongly in the opposite direction by slashing personal and corporate tax rates. Although it is fighting wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and claims to be fighting a global "war" on terrorism, the United States is not acting like a country under intense international pressure. Aside from the volunteer servicemen and women and their families, US citizens have not been asked to make sacrifices for the sake of national prosperity and security. The country could clearly devote a greater proportion of its economy to military spending: today it spends only about 4 percent of its GDP on the military, as compared to 7 to 14 percent during the peak years of the Cold War. It could also spend its military budget more efficiently, shifting resources from expensive weapons systems to boots on the ground. Even more radically , it could reinstitute military conscription, shifting resources from pay and benefits to training and equipping more soldiers . On the economic front, it could raise taxes in a number of ways, notably on fossil fuels, to put its fiscal house back in order . No one knows for sure what would happen if a US president undertook such drastic measures, but there is nothing in economics, political science, or history to suggest that such policies would be any less likely to succeed than China is to continue to grow rapidly for decades. Most of those who study US politics would argue that the likelihood and potential success of such powergenerating policies depends on public support, which is a function of the public's perception of a threat. And as unnerving as terrorism is, there is nothing like the threat of another hostile power rising up in opposition to the United States for mobilizing public support. With latent power in the picture, it becomes clear that unipolarity might have more built-in self-reinforcing mechanisms than many analysts realize. It is often noted that the rise of a peer competitor to the United States might be thwarted by the counterbalancing actions of neighboring powers. For example, China's rise might push India and Japan closer to the United States-indeed, this has already happened to some extent. There is also the strong possibility that a peer rival that comes to be seen as a threat would create strong incentives for the United States to end its selfinflicted overstretch and tap potentially large wellsprings of latent power. A2: MIDDLE POWERS 1. Short term loss of Hegemony outweighs it would cause global chaos as countries lose faith in international security makes tense relations like IndoPak and ChinaTaiwan spark into conflict 2. Heg is sustainable hegemonic cooperation Norrlof 10 (Carla, an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto) "America's Global Advantage US Hegemony and International Cooperation" p. 56 American hegemony, and the order it generates, is surprisingly stable. What makes the system stable is the hegemon's interest in achieving disproportionate gains through international cooperation and other Great Powers' interest in achieving gains above what they can achieve through unilateral action . A benevolent hegemon would not seek disproportionate benefits whereas an exploitative hegemon uses force to seek disproportionate benefits, and risks turning allies into balancers and adversaries. There is at present no prospect of this. Pax Americana persists, despite a gradual increase in American exceptionalism and a rising sense that the United States no longer carries the burden of underwriting global order in a manner commensurate with its size and role . This shifts our focus from the question of whether collective action will take place to how different forms of cooperation are connected (bilateral and multilateral) and how the gains from multilateral cooperation are distributed. In the following chapters we will see how this theoretical proposition rhymes with collaboration in the trade area (chapter 4), in monetary and financial affairs (chapter 5), and in the security field (chapter 6), and we also examine where today's collective action to circumvent American power might take us (chapter 7). Will it lead us to a new world order or right back to the Americancentered system in which we live? 3. There's a reason they're called "middle powers" our evidence speaks to great power competition as the main threat they're the only ones who can cause escalation 4. Dominant sea power prevents balancing comprehensive historical studies prove Levy and Thompson 10 (Jack S., Board of Governors' Professor at Rutgers University and former president of both the International Studies Association and the Peace Science Society, & William R., Donald A. Rogers Professor of Political Science at Indiana University, former president of the International Studies Association, and Managing Editor of International Studies Quarterly) Summer " Balancing on Land and at Sea Do States Ally against the Leading Global Power?" http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Balancing_on_Land_and_at_Sea.pdf Contrary to traditional balance of power theory and its argument that states tend to balance against the strongest power in the system, particularly if that lead state is increasing in strength, hypothesis 1 predicts that there is no strong tendency for great powers to balance against the leading sea power in the system, even if it is signicantly increasing in strength. As the marginal frequencies in the right column of table 3 indicate, great power alliances have formed against the lead sea power in 88 cases out of a total of 544 possible opportuni ties, or about 16 percent of the time. This is strong evidence in support of H1 about the absence of a systematic tendency toward balancing against the leading sea power . In marked contrast, great power alliances formed against the leading land power in Europe about 43 percent of the time over the same time period.67 This comparison provides strong support for H1's implication that great powers are signicantly less likely to balance against the leading global sea power than against the leading European land power. A2: OBAMA WEAKNESS 1. Hegemony is still credible in the Status Quo this is just an argument for why the maintaining it now is key countries will see leadership as a test case of US primacy 2. Hegemonic cooperation maintains leadership Norrlof 10 (Carla, an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto) "America's Global Advantage US Hegemony and International Cooperation" p. 56 American hegemony, and the order it generates, is surprisingly stable. What makes the system stable is the hegemon's interest in achieving disproportionate gains through international cooperation and other Great Powers' interest in achieving gains above what they can achieve through unilateral action . A benevolent hegemon would not seek disproportionate benefits whereas an exploitative hegemon uses force to seek disproportionate benefits, and risks turning allies into balancers and adversaries. There is at present no prospect of this. Pax Americana persists, despite a gradual increase in American exceptionalism and a rising sense that the United States no longer carries the burden of underwriting global order in a manner commensurate with its size and role . This shifts our focus from the question of whether collective action will take place to how different forms of cooperation are connected (bilateral and multilateral) and how the gains from multilateral cooperation are distributed. In the following chapters we will see how this theoretical proposition rhymes with collaboration in the trade area (chapter 4), in monetary and financial affairs (chapter 5), and in the security field (chapter 6), and we also examine where today's collective action to circumvent American power might take us (chapter 7). Will it lead us to a new world order or right back to the Americancentered system in which we live? 3. Economics and interdependence guarantee Hegemony Friedman 10 (George, Founder and CEO of STRATFOR, the World's Leading Private Intelligence and Forecasting Company, Media Expert, "The the twentieth century. After the debris of the European empire is cleared away, as well as what's left of the Soviet Next 100 Years," January, Originally Published January 27th 2009, p.4) Standing at the beginning of the twentyfirst century, we need to identify the single pivotal event for this century, the equivalent of German unification for Union, one power remains standing and overwhelmingly powerful . That power is the United States Certainly, as is . usually the case, the United States currently appears to be making a mess of things around the world. But it's important not to be too confused by the passing chaos. The U nited tates S is economically, militarily, and politically the most powerful country in the world, and there is no real challenger to that power. Like the Spanish American War, a hundred years from now the war between the United States and the radical Islamists will be little remembered regardless of the prevailing sentiment of this time. Ever since the Civil War, the U nited tates has been on an S extraordinary economic surge. It has turned from a marginal developing nation into an economy bigger than the next four countries combined. Militarily, it has gone from being an insignificant force to dominating the globe. Politically, the U nited tates S touches virtually everything, sometimes internationally and sometimes simply because of its presence. As you read this book, it will seem that it is Americacentric, written from an American point of view. That may be true, but the argument I'm making is that the world does, in fact, pivot around the United States. This is not only due to American power. It also has to do with a fundamental shift in the way the world works. For the past five hundred years, Europe was the center of the international system, its empires creating a single global system for the first time in human history. The main highway to Europe was the North Atlantic. Whoever controlled the North Atlantic controlled access to Europe and Europe's access to the world. The basic geography of global politics was locked into place. Then, in the early 1980s, something remarkable happened. For the first time in history, transpacific trade equaled Trans Atlantic trade. With Europe reduced to a collection of secondary powers after World War II, and shift in trade patterns, the North Atlantic was no longer the single key to anything. Now whatever country controlled both the North Atlantic and the Pacific could control , if it wished, the world's trading system, and therefore the global economy. In the twentyfirst century, any nation located on both oceans has al a tremendous advantage Given the cost of building naval power, and the huge cost of deploying it around the world, the power native to both . oceans became the preeminent actor in the intentional system for the same reasons that Britain dominated the nineteenth century: it loved on the sea it had to control. In this way, North America has replaced Europe as the center of gravity in the world, and whoever dominated North America is virtually assured of being the dominant global power . For the twentyfirst century, at least, that will be the U nited tates. S A2: OBAMA WEAKNESS 3. Smart power approach will maintain Hegemony Nathan Gardels, journalist and Senior Fellow at the UCLA School of Public Affairs, former executive director of the Institute for National Strategy, degree in Theory and Comparative Politics; andMike Medavoy. 2009. (American Idol After Iraq: Competing for Hearts and Minds in the Global Media Age, page 126.) In this informationflush environment, the allegiance of hearts and minds must be granted consensually by persuasion as the result of the power of example instead of the example of power, as Bill Clinton has put it so well. Unilateral willtopower policies backfire because they lack legitimacy. No amount of spin can turn people around when the Al Jazeeras or Al Arabiyas of the world, not to speak of CNN or the Western media or milbloggers (military bloggers), are on the case. The key, therefore, to recovering American prestige is to lead by seeking consensus for our vision of the world order, by working with others and by attracting support through sticking to our ideals in practice. lt would be a mistake to believe that when the debacle of Iraq War and the ruinous policies of the Bush administration are behind us, all will be well once again just as after the Vietnam War, that our prestige will automatically return. It is certainly true that market democracies, most particularly the US with its flexible culture, are selfcorrecting because of the robust feedback open societies afford. We learn, we change. Butselfcorrection does not mean a return to the status quo ante but to forward evolution based on new conditions. h the Vietnam years, the world remained frozen within the CoId War framework both geopolitically and geoculturally. The Cold War prevented the freer flow of capital, skills, formation, and technology across borders from taking Rkce. This has not been true in the years since 9/11/01. In our age of future shock and accelerated change on a global scale, a torrent of transformation has flowed under the bridge from the continuing rapid growth of China to the digital democratization of information. The changes in this period didn't start from scratch but had a running start. During the previous eight years of the Clinton residency, it was Americanled globalization that helped to unleash the torrent. Paradoxically, that globalization has both bound America through deeper interdependence (for example through the current account imbalance with China that finances our consumption) and constrained its power through fostering a devolution of power to other centers, including not only the European Union but "emerging market" countries like Brazil, lndia, and China which have become established players. The multipolar world order now emerging both culturally and geopolitically was already in the birth canal. Paradoxically, it was the reaction incited by the muscular unilateralism of the Bush administration that finally pushed it out of its postCold War womb. In this sense, America's waning soft power has been the midwife of the new cultural selfassertion around the world. Finally, and perhaps most fundamentally, the years after 9/11 have led to a jaded view in world public opinion of America's universalist claims. It turns out that even this historically exceptional nation, guarantor without peer of the liberal world order, retreated like any other country from its principles when fear narrowed its perception of national interest. America is no longer the same in the eyes of the world. The path to the recovery of American prestige offered by the traditional foreign policy establishment has been called "smart power" by Harvard professor Joe Nye. Essentially this means rebalancing hard power with a surge of soft power through enhanced educational exchanges, reinvigorated alliances and multilateral institutions, policies aimed at preserving an open world economy "a commitment to universal rules of openness that spread the gains widely" in the words of John Ikenberry1 and joining the fight against poverty and global warming. In the campaign against terrorism and nuclear nonproliferation, hard power must be deployed judiciously, wrapped in the legitimacy of multilateralism but for the most exceptional cases. Smart power seeks a retreat from ideology to the pragmatism for which American leadership was once admired. A2: TRANSITION FROM MILITARY POWER 1. Spread of democracy, free trade, and economic liberalization shows that leadership is strong this is just an argument for why Hegemony can adapt 2. US hegemony is guaranteed economics and interdependence Friedman 10 (George, Founder and CEO of STRATFOR, the World's Leading Private Intelligence and Forecasting Company, Media Expert, "The Next 100 Years," January, Originally Published January 27th 2009, p.4) Standing at the beginning of the twentyfirst century, we need to identify the single pivotal event for this century, the equivalent of German unification for the twentieth century. After the debris of the European empire is cleared away, as well as what's left of the Soviet Union, one power remains standing and overwhelmingly powerful . That power is the United States Certainly, as is . usually the case, the United States currently appears to be making a mess of things around the world. But it's important not to be too confused by the passing chaos. The U nited tates S is economically, militarily, and politically the most powerful country in the world, and there is no real challenger to that power. Like the Spanish American War, a hundred years from now the war between the United States and the radical Islamists will be little remembered regardless of the prevailing sentiment of this time. Ever since the Civil War, the U nited tates has been on an S extraordinary economic surge. It has turned from a marginal developing nation into an economy bigger than the next four countries combined. Militarily, it has gone from being an insignificant force to dominating the globe. Politically, the U nited tates S touches virtually everything, sometimes internationally and sometimes simply because of its presence. As you read this book, it will seem that it is Americacentric, written from an American point of view. That may be true, but the argument I'm making is that the world does, in fact, pivot around the United States. This is not only due to American power. It also has to do with a fundamental shift in the way the world works. For the past five hundred years, Europe was the center of the international system, its empires creating a single global system for the first time in human history. The main highway to Europe was the North Atlantic. Whoever controlled the North Atlantic controlled access to Europe and Europe's access to the world. The basic geography of global politics was locked into place. Then, in the early 1980s, something remarkable happened. For the first time in history, transpacific trade equaled Trans Atlantic trade. With Europe reduced to a collection of secondary powers after World War II, and shift in trade patterns, the North Atlantic was no longer the single key to anything. Now whatever country controlled both the North Atlantic and the Pacific could control , if it wished, the world's trading system, and therefore the global economy. In the twentyfirst century, any nation located on both oceans has al a tremendous advantage Given the cost of building naval power, and the huge cost of deploying it around the world, the power native to both . oceans became the preeminent actor in the intentional system for the same reasons that Britain dominated the nineteenth century: it loved on the sea it had to control. In this way, North America has replaced Europe as the center of gravity in the world, and whoever dominated North America is virtually assured of being the dominant global power . For the twentyfirst century, at least, that will be the U nited tates. S A2: TRANSITION FROM MILITARY POWER 3. Smart power approach will maintain Hegemony Nathan Gardels, journalist and Senior Fellow at the UCLA School of Public Affairs, former executive director of the Institute for National Strategy, degree in Theory and Comparative Politics; andMike Medavoy. 2009. (American Idol After Iraq: Competing for Hearts and Minds in the Global Media Age, page 126.) In this informationflush environment, the allegiance of hearts and minds must be granted consensually by persuasion as the result of the power of example instead of the example of power, as Bill Clinton has put it so well. Unilateral willtopower policies backfire because they lack legitimacy. No amount of spin can turn people around when the Al Jazeeras or Al Arabiyas of the world, not to speak of CNN or the Western media or milbloggers (military bloggers), are on the case. The key, therefore, to recovering American prestige is to lead by seeking consensus for our vision of the world order, by working with others and by attracting support through sticking to our ideals in practice. lt would be a mistake to believe that when the debacle of Iraq War and the ruinous policies of the Bush administration are behind us, all will be well once again just as after the Vietnam War, that our prestige will automatically return. It is certainly true that market democracies, most particularly the US with its flexible culture, are selfcorrecting because of the robust feedback open societies afford. We learn, we change. Butselfcorrection does not mean a return to the status quo ante but to forward evolution based on new conditions. h the Vietnam years, the world remained frozen within the CoId War framework both geopolitically and geoculturally. The Cold War prevented the freer flow of capital, skills, formation, and technology across borders from taking Rkce. This has not been true in the years since 9/11/01. In our age of future shock and accelerated change on a global scale, a torrent of transformation has flowed under the bridge from the continuing rapid growth of China to the digital democratization of information. The changes in this period didn't start from scratch but had a running start. During the previous eight years of the Clinton residency, it was Americanled globalization that helped to unleash the torrent. Paradoxically, that globalization has both bound America through deeper interdependence (for example through the current account imbalance with China that finances our consumption) and constrained its power through fostering a devolution of power to other centers, including not only the European Union but "emerging market" countries like Brazil, lndia, and China which have become established players. The multipolar world order now emerging both culturally and geopolitically was already in the birth canal. Paradoxically, it was the reaction incited by the muscular unilateralism of the Bush administration that finally pushed it out of its postCold War womb. In this sense, America's waning soft power has been the midwife of the new cultural selfassertion around the world. Finally, and perhaps most fundamentally, the years after 9/11 have led to a jaded view in world public opinion of America's universalist claims. It turns out that even this historically exceptional nation, guarantor without peer of the liberal world order, retreated like any other country from its principles when fear narrowed its perception of national interest. America is no longer the same in the eyes of the world. The path to the recovery of American prestige offered by the traditional foreign policy establishment has been called "smart power" by Harvard professor Joe Nye. Essentially this means rebalancing hard power with a surge of soft power through enhanced educational exchanges, reinvigorated alliances and multilateral institutions, policies aimed at preserving an open world economy "a commitment to universal rules of openness that spread the gains widely" in the words of John Ikenberry1 and joining the fight against poverty and global warming. In the campaign against terrorism and nuclear nonproliferation, hard power must be deployed judiciously, wrapped in the legitimacy of multilateralism but for the most exceptional cases. Smart power seeks a retreat from ideology to the pragmatism for which American leadership was once admired. 4. Dominant sea power prevents balancing comprehensive historical studies prove Levy and Thompson 10 (Jack S., Board of Governors' Professor at Rutgers University and former president of both the International Studies Association and the Peace Science Society, & William R., Donald A. Rogers Professor of Political Science at Indiana University, former president of the International Studies Association, and Managing Editor of International Studies Quarterly) Summer " Balancing on Land and at Sea Do States Ally against the Leading Global Power?" http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Balancing_on_Land_and_at_Sea.pdf Contrary to traditional balance of power theory and its argument that states tend to balance against the strongest power in the system, particularly if that lead state is increasing in strength, hypothesis 1 predicts that there is no strong tendency for great powers to balance against the leading sea power in the system, even if it is signicantly increasing in strength. As the marginal frequencies in the right column of table 3 indicate, great power alliances have formed against the lead sea power in 88 cases out of a total of 544 possible opportuni ties, or about 16 percent of the time. This is strong evidence in support of H1 about the absence of a systematic tendency toward balancing against the leading sea power . In marked contrast, great power alliances formed against the leading land power in Europe about 43 percent of the time over the same time period.67 This comparison provides strong support for H1's implication that great powers are signicantly less likely to balance against the leading global sea power than against the leading European land power. A2: IRAQ/WOT 1. Hegemony is still credible in the Status Quo this is just an argument for why the maintaining it now is key countries will see leadership as a test case of US primacy 2. US hegemony is guaranteed economics and interdependence Friedman 10 (George, Founder and CEO of STRATFOR, the World's Leading Private Intelligence and Forecasting Company, Media Expert, "The Next 100 Years," January, Originally Published January 27th 2009, p.4) Standing at the beginning of the twentyfirst century, we need to identify the single pivotal event for this century, the equivalent of German unification for the twentieth century. After the debris of the European empire is cleared away, as well as what's left of the Soviet Union, one power remains standing and overwhelmingly powerful . That power is the United States Certainly, as is . usually the case, the United States currently appears to be making a mess of things around the world. But it's important not to be too confused by the passing chaos. The U nited tates S is economically, militarily, and politically the most powerful country in the world, and there is no real challenger to that power. Like the Spanish American War, a hundred years from now the war between the United States and the radical Islamists will be little remembered regardless of the prevailing sentiment of this time. Ever since the Civil War, the U nited tates has been on an S extraordinary economic surge. It has turned from a marginal developing nation into an economy bigger than the next four countries combined. Militarily, it has gone from being an insignificant force to dominating the globe. Politically, the U nited tates S touches virtually everything, sometimes internationally and sometimes simply because of its presence. As you read this book, it will seem that it is Americacentric, written from an American point of view. That may be true, but the argument I'm making is that the world does, in fact, pivot around the United States. This is not only due to American power. It also has to do with a fundamental shift in the way the world works. For the past five hundred years, Europe was the center of the international system, its empires creating a single global system for the first time in human history. The main highway to Europe was the North Atlantic. Whoever controlled the North Atlantic controlled access to Europe and Europe's access to the world. The basic geography of global politics was locked into place. Then, in the early 1980s, something remarkable happened. For the first time in history, transpacific trade equaled Trans Atlantic trade. With Europe reduced to a collection of secondary powers after World War II, and shift in trade patterns, the North Atlantic was no longer the single key to anything. Now whatever country controlled both the North Atlantic and the Pacific could control , if it wished, the world's trading system, and therefore the global economy. In the twentyfirst century, any nation located on both oceans has al a tremendous advantage Given the cost of building naval power, and the huge cost of deploying it around the world, the power native to both . oceans became the preeminent actor in the intentional system for the same reasons that Britain dominated the nineteenth century: it loved on the sea it had to control. In this way, North America has replaced Europe as the center of gravity in the world, and whoever dominated North America is virtually assured of being the dominant global power . For the twentyfirst century, at least, that will be the U nited tates. S 3. Vietnam proves that US leadership will be maintained in spite of an illperceived military occupation 4. Dominant sea power prevents balancing comprehensive historical studies prove Levy and Thompson 10 (Jack S., Board of Governors' Professor at Rutgers University and former president of both the International Studies Association and the Peace Science Society, & William R., Donald A. Rogers Professor of Political Science at Indiana University, former president of the International Studies Association, and Managing Editor of International Studies Quarterly) Summer " Balancing on Land and at Sea Do States Ally against the Leading Global Power?" http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Balancing_on_Land_and_at_Sea.pdf Contrary to traditional balance of power theory and its argument that states tend to balance against the strongest power in the system, particularly if that lead state is increasing in strength, hypothesis 1 predicts that there is no strong tendency for great powers to balance against the leading sea power in the system, even if it is signicantly increasing in strength. As the marginal frequencies in the right column of table 3 indicate, great power alliances have formed against the lead sea power in 88 cases out of a total of 544 possible opportuni ties, or about 16 percent of the time. This is strong evidence in support of H1 about the absence of a systematic tendency toward balancing against the leading sea power . In marked contrast, great power alliances formed against the leading land power in Europe about 43 percent of the time over the same time period.67 This comparison provides strong support for H1's implication that great powers are signicantly less likely to balance against the leading global sea power than against the leading European land power. A2: NO ECONOMIC POWER Statistics prove U.S. economic power is high Fernndeza and NikolskoRzhevskyy, 10 * Ph.D. in economics from the University of Houston, economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas AND ** Assistant Professor of Economics at the University of Memphis, Ph.D. in economics from the University of Houston (*Adriana Z. and **Alex, "The changing nature of the U.S. economic influence in the World", Journal of Policy Modeling, MarchApril 2010, Vol. 32, Issue 2, Galileo, KONTOPOULOS) Using realtime data3 from 1960 to 2007 to calculate business cycles for the U.S. and other eleven important partners, we analyze the evolution of the U.S. influence over other countries from different perspectives. We first look at how closely the U.S. business cycles move together with other countries' contemporaneous cycles. For that, we employ a simple correlation analysis,4 which shows that over the years, the U.S. and other countries have observed a slowly decreasing degree of economic synchronicity . We interpret that as a gradual decrease in the informational value of current U.S. economic fluctuations to explain other countries' current fluctuations. Second, in order to see if the U.S. fluctuations take some time to manifest in other countries' economies, we look at how U.S. fluctuations that occurred up to a year ago affect other countries' current cycles via Granger causality tests.5 The results suggest that since the early 1980s, cyclical movements in the U.S. economy affect other economies with a lag, rather than contemporaneously, suggesting that it indeed now takes more time for U.S. economic fluctuations to show up in other countries' economies. We then look at how unexpected forces ("shocks") that affect the U.S. business cycle would have in other countries' cycles, and the time it would take for the full effects of such shock to dissipate.6 The results current U.S. business cycles influence other countries' current cycles. Specifically, we look at the accumulated effects that a 1% unexpected fluctuation in indicate that the overall accumulated effects of U.S. shocks have tended to increase over time, as well as the time it takes for a shock to dissipate. This suggests that the U.S. economic influence may not be decreasing in the long run. There seems to be instead, an increasing delay between a U.S. downturn and its full manifestation in other economies. Our overall findings may shed light on the reasons why many would invoke the theory of decoupling to describe the performance of other countries at the beginning of the U.S. downturn in the summer of 2007. Globalization, which is also a factor of the greater intricacy of transmission channels, in all its dimensions may in fact have made countries more dependent on each other and may explain the perceived time delay. A2: HISTORICAL EXAMPLES Historical examples don't apply US is different in every way Cols, 08 Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Birkbeck (Alejandro, "Open Doors and Closed Frontiers: The Limits of American Empire", European Journal of International Relations, 2008, July 30th 2010, Vol. 14, p. 1920, KONTOPOULOS) PDF The specific limits of US global power, then, lie in its contradictory promotion of sovereign states and free markets. Unlike previous global hegemons, the US is neither interested in territorial acquisition nor in prolonged military occupations. It does not rely on tribute or the forcible control of populations for its socioeconomic reproduction . Rather, American global power projects itself through the mediation of states and the transterritorial dynamics of the capitalist market. Its preferred form of rule is through allies, not dominions; its source of wealth capitalist exchange, not tribute; and its political geography organized around a pluriverse of closed frontiers rather than a limitless universal ecumene. To be sure, such sources of power and wealth are policed through an extensive network of military bases and the US domination over air and sea through supreme firepower. But, as the concluding section of this essay will suggest, the unique organization of political space under American hegemony prevents it from dominating on land. And in a postcolonial world of mass politics and exclusive territorial authority, controlling outcomes means controlling populations through the territorial power of the state. HEG SUSTAINABLE MORE EVIDENCE Hegemony is sustainable no external force can collapse or balance against it Brooks and Wohlforth 2 *Assistant Professor AND **Associate Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College (Stephen G. and William C., "American Primacy in Perspective," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 4, July/August 2002) Many who acknowledge the extent of American power, however, regard it as necessarily selfnegating. Other states traditionally band together to restrain potential hegemons, they say, and this time will be no different. As German political commentator Josef Joffe has put it, "the history books say that Mr. Big always invites his own demise. Nos. 2, 3, 4 will gang up on him, form countervailing alliances and plot his downfall. That happened to Napoleon, as it happened to Louis xiv and the mighty Hapsburgs, to Hitler and to Stalin. Power begets superior counterpower; it's the oldest rule of world politics." What such arguments fail to recognize are the features of America's post Cold War position that make it likely to buck the historical trend. Bounded by oceans to the east and west and weak, friendly powers to the north and south, the United States is both less vulnerable than previous aspiring hegemons and also less threatening to others. The main potential challengers to its unipolarity , meanwhile-- China, Russia, Japan, and Germany--are in the opposite position. They cannot augment their military capabilities so as to balance the United States without simultaneously becoming an immediate threat to their neighbors. Politics, even international politics, is local. Although American power attracts a lot of attention globally, states are usually more concerned with their own neighborhoods than with the global equilibrium. Were any of the potential challengers to make a serious run at the United States, regional balancing efforts would almost certainly help contain them , as would the massive latent power capabilities of the United States, which could be mobilized as necessary to head o an emerging threat. When analysts refer to a historical pattern of balancing against potentially preponderant powers, they rarely note that the cases in question --the Hapsburg ascendancy, Napoleonic France, the Soviet Union in the Cold War, and so forth-- featured wouldbe hegemons that were vulnerable , threatening, centrally located, and dominant in only one or two components of power. Moreover, the wouldbe hegemons all specialized in precisely the form of power--the ability to seize territory--most likely to scare other states into an antihegemonic coalition. American capabilities, by contrast, are relatively greater and more comprehensive than those of past hegemonic aspirants, they are located safely offshore, and the prospective balancers are close regional neighbors of one another. U.S. power is also at the command of one government, whereas the putative balancers would face major challenges in acting collectively to assemble and coordinate their military capabilities. Previous historical experiences of balancing, moreover, involved groups of status quo powers seeking to contain a rising revisionist one . The balancers had much to fear if the aspiring hegemon got its way. Today, however, U.S. dominance is the status quo. Several of the major powers in the system have been closely allied with the United States for decades and derive substantial benefits from their position. Not only would they have to forego those benefits if they tried to balance, but they would have to find some way of putting together a durable, coherent alliance while America was watching. This is a profoundly important point, because although there may be several precedents for a coalition of balancers preventing a hegemon from emerging, there is none for a group of subordinate The comprehensive nature of U.S. power, finally, also skews the odds against any major attempt at balancing, let alone a successful one. The United States is both big and rich, whereas the potential challengers are all either one or the other. It will take at least a generation for today's other big countries (such powers joining to topple a hegemon once it has already emerged, which is what would have to happen today. a figure equal to more than half the current population of France or the United Kingdom . as China and India) to become rich, and given declining birth rates the other rich powers are not about to get big, at least in relative terms. During the 1990s, the U.S. population increased by 32.7 million-- the bigorrich rule. It is true that if Brussels were to develop impressive military capabilities and wield its latent collective power like a state, the EU would clearly constitute another pole. But the creation of an autonomous and unified defense and defenseindustrial capacity that could compete with that of the United States would be a gargantuan task . The eu is struggling to put together a 60,000 strong rapid reaction force that is designed for smaller operations such as humanitarian relief, peacekeeping, and crisis management, but it still lacks military essentials such as capabilities in intelligence gathering, airlift, airdefense suppression, airtoair refueling, sea transport, medical care, and combat search and rescue--and even when it has those capacities, perhaps by the end of this decade, it will still rely on nato command and control and other assets. Whatever capability the eu eventually assembles, moreover, will matter only to the extent that it is under the control of a statelike decisionmaking body with the authority to act quickly and decisively in Europe's name. Such authority, which does not yet exist even for international financial matters, could be purchased only at the price of a direct frontal assault on European nations' core sovereignty. And all of this would have to occur as the eu expands to add ten or more new member states, a process that will complicate further deepening. Given these obstacles, Some might argue that the European Union is an exception to Europe is unlikely to emerge as a dominant actor in the military realm for a very long time , if ever. Most analysts looking for a future peer competitor to the United States, therefore, focus on China , since it is the only power with the potential to match the size of the U.S. economy over the next several decades. Yet even if China were eventually to catch up to the United States in terms of aggregate gdp, the gaps in the two states' other power capabilities --technological, military, and geographic--would remain. Since the mid1990s, Chinese strategists themselves have become markedly less bullish about their country's ability to close the gap in what they call "comprehensive national power" any time soon. The latest estimates by China's intelligence agency project that in 2020 the country will possess between slightly more than a third and slightly more than half of U.S. capabilities. Fifty percent of China's labor force is employed in agriculture, and relatively little of its economy is geared toward high technology. In the 1990s, U.S. spending on technological development was more than 20 times China's. Most of China's weapons are decades old. And nothing China can do will allow it to escape its geography, which leaves it surrounded by countries that have the motivation and ability to engage in balancing of their own should China start to build up an expansive military force. These are not just facts about the current system; they are recognized as such by the major players involved. As a result, no global challenge to the United States is likely to emerge for the foreseeable future. No country, or group of countries, wants to maneuver itself into a situation in which it will have to contend with the focused enmity of the United States. Two of the prime causes of past greatpower conflicts--hegemonic rivalry and misperception--are thus not currently operative in world politics. At the dawn of the twentieth century, a militarily powerful Germany challenged the United Kingdom's claim to leadership. The result was World War I. In the middle of the twentieth century, American leadership seemed under challenge by a militarily and ideologically strong Soviet Union. The result was the Cold War. U.S. dominance today militates against a comparable challenge, however, and hence against a comparable global conflict. Because the United States is too powerful to balance, moreover, there is far less danger of war emerging from the misperceptions, miscalculations, arms races, and so forth that have traditionally plagued balancing attempts. Pundits often lament the absence of a postCold War Bismarck. Luckily, as long as unipolarity lasts, there is no need for one. HEG SUSTAINABLE MORE EVIDENCE Other nations will always perceive the U.S. as a hegemon Drezner 9 Professor of International Politics at the Fletcher School at Tufts University, senior editor at The National Interest, author (Daniel W., "The False Hegemon," The National Interest, http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=21858, 7/15/09) The rest of the world certainly seems to treat America as the hegemonic power, for good or ill. According to the New York Times, Latin America is waiting for the United States to break the deadlock in Honduras . Vladimir Putin is incapable of giving a foreignpolicy speech in which he does not blast American hegemony as the root of all of Russia's ills. While Chinese officials talk tough about ending the dollar's reign as the world's reserve currency, its leaders also want America to solve the current economic crisis and to take the lead on global warming in the process. It's not just foreign leaders who are obsessed with American hegemony. Last week, in an example of true hardship duty, I taught a short course in American foreign policy at the Barcelona Institute for International Studies. The students in my class represented a true cross section of nationalities: Spaniards, Germans, Brits, Estonian, Chinese, Vietnamese, Indian, Thai, Ghanaian, Kenyan, Turkish, Belgian, Mexican, Nicaraguan and, yes, even Americans. I cannot claim that my students represent a scientific cross section of nonAmericans (one of them complained that I did not rely on Marxism as a structural explanation for American foreign policy). Still, by and large the students were bright, well informed about world affairs and cautiously optimistic about President Obama. That said, a persistent trend among my students was their conviction that the U.S. government was the world's puppeteer, consciously manipulating every single event in world politics. For example, many of them were convinced that George W. Bush ordered Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili to precipitate last year's war with Russia. The Ghanaian students wanted to know why Obama visited their country last week. The standard "promotion of good democratic governance" answer did not satisfy them. They were convinced that there had to be some deeper, potentially sinister motive to the whole enterprise. Don't even ask what they thought about the reasons behind the war in Iraq. To be sure, the United States is a powerful actor; the government is trying to influence global events (and Americans are not immune to their own misperceptions). And good social scientists should always search for underlying causes and not take rhetoric at face value. Nevertheless, the belief in an allpowerful America hatching conspiracies left and right frequently did not jibe with the facts. For many of these students, even apparent policy mistakes were merely examples of American subterfuge. Ironically, at the moment when many Americans are questioning the future of U.S. hegemony, many nonAmericans continue to believe that the U.S. government is diabolically manipulating events behind the scenes. Going forward, the persistence of antiAmericanism in the age of Obama might have nothing to do with the president, or his rhetoric or even U.S. government actions. It might, instead, have to do with the congealed habits of thought that place the United States at the epicenter of all global movings and shakings. The tragedy is that such an exaggerated perception of American power and purpose is occurring at precisely the moment when the United States will need to scale back its global ambitions. Indeed, the external perception of U.S. omnipresence will make the pursuit of a more modest U.S. foreign policy all the more difficult. The Obama administration has consciously adopted a more modest posture in the hopes of improving America's standing abroad. If the rest of the world genuinely believes that the United States causes everything, however, then the attempt at modesty will inevitably fail. HEG SUSTAINABLE MORE EVIDENCE Hegemony is sustainable it's only a question of restraint Walt 10 Professor of International Affairs at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government (Stephen M., "Five big questions," Foreign Policy, http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/07/12/five_big_questions, 7/12/10) The United States will remain the world's most powerful state for some time to come. Its economy will be the world's largest until 2030 at least, and its per capita income will be much higher than that of other potential rivals (meaning there is great potential wealth that can be mobilized for national purposes). Unlike Europe, Japan, and Russia, the U.S. population will continue to grow and will not as old. And it will take a great deal of time before any other country amasses global military capabilities akin to ours. Nonetheless, the position of primacy that the United States enjoyed in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet collapse has already eroded significantly and is unlikely to return. China is growing rapidly, and it will gradually translate some of its growing wealth into greater military capacity. It will not challenge the United States around the globe , but it is likely to challenge America's current preeminence in East Asia. No great power likes seeing another one with a large and visible military presence in its own backyard, and China will be no exception to that rule. Other states may acquire a greater capacity to deter us (in some case including WMD) thereby forcing the United States to treat them gingerly than we might prefer. Countries such as Brazil and Turkey have been growing steadily in recent years, casting off their past deference to Washington, and gaining considerable influence in their immediate surroundings. To succeed, therefore, U.S. diplomacy and grand strategy will have to be more nuanced, attentive, and flexible than it was in the earlier era of clear U.S. dominance (and a rigidly bipolar global order). We'll have to cut deals where we used to dictate, and be more attentive to other states' interests. The bad news is that nuance and flexibility are not exactly America's long suit . We like black andwhite, good vs. evil crusades, and our leaders love to tell the rest of the world what to do and how and when to do it. Even worse, our political system encourages xenophobic posturing, knownothing demonizing, and relentless threatinflation, all combined with a cando attitude that assumes Americans can solve almost any problem and have to play the leading role in addressing almost anything that comes up. It is also a system that seems incapable of acknowledging mistakes and admitting that sometimes we really don't know best. Leaders like Bush and Obama sometimes talk about the need for humility and restraint, but they don't actually deliver it. So for me, a big question is whether the United States can learn how to deal with a slightly more even distribution of power, a somewhat larger set of consequential actors, and a rather messier global order. It's hard to be confident, but I'm open to being pleasantly surprised. Hegemony is sustainable military superiority and demographics Their claims are exaggerated Dawson 10 PhD Ohio State University (David, "Fear of U.S. decline is exaggeration of small problems", http://www.thelantern.com/opinion/fearofusdeclineisexaggerationofsmallproblems1.1472458) "Whether we like it or not," the president remarked at his recent nuclear proliferation conference, "we remain a dominant military superpower." His phrasing suggests weariness, almost like the status is all too much. Why fight to hold on to our supremacy, when all it leads to is war, terrorism and recession? Most people seem to think it's not something we'll have to worry about for much longer anyway. The popular sentiment is that the era of American superpower is coming to a close. Liberals like the president will say "good riddance." Conservatives will wonder what the world will do without America's guiding light. Both will be wrong. I find it hard to believe that our country is in decline. The American economy represents about 30 percent of the world's wealth, an incredible number considering we're less than 5 percent of the world population. No nation in history has ever enjoyed the military superiority of the U.S. We have control of every ocean and airspace. Our soldiers are the best trained and most technologically advanced by miles. Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan drain morale, but is our hegemony changed by them? But most importantly, now and in the future, the iron laws of demographics are on our side. By 2050, America will add 100 million new people. Some will be born here (at a rate exceeding most other powerful countries, including China) and many will immigrate here by choice. Our population will be young, wealthy and highly educated, eager to shape the world, and to do so profitably. Meanwhile, Europe and Russia will have lost population, and will have gotten older. China and India will have gotten richer but will struggle to apply that wealth to their massive poverty problems. The Middle East will be much more powerful, but it's not certain it can make the needed political and societal changes to become a real force to contend with. American power is increasing, not the other way around.No matter what kind of president or Congress is elected, the American Empire is going to stay involved in world affairs, not by choice, but by geopolitical necessity. In war, technology, culture, entrepreneurship and even morality, the world will continue to follow our lead. But the pessimism about our future will not abate either. It will always be beneficial to overstate relatively small problems, insisting on immediate action. Americans are greatly excited about short term issues but have difficulty conceptualizing the longterm. People will always expect the sky to begin falling, when in reality the good times are on their way. HEG SUSTAINABLE MORE EVIDENCE Their evidence doesn't assume demographics America will maintain its lead Kotkin 10 is a distinguished presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University, adjunct fellow at the Legatum Institute in London and serves as executive editor of newgeography.com, (Joel, "America on the Rise", http://www.forbes.com/2010/02/09/declinismchinaagingpopulationopinionscolumnistsjoelkotkin.html) For much of the past decade, "declinism"the notion that America is heading toward a deadly denouementhas largely been a philosophy of the left. But more recently, particularly in the wake of Barack Obama's election, conservatives have begun joining the chorus, albeit singing a somewhat different variation on the same tune. In a recent column in TheWashington Post George Will illustrates this conservative change of heart. Looking over the next few decades Will sees an aging, obsolescent America in retreat to a young and aggressive China. "America's destiny is demographic, and therefore is inexorable and predictable," he suggests, pointing to predictions by Nobel Prize economist Robert Fogel that China's economy will be three times larger than that of the U.S. by 2040. Will may be one of America's great columnists, but helike his equally distinguished liberal counterpart Thomas Friedmanmay be falling prey to a current fashion for sinophilia. It is a sign of the times that conservatives as well as liberals often underestimate the Middle Kingdom's problemsin addition to America's relative strengths. Rarely mentioned in such analyses is China's own aging problem. The population of the People's Republic will be considerably older than the U.S.' by 2050. It also has far more boys than girlsa rather insidious problem. Among the younger generation there are already an estimated 24 million more men of marrying age than women. This is not going to end wellexcept perhaps for investors in prostitution and pornography. In the longer term demographic trends actually place the U.S. in a relatively strong position. By the end of the first half of the 21st century, the American population aged 15 to 64essentially your economically active cohortare projected to grow by 42%; China's will shrink by 10%. Comparisons with other competitors are even larger, with the E.U. shrinking by 25%, Korea by 30% and Japan by a remarkable 44%. Declinism is exaggerated Our argument is empirically proven in the context of demographics Kotkin 10 is a distinguished presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University, adjunct fellow at the Legatum Institute in London and serves as executive editor of newgeography.com, (Joel, "America on the Rise", http://www.forbes.com/2010/02/09/declinismchinaagingpopulationopinionscolumnistsjoelkotkin.html) The Japanese experience best illustrates how wrong punditry can be. Back in the 1970s and 1980s it was commonplace for punditsparticularly on the leftto predict Japan's ascendance into world leadership. At the time distinguished commentators like George Lodge, Lester Thurow and Robert Reich all pointed to Europe and Japan as the nations slated to beat the U.S. on the economic battlefield. "Japan is replacing America as the world's strongest economic power," one prominent scholar told a Joint Economic Committee of Congress in 1986. "It is in everyone's interest that the transition goes smoothly." This was not unusual or even shocking at the time. It followed a grand tradition of declinism that over the past 70 years has declared America illsuited to compete with everyone from fascist Germany and Italy to the Soviet Union. By the mid1950s a majority were convinced that we were losing the Cold War. In the 1980s Harvard's John Kenneth Galbraith thought the Soviet model successful enough that the two systems would eventually "converge." We all know how that convergence worked out. Even the Chinese abandoned the Stalinist economic model so admired by many American intellectuals once Mao was safely amoldering in his grave. Outside of the European and American academe, the only strong advocates of state socialism can be found in such economic basket cases as Cuba, North Korea and Venezuela. So given this history, why the current rise in declinism? Certainly it's a view many in the wider public share. Most Americans fear their children will not be able to live as well as they have. A plurality think China will be the world's most powerful country in 20 years . To be sure there are some good reasons for pessimism. The huge deficits, high unemployment, our leakage of industry not only to China but other developing countries are all worrisome trends. Yet if the negative case is easier to make, it does not stand historical scrutiny . Let's just go back to what we learned during the "Japan is taking over the world" phase during the 1970s and 1980s. At the time Dai Nippon's rapid economic expansion was considered inexorable. Yet history is not a straightline project. Most countries go through phases of expansion and decline. The factors driving success often include a wellconceived economic strategy, an expanding workforce and a sense of national elan. In the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s Japanlike China todaypossessed all those things. Its bureaucratic state had targeted key industries like automobiles and electronics, and its large, welleducated baby boom population was hitting the workforce. There was an unmistakable sense of pride in the country's rapid achievements after the devastation of the Second World War. Yet even then, as the Economist's Bill Emmot noted in his 1989 book The Sun Also Sets, things were not so pretty once you looked a little closer. In the mid1980s I traveled extensively in Japan and, with the help of a young JapaneseAmerican scholar, Yoriko Kishimoto, interviewed demographers and economists who predicted Japan's eventual decline. By then, the rapid drop in Japan's birthrate and its rapid aging was already clearly predictable. But even more persuasive were hours spent with the new generation of Japanesethe equivalent of America's Xerswho seemed alienated from the selfabnegating, workobsessed culture of their parents . By the late 1980s it was clear that the shinjinrui ("the new race") seemed more interested in design, culture and just having fun than their forebears. They seemed destined not to become another generation of economic samurai. At the time though, the very strategies so critical to Japan's growthparticularly a focus on highend manufacturingproved highly susceptible to competitors from lowercost countriesfirst Taiwan, Korea and Singapore, and later China, Vietnam and more recently India. Like America and Britain before it, Japan exported its unique genius abroad. Now many companies, including American ones, have narrowed the technological gap with Japan. Today Japan, like the E.U., lacks the youthful population needed to recover its mojo. It likely will emerge as a kind of megaSwitzerland, Sweden or Denmarkrenowned for its safety and precision. Its workforce will have to be ultraproductive to finance the robots it will need to care of its vast elderly population . Will China follow a similar trajectory in the next few decades? Countries infrequently follow precisely the same script as another. Japan was always hemmed in by its position as a small island country with very minimal resources. Its demographic crisis will make things worse. In contrast, China, for the lowwage manufacturing strategy that has generated China's success already seems certainas occurred with Japanis already leading to a backlash across much of the world. China's very girth projects a more terrifying prospect than little Japan. At some point China will either have to locate much of its industrial base closer to its customers, as Japan has done, or lose its markets. More important still are massive internal problems. Japan, for all its many imperfections, was and remains a stable, functioning democracy , open to the free flow of information. China is a fundamentally unstable autocracy, led from above, and one that seeks to control information as evidenced in its conflict with Google ( GOOG news people )in an age where the free flow of information constitutes an essential part of economic progress. China's social problems will be further exacerbated by a huge, largely illeducated restive peasant class still living in poverty. Of course America too has many problemswith stunted upward mobility, the skill levels of its workforce, its fiscal situation. But the U.S., as the Japanese scholar Fuji Kamiya once noted, possesses sokojikara, a selfrenewing capacity unmatched by any country. As we enter the next few decades of the new millennium, I would bet on a more youthful, still resourcerich and democratic America to maintain its preeminence even in a world where economic power continues to shift from its historic home in Europe to Asia. U.N. could never fill the role of the U.S. Brookes 8 Senior Fellow for National Security Affairs at The Heritage Foundation, member of the congressional U.S.China Economic and Security Review Commission (Peter, "Why the World Still Needs America's Military Might," http://www.heritage.org/Research/Lecture/WhytheWorldStill NeedsAmericasMilitaryMight, 11/24/08) Unfortunately, in the role of helping to provide for global stability, as a practical matter, there is nobody else to relieve the next few decades, certainly won't suffer a shortage of economically productive workers But it could face greater problems. The kind of United States of this dutyat least for the moment. While some would like to see the United Nations in this role, it has been nothing short of a disappointment. The U.N., in its current configuration, is fundamentally inca pable of carrying out its original purposespre venting and responding to aggression. In truth, while the U.N. means well, and often does well especially on humanitarian issues, it is hamstrung by its own diversity of values and interests, leaving it often quite feckless in dealing with the security matters that everyone agrees require action. Even if hegemony isn't perfect, it's the best deal we have Brookes 8 Senior Fellow for National Security Affairs at The Heritage Foundation, member of the congressional U.S.China Economic and Security Review Commission (Peter, "Why the World Still Needs America's Military Might," http://www.heritage.org/Research/Lecture/WhytheWorldStill NeedsAmericasMilitaryMight, 11/24/08) Obviously, military might is not the answer to every problem, but over the millennia it has often played a central, if regrettable, role in international politics. As one American statesman said, diploma cy without the credible threat of military force is nothing but a prayer. Unfortunately, I think that's correct. To this end, America should seek consensus before making a decision, understanding that this end state is not always possible, while other nations should recognize that they must also bear the bur den of keeping the international order upright and shipshape. Unfortunately, American military might has become an international public good: one which, in my estimation, is greatly underappreciat ed, but one that many would like to command without the attendant sacrifices in blood and trea sure, of course. The United States is not the world's policeman; nor does it want to be. We have no right to force others to believe as we believe. But I hope I am not alone in believing that freedom and democracy are superior to such dark alternatives as oppression and tyranny. The fact is that, like it or not, for the moment, there isn't any better deal out there as we say in the Statesfor promoting global stability based on our transatlantic shared values of democracy and human rights than the United States of America. While many may wish for the demise of American military power , I'll warn you one more time: Be careful what you wish for. I promise you, you'll miss it when it's gone. **OFFSHORE BALANCING BAD** RUSSIAN CONFLICT Offshore balancing causes U.S.Russian conflict Kagan, 08 Adjunct Professor of History at Georgetown University, Senior fellow at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Robert, "End of Dreams, Return of History", Hoover Institution, 2008, July 27th 2010, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/article/6136, KONTOPOULOS) In Europe, too, the departure of the United States from the scene -- even if it remained the world's most powerful nation -- could be destabilizing. It could tempt Russia to an even more overbearing and potentially forceful approach to unruly nations on its periphery. Although some realist theorists seem to imagine that the disappearance of the Soviet Union put an end to the possibility of confrontation between Russia and the West, and therefore to the need for a permanent American role in Europe, history suggests that conflicts in Europe involving Russia are possible even without Soviet communism . If the United States withdrew from Europe -- if it adopted what some call a strategy of "offshore balancing" -- this could in time increase the likelihood of conflict involving Russia and its near neighbors, which could in turn draw the United States back in under unfavorable circumstances. Extinction Bostrom, 02 Ph.D. and Professor at Oxford University (Nick, March, www.transhumanist.com/volume9/risks.html) A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR . An allout nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization. Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankind's potential permanently. A2: SOLVES ME INSTABILITY Offshore balancing doesn't solve Middle Eastern stability Kagan, 08 Adjunct Professor of History at Georgetown University, Senior fellow at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Robert, "End of Dreams, Return of History", Hoover Institution, 2008, July 27th 2010, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/article/6136, KONTOPOULOS) It is also optimistic to imagine that a retrenchment of the American position in the Middle East and the assumption of a more passive, "offshore" role would lead to greater stability there. The vital interest the United States has in access to oil and the role it plays in keeping access open to other nations in Europe and Asia make it unlikely that American leaders could or would stand back and hope for the best while the powers in the region battle it out. Nor would a more "evenhanded" policy toward Israel, which some see as the magic key to unlocking peace, stability, and comity in the Middle East , obviate the need to come to Israel 's aid if its security became threatened. That commitment, paired with the American commitment to protect strategic oil supplies for most of the world, practically ensures a heavy American military presence in the region, both on the seas and on the ground. A2: SOLVES CONFLICT It only changes the equation not the outcome Kagan, 08 Adjunct Professor of History at Georgetown University, Senior fellow at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Robert, "End of Dreams, Return of History", Hoover Institution, 2008, July 27th 2010, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/article/6136, KONTOPOULOS) The subtraction of American power from any region would not end conflict but would simply change the equation. In the Middle East, competition for influence among powers both inside and outside the region has raged for at least two centuries. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism doesn 't change this. It only adds a new and more threatening dimension to the competition, which neither a sudden end to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians nor an immediate American withdrawal from Iraq would change. The alternative to American predominance in the region is not balance and peace. It is further competition. The region and the states within it remain relatively weak. A diminution of American influence would not be followed by a diminution of other external influences. One could expect deeper involvement by both China and Russia, if only to secure their interests. 18 And one could also expect the more powerful states of the region, particularly Iran, to expand and fill the vacuum. It is doubtful that any American administration would voluntarily take actions that could shift the balance of power in the Middle East further toward Russia, China, or Iran. The world hasn 't changed that much. An American withdrawal from Iraq will not return things to "normal" or to a new kind of stability in the region. It will produce a new instability, one likely to draw the United States back in again. The alternative to American regional predominance in the Middle East and elsewhere is not a new regional stability. In an era of burgeoning nationalism, the future is likely to be one of intensified competition among nations and nationalist movements. Difficult as it may be to extend American predominance into the future, no one should imagine that a reduction of American power or a retraction of American influence and global involvement will provide an easier path. ECONOMIC COLLAPSE/NUKE WAR Offshore balancing fails and results in economic collapse and nuclear war Khalizad, 95 Former Ambassador to the U.N., Counselor at the Center for Strategic International Studies (Zalmay, "Losing the moment? The United States and the world after the cold war", The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 18, Issue 2, Spring 1995, July 27th 2010, KONTOPOULOS) PDF It is possible that in a balance of power system the United States would be in a relatively privileged position as compared to the other great powers. Given the relative distance of United States the from other power centers, it might be able to mimic the former British role of an offshore balancer As in the nineteenth century, the United States and other great powers would compete and . cooperate to avoid hegemony and global wars. Each great power would protect its own specific interests and protect common interests cooperatively. If necessary, the United States would intervene militarily to prevent the emergence of a preponderant power. But there are also several serious problems with this approach . First, there is a real question whether the major powers will behave as they should under the logic of a balance of power framework . For example, would the West European powers respond appropriately to a resurgent Russian threat, or would they behave as the European democracies did in the 1930s? The logic of a balance of power system might well require the United States to support a nondemocratic state against a democratic one, or to work with one undesirable state against another. For example, to contain the power of an increasingly powerful Iran, the United States would have to strengthen Iraq. The United States may, however, be politically unable to behave in this fashion. For example, after the Iraqi victory against Iran in 1988, balance of power logic indicated that the United States should strengthen Iran. However, because of ongoing animosity in U.S.Iranian relations, the nature of Iran's regime, and moral concerns, the United States could not implement such a strategy. There are many other examples. To expect such action is therefore probably unrealistic. Second, this system implies that the major industrial democracies will no longer see themselves as allies. Instead , political, and possibly even military, struggle among them will become not only thinkable but legitimate . n5 Each will pursue its own economic interest much more vigorously, thereby weakening such multilateral economic institutions as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the liberal world trading order in general. This would increase the likelihood of major economic depressions and dislocations. Third, the United States is likely to face more competition from other major powers in areas of interest to it . For example, other powers might not be willing to grant the United States a sphere of influence in the Americas, but might seek, as Germany did in World War I, to reach antiU.S. alliances with Latin American nations. Similarly, as noted above, another great power might decide to support a potential hegemon in the Persian Gulf. Finally, and most important, there is no guarantee that the system will succeed in its own terms. Its operation requires subtle calculations and indications of intentions in order to maintain the balance while avoiding war; nations must know how to signal their depth of commitment on a given issue without taking irrevocable steps toward war. This to stay out of. The balance of power system failed in the past, producing World War I and other major conflicts. It might not work any better in the future and war among major powers in the nuclear age is likely to be more devastating . balancing act proved impossible even for the culturally similar and aristocratically governed states of the nineteenth-century European balance of power systems. It will be infinitely more difficult when the system is global, the participants differ culturally, and the governments of many of the states, influenced by public opinion, are unable to be as flexible (or cynical) as the rules of the system require. Thus, miscalculations might be made about the state of the balance that could lead to wars that the United States might be unable ECONOMIC COLLAPSE/NUKE WAR Global nuclear war Mead 09 (Walter Russell, Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, New Republic, February 4, http://www.tnr.com/politics/story.html?id=571cbbb928874d81854292e83915f5f8&p=2] So far, such halfhearted experiments not only have failed to work; they have left the societies that have tried them in a progressively worse position, farther behind the frontrunners as time goes by. Argentina has lost ground to Chile; Russian development has fallen farther behind that of the Baltic states and Central Europe. Frequently, the crisis has weakened the power of the merchants, industrialists, financiers, and professionals who want to develop a liberal capitalist society integrated into the world. Crisis can also strengthen the hand of religious extremists, populist radicals, or authoritarian traditionalists who are determined to resist liberal capitalist society for a variety of reasons. Meanwhile, the companies and banks based in these societies are often less established and more vulnerable to the consequences of a financial crisis than more established firms in wealthier societies. As a result, developing countries and countries where capitalism has relatively recent and shallow roots tend to suffer greater economic and political damage when crisis strikesas, inevitably, it does. And, consequently, financial crises often reinforce rather than challenge the global distribution of power and wealth. This may be happening yet again. None of which means that we can just sit back and enjoy the recession. History may suggest that financial crises actually help capitalist great powers maintain their leadsbut it has other, less reassuring messages as well. If financial crises have been a normal part of life during the 300year rise of the liberal capitalist system under the Anglophone powers, so has war. The wars of the League of Augsburg and the Spanish Succession; the Seven Years War; the American Revolution; the Napoleonic Wars; the two World Wars; the cold war: The list of wars is almost as long as the list of financial crises. Bad economic times can breed wars. Europe was a pretty peaceful place in 1928, but the Depression poisoned German public opinion and helped bring Adolf Hitler to power. If the current crisis turns into a depression, what rough beasts might start slouching toward Moscow, Karachi, Beijing, or New Delhi to be born? The United States may not, yet, decline, but, if we can't get the world economy back on track, we may still have to fight. CONFLICTS Offshore balancing would immediately foster conflict across the globe Drezner, 03 Professor of international politics at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University (Daniel W., "The perils of hegemonic power", Danieldrezner.com, January 6th 2003, July 27th 2010, http://www.danieldrezner.com/archives/000450.html, KONTOPOULOS) Imagine for a second that the U.S. announced that it had decided to heed the calls to reign in its power. Say U.S. troops were pulled out of Europe, Korea, and the Middle East. No change in our economic or cultural policies, just a withdrawal of troops from the globe. What would happen? Undoubtedly, some of the animus towards the U.S. would dissipate in the short run. However, within the next year: 1) Japan would go nuclear. 2) The Balkans would be likely to erupt again, with Macedonia being the trigger this time. 3) Afghanistan would implode. 4) India and Pakistan would likely escalate their border skirmishes. 5) Israel would escalate its quasimilitary actions in the occupied territories. 6) Arab fury at the U.S. inaction in the Middle East would rise even further. 7) AntiAmerican activists would criticize the U.S. for isolationism and inaction in the face of global instability. I don't deny that the looming specter of U.S. hard power in Iraq and elsewhere is eroding our capital of soft power. However, to paraphrase Churchill, the current policy is without question an awful one, until you consider the alternatives. **COUNTERBALANCING** 2AC A2: COUNTERBALANCING LONG 1. No counterbalancing no country or group of countries can challenge the US Kagan 7 Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund (Robert, "End of Dreams, Return of History," Hoover Institution, No. 144, August/September, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/article/6136) The anticipated global balancing has for the most part not occurred. Russia and China certainly share a common and openly expressed goal of checking American hegemony. They have created at least one institution, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, aimed at resisting American influence in Central Asia, and China is the only power in the world, other than the United States, engaged in a longterm military buildup. But SinoRussian hostility to American predominance has not yet produced a concerted and cooperative effort at balancing. China 's buildup is driven at least as much by its own longterm ambitions as by a desire to balance the United States. Russia has been using its vast reserves of oil and natural gas as a lever to compensate for the lack of military power, but it either cannot or does not want to increase its military capability sufficiently to begin counterbalancing the United States. Overall, Russian military power remains in decline. In addition, the two powers do not trust one another. They are traditional rivals, and the rise of China inspires at least as much nervousness in Russia as it does in the United States. At the moment, moreover, China is less abrasively confrontational with the United States. Its dependence on the American market and foreign investment and its perception that the United States remains a potentially formidable adversary mitigate against an openly confrontational approach. In any case, China and Russia cannot balance the United States without at least some help from Europe, Japan, India, or at least some of the other advanced, democratic nations. But those powerful players are not joining the effort. Europe has rejected the option of making itself a counterweight to American power. This is true even among the older members of the European Union, where neither France, Germany, Italy, nor Spain proposes such counterbalancing, despite a public opinion hostile to the Bush administration. Now that the eu has expanded to include the nations of Central and Eastern Europe, who fear threats from the east, not from the west, the prospect of a unified Europe counterbalancing the United States is practically nil. As for Japan and India, the clear trend in recent years has been toward closer strategic cooperation with the United States. If anything, the most notable balancing over the past decade has been aimed not at the American superpower but at the two large powers: China and Russia. In Asia and the Pacific, Japan, Australia, and even South Korea and the nations of Southeast Asia have all engaged in "hedging" against a rising China. This has led them to seek closer relations with Washington, especially in the case of Japan and Australia. India has also drawn closer to the United States and is clearly engaged in balancing against China. Russia 's efforts to increase its influence over what it regards as its "near abroad," meanwhile, have produced tensions and negative reactions in the Baltics and other parts of Eastern Europe. Because these nations are now members of the European Union, this has also complicated euRussian relations. On balance, traditional allies of the United States in East Asia and in Europe, while their publics may be more antiAmerican than in the past, nevertheless pursue policies that reflect more concern about the powerful states in their midst than about the United States. 12 This has provided a cushion against hostile public opinion and offers a foundation on which to strengthen American relations with these countries after the departure of Bush. 2. No incentive to balance a) Extend Thayer 6 all states have an interest in maintaining American primacy because it provides positive externalities like free trade and open labor markets. Countries actually love our hegemony that solves for resentment or violent rises. b) Countries don't balance against established powers, they balance against rising powers. There's only a risk that minor regional powers will balance against countries like China c) Your balancing arguments conflate power with threat the U.S. does not have offensive intentions towards countries like Russia so there's no reason for them to balance 2AC A2: COUNTERBALANCING LONG 3. Shared interests prove no country will balance Lieber and Alexander 5 *Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame, Fellow at the Joan B. Kroc Institute for The major powers are not balancing against the United States because of the nature of U.S. grand strategy in the post International Peace Studies and the Nanovic Institute for European Studies, **Associate Professor of Politics at the University of Virginia (Keir and Gerard, "Waiting for balancing", http://people.virginia.edu/~ga8h/WaitingforBalancing.pdf, WEA) September 11 world. There is no doubt that this strategy is ambitious, assertive, and backed by tremendous offensive military capability. But it is also highly selective and not broadly threatening. Specifically, the United States is focusing these means on the greatest threats to its interests--that is, the threats emanating from nuclear proliferator states and global terrorist organizations. Other major powers are not balancing U.S. power because they want the United States to succeed in defeating these shared threats or are ambivalent yet understand they are not in its crosshairs. In many cases, the diplomatic friction identified by proponents of the concept of soft balancing instead reflects disagreement about tactics, not goals, which is nothing new in history. To be sure, our analysis cannot claim to rule out other theories of great power behavior that also do not expect balancing against the United States. Whether the United States is not seen as a threat worth balancing because of shared interests in nonproliferation and the war on terror (as we argue), because of geography and capability limitations that render U.S. global hegemony impossible (as some offensive realists argue), or because transnational democratic values, binding international institutions, and economic interdependence obviate the need to balance (as many liberals argue) is a task for further theorizing and empirical analysis. Nor are we claiming that balancing against the United States will never happen. Rather, there is no persuasive evidence that U.S. policy is provoking the kind of balancing behavior that the Bush administration's critics suggest. In the meantime, analysts should continue to use credible indicators of balancing behavior in their search for signs that U.S. strategy is having a counterproductive effect on U.S. security. Below we discuss why the United States is not seen by other major powers as a threat worth balancing. Next we argue that the impact of the U.S.led invasion of Iraq on international relations has been exaggerated and needs to be seen in a broader context that reveals far wouldbe nuclear proliferators and Islamist extremists, which makes sense given that these are the threats targeted by the United States. The United States' Focused Enmity Great powers seek to organize the world according to their own preferences, looking for opportunities to expand and consolidate their economic and military power positions. Our analysis does not assume that the United States is an exception. It can fairly be seen to be pursuing a hegemonic grand strategy and has repeatedly acted in ways that undermine notions of deeply rooted shared values and interests. U.S. objectives and the current world order, however, are unusual in several respects. First, unlike previous states with preponderant power, the United States more cooperation with the United States than many analysts acknowledge. Finally, we note that something akin to balancing is taking place among has little incentive to seek to physically control foreign territory. It is secure from foreign invasion and apparently sees little benefit in launching costly wars to obtain additional material resources. Moreover, the bulk of the current international order suits the United States well. Democracy is ascendant, foreign markets continue to liberalize, and no major revisionist powers seem poised to challenge U.S. primacy. This does not mean that the United States is a status quo power, as typically defined. The United States seeks to further expand and consolidate its power position even if not through territorial conquest. Rather, U.S. leaders aim to bolster their power by promoting economic growth, spending lavishly on military forces and research and development, and dissuading the rise of any peer competitor on the international stage. Just as important, the confluence of the proliferation of WMD and the rise of Islamist radicalism poses an acute danger to U.S. interests. This means that U.S. grand strategy targets its assertive enmity only at circumscribed quarters, ones that do not include other great powers. The great powers, as well as most other states, either share the U.S. interest in eliminating the threats from terrorism and WMD or do not feel that they have a significant direct stake in the matter. Regardless, they understand that the United States does not have offensive designs on them. Consistent with this proposition, the United States has improved its relations with almost all of the major powers in the postSeptember 11 world. This is in no small part because these governments--not to mention those in key countries in the Middle East and Southwest Asia, such as Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia-- are willing partners in the war on terror because they see Islamist radicalism as a genuine threat to them as well. U.S. relations with China, India, and Russia, in particular, are better than ever in large part because these countries similarly have acute reasons to fear transnational Islamist terrorist groups. The EU's official grand strategy echoes that of the United States. The 2003 European security strategy document, which appeared months after the U.S.led invasion of Iraq, identifies terrorism by religious extremists and the proliferation of WMD as the two greatest threats to European security. In language familiar to students of the Bush administration, it declares that Europe's "most frightening scenario is one in which terrorist groups acquire weapons of mass destruction." 60 It is thus not surprising that the major European states, including France and Germany, are partners of the United States in the Proliferation Security Initiative. Certain EU members are not engaged in as wide an array of policies toward these threats as the United States and other of its allies. European criticism of the Iraq war is the preeminent example. But sharp differences over tactics should not be confused with disagreement over broad goals. After all, comparable disagreements, as well as incentives to free ride on U.S. efforts, were common among several West European states during the Cold War when they nonetheless shared with their allies the goal of containing the Soviet Union.61 In neither word nor deed, then, do these states manifest the degree or nature of disagreement contained in the images of strategic rivalry on which balancing claims are based. Some other countries are bystanders. As discussed above, freeriding and differences over tactics form part of the explanation for this behavior. And some of these states simply feel less threatened by terrorist organizations and WMD proliferators than the United States and others do. The decision of these states to remain on the sidelines, however, and not seek opportunities to balance, is crucial. There is no good evidence that these states feel threatened by U.S. grand strategy. In brief, other great powers appear to lack the motivation to compete strategically with the United States under current conditions. Other major powers might prefer a more generally constrained America or, to be sure, a world where the United States was not as dominant, but this yearning is a long way from active cooperation to undermine U.S. power or goals. 2AC A2: COUNTERBALANCING LONG 4. Even if there is a motive to balance, research on elite perceptions prove they still defer Wohlforth 9 William Wohlforth (professor of government at Dartmouth College) 2009 " Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War"Project Muse Research on the elite perceptions and discourse in Russia, China, India, Europe, and Japan reveals that there is a strong interest in a favorable status comparison visvis outgroups and that the United States looms large as a comparison group, but in no capital is there evidence of the kind of status dissonance that characterized , for example, Moscow in the midtwentieth century or St. Petersburg in the midnineteenth.71 Resentment of the U.S. role is evident, especially in Russia and China, but the operative assessment is that the capabilities gap precludes a competitive identitymaintenance strategy visvis the United States. Indeed, both countries attempted competitive strategies in the 1990s but reversed course as the evidence accumulated that their efforts had been counterproductive. 5. Assuming there is an incentive to balance, Thayer indicates that no force can balance us we're logistically just too far ahead 6. Statistical analysis of the past five hundred years prove our arguments Levy and Thompson 10 *Board of Governors' Professor at Rutgers University and former president of both the International Studies Association and the Peace Science Society, **Donald A. Rogers Professor of Political Science at Indiana University, former president of the International Studies Association, and Managing Editor of International Studies Quarterly (*Jack S., William R., "Balancing on Land and at Sea", International Security, Vol. 35, No. 1, Summer 2010, July 6th 2010, Galileo, p. 3536, KONTOPOULOS) PDF power balancing coalition against the United States is not the puzzle that some have claimed it to be, but it is consistent with at least five centuries of behavior in the global system. This is not to say that balancing coalitions never form against leading maritime or global powers, only that the threshold for balancing is both higher and different. We can certainly imagine the United States behaving in such a way as to threaten the interests of other great powers and eventually to provoke a balancing coalition, but the trigger would have to involve specific behavior that threatens other great powers, not the fact of U.S. power. Whereas dominant continental Our argument and our empirical findings have important implications for contemporary debates about balancing behavior. The absence of a great powers are inherently threatening because of their power and systeminduced uncertainties regarding their intentions, the threat from predominant global powers to other great powers emerges primarily from their behavior and from what that signals about their intentions. 7. Hegemony solves backlash from resentment Ross 2 Christopher Ross, special coordinator for public diplomacy and public affairs at the Department of State, Washington Quarterly, Spring, 2002 Although the wording of recriminations varies -- ranging from hegemony to multilateralism to cultural imperialism -- the United States, as the world's dominant power, will inevitably be accused of heavyhandedness and arrogance . It will inform and influence public opinion effectively only if it changes the paradigm of the past and establishes a two-way approach that builds credible dialogue. To arrive there, the United States should experiment and take a few chances, developing programs that encourage two-way engagement with the people it seeks to influence. Some efforts may fail, but others will succeed; the U.S. government can use those successes to shape a sustained future effort. Terrorism has changed the way people think about public diplomacy. Today, no serious observer can deny the link between perceptions of the United States and the country's national security. Some of those perceptions range far beyond U.S. control. Some of them, however, depend on how the United States talks to the world. All the pieces matter: the U.S. policy message itself, the channels of communication the United States selects, the tone of voice in which it speaks, and its familiarity with the environment in which it is speaking. The United States will never persuade its sworn enemies. The surprisingly muted reaction to the quick U.S. military success in Afghanistan, however, suggests that more people might be able to be persuaded than we originally thought . Certainly, most people will back a winner. The United States is winning and, because it is resolute, it will continue to win. 2AC A2: COUNTERBALANCING LONG 8. The methodology of the authors behind counterbalancing evidence is flawed and based on single indicators Wohlforth 7 Professor of Government at Dartmouth College and Chair of the Department of Government (Spring 2007, William, "Unipolar stability: the rules of power analysis," Harvard International Review 29.1, p.44, Academic OneFile) When analysts forecast the coming of multipolarity, they often talk of how the rising BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) will alter the global balance of power. If we carefully examine the numbers, what drives most of these projections is China. And if examined even more closely, we will likely see that one indicator alone is being used to project China's rise: the growth of its gross domestic product (GDP). China's global clout will certainly rise with the relative size of its economy. But economic size is only one indicator of power, and it can be a misleading one. When a huge number of poor people are gathered together in one country, they can create a large economy that is much less capable of generating power than the raw numbers would suggest. After all, India is estimated to have had a much larger economy than the British Isles when it was colonized in the nineteenth century. Studies of national power in the postindustrial age find that what matters most today is not just economic size, but wealth and technological development. Indeed, even if China's overall GDP did come to equal that of the United States, its percapita GDP would still be only onequarter that of the United States. Current projections of China's economic rise may well be overstated. Iraq aside, what is most responsible for the virtual shift to multipolarity is not a word but an acronym: PPP. PPP stands for the "purchasing power parity" estimate of countries' exchange rates--the size of their economies in dollar terms. Although the prices of many manufactured products tend to be equalized by international trade, the price of labor is not, and therefore labor-intensive products and services tend to be relatively cheap in poor counties. PPP corrects for this discontinuity by using prices for a locally selected basket of goods to adjust the exchange rate for converting local currency into dollars. As University of Pennsylvania professor Avery Goldstein notes, " the World Bank's decision in 1994 to shift to a PPP estimate for China's economy was crucial in propelling perceptions of that country's imminent rise to great power status." Economists universally agree that, properly applied, this method provides better estimates of comparative living standards. But forecasts about China's rise should not be based on predictions of its living standards. They should discuss China's presence as a great power in international politicsits ability to use money to purchase goods and influence matters abroad. PPP clearly exaggerates this sort of power. No one knows how much to discount the PPP numbers for the purposes of making comparisons of national power. What is certain, economist Albert Keidel notes, is that one should not "use projections of national accounting growth rates from a PPP base. This common practice seriously inflates estimates of China's future economic size --exaggerating the speed with which China's economy will overtake that of the United States in total size." Projections must take into account the fact that growth will cause prices to converge with international norms, and thus the PPP to converge with the market exchange rate. Using such a methodology, Keidel estimates that it will take until 2050 for China's total economic size to equal the United States. National power is a complex phenomenon. We all know that relying on one simple indicator of power is not a good idea. Yet research by political scientists, psychologists, and historians continues to demonstrate that decisionmakers and analysts tend to break this basic rule. Projections of China's rise are a case in point. Even setting aside the manifold challenges that this country faces on the road to superpowerdo --including a looming demographic crisis, a shaky financial system, and the political challenges inherent in a capitalist country ruled by a m communist party--extrapolating its rise based on GDP and PPP estimates of its current size is a dubious analytical exercise. 2AC A2: COUNTERBALANCING SHORT 1. No incentive to balance a) Extend Thayer 6 all states have an interest in maintaining American primacy because it provides positive externalities like free trade and open labor markets. Countries actually love our hegemony that solves for resentment or violent rises. b) Countries don't balance against established powers, they balance against rising powers. There's only a risk that minor regional powers will balance against countries like China c) Your balancing arguments conflate power with threat the U.S. does not have offensive intentions towards countries like Russia so there's no reason for them to balance 2. No counterbalancing no country or group of countries can challenge the US Kagan 7 Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund (Robert, "End of Dreams, Return of History," Hoover Institution, No. 144, August/September, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/article/6136) The anticipated global balancing has for the most part not occurred. Russia and China certainly share a common and openly expressed goal of checking American hegemony. They have created at least one institution, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, aimed at resisting American influence in Central Asia, and China is the only power in the world, other than the United States, engaged in a longterm military buildup. But SinoRussian hostility to American predominance has not yet produced a concerted and cooperative effort at balancing. China 's buildup is driven at least as much by its own longterm ambitions as by a desire to balance the United States. Russia has been using its vast reserves of oil and natural gas as a lever to compensate for the lack of military power, but it either cannot or does not want to increase its military capability sufficiently to begin counterbalancing the United States. Overall, Russian military power remains in decline. In addition, the two powers do not trust one another. They are traditional rivals, and the rise of China inspires at least as much nervousness in Russia as it does in the United States. At the moment, moreover, China is less abrasively confrontational with the United States. Its dependence on the American market and foreign investment and its perception that the United States remains a potentially formidable adversary mitigate against an openly confrontational approach. In any case, China and Russia cannot balance the United States without at least some help from Europe, Japan, India, or at least some of the other advanced, democratic nations. But those powerful players are not joining the effort. Europe has rejected the option of making itself a counterweight to American power. This is true even among the older members of the European Union, where neither France, Germany, Italy, nor Spain proposes such counterbalancing, despite a public opinion hostile to the Bush administration. Now that the eu has expanded to include the nations of Central and Eastern Europe, who fear threats from the east, not from the west, the prospect of a unified Europe counterbalancing the United States is practically nil. As for Japan and India, the clear trend in recent years has been toward closer strategic cooperation with the United States. If anything, the most notable balancing over the past decade has been aimed not at the American superpower but at the two large powers: China and Russia. In Asia and the Pacific, Japan, Australia, and even South Korea and the nations of Southeast Asia have all engaged in "hedging" against a rising China. This has led them to seek closer relations with Washington, especially in the case of Japan and Australia. India has also drawn closer to the United States and is clearly engaged in balancing against China. Russia 's efforts to increase its influence over what it regards as its "near abroad," meanwhile, have produced tensions and negative reactions in the Baltics and other parts of Eastern Europe. Because these nations are now members of the European Union, this has also complicated euRussian relations. On balance, traditional allies of the United States in East Asia and in Europe, while their publics may be more antiAmerican than in the past, nevertheless pursue policies that reflect more concern about the powerful states in their midst than about the United States. 12 This has provided a cushion against hostile public opinion and offers a foundation on which to strengthen American relations with these countries after the departure of Bush. 3. Even if there is a motive to balance, research on elite perceptions prove they still defer Wohlforth 9 William Wohlforth (professor of government at Dartmouth College) 2009 " Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War"Project Muse Research on the elite perceptions and discourse in Russia, China, India, Europe, and Japan reveals that there is a strong interest in a favorable status comparison visvis outgroups and that the United States looms large as a comparison group, but in no capital is there evidence of the kind of status dissonance that characterized , for example, Moscow in the midtwentieth century or St. Petersburg in the midnineteenth.71 Resentment of the U.S. role is evident, especially in Russia and China, but the operative assessment is that the capabilities gap precludes a competitive identitymaintenance strategy visvis the United States. Indeed, both countries attempted competitive strategies in the 1990s but reversed course as the evidence accumulated that their efforts had been counterproductive. 2AC A2: COUNTERBALANCING SHORT 4. Assuming there is an incentive to balance, Thayer indicates that no force can balance us we're logistically just too far ahead 5. Statistical analysis of the past five hundred years prove our arguments Levy and Thompson 10 *Board of Governors' Professor at Rutgers University and former president of both the International Studies Association and the Peace Science Society, **Donald A. Rogers Professor of Political Science at Indiana University, former president of the International Studies Association, and Managing Editor of International Studies Quarterly (*Jack S., William R., "Balancing on Land and at Sea", International Security, Vol. 35, No. 1, Summer 2010, July 6th 2010, Galileo, p. 3536, KONTOPOULOS) PDF Our argument and our empirical findings have important implications for contemporary debates about balancing behavior. The absence of a great power balancing coalition against the United States is not the puzzle that some have claimed it to be, but it is consistent with at least five centuries of behavior in the global system. This is not to say that balancing coalitions never form against leading maritime or global powers, only that the threshold for balancing is both higher and different. We can certainly imagine the United States behaving in such a way as to threaten the interests of other great powers and eventually to provoke a balancing coalition, but the trigger would have to involve specific behavior that threatens other great powers, not the fact of U.S. power. Whereas dominant continental powers are inherently threatening because of their power and systeminduced uncertainties regarding their intentions, the threat from predominant global powers to other great powers emerges primarily from their behavior and from what that signals about their intentions. A2: COUNTERBALANCING GENERIC Declinism is exaggerated the US will maintain hegemony other countries are bandwagoning and distrust China the US will remain the largest economy the US will maintain military superiority Lee 9 foreignpolicy fellow at the Centre for Independent Studies in Sydney and visiting fellow at the Hudson Institute in Washington (John, interview with ABC "Sun yet to set on US 'empire'", http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/content/2009/s2660492.htm) JOHN LEE: Well growing economic power doesn't necessarily imply proportionate strategic influence or leadership in the region. In China's case, China is quite literally the most distrusted rising power in world history. If you look at China's strategic situation they have land disputes with Russia and India that are still outstanding, they have maritime disputes with Japan, the Philippines, with Indonesia, with Vietnam. China has very few genuine allies in the region, it's only allies are North Korea, Myanmar, two basket case countries. China is actually in a very poor strategic position and even though China presents enormous economic opportunities for the region, the region still views China as a potential strategic enemy in the future. ELEANOR HALL: It's understandable that other countries in the region would not want China to be a dominant power, but that doesn't necessarily mean that it won't succeed in being one, I mean it certainly has ambitions doesn't it? JOHN LEE: It certainly has ambitions and that's part of the worry to other Asian states have, however what you'll see is that as China rises, other countries like Japan, like India are already balancing against China and band wagoning with the Americans. Even smaller countries like Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia have all moved closer to Washington strategically, not further away. ELEANOR HALL: Let's just get a sense though of the relative economic and military power the US has been declining in the region and China has been growing give us some numbers on that. JOHN LEE: Right, there is a lot of talk about relative US decline visvis China, but if you look at economics for example, the US will still remain the largest economy by all measurements up until 2030, 2040. Militarily the US still spends more than the next 10 countries combined, and even up to 2050, 2060 the US will still be the preponderant power in Asia. So the relative decline of US is occurring but it's exaggerated. ELEANOR HALL: Is there any doubt that there's resentment in China about the US position in the region? JOHN LEE: Oh there's no doubt there's resentment in Beijing, however Beijing can do very little about it. The US has built up good will over 60 years as a dominant power in the region, as a provider of public goods, as the power that is what sometimes called "the coast guard" of Asia. In contrast, Beijing is distrusted, and the US will continue to remain the overwhelming preferred dominant power in the region. Perception of US hegemony as benign disincentivizes counterbalancing, pacifies potential rivals, and sustains US dominance. Ickenberry 02 (John, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, "America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power" 2002, pg 251) This argument starts from realist assumptions, but then moves from the system level to the unit level of analysis. Distinctive features of American foreign policy have prevented a counterbalancing response so far. Michael Mastanduno, for example, has argued that the Bush and Clinton administrations have in fact pursued a grand strategy of preserving U.S. primacy in the world system. John Ickenberry claims that U.S. hegemony is characterized by reluctance, openness, and a high degree of institutionalization. Benign hegemony results from the openness of the U.S. political system and from the American efforts of basing its hegemony on a dense set of multilateral institutions. Both characteristics of this particular hegemony give lesser powers ample opportunities to voice their concerns and to influence U.S. policies. As a result, the United States has managed to keep potential rivals happy in the postCold War era, and there is little reason to assume that this will change in the near future. At the same time, benign hegemony guarantees U.S. dominance in the international system and makes sure that a possible transition to a multipolar world might actually be managed rather smoothly. This argument ultimately rests on liberal and institutionalist assumptions about international order and leaves realism further behind. In a realist world, benign hegemony depends on the willingness of the hegemonic power to play by its own rules, which begs the question why the lesser powers should trust it. Ickenberry's propositions only make sense if the norms of multilateral institutions exert enough independent causal influence on state behavior to guarantee that smaller states in the system are happy with U.S. power. That is rather close to an emphasis on security communities. A2: CHINA 1. China's behavior disproves no first use policy, disassembled nuclear weapons. China is intentionally rising in a manner nonthreatening to the U.S. 2. China's rise will result in other regional powers balancing against it Walt 10 Professor of International Affairs at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government (Stephen M., "Balancing act (Asian version)," Foreign Policy, http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/05/03/balancing_act_asian_version, 5/3/10) So will Asia balance or bandwagon? In my previous work on alliances, I argued that balancing behavior tends to predominate in international politics, but that especially weak and/or isolated states were somewhat more likely to bandwagon than strong states are. Because weak states can do little to affect the outcome of a contest and may suffer grievously in the process, they must choose the side that is likely to win . And where great powers tend to have global interests, weak states worry mostly about the balance of power in their immediate region. They may be willing to stand up to a stronger power if they are assured of ample allied support, but a weak state left to its own devices may have little choice but to kowtow to a larger and stronger neighbor. That is how "spheres of influence" are born. What does this logic tell us about future events in East Asia? On the one hand, prospects for balancing ought to be fairly good. Although China has the greatest power potential in Asia, several of its neighbors are hardly "weak states." Japan has the world's third largest economy (despite a lengthy period of stagnation), a latent nuclear capability, and significant military power of its own. Despite an aging population, it would be hard to intimidate. Vietnam has never been a pushover, India has a billion people and is nuclearcapable, and states like Indonesia and Singapore possess valuable real estate and (in Singapore's case) military strength disproportionate to size. Furthermore, even a far more powerful China would have some difficulty projecting power against its various neighbors, because it would have to do so via naval, air, and amphibious capabilities and not via land power alone. And given the U.S. interest in preventing China from exercising regional hegemony, the potential targets of a Chinese drive for regional dominance would have a great power ally ready to back them up. But on the other hand, a U.S. effort to maintain a defensive alliance in East Asia would also face several obvious obstacles. First, defensive alliances invariably face collective action problems, as each member of the alliance tries to shift the main burden onto its partners. This is a tendency that an adroit rising power can exploit, in effect playing "divideandrule" while the putative partners quarrel over strategy and burdensharing. 3. China doesn't have the weapons and regional alliances aren't a threat Welch and Shevchenko 10 *Professor of Political Science at UCLA and **Assistant Professor of Political Science at California State University, Fullerton (*Deborah and **Alexei, "Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to U.S. Primacy", International Security, Vol. 34, No. 4, Spring 2010, June 29 2010, p. 2425, KONTOPOULOS) PDF Against this backdrop of mutual recognition of status, there is little evidence that China is engaging in social competition with the United States. Some observers have suggested that China is using regional multilateral organizations to undermine U.S influence and alliance systems in Asia.131 On the other hand, these regional bodies are informal, consensus based, and impose no commitments. Most members also want to maintain good relations with the United States.132 China has increased its defense budget by double digits over the past two decades, but its military acquisitions and spending levels do not indicate that it aspires to be a peer competitor with the United States. China's military acquisitions (submarines, fighter aircraft, and surfacetoair missiles) appear to be aimed at deterring Taiwan from declaring independence and at deterring, delaying, or denying U.S. support for the island. China does not have global power projection capabilities, as indicated by its lack of aircraft carriers or longrange bombers.133 A2: CHINA 4. By the time China has the will or ability to challenge us, reform will change their calculus Lieber 5 PhD from Harvard, Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown, former consultant to the State Department and for National Intelligence Estimates (Robert, "The American Era", pages 171172, WEA) Despite the muscle flexing directed at Taiwan and Japan, the newer and more highly educated "fourth generation" Chinese Communist Party leadership of Hu Jintao has tended to downplay great power confrontation with the United States in order to continue to pursue development and modernization. China has an enormous stake in American trade and investment, and a serious conflict would have drastic consequences at a time when the country continues to undergo a wrenching transformation of its economy and society. China's trade (exports plus imports) with the United States in 2004 amounted to $179 billion,32 dwarfing the $20 billion in trade with Russia, and not surprisingly the Chinese have been reluctant to jeopardize their relationship with America. Beijing thus has its own practical reasons for not seeking to challenge the pivotal U.S. role in East Asia and for avoiding major disruptions in its external environment. While it is conceivable that an economically powerful China could ultimately emerge as a revisionist power and seek to challenge the U.S. position of unipolar primacy, it is also possible that China's economic development, social change, integration with the world economy, and own selfinterest could facilitate both a liberalizing political transition and sustained cooperative relations with the United States.33 Paradoxically, improvement in U.S.China ties has also been a consequence of did not make it appear subservient to the superpower. China also found good reasons of its own for cooperation with the the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The Bush administration welcomed Beijing's cooperation in the war on terror, and this enabled China to cooperate in ways that United States in facing the problem of North Korea. For its part, Washington supported China in its ongoing conflict with Uigur separatists in Sinjiang province, while downplaying other areas of disagreement, including human rights. Nonetheless, tensions remain evident in other areas, as, for, example, over Iran's nuclear program. China has courted Tehran as an important energy supplier and has opposed American efforts to bring the issue of Iran's nuclear program to the U.N. Security Council 5. China will not seek hegemony multiple warrants Freeman 10 served for the State and Defense Departments, ast president of the Middle East Policy Council, cochair of the U.S. China Policy Foundation, and vicechair of the Atlantic Council (Charles W, "China's Challenge to American Hegemony", http://www.mepc.org/whats/cwf012010.asp) Why has China, alone among nations, felt obliged to assert that it does not aspire to regional or global hegemony? Is this simply propaganda, intended to distinguish Beijing from Brezhnev's Moscow or from the militarism of contemporary Washington? Is it a contrite acknowledgment and repudiation of imperial China's past hegemonic status in East Asia? Or is it sincere counsel to future generations of Chinese not to bully their neighbors or the world once they have the power to do so? If so, is there something unique about China that causes its leaders to believe they must make a special effort to resist deepseated hegemonic impulses? This has become a timely question. After a couple of bad centuries, China is back. It believes, with some justification, that for most of its history it was the largest, wealthiest, best governed, and technologically most advanced society on the planet. China brims with confidence that it can regain this status, which it considers the natural order of affairs, and that it will do so in this century. Analogies to other rising powers with shallower histories -- France, the United States, Germany, Japan, the USSR -- are not helpful in predicting the consequences of China's rise. China has no messianic ideology to export; no doctrine of "manifest destiny" to advance; no belief in social Darwinism or imperative of territorial expansion to act upon; no cult of the warrior to animate militarism or glorify war; no exclusion from contemporary global governance to overcome; no satellite states to garrison; no overseas colonies or ideological dependencies to protect; no history of power projection or military intervention beyond its immediate frontiers; no entangling alliances or bases abroad. China has a very persuasive explanation of its national interests. It says it needs domestic tranquility and peace on its borders in order to pursue its continued modernization and economic development. It seems very comfortable with a multipolar world order, where peace and economic growth prevail. But anyone with experience of negotiating with the Chinese can attest that they are capable of both haughtiness and petulance. Some of this sort of conduct seems to have been on display at Copenhagen last month. How a stillmorepowerful China conducts itself in the future will be decided in part by Chinese realities as shaped by Chinese history. But Chinese behavior will also reflect how the rest of the world, including most notably the incumbent hegemon -- the United States -- reacts and interacts with China as China rises. And future Chinese conduct cannot be separated from the character of China's domestic politics. An autocracy that feels free to ignore the rule of law at home is unlikely to defer to international law and procedure abroad. Whatever the meaning of China's assurances that it will not pursue hegemony or engage in military expansionism in future, we cannot be certain that it will not. There are grounds for optimism, especially with respect to China's use of military power. China's history includes examples of aggressive actions along its borders -- especially in Korea and Vietnam. But overall China has been notable for its cautious, defensive, and inwardlooking national security posture. The Great Wall stands as a symbol of this as does the scuttling of the Ming fleet in 1437. Despite a formidable history of innovation in military technology and warfare on a scale commensurate with its huge population and vast size, the Chinese strategic tradition stresses that weapons are inauspicious instruments to be used only when the use of force is unavoidable. The People's Republic of China has used force when measures short of war have Beijing has shown a similar preference for negotiations rather than the use of force to settle the Taiwan issue. proven inadequate to secure its borders or strategic interests (as in Korea, India, and Vietnam), but, by marked contrast with India in Goa or Indonesia in TimorLeste, it gave diplomacy the decades needed to resolve the Hong Kong and Macau issues without bloodshed. Crossstrait tensions are lessening. It should be encouraging that China has insisted on United Nations authorization for its military activities abroad, which are directed at peacekeeping and against piracy . A2: EU 1. There are multiple constraints to EU balancing Singh 8 Professor, School of Politics and Sociology, Birkbeck College, University of London (Robert, International Politics, Vol. 45, Iss. 5, "The exceptional empire", ProQuest, WEA) Aside from its elusiveness currently, however, this multipolar vision also has grievous normative problems. Prior balances of great powers have rarely been either stable or benign (think of the years preceding WWI and during the 1920s and 1930s leading to WWII). Even were some new concert of major powers to be thrashed out, however, it is doubtful that such a set of rival powers would resolve the humanitarian crises, ethnic cleansing, genocides, failed states and Islamist movements that together threaten the contemporary international system. At least as pointedly, the main potential rival powers to the US are themselves inhibited by all manner of problems ranging from energy needs and environmental decay to the threat of pandemics, acute socioeconomic inequalities and demographic stresses. In each, the internal tensions and strains of social, economic and political change may be as likely to retard as to advance the various emerging powers' routes to great or superpower status. The EU, for example, faces acute demographic problems that deeply complicate the still unresolved institutional and political dilemmas shaping its development. Generous welfare spending, inflexible labour markets, a rapidly aging workforce, a diminishing tax base, a declining fertility ratio and the problems of a growing but alienated Muslim population pose powerful hindrances to sustaining positive growth rates. However large its economy, the EU likewise remains a relatively minor global actor: In the near future, the European Union (EU) will be a structurallycrippled geopolitical actor . It has expanded too fast and speaks in 23 tongues. Too much of the leaders' time is spent on discussing how Europe should make its decisions. The patchwork accords reached under the German presidency in June 2007 have not solved the fundamental problem. It would only be a mild exaggeration to say that the perpetual European discussions on seating arrangement are akin to rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic . The geopolitical environment around Europe has worsened while the EU has focused inwards: it faces a more troubled environment in North Africa, the Middle East, the Balkans, the Caucasus and even visa vis Russia. This is a pretty dismal record. (Mahbubani, 2007, 203204) 2. Your argument is both theoretically flawed and untrue Howorth and Menon 9 Professor of Political Science at Yale University AND scholar at the European Research Institute in the UK (Jolyon and Anand, "Still Not Pushing Back: Why the European Union is not Balancing the United States," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol 53, No. 5, October 2009) Many of those who argue that states are beginning to "push back" against American preeminence have used ESDP as an illustrative case. We argue, however, that they have fundamentally misinterpreted it. For one thing, their approach is both theoretically and methodologically flawed. More significantly, careful empirical analysis of a kind too infrequently undertaken reveals the shortcomings of their analysis. The EU's nascent security and defense policies simply do not represent the kind of balancing response to U.S. primacy postulated by the soft balancers. Moreover, they could not. An important distinction must be made between the preferences of individual national capitals and the actions of the EU. Even if one or two powerful member states might be tempted by balancing, the very nature of the EU would preclude this simply being adopted as a strategy for ESDP. International intergovernmental institutions like the EU are quite inappropriate vehicles for the kinds of balancing behavior that some (wrongly) claim it to be engaged in. A2: JAPAN 1) Japan only has a defensive military that is limited by the constitution we wrote for them after World War II they could never overtake us militarily 2) Japan is not counterbalancing America. Owen 2 John M. Owen IV, Assistant Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia, 2002 "Transnational Liberalism and U.S. Primacy," INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 26.3 (2002) 117152 Neither is Japan counterbalancing the United States. Its aggregate military spending remains around 1 percent of its gross national product. It is increasing its ability to defend itself against missile attacks by building four space surveillance satellites and developing theater missile defense. These policies, however, are clearly in reaction to the North Korean launch of a TaepoDong missile over Japan in August 1998. Japan's TMD initiative was at the prodding of the United States itself and is a joint U.S.Japanese venture. 44 Indeed, far from attempting to form any antiU.S. alliance, Tokyo renewed the 1960 U.S.Japanese security treaty in 1997. The Japanese Diet has yet to approve all of the [End Page 130] details of the new treaty, but the chances of repudiation appear nil. 45 Despite increasing domestic political costs, successive governments have continued to favor the presence of four U.S. naval bases on Japanese territory . 46 Japanese and West European relative acquiescence to U.S. power is caused in part by the predominance of liberalism in these societies. Along with North America, Western Europe and Japan are the most liberal areas of the world. Although these countries have antiliberal elements, such as ultranationalists and communists, all are liberal democracies overwhelmingly dominated by liberal elites. To varying degrees their governments often criticize U.S. internal and external policies, even to the point where they sound antiAmerican. Yet elites in most of these countries do not appear to fear that the United States will use its massive power against them. Many even indirectly support U.S. primacy by asserting that in today's world military power matters little, thereby absolving their countries of the need to counterbalance. 3) No incentive to counterbalance doesn't fear U.S. power Owen 2 John M. Owen IV, Assistant Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia, 2002 "Transnational Liberalism and U.S. Primacy," INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 26.3 (2002) 117152 Japanese and West European relative acquiescence to U.S. power is caused in part by the predominance of liberalism in these societies. Along with North America, Western Europe and Japan are the most liberal areas of the world. Although these countries have antiliberal elements, such as ultranationalists and communists, all are liberal democracies overwhelmingly dominated by liberal elites. To varying degrees their governments often criticize U.S. internal and external policies, even to the point where they sound antiAmerican. Yet elites in most of these countries do not appear to fear that the United States will use its massive power against them. Many even indirectly support U.S. primacy by asserting that in today's world military power matters little, thereby absolving their countries of the need to counterbalance. A2: INDIA India won't counterbalance because they need us Lieber 5 PhD from Harvard, Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown, former consultant to the State Department and for National Intelligence Estimates (Robert, "The American Era", pages 172173, WEA) The American regional commitment in Asia also provides reassurance to India visavis China, with which the memory of a brief but bitter border war in 1962 still lingers. In recent years, India's relations with the United States have improved significantly, and there is no sign of India seeking to join with others in balancing against American primacy. Moreover, as a consequence of 9/11, the United States has become increasingly engaged in South Asia, not only in the war against terrorism but in the effort to dampen conflict between India and Pakistan. Leaders of India, along with those of Pakistan, have been remarkably explicit in expressing their desire for continuing American engagement in the region. India, which for half a century had emphasized its neutrality yet had done so in ways that typically brought it closer to the Soviet Union than to the United States and which had equipped its military with Soviet weapons, has in recent years clearly tilted toward Washington. As an Indian author has observed, "New Delhi has transacted more political business with Washington in the last four years than in the previous four decades."34 Moreover, in the aftermath of 9/11 and the successful U.S. military campaign to oust the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, the Indian Foreign Minister observed, "I don't think America can give up its Central Asia presence now,"35 and he expressed his preference that American forces remain in Pakistan indefinitely in order to stabilize that country. For his part, the Pakistani President, General Pervez Musharraf, made clear his view that U.S. air power should remain in Afghanistan as a coercive force and the key to peace there, adding that "the U.S. presence in the region must remain as long as it is needed."36 A2: RUSSIA/CHINA ALLIANCE 1. Their balancing argument is dependent on a Russia and China angry at a conservative American president who wages decade long wars withdrawal solves their incentive to balance 2. Russia and China can't counterbalance the US Brose 9 Senior Editor at Foreign Policy (Christian, "Managing American Hegemony", Hoover Institution, Interview, 2009, No. 3, June 29th 2010, http://www.hoover.org/publications/hooverdigest/article/5577, KONTOPOULOS) *Quoting Kori N. Schake Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution and Distinguished Professor of International Security Studies at the United States Military Academy at West Point, Worked on the National Security council, Policy Planning Staff at the Department of State, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Staff Of course, other states could conceivably find new paths to power: melding authoritarian societies with market economies, discovering essential resources, banding together to damage American interests. Azar Gat has argued in his work on authoritarian capitalism that Russia and China are doing so, but I'm not yet persuaded. Russia is trending in very dangerous directions, but they are unsuccessful directions, as international reaction to their invasion of Georgia last summer demonstrates. China looks to me to be trending more positively. And a prosperous, confident China does not necessarily diminish American power, as the postwar success of Germany and Japan illustrates. 3. China and Russia won't prematurely balance against the US. Brown, Bromley, and Athreye 4 *William Brown, psychologist, *Simon Bromley, Simon Bromley joined The Open University in 1999, after teaching and research at the University of Leeds. He is currently Associate Dean (Curriculum Planning) in the Faculty of Social Sciences. *Suma Athreye, Professor of International Strategy. Her research focuses on internationalisation and its impact on technology entrepreneurship (Ordering the international: history, change and transformation, p. 166) In short, both China and Russia, perhaps like France and Germany in Europe, envisage a long and complicated struggle between US efforts to preserve its Unipolar moment and their desire to hasten the transition to a multipolar world, in which the major powers fashion some kind of agreed regional division of labour among themselves, while working in concert on truly global issues. Nonetheless, until such a situation evolves, neither has anything to gain from directly antagonizing the USA. Nor are they likely to forge an alliance hostile to US interests . China and Russia share a long border that constitutes a zone of potential instability and there is scant prospect that either will trust the other to guarantee its security. Moreover, it is far from clear how they could gain from establishing closer links with one another than they have with Washington. A2: BRIC 1) BRIC won't balance the U.S. internal competition, economic asymmetries, and differing interests Twining 10 Senior Fellow for Asia with the German Marshall Fund in Washington (Dan, "BRIC Nations Won't Build a New World Order," http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2010/04/23/bric_nations_wont_build_a_new_world_order_98932.html, 4/23/10) But in many ways, these countries are more rivals than partners. India's national security planners identify China as their most important adversary, and bilateral tensions have grown even as twoway trade has multiplied. Russia defines itself as a European power and feels threatened by China's rise, particularly given the challenge of defending the mineral rich Siberian heartland from creeping Chinese economic colonization. Russia, China, and India compete vigorously for influence in Central Asia, as do China and India in South and Southeast Asia and in markets for natural resources worldwide. Brazil has important commercial relations with China, but their political regimes could not be more different. Leaders in both Brazil and India have invested much more in a trilateral partnership with South Africa that unites them in an alliance of values spanning three continents. Nor are the economic interests of the BRICs as complementary as they might appear. Although it suffers from acute misgovernance, Russia is an industrialized country that sits on the UN Security Council and in the G8; it is not a developing state excluded from great power clubs. Russia is also a declining power rather than a rising one its demographic and social indicators are ruinous, and its energydominated economy is illequipped to compete with the innovation and manufacturing prowess of the Asian giants. Brazil is a middleincome country that experienced in the 1970s the economic takeoff China and India are now enjoying; its moderate growth rates and industrial structure put it in a different league, and constrain the speed of its further rise. The economic asymmetries don't stop there. India's consumption driven, privatesectorled, servicesoriented economy is the converse of China's exportdriven, statedominated, mass manufacturing economy. China's artificially cheap currency handicaps the export prowess of the other BRICS. That's why their finance ministers were quick to side with the United States before this week's G20 finance ministers' meeting in calling for China to allow the renmimbi to appreciate an "absolutely critical" requirement, declared Brazil's central bank chief, and an assessment echoed by his Indian counterpart. Partly as a result of these rivalries and differences, each of the BRICs (with the partial exception of Brazil) covets closer partnership with the West and prioritizes those relations above ties to each other. Each views its ties to the United States as its most important bilateral relationship. Each works to maximize investment in and trade with the developed markets of Europe. Trade with the West is in many ways more complementary and mutually beneficial than their structurally imbalanced trade with China in which Brazil, Russia, and India export raw commodities and import lowcost manufactures. These relations are not entirely unlike the unequal and extractive nature of economic exchange that characterized relations between the European empires of yesteryear and their overseas colonies. Moreover, it is more likely that geopolitical competition in the 21st century will occur between rising powers like China and India or will pit revisionist states like China against established powers like America than that the future strategic landscape will divide between a BRIC bloc and the West. Countries like India, Brazil, and Russia have too much at stake in their relations with North America and Europe, and remain too wary of the Chinese colossus, to make Beijing their alliance partner of choice. And we should not overlook another set of ascending powers South Korea, Indonesia, Mexico, and South Africa all democracies with strong ties to the West and, as their membership in the G20 shows, emerging global players. These rising powers are knocking at the door of global governance frameworks and institutions. Are Western nations willing to let them in? Are they willing to invest in relations with potentially likeminded countries such as India and at a level of quality and intensity that the transatlantic allies previously reserved only for each other? Failure on either front would give the BRICs a lot more in common than they have now. 2) No risk of balancing little common interest or incentive to cooperate Rozhnov 10 (Konstantin, "Bric countries try to shift global balance of power," http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/8620178.stm, 4/15/10) Though for years Brazil, Russia, India and China have often been talked about as a group, experts note that the countries' agendas are not exactly the same. "What brings them together is that they are at the frontier of capitalism," says Christian Lohbauer, an international relations expert at the University of Sao Paulo. "But it's obvious they don't have a common agenda and their interests diverge and are [at] many times conflicting. " For example, Russia and Brazil benefit from rising commodity prices, while for China and India it is a completely different story. Also, a top official at Russia's economic development ministry has said that China and India are among the 23 countries that limit free access to their markets for Russian companies. This week China introduced a duty on imports of US and Russian electrical steel, accusing the two countries of selling the product at abnormally low prices. For his part, Brazilian finance minister Guido Mantega said his country's manufacturers were being "harmed" by Beijing's currency policy, despite China being "an important trade partner". However such differences don't mean the bloc can be written off. Vladimir Portyakov, deputy director of the Institute of Far Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, says the Bric countries have already managed to come up with "some elements of the common position". First of all, he says, they agree that emerging economies should increase their role in international financial institutions. Mr Portyakov told the BBC Russian Service that there was an idea to use the Bric countries' national currencies in mutual trade and potentially turning them into global reserve currencies in the futur A2: BRIC 3) BRIC countries are actually drawing closer to the US or being balanced themselves Kagan 8 senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (11/1/08, Robert, "Robert Kagan: Make no mistake America is thriving," The Independent) Today, despite the polls, President George Bush has managed to restore closer relations with allies in Europe and Asia, and the next president will be able to improve them even further. Realist theorists have consistently predicted for the past two decades that the world would "balance" against the United States. But nations such as India are drawing closer to America, and if any balancing is occurring, it is against China, Russia and Iran. Sober analysts such as Richard Haass acknowledge that the United States remains "the single most powerful entity in the world". But he warns, "The United States cannot dominate, much less dictate, and expect that others will follow." That is true. But when was it not? Was there ever a time when the United States could dominate, dictate and always have its way? 4) BRIC is unable to balance the U.S. Nye 10 Joseph Nye (former US Assistant Secretary of Defense, is a professor at Harvard University) May 2010 "What's in a BRIC?" http://www.projectsyndicate.org/commentary/nye82/English Brazil, like the other BRICs, also faces a serious number of problems. It ranks 75th out of 180 countries on Transparency International's corruption perceptions index (compared to 79th for China, 84th for India, and 146th for Russia). The World Economic Forum ranks Brazil 56th among 133 countries in terms of economic competitiveness (compared to 29th for China, 49th for India, and 63rd for Russia). Poverty and inequality remain serious problems. Brazil's Gini coefficient is .57 (1.0 is perfect inequality, with one person receiving all income), compared to .45 for the United States, .42 for China, .37 for India and .42 for Russia. So, how seriously should analysts take the term BRIC? As an indicator of economic opportunity, they should welcome it, though it would make more sense if Indonesia replaced Russia. In political terms, China, India, and Russia are competitors for power in Asia, and Brazil and India have been hurt by China's undervalued currency. Thus, BRIC is not likely to become a serious political organization of likeminded states. A2: ASEAN ASEAN will fail no established purpose and internal counterbalancing Josse 5 (M.R., "Counterbalancing China East Asian Summit Begins," News Blaze, http://newsblaze.com/story/20051214063915nnnn.nb/topstory.html, 12/14/05) Russia is interested in its membership. Sans consensus, however, it will not become a member yet. Apparently, Russia does not meet the established criteria: ASEAN dialogue partner status, strong relations with the region, and a signatory of an "amity and cooperation" treaty. No one yet knows what exactly the forum stands for, or even when it will convene again. Malaysia says that it will be a strategyfocused organisation with a wide geopolitical view; others hope that it could be the precursor of an eventual freetrade East Asian community. Preparations have exposed deep divides with bitter exchanges between China and Japan and a split in the membership along pro and antiUS lines. Moreover, as Abdul Razak Baginda of the Malaysian Strategic Research Centre believes, the inclusion of India, Australia and New Zealand is designed as a counterweight to China in a forum where the US is not invited. A2: WTO 1) WTO fails and isn't cohesive no risk of balancing Neubacher 8 (Alexander, "The Fragmented Future of World Trade," http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,570219,00.html, 8/5/08) The day after the World Trade Organization (WTO) talks collapsed amid squabbling last Tuesday, with the limousines already lined up along Geneva's lakeside promenade, the participants to the conference suddenly appeared to have found agreement after all at least when it came to their choice of words. Indonesian Minister of Trade Mari Elka Pangestu said that she was "deeply disappointed." Kamal Nath, the Indian industry minister, also expressed his "deep disappointment." And when US Trade Representative Susan Schwab spoke of a "very disappointing turn of events," European Trade Commissioner and avowed cynic Peter Mandelson couldn't help but echo the general sense of official mourning over the conference. It was "heartbreaking," Mandelson said of the meeting's outcome. This collective melancholy is certainly appropriate. For nine days, the senior representatives of 153 countries attempted in vain to agree on a new set of rules and regulations to govern international trade. The ultimate failure last week of this most recent effort, may mark the end of mankind's dream of a world without borders and customs barriers. 2) The WTO is already falling apart it will die this year Blustein 10 (Paul, "R.I.P, WTO," Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/01/04/rip_wto, Jan/Feb 2010) Someday historians may look back on 2010 as the year the global trade system died or contracted a terminal illness. A pledge by world leaders to complete the Doha round of global trade negotiations this year looks increasingly likely to end in yet another flop, and that would deal a crushing blow to the trade system as we know it . Of course, commerce will continue across national borders, and oneoff deals between countries will still happen. But the slowbutsteady, acrosstheboard opening of markets that has fueled growth for decades is grinding to a halt. After eight painful years of standstill and failure, with each meeting just a shoveling of intractable problems forward to the next, the Doha talks might collapse once and for all in 2010, possibly taking the World Trade Organization (WTO) down in the process. Yes, negotiators could once again defer the day of reckoning by setting a new deadline and resolving to try again later just as they've already done in Cancn, Geneva (three times), Hong Kong, and Potsdam. But they're running out of chances. No less an authority than Stuart Harbinson, the former WTO General Council chairman who played a key role in the round's launch in 2001, wrote recently: "This time ... the crisis is real. Too many deadlines have come and gone and the WTO simply cannot afford a repeat. The fundamental credibility of the institution is now at stake ... 2010 is a real deadline." That's dangerous, because for all its failings, the WTO is a rare international organization that works as intended. The Genevabased trade group is the current embodiment of the system established after World War II to prevent a reversion to 1930sstyle protectionism and trade wars. Its rules keep a lid on its member countries' import barriers, and members take their trade disputes to WTO tribunals rather than imposing titfortat sanctions on each other's goods. In addition, the WTO is the guardian of the mostfavorednation principle, which requires members to treat each other's products in a nondiscriminatory fashion a valuable bulwark against the sorts of trade blocs that can lead to friction or even military conflict. If Doha falls apart, the WTO's ability to continue performing its vital functions would be imperiled. If it can't forge new agreements, how long before it loses its authority to arbitrate disputes? The trade body won't disintegrate overnight, but the danger is that its tribunals will be weakened to the point where member countries start ignoring WTO rulings and flouting their commitments. Without negotiated settlements of contentious issues, litigation will almost surely spread like wildfire a potentially explosive situation. On climate change, for example, some in the United States and Europe want to impose "green tariffs" on goods from countries that aren't reducing their carbon emissions fast enough (read: China and India). In the absence of clear rules, China and India would have plenty of leeway to challenge such tariffs, putting WTO tribunals in the terribly awkward position of having to decide: Are such tariffs illegal, meaning that free trade trumps saving the planet? Or, if the tariffs are legal, should the Chinese and Indians have the right to slap duties on goods from Western countries, which they blame for creating the global warming problem in the first place? A2: SOFT BALANCING 1. Even if soft balancing happens, the U.S. will still maintain hard power and can destroy any country that tries to get in its way 2. Ignore soft balancing--it's not driven by hegemony Brooks and Wohlforth 5 professors of government at Dartmouth (Stephen and William, International Security, 30:1, "Hard times for soft balancing", EBSCO, WEA) How does one identify soft balancing? The answer matters greatly for both policy and theory, yet it remains elusive because soft balancing proponents have not supplied the conceptual tools to distinguish behavior that is an outgrowth of the systemic balancing imperative from what we might call "unipolar politics as usual." Crucially missing from the literature is sufficient recognition that other explanations besides soft balancing exist for state actions that constrain the United States . As a result, analysts tend to treat nearly any behavior that complicates U.S. foreign policy as soft balancing. We remove this bias by setting out four alternative explanations. economic interest States may undertake actions that hamper the conduct of U.S. foreign policy not principally because they wish to do so, but rather to advance economic gains , either for the state as a whole or for powerful interest presence of a hegemon on the horizon or the potential security threat it poses. regional security concerns States routinely pursue policies to groups or business lobbies. A government's interest in fostering economic growth or obtaining revenue for itself or its constituents may be unrelated to the enhance local security that are unrelated to constraining U.S. hegemony . For a variety of reasons, there is a greater demand for regional policy coordination than existed in the past: a vast increase in the number of states; a consequent increase in the overall number of weak or failed states; and the rise of transnational security challenges such as organized crime, terrorism, drug trafficking, and refugee flows. Major powers frequently face incentives to enhance their capabilities--often through collaboration with other regional states--in response to these local or regional concerns. These efforts may result in shifts in relative power--and perhaps in reduced U.S. freedom of action--even if constraining U.S. hegemony is not an important driver of them. policy disputes and bargaining Other states may undertake actions U.S. policies. Governments may resist a given U.S. policy because they are convinced that it i s ill suited to the problem at the long term. If so, then soft balancing is a misnomer, for the behavior concerned is unrelated to maximizing hand or otherwise inappropriate, and not because they think it directly threatens their security or that opposition to it will reduce U.S. power over that constrain the United States not in response to the security threat presented by U.S. hegemony, but rather because they sincerely disagree with specific security under anarchy by checking a dangerous systemic concentration of power. In short, other states may push back against specific U.S. policies (pushing back because they disagree) and not against U.S. power in general (pushing back because they fear or wish to challenge U.S. hegemony). Given the reasonable expectation of future policy differences on various issues, and therefore the expectation of future policy bargaining, it follows that states may take actions intended to increase, or at least maintain, bargaining leverage over the long term. This is where policy bargaining takes forms that most closely resemble what analysts mean by soft balancing. As we show below, there are crucial analytical differences between longterm bargaining enhancement strategies and real soft balancing. 3. Soft balancing is a cheap coverup for no balancing--there's no conceptual integrity or link to primacy Lieber and Alexander 5 *Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame, Fellow at the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies and the Nanovic Institute for European Studies, **Associate Professor of Politics at the University of Virginia (Keir and Gerard, "Waiting for balancing", http://people.virginia.edu/~ga8h/WaitingforBalancing.pdf, WEA) Distinguishing Soft Balancing from Traditional Diplomatic FrictionThere is a second, more important, reason to be skeptical of softbalancing claims. The criteria they offer for detecting the presence of soft balancing are conceptually flawed. Walt defines soft balancing as "conscious coordination of diplomatic action in order to obtain outcomes contrary to U.S. preferences, outcomes that could not be gained if the balancers did not give each other some degree of mutual support."57 This and other accounts are problematic in a crucial way. Conceptually, seeking outcomes that a state (such as the United States) does not prefer does not necessarily or convincingly reveal a desire to balance that state geostrategically. For example, one trading partner often seeks outcomes that the other does not prefer, without balancing being relevant to the discussion. Thus, empirically, the types of events used to operationalize definitions such as Walt's do not clearly establish the crucial claim of softbalancing theorists: states' desires to balance the United States. Widespread anti Americanism can be present (and currently seems to be) without that fact persuasively revealing impulses to balance the United States. The events used to detect the presence of soft balancing are so typical in history that they are not, and perhaps cannot be, distinguished from routine diplomatic friction between countries, even between allies. Traditional balancing criteria are useful because they can reasonably, though surely not perfectly, help distinguish between real balancing behavior and policies or diplomatic actions that may look and sound like an effort to check the power of the dominant state but that in actuality reflect only cheap talk, domestic politics, other international goals not related to balances of power, or the resentment of particular leaders. The current formulation of the concept of soft balancing is not distinguished from such behavior. Even if the predictions were correct, they would not unambiguously or even persuasively reveal balancing behavior, soft or otherwise. Our criticism is validated by the long list of events from 1945 to 2001 that are directly comparable to those that are today coded as soft balancing. These events include diplomatic maneuvering by U.S. allies and nonaligned countries against the United States in international institutions (particularly the UN), economic statecraft aimed against the United States, resistance to U.S. military basing, criticism of U.S. military interventions, and waves of antiAmericanism. A2: INSTITUTIONS International institutions fail--empirics, capability, people expect us to act Lieber 5 PhD from Harvard, Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown, former consultant to the State Department and for National Intelligence Estimates (Robert, "The American Era", pages 45, WEA) Second, as much as we might wish for more effective means of cooperation in addressing common problems, the reality of the United Nations and of other international institutions is that on the most urgent and deadly problems, they are mostly incapable of acting or inadequate to the task. The U.N.'s decisionmaking structure and institutional weaknesses, the makeup of the Security Council, failures in Bosnia (199195) and Rwanda (1994), the massive corruption of the oilforfood program, the ability of terrorists to drive the organization out of Iraq with one blow ,12 and the feckless response to crimes against humanity in the Darfur region of Sudan are evidence of these grave shortcomings. Nor does the European Union, let alone weaker regional bodies such as the Arab League, African Union, or Organization of American States, have much capacity to deal with the deadliest threats. The U.N. has a significant role to play, not least in burdensharing and in contributing to the perceived legitimacy of collective action, but its weaknesses remain a fundamental constraint. As Stanley Hoffmann, of Harvard's Center for European Studies, has observed, the U.N. and other international organizations "are increasingly important as sources of legitimacy and stabilizing forces, but often mismanaged and devoid of adequate means."13 Third, in an international system with no true central authority and the United States as the preponderant power, other countries will continue to look to us for leadership . In this anarchic and unipolar system, if America does not take action on the most dangerous perils, no one else is likely to have the capacity or the will to do so.14 Yet, in view of U.S. primacy, it is not surprising that the onus for action falls on its shoulders and that others may be tempted to act as free riders or "buckpassers" in a situation where security is a collective good. **HEG SOLVES** BENIGN American hegemony is benign--comparatively better than any alternative. Ickenberry 02 (John, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, "America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power" 2002, pg 251) My argument has much in common with that of Thomas Risse. Unlike Risse, however, I see the ascendancy of liberal norms and institutions less as constitutive of a security community and more constitutive (and derivative) of American hegemony . The United States has actively promoted liberal institutions as a way to extend and preserve its influence in Europe and Asia . As a liberal myself, I do agree that U.S. hegemony is peculiarly benign. Not only does it allow smaller countries relatively more influence over the hegemon, but it also promotes human flourishing--freedom and prosperity--better than any alternative yet tried. Benign US hegemony ensures sharing of economic benefits, positive relations with lesser powers, and democratic modeling. Barry 02 (Tom, Interhemispheric Resource Center (IRC), "The U.S. Power Complex:What's New," November 2002. ) http://www.igadi.org/arquivo/pdf/te_se07/te19_7_005tom_barry_srpower_us.pdf Benign Hegemony: Unlike coercive forms of hegemony, such as Japan's prewar regional Coprosperity Sphere in East Asia, benign hegemony (also referred to as "benevolent hegemony") ensures respect for leadership by encouraging a widespread sharing of economic benefits and frequent consultations with lesser powers. The actions of the hegemon, empire, or imperial power are commonly justified by the argument that they are motivated by benign or benevolent objectives. After the Second World War, the U.S. won respect as a benign hegemon because of its geopolitical strategy of liberal internationalism, its security umbrella in Europe and Asia benefiting former enemies, and its relatively transparent and democratic process of governance at home. LAUNDRY LIST Disease spread, failed, states and terrorism are all inevitable absent US hegemony. Haass 05 (Richard N., President of the Council on Foreign Relations, "The Politics of Power: New Forces and New Challenges" Harvard International Review, Defining Power, Vol. 27 (2) Summer 2005) The United States could lose its predominance in essentially one of two ways, yielding very different worlds. One would result from the loss of US predominance to China. The United States would not be replaced by China--that is far-fetched--but rather would lose its position of primacy. This could come from a combination of a gradual weakening of the United States and a gradual strengthening of China. The world would be no longer unipolar, but bipolar or multipolar. Thus one alternative world would be one in which the balance of power would re-emerge, replacing today's imbalance of power. You would have a much more competitive relationship between the United States and China, perhaps the emergence of a new Cold War. That to me is one way in which history could evolve over the next several decades, although it is not a terribly attractive way, to say the least. A very different alternative to a unipolar world would be an apolar world in which the current situation is replaced not by the emergence of one or more powers with whom the United States has to share world leadership, but by the ending of US primacy. The danger is that without US primacy and without any sort of a balance that would take its place, the world would degenerate in many ways, and it may even take on elements of a modern dark ages. That would be a world in which, for example, terrorist organizations had tremendous sway, in which failed states could be counted in the dozens, in which disease-- HIV/AIDS and othersravaged societies and populations, and in which local conflict became endemic. That to me would be an even worse alternative. So I would suggest that the goal of US foreign policy should be to avoid either of these alternatives, either the emergence of a multipolar, new Cold War kind of world or the emergence of a world without poles, in which order breaks down. WAR US hegemony checks regional arms races from escalating. Lind 09 (Michael, Policy Director of the Economic Growth Program at the New America Foundation in Washington, D.C, "Moving Beyond U.S. Cold War Hegemony" September 29, 2009). http://hoosierinva.blogspot.com/2009/09/movingbeyonduscoldwarhegemony.html Defenders of U.S. hegemony, a group that includes most of the members of the Democratic as well as Republican foreign policy elites, argue that American primacy is necessary to avert what I think of as the Two Spirals the spiral of arms races and the spiral of protectionism. According to what is called "hegemonic stability theory," both world peace and world trade depend on a single overwhelmingly powerful country that provides other nations with the public goods of security, market access and a global reserve currency. If the U.S. were unwilling to sacrifice its soldiers and treasure on behalf of the interests of other nations as well as its own, then the other great powers in particular, Germany and Russia in Europe and Japan and China in Asia would arm themselves to defend their interests, and mutual suspicion might lead to arms races and regional or global war. And if the U.S. were not willing to sacrifice its own industries to export oriented countries, other nations might abandon the idea of a global economy and the scramble to lock up markets and raw materials might also lead to regional or global war. The geopolitical parade of horribles invoked by America's foreignpolicy establishment always leads back to the same grand marshal the next world war, Dubyah Dubyah Three. SINOTAIWAN CONFLICT Hegemony key to check ChineseTaiwan conflict Wortzel 2 director of the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation (Larry M., "The PoliticalMilitary Dimension of U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan," The Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Lecture/ThePoliticalMilitaryDimensionofUSPolicyTowardTaiwan, 10/21/02) The United States has no fundamental interest in how the two "Republics of China" resolve their differences over sovereignty. It is in the American interest to insist that the resolution of those differences be freely agreed to by the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, without force or coercion. Of course, we must understand that today only citizens on one side of the Taiwan Strait, Taiwan, where people vote, can freely express their will. Policies that help Taiwan defend itself from coercion, and keep the United States with sufficient military strength to ensure the security and stability of the Western Pacific, are in America's interest. The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 perhaps says it most elegantly: We will regard any attempt to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful mean s, including boycott or embargo, as a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific and a matter of grave concern to the United States. In Taiwan today the people have the freedom to express their will about relations across the Taiwan Strait, either through a referendum or through support for a candidate from a political party that runs on a platform supporting one means of resolution or another. Unfortunately, Beijing threatens to turn the Taiwan Strait into a "sea of fire" if the ROC's citizens attempt a referendum. In China, a totalitarian state run by a communist party that insists on the Leninist principle of "democratic centralism," no such free expression of will is possible. The political system in China may allow "village elections," but the Chinese Communist Party does not allow the free articulation of political interest by the people. There is no free press through which ideas can be debated, there is no freedom to associate, and there is no means to support candidates for office from other parties, including political parties that may seek alternative ways of resolving problems across the Taiwan Strait. It is in the interest of the United States to provide the ROC the necessary defensive goods and services to deter China from using force. It is in the interest of the United States to ensure that Taiwan's armed forces can effectively operate the military equipment it procures, including through military exchanges and training. And it is in the interest of the United States to treat the democratically elected leaders of the Republic of China with dignity when they visit or pass through our country. American military preeminence solves Chinese aggression against Taiwan Wortzel 2 director of the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation (Larry M., "The PoliticalMilitary Dimension of U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan," The Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Lecture/ThePoliticalMilitaryDimensionofUSPolicyTowardTaiwan, 10/21/02) Militarytomilitary contacts with Taiwan should be designed to produce an armed force that can deter Chinese aggression, effectively defend that island, and ensure that in the event the PRC uses force America can meet its obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act. CONCLUSION China's propensity to settle disputes by the use of force threatens American interests in Asia. China's policies on proliferation, that is, supplying missiles, weapons of mass destruction, and the technology to make such deadly instruments of war, to dangerous rogue states that support terror threaten American security and vital U.S. foreign policy interests. China's twentyplus nucleartipped intercontinental ballistic missiles threaten the United States. And China's threats against Taiwan could embroil U.S. forces in a military conflict. Therefore, it is important that the United States maintain a strong military edge while it engages Beijing economically and politically. U.S. military power key to check Chinese aggression against Taiwan Brookes 8 Senior Fellow for National Security Affairs at The Heritage Foundation, member of the congressional U.S.China Economic and Security Review Commission (Peter, "Why the World Still Needs America's Military Might," http://www.heritage.org/Research/Lecture/WhytheWorldStill NeedsAmericasMilitaryMight, 11/24/08) Further to the south, what about stability across the Taiwan Strait? We know that China is undergoing a major mil itary buildup, especially involving its power projec tion forcesi.e., air force, navy, and ballistic missile forces, all aimed at Taiwan. Indeed, today Beijing has the world's third largest defense budget and the world's fastest growing peacetime defense budget, today if not for an implied commitment on the part of the United States to prevent a change in the political status quo via military means. China hasn't renounced the use of force against its neighbor and rival , Taiwan, a vibrant, freemarket democracy. It is believed by many analysts that absent American military might, China would quickly unite Taiwan with the main land under force of arms. In general, the system of military alliances in Asia that the United States maintains growing at over 10 percent per year for over a decade. It increased its defense budget nearly 18 percent annually over the past two years. I would daresay that military tensions across the 100milewide Taiwan Strait between Taiwan and China would be much greater provides the basis for stability in the Pacific, since the region has failed to develop an overarching security architecture such as that found in Europe in NATO. SINOTAIWAN CONFLICT Hegemony key to check ChineseTaiwan conflict Wortzel 2 director of the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation (Larry M., "The PoliticalMilitary Dimension of U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan," The Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Lecture/ThePoliticalMilitaryDimensionofUSPolicyTowardTaiwan, 10/21/02) The United States has no fundamental interest in how the two "Republics of China" resolve their differences over sovereignty. It is in the American interest to insist that the resolution of those differences be freely agreed to by the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, without force or coercion. Of course, we must understand that today only citizens on one side of the Taiwan Strait, Taiwan, where people vote, can freely express their will. Policies that help Taiwan defend itself from coercion, and keep the United States with sufficient military strength to ensure the security and stability of the Western Pacific, are in America's interest. The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 perhaps says it most elegantly: We will regard any attempt to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful mean s, including boycott or embargo, as a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific and a matter of grave concern to the United States. In Taiwan today the people have the freedom to express their will about relations across the Taiwan Strait, either through a referendum or through support for a candidate from a political party that runs on a platform supporting one means of resolution or another. Unfortunately, Beijing threatens to turn the Taiwan Strait into a "sea of fire" if the ROC's citizens attempt a referendum. In China, a totalitarian state run by a communist party that insists on the Leninist principle of "democratic centralism," no such free expression of will is possible. The political system in China may allow "village elections," but the Chinese Communist Party does not allow the free articulation of political interest by the people. There is no free press through which ideas can be debated, there is no freedom to associate, and there is no means to support candidates for office from other parties, including political parties that may seek alternative ways of resolving problems across the Taiwan Strait. It is in the interest of the United States to provide the ROC the necessary defensive goods and services to deter China from using force. It is in the interest of the United States to ensure that Taiwan's armed forces can effectively operate the military equipment it procures, including through military exchanges and training. And it is in the interest of the United States to treat the democratically elected leaders of the Republic of China with dignity when they visit or pass through our country. American military preeminence solves Chinese aggression against Taiwan Wortzel 2 director of the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation (Larry M., "The PoliticalMilitary Dimension of U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan," The Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Lecture/ThePoliticalMilitaryDimensionofUSPolicyTowardTaiwan, 10/21/02) Militarytomilitary contacts with Taiwan should be designed to produce an armed force that can deter Chinese aggression, effectively defend that island, and ensure that in the event the PRC uses force America can meet its obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act. CONCLUSION China's propensity to settle disputes by the use of force threatens American interests in Asia. China's policies on proliferation, that is, supplying missiles, weapons of mass destruction, and the technology to make such deadly instruments of war, to dangerous rogue states that support terror threaten American security and vital U.S. foreign policy interests. China's twentyplus nucleartipped intercontinental ballistic missiles threaten the United States. And China's threats against Taiwan could embroil U.S. forces in a military conflict. Therefore, it is important that the United States maintain a strong military edge while it engages Beijing economically and politically. EUROPE/RUSSIA U.S. military power checks European conflict and Russian aggression Brookes 8 Senior Fellow for National Security Affairs at The Heritage Foundation, member of the congressional U.S.China Economic and Security Review Commission (Peter, "Why the World Still Needs America's Military Might," http://www.heritage.org/Research/Lecture/WhytheWorldStill NeedsAmericasMilitaryMight, 11/24/08) We further know that the Kremlin has planted a flag on the seabed at the North Pole , asserting claims to an area the size of France, Germany, and Italy combinedan area which may hold onethird of the world's total undiscovered energy reserves. Russian action in Georgia and threats against Ukraine aren't comforting, either. Considering the weak defense spending in Europe, who will be able to stand up to this new Russia if necessary? I would suggest that, absent American military might, NATOor any future European defense forcemight be little more than a paper tiger in the shadow of the Russian bear. JAPAN NUKES U.S. military power key to prevent Japanese aggression and nuclearization Brookes 8 Senior Fellow for National Security Affairs at The Heritage Foundation, member of the congressional U.S.China Economic and Security Review Commission (Peter, "Why the World Still Needs America's Military Might," http://www.heritage.org/Research/Lecture/WhytheWorldStill NeedsAmericasMilitaryMight, 11/24/08) American military might has been primarily responsible for Japanese security since the end of World War II. This has not only allowed Japan to prosper economically and politically like South Korea and Germany, I might addbut has also kept Japan at peace with its neighbors. The presence of U.S. forces and the American nuclear deterrent has also kept Japan from exercis ing a nuclear option that many believe it might take, considering the rise of China, North Korea's nuclear breakout, its advanced scientific and technical capa bilities , and indigenous nuclear power industrya producer of a significant amount of fissile material from its reactors. Political and historical considerations aside, many believe that Japan could quickly join the onceexclu sive nuclear weapons club if it chose to do so, result ing in unforetold challenges to regional security. AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN US Hegemony solves Afghanistan and Pakistan instability--decline risks a terrorist attack on the US Curtis 619 (Lisa, Senior Research Fellow at The Heritage Foundation, "Need for U.S. Leadership on Afghanistan Pakistan Reconciliation" Heritage Foundation, June 19, 2010). http://blog.heritage.org/2010/06/19/needfor usleadershiponafghanistanpakistanreconciliation/ A front-page story on Afghan-Pakistani relations in today's Washington Post indicates that Afghanistan and Pakistan are discussing a peace settlement for Afghanistan. While a genuine thaw in relations between the two countries would be welcome, the idea that the U.S. would take a back seat in any effort to negotiate an end to the war in Afghanistan defies logic . The U.S. has not lost over 1,000 U.S. soldiers in battle and invested billions of U.S. dollars in Afghanistan only to allow Pakistan to re-install its violent proxies there. President Karzai is weaker than ever and any notion that he would be able to hold his own in negotiations with the Pakistani military does not stand up to scrutiny. According to today's Washington Post article (and other sources), the Pakistani military is offering to mediate a solution by bringing the deadly Jalaluddin Haqqani network into the negotiations. (Reminder: Jalaluddin Haqqani's forces in coordination with Pakistan's intelligence serve (ISI) bombed the Indian Embassy in Kabul in July 2008, killing two senior Indian officials and over 50 Afghan civilians). Moreover, Pakistan's "offer" to bring Haqqani into the negotiations comes at a time when the U.S. is pressing Pakistan to take on Haqqani's forces in North Waziristan through military operations. General David Petraeus in Congressional testimony this week told U.S. lawmakers that Pakistan's military Chief General Kayani was recently informed by U.S. officials that Haqqani fighters were involved in a raid on the U.S. Bagram Airbase in mid-May. Obama administration policies are partially to blame for the Pakistani hubris of pushing for a political settlement in Afghanistan that favors their proxy and our enemy , Haqqani. The Obama administration's lack of a clear policy on reconciliation also is contributing to Karzai's flailing about on the issue . Karzai recently fired respected Afghan intelligence chief Amrullah Saleh over differences on the Taliban reconciliation issue. Saleh said negotiations with the Taliban would "disgrace" Afghanistan. Senior administration officials (including Obama himself) have repeatedly said any reconciliation with the Taliban must be Afghan-led, and they have failed to assert a clear U.S. role and vision for this process. The Obama administration must be more forthright about what a political settlement in Afghanistan should involve and take a leadership role in the process. If the U.S. fails to take a more direct role in the reconciliation process, it risks squandering the entire situation in Afghanistan and allowing the country to return to domination by extremist forces friendly to those still intent on attacking the U.S. homeland KOREAN CONFLICT U.S. military power key to prevent Korean conflict Brookes 8 Senior Fellow for National Security Affairs at The Heritage Foundation, member of the congressional U.S.China Economic and Security Review Commission (Peter, "Why the World Still Needs America's Military Might," http://www.heritage.org/Research/Lecture/WhytheWorldStill NeedsAmericasMilitaryMight, 11/24/08) United Nations was concluded in 1953, the United States military has been the predominant force reducing the risk of Let's start with the Korean Peninsula. Ever since the ceasefire agreement between North Korean and Chinese forces and the another conflict on the divided Korean Peninsula. Indeed, even today55 years hencean American fourstar general leads the Combined Forces Command of U.S. and Republic of Korea forces that keep the peace against a North Korean regime that still harbors dreams of unitingmilitarily if necessarythe North and South under its despotic rule. Nearly 30,000 U.S. soldiers stand shoulder to shoulder with 650,000 South Korean forces across a surely misnamed demilitarized zone (DMZ) arguably the last vestige of the Cold Wardeterring over one million, ideologically driven North Korean troops. Even though peace has not been officially declared between the two nations, the odds of a conflict breaking out across the DMZ remain slim due to America's commitment to stabil ity on the peninsula. I would suggest that absent the presence of American forces and the military might behind it, including an extension the U.S.'s nuclear umbrella to South Korea, the history of the past 50 years might be quite different from what has been record ed today. A second Korean war has beenand still isa distinct but unfortunate possibility, and I would speculate that a new war would be even more horrific than the last, if that is possible. In March 2008, a North Korean news reader on state television said that if the South Korean govern ment made even the slightest gesture of an attack, "Everything will be in ashes, not just a sea of fire, if our advanced preemptive strike once begins." Considering that the capital of South Korea Seoul, a city of more than 10 millionlies within range of 10,000 pieces of Korean People's Army artillery, which could rain an estimated one million rounds on the city in the opening hours of a con flict, I think we have to take that commentator at his word. ECONOMY Collapse of US hegemony means collapse of the global economy. Lind 09 (Michael, Policy Director of the Economic Growth Program at the New America Foundation in Washington, D.C, "Moving Beyond U.S. Cold War Hegemony" September 29, 2009). http://hoosierinva.blogspot.com/2009/09/movingbeyonduscoldwarhegemony.html Defenders of U.S. hegemony, a group that includes most of the members of the Democratic as well as Republican foreign policy elites, argue that American primacy is necessary to avert what I think of as the Two Spirals the spiral of arms races and the spiral of protectionism. According to what is called "hegemonic stability theory," both world peace and world trade depend on a single overwhelmingly powerful country that provides other nations with the public goods of security, market access and a global reserve currency. If the U.S. were unwilling to sacrifice its soldiers and treasure on behalf of the interests of other nations as well as its own, then the other great powers in particular, Germany and Russia in Europe and Japan and China in Asia would arm themselves to defend their interests, and mutual suspicion might lead to arms races and regional or global war. And if the U.S. were not willing to sacrifice its own industries to exportoriented countries, other nations might abandon the idea of a global economy and the scramble to lock up markets and raw materials might also lead to regional or global war. The geopolitical parade of horribles invoked by America's foreignpolicy establishment always leads back to the same grand marshal the next world war, Dubyah Dubyah Three. US hegemony sustains the global economy. The League 720 (The League, Program of Revolutionaries for a New America, "Globalization, Speculative Capital and U.S. Hegemony." July 20, 2010). http://www.lrna.org/2pt/555/v16ed5art2.html U.S. dominance of the world's financial system has grown quantitatively since the end of World War II, setting the conditions for the qualitatively new world financial system of today. A brief history explains the unique position of the U.S. in the global economy. The U.S. has dominated global finance since the end of WW II , when the major industrial powers established the institutions of global capital the United Nations, GATT (precursor to WTO), the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. The Bretton Woods agreements (19441945)established a system of fixed exchange rates with the dollar pegged to gold at $35 an ounce that secured U.S. financial dominance in line with its political and military dominance. Dollars became the reserve currency for the capitalist world. As the U.S. became a debtor country with its military spending far exceeding its exports, the growth of the world's monetary reserves came to depend on the foreign dollar balances created by the U.S. trade deficit. In 1971, when international creditors lost confidence in the dollar and demanded payment for their dollars in gold, the U.S. defaulted on its payments, thus severing the link between gold and the dollar. During the 1973 Middle East crisis, the U.S. forced the oilproducing nations to denominate the sale of oil in dollars. This meant that other countries had to acquire sufficient quantities of dollars in order to purchase essential supplies of oil. The "petrodollars" accumulating in the hands of the oil producing countries were returned to the U.S. as investments, thus financing the U.S. deficit. Enabled by the international institutions of global finance, U.S. domination of the oil market and dollar hegemony, in a symbiotic relationship, have grown in significance over the years. The WTO imposes draconian freemarket rules on everything except oil and currencies, and the IMF acts as the world's policeman in defense of dollar hegemony. Since the advent of electronic technology and the rise of globalization , U.S. dominance of global finance has entered a qualitatively new stage. The federal government bailed out the Savings and Loan companies (1989) and Chrysler Corporation (1979) because their failure could have caused financial crisis and even depression. In a similar way today , any signs of faltering in the U.S. economy or sharp changes in the value of the dollar are met with rapid and decisive actions by the IMF and central banks of Europe and Asia to protect the dollar and the U.S. economy. To do otherwise would put their own economies, and possibly the entire world economy, at risk of financial crisis and depression. "[T]he U.S. Treasury [has] run up an international debt of over $600 billion, using the balanceofpayments deficit to finance not only its widening trade deficit but its federal budget deficit as well. To the extent that these Treasury IOUs are being built into the world's monetary base they will not have to be repaid, but are to be rolled over indefinitely. This feature is the essence of America's free financial ride, a tax imposed at the entire globe's expense." (Michael Hudson, Super Imperialism, 2003). Contrary to the rhetoric of market fundamentalism and free trade that it imposes on the rest of the world, the U.S. economy would be in its death throes if it had to live by the rules of the market and free trade. The American market is an important source of profit for global capital. As wages decline and paychecks become inadequate to purchase the flood of commodities, consumer debt and fictitious wealth creation through the stock market and housing bubbles sustain the American consumer and the American market. Since the U.S. budget deficit is largely paid for by investment from foreign central banks, not by taxation, American corporations and labor have some protection from the intense competition of lowwage producing countries, such as China. DEMOCRACY US hegemony enables democracy promotion--solves every impact. Yankiver and Taqi 06 (Bradford L., Carnegie Mellon, and Alawi, American University of Kuwait, "U.S. Leadership and the Spread of Freedom and Democracy" 03 January 2006). http://www.commongroundnews.org/article.php?id=1318&lan=en&sid=1&sp=0 It is important to recognise that the United States of America is playing a vital role in nurturing the spread of democracy. The U.S. projects its power militarily and economically, but above all it promotes its values : liberalism, free market economies, democracy , and freedom. Critics of the U.S. invasion of Iraq should remember that empire is not the goal. However misguided the means have been, the U.S. actions suggest that it genuinely want to see democracy established in the Middle East, dictators toppled, and human rights and freedoms respected. Proof of this is the fact that the U.S. has not simply exploited Iraq for its oil nor simply established a friendly dictatorship as many critics had assumed it would. This suggests a commitment to democracy in Iraq. The importance of freedom and democracy cannot be underestimated. Dignity, prosperity and creativity can flourish only within a climate of freedom. Furthermore, democratic political systems are the most effective at promoting economic development and fighting inequality and poverty. But it is never easy to arrive there arguments that democratisation efforts are too costly and potentially destabilising ignore the fact that the road to democracy was long and arduous even for Western nations. Few would argue that the French or American revolutions were not worth the cost. While there is no question that U.S. foreign policy under the Bush administration has some serious flaws, if U.S. support for democracy does not falter and the U.S. cooperates with the international community, history books may eventually look back on this period of time as the era when democracy took root in the Middle East. Hegemony key to democracy promotion McFaul 4 Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law at Stanford University (Michael, "Democracy Promotion as a World Value," The Washington Quarterly, Winter 2004/2005) There is a genuine correlation between the advance of democracy as well as democratic norms worldwide and the growth of U.S. power. No country has done more to strengthen the norms and practices of democracy around the world than the United States. If Adolf Hitler had prevailed in World War II, democratic values would have survived, but few democratic regimes would have remained. Similarly, if the Cold War had ended with U.S. disintegration , rather than Soviet dissolution, command economies run by oneparty dictatorships would be the norm and democracy the exception. Thus, even good ideas need powerful actors to defend and advance them. US hegemony is essential to support democracies Diamond 96 senior researcher fellow at Hoover Institution (Larry, "Beyond the Unipolar Moment: Why the United States Must Remain Engaged," Orbis, 2006) In the past, global power has been an important reason why certain countries have become models for emulation by others. The global power of the United States, and of its Western democratic allies, has been a factor in the diffusion of democracy around the world, and certainly is crucial to our ability to help popular, legitimate democratic forces deter armed threats to their overthrow, or to return to power (as in Haiti) when they have been overthrown. Given the linkages among democracy, peace, and human rightsas well as the recent finding of Professor Adam Przeworski (New York University) that democracy is more likely to survive in a country when it is more widely present in the regionwe should not surrender our capacity to diffuse and defend democracy. It is not only intrinsic to our ideals but important to our national security that we remain globally powerful and engagedand that a dictatorship does not rise to hegemonic power within any major region. PROLIF U.S. military power checks proliferation and ballistic missles Brookes 8 Senior Fellow for National Security Affairs at The Heritage Foundation, member of the congressional U.S.China Economic and Security Review Commission (Peter, "Why the World Still Needs America's Military Might," http://www.heritage.org/Research/Lecture/WhytheWorldStill NeedsAmericasMilitaryMight, 11/24/08) The United States military has also been a central player in the attempts to halt weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile prolifera tion. In 2003 , President Bush created the Prolifera tion Security Initiative (PSI), an initiative to counter the spread of WMD and their delivery systems throughout the world. The U.S. military's capabili ties help put teeth in the PSI, a voluntary, multilat eral organization of 90plus nations which uses national laws and joint military operations to fight proliferation. While many of the PSI's efforts aren't made pub lic due to the potential for revealing sensitive intelligence sources and methods, some operations do make their way to the media. For instance, accord ing to the U.S. State Department, the PSI stopped exports to Iran's missile program and heavy water related equipment to Tehran's nuclear program, which many believe is actually a nuclear weapons program. In the same vein, the United States is also devel oping the world's most prodigiousever ballistic missile defense system to protect the American homeland, its deployed troops, allies, and friends, including Europe. While missile defense has its crit ics, it may provide the best answer to the spread of ballistic missiles and the unconventional Twentyfive years ago, nine countries had ballistic missiles. Today, there are 28 countries with ballistic missile arsenals of varying degrees. This payloads, including the WMD, they may carry. Unfortunately, the missile and WMD prolifera tion trend is not positive. For instance, 10 years ago, there were only six nuclear weapons states. Today there are nine members of the onceexclusive nucle ar weapons club, with Iran perhaps knocking at the door. defensive system will not only provide deter rence to the use of these weapons, but also provide policymakers with a greater range of options in pre venting or responding to such attacks, whether from a state or nonstate actor. PIRACY U.S. military power solves piracy Brookes 8 Senior Fellow for National Security Affairs at The Heritage Foundation, member of the congressional U.S.China Economic and Security Review Commission (Peter, "Why the World Still Needs America's Military Might," http://www.heritage.org/Research/Lecture/WhytheWorldStill NeedsAmericasMilitaryMight, 11/24/08) Moreover, the U.S. Navy patrols the world's oceansfree of charge, I might addproviding freedom of the seas and protecting against sea ban ditry and piracy, which is a growing problem, espe cially in Southeast Asia and off the Horn of Africa. Indeed, should Iran attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz, a strategic waterway which carries 20 per cent40 percent of the world's oil supply, which it has threatened to do on numerous occasions, the U.S. Navy is the only maritime force in the world today that could effectively intervene to keep it openor would be willing to do so. DISEASE US leadership solves global disease spread. ONE 10 (ONE, advocacy organization committed to the fight against extreme poverty and preventable disease, "American Leadership: A healthier, more prosperous World." Pg 2) PDF Thanks to US leadership, the tools to prevent and treat HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria are affordable, effective, and saving millions of lives each year. Nearly four million Africans--up from 50,000 in 2002--are now receiving antiretroviral treatment for HIV/AIDS. Malaria programs have reached 25 million people with prevention and treatment measures. The Global Fund has also treated more than 7 million people for tuberculosis since 2002. But there's still much more we must do. In 2008, HIV/AIDS killed 2 million people, 1.4 million in Africa alone. Malaria kills roughly 900,000 people every year--mostly children and pregnant women in subSaharan Africa--with 6.7 million people still in need of effective treatment worldwide. And tuberculosis killed nearly 1.3 million people in 2008, with 90 percent of cases affecting the world's poorest. America's investments have changed--and saved--millions of lives, one person at a time. This is no time to stop. Every year, nearly 343,000 mothers die giving birth. Most of these women live in the world's poorest countries. Women in subSaharan Africa, for example, stand a 1 in 26 chance of dying during delivery, compared to a 1 in 4,800 chance for a mother in the United States. Investments in maternal health can deliver lifesaving results. If women had access to basic health services--such as a trained health care worker during delivery--80% of maternal deaths could be prevented. A healthy mother also means stronger, more healthy children. Today, 8.8 million children die before their fifth birthday. Pneumonia, diarrhea, malaria and the measles--preventable, treatable diseases that are no longer widespread in the United States--are the leading cause of child mortality worldwide. Children who lose their mothers are 5 times more likely to die in infancy than those who do not. But women who are healthy help ensure that their children attend school, eat as nutritiously as possible, and receive proper immunizations . Through simple, cost effective means, we've helped cut the number of child deaths in half since 1960. We can do it again by 2020. US leadership on global health matters checks disease spread and strengthens credibility. Medical News Today 08 (Medical News Today, "Report: U.S. Funding For Research On Neglected Infectious Diseases Is Very Low," 19 Dec 2008). http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/133512.php "There is no better place for the United States to reestablish its global leadership than in matters of global health," Rep. Jim McDermott (DWA) said today. "We live in an increasingly shrinking world; contact between Americans and the rest of the world via infection is increasing every day. The AIDS pandemic was the first shot across our bow; troops coming home from Iraq infected with leishmaniasis is the second shot, and drugresistant TB strains [is] just over the horizon. The data presented in the report released by Families USA outline current U.S. funding on global diseases that threaten Americans and U.S. interests, and we should increase government funding to combat these threats." "Families USA's report highlights the continued need to invest in research to eliminate devastating infectious diseases like tuberculosis, which continue to kill millions of people worldwide each year," Peg Willingham, Senior Director, External Affairs, Aeras Global TB Vaccine Foundation, Rockville, Maryland, said today. " U.S. leadership and funding remain crucial to developing new tools to prevent, diagnose and treat TB and other global killers . Past history shows that tuberculosis increases during economic crises; we should invest now to prevent needless deaths." Pollack said that, although incidence of these diseases in the U.S. is rare, the threat is truly global. "More than a quarter of the world's population live in areas that put them at high risk for contracting one or more of these eight diseases ," he said, "In dengue fever." The U.S. is the world leader in medical research and development, Pollack noted, and, as the report makes clear, this leadership needs to be strengthened with additional funding. "Our research spending amounts to less than a penny a day for each person affected by these diseases. We can do better," Pollack said. "Investing in neglected infectious disease research makes sense. It advances our public health and economic interests, and it strengthens our standing in the world." fact, the World Health Organization estimates that up to half the world's population is at risk of contracting malaria, and twofifths is at risk of contracting WARMING US leadership solves warming, saves the economy, and advances foreign policy initiatives. NREL 08 (A national laboratory of the U. S. Department of Energy, Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, operated by the Alliance for Sustainable Energy, LLC, "Strengthening U.S. Leadership of International Clean Energy Cooperation," pg 11) PDF Global investments in renewable energy and energy efficiency are growing exponentially in response to increasing fossil fuel prices, reductions in costs of these clean energy technologies, and pressing energy security and environmental concerns. The United States has an unparalleled opportunity to advance this global energy market transformation. U.S. leadership of robust international clean energy cooperation programs can grow clean energy markets and reap vital domestic economic and energy security rewards while advancing U.S. foreign policy interests and reducing global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The private sector, international institutions, and other countries have dramatically increased their engagement in international clean energy cooperation, and the time is ripe for the U.S. government to become a full partner in this transformation. The current financial crisis has elevated the need for government programs and incentives to maintain and grow global, privatesector clean energy investment, which can drive job creation and economic vitality for the United States and other countries. U.S. global leadership key to global warming solution Parsons 9 Assistant Counsel to and Environmental Practice Team Leader for Naval Facilities Engineering Command (Rymn, "Taking up the Security Challenge of Climate Change," Strategic Studies Institute, August 2009) On the issue of climate change, U.S. leadership is widely seen as critical to achieving an effective global solution.71 Other key players, the European Union, Japan, Brazil, Russia, India, and China among them-- who together with the United States account for 75 percent of all greenhouse gas emissions--must be included.72 Adapting to and mitigating climate change and the security implications of climate change is a mammoth undertaking. The challenges associated with cutting greenhouse gas emissions are themselves immense, with intricate political and economic considerations. The United States should demonstrate its readiness and willingness to assume the mantle of leadership in climate change and environmental security, to stabilize and strengthen the international system, and relieve anxiety over American intentions. 73 Progress achieved on climate change will redound to America's advantage in other arenas.74 Hegemony is key to multilateral environmental action a multipolar world doesn't elicit cooperation Falkner 5 Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the London School of Economics and Associate Fellow of the Energy, Environment and Development Programme at Chatham House (Robert, "American Hegemony and the Global Environment" International Studies Review (2005) 7, 585599) The first use of hegemony in international environmental politics revolves around the use of superior power in the interest of international regime building. Young (1989:88) has argued in International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment that, even though hegemonic states rarely impose international regimes against the wishes of other states, they play an important role in providing leadership in the creation of mutually agreeable environmental regimes. Although environmental leadership does not necessarily result from hegemonic power, it is closely linked to such power. Environmental leadership can take many different forms: policy entrepreneurship of individual actors in international bargaining that facilitates compromise and agreement in the interest of environmental causes (entrepreneurial leadership); diffusion and role model effects of national environmental policy (intellectual leadership); and the more explicit use of economic incentives and sanctions in pursuit of international environmental objectives (structural leadership) (Young 1991; Lake 1993; Vogel 1997; Tews 2004). Even though hegemony is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for the existence of environmental leadership, it is usually only powerful states that have a lasting effect on international negotiations and norm creation. Weaker states may assume a leading position when it comes to developing progressive environmental policies or demanding stringent international rules. But such initiatives will remain ineffective if they are not backed up by political and economic clout that can foster international agreement and induce compliance. For example, smaller European states such as Denmark and the Netherlands have often been in the vanguard of environmental policy innovation, but Germany, Europe's largest economy, is usually credited with providing the essential leadership for advancing environmental policies at the EU level. A similar picture emerges in the international system. It is mainly states that have dominant economic and political clout and whose position in the international economy affords them the possibility of exerting indirect or direct pressure on other states that can provide effective leadership on environmental issues. The United States is a good example of this conclusion. For much of the early phase of international environmental politics, the United States provided international leadership in one form or the other. It was one of the first leading industrialized nations to develop comprehensive environmental legislation and regulatory institutions. The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which was set up in 1970 to integrate the widely scattered programs and institutions dealing with environmental matters, instantly became a model for similar regulatory agencies that were created in which came into existence in the mid1960s. US environmental groups ranging from the more traditional bodies (Sierra Club, National Audubon Society) to modern environmental nongovernmental organizations (Environmental Defense Fund, Natural Resources Defense Council, Greenpeace) worked to create broadly based domestic support for a more ambitious environmental policy at home and abroad. US scientists and activists came to play a leading role in the other industrialized countries during the 1970s. Much of this state activity was underpinned by the world's most dynamic environmental movement, global environmental movement that began to emerge in the 1970s (Kraft 2004). At the international level, the United States began to claim the mantle of environmental leader, first at the UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm in 1972 (Hopgood 1998:96), and later in the context of the multilateral efforts to agree on environmental treaties. Having declared eight whale species endangered based on the Endangered Species Act of 1969, the United States took up the issue of whale preservation internationally and initiated a transformation of the international whaling regime to emphasize species protection rather than natural resource usage. US diplomatic pressure and threat of sanctions were instrumental in getting the International Whaling Commission to place a ban on commercial whaling in 1984 (Porter and Brown 1996:7781; Fletcher 2001). Also in the 1970s, the United States began to support international efforts to take action against ozone layer depletion and in the 1980s became a key advocate of international restrictions on the use of ozonedepleting chemicals. During the negotiations on the Montreal Protocol, the US government provided important leadership and exerted pressure on skeptical states, especially the European producers of ozone depleting substances, that objected to strong international measures (Benedick 1991). Whereas the ozone negotiations provided the United States with an opportunity to display leadership in a multilateral context, US policy on the conservation of species took on a more unilateral character. More than any other country, the United States has used the threat of sanctions to change other nations' behavior in areas that endanger threatened species. Using import restrictions on products made in an environmentally damaging way, the US government forced foreign fishing fleets to comply with American standards of protection of, for example, dolphins and sea turtles (DeSombre 2001). In these cases and others, the United States benefitted from its superior position as the world's largest economy and import market for internationally traded goods. The nodal position that the US economy occupies in international economic flows affords it a unique opportunity to use economic pressure in the pursuit of environmental objectives. This is not to say that other nations are devoid of similar economic power; depending on the nature of the environmental issue, such as in international trade (Smith 2004). But the fact remains that on many environmental issues, the United States has unrivaled economic power can be more dispersed than concentrated in the international economy. In biodiversity protection, for example, none of the industrialized countries appear to have such decisive economic clout that it can force support of the global biodiversity regime; all they can do is provide financial side payments. Furthermore, the European Union has emerged as a potential contender to US environmental leadership not the least because it has assumed a coequal position in key areas of international policymaking, opportunities for exercising leadership. That it has not always acted on these opportunities does not alter the reality of America's superior power. ENVIRONMENT Hegemony is key to multilateral environmental action a multipolar world doesn't elicit cooperation Falkner 5 Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the London School of Economics and Associate Fellow of the Energy, Environment and Development Programme at Chatham House (Robert, "American Hegemony and the Global Environment" International Studies Review (2005) 7, 585599) The first use of hegemony in international environmental politics revolves around the use of superior power in the interest of international regime building. Young (1989:88) has argued in International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment that, even though hegemonic states rarely impose international regimes against the wishes of other states, they play an important role in providing leadership in the creation of mutually agreeable environmental regimes. Although environmental leadership does not necessarily result from hegemonic power, it is closely linked to such power. Environmental leadership can take many different forms: policy entrepreneurship of individual actors in international bargaining that facilitates compromise and agreement in the interest of environmental causes (entrepreneurial leadership); diffusion and role model effects of national environmental policy (intellectual leadership); and the more explicit use of economic incentives and sanctions in pursuit of international environmental objectives (structural leadership) (Young 1991; Lake 1993; Vogel 1997; Tews 2004). Even though hegemony is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for the existence of environmental leadership, it is usually only powerful states that have a lasting effect on international negotiations and norm creation. Weaker states may assume a leading position when it comes to developing progressive environmental policies or demanding stringent international rules. But such initiatives will remain ineffective if they are not backed up by political and economic clout that can foster international agreement and induce compliance. For example, smaller European states such as Denmark and the Netherlands have often been in the vanguard of environmental policy innovation, but Germany, Europe's largest economy, is usually states that have dominant economic and political clout and whose position in the international economy affords them the possibility of exerting indirect or direct pressure on other states that can provide effective leadership on environmental issues. The United States is a good example of this conclusion. For much of the early phase of international environmental politics, the United States provided international leadership in one form or the other. It was one of the first leading industrialized nations to develop comprehensive environmental legislation and regulatory institutions. The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which was set up in 1970 to integrate the widely scattered programs and institutions dealing with environmental matters, instantly became a model for similar regulatory agencies that were created in which came into existence in the mid1960s. US environmental groups ranging from the more traditional bodies (Sierra Club, National Audubon Society) to modern environmental nongovernmental organizations (Environmental Defense Fund, Natural Resources Defense Council, Greenpeace) worked to create broadly based domestic support for a more ambitious environmental policy at home and abroad. US scientists and activists came to play a leading role in the credited with providing the essential leadership for advancing environmental policies at the EU level. A similar picture emerges in the international system. It is mainly other industrialized countries during the 1970s. Much of this state activity was underpinned by the world's most dynamic environmental movement, global environmental movement that began to emerge in the 1970s (Kraft 2004). At the international level, the United States began to claim the mantle of environmental leader, first at the UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm in 1972 (Hopgood 1998:96), and later in the context of the multilateral efforts to agree on environmental treaties. Having declared eight whale species endangered based on the Endangered Species Act of 1969, the United States took up the issue of whale preservation internationally and initiated a transformation of the international whaling regime to emphasize species protection rather than natural resource usage. US diplomatic pressure and threat of sanctions were instrumental in getting the International Whaling Commission to place a ban on commercial whaling in 1984 (Porter and Brown 1996:7781; Fletcher 2001). Also in the 1970s, the United States began to support international efforts to take action against ozone layer depletion and in the 1980s became a key advocate of international restrictions on the use of ozonedepleting chemicals. During the negotiations on the Montreal Protocol, the US government provided important leadership and exerted pressure on skeptical states, especially the European producers of ozone depleting substances, that objected to strong international measures (Benedick 1991). Whereas the ozone negotiations provided the United States with an opportunity to display leadership in a multilateral context, US policy on the conservation of species took on a more unilateral character. More than any other country, the United States has used the threat of sanctions to change other nations' behavior in areas that endanger threatened species. Using import restrictions on products made in an environmentally damaging way, the US government forced foreign fishing fleets to comply with American standards of protection of, for example, dolphins and sea turtles (DeSombre 2001). In these cases and others, the United States benefitted from its superior position as the world's largest economy and import market for internationally traded goods. The nodal position that the US economy occupies in international economic flows affords it a unique opportunity to use economic pressure in the pursuit of environmental objectives. This is not to say that other nations are devoid of similar economic power; depending on the nature of the environmental issue, economic power can be more dispersed than concentrated in the international economy. In biodiversity protection, for example, none of the industrialized countries appear to have such decisive economic clout that it can force support of the global biodiversity regime; all they can do is provide financial side payments. Furthermore, the European Union has emerged as a potential contender to US environmental leadership not the least because it has assumed a coequal position in key areas of international policymaking, such as in international trade (Smith 2004). But the fact remains that on many environmental issues, the United States has unrivaled opportunities for exercising leadership. That it has not always acted on these opportunities does not alter the reality of America's superior power. **A2: HEG BAD IMPACT TURNS** 2AC A2: HEG > NUKE WAR (ALLIANCES) They're in a double bind: either a) their scenario isn't true and Heg solves nuclear war or b) their impact is true and other countries will cooperate to stop proliferation regardless of who the hegemon is U.S. withdrawal from the global sphere would leave behind a power vacuum, spurring terrorism, economic turmoil and multiple nuclear wars. Niall Ferguson, July/August 2004 "A World Without Power," FOREIGN POLICY Issue 143 So what is left? Waning empires. Religious revivals. Incipient anarchy. A coming retreat into fortified cities. These are the Dark Age experiences that a world without a hyperpower might quickly find itself reliving . The trouble is, of course, that this Dark Age would be an altogether more dangerous one than the Dark Age of the ninth century. For the world is much more populous-roughly 20 times more--so friction between the world's disparate "tribes" is bound to be more frequent. Technology has transformed production; now human societies depend not merely on freshwater and the harvest but also on supplies of fossil fuels that are known to be finite. Technology has upgraded destruction, too, so it is now possible not just to sack a city but to obliterate it. For more than two decades, globalization--the integration of world markets for commodities, labor, and capital--has raised living standards throughout the world, except where countries have shut themselves off from the process through tyranny or civil war. The reversal of globalization which a new Dark Age would produce would certainly lead to economic stagnation and even depression. As the United States sought to protect itself after a second September 11 devastates, say, Houston or Chicago, it would inevitably become a less open society, less hospitable for foreigners seeking to work, visit, or do business. Meanwhile, as Europe's Muslim enclaves grew, Islamist extremists' infiltration of the EU would become irreversible, increasing transAtlantic tensions over the Middle East to the breaking point. An economic meltdown in China would plunge the Communist system into crisis, unleashing the centrifugal forces that undermined previous Chinese empires. Western investors would lose out and conclude that lower returns at home are preferable to the risks of default abroad. The worst effects of the new Dark Age would be felt on the edges of the waning great powers. The wealthiest ports of the global economy from New York to Rotterdam to Shanghai would become the targets of plunderers and pirates. With ease, terrorists could disrupt the freedom of the seas, targeting oil tankers, aircraft carriers, and cruise liners, while Western nations frantically concentrated on making their airports secure. Meanwhile, limited nuclear wars could devastate numerous regions , beginning in the Korean peninsula and Kashmir, perhaps ending catastrophically in the Middle East . In Latin America, wretchedly poor citizens would seek solace in Evangelical Christianity imported by U.S. religious orders. In Africa, the great plagues of aids and malaria would continue their deadly work. The few remaining solvent airlines would simply suspend services to many cities in these continents; who would wish to leave their privately guarded safe havens to go there? For all these reasons, the prospect of an apolar world should frighten us today a great deal more than it frightened the heirs of Charlemagne. If the United States retreats from global hegemonyits fragile self-image dented by minor setbacks on the imperial frontier--its critics at home and abroad must not pretend that they are ushering in a new era of multipolar harmony, or even a return to the good old balance of power . Be careful what you wish for. The alternative to unipolarity would not be multipolarity at all. It would be apolaritya global vacuum of power And far more dangerous forces than rival great powers would benefit from . such a notsonew world disorder. Heg solves the motives for nuclear strikes--stabilizes the global economy, and ends conflict through intervention and promotion of democracy. 1AR A2: HEG > NUKE WAR Ext. Furguson: Nuclear war is inevitable absent US hegemony. The only alternative would be apolarity and a global power vacuum. Our evidence indicates that rogue states and power rivals would benefit from world disorder and seize the chance to fight for power. Heg solves the motives for nuclear strikes--stabilizes the global economy, and ends conflict through intervention and promotion of democracy. 2AC A2: HEG > WAR [Afghanistan only] Afghan COIN destroys credibility and gives countries an incentive to challenge the US. The Aff's withdrawal of troops increases credibility and allows the US to project its influence--this means the aff is a prerequisite for solving war. [Afghanistan only]: Ext. Our dollar internal link-- the need to keep the dollar as the international trade currency disincentivizes war. Trade means countries have an incentive to deescalate conflict. Reject their Mastanduno evidence 1it's missing an internal link--no reason why US has lost influence. 2 its claims are relative--even if the US has less influence than in the past, it still has enough to deter conflicts Hegemony is sustainable and solves global war there is no alternative Robert Knowles (Assistant Professor New York University School of Law) 2009 "american hegemony and the foreign affairs constitution" Arizona State Law Journal, Vol. 41 Lexis First, the "hybrid" hegemonic model assumes that the goal of U.S. foreign affairs should be the preservation of American hegemony, which is more stable, more peaceful, and better for America's security and prosperity, than the alternatives. If the United States were to withdraw from its global leadership role, no other nation would be capable of taking its place . 378 The result would be radical instability and a greater risk of major war. 379 In addition, the United States would no longer benefit from the public goods it had formerly produced; as the largest consumer, it would suffer the most. Second, the hegemonic model assumes that American hegemony is unusually stable and durable. 380 As noted above, other nations have many incentives to continue to tolerate the current order. 381 And although other nations or groups of nations China, the European Union, and India are often mentioned may eventually overtake the United States in certain areas , such as manufacturing, the U.S. will remain dominant in most measures of capability for decades. According to 2007 estimates, the U.S. economy was projected to be twice the size of China's in 2025. 382 The U.S. accounted for half of the world's military spending in 2007 and holds enormous advantages in defense technology that far outstrip wouldbe competitors. 383 Predictions of American decline are not new, and they have thus far proved premature. 384 Ext. Thayer--Multiple checks against conflict by US preponderance: 1. Human rights, democracy, and free trade are directly linked to US presence 2. Keeps complicated relations aligned and checks prolif and miscalc 3. Solves potential motives for war--stabilizes the global economy, fosters trade alliances, and stabilizes international politics. 1AR A2: HEG > WAR [Afghanistan only] Withdrawal from Afghanistan is key--COIN failure makes the US look weak and gives countries an incentive to challenge the US. The Aff's withdrawal of troops increases credibility and allows the US to project its influence. [Afghanistan only]: Keeping the dollar as the international trade currency promotes trade and gives countries the incentive to deescalate conflict. Ext. Thayer--Multiple checks against conflict by US preponderance: 1. Human rights, democracy, and free trade are directly linked to US presence 2. Keeps complicated relations aligned and checks prolif and miscalc 3. Solves potential motives for war--stabilizes the global economy, fosters trade alliances, and stabilizes international politics. Ext. Knowles: Withdrawal of the US from its leadership role would breed radical instability and power wars. 2AC A2: HEG > PREEMPTIVE STRIKES Perception of US hegemony as benign disincentivizes counterbalancing, pacifies potential rivals, and sustains US dominance. Ickenberry 02 (John, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, "America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power" 2002, pg 251) This argument starts from realist assumptions, but then moves from the system level to the unit level of analysis. Distinctive features of American foreign policy have prevented a counterbalancing response so far. Michael Mastanduno, for example, has argued that the Bush and Clinton administrations have in fact pursued a grand strategy of preserving U.S. primacy in the world system. John Ickenberry claims that U.S. hegemony is characterized by reluctance, openness, and a high degree of institutionalization. Benign hegemony results from the openness of the U.S. political system and from the American efforts of basing its hegemony on a dense set of multilateral institutions. Both characteristics of this particular hegemony give lesser powers ample opportunities to voice their concerns and to influence U.S. policies. As a result, the United States has managed to keep potential rivals happy in the postCold War era, and there is little reason to assume that this will change in the near future. At the same time, benign hegemony guarantees U.S. dominance in the international system and makes sure that a possible transition to a multipolar world might actually be managed rather smoothly. This argument ultimately rests on liberal and institutionalist assumptions about international order and leaves realism further behind. In a realist world, benign hegemony depends on the willingness of the hegemonic power to play by its own rules, which begs the question why the lesser powers should trust it. Ickenberry's propositions only make sense if the norms of multilateral institutions exert enough independent causal influence on state behavior to guarantee that smaller states in the system are happy with U.S. power. That is rather close to an emphasis on security communities. No risk of a turn: Any reason why their BBC evidence is correct would meant that preemptive strikes in the past 4 years would have caused their extinction. 1AR A2: HEG > PREEMPTIVE STRIKES Their evidence does not assume benign hegemony. Ickenberry is a Princeton Professor of International Affairs and he indicate that US hegemony is perceived as benevolent because of the openness of its political system and basis on multilateral institutions--this guarantees international compliance and sustains US hegemony into the future. Empirics mitigates any risk of a turn: No preemptive strikes in the 4 years since their evidence was written proves that heg acts a deterrent against nuclear strikes. 2AC A2: HEG > TERRORISM Their evidence only assumes a world of malign hegemony in which other countries perceive the US as a hostile competitor. Benign hegemony disincentivizes counterbalancing, pacifies potential rivals, sustains US dominance, and eliminates motives for terrorism. Ickenberry 02 (John, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, "America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power" 2002, pg 251) This argument starts from realist assumptions, but then moves from the system level to the unit level of analysis. Distinctive features of American foreign policy have prevented a counterbalancing response so far. Michael Mastanduno, for example, has argued that the Bush and Clinton administrations have in fact pursued a grand strategy of preserving U.S. primacy in the world system. John Ickenberry claims that U.S. hegemony is characterized by reluctance, openness, and a high degree of institutionalization. Benign hegemony results from the openness of the U.S. political system and from the American efforts of basing its hegemony on a dense set of multilateral institutions. Both characteristics of this particular hegemony give lesser powers ample opportunities to voice their concerns and to influence U.S. policies. As a result, the United States has managed to keep potential rivals happy in the postCold War era, and there is little reason to assume that this will change in the near future. At the same time, benign hegemony guarantees U.S. dominance in the international system and makes sure that a possible transition to a multipolar world might actually be managed rather smoothly. This argument ultimately rests on liberal and institutionalist assumptions about international order and leaves realism further behind. In a realist world, benign hegemony depends on the willingness of the hegemonic power to play by its own rules, which begs the question why the lesser powers should trust it. Ickenberry's propositions only make sense if the norms of multilateral institutions exert enough independent causal influence on state behavior to guarantee that smaller states in the system are happy with U.S. power. That is rather close to an emphasis on security communities. Turn: Benign hegemony increases incentives to cooperate with the US and guts antiAmericanism. Heg solves terrorism deterrence Thayer, 07 Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, Missouri State University (Bradley A., American Empire, Routledge, page 16) Another critical question is not simply how much the United States spends on defense but what benefits it receives from its spending: "Is the money spent worth it?" the benefits of American military power are considerable , and I will elaborate on five of them. First, and most importantly, the American people are protected from invasion and attack. The horrific attacks of 9/11 are--mercifully--an aberration. The men and women of the U.S. military and intelligence community do an outstanding job deterring aggression against the United States. Second, American interests abroad are protected . U.S. military power allows Washington to defeat its enemies overseas. For example, the U nited tates S has made the decision to attack terrorists far from America's shores, and not to wait while they use bases in other countries to plan and train for attacks against the U nited tates itself. S Its military power also gives Washington the power to protect its interests abroad by deterring attacks against America's interests or coercing potential or actual opponents. In international politics, coercion means dissuading an opponent from actions America does not want it to do or to do something that it wants done. For example, the United States wanted Libya to give up the weapons of mass destruction capabilities it possessed or was developing. As Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz said, "I think the reason Mu'ammar Qadhai agreed to give up his weapons of mass destruction was because he saw what happened to Saddam Hussein."21 2AC A2: HEG > TERRORISM No impact to terrorism not seen as a threat and no spillover. At worst, attacks will remain small scale. Boyle, 10 1 Lecturer in International Relations and a Research Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St Andrews (3/10/10, Michael, International Affairs, "Do counterterrorism and counterinsurgency go together?" http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/123318677/abstract) This description of the interlinked threats between terrorists and insurgents in theatre wars like Afghanistan is descriptively accurate, as recent accounts of the ideology of the Taleban indicate.24 Moreover, the idea that the global war against AlQaeda can be conceptualized as an insurgency has merit as long as it is seen for what it is: a metaphor designed to help policymakers to avoid overreaction and thoughtless mistakes that may alienate the Muslim world or drive its population into the hands of extremists. But--as Kilcullen realizes--in both descriptive and prescriptive terms this fusion of threats between terrorism and insurgency has its limits . First, such arguments (especially at the international level) give AlQaeda too much credit. The AlQaeda organization is neither an insurgency against a US hegemonic order nor the vanguard of a global Islamic resistance to globalization or westernization. It is a resilient and highly lethal terrorist organization with a fanciful political programme and relatively little popular support in the Muslim world. 5 It has killed thousands of people, but has not articulated a vision of political life that has 2 it proved attractive to potential followers. It does not pose a threat to the existing global order, nor does it provide an ideological model that has purchase in the Muslim world. For that reason, no global `hearts and minds' approach to the Muslim world is likely to prove necessary to defeat AlQaeda, which is more like a parasite on the Muslim world than its representative. Moreover, its highly committed adherents are unlikely to be swayed by public diplomacy campaigns launched by the US. Quite the contrary: adherents of AlQaeda are more likely to see efforts to engage the Muslim world as a sinister front to mask a continuing US attempt at domination in the region .26 1AR A2: HEG > TERRORISM Their evidence only assumes a world of malign hegemony in which other countries perceive the US as a hostile competitor. Ext. Ickenberry--international perception of US hegemony as benevolent incentivizes cooperation, pacifies rogue states, eliminates motives for terrorism, and strengthens long term power projection. Benign hegemony disincentivizes counterbalancing, pacifies potential rivals, sustains US dominance, and eliminates motives for terrorism. Ickenberry 02 Heg solves terrorism hearts and minds Thayer, 06 Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, Missouri State University (Bradley A., "In Defense of Primacy," National Interest, November/December, Lexis) American generosity has done more to help the United States the War on Terror almost fight than any other measure . Before the tsunami, 80 percent of Indonesian public opinion was opposed to the United States; after it, 80 percent had a favorable opinion of America. Two years after the disaster, and in poll after poll, Indonesians still have overwhelmingly positive views of the United States. In October 2005, an enormous earthquake struck Kashmir, killing about 74,000 people and leaving three million homeless. The U.S. military responded immediately, diverting helicopters fighting the War on Terror in nearby Afghanistan to bring relief as soon as possible. To help those in need, the United States also provided financial aid to Pakistan; and, as one might expect from those witnessing the munificence of the United States, it left a lasting impression about America. For the first time since 9/11 polls of Pakistani opinion have found that more , people are favorable toward the U nited tates than S unfavorable, while support for AlQaeda dropped to its lowest level. Whether in Indonesia or Kashmir, the money was wellspent because it helped people in the wake of disasters, but it also had a real impact on the War on Terror. When people in the Muslim world witness the U.S. military conducting a humanitarian mission, there is a clearly positive impact on Muslim opinion of the United States. As the War on Terror is a war of ideas and opinion as much as military action, for the United Ext. Boyle--even if they win a risk that Heg breeds antiAmericanism, Boyle indicates that Al Qaeda is not an insurgency against US hegemonic order. No spillover--Al Qaeda's ideological model is not attractive to potential followers. No risk a weakened terrorist organization will derail global order. 2AC A2: HEG > US CHINA WAR Their evidence only assumes China's ability to challenge the US. If we win the sustainability debate, their argument goes away China doesn't have the weapons and regional alliances aren't a threat Welch and Shevchenko, 10 *Professor of Political Science at UCLA and **Assistant Professor of Political Science at California State University, Fullerton (*Deborah and **Alexei, "Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to U.S. Primacy", International Security, Vol. 34, No. 4, Spring 2010, June 29 2010, p. 2425) PDF Against this backdrop of mutual recognition of status, there is little evidence that China is engaging in social competition with the U nited tates. Some observers have suggested that S China is using regional multilateral organizations to undermine U.S influence and alliance systems in Asia.131 On the other hand, these regional bodies are informal, consensus based, and impose no commitments. Most members also want to maintain good relations with the nited tates.132 U S China has increased its defense budget by double digits over the past two decades, but its military acquisitions and spending levels do not indicate that it aspires to be a peer competitor with the United States. China's military acquisitions (submarines, fighter aircraft, and surfacetoair missiles) appear to be aimed at deterring Taiwan from declaring independence and at deterring, delaying, or denying U.S. support for the island. China does not have global power projection capabilities, as indicated by its lack of aircraft carriers or longrange bombers .133 <3 Their evidence overstates Chinese strength--lagging economy, deficient technology, and a weak military minimize potential to balance the US and increase incentives to avoid conflict. China won't challenge us--by the time they have will or ability, reform will change their calculus Lieber 2005 PhD from Harvard, Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown, former consultant to the State Department and for National Intelligence Estimates (Robert, "The American Era", pages 171172, WEA) Despite the muscle flexing directed at Taiwan and Japan, the newer and more highly educated "fourth generation" Chinese Communist Party leadership of Hu Jintao has tended to downplay great power confrontation with the United States in order to continue to pursue development and modernization. China has an enormous stake in American trade and investment, and a serious conflict would have drastic consequences at a time when the country continues to undergo a wrenching transformation of its economy and society. China's trade (exports plus imports) with the United States in 2004 amounted to $179 billion,32 dwarfing the $20 billion in trade with Russia, and not surprisingly the Chinese have been reluctant to jeopardize their relationship with America. Beijing thus has its own practical reasons for not seeking to challenge the pivotal U.S. role in East Asia and for avoiding major disruptions in its external environment. While it is conceivable that an economically powerful China could ultimately emerge as a revisionist power and seek to challenge the U.S. position of unipolar primacy, it is also possible that China's economic development, social change, integration with the world economy, and own selfinterest could facilitate both a liberalizing political transition and sustained cooperative relations with the United States.33 Paradoxically, improvement in U.S.China ties has also been a consequence of did not make it appear subservient to the superpower. China also found good reasons of its own for cooperation with the the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The Bush administration welcomed Beijing's cooperation in the war on terror, and this enabled China to cooperate in ways that United States in facing the problem of North Korea. For its part, Washington supported China in its ongoing conflict with Uigur separatists in Sinjiang province, while downplaying other areas of disagreement, including human rights. Nonetheless, tensions remain evident in other areas, as, for, example, over Iran's nuclear program. China has courted Tehran as an important energy supplier and has opposed American efforts to bring the issue of Iran's nuclear program to the U.N. Security Council 2AC A2: HEG > US CHINA WAR Their warrant is based on flawed theory--China will not challenge hegemony Shambaugh, 04 Director of the China Policy Program at George Washington University (Winter 04/05, David, "China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order," International Security, Project Muse ) To be sure, this is a subjective assessment, but I would argue that it is a fair portrayal of the views and interests of the U.S. and Chinese governments. On balance, as Table 2 indicates, the United States and China find themselves on the same side of many of the key issues affecting the future of the Asian region, which may well enhance their opportunities for tangible cooperation. Some observers in the United States, however, see China's Asian engagement as an inexorable zerosum attempt to displace the United States as the primary power in the region.94 Some have even called for preemptively containing China before it can truly challenge U.S. preeminence first in Asia and then globally. This policy prescription, which is rooted in the theory of offensive realism, is most notably advocated by the University of Chicago scholar John Mearsheimer. Both the logic and application of offensive realism in this case are, in my view, unsustainable . It is a classic example an international relations of theorist, who is not well grounded in regional area studies, deductively applying a theory to a situation rather inductively than generating theory from evidence As a China specialist, I do not recognize the China that Mearsheimer describes, and I . see no evidence of his "Chinese hegemony" thesis and thus reject his policy prescription of preemptive containment.95 Contemporary international relations involve more than relations among great powers, and even great power interactions are not intrinsically zerosum Hobbesian struggles. Rather they are complex mixtures of interdependence, cooperation amid competition, and structural adjustments . Just as one nation ( China) rises, it does not ipso facto follow that another (the United States) must fall --or even decline relatively. Nor does the rising power necessarily seek hegemonic dominance. It is also not inevitable that rising powers challenge the established power , thus producing structural conflict (as, for example, the power transition theory would predict). Not only do the analogies of previous rising powers fail to fit contemporary China, but they also have no precedents in China's past. As historian Wang Gungwu points out, this is not the rst time in history that China has risen: it is the fourth such economic, social, and demographic pressures to precipitate dy nastic decline. Moreover, China does not have a significant history of instance.96 In the QinHan, SuiTang, and MingQing dynasties, external pressures on China's northern and eastern periphery combined with domestic coercive statecraft.97 China's "tribute system," which constituted the regional system in Asia for more than 2,500 years, was characterized by a combination of patronclient ties; economic interdependence; security protection for those closest to China (especially Korea); cultural assimilation into Confucian customs (lai Hua); political ritual (koutou); and benevolent governance (wangdao). The tribute system may have been hegemonic, but it was not based on coercion or territorial expansionism.98 These are essential points to bear in mind when considering China's new ascendance in Asian affairs. 1AR A2: HEG > US CHINA WAR No qualified evidence exists indicating that China intends to compete with the US. Welch and Shevchenko indicates that any regional alliances China might use to undermine the US are informal and unenforced. Low spending levels and inefficient military acquisitions indicate that China is not capable of global power projection. China won't challenge heg Shambaugh is specific their arguments aren't grounded in history just because China is rising, doesn't mean the US has to fall their authors are just applying a random theory to a situation No US China war Kellerhals, 10 (6/7/10, "Merle David Jr., Staff Writer, "ShangriLa Conference Highlights AsiaPacific Security Concerns", http://www.lexisnexis.com) Gates said that last year President Obama and Chinese President Jintao Hu made a commitment to "sustained and reliable militarytomilitary relations" between the two nations. But the relationship has been repeatedly interrupted by "the vagaries of political weather." "Regrettably, we have not been able to make progress on this relationship in recent months," Gates said. The Pentagon wants improved militarytomilitary relations with Chinese military officials at all levels to reduce miscommunication, misunderstanding and miscalculation , he added. Gates said that as regional partners develop new capabilities, they have a responsibility to take a greater role in providing regional and global security. The nations of Asia have been making significant contributions in the Gulf of Aden against highseas piracy, and in securing peace for Iraq and for Afghanistan, he said. But North Korea has provided another reality, one that continues to undermine the peace and stability of East Asia, Gates said. The March 26 unprovoked attack on the South Korean ship Cheonan, in which 46 sailors were killed, is not an isolated event, he added. 2AC A2: HEG > TAIWAN DRAW IN Their impact is empirically denied--US security commitments in Asia over the past decades disprove their impact And-- Heg deters China/Taiwan war Brookes 08 (Peter, Senior Fellow for National Security Affairs at The Heritage Foundation and member of the congressional U.S.China Economic and Security Review Commission, Heritage, Why the World Still Needs America's Military Might). November 24, 2008 We know that China is undergoing a major military buildup, especially involving its power projection forcesi.e., air force, navy, and ballistic missile forces, all aimed at Taiwan. Indeed, today Beijing has the world's third largest defense budget and the world's fastest growing peacetime defense budget, growing at over 10 percent per year for over a decade. It increased its defense budget nearly 18 percent annually over the past two years. I would daresay that military tensions across the 100milewide Taiwan Strait between Taiwan and China would be much greater today if not for an implied commitment on the part of the United States to prevent a change in the political status quo via military means. China hasn't renounced the use of force against its neighbor and rival, Taiwan, a vibrant, freemarket democracy. It is believed by many analysts that absent American military might, China would quickly unite Taiwan with the mainland under force of arms. In general, the system of military alliances in Asia that the United States maintains provides the basis for stability in the Pacific, since the region has failed to develop an overarching security architecture such as that found in Europe in NATO Taiwan war won't happen experts agree Adams, 09 reporter for global post and Newsweek on China and Taiwan (3/31/09, Jonathon, Global Post, "The dragon sharpens its claws," http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/chinaanditsneighbors/090331/thedragonsharpensitsclaws) Taiwan insists it's an independent state. Beijing sees it as Chinese territory that must one day end its democratic "holiday" and return to the fold. The U.S. has a commitment, albeit an ambiguous one, to help defend Taiwan's democracy against Chinese aggression. That means U.S. Marines, sailors and pilots could one day, perhaps suddenly, be sent to take on Asia's most lethal military, all for the sake of a small island which few Americans can distinguish from Thailand. U.S. diplomacy has helped keep the peace in Taiwan the Strait for 60 years. And tensions have eased in the past year with the election of a Taiwan president who is forging better relations with Beijing . Chinese and Taiwanese media reported this week that the two sides' militaries will both attend a conference in Hawaii this summer. The good news: most experts agree that conflict will probably never happen . 1AR A2: HEG > TAIWAN DRAW IN Absent US hegemony, the system of Asian military alliances maintained by US hegemony would lose its basis and instability would break out over violent Chinese annexation of Taiwan--that's Brooks. Experts agree Taiwan war will never happen Adams concludes aff and assumes the recent election of a Taiwanese who forged better ties with China No China/Taiwan war Richardson 6/16 visiting senior research fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore (Michael, Japan Times, "China ups the ante in Asia." http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi bin/eo20100616mr.html) Will China respect these U.S. interests, which are supported by Japan and many other Asian nations apprehensive at what China's rise might mean, especially without an effective counterbalance that only America can provide? China will not abandon its quest for national unity with Taiwan. But in the past two years, there has been a significant easing of tensions between the mainland and Taiwan, enabling productive negotiations between the two sides to proceed . This has taken place despite Beijing's objections to the sale of defensive U.S. weapons to Taiwan, and U.S. objections to the buildup of Chinese missiles aimed at Taiwan. With Taiwan, Beijing probably that feels time and the balance of power and influence are on its side. So China can afford to be patient, avoiding the costs of conflict while eventually getting what it wants. 2AC A2: HEG > SPACE WEAPONIZATION No warrant to why heg will "force" space weaponization--their evidence just says that the US is assuming a more powerful role in space. Their own Chomsky evidence quotes the Air force Space command saying that "No one can challenge our total domination." US Air and space power solve multiple nuclear wars and space weaponization Khalilzad and Lesser, 98 (Zalmay, Permanent United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Ian, Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Washington, "Sources of Conflict in the 21 st Century," http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR897/MR897.chap3.pdf) The first key implication derived from the analysis of trends in Asia suggests that American air and space power will continue to remain critical for conventional and unconventional deterrenc in Asia This argument is justified by the fact that several e . subregions of the continent still harbor the potential for fullscale conventional war. This potential is most conspicuously on the Korean peninsula and to a lesser degree, in South Asia, the Persian Gulf, and the South China Sea. In some of these areas such as Korea and the Persian Gulf, the United States has clear treaty obligations and therefore has preplanned the use of air power should contingencies arise. U.S. Air Force assets could also be called upon for operations in some of these other areas. In almost all these cases, US airpower would be at the forefront of an American politicomilitary response because (a) of the vast distances on the Asian continent; (b) the diverse range of operational platforms available to the U.S. Air Force, a capability unmatched by any other country or service, (c) the possible unavailability of naval assets in close proximity, particularly in the context of surprise contingencies; and (d) the heavy payload that can be carried by U.S. Air Force platforms. These platforms can exploit speed, reach, and high operating tempos to sustain continual operations until the political objectives are secured. The entire range of warfighting capability--fighters, bombers, electronic warfare (EW), suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD), combat support platforms such as AWACS and JSTARS and tankers-- are relevant in the AsiaPacific region, because many of the regional contingencies will involve large, fairly modern, conventional forces, most of which are built around large land armies, as is the case in Korea, ChinaTaiwan, IndiaPakistan and the Persian Gulf. In addition to conventional combat, the demands of unconventional deterrence will increasingly confront the U.S. Air Force in Asia. The Korean peninsula, China, and the Indian subcontinent are already arenas of WMD proliferation. While emergent nuclear capabilities continue to receive the most public attention, chemical and biological warfare threats will progressively become future problems. The delivery systems in the region are increasing in range and diversity. during the time frames examined in this report. The second key implication derived from the analysis of trends in Asia suggests that air and space China already targets the continental United States with ballistic missiles. North Korea can threaten northeast Asia with existing Scudclass theater ballistic missiles. India will acquire the capability to produce ICBMclass delivery vehicles, and both China and India will acquire longrange cruise missiles power will function as a vital rapid reaction force in a breaking crisis. Current guidance tasks the Air Force to prepare for two major regional conflicts that could break out in the Persian Gulf and on the Korean peninsula. In other areas of Asia, however, such as the Indian subcontinent, the South China Sea, Southeast Asia, and Myanmar, the United States has no treaty obligations requiring it to commit the use of its military forces. But as past experience has shown, American policymakers have regularly displayed the disconcerting habit of discovering strategic interests in parts of the world previously neglected after conflicts have already broken out. Mindful of this trend, it would behoove U.S. Air Force planners to prudently plan for regional contingencies in nontraditional areas of interest, because naval and air power will of necessity be the primary instruments constituting the American response. Such responses would be necessitated by three general classes of contingencies. The first involves the politicomilitary collapse of a key regional actor, as might occur in the case of North Korea, Myanmar, Indonesia, or Pakistan. The second involves acute political military crises that have a potential for rapid escalation, as may occur in the Taiwan Strait, the Spratlys, the Indian subcontinent, or on the Korean peninsula. The third involves cases of prolonged domestic instability that may have either spillover or contagion effects, as in China, Indonesia, Myanmar, or North Korea. Their evidence is from 04--any reasons why their evidence is true would meant that an arms race would have already erupted from Russian and Chinese nuclearization. 1AR A2: HEG > SPACE WEAPONIZATION No warrant to why heg will "force" space weaponization--their evidence just says that the US is assuming a more powerful role in space. Their own Chomsky evidence quotes the Air force Space command saying that "No one can challenge our total domination." United States maintain leadership in Space to deter conflicts and prevent other count Everett 5(Dolman, C. "Strategy Lost: Taking the Middle Road to Nowhere." High Frontier Journal. Vol. 3, No. 1 Winter, 2K5) Common to all hedging strategy proponents is the fear that placing weapons in space will spur a new arms race. Unfortunately, such a strategy increases the likelihood of a space arms race if and when space weapons are ultimately deployed, as the only plausible response by the US would be to at least match the opposing capabilities. This dithering approach blatantly ignores the current real world situation. At present, the US has no peer competitors in space. For the US to refrain from weaponizing until another state proves the capacity to challenge it allows for potential enemies to catch up to American capabilities. At a minimum, there is no risk for potential peer competitors to try. On the other hand, should the US reject the hedging strategy and unilaterally deploy weapons in space, other states may rationally decide not to compete. The cost of entry will simply be too great; the probability of failure palpable. In other words, the fear of an arms race in space, the most powerful argument in favor of the hedging plan, is most likely if the US follows its counsel. Any reasons why their impact is true would mean that an arms race would have already occurred. 2AC A2: HEG > NORTH KOREA NUKE WAR Hegemony is key to stabilize Korea and prevent regional arms races Lieber 2005 PhD from Harvard, Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown, former consultant to the State Department and for National Intelligence Estimates (Robert, "The American Era", pages 164166, WEA) On the Korean peninsula, in one of the world's most dangerous and most heavily armed regions, the American military commitment has deterred North Korea from seeking to invade the South. Paradoxically, even while they engage in their most important mutual contacts in half a century, the leaders of the two Koreas have called for the U nited tates S to remain on the peninsula. In the words of the North Korean leader, Kim Jong Il, as quoted by former South Korean President Kim Dae Jung, "We are surrounded by big powers Russia, Japan and China so the U nited tates S must continue to stay for stability and peace in East Asia ."18 At the same time, there are risks that the United States could be drawn into a major military conflict in Korea. Though Pyongyang has at times been willing to negotiate with the United States, its strategy has habitually combined bargaining, deception, and blackmail. Notably, in the case of the October 1994 Agreed Framework, the North agreed to freeze its existing nuclear facilities, and Washington undertook to assist it in obtaining two new proliferationresistant light water reactors for producing electrical power (mainly financed by South Korea and Japan) and in the interim to provide heavy fuel oil for free. However, within months of signing the agreement and some seven years before President Bush labeled the regime as part of the "axis of evil" North Korea began violating its terms by secretly constructing plants for the production of highly enriched uranium. In October 2002, the North privately admitted to U.S. diplomats the existence of this program, and in 2003 it forced the removal of outside inspectors, renounced its signature on the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty, unsealed 8,000 fuel rods and proclaimed that it would reprocess the nuclear material in them, and announced that it possessed nuclear weapons. For more than a decade, North Korea thus has seemed determined both to negotiate for major concessions from the United States and others in the form of aid and security guarantees and to continue with its nuclear weapons program.19 America faces dangerous choices in dealing with North Korea, but it does not do so in isolation. Because of shared concerns over the North's behavior and the dangers a nuclear North Korea would pose, four strong regional neighbors China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia have been inclined to cooperate with the United States in sixparty negotiations with Pyongyang. The relationships among these countries and with Washington have been complicated and often difficult, and China has sometimes been widely assumed that North Korean weapons and technology would be sold abroad and that a perilous regional nuclear arms race would erupt, with Japan and possibly South Korea going nuclear to deter Pyongyang,20 China reacting by increasing its own nuclear weapons deployment, India expanding its arsenal in response to China, Pakistan seeking to keep up with India , Iran accelerating its nuclear ambitions, and other countries such as Taiwan attempting to acquire nuclear weapons as well.21 The South Korean case also provides evidence of why countries in the region continue to favor the American presence. In December 2002, South Korea elected a new president, Roh Moohyun, representing a new generation of democratic, affluent, mid2003 unveiling of plans for realignment and rebalancing of its forces in Korea and East Asia. In February 2004, an act that symbolized its solidarity in with the United States, the South Korean government agreed to dispatch 3,000 troops to Northern , and the Iraq National Assembly approved the measure by a threetoone margin.22 A few months later, in June 2004, when Washington announced that onethird of the 37,000 American troops stationed in Korea would be withdrawn and the remainder repositioned to bases less vulnerable to a sudden North Korean attack across the demilitarized zone, the South Korean President, political leaders, and media responded with concern. Anxious about any sign of a weakened U.S. presence, the Seoul government gained Washington's agreement that the drawdown would take place gradually and would not be completed until 2008. Reactions to this change in American deployment showed how much the U.S. presence is still desired. The realignment plan provided for a smaller and less intrusive "footprint" and one more appropriate to a democratic South Korean society that had chafed at a conspicuous foreign presence and a large base in the very heart of Seoul. The changes also modernized the foundation for a sustained American regional role by shifting to more flexible force structures with emphasis on hightech weaponry and longrange precision strikes. and educated voters with little or no memory of the Korean War half a century ago. Roh came to office having pledged to deemphasize the longstanding relationship with the United States and to seek closer ties with North Korea. Anti United States demonstrations in February 2003 seemed to suggest a shift in public sentiment as well. But Roh and his supporters ultimately found themselves closing ranks with America. North Korea's intransigence and its nuclear program provided strong motivation, as did Washington's unhelpful, but all of them would face adverse security consequences from an unrestrained North Korean nuclear program. Based on past experience it is NK's military is too weak to launch a nuclear attack Sydney Morning Herald, 10 (5/29/10, "North Korean war unlikely, say analysts", http://www.lexisnexis.com) "China refuses scheming against NK with the US," read the front page banner headline. Patrick Morgan, a leading strategic analyst at the University of California, writes that the North has succeeded in looking "like Mighty Mouse" because its nuclear deterrence has not been tested by highly motivated potential attackers. "Why not? Because a collapse of the North seems at least as dangerous, and much more likely, than its use of nuclear weapons," Morgan says. The good news, however, is that the North's estimated eight nuclear missiles, of questionable functionality, are not nearly enough to embolden the North to deliberately risk outright military confrontation. "Pyongyang has never displayed intense dedication to anything except survival; it will not initiate a war to die for its principles," Morgan says. Peter Hayes, at the Nautilus Institute, recalls being in North Korea in 1998, when the country was also on a war footing. "The whole country just went berserk. It was like throwing petrol on an ant hill," he said. "Presumably [the war ritual] is a positive for the regime, or they wouldn't do it." 1AR A2: HEG > NORTH KOREA NUKE WAR A few conceded warrants in our Lieber evidence mean Hegemony acts as a backstop against NK nuclear war: 1 Deterrence by the US military 2 US stabilizing presence in East Asia Ext. Sydney Morning Herald--weakness of the North Korean military eliminates any risk of an attack. 8 nuclear weapons of questionable functionability mitigate any risk of NK military confrontation. No NK nuclear confrontation regime wants to preserve its survival Asia Monitor, 09 (7/1/09, "Rising Risk of Military Crash" http://www.lexisnexis.com) Despite its provocative actions, we continue to believe that North Korea does not seek an actual fullscale war. The regime of Kim Jong Il seeks survival, and it knows that war would ultimately lead to its defeat and probable overthrow. Thus, aside from testing the US and the South, the North's current activities reflect Kim's desire to reassert his leadership after a long period of illness, and demonstrate to the outside world and indeed domestic hardliners that there will be no change in Pyongyang's hardline policy if he dies. Regarding the succession itself, South Korea's National Intelligence Service reportedly told a group of legislators that Kim had recently chosen his youngest son, Kim Jong Un, 26, as his eventual successor. Nonetheless, given Kim Jong Un's young age, we consider it more likely that the North's National Defence Commission (NDC) would take power, at least in the interim. The NDC is the country's highest body, headed by Kim Jong Il himself, and its membership was recently expanded to 13. The rising profile of its members suggests that it would form a collective leadership, postKim Jong Il. 2AC A2: HEG> IRAQI INSTABILITY Their link is from 04--any reason why heg destabilizes Iraq should have occurred in the past 6 years. US hegemony in Iraq prevents Iraqi collapse Washington Post 7 ("IF Leave, Regional War and `Shiastan'", http://newsweek.washingtonpost.com/postglobal/leon_krauze/2007/04/keep_foot_on_or_chaos_and_shia.htm l, April 30, 2007) For a while now, there have been only two possible outcomes in Iraq: the bad and the worse. Which is the latter and how to avoid it? The worst outcome for Iraq would be a full-scale civil war that ends in the country's partition. There is little question that, once the American forces leave, the country will become a far bloodier and more lawless battleground than it is now. Once that happens, I see no reason why Moqtada al-Sadr and other Shiite strongmen would seek any kind of compromise with Sunni leaders in a pluralist government. Outright Shia domination of Iraq should never be allowed. Given the recent history of both the Middle East and Islam, secularity is a precious asset. In fact, Saddam's pragmatic view of religion was perhaps the man's only virtue. It wasn't an insignificant attribute, especially given the aggressive expansionist theocracy next door. America (and the world) should make sure that Iraq remains a diverse multicultural federation rather than become three isolated and weak enclaves. So the bad but not the worst is a state more like India than the former Yugoslavia. But is this even possible? Can this be achieved without a violent, revolutionary period? The stakes are too high to wait and find out. The consequences of an enormous "Shiastan" right in the heart of the Middle East could prove to be disastrous. Saudi Arabia, Israel and Syria would stretch out their own claws soon enough. Regional conflict would be, literally, around the corner. The only warrant in their Selden evidence is that the absence of US hegemony opens the doors to reconstruction, but US reconstruction and stabilization measures postdate and disprove their claims. GAO 08 (United States Government Accountability Office, Report to Congressional Committees: SECURING, STABILIZING, AND REBUILDING IRAQ ; Progress Report: Some Gains Made, Updated Strategy Needed" June 23, 2008). http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08837.pdf In January 2007, the President announced a new U.S. strategy to stem the high levels of violence in Iraq and help the Iraqi government foster conditions for national reconciliation. The Administration stated that the security and political conditions in Iraq were more difficult than it had anticipated earlier in the war. To improve these conditions, The New Way Forward established near term (12 to 18 months) goals that the Administration stated were achievable in this time period. In addition, the strategy reasserted the Administration's longterm goal or end state for Iraq: a unified, democratic, federal Iraq that can govern, defend, and sustain itself, and is an ally in the war on terror. In support of this new strategy, the United States increased its military presence and financial commitments for operations in Iraq . U.S. troops and civilian personnel have performed courageously under dangerous and difficult circumstances. In April 2008, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq and the Commanding General of the Multinational ForceIraq (MNFI) testified before congressional committees on conditions in Iraq. They stated that significant progress had been made toward achieving U.S. goals but that progress was fragile and reversible. From fiscal year 2001 through December 2007, Congress has provided about $635.9 billion to the Department of Defense (DOD) for the Global War on Terrorism. The majority of this amount has been for military operations in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, including the cost of equipping, maintaining, and supporting our deployed forces. Moreover , since fiscal year 2003, about $45 billion was provided to DOD and several other U.S. agencies for stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Iraq, including developing Iraq's security forces, enhancing Iraq's capacity to govern, and rebuilding Iraq's oil, electricity, and water sectors, among others. 2AC A2: HEG> IRAQI INSTABILITY Alt causes mean violence in Iraq is inevitable--qualified experts agree. Middle East Quarterly. "How Violent Is Iraqi Culture?" Winter 2008. http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/iraq/war_in_iraq.htm Nimrod Raphaeli responds: Mr. Damluji suggests that the intent of my article is "to demonstrate that Iraqis are essentially more violent than other cultures." To the contrary, my intent was to highlight the efforts by Iraqis to revive their cultural life after decades of oppression and political violence. By highlighting poetry, theater, and art, the article takes an optimistic view of post-Saddam cultural achievements. What the article is not, though, is a comparative study of cultures; it does not examine the extent to which violence in Iraq may or may not exceed that of other cultures. As to the question whether the Iraqi culture is rooted in violence, the answer, unfortunately, is yes. Saddam's rein of terror has historic precedent. Generations of Iraqi students memorized the speech of the seventh-century governor of Iraq celebrating the idea of problem-solving through violence. An article by Shafeeq Ghabra, on "Iraq's Culture of Violence" (MEQ, Summer 2001), also makes the point that "the phenomenon of Saddam is planted deep in Iraqi social and political soil, a thesis supported by much evidence. "[1] My article quotes Iraqi historian and sociologist `Ali al-Wardi to the effect that Bedouin culture formed the bedrock of Iraqi society. `Ali Allawi, the first civilian minister of defense of Iraq in the post-Saddam era, wrote that a "sense of a conflict-strewn society, permeates the work of al-Wardi: tribe versus tribe; tribe versus government; intra-urban violence between neighbourhoods; tribe versus town; town versus town; town versus government." [2] Writing in the pan-Arab daily Asharq al-Awsat, Ma'ad Fayadh referred to the seat of power of the kings and the leaders of Iraq as "the seat of death."[3] I don't know under what circumstances Mr. Damluji left Iraq. Like that of many of my community with roots dating back to the pre-Islamic era, my citizenship was taken from me: I was handed a piece of paper stating, "His citizenship has been revoked, and he will absolutely not be allowed to enter Iraq." I was expelled from Iraq. Now, I can only look back with nostalgia as I read Mahdi Muhammed Ali's poem "The Flight": No impact--reject their Corsi evidence 1Unqualified--Corsi is a right wing hack with no credibility in mainstream public discourse 2 He's white supremacist biased against the Middle East--he called Islam "a worthless, dangerous Satanic religion" 3 Their evidence says that China attacking Taiwan--NOT Iraqi instability--would lead to WWIII 1AR A2: HEG > IRAQI INSTABILITY Ext. Washington Post-- US hegemony in Iraq prevents Iraqi collapse because it stabilizes East Asia and prevents regional wars from escalating. Alt cause to instability and violence: corruption in the Iraqi oil industry. Bilal A. Wahab, Fulbright fellow from Iraqi Kurdistan enrolled at American University. "How Iraqi Oil Smuggling Greases Violence." Fall 2006 http://www.meforum.org/1020/how-iraqi-oil-smuggling-greasesviolence Oil is the lifeblood of Iraq. As Iraqis work to emerge from years of war and sanctions, oil exports are the government's greatest source of revenue. Since 2003, the new Iraqi government has exported US$33 billion in oil.[1] But rather than just fund reconstruction, oil has become a primary commodity on the black market and a central component of the web of corruption, terror, and criminality in Iraq. Oil smuggling has led to a convergence of crime and terrorism that increasingly destabilizes the country. US leadership in Iraq is key to stop international terrorism Gardiner 08 (Nile, Ph.D. Director of the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at the Heritage Foundation .Anthony Benedetto, March 18, 2008) The U.S. and its allies must still make a longterm military commitment to defeating the alQaeda threat in Iraq Talk in Washington of a largescale withdrawal of U.S. forces from the country after the end of the Bush Administration . sends the wrong signal at a time of continuing uncertainty and will only serve to embolden the enemies of the West. An early withdrawal would not only hand a huge propaganda victory to alQaeda, giving it tremendous momentum and reversing the progress of the past year, but also open the door to mass ethnic cleansing that would claim hundreds of thousands of lives. The world needs stronger U.S. leadership and is a far more dangerous place without it. As the only superpower, America might not always be loved, but it is respected and feared by its enemies. The United States still possesses the strength and the will to fight, even in the most difficult of circumstances. The dramatic turnaround in Iraq is a warning signal to the enemies of the free world. From Tehran to Damascus to Pyongyang, rogue regimes and state sponsors of terrorism are taking note of a renewed American determination to stand and fight. 2AC A2: HEG > IRAN WAR No chance of USIran War--diplomacy. LA Times 1/16 (Los Angeles Times, "Iran: USIranian Relations Seen Through The Prism of High School Textbooks" http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/babylonbeyond/2010/01/iranamericaniranianrelationsseenthroughtheprismofhighschooltextbooks.html) The Obama administration and the West have vowed to use diplomacy to untangle decades of mistrust and resolve longstanding differences with Iran, especially over its nuclear program. The U.S. State Department and other government agencies have pledged to hire more Persian speakers and learn more about the Islamic Republic. But Marandi, an IranianAmerican who has emerged in Iran's postelection unrest as an eloquent spokesman for the government position on Iran's domestic political troubles as well as Iran's nuclear program, suggested that Americans also need to brush up on their understanding of the Islamic Republic. US hegemony stabilizes Iran and checks back Iranian proliferation Brookes 2008 (Peter, Senior Fellow for National Security Affairs at the Heritage Foundation and a member of the congressional US-China Economic and The United States military has also been a central player in the attempts to halt weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile proliferation. In 2003, President Bush created the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), an initiative to counter the spread of WMD and their delivery systems throughout the world The U.S. military's capabilities help put teeth in the PSI a voluntary, multilateral . , organization of 90plus nations which uses national laws and joint military operations to fight proliferation. While exports to Iran's missile program and heavy water related equipment to Tehran's nuclear program, which many believe is actually a nuclear weapons program. In the same vein, the United States is also developing the world's most prodigiousever ballistic missile defense system to protect the American homeland, its deployed troops, allies, and friends including Europe. While missile defense has its crit ics, it may , provide the best answer to the spread of ballistic missiles and the unconventional payloads, including the WMD, they may carry. Unfortunately, the missile and WMD proliferation trend is not positive. For instance, 10 years ago, there were only six nuclear weapons states. Today there are nine members of the onceexclusive nuclear weapons club, with Iran perhaps knocking at the door. Twentyfive years ago, nine countries had ballistic missiles. Today, there are 28 countries with ballistic missile arsenals of varying degrees. This defensive system will not only provide many of the PSI's efforts aren't made public due to the potential for revealing sensitive intelligence sources and methods, some operations do make their way to the media. For instance, according to the U.S. State Department, the PSI stopped Security ReviewCommission, Why the World Still Needs America's Military Might, Heritage Lecture #1102, November 24 th, 2008) http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/hl1102.cfm deterrence to the use of these weapons, but also provide policymakers with a greater range of options in preventing or responding to such attacks, whether from a state or nonstate actor Perhaps General Trey . proliferation of these missiles in the past is that there has historically been no defense against them ." Obering, the Director of the Missile Defense Agency, said it best when describing the value of missile defense in countering the growing threat of WMD and delivery system proliferation: "I believe that one of the reasons we've seen the Their Hirsh evidence is a link turn not a neg impact--it indicates that US hegemony and nuclear weapons doctrine would be perceived as "potentially saving both American and Iranian lives"--hegemony would be perceived as benign and incentivize cooperation. Their own evidence indicates that the international sphere blurs the line separating more destructive weapons and all other weapons--past deployment of weaker weapons should have triggered their perception links. 2AC A2: HEG > PROLIF American military power allows it to coerce other nations this can solve proliferation Bradley A. Thayer (Associate Professor in the Dept. of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University) 2007 "American Empire: A Debate" p 16 Second, American interests abroad are protected. U.S. military power allows Washington to defeat its enemies overseas. For example, the United States has made the decision to attack terrorists far from America's shores, and not to wait while they use bases in other countries to plan and train for attacks against the United States itself. Its military power also gives Washington the power to protect its interests abroad by deterring attacks against America's interests or coercing potential or actual opponents. In international politics, coercion means dissuading an opponent from actions America does not want it to do or to do something that it wants done. For example, the United States wanted Libya to give up the weapons of mass destruction capabilities it possessed or was developing. As Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz said, "I think the reason Mu'ammar Qadhafi agreed to give up his weapons of mass destruction was because he saw what happened to Saddam Hussein " Heg collapse causes wildfire proliferation Stephen Peter Rosen (PhD from Harvard University in 1979 and is currently the Beton Michael Kaneb Professor of National Security and Military Affairs in the Department of Government, Harvard University) Spring 2003 "An Empire, If you Can Keep It," The National Interest, , LN Academic, UK: Fisher Rather than wrestle with such difficult and unpleasant problems, the United States could give up the imperial mission, or pretensions to it, now. This would essentially mean the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the Middle East, Europe and mainland Asia . It may be that all other peoples, without significant exception, will then turn to their own affairs and leave the United States alone. But those who are hostile to us might remain hostile, and be much less afraid of the United States after such a withdrawal. Current friends would feel less secure and, in the most probable postimperial world, would revert to the logic of self-help in which all states do what they must to protect themselves. This would imply the relatively rapid acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Iran, Iraq and perhaps Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Indonesia and others. Constraints on the acquisition of biological weapons would be even weaker than they are today. Major regional arms races would also be very likely throughout Asia and the Middle East. This would not be a pleasant world for Americans, or anyone else. It is difficult to guess what the costs of such a world would be to the United States. They would probably not put the end of the United States in prospect, but they would not be small. If the logic of American empire is unappealing, it is not at all clear that the alternatives are that much more attractive. A2: HEG DESTROYS US RUSSIA RELATIONS Their ev is terrible it's a rant from the Russian President on PressTV. It cites Medvedev ranting about the global financial crisis which is completely unrelated to US primacy The rivalry between the US and Russia is over Welch and Shevchenko, 10 *Professor of Political Science at UCLA and **Assistant Professor of Political Science at California State University, Fullerton (*Deborah and **Alexei, "Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to U.S. Primacy", International Security, Vol. 34, No. 4, Spring 2010, June 29th 2010, p. 27) PDF In addition to accepting U.S. bases in Central Asia, Putin made several unilateral concessions indicating that the geopolitical rivalry between the United States and Russia was over,142 evidence that he was following a social creativity strategy. He withdrew from a large Russian electronic intelligence gathering and military base in Cuba and a naval base in Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam. Putin reacted mildly to the U.S. withdrawal from the Antiballistic Missile treaty--one of the few remaining symbols of Russian equality --calling it a "mistake" because it would hurt arms control, not because it would damage Russian security. Putin adopted a softer position toward admission of the Baltic states to NATO. He accepted the creation of the NATORussia Council as a vehicle for cooperation, although it did not give Russia a vote. Finally, he accepted a strategic arms reduction treaty that allowed the United States to store dismantled warheads.143 2AC A2: HEG> DISEASE Perception of US hegemony as benign disincentivizes counterbalancing, pacifies potential rivals, and sustains US dominance. Ickenberry 02 (John, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, "America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power" 2002, pg 251) This argument starts from realist assumptions, but then moves from the system level to the unit level of analysis. Distinctive features of American foreign policy have prevented a counterbalancing response so far. Michael Mastanduno, for example, has argued that the Bush and Clinton administrations have in fact pursued a grand strategy of preserving U.S. primacy in the world system. John Ickenberry claims that U.S. hegemony is characterized by reluctance, openness, and a high degree of institutionalization. Benign hegemony results from the openness of the U.S. political system and from the American efforts of basing its hegemony on a dense set of multilateral institutions. Both characteristics of this particular hegemony give lesser powers ample opportunities to voice their concerns and to influence U.S. policies. As a result, the United States has managed to keep potential rivals happy in the postCold War era, and there is little reason to assume that this will change in the near future. At the same time, benign hegemony guarantees U.S. dominance in the international system and makes sure that a possible transition to a multipolar world might actually be managed rather smoothly. This argument ultimately rests on liberal and institutionalist assumptions about international order and leaves realism further behind. In a realist world, benign hegemony depends on the willingness of the hegemonic power to play by its own rules, which begs the question why the lesser powers should trust it. Ickenberry's propositions only make sense if the norms of multilateral institutions exert enough independent causal influence on state behavior to guarantee that smaller states in the system are happy with U.S. power. That is rather close to an emphasis on security communities. Ext. Thayer--Heg solves the root cause of disease spread: 1--Diseases spread during times of war--US primacy checks war from erupting in global hotspots 2--Heg ensures stability--eliminates motives for bioweapon launch 3--US primacy ensures success of the global economy--substantially decreases poverty and ensures that other countries will have the resources to finance an effective healthcare system. They're in a double bind: Either a) their impact is true and other countries will fight diseases regardless of who the hegemon is or b) there is no risk of their impact Large scale spread is impossible Newhouse 2, CDI Senior Fellow senior fellow at the Center for Defense Information. Former senior policy advisor on European Affairs to secretary of state. Former director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. (John, World Policy Journal 7/31 V.XIX; N.2 p. 21) Temperature, sunlight, wind, and moisture can all prevent effective delivery of chemical weapons. Biological pathogens are living organisms and more thus fragile than chemical agents. Chlorine in water the supply can kill them Munitions . can as easily vaporize an agent as dispense one. If released from a bomb or warhead, explosive effects would destroy all but 12 percent of the agent. 31 1AR A2: HEG > DISEASE Ext. Thayer--No chance of disease spread in a world of Hegemony: 1--Diseases spread more likely during wartime--US primacy checks war from erupting in global hotspots 2--Heg ensures stability--eliminates motives for bioweapon launch 3--Ensures global economic stability--substantially decreases poverty and ensures that other countries will have the resources to finance an effective healthcare system. Their argument is illogical: Any risk of their impact being true means other countries will fight diseases regardless of who the hegemon is Prevention measures check dispersal Space.com 1 (10/30, Survival of the Elitist: Bioterrorism May Spur Space Colonies, http://www.space.com/scienceastronomy/generalscience/colonize_now_0110302.html, AG) Croddy is an expert on chemical and biological weapons at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. Croddy said the threat of a virus wiping out the entire human species is simply not real. Even the most horrific virus outbreak in history, the 1918 Spanish Flu epidemic that killed between 20 million and 40 million people, including hundreds of thousands in the United States, eventually stopped Experts say new strains of the influenza virus emerge every few decades and catch the . human immune system unprepared, but prevention measures and everevolving medical treatments overcome the outbreaks "I'd . be much more concerned about an asteroid hitting the planet," Croddy said. Many scientists argue that there is no need to worry about the mortality of civilization right now. Eric A2: HEG NOT KEY TO MIDDLE EAST Diminished influence increases the risk of war between China and Taiwan, Russia and Georgia, India and Pakistan, Iran and Israel, as well as Mid East and Asian instability Kagan, 07 Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund (Robert, "End of Dreams, Return of History," Hoover Institution, No. 144, August/September, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy review/article/6136) The current order, of course, is not only far from perfect but also offers no guarantee against major conflict among the world 's great powers. Even under the umbrella of unipolarity, regional conflicts involving the large powers may erupt. War could erupt between China and Taiwan and draw in both the U nited tates and Japan. S War could erupt between Russia and Georgia , forcing the United States and its European allies to decide whether to intervene or suffer the consequences of a Russian victory. Conflict between India and Pakistan remains possible, as does conflict between Iran and Israel or other Middle Eastern states. These, too, could draw in other great powers, including the United States. Such conflicts may be unavoidable no matter what policies the United States pursues. But they are more likely to erupt if the U nited tates weakens or S withdraws from its positions of regional dominance . This is especially true in East Asia, where most nations agree that a reliable American power has a stabilizing and pacific effect on the region. That is certainly the view of most of China 's neighbors. But even China, which seeks gradually to supplant the United States as the dominant power in the region, faces the dilemma that an American withdrawal could unleash an ambitious, independent, nationalist Japan. Heg collapse destroys US influence over the ArabIsraeli conflict Richard Haas (president of the Council on Foreign Relations, former director of policy planning for the Department of State, former vice president and director of foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution, the Sol M. Linowitz visiting professor of international studies at Hamilton College, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a lecturer in public policy at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, and a research associate at the International Institute for Strategic Studies) April 2008 "Ask the Expert: What Comes After Unipolarity?" http://www.cfr.org/publication/16063/ask_the_expert.html How will the IsraeliArab conflict be affected by a shift from a unipolar world? What could be the main differences (in that particular issue) between a multipolar and prior bipolar scene (roughly US vs. USSR)? Enrique Fleischmann, Barcelona Richard Haass: In a nonpolar world, the ability of the U nited tates S to shape the greater Middle East will be reduced. Other entities, including local states (Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iraq, Syria), militias, terrorist groups, political parties and movements, sovereign wealth funds, etc., will all have influence of their own and reduce what it is the United States or any outside power can accomplish. That said, the United States will retain considerable influence in the region, although less than it has enjoyed in recent decades. A2: MULTIPOLARITY SOLVES PEACE Multipolarity alone is not enough for peace primacy key to shaping that world Haas 99 Vice President, Director of Foreign Policy Studies, and Sydney Stein, Jr., CHair in International Security at the Brookings Institution (Richard N., "What to Do with American Primacy," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 5 (Sep.Oct., 1999), pp.3749 Meanwhile, the world is becoming more multipolar. American foreign policy should not resist such multipolarity (which would be futile) but define it. Like unipolarity, multipolarity is simply a description. It tells us about the distribution of power in the world, not about the character or quality of international relations. A multipolar world could be one in which several hostile but roughly equal states confront one another, or one in which a number of states, each possessing significant power, work together in common. The U.S. objective should be to persuade other centers of political, economic, and military powe,? including but not limited to nationstates, to believe it is in their selfinterest to support constructive notions of how international society should be organized and should operate. The proper goal for American foreign policy, then, is to encourage a multipolarity characterized by cooperation and concert rather than competition and conflict. In such a world, order would not be limited to peace based on a balance of power or a fear of escalation, but would be founded in a broader agreement on global purposes and problems. In his insightful first book, A World Restored, Henry A. Kissinger argues that the competitive multipolar world of nineteenthcentury Europe managed to avoid greatpower war because the great powers forged a consensus on certain core issues of international relations . American leaders must seek to build such an international consensus for the 21st century. U.S. primacy key to the transition quick collapse doesn't access their multipolarity good arguments Haas 99 Vice President, Director of Foreign Policy Studies, and Sydney Stein, Jr., CHair in International Security at the Brookings Institution (Richard N., "What to Do with American Primacy," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 5 (Sep.Oct., 1999), pp.3749 The world described here will not come about solely from its inherent appeal. To the contrary, building and maintaining such an order requires sustained effort by the world's most powerful actor, the United States . Its ultimate success, in turn, demands that Americans properly handle their country's role as sole superpower of the world. American foreign policy must project an imperial dimension, although not in the sense of territorial control or commercial exploitation; such relationships are neither desirable nor sustainable today. Rather, the United States must attempt to organize the world along certain principles affecting both relations between states and conditions within them. The U.S. role should resemble that of nineteenthcentury Great Britain, the global leader of that era. U.S. influence would reflect the appeal of American culture, the strength of the American economy, and the attractiveness of the norms being promoted. Coercion and the use of force would normally be a secondary option. The United States seeks a world based on peaceful relations, nonproliferation, respect for human rights, and economic openness. It must therefore convince other great powers to join with it to promote these ends , thereby constructing a stronger and more durable order that protects the bulk of U.S. interests and reduces the foreign policy burden, in financial and human terms alike, on the United States. MILITARY POWER > TECHNOLOGY U.S. military power incentivizes technology Brookes 8 Senior Fellow for National Security Affairs at The Heritage Foundation, member of the congressional U.S.China Economic and Security Review Commission (Peter, "Why the World Still Needs America's Military Might," http://www.heritage.org/Research/Lecture/WhytheWorldStill NeedsAmericasMilitaryMight, 11/24/08) Lastly, U.S. military research has supported the development of new technologies which often find their way to benefit the civilian sectortechnolo gies which directly and indirectly support stability. These innovations include information technology, such as the creation of the Internet, communica tions, aviation, space systems, medicine, nuclear and alternative fuels, and even clean water technol ogya critical need in the developing world today. ***HEG BAD*** **SUSTAINABILITY** SUSTAINABILITY AT: BEST MILITARY/MILITARY ARGUMENTS/DEFENSE SPENDING Our military is deteriorating and their authors don't assume future threats Krepinevich, 09 Professor of International Relations and History at Boston University, Ph.D. from Harvard University and President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (Andrew F., "The Pentagon's wasting assets: the eroding foundations of American power", Foreign Affairs, July 1st 2009, http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_028638273632_ITM, KONTOPOULOS) THE MILITARY foundations of the United States' global dominance are eroding. For the past several decades, an overwhelming advantage in technology and resources has given the U.S. military an unmatched ability to project power worldwide. This has allowed it to guarantee U.S. access to the global commons, assure the safety of the homeland, and underwrite security commitments around the globe. U.S. grand strategy assumes that such advantages will continue indefinitely. In fact, they are already starting to disappear. Several events in recent years have demonstrated that traditional means and methods of projecting power and accessing the global commons are growing increasingly obsolete becoming "wasting assets," in the language of defense strategists. The diffusion of advanced military technologies, combined with the continued rise of new powers, such as China, and hostile states, such as Iran, will make it progressively more expensive in blood and treasureperhaps prohibitively expensivefor U.S. forces to carry out their missions in areas of vital interest, including East Asia and the Persian Gulf. Military forces that do deploy successfully will find it increasingly difficult to defend what they have been sent to protect. Meanwhile, the U.S. military's longunfettered access to the global commonsincluding space and cyberspaceis being increasingly challenged . Recently, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates argued in these pages for a more "balanced" U.S. military, one that is better suited for the types of irregular conflicts now being waged in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, he also cautioned, "It would be irresponsible not to think about and prepare for the future." Despite this admonition, U.S. policymakers are discounting real future threats, thereby increasing the prospect of strategic surprises. What is needed is nothing short of a fundamental strategic review of the United States' position in the worldone similar in depth and scope to those undertaken in the early days of the Cold War. SUSTAINABILITY AT: BEST MILITARY/MILITARY ARGUMENTS/DEFENSE SPENDING It will be shortlived competitors are on our tails Baxter, 09 Contributor to the Sunday Times(Sarah, "Pentagon warns US arms may be obsolete", The Sunday Times, July 5th 2009, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/article6638694.ece, KONTOPOULOS) ***Citing Andrew Krepinevich Professor of International Relations and History at Boston University, Ph.D. from Harvard University and President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments America's traditional means of projecting power abroad is growing "increasingly obsolete" and its billiondollar military hardware could be as ineffectual against future threats as the heavily fortified Maginot line was in defending France against the Nazis, a senior Pentagon adviser has warned. In a wakeup call to US military chiefs, Andrew Krepinevich, a leading architect of the counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan, argues that the Pentagon is illequipped to counter rising powers such as China, hostile states such as Iran, the threat from irregular forces such as Hezbollah, and terrorists such as Al Qaeda. It is also wasting billions on weaponry that could be outdated before it rolls off the production line . In an interview, Krepinevich said the military, like many bureaucracies, was in danger of "drinking its own bathwater" and discounting new challenges, including the proliferation of precisionguided weapons and threats from space and cyberspace . Last week Robert Gates, the defence secretary, rewarded him for his prescience with a seat on the influential defence policy board at the Pentagon. Aircraft carriers, navy destroyers, shortrange fighter aircraft and forward bases such as Guam and Okinawa in the Pacific Ocean are becoming increasingly vulnerable to technology and tactics being developed by America's rivals, Krepinevich argues in the July issue of Foreign Affairs journal. Even new areas of supremacy, such as US dominance of global positioning satellites that guide "smart" bombs to their targets, are becoming a "wasting asset" as states such as China develop the space technology to destroy them. China already has the ballistic missiles and laser technology to destroy loworbit satellites on which the military depends. Krepinevich claims America should devote more resources to cuttingedge nanosatellites to maintain its technological lead and should invest in missile interceptors and laser energy defences that could counter the threat from adversaries deploying their own "smart" weapons. " Britain came out of the first world war with all the world's aircraft carriers but fell behind between the wars ," said Krepinevich. "Being the leader doesn't necessarily help you over time." His essay, The Pentagon's Wasting Assets, has become essential reading for military and defence officials. It reflects a debate in Britain in which Lord Guthrie, former chief of the defence staff, has criticised plans for the Royal Navy to spend 5 billion on two new aircraft carriers. "How good are aircraft carriers at chasing Somali pirates in the Gulf of Aden?" Guthrie has asked. The Pentagon is preparing its defence review, which is presented to Congress every four years. Along with retired LieutenantGeneral Paul Van Riper, Krepinevich has just been appointed to a "red team" of defence advisers with responsibility for thinking like the enemy and spotting weaknesses in the quadrennial defence review. In his essay he draws attention to the astonishing success in 2002 of a "red team" of wargamers, led by Van Riper, representing an unnamed Gulf power -- in reality, Iran. A surprise attack was launched on the US fleet by swarms of Iranian suicide vessels and antiship cruise missiles. More than half of the US ships were sunk or disabled in "the worst naval disaster since Pearl Harbor". Van Riper turned off his antiradar defences and kept his missile launchers moving, thwarting US attempts to track and destroy them, and rendering US ground forces that landed in Iran vulnerable to attack. In wars of the future, "smart" rockets and missiles will be readily available to non state forces such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza, let alone traditional powers such as Russia and China, which already have the technology and the ability to sell it on. Despite this, the Pentagon is spending billions on shortrange strike aircraft that need to operate from forward land bases or aircraft carriers vulnerable to missiles, submarines and drones. In 2006, China sneaked one of its submarines into the middle of a US carrier group -- to the mortification of the US navy. The marines, Krepinevich notes, are developing an amphibious expeditionary fighting vehicle (EVF) that can navigate ashore and fight on land. Not only is it at great risk from roadside bombs, but "the fleet that would launch these is being forced to operate ever further from the shore, far Iraq and Bagram in Afghanistan, which provide a sanctuary for US land forces, could also be vulnerable, Krepinevich warns, citing the example of the recent war in Lebanon as the "harbinger" of the future. Hezbollah's nonstop rocket attacks forced the evacuation of 300,000 Israelis. beyond the distance for which the EVF was designed". It should be cancelled, he advises. Traditionally safe rear bases such as Camp Victory in Generals of the army go neg USA Today, 07 ("Gen. Pace: Military capability eroding", USA Today, February 27th2007, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/20070227pacemilitary_x.htm, KONTOPOULOS) ***Citing General Peter Pace Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strained by the demands of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is a significant risk that the U.S. military won't be able to quickly and fully respond to yet another crisis, according to a new report to Congress. The assessment, done by the nation's top military officer, Gen. Peter Pace, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, represents a worsening from a year ago, when that risk was rated as moderate. The report is classified, but on Monday senior defense officials, speaking on condition on anonymity, confirmed the decline in overall military readiness. And a report that accompanied Pace's review concluded that while the Pentagon is working to improve its warfighting abilities, it "may take several years to reduce risk to acceptable levels." Pace's report comes as the U.S. is increasing its forces in Iraq to quell escalating violence in Baghdad. And top military officials have consistently acknowledged that the repeated and lengthy deployments are straining the Army, Marine Corps and reserve forces and taking a heavy toll on critical warfighting equipment . The review grades the military's ability to meet the demands of the nation's military strategy -- which would include fighting the wars as well as being able to respond to any potential outbreaks in places such as North Korea, Iran, Lebanon, Cuba or China. SUSTAINABILTIY AT: BEST AIR FORCE Air force deteriorating Grant, 09 Contributor to DOD Buzz (Greg, "U.S. Air Dominance Eroding", DOD Buzz, September 15th, 2009 http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/09/15/usairdominanceeroding/, KONTOPOULOS) ***Citing Lt. General David Detula of the Air Force The U.S. military's historic dominance of the skies, unchallenged since around spring 1943, is increasingly at risk because of the proliferation of advanced technologies and a buildup of potential adversary arsenals, according to Air Force Lt. Gen. David Deptula, the service's chief for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. Speaking today at the Air Force's annual convention in the Washington area today, he provided a wide ranging assessment of what the QDR team is calling "highend, asymmetric threats." Emphasizing the increasing capabilities of "antiaccess weapons," such as long range precision missiles , Deptula said pilots in future wars will not operate in the "permissive" threat environments of current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Deptula, best known for crafting the Desert Storm air campaign, said potential opponents have learned from U.S. operations and will use precision arsenals to stop a buildup of U.S. airpower near their borders before a war even begins. Without functioning ground bases, aircraft cannot operate ; the Air Force is investing heavily in shorter ranged tactical aircraft, such as the F22 and F35, along with a host of older F15 and F16. Overseas bases from which these aircraft operate are now threatened by increasingly accurate ballistic missiles in Chinese, Russian, Iranian and North Korean arsenals, Deptula said. The newest models are road mobile and exceedingly difficult to locate. Enemies will use cyber attacks to target U.S. command and control networks and satellite relays, the smooth functioning of which the military is now completely dependant. "Space is no longer a sanctuary and our satellites are at risk... for five decades the U.S. has led the world in space," he said, now, "the space domain is perhaps the most likely arena for threats to achieve leveraged effects," against U.S. operations. The Chinese are developing antisatellite weapons, as are the Russians, and the number of countries that can launch sensorloaded satellites into space is increasing. Because of improvements in over the horizon and passive radars, U.S. aircraft will be detected long before they reach their targets. "The area that we operate in free from detection is rapidly shrinking ," Deptula said, "our adversaries are going to have capabilities that we've never operated against." The newest generation surfacetoair missiles, such as the Russian SA21, have ranges exceeding 300 miles and the ability to target low flying aircraft, and will likely be exported. Speaking to the more traditional realm of airtoair combat, so dear to his audience's heart, Deptula contends that the U.S. technological edge there is eroding. While "fourth generation" fighters are no match for the most advanced U.S. fighters, Deptula reminded the audience of the Russian export success with the MIG21, some 12,000 of which were built, and operated by over 50 countries. Russia and China are both developing "fifth generation" fighters that will be widely exported at prices that will undercut the F35 price tag . Both nations will thus acquire "near F22 performance... while attempting to proliferate the [aircraft] to perhaps near F35 like quantities," he said. "We may be facing a fighter threat capability in quantities we've never experienced before." Its not just in the technology realm that America's enemies are seeking advantage. Unable to counter the U.S. dominance in longrange strike, enemies in wars among the people use information operations to influence perceptions about civilian casualties and deny the U.S. ability to leverage its asymmetric advantages. Deptula said media savvy opponents who skillfully manipulate global public perception are an example of successful "Effects Based Operations," a doctrinal term that has recently fallen into disfavor, except among air power advocates. SUSTAINABILITY AT: BEST NAVY Navies are obsolete cruise missiles and submarines will take out the fleet Burleson, 07 Columnist for Sea Classics Magazine (Mike, "An AllSubmarine Navy", June 19th 2007, Sea Classics Magazine, http://www.opinioneditorials.com/guestcontributors/mburleson_20070619.html, KONTOPOULOS) Last week, the third in a new class of underwater battleships, the USS MICHIGAN, joined the fleet after a $1 billion face lift. The 4 converted subs of the OHIO class, former Trident missile ships, are the undersea equivalent of the reborn IOWA class from the 1980's. Armed with over 150 Tomahawk cruise missiles, plus the ability to carry special forces and unmanned vehicles, they give the Navy an incredible ability to strike decisively from the sea. I am of the opinion tha t in fullscale shooting war at sea, the US surface navy will be devastated in the first day., by the combination of cruise missiles and stealthy submarines. The survivors would all be forced into port, unable to participate in the counterattack, which would likely be initiated by our own deadly nuclear attack submarines . What this means is, our current force of colossal and pricey warships including aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, and amphibious ships are obsolete in today's precision, push button warfare. They are also tremendously expensive to build and operate, with only the richest of earth's superpowers able to afford them in ever declining numbers. If this wasn't reason enough for maritime nations to reevaluate their shipbuilding priorities, there are few if any jobs the surface fleet can do which the submarine cannot . I'll elaborate: Command of the Sea Submariners say there are only 2 types of ships: submarines and targets. There's valid reasons for this. Since World War 2 antisubmarine defenses have failed to match the attack boat's advancements in speed, stealth, and weaponry. For instance, since 1945 the average speed of destroyers have remained at 30 knots, with only nuclear vessels able to maintain this rate for any period. In contrast, the velocity of nuclear attack submarines, beginning with the launch of USS NAUTILUS in 1954, has tripled and quadrupled from around 10 knots submerged to 30-40 knots. Also, an antisubmarine vessel must get within a few miles of an enemy sub to fire its rockets or torpedoes. Its only long-range defense, the helicopter, is slow and must linger in a vulnerable hover while its sonar buoys seek out their prey. Some Russian-built boats come equipped with anti-aircraft missiles which makes this standard ASW tactic suicidal. In contrast, a modern submarine can launch its missiles from 75 miles away and farther. Should it choose to close the distance, as occurred when a Chinese SONG class stalked the USS KITTY HAWK last year, to fire its ship killing torpedoes, it can do so at speeds as fast as and sometimes surpassing surface warships. Whether attacking with cruise missiles or wake-homing torpedoes the attack boat remains submerged; the preeminent stealth vessel. The sub has likely held this dominate position on the high seas, since the dawn of the first nuke ships beginning in the 1950's. The only lacking factor has been a full-scale naval war to prove it. The single example is the sinking of the Argentine cruiser BELGRANO 25 years ago by the British submarine HMS CONQUEROR in the Falklands Conflict. Afterward, the Argentine Navy fled to port and remained there! Commerce Raiding/Protection: This traditional role of the submarine is one which it excelled in the last century. The difference today is, neither America nor Britain has the capability to mass produce the thousands of antisubmarine escorts which just barely defeated Germany's Uboats in 2 world wars, even if it would matter. In the next war at sea, the submarine would bring all commerce to a halt, making a mockery of the globalized free market system. The only counter to this menace is perhaps a combination of aircraft and submarine escorts, with the latter acting as the destroyer, shepherding its convoy through the "shark" ridden waters. SUSTAINABILITY AT: SOFT POWER Soft power is irrelevant to hegemony Kagan, 06 PhD from American University, Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment For International Peace and Adjunct Professor of History at Georgetown University (Robert, "Still the Colossus", The Washington Post, January 15th 2006, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=17894&prog=zgp&proj=zusr, KONTOPOULOS) The striking thing about the present international situation is the degree to which America remains what Bill Clinton once called "the indispensable nation." Despite global opinion polls registering broad hostility to George W. Bush's United States, the behavior of governments and political leaders suggests America's position in the world is not all that different from what it was before Sept. 11 and the Iraq war. The muchanticipated global effort to balance against American hegemony which the realists have been anticipating for more than 15 years now has simply not occurred. On the contrary, in Europe the idea has all but vanished. European Union defense budgets continue their steady decline, and even the project of creating a common foreign and defense policy has slowed if not stalled. Both trends are primarily the result of internal European politics. But if they really feared American power, Europeans would be taking more urgent steps to strengthen the European Union's hand to check it. Nor are Europeans refusing to cooperate , even with an administration they allegedly despise. Western Europe will not be a strategic partner as it was during the Cold War, because Western Europeans no longer feel threatened and therefore do not seek American protection. Nevertheless, the current trend is toward closer cooperation. Germany's new government, while still dissenting from U.S. policy in Iraq, is working hard and ostentatiously to improve relations. It is bending over backward to show support for the mission in Afghanistan, most notably by continuing to supply a small but, in German terms, meaningful number of troops. It even trumpets its willingness to train Iraqi soldiers. Chancellor Angela Merkel promises to work closely with Washington on the question of the China arms embargo, indicating agreement with the American view that China is a potential strategic concern. For Eastern and Central Europe, the growing threat is Russia, not America, and the big question remains what it was in the 1990s: Who will be invited to join NATO? SUSTAINABILITY AT: ECONOMIC POWER Trends go our way even if we are the leader in the short term, our economic power will wane in the long term Thompson, 08 Chief Operating Officer of the Lexington Institute (Loren, "America's economic decline", Armed Forces Journal, 2008, http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2009/03/3922551/, KONTOPOULOS) In other words, America's economy is in decline. The problem isn't just a severe cyclical downturn caused by excesses in the housing market. The economy is undergoing a more profound, secular erosion that has resulted in it giving up a little more of its share of global output every year in this decade, in much the same way that General Motors and Ford have gradually yielded share in the domestic automobile market. When the current decade began, America generated nearly a third of world output. By the time it ends, America will claim barely a quarter. Optimists such as Fareed Zakaria describe this trend as "the rise of the rest," but it might just as easily be called the decline of the West, especially America. The negative economic news has not yet had much impact on the thinking of military analysts. They are accustomed to thinking of defense as one of the few sectors in the national economy driven by noneconomic forces, namely threats and politics. But if the country's economy continues to weaken, it is inevitable that the resulting scarcity of funds will force reductions in military outlays. Furthermore, the decline of specific industrial sectors such as steelmaking, electronics, chemicals and pharmaceuticals will limit the options military planners have for sustaining the most demanding military campaigns. So policymakers need to take a hard look at what current economic trends mean for the nation's future military preparedness. The place to start is by asking three basic questions. First, how serious is the decline in America's economic power? Second, what does the decline portend for the affordability of the planned defense program? And third, how can defense outlays be structured so that they help the economy rather than hurt it? Liberals and conservatives alike will question the wisdom of making defense spending decisions according to economic criteria, but as the following analysis indicates, separation of the two spheres is no longer affordable because Washington is out of money. How serious? Shortly before President Barack Obama took office, the U.S. intelligence community's top analyst completed a major assessment of global trends through 2025. The analyst, Thomas Fingar, predicted that the international system would be "transformed" over the next 15 years in much the same way that it was remade after World War II. But unlike during the Cold War, when America rose to unrivaled supremacy, Fingar's study predicted it would be China that had the most influence on global politics and economics in the years ahead. The U.S. would probably remain the single most powerful nation in the near term, Fingar concluded, but in relative terms, China would be rising fast, and America would de declining. Fingar traced the source of these trends mainly to America's loss of economic power. He said, "In terms of size, speed and directional flow, the transfer of global wealth and economic power now under way -- roughly from West to East -- is without precedent in modern history." Shortly after Fingar's it would "accelerate trends that are shifting the world's center of gravity away from the U nited States." He too saw China as a rising power poised to capitalize on America's decline. findings became public, former Deputy Treasury Secretary Robert Altman rendered a similar verdict in Foreign Affairs keyed to the creditmarket collapse. Altman warned that the unfolding financial crisis "is a major geopolitical setback for the U nited States and Europe," and predicted Transition to economic multipolarity now BBC News, 09 ("US economic power 'is declining'", BBC News, October 4th 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/8289302.stm, KONTOPOULOS) ***Citing Robert Bruce Zoellick President of the World Bank US economic power is declining as a result of the financial crisis, the head of the World Bank has said. "One of the legacies of this crisis may be a recognition of changed economic power relations ," said World Bank president Robert Zoellick. The US, the world's biggest economy, has been in recession for almost two years, while emerging economies like China and Brazil have grown. This may help bring about a longterm rebalancing of the world economy. 'Changed relations' "A multipolar economy less reliant on the US consumer will be a more stable world economy," Mr Zoellick said. He was speaking in Istanbul before meetings of the the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), where there is some discussion about how to reorganise the leadership of the bodies so that they better reflect the diversified world. For example, China recently got a permanent chair on the IMF's 24seat policymaking committee. SUSTAINABILITY AT: ECONOMIC POWER More ev. Jones, 09 Former Navy Master Chief (Daniel Christopher, "Is America's economic power declining?", Business Management, 10/05/09, http://www.busmanagement.com/news/economicpower/, KONTOPOULOS) It was where the global financial crisis began, all those months ago. The greedy bankers and reckless lenders of America got the ball rolling on what has been the worst financial downturn since the Great Depression. Although we seem to be through the worst of it, there are conflicting reports as to whether the US is in fact recovering. But it appears that, even if the US has recovered, some of the damage caused by the recession has been irreparable. As a result, US economic power is declining. Every indicator goes our way economic power is declining Agence FrancePresse, 09 ("US facing massive economic `power shift' with dollar's downward spiral", The Raw Story, October 11th 2009, http://rawstory.com/2009/10/usfacingmassiveeconomicpowershiftwithdollarsdownwardspiral/, KONTOPOULOS) The dollar's position as the world's leading reserve currency faces increased pressure as the financial crisis allows emerging economies greater influence on the world stage, analysts said. A report last week in The Independent claiming that China, Russia and Gulf States are among nations prepared to ditch the dollar for oil trades has heightened the uncertainty surrounding the US currency's future. The dollar slumped against rivals last week in the wake of the British daily's controversial report. " The US dollar is being hurt by the continued talk of a shift away from a dollarcentric world," said Kit Juckes, an analyst at currency traders ECU Group. "Three conclusions stand out very clearly. Firstly, the shift in economic power away from the G7 economies is continuing. "Secondly, there is a growing acceptance amongst those winners that one consequence of this power shift will be to strengthen their currencies". And finally, as long as the US economy is not strong enough for any rise in interest rates to be conceivable for a long time, the dollar's underlying downtrend will remain in place," added Juckes. The Independent, under the frontpage headline "The Demise of the Dollar", reported last Tuesday that Gulf states, together with China, Russia, Japan and France, were considering replacing the dollar as the currency for oil deals. "In the most profound financial change in recent Middle East history, Gulf Arabs are planning along with China, Russia, Japan and France to end dollar dealings for oil," wrote The Independent's Middle East correspondent Robert Fisk. They would switch "to a basket of currencies including the Japanese yen and Chinese yuan, the euro, gold and a new, unified currency planned for nations in the Gulf Cooperation Council, including Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, Kuwait and Qatar," added Fisk, citing Gulf Arab and Chinese banking sources. The report was denied by a host of countries, including Kuwait, Qatar and Russia, while France dismissed it as "pure speculation." Even so, the United Nations itself last week called for a new global reserve currency to end dollar supremacy, which had allowed the United States the "privilege" of building up a huge trade deficit. UN undersecretarygeneral for economic and social affairs, Sha Zukang, said "important progress in managing imbalances can be made by reducing the (dollar) reserve currency country's 'privilege' to run external deficits in order to provide international liquidity." Zukang was speaking at the annual meetings of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, whose President Robert Zoellick recently warned that the United States should not "take for granted" the dollar's role as preeminent global reserve currency. Meanwhile at a G20 summit in Pittsburgh last month, world leaders unveiled a new vision for economic governance, with bold plans to fix global imbalances and give more clout to emerging giants such as China and India. Following the summit, US Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner repeated Washington's another excuse to take the dollar lower," GFT Global Markets analyst David Morrison told AFP. Economic power is shifting now Business News, 10 ("Economic power shifting to developing countries, OECD says", Business News, June 16th 2010, commitment to a strong dollar. But last week the finance chief was left to watch as traders used The Independent's report as an opportunity to push lower the troubled US unit. The report "has helped concentrate the minds of traders and investors alike, and has given them http://www.monstersandcritics.com/news/business/news/article_1563732.php/EconomicpowershiftingtodevelopingcountriesOECDsays, KONTOPOULOS) ***Cites the OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Global economic power is shifting away from the developed world and towards developing and emerging economies, the Parisbased Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) said Wednesday. According to a new OECD publication, Perspectives on Global Development: Shifting Wealth, this trend is being accelerated by the economic and financial crisis . 'Longerterm forecasts suggest that today's developing and emerging countries are likely to account for nearly 60 per cent of world GDP by 2030,' the OECD said. This structural transformation is being led primarily by China and India. 'Due to their rapid growth and sheer size, India and China influence the key macroeconomic variables that matter for poor countries: interest rates, the price of raw materials, and wage levels for lowskill jobs ,' the OECD said. 'They also have major impacts on global trading and investment patterns .' However, the OECD said that poverty reduction remained 'a major challenge for the developing world' because economic growth has not kept pace with the effects of population growth. But according to OECD secretarygeneral Angel Gurria, 'Thanks to the rapid growth rates in emerging economies, their governments can now afford to boost public spending on social protection. This is a powerful tool to reduce inequality.' SUSTAINABILITY AT: ECONOMIC POWER Statistics prove US economy has less of an effect Fernndeza and NikolskoRzhevskyy, 10 * Ph.D. in economics from the University of Houston, economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas AND ** Assistant Professor of Economics at the University of Memphis, Ph.D. in economics from the University of Houston (*Adriana Z. and **Alex, "The changing nature of the U.S. economic influence in the World", Journal of Policy Modeling, MarchApril 2010, Vol. 32, Issue 2, Galileo, KONTOPOULOS) than contemporaneously. This is true especially after the early 1980s, when globalization presumably took off. The U.S. Overall, the results indicate that cyclical movements in the U.S. economy affect other economies with a lag , rather influence seems to show up gradually, presently taking longer for the full effects of a shock to the U.S. business cycle to manifest in other economies. This suggests that, while the U.S. may be decreasing its overall shortterm impact over other economies, it is not necessarily decreasing its longer term influence. In fact, it seems that the U.S. continues to exert a strong longer term influence over the business cycles worldwide. In this context, it is understandable why many would invoke the theory of decoupling to explain the performance of other countries at the beginning of the U.S. downturn in 2007. Globalization in all its dimensions, a factor of the greater intricacy of transmission channels, may in fact have made countries more dependent on each other and therefore weakened the initial response to economic fluctuations of the U.S. This in turn would correspond with the perceived delay in the worldwide response to the U.S. economic slowdown. If the U.S. sneezed in the past, all countries would catch pneumonia right away, whereas now, when the U.S. sneezes, a few countries get a mild cold that takes some time to fully develop. SUSTAINABILITY AT: ECONOMIC POWER AT: COMPETITIVENESS/TECH INTERNALS U.S. competitiveness doesn't access economic power Thompson, 08 Chief Operating Officer of the Lexington Institute (Loren, "America's economic decline", Armed Forces Journal, 2008, http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2009/03/3922551/, KONTOPOULOS) Such fears might be overstated in much the same way that warnings of Japan's rise were overdone a generation ago. Concern about national decline has been a commonplace topic among intellectuals since Edward Gibbon published the first volume of "The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire" in 1776. Clearly, some of the more pessimistic predictions from past generations were wrong. Even today, there is much misinformation in the public media about precisely what's wrong top 40 universities. In a typical year, IBM generates more technology patents than all of China combined. However, America's scientific with America. For example, as a recent Rand Corp. study pointed out, it is hard to argue that American science is in decline when the nation generates 40 percent of all research spending among industrialized countries, produces a similar share of patented innovations, and hosts threequarters of the world's prowess is no longer translating into economic strength the way it once was. A review of economic trends over the past decade reveals rapid deterioration in the solvency and competitiveness of the U.S. economy. MULTIPOLARITY INEVITABLE Peaceful shift to multipolarity occurring now Grant 10 writer, editor, TrueSlant (Japhy, "Time to calm our long national freakout", http://trueslant.com/japhygrant/2010/07/10/wethotamericansummer/) This week's bizarre scene of U.S. and Russian spies being traded on a tarmac in Austria is just the latest in a string of surrealistic images that have marked a year in which we've seen the Gulf transformed into a rainbow hued oil slick, political candidates alluding to taking back the government forcibly with arms and an economy on life support, with those in charge of its welfare arguing whether or not to pull the plug. While politicos, media pundits and economists debate the number of angels standing on a pin, most Americans are wondering about the fundamentals of our democracy and our capitalist society. In short, we're in the midst of a great national freak out, a collective anxiety attack that threatens to shake our collective faith in the ability of this country to confront and solve the problems it's facing. What we need to do is to take a deep breath. We're not in the midst of collapse; we're in the midst of reinvention. Perhaps the most interesting thing about the spy scandal, if it can even be called that, is how blase the whole affair has been treated. The administration's primary concern was not that Russians were spying (albeit, by all accounts ineptly) on U.S. interests, but that the affair could damage relations with Russia. This is remarkable progress and the Obama administration deserves credit for handling the situation so adroitly that most of us responded with a sense of Cold War nostalgia, not fear. It also highlights how much the world has changed in the twenty plus years since the end of the Cold War. 19902010 may very well be viewed as an interregnum between two eras, the later of which we are just now entering. What was once called `national defense' is now referred to as 'security'. The United States, having failed in its attempts to force democracy on the Middle East is beginning to move away from its Cold War mission of spreading U.S. style democracy across the globe and is now beginning to engage global partners like China and the E.U. as equals. If you believe in American supremacy, this is cause to throw up your arms in disgust, but as we've learned from our misadventures in Iraq and Afghanistan, trying to remake the world in our image requires abandoning the very values we hope to promote. China is a better model. By tying our economy with theirs, we've brought a nation famous for isolationism into the global sphere. Yes, this means more competition, but it also means we've created a far more stable world than what preceded it. **COUNTERBALANCING** GENERIC 1. Their evidence doesn't assume the current financial crisis or decline in support for Iraq and Afghanistan means even if they win that the situation of other countries is poor the situation of the U.S. is uniquely worse. 2. Counterbalancing inevitable US hegemony is on a steady decline Reuters 2k8 (Reuters News Service, "Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the Decline of American Power," 101808, http://blogs.reuters.com/pakistan/2008/10/18/pakistanafghanistanandthedeclineofamericanpower/) Does the financial crisis mark the beginning of the end of American global dominance? And if so, what would the decline of American power mean for Afghanistan and Pakistan? It's early days yet, but here are a few themes that are emerging from the maelstrom. If you put aside the many arguments over whether the Americans were, or were not, guilty of latterday imperialism , you can find consensus on two main points: that the U.S. model of freemarket capitalism has been sorely challenged by the financial crisis; and that America's reputation as a military superpower has been tarnished by its lessthansuccessful campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. In this respect, there are obvious parallels with the collapse of the British empire after World War Two, starting with its departure from India in 1947. Although Britain likes to think it won the war, its postwar situation carried all the hallmarks of defeat. It was virtually bankrupt and with the fall of Singapore to the Japanese in 1942 it had lost the myth of invincibility that allowed it to rule an empire on which the sun never set. With neither the money, nor the credibility, to hold India by force in the face of a powerful Indian independence movement, it mustered as much dignity as possible for an emperor stripped of his clothes and left abruptly, partitioning the subcontinent into India and Pakistan on its way out. Let's assume for the sake of argument that this analogy works for the United States, and that it too begins to draw in on itself. The lessons of British imperial history suggest that when empires collapse, they do so not gradually, but in big leaps that create chaos for those left behind (for example in the estimated one million killed at Partition). In an analysis in TomDispatch.com, Aziz Huq writes about how Britain, even after being forced to withdraw from India, only properly realised the limitations of its power in 1956, after its hopelessly miscalculated attack on Egypt following the nationalisation of the Suez Canal. "The country's monetary weakness led directly to its military collapse in the crisis," he writes. "The Suez fiasco ... also marked the end of British imperial ambitions." This is not to suggest that the Americans are about to suddenly abandon Afghanistan and Pakistan. In the short term, both U.S. presidential candidates Barack Obama and John McCain are committed to stepping up the campaign in Afghanistan. At the same time, Western leaders are already lowering their sights on Afghanistan, according to this analysis from Reuters Kabul correspondent Jon Hemming. In a country that is "famously unforgiving to foreign forces", this may well have happened even without the financial crisis. But it does suggest that whatever the next U.S. President decides to do about Afghanistan and Pakistan, it is unlikely to be smooth. Now add into this mix the growing power of Afghanistan's neighbours -- Iran and Russia, traditional U.S. rivals buoyed up by petrodollars and so likely to benefit from the clipping of America's wings that they have been dubbed along with Venezuela as a new "axis of oil". Both Iran and Russia, along with India, supported Afghanistan's antiTaliban Northern Alliance when the Taliban were in power in Kabul, and are seen as likely to resist any attempt by the United States to seek reconciliation with the Taliban as a facesaving way out of the Afghan quagmire. Then there is China, sitting on $2 trillion of foreign exchange reserves. As I mentioned in an earlier post, Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari just visited China to seek help to bail out Pakistan's economy, in a trip that also marked out his independence from the United States. China has yet to fully show its hand in how far it intends to use its newfound economic might to exercise global political power. But it's worth remembering that the United States, when it rescued Britain from bankruptcy after World War Two, insisted on an end to British imperialism and a withdrawal from its overseas colonies. We don't yet know what China will demand. Does anyone want to hazard a guess how all this will play out? America's status as the lone superpower looks vulnerable; Iran and Russia are loudly assertive, and China is quietly buying up the world's economy . Personally, I think there are so many variables that we can't possibly know yet; but whatever happens, it's likely to catch us by surprise. 3. Their Norlroff evidence is terrible only says that the U.S. spends more on its defense empirically false and that amount of spending isn't stable considering the past financial crisis also doesn't assume a decline in diplomatic ties. GENERIC 4. Counterbalancing inevitable multiple factors Pape 2k9 (Robert A, Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, "Empire Falls," National Interest Online, 12209, http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=20484) AMERICA IS in unprecedented decline. The selfinflicted wounds of the Iraq War, growing government debt, increasingly negative currentaccount balances and other internal economic weaknesses have cost the United States real power in today's world of rapidly spreading knowledge and technology. If present trends continue, we will look back at the Bush administration years as the death knell for American hegemony. Since the cold war, the United States has maintained a vast array of overseas commitments, seeking to ensure peace and stability not just in its own neighborhood-- the Americas--but also in Europe and Asia, along with the oilrich Persian Gulf (as well as other parts of the world). Simply maintaining these commitments requires enormous resources, but in recent years American leaders have pursued far more ambitious goals than merely maintaining the status quo. The Bush administration has not just continued America's traditional grand strategy, but pursued ambitious objectives in all three major regions at the same time--waging wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, seeking to denuclearize North Korea and expanding America's military allies in Europe up to the borders of Russia itself. For nearly two decades, those convinced of U.S. dominance in the international system have encouraged American policy makers to act unilaterally and seize almost any opportunity to advance American interests no matter the costs to others, virtually discounting the possibility that Germany, France, Russia, China and other major powers could seriously oppose American military power. From public intellectuals like Charles Krauthammer and Niall Ferguson to neoconservatives like Paul Wolfowitz and Robert Kagan, even to academicians like Dartmouth's William Wohlforth and Stephen Brooks, all believe the principal feature of the post coldwar world is the unchallengeable dominance of American power. The United States is not just the sole superpower in the unipolardominance school's world, but is so relatively more powerful than any other country that it can reshape the international order according to flawed arguments, while the ultimate foundation of American power--the relative superiority of the U.S. economy in the world--has been in decline since early on in the Bush administration. There is also good reason to think that, without deliberate action, the fall of American power will be more precipitous with the passage of time. To be sure, the period of U.S. relative decline has been, thus far, fairly short. A healthy appreciation of our situation by American leaders may lead to policies that could mitigate, if not rectify, further decline in the foreseeable future. Still, America's shrinking share of world economic production is a fact of life and important changes in U.S. grand strategy are necessary to prevent the decline in America's global position from accelerating. Although the immediate problems of war in Iraq and Afghanistan, alQaeda's new sanctuary in western Pakistan, Iran's continued nuclear program and Russia's recent military adventure in Georgia are highpriority issues, solutions to each of them individually and all of them collectively will be heavily influenced by America's reduced power position in the world. Most important, America's declining power means that the unipolar world is indeed coming to an end, that major powers will increasingly have the strength to balance against U.S. policies they oppose and that the United States will increasingly face harsh foreignpolicy choices . Like so many great powers that have come and gone before, our own hubris may be our downfall. FROM ROME, Imperial China, Venice, Spain, France, Great Britain and the Soviet Union to the United States today, the rise and fall of great nations has been driven primarily by relative economic strength. As Paul Kennedy so ably describes in his classic The Rise and Fall of Great Powers, the more international commitments a state has, the more its power matters and hence the American interests. This is simply no longer realistic. For the past eight years, our policies have been based on these more relative economic strength it needs. Although scholars have long debated its nuances, the basic definition of power in international politics is simple: power is the aggregate resources a state has at its disposal to achieve its aims, the most important of which are to defend its national interests, both at home and abroad. 1 But it is not only how much power a state has that matters. It is also how much power a state has relative to other states. This is true in any roughandtumble environment. A Ford Explorer is a powerful vehicle--unless it collides with a Mack Truck. In international politics, power does not ensure success. But, power certainly helps. At any given moment, U.S. power is heavily dependent on the size and quality of its military forces and other current power assets. A successful grand strategy, however, must work for the long haul and so depends on the power a state is able to produce in the future. Over time, America's power is fundamentally a result of its economic strength. Productive capacity--defined by indicators such as wealth, technology and population size--is a prerequisite for building and modernizing military forces. The United States, like any state, may choose to vary the degree to which its productive capacities are used to create military assets. But it is the economy as a whole that constrains the choice. And the size of the economy relative to potential rivals ultimately determines the limits of power in international politics. Major assessments of this relative position have long turned heavily on a single statistic: America's share of world economic product. Advocates of extending America's unipolar dominance are well aware of the central importance of the economic foundations of American power and routinely present detailed statistics on the U.S. share of world product. The basic notion is simple: take U.S. domestic product in any year and divide it by the aggregate total of the gross domestic product of all states in the world. To measure gross domestic product, the unipolardominance school prefers to compare every country's output in currentyear U.S. dollars, a method that tends to show America is much further ahead of other countries than alternative measures. Indeed, the most recent call for America to exploit its hegemonic position (published in 2008) rests on the presumption of U.S. dominance based on the currentyear dollar figures. 2 By this metric, in 2006 the United States had 28 percent of world product while its nearest most likely competitor, China, had 6 percent. Looks pretty good for America, right? Alas, singleyear "snapshots" of America's relative power are of limited value for assessing the sustainability of its grand strategy over many years. For grandstrategic concerns--especially how well the United States can balance its resources and foreignpolicy commitments--the trajectory of American power compared to other states is of seminal importance. For the sake of argument, let us start with the unipolardominance school's preferred measure of American hegemony, but look at the trajectory of the data over time . According to GDP figures in current U.S. dollars from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the United States increased its share of world production during the 1990s, reached its apogee in 2000, and then began to steadily lose ground during the eight years of the Bush administration, with its relative power ultimately falling by nearly a quarter in the first decade of the twentyfirst century. At the same time, the relative power of China, the state many consider America's most likely future rival, has grown consistently. If we look out as far as the IMF can see (2013), things get even worse--with the United States expected to continue declining and China to continue rising. The United States has been going through the first decade of the twentyfirst century not stronger than before, but substantially weaker. How good are the numbers? Economists commonly use two other methods to calculate GDP, constantdollar calculations and purchasing power parity. 3 Although each offers advantages and disadvantages, for our purposes what matters is that they form a lower bound of America's relative decline. And regardless of the metric, the trend is the same. Again using IMF figures, Table 2 shows the trajectory of the share of world product for the United States and China using both alternative measures. Simply put, the United States is now a declining power. This new reality has tremendous implications for the future of American grand strategy. THE EROSION of the underpinnings of U.S. power is the result of uneven rates of economic growth between America, China and other states in the world. Despite all the proeconomy talk from the Bush administration, the fact is that since 2000, U.S. growth rates are down almost 50 percent from the Clinton years. This trajectory is almost sure to be revised further downward as the consequences of the financial crisis in fall 2008 become manifest. As Table 3 shows, over the past two decades, the average rate of U.S. growth has fallen considerably, from nearly 4 percent annually during the Clinton years to just over 2 percent per year under Bush. At the same time, China has sustained a consistently high rate of growth of 10 percent per year--a truly stunning performance. Russia has also turned its economic trajectory around, from year after year of losses in the 1990s to significant annual gains since 2000. Worse, America's decline was well under way before the economic downturn, which is likely to only further weaken U.S. power. As the most recent growth estimates (November 2008) by the IMF make clear, although all major However, the ability to diffuse new technology--to turn chalkboard ideas into massproduced applications--has countries are suffering economically, China and Russia are expected to continue growing at a substantially greater rate than the United States. True, the United States has not lost its position as the most innovative country in the world, with more patents each year than in all other countries combined. been spreading rapidly across many parts of the globe, and with it the ultimate sources of state power-- productive capacities. America is losing its overwhelming technological dominance in the leading industries of the knowledge economy. In past eras--the "age of iron" and the "age of steel"--leading states retained their technological advantages for many decades.4 As Fareed Zakaria describes in his recent book, The PostAmerican World, technology and knowledge diffuse more quickly today, and their rapid global diffusion is a profound factor driving down America's power compared to other countries. For instance, although the United States remains well ahead of China on many indicators of leading technology on a per capita basis, this grossly under weights the size of the knowledge economy in China compared to America. Whereas in 2000, the United States had three times the computer sales, five times the internet users and forty times the broadband subscribers as China, in 2008, the Chinese have caught or nearly caught up with Americans in every category in the aggregate. 5 The fact that the United States remains ahead of China on a per capita basis does matter-- it means that China, with more than four times the U.S. population, can create many more knowledge workers in the future. 5. Evidence that indicates that there is no incentive to balance doesn't assume the decline in U.S. power provides the incentive RUSSIA/CHINA 1. Their Brose evidence only provides one warrant that Russia looked bad because it invaded Georgia doesn't assume RussianChinese force or cooperation no reason one diplomatic issue prevents counter balancing 2. Their Brown evidence is from 2004 doesn't assume rapid Chinese economic growth or growing RussiaChina cooperation also doesn't assume U.S. economic downturn in 2008 which prompted the rise of other powers 3. U.S. aggressive military stance has contributed to counter balancing by both Russia and China Roberts 2k7 (Paul Craig, wrote the KempRoth bill and was Assistant Secretary of the Treasury in the Reagan administration, was Associate Editor of the Wall Street Journal editorial page and Contributing Editor of National Review, author or coauthor of eight books, has held numerous academic appointments, including the William E. Simon Chair in Political Economy, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University and Senior Research Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, contributed to numerous scholarly journals and testified before Congress on 30 occasions, "US Hegemony spawns RussiaChina Alliance," 8907, http://www.lewrockwell.com/roberts/roberts218.html) This week the Russian and Chinese militaries are conducting a joint military exercise involving large numbers of troops and combat vehicles. The former Soviet Republics of Tajikistan, Kyrgkyzstan, and Kazakstan are participating. Other countries appear ready to join the military alliance. This new potent military alliance is a real world response to neoconservative delusions about US hegemony. Neocons believe that the US is supreme in the world and can dictate its course. The neoconservative idiots have actually written papers, read by Russians and Chinese, about why the US must use its military superiority to assert hegemony over Russia and China. Cynics believe that the neocons are just shills, like Bush and Cheney, for the militarysecurity complex and are paid to restart the cold war for the sake of the profits of the armaments industry. But the fact is that the neocons actually believe their delusions about American hegemony. Russia and China have now witnessed enough of the Bush administration's unprovoked aggression in the world to take neocon intentions seriously. As the US has proven that it cannot occup y the Iraqi city of Baghdad despite 5 years of efforts, it most certainly cannot occupy Russia or China. That means the conflict toward which the neocons are driving will be a nuclear conflict. In an attempt to gain the advantage in a nuclear conflict, the neocons are positioning US antiballistic missiles on Soviet borders in Poland and the Czech Republic. This is an idiotic provocation as the Russians can eliminate antiballistic missiles with cruise missiles. Neocons are people who desire war, but know nothing about it. Thus, the US failures in Iraq and Afghanistan. Reagan and Gorbachev ended the cold war. However, US administrations after Reagan's have broken the agreements and understandings. The US gratuitously brought NATO and antiballistic missiles to Russia's borders. The Bush regime has initiated a propaganda war against the Russian government of V. Putin. These are gratuitous acts of aggression. Both the Russian and Chinese governments are trying to devote resources to their economic development, not to their militaries. Yet, both are being forced by America's aggressive posture to revamp their militaries. Americans need to understand what the neocon Bush regime cannot: a nuclear exchange between the US, Russia, and China would establish the hegemony of the cockroach. In a mere 6.5 years the Bush regime has destroyed the world's good will toward the US. Today, America's influence in the world is limited to its payments of tens of millions of dollars to bribed heads of foreign governments, such as Egypt's and Pakistan's. The Bush regime even thinks that as it has bought and paid for Musharraf, he will stand aside and permit Bush to make air strikes inside Pakistan. Is Bush blind to the danger that he will cause an Islamic revolution within Pakistan that will depose the US puppet and present the Middle East with an Islamic state armed with nuclear weapons? Considering the instabilities and dangers that abound, the aggressive posture of the Bush regime goes far beyond recklessness. The Bush regime is the most irresponsibly aggressive regime the world has seen since Hitler's. CHINA 1. Even if China doesn't directly challenge US power in a confrontation as long as we win they will surpass the U.S. as a world player then that means that they will increase their status as the global hegemon at the expense of American unipolarity. 2. China's rise is inevitable signals a decline in American hegemony Jones 2k7 (Andy, University of St. Andrews, "China's rise and American Hegemony: towards a peaceful coexistence?" 12222007, http://www.e ir.info/?p=149) Twentyfirst century SinoAmerican relations are increasingly shaped by the perception and acknowledgement that `China is a player at the table. As a result, many American policymakers are obsessed by the realist pessimist idea of the `China threat,' perhaps drawing on Samuel Huntington's prediction of a `clash of civilizations.' The eminent pessimist John Mearsheimer urges America to contain China's rise, predicated on Hans Morgenthau's notion of the eternal struggle for power, which, `by its very nature...is never ended, for the lust for power, and the fear of it, is never still.' However, America cannot prevent China's rise . The reality is that positive SinoAmerican relations are both beneficial and necessary for the future economic prosperity and security of both states. Declining tensions in the Taiwan Strait, as economic ties between China and Taiwan evolve, should provide a useful clue as to the future trajectory of SinoAmerican relations--though conflict is never inevitable. For its part, China has launched a skilful, selffulfilling foreign policy public relations campaign which primarily uses realist optimism and touches on liberal institutionalism. This policy is aimed at increasing harmony, trust and cooperation in the international arena. America, however, has consistently impugned Beijing's motives and has pursued a policy of hedging its bets, but is increasingly moving from realist pessimism to a more open realist optimism. Further, many American decisionmakers are convinced that Chinese foreign policy is manifestly targeted at ending American hegemony. While China's rise is not in question, the ends to which it will use its burgeoning power are unclear. David Lampton, for example, thus recommends that `Americans must balance the impulse to treat China as it is with the foresight to recognize China for what it may become.' By approaching the relationship from a realist optimist theoretical viewpoint, this essay will seek to argue that the unprecedented power of the United States (both economic and military) over China limits the scope for future conflict. Further, it will argue that the most important theoretical underpinnings guiding SinoAmerican relations lie in the distinction between realist optimism and realist pessimism, and not between realism and liberalism. This essay will maintain that neither sensationalist realist pessimism nor triumphalist liberal hubris reflects the likely course of SinoAmerican relations. Chapter I will discuss relevant political theory and analyse each state's contemporary SinoAmerican policies. Chapters II and III will then review issues of economic development, energy security, and military relations with specific reference to Taiwan. Finally, Chapter IV will evaluate the future of regional balance of power politics. 3. Even if China currently lacks the military to challenge American military power if they surpass the U.S. economically their global influence would also surpass the U.S. allows for an increase in military resources later. CHINA 4. US will lose its dollar hegemony deficits China will fill in Hudson 10 distinguished Professor of Economics, University of Missouri (Michael, "Letter to Premier Wen Jaibao, March 15, 2010", http://www.americanpendulum.com/2010/07/dollarhegemonyandtheriseof china/) Today, the United States is unlikely to give a gold guarantee, or to expect Congress to agree to such an arrangement. (Often in the past, US presidents and the Executive Branch have made agreements on foreign trade and finance, which Congress has refused to confirm.) It could guarantee China's official dollar holdings visvis a basket or whatever the Government of China preferred to hold its reserves, from euros to a new post Yekaterinburg currency mix. But no currency today is stable. All the major Western currencies are buckling under the burden of unpayably large debts. The US Treasury owes $4 trillion to foreign central banks, but there is no foreseeable way in which it can make good this foreign debt, given its chronic structural deficit of foreign military spending, import dependency and capital outflows. That is why so many countries are treating the dollar like a "hot potato" and trying to avoid holding them. And holding euros or British sterling does not provide a better alternative. Most central banks today hold down their exchange rates by recycling their dollar inflows to buy US Treasury IOUs. This recycling enables the United States to finance its overseas military spending and also its domestic budget deficit (largely military in character) since the 1950s. So Europe and Asia have used their foreign exchange earnings to finance a unipolar US buildup of military bases to surround them. This situation is inherently unstable, and hence selfterminating. The era is ending where international reserves are based on the unpayably high debts of any single government, especially when these debts are run up for military purposes. Certainly the US dollar cannot continue to fill this role, given the chronic US payments deficit. For most years since 1951, US overseas military spending (mainly in Asia) has accounted for the largest part of this deficit. And increasingly, the US trade balance has fallen into deficit (except for agriculture, entertainment and military arms). Most recently, capital outflows have accelerated from the United States, especially to China and Third World countries. US money managers have concluded that the US and other Western economies are entering a period of debtburdened, permanently slower growth. So they are looking to China, hoping to obtain its surpluses for themselves by buying out its banking and industry. INDIA 1. Even if India doesn't currently have the strength to challenge American hegemony their influence will inevitably increase potentially surpassing that of the U.S. 2. Even U.S. officials acknowledge that India will hold global influence in the near future IE 6610 (Indian Express News Service, "US says India Destined to be a Nation of Global Influence," 6610, http://www.indianexpress.com/news/ussaysindiadestinedtobeanationofglobalinfluence/630131/1) Declaring that India is destined to be a nation of global influence, the US has said bilateral ties are moving towards "full maturity", encompassing cooperation in areas like defence, climate change and energy as well as on nuclear and regional geopolitical issues. "Obviously, India is on a path of ascendancy. It is destined to be a nation of global influence," US National Security Adviser Gen (Retd) James Jones said here. His remarks follow US President Barack Obama's statement that India is a rising and responsible global power "indispensable" to a future American strategy. Jones said it is extremely important that countries like India and the United States have "a national affinity" for one another as expressed by the strong friendship between the two sides, including their heads of State. "We have converging values, we both want better lives for our citizens and our children, we want to eliminate the scourge of terrorism, we would like to have a better climate, a better management of our fragile planet and nations of influence can shape that globally. IRAQ WAR 1. Even if the Iraq war has not inhibited US achievement of national goals or strategies it has undermined credibility and crushed the perception of American hegemony all we need to win is perception. 2. Iraq war has resulted in a decline in US hegemony and results in counterbalancing Huss 4510 (Matthew, Research Associate at the Center for American Progress Action Fund, "Report: Iraq War Undercut U.S. Credibility, Hobbled Democratic Reform," 4510, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/matthewduss/reportiraqwarundercut_b_525859.html) Even though Iraq continues to endure a level of terrorism that any other country would consider a national crisis, and even though Republican Congressman Dana Rohrbacher acknowledged recently that "everybody I know thinks it was a mistake to go in" to Iraq, you can still find people usually people who worked in the Bush administration who continue to insist that the war was worth it, and that the decision to invade and occupy and attempt to remake Iraq at a cost of trillions of dollars will be vindicated by history. A recently published RAND study of the regional effects of the Iraq war should (but probably won't, as too many influential people have too much professionally and emotionally invested in the war being seen as a "success") put such claims to rest. The study finds that, in addition to facilitating the rise of Iranian power, undercutting perceptions of U.S. strength and influence, and increasing the profile of other actors like Russia and China, the war has seriously hurt the prospects for political reform in the region: On the domestic front, societal conflict in the broader region resulting from the war has not yet materialized to the extent forecast; rather, state power has strengthened and tolerance of domestic political opposition has decreased . Specifically, Iraq's instability has become a convenient scarecrow neighboring regimes can use to delay political reform by asserting that democratization inevitably leads to insecurity. And while the entrenchment of U.S.allied regimes may be deceptively reassuring in the short term, it does little to address the more deeply rooted problem of regime illegitimacy or to mitigate the wellsprings of radicalism. So not only did the Bush administration's key (postWMD) strategic claim about the war that replacing Saddam Hussein with a less despotic, more democratic government would start a democratic chain reaction in the region turn out to be false, the war actually made things worse for democracy. By offering democratic reform as a component to the "war on terror," which many Muslims see as a war against Islam, the U.S. alienated and isolated at the outset scores of potential reformist allies. By then promoting Iraq as a potential showpiece for that agenda ("See all these explosions? This could be your country! Who's in?") we discredited democratic reform even more. The irony here is that , in diagnosing the overabundance of authoritarianism as a problem in the Middle East, the Bush administration and its neoconservative brain trust were not entirely wrong. Oppressive behavior by governments viewed by many as illegitimate and unjust is a key driver of extremism in the region. But the course of "treatment" that was undertaken by the Bush administration American invasion and military occupation has turned out to be just as bad, if not worse, than the disease, both for the U.S., whose power and influence have declined as a result, and for the region, which will be grappling with the destabilizing consequences of the war for decades to come. The RAND study also concludes, "on a morepositive note," that "the war's appeal as a draw for terrorist recruitment has been offset by declining public support among Arabs of alQaeda's goals, operations, and tactics." Less popularity for Al Qaeda is obviously a good thing. But before anybody breaks out the champagne on this, let's remember that this is the result of Al Qaeda's brutality against Iraqi civilians , brutality that was directly facilitated by the U.S. invading and then failing to properly secure the country. It's important to remember that luring terrorists to Iraq to blow themselves up in markets and mosques wasn't just some tragic sideeffect of the Iraq policy. It was, for many of the war's architects and supporters, a bonus feature of the policy. The fact that "flypaper strategy" may have, by enabling the murder and maiming of thousands of Iraqi women, men and children, (Iraq accounts for more than half of all suicide bombings recorded since 1981) managed to drive down Al Qaeda's poll numbers in the region doesn't make the idea any less morally reprehensible, let alone qualify the policy as a whole as a success. MIDDLE EAST Counter balancing will inevitably occur in the Middle East US hegemony in the region is drawing to a close Phillips 61010 (Chris, has researched Arab identity to Syria and Jordan, writes regularly for the Guardian, and has spent several years in the Middle East, "The End of American Hegemony in the Middle East," 61010, http://www.thepressnet.org/354/theendofamericanhegemonyinthe middleeast) The U.S. power in the Middle East are declining, however, discuss the possibility of a new cold war in the region is incorrect; powers such as Russia and Turkey are simply taking advantage of the power vacuum in the Middle East English analyst supported and provided weapons to the enemies of Tel Aviv and Washington. Yet the return of Russia to Syria, is being realized writes Chris Phillips A recent agreement to purchase weapons, signed between Russia and Syria, has dangled the prospect of a new Cold War in the Middle East. For example, Josh Landis in Foreign Policy suggests that unconditional U.S. support to Israel will return to his role Moscow pre1989 when it through the sale of MiG29 or the construction of a port area on the Syrian coast, there appears to be the action of a superpower capable of challenging U.S. hegemony in the period as 19451989, but rather that of a regional power, determined to take advantage of the growing power vacuum in the region . Instead of a new Cold War bipolar situation, the regional powers such as Russia and Turkey are increasing their influence at the expense of the United States. The idea of a new Cold War has gained popularity in some quarters from the wrong reasons. The same Syrian President Bashar alAssad said in `The Republic' last week that "Russia is reasserting. And the Cold War is simply a natural reaction to the American attempt to dominate the world. " In the same interview he spoke of the existence of a new triple alliance between Syria, Turkey and Iran, which would be part of the "Northern Alliance" that Damascus had tried to build against Israel and the United States, and to ` within which Russia is now assigned to the role of superpower benefactor. As the leader of a small power that seeks to challenge the hegemonic world power , is in the interests of Assad exaggerate the strength of this alliance. However in reality there is no unified and cohesive bloc. Russia is putting in place pragmatic national agenda that will enable it to maximize its influence without having to compare with the United States. This is a key foreign policy to Medvedev. A recent dispute with Tehran because of Russian support for new UN sanctions on Iran proposed by Washington certainly does not show a united front antiamericano/antiisraeliano. Although Turkey is not bound by any deployment. Damascus would consider a resumption of relations of force in Ankara with Iraq, Iran and Syria as a fact of crucial importance for any new deployment. However, the policy of "zero problems with neighbors led" Turkey is not limited to these countries to its southern border. Turkey is trying to impose its influence and win new markets in the region, including Israel, to meet the needs of its rapidly expanding economy. Although the rhetoric of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has point blocking antiAmerican and antiIsraeli. Although the return to bipolar alignments of the Cold War in the Middle East become more populist and antiIsrael from the Gaza War of 20082009, the close trade relations, economic and military between Turkey and Israel are showing no signs of abating. Like Russia, Turkey is pursuing its own interests by asserting its influence throughout the Middle East, not only as a reference is unlikely, international relations in the region are changing. The U.S. power is declining. Although Washington remains the only superpower, the quagmire in which the U.S. is in Iraq and Afghanistan has highlighted the limits of American ambitions, while the economic crisis has forced the Obama Administration to focus its energies on other sectors. While the Bush era saw the assertion of American hegemony in the region and the attempt to crush the many challenges posed by countries like Syria and Iraq of Saddam Hussein, the Middle East today is characterized by a power vacuum caused from the partial American withdrawal, which is filled by medium regional powers that have the ability to assert himself. This new situation is exemplified by the recent nuclear deal reached by Turkey with Iran and Brazil. Stephen Walt (Professor of International Relations at Harvard University (NDT)) stressed that this change in the balance of power is happening globally, as, for example, gross domestic product of Asia already exceeds that of the U.S. or Europe. As in previous years, it seems that the Middle East could become the microcosm of these international changes. If, on the one hand, the era of American is coming to an end a process that was hastened by unnecessary wars and poor economic prudence the other is much more likely that international relations in the Middle East reflect the emerging multipolar world rather than return to a situation of cold war bipolar. In this situation , not only Russia and Turkey will increase their sphere of influence in the region, but also China, India and Brazil will try to carve out a role, most likely turning its satellite states less claims in respect of democratic reforms and their reconciliation with Israel than does Washington. The intensification of the relationship between Saudi Arabia and China could anticipate this future development. But this moment has not arrived yet. The United States remains a superpower that can lead to important changes in the region at will. However, the recent moves of Russia and Turkey in the Middle East show a new determination by the regional powers to follow its own path in defiance of U.S. wishes, and that this be done through military agreements, business or diplomatic moves . Although a new Cold War is unlikely, the period dell'indiscussa American hegemony in the Middle East could be close to conclusion . IRAN Iran is beginning to challenge American hegemony Iraq proves Kabalan 62310 (Marwan Al, member of the Centre for Strategic Studies and Research at Damascus University in Syria, "US and Iran are Competing in Iraq," 62310, http://gulfnews.com/opinions/columnists/usandiranarecompetinginiraq1.658023) The fourmonth stalemate is interpreted as being a result of the standoff between the US and Iran, the two key foreign powers in Iraq. Each hopes to redraw the political map of the country in a way that suits its own interests. Most analysts tend to believe now that Iraq, and not nuclear weapons, is the key bone of contention between the two countries. Iran is eager to see the US withdraw from Iraq so that a formidable obstacle to it establishing military dominance in the Gulf is removed. Another Iranian objective is to prevent the emergence of a proUS government in Baghdad that would eventually resist its regional ambitions. Washington, on the other hand, wants to withdraw from Iraq because it faces growing challenges in Afghanistan -- but without handing Iraq to Iran on a silver platter. The US, therefore, seeks to find a way to counterbalance Iran by establishing a client government in Baghdad. The nuclear issue in this case is seen simply as an element of a broader geopolitical struggle between the two powers in the region. Historically, Iraq has always been regarded by both the US and Iran as a strategic challenge. After the 1958 military coup, which ousted the monarchy in Iraq, the US supported the shah to contain the aspirations of proMoscow Iraqi officers. Similarly, following the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran, Washington relied on Iraq to tame the revolutionary ambitions of the cleric's regime in Tehran. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, Washington led an international coalition to expel the Iraqi forces and prevent Saddam Hussain from accumulating too much wealth and power. Throughout the 1990s, Washington tried to keep the Iranian and Iraqi threats at bay through its Dual Containment policy. When, from the late 1990s onwards, Iraq was moving toward ending its political isolation, Washington regarded that as an extremely destabilising development for its national interests in the Gulf. Until the 2003 invasion, regional stability from Washington's dismantle its government and replace it with a proAmerican regime, thereby restoring the balance of power. When that assessment proved inaccurate, Washington was forced to assume a policing role as well as acting as a shield to prevent Iran from dominating the country and thereby gaining control of the Gulf. Regime change Indeed, the US and Iran both wanted to eliminate Saddam's regime, and they collaborated to some extent during the invasion. But from there, their goals diverged. The Iranians hoped to establish a Shiite regime in Baghdad that would be under Tehran's influence. Washington sought to establish a regime that would thwart the Iranians. From the very beginning, US strategy in Iraq was in shambles, to say the least. The deBaathification process drove most of the Sunnis into opposition. At the same time, the Americans were trying to prevent Iran from installing a client government in Baghdad. The end result was conflict. What was intended to be a shortterm operation turned into an extended war, requiring longterm US military commitment. The US could not leave because it had created a situation in which Iraq was too weak to act as a counterbalance to Iran . The Obama administration believes that the formation of a friendly Iraqi government with sufficient military capability to enforce law internally and to prevent Iran from having too much influence in the country is the only hope to salvage the US strategy. At the very least, Washington believes, any Iraqi government viewpoint was based on the IranIraq balance of power. The US invaded Iraq on the assumption that it could quickly defeat and would have to be able to act independently from Iranian influence. This raises several questions. Can the US form such a government before it leaves by the end of the summer? Can the Iraqis agree on the formation of a relatively strong government that is also on good terms with the US? What about Iran? Would it accept such a government? So far, neither the US nor Iran have been able to put an appealing government in power. But as the stalemate persists and the date of the US withdrawal approaches, Iraq is set to pay the heaviest price for this struggle of wills between foreign powers. ASIA Nations in Asia will inevitably counterbalance and surpass the US Bello 2k8 (Walden, This essay appears as the author's commentary in Foreign Policy in Focus, Sept. 5, 2008. An earlier version was delivered as the Ted Wheelwright Memorial Lecture at the University of Sydney on Sept. 1, 2008, "A New American Isolationism: Toward a 21 st Century Relationship between Asia and America," 9/8, http://www.docstoc.com/docs/2453417/TheCrisisofUSHegemonyandtheFutureoftheAsiaPacificRegion) Despite the glitter that surrounded the Olympics in Beijing, the Democratic National Convention in Denver, and the Republican National Convention in Minneapolis, the messages coming to Asia from these events were very different. From Beijing, the message was, to put it in the words of one pundit, China has had a few bad centuries but is back on its feet. From Denver, the word was that the world's most powerful country has been on a desperate decadelong downspin that can only get worse if the Republicans keep the White House. From Minneapolis, the message was that things weren't that bad but they would definitely get worse under the Democrats. For people in this part of the world, the weakening of US power is most evident elsewhere: in the Middle East and Southwest Asia, where Washington is bogged down in unending wars in Iraq and Afghanistan; in Latin America, where the rebellion against neoliberalism and US meddling is in full swing; and, most recently, in Central Asia, where Washington and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have been taught a painful lesson in overextension in Georgia. The erosion of Washington's position is less obvious in East Asia. After all, the US continues to maintain over 300 military bases and facilities in the Western Pacific. Over the last decade, it has established what amounts to a permanent troop presence in the Southern Philippines to make up for its giving up its two big military bases on Luzon Island in 1992. And in Indonesia, the Pentagon has reestablished its close ties with the Indonesian military after several years of uncertainty, using the opportunity provided by relief operations during the tsunami of 2004. Erosion of US Power in East Asia Nevertheless, the region and Southeast Asia in particular is probably more independent of the US today than at any other time in the last 60 years. Economics is the reason. Over the last two decades, several developments have eroded the US's position. First of all, its drive to create the transPacific free trade area known as the Asia Pacific Cooperation (APEC) failed. APEC was meant to be a westward extension of the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), and both were intended to serve as a geoeconomic counterweight to the European Union. Japan, China, and the Association of Southeast Asian (ASEAN) countries, fearing US economic domination in the name of free trade, scuttled President Bill Clinton's transPacific dream at the APEC Summit in Osaka in 1995. APEC summits continue to be held, but these are remembered more as times when heads of state don the host country's national costume than as occasions for serious economic decisionmaking . Second, the US effort to impose capital account and financial liberalization on the Asia Pacific economies as a key element of more thoroughgoing structural transformation backfired. Capital account liberalization led to the Asian Financial Crisis in 19971998. Instead of helping to shore up economies in crisis, Washington took advantage of the crisis to try to comprehensively transform the region's economies along neoliberal lines. As one of Clinton's economic lieutenants saw it, "Most of these countries are going through a dark and deep tunnel...But on the other end there is going to be a significantly different Asia in which American firms have achieved a much deeper market penetration, much greater access." The outcome proved to be different. Malaysia imposed capital controls. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was discredited, with the Thai government declaring its intention never to go back to the agency after paying off its loans in 2003 and the Indonesian government resolving to do the same thing in 2008. While Washington and the IMF were able to kill Japan's proposal for an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) at the height of the crisis, the East Asian governments formed the "ASEAN Plus Three" financial mechanism that excludes the US and is likely to be the precursor of a fullblown regional financial agency. Neoliberal transformation has stalled in Japan and most Southeast Asian countries, with possibly only South Korea continuing to travel along the freemarket path desired by the US. Moreover, to protect themselves against future speculative crises provoked by the movements of global finance capital spearheaded by US funds, the Asian governments have built up massive foreign exchange reserves, on which the US has become dependent for funds to prop up its massive military expenditures and the middleclass spending that for a long time served as an artificial barrier against recession. With the unraveling of American financial institutions, the onset of recession, and the depreciation of the dollar, the US economy has become hostage to these countries' decisions to continue to lend to Washington and Wall Street. A third development that is not positive for the US is the region's becoming increasingly dependent on the redhot Chinese economic locomotive. According to a United Nations report, China has been a major engine of growth for most of the economies in the region. The country's imports accelerated even more than its exports, with a large proportion of them coming from the rest of Asia." In fact, Chinese demand is what pulled the Asia Pacific economies from the recession caused by the Asian financial crisis that the US tried to take advantage of. China has not only surpassed the United States to become Japan's main trading partner but Chinese demand has helped keep the world's secondlargest economy from falling back into recession. Conscious of its economic clout, China has moved to consolidate its position as East Asia's new economic center via smart economic diplomacy. In 2002, it convinced the ASEAN governments to create the ASEANChina Free Trade Area that is scheduled to come into effect in 2010. Japan has tried to catch up by offering ASEAN countries "economic partnership agreements." Meanwhile, talks on a U.S.Thailand free trade area have been frozen by popular opposition to Washington's strident championing of the socalled intellectual property rights of its corporations. All in all, there is a great deal of truth in the observation that the biggest beneficiary of the Bush administration's imperial and corporate misadventures over the last decade has been China, which has kept itself from military entanglements and devoted itself single mindedly to economic development. Challenges Posed by China's Ascent The rise of China provides a number of very fundamental challenges to different key actors in East Asia. To Japan, the key challenge is to move from being effectively a vassal state of the United States in security matters to a mature relationship with China that would definitively leave behind five decades of aggression followed by six decades of serving as a springboard for US power projection onto the Asian mainland. A definitive acceptance of responsibility for the atrocities committed by Japanese troops during the Second World War, including the infamous Nanjing Massacre, on the part of the Japanese people and their leaders is an indispensable step in this move towards a mature relationship between Asia's leading economic powers. For Southeast Asia, the challenge is how to avoid becoming an appendage of the Chinese economy. Chinese demand was, as mentioned earlier, an immense force lifting Southeast Asia's economies from the depths of the Asian financial crisis. However, China's developing trade and investment relations with ASEAN have had some not pleasant aspects. The experience of Thai vegetable and fruit producers owing to an "early harvest" free trade arrangement with Thailand earlier this decade is one of them. Under the agreement, Thailand would export tropical fruits to China while winter fruits from China would be eligible for the zerotariff deal. The expectations of mutual benefit evaporated after a few months, however, with massive imports from China wiping out Thai producers of many fruits and vegetables such as garlic and red onions. But the fear of many in Southeast Asia goes beyond having trade agreements with China that would yield unequal benefits. With land and energy relatively scarce in China, Chinese enterprises, with the blessings of the Chinese government, are seeking deals that would allow them to mine minerals and grow crops in Southeast Asian countries for exclusive export to the China market. To take one example, in a deal with the Philippines, the Chinese Fuhua Group planned to invest $3.83 billion over five to seven 6 years to develop 1 million hectares of land to grow highyielding strains of corn, rice, and sorghum. 8 The Philippine government's Departments of Environment and Agrarian Reform plan to identify "idle lands" that could be incorporated into the Chinese plantations. 9 This in a country where seven out of 10 farmers are landless! This is a formula for real trouble. Some have been quick to call China's international economic policies "imperialistic." It is, however, difficult to sustain this label since exploitative relations between China and other developing countries have not congealed structurally. Economic trends where China emerges as a net beneficiary do not add up to imperialism. Moreover, there is absent that element of force and coercion that accompanied the imposition of European and American economic power on weaker societies. Nevertheless, Southeast Asian governments need to balance their spontaneous feelings of SouthSouth solidarity with cool headed realism. Countries like China, Brazil, and India, are led by developmentalist elites that are seeking to find their place in a new global capitalist order marked by the loosening of the economic hegemony of the old capitalist centers, that is, Japan, the US, and the European Union. The pursuit of national economic interest, not regional cooperation for development, is their central concern. By uncritically signing trade and investment agreements or joining a regional formation anchored by these bigger, ambitious powers, smaller countries may simply end up being used economically, territorially, and politically to advance their regional and global agenda. Does this mean that a trade agreement and regional economic formation linking China and ASEAN is to be avoided at all costs? No, it simply means the ASEAN 7 governments must enter talks with China with eyes wide open and negotiate collectively, not as 10 separate governments. They must make it clear to China that they do not desire a trade agreement based on free trade, such as the arrangements that the US, European Union, and Japan are pushing on them, but one where, as the weaker economies, the net benefits of the arrangement accrue to them, not China. They must see to it that the terms of association must be carefully negotiated and that they work closely to offset the dominance of the central power. Yes, China's relationship with Southeast Asia cannot be described as an exploitative one. But unless considerations of equity are front and center in the negotiation of economic relationships between Beijing and its neighbors, the old structural patterns marking the relations between Southeast Asia and Europe, the United States, and Japan could easily be replicated. The USChina Relationship The most critical regional relationship, however, is between the US and China since the US is the most powerful power in East Asia and China the next most powerful. In his stimulating book Adam Smith in Beijing , our eminent colleague Giovanni Arrighi of Johns Hopkins University writes that there are three alternative policies that the United States can adopt towards a China that is on the ascendant. The first is an updated version of the Cold War strategy of containment. In this strategy, China is seen as a strategic threat or, as the 2002 National Security Strategy Paper of the Bush administration puts it euphemistically, a "strategic competitor." The US response would be to "dissuade China" from its military ambitions by giving a high profile to the massive American military presence in the Western Pacific, strengthening 8 the bilateral agreements with US allies that sustain this transPacific garrison state, and building up defense cooperation with India, Asia's other big power. Needless to say, this response misconstrues the nature of the Chinese challenge, which is an economic rather than a strategic one. And needless to say as well, this response would be disastrous for the whole world. A second strategy is not to directly confront China as the US confronted the old Soviet Union but to put into motion balance of power politics, wherein China is weakened indirectly. Arrighi quotes James Pinkerton, a protagonist of this approach: Instead of confronting directly the rising Asian powers, the United States should play them off each other. As the Latin expression tertium gaudens -- the happy third -- reminds us, rather than getting in the middle of every fight, sometimes it is better "to hold the coats of those who do." For the US national interest, "a better Asia would be one in which China, India, Japan, and possibly another tiger or two contend with each other for power while we enjoy the happy luxury of third party bystanding." 10 Needless to say, this strategy would also have terrible consequences for the region. A third strategy, one that Arrighi identifies with two old faces from the 20 th century, Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Adviser to President Jimmy Carter, does not see China as a revisionist power but as one that wants to join the global status quo. The appropriate response for Washington is to accept China as part of the elite of the global state system and work with it in pursuit of international stability, in the same way that Britain, the hegemon of the 19 th century, cooperated and made way for the United States , the hegemon of the 20 th century. 9 Arrighi prefers the third strategy. Indeed, though still in essence conservative in that it seeks to preserve the global status quo, this is by far a preferable American response. It is, however, the least likely to be adopted. The problem is that imperial America is not like imperial Britain. The US is ideologically an expansionist missionary democracy that will find it difficult to accept a No. 2 status without provoking a reactionary populist reaction among key segments of its population. Aside from its powerful corporate and strategic drives, providing leadership in the messianic enterprise of remaking the world along the lines of a liberal or neoliberal Lockean democracy is a fundamental driving force of US hegemony. Civil Society, China, and America This conundrum inevitably leads to a discussion of how civil society, both in Asia and globally, ought to respond to the erosion of US hegemony and the ascent of China. In the best of all possible worlds, the US and China could be supporters of the effort to create a new world order built on peace, justice, and popular sovereignty. Unfortunately, we live in a less than ideal world With respect to China, the task of civil society is to pressure it, as it intensifies its engagement with the world, to resist the temptation of following the destructive imperial path trodden by Europe and the United States. It is also to push it to move away from the fossilfuel intensive, overconsumption oriented path of development pioneered by the West to one that is more ecologically sustainable and sensitive to equity issues. This will not be easy. Nevertheless, there are signs of hope, one of them being the rethinking of the direction of China's development that is going on among China's leaders. O ne can only agree with Arrighi when he says: 10 If the reorientation succeeds in reviving and consolidating China's traditions of selfcentered marketbased development, accumulation without dispossession, mobilization of human rather than nonhuman resources, and government through mass participation in shaping policies, then the chances are that China will be in a position to contribute decisively to the emergence of a commonwealth of civilizations truly respectful of differences. But, if the reorientation fails, China may well turn into a new epicenter of social and political chaos that will facilitate Northern attempts to reestablish a crumbling global dominance. 11 With the Chinese leadership's great concern for legitimacy both internally and internationally, one cannot say that the failure of the proponents of reorientation is a foregone conclusion. This is why pressure from international civil society for a change in economic strategy, for proenvironment policies, for the expansion of democratic rights, and for equitable relations with the developing countries must be kept up. Towards a New American Isolationism Blunting Washington's innately hegemonic thrust will be much more difficult. Difficult but not impossible. Perhaps the best strategy for civil society at this point is not so much to rely on appeals to American ideals but to continually point to the very high costs of intervention, in terms of soldiers killed, money spent, domestic strife, and credibility lost, to consistently campaign against any temptation for US forces to intervene on whatever grounds. Part of this strategy must be pressure for the removal of the US military bases from Asia and the Pacific and the neutralizing of the bilateral treaties between the US and a number of Asian countries. Aside from being the pillars for Washington's containment 11 of China, these institutions are the main factors that prevent China and other East Asian countries from evolving a more mature relationship. More broadly, the aim of civil society mobilization both in Asia and globally should be to encourage a new American isolationism. Barack Obama is definitely preferable to John McCain, but the world does not need a new American internationalism, this time of the liberal and "soft power variety." We should not tolerate a military confrontation, an aggressive diplomatic isolation of Iran led by a Democratic elite that is uncritical, as Obama is, of Israel. We do not want an obsession with the Middle East to be replaced with an obsession with destabilizing Hugo Chavez and restoring US influence in Latin America. And we should worry when Bill Clinton says, as he did during the Democratic Party convention, that one of Obama's objectives will be to "restore American leadership in the world." Asia does not need or want American leadership. What Asia, like the rest of the world, needs is a vacation from a messianic United States, and a few decades of a withdrawn, selfabsorbed, isolationist America, paying attention to its domestic troubles and deterred by the high costs of the continued pursuit of hegemony globally, would be good for the region, good for everybody. The Asia Pacific region, in sum, is pregnant with both dangers and possibilities, and there is, if anything, great indeterminacy, a great element of contingency on where we're heading. In times like this, when the possible and the impossible hang in a fine balance, it is important to remember the advice of that great Italian thinker Antonio Gramsci about balancing the pessimism of the intellect with the optimism of the will. policy of withdrawing troops from Iraq, only to send them to Afghanistan in the name of defending human rights. We do not want in place of TURKEY As American power wanes Turkey's will rise Feffer 10 (John, codirector of Foreign Policy in Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies, "Stealth Superpower: How Turkey is Chasing China in Bid to Become the Next Big Thing," 6/13/10, http://www.truthdig.com/report/item/stealth_superpower_how_turkey_is_chasing_china_20100613/) The future is no longer in plastics, as the businessman in the 1967 film The Graduate insisted. Rather, the future is in China. If a multinational corporation doesn't shoehorn China into its business plan, it courts the ridicule of its peers and the outrage of its shareholders. The language of choice for ambitious undergraduates is Mandarin. Apocalyptic futurologists are fixated on an eventual global war between China and the United States. China even occupies valuable real estate in the imaginations of our fabulists. Much of the action of Neal Stephenson's novel The Diamond Age, for example, takes place in a future neoConfucian China, while the crew members of the space ship on the cult TV show Firefly mix Chinese curse words into their dialogue. Why doesn't Turkey have a comparable grip on American visions of the future? Characters in science fiction novels don't speak Turkish. Turkishlanguage programs are as scarce as hen's teeth on college campuses. Turkey doesn't even qualify as part of everyone's favorite group of upandcomers, that swinging BRIC quartet of Brazil, Russia, India, and China. Turkey remains stubbornly fixed in Western culture as a backwardlooking land of doner kebabs, bazaars, and guest workers. But take population out of the equation an admittedly big variable and Turkey promptly becomes a likely candidate for future superpower. It possesses the 17th top economy in the world and , according to Goldman Sachs, has a good shot at breaking into the top 10 by 2050. Its economic muscle is also well defended: after decades of NATO assistance, the Turkish military is now a regional powerhouse. Perhaps most importantly, Turkey occupies a vital crossroads between Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia. A predominantly Muslim democracy atop the ruins of Byzantium, it bridges the Islamic and JudeoChristian traditions, even as it sits perched at the nexus of energy politics. All roads once led to Rome; today all pipelines seem to lead to Turkey. If superpower status followed the rules of real estate location, location, location then Turkey would already be near the top of the heap. As a quintessential rising middle power, Turkey no longer hesitates to put itself in the middle of major controversies. In the last month alone, Turkish mediation efforts nearly heralded a breakthrough in the Iran nuclear crisis, and Ankara supported the flotilla that recently tried to break Israel's blockade of Gaza . With these and other less highprofile interventions, Turkey has stepped out of the shadows and now threatens to settle into the prominent place on the world stage once held by its predecessor. In the seventeenth century, the Ottoman Empire was a force to be reckoned with, spreading through the Balkans to the gates of Vienna before devolving over the next 200 years into "the sick man of Europe." Today, a dynamic neoOttoman spirit animates Turkey. Once rigidly secular, it has begun to fashion a moderate Islamic democracy. Once dominated by the military, it is in the process of containing the army within the rule of law. Once intolerant of ethnic diversity, it has begun to reexamine what it means to be Turkish. Once a sleepy economy, it is becoming a nation of Islamic Calvinists. Most critically of all, it is fashioning a new foreign policy. Having broken with its more than halfcenturylong subservience to the United States, it is now carving out a geopolitical role all its own. The rise of Turkey has by no means been smooth. Secular Turks have been uncomfortable with recent more assertive expressions of Muslim identity, particularly when backed by state power. The country's Kurds are still secondclass citizens, and although the military has lost some of its teeth, it still has a bite to go along with its bark. Nonetheless, Turkey is remaking the politics of the Middle East and challenging Washington's traditional notion of itself as the mediator of last resort in the region. In the twentyfirst century, the Turkish model of transitioning out of authoritarian rule while focusing on economic growth and conservative social values has considerable appeal to countries in the developing world. This "Ankara consensus" could someday compete favorably with Beijing's and Washington's versions of political and economic development. The Turkish model has, however, also spurred rightwing charges that a new Islamic fundamentalist threat is emerging on the edges of Europe. Neocon pundit Liz Cheney has even created a new version of George W. Bush's "axis of evil" in which Turkey, Iran, and Syria have become the dark trinity. These are all signs that Turkey has indeed begun to wake from its centurieslong slumber. And when Turkey wakes, as Napoleon said of China, the world will shake. Out of Ottomanism Constantinople was once an Orientalist's dream. In his otherwise perceptive 1877 guide to the city, the Italian author Edmondo de Amicis typically wrote that old Istanbul "is not a city; she neither labors, nor thinks, nor creates; civilization beats at her gates and assaults her in her streets, but she dreams and slumbers on in the shadow of her mosques, and takes no heed." Turkey's first wakeup call came from Kemal Ataturk, the modernizing military officer from Salonika who created a new country out of the unpromising materials left behind by the collapsed Ottoman Empire. Decisively ending the caliphate in 1924, Ataturk patterned his new secular state on the French model: strong central power, a modern army, and a strict division between public and private spheres. This was no easy process: Ataturk brought Turkey kicking and screaming into the twentieth century. In many ways, that kicking and screaming continued throughout the rest of that century. The Turkish military never quite got used to civilian rule. It's seized power four times since 1960. In the 1980s and 1990s, Turkish security forces killed thousands of its own citizens in a dirty war against the Kurds and the Turkish left, and subjected many more to beatings, torture, and imprisonment. The country's leadership maintained a garrison mentality based on a fear that outsiders, aided by a fifth column, were bent on dismembering the country (as outside powers had indeed attempted to do in 1920 with the Treaty of Svres). In the 1980s, however, economic globalization began to eat away at this garrison mentality as thenPresident Turgut Ozal attempted to reconnect Turkey to the world through exportoriented reforms and a policy of building economic bridges rather than erecting suspicious walls. During the eightyear IranIraq War, for instance, Turkey refused to choose sides, remaining a friend to both countries. In the process, Istanbul was transformed. It became the center of a laboring, thinking, and creating class that faced both westward toward Europe and the United States and eastward toward the Middle East and Central Asia. Even Central Anatolia and its key city, Kayseri, once considered a Turkish backwater, was emerging as a vital center of manufacturing. "While Anatolia remains a socially conservative and religious society, it is also undergoing what some have called a `Silent Islamic Reformation,'" went the European Stability Initiative's influential 2005 report on Turkey's new Islamic Calvinists. "Many of Kayseri's business leaders even attribute their economic success to their `protestant work ethic.'" By the 1990s, the "star of Islam"--as The Economist dubbed Turkey--had gone about as far as it could within the confines of the existing Ataturk model. In 1997, the military once again swatted aside the civilian leadership in a "stealth coup," and the country seemed to be slipping back into aggressive paranoia. The Kurdish war flared; tensions with Russia over Chechnya rose; a war of words broke out with Greece over maritime territorial disputes. And Turkey nearly went to war with Syria for harboring the Kurdish separatist leader Abdullah Ocalan. But that stealth coup proved a last gasp attempt to place the uncontainable new political and economic developments in Turkish society under tighter controls. Soon enough, the military gave way again and the Islaminfluenced Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002, only enlarging its political base after the 2007 elections. Zero Problems? Throughout the twentieth century, geography had proved a liability for Turkey. It found itself beset on all sides by former Ottoman lands which held grudges against the successor state. The magic trick the AKP performed was to transform this liability into an asset. Turkey in the twentyfirst century turned on the charm. Like China, it discovered the advantages of soft power and the inescapable virtues of a "soft rise" during an era of American military and economic dominance. Led by Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, a former academic who provided a blueprint for the country's new goodneighbor policy in his 2001 book Strategic Depth, Turkey pledged "zero problems with neighbors." In foreign policy terminology, Davutoglu proposed the carving out of a Turkish sphere of influence via canny balanceofpower politics. Like China, it promised not to interfere in the domestic affairs of its partners. It also made a major effort to repair relations with those near at hand and struck new friendships with those far away. Indeed, like Beijing, Ankara has global aspirations. Perhaps the most dramatic reversal in Turkish policy involves the Kurdish region of Iraq. The dtente orchestrated by the AKP could be compared to President Richard Nixon's startling policy of rapprochement with China in the 1970s, which rapidly turned an enemy into something like an ally. In March, Turkey sent its first diplomat to Arbil, the capital of Iraqi Kurdistan, to staff a new consulate there. Today , as journalist Jonathan Head has written, "70% of investment and 80% of the products sold in the Kurdish region [of Iraq] are Turkish." Realizing that when U.S. troops leave Iraq, its Kurdish regions are bound to feel vulnerable and thus open to economic and political influence, Ankara established a "strategic cooperation council" to sort things out with the Iraqis in 2009, and this has served as a model for similar arrangements with Syria, Bulgaria, Greece, and Russia. Dtente with Iraqi Kurdistan has gone hand in hand with a relaxation of tensions between Ankara and its own Kurdish population with which it had been warring for decades. Until the early 1990s, the Turkish government pretended that the Kurdish language didn't exist. Now, there is a new 24hour Kurdishlanguage national TV station, and new faculty at Mardin Artuklu University will teach Kurdish. The government began to accept returning Kurdish refugees from northern Iraq, as well as a handful of Kurdish guerrillas from the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). This hasn't been an easy sell for Turkish nationalists. In December, a Turkish court banned the main Kurdish political party, and this spring the military launched repeated attacks against PKK targets inside Iraq. But the AKP is continuing to push reforms, including proposed changes in the country's constitution that would allow military commanders for the first time to be tried in civilian court for any crimes they commit. The elimination of this demonizing of "internal enemies" is crucial to the AKP's project, helping as it does to reduce the military's power in internal affairs. Reining in the military is a top objective for party leaders who believe it will strengthen political stability, improve prospects for future integration into the European Union (EU), and remove a powerful opponent to domestic reforms--and to the party itself. Only a little less startling than the government's gestures toward the Kurds has been its program to transform TurkishGreek relations. The two countries have long been at each other's throats, their conflict over the divided island of Cyprus being only the most visible of their disagreements. The current Greek economic crisis, however, may prove a blessing in disguise when it comes to bilateral relations. The Greek government--its finances disastrous and economic pressure from the European Union mounting--needs a way to make military budget reductions defensible. In May, Turkish president Erdogan visited Greece and, while signing 21 agreements on migration, environment, culture, and the like, began to explore the previously inconceivable possibility of mutual military reductions. "Both countries have huge defense expenses," Erdogan told Greek television, "and they will achieve a lot of savings this way." If Turkey manages a rapprochement with Armenia, it will achieve a diplomatic trifecta. The two countries disagree over the fate of the NagornoKarabakh enclave, which is also at the center of a dispute between Armenia and Turkish ally Azerbaijan. Complicating this territorial issue is a longstanding historical controversy. Armenia wants acknowledgement of the Ottoman Empire's 1915 extermination campaign that killed more than a million Armenians. The Turkish government today disputes the numbers and refuses to recognize the killings as "genocide." Nevertheless, Turkey and Armenia began direct negotiations last year to reopen their border and establish diplomatic relations. Although officially stalled, secret talks between the two are continuing. Other diplomatic efforts are no less dramatic. When Bashar Assad arrived in Ankara in 2004, it was the first visit by a Syrian leader in 57 years. Meanwhile, Turkey has cemented its relations with Russia, remains close to Iran, and has reconnected to the Balkans. This charm offensive makes Chinese efforts in Asia look bumbling. Mediation Central A friend to all sides, Turkey is offering its services as a diplomatic middleman, even in places where it was persona non grata not long ago. "Not many people would imagine that the Serbians would ask for the mediation of Turkey between different Bosniak groups in the Sandjak region of Serbia," observes Sule Kut, a Balkans expert at Bilge University in Istanbul. "Turks were the bad guys in Serbian history. So what is happening? Turkey has established itself as a credible and powerful player in the region." It's not just the Balkans. The new Turkey is establishing itself as Mediation Central. Teaming up with Brazil, Turkey fashioned a surprise compromise meant to head off confrontation with Iran over its nuclear program (which the Obama administration managed to shoot down). Along with Spain, it initiated the Alliance of Civilizations , a U.N. effort to bridge the divide between Islam and the West. It also tried to work its magic in negotiating an end to the blockade of Gaza, removing obstacles to the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq, bringing Syria and Israel together, resolving the brouhaha around the cartoon depiction of Mohammed, and hosting U.N. meetings on Somalia. "Zero problems with neighbors" is a great slogan. But it's also a logical impossibility. Turkey can't embrace Hamas without angering Egypt and Israel. It can move closer to Russia only at the potential expense of good relations with Georgia. Rapprochement with Armenia angers Azerbaijan. Nor was Ankara's attempt to transcend zerosum thinking an easy task during the "with us or against us" years of the Bush administration. In addition, there are the periodic tensions that arise around U.S. congressional resolutions on the Armenian genocide, still a touchy issue in Turkey. Washington has indicated its growing unhappiness with Turkey's increasingly active role in the Middle East, particularly its overtures to Syria. As a result, Turkey has had to finesse its relationship with the U.S. in order to remain a key NATO ally a challenger to American power in the region. As with China, the United States is willing to work with and Turkey on some diplomatic issues even as it finds the country's growing influence in the region a problem. In turn, Ankara, like Beijing, is trying to figure out how it can best take advantage of the relative decline in U.S. global influence even as it works closely with Washington on an issuebyissue basis. The greatest challenge to Turkey's zeroproblems paradigm, however, is its ever more troubled relationship with Israel. The U.S.TurkeyIsrael troika was once a solid verity of Middle Eastern politics. A considerable amount of bilateral trade, including military deals, has linked Turkey and Israel, and that trade increased dramatically during the AKP era. But Israel's 2008 invasion of Gaza--and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's subsequent excoriation of thenIsraeli president Shimon Peres at the World Economic Forum in Davos--began a process that is tearing these former allies apart, while boosting support for Turkey in the Arab world. In October, Turkey cancelled Israel's participation in a military exercise, throwing lucrative military contracts between the two countries in jeopardy. In the wake of the recent Gazaaid debacle in international waters, the rift threatens to become irreparable. When Israeli commandos seized a flotilla of ships attempting to break the Gaza embargo, killing nine Turkish citizens, Turkey spoke of severing diplomatic relations. With Israel increasingly isolated and American mediation efforts seriously compromised, only Turkey is emerging stronger from what can now only be seen as the beginning of a regional realignment of power. Once viewed with suspicion throughout the area where the Ottomans ruled, Turkey may now be the only power that has even a remote chance of one day brokering peace in the Middle East. Return to Ottomanism? NeoOttomanism is not exactly a popular phrase in Turkey today. The leadership in Ankara wants to be clear: they have no intention of projecting imperial power or reestablishing the modern equivalent of the Ottoman caliphate. However, if you look at the friendships that Turkey has cultivated and the trade relations it has emphasized--Syria, Armenia, Greece, Palestine, Iraq, Libya, the Balkans--you can see a map of the old Ottoman empire reassembling itself. In other words, just as the AKP has turned geography to its advantage, so it is transforming an imperial albatross into the goose that lays golden eggs (in the form of lucrative trade deals). In a similar way, China has tried to revive its old Sinocentric imperial system without stirring up fears of the Chinese army marching into India or the Chinese navy taking over the South China Sea, even as it--like Turkey-- also establishes friendly relations with old adversaries (including Russia). Still, even this amiable version of neoOttomanism can raise hackles. "We want a new Balkan region based on political values, economic interdependence, and cooperation and cultural harmony," Foreign Minister Davutoglu said nostalgically at a conference in Sarajevo in October. "That is what the Ottoman Balkans was like. We shall revive such a Balkan region... The Ottoman centuries were a success story, and this should be revived." A furor followed among some Serb commentators, who viewed this romanticized version of history as evidence of a Turkish desire to Islamicize the Balkans. What Turkey means by its vision of Balkan harmony may prove critical in the context of European integration . The Ottomans and Western Europe fought a succession of wars over control of the Balkans. Today, the E.U. and Turkey compete for influence in the region, and much hangs on Turkey's prospects for joining the 27member European organization. Although Turkey began the process of meeting requirements for joining the Union, the talks stalled long ago. In the meantime, some European leaders like French Prime Minister Nicholas Sarkozy have spoken out against Turkish membership, while the spread of Islamophobia throughout Europe has dimmed what enthusiasm may still exist for bringing Turkey on board. In Turkey as well, public support for membership has declined from 70% in 2002 to just over 50% today. In fact, Turkey's turn toward the Middle East, Central Asia, and North Africa has in part been a reaction to the fading of the E.U. option. Fine , the Turks are saying, if you don't want us, we can play with others. And play they have, particularly when it comes to the energy game. If oil had been discovered in its territory just a little sooner, some form of the Ottoman Empire might have survived as the wealthiest energy player in history. The riches of Iraq, Kuwait, and Libya all once fell within the territorial limits of its empire. Today, Turkey lacks energy wealth, but has worked assiduously to ensure that a maximum number of oil and natural gas pipelines flow through the country. Europe and the United States have funded a series of pipelines (like the Nabucco pipeline from the Caspian Sea) that use Turkish territory to bypass Russia and lessen Moscow's ability to blackmail Western Europe by threatening to withhold energy supplies. Turkey hasn't stopped there, however. It negotiated directly with Russia for another set of pipelines--the South Stream, which goes from Russia to Bulgaria through Turkish territorial waters, and the SamsunCeyhan pipeline that would transport Russian and Kazakh oil from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean through Turkey. Turkey now relies on Russia for 60% of its energy imports and Iran for another 30%. In this sense, "zero problems with neighbors" could just as easily be understood as "zero problems with energy suppliers." Turkey is also a builder. Of the top 225 international contractors, 35 are Turkish, second only to China. Like China, Turkey asks no difficult questions about the political environment in other countries, and so Turkish construction companies are building airports in Kurdistan and shopping malls in Libya. Despite political tensions, in 2009 they were even involved in nine projects worth more than $60 million in Israel. Finally, there is culture. Like the Confucian institutes China is establishing all over the world to spread its language, culture, and values, Turkey established the Yunus Emre Foundation in May 2009 to administer cultural centers in Germany, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Egypt, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Israel. Turkish schools have sprung up in more than 80 countries. Turkish culture has also infiltrated Middle Eastern life through television, as Turkish soap operas spread the liberal cultural values of moderate Islam. "The Turkish soaps have been daring and candid when it comes to gender equality, premarital sex, infidelity, passionate love, and even children born out of wedlock," writes journalist Nadia BilbassyCharters. Beyond Ottomanism Turkey's leaders may not themselves be comfortable with the neoOttoman label--in part because their ambitions are actually much larger. Their developing version of a peaceful, tradeoriented Pax Ottomanica takes in Turkey's improved relations with subSaharan Africa, Latin America, and the AsiaPacific. Turkey declared 2005 the "year of Africa" and accepted observer status in the African Union. In 2010, it has already opened eight embassies in African countries and plans to open another 11 next year. At the panIslamic level--and a Turk, Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, now heads up the 57member Organization of the Islamic Conference, the leading international voice of Islamic states--Turkish leaders think in terms of the ummah, the global Muslim community. For some critics, Turkey's Islamic character and its ruling Islaminfluenced party--as well as its recent attacks on Israel-- suggest that the country is on a mission to reestablish, if only informally, the Islamic caliphate. In the most extreme version of this argument, historian of the Middle East Bernard Lewis has argued that Turkey's fundamentalism will strengthen to such an extent that, in a decade's time, it will resemble Iran, even as the Islamic Republic moves in the opposite direction. This is, however, a fundamental misunderstanding of the AKP and its intentions. Islamism has about as much influence in modernday Turkey as communism does in China. In both cases, what matters most is not ideology, but the political power more nationalist and more assertive, and flexibility, not fundamentalism, has been the hallmark of its new foreign policy. In 1999, Bill Clinton suggested that if Ankara launched a reformist movement, the twenty first century could be "Turkey's century." Turkey has indeed heeded Clinton's advice. Now, Europe and the United of the ruling parties. Economic growth, political stability, and softpower diplomacy regularly trump ideological consistency. Turkey is becoming States face a choice. If Washington works with Turkey as a partner, it has a far greater chance of resolving outstanding conflicts with Iran, inside Iraq, and between the Palestinians and Israelis, not to mention simmering disputes elsewhere in the Islamic world. If the European Union accepts Turkey as a member, its economic dynamism and new credibility in the Muslim world could help jolt Europe out of its current sclerosis. Spurned by one or both, Turkey's global influence will still grow. By all means, get that Lenovo computer, buy stock in Haier, and encourage your child to study Mandarin. China can't help but be a twentyfirstcentury superpower. But if you want to really be ahead of the curve, pay close attention to that vital crossroads between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. It won't be long before we'll all be talking Turkey. **OFFSHORE BALANCING** OFFSHORE BALANCING UNIQUENESS Offshore balancing coming now and solves better than primacy Mearsheimer, 08 Ph.D., Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, International Relations Theorist (John, "Middle The United States is in deep trouble in the Middle East. Despite Barack Obama's promises to withdraw from Iraq, the debacle there shows no sign of ending soon. Hamas rules in Gaza; Iran is quickly moving to acquire a nuclear deterrent. We need a radically different strategy for the region. Fortunately, there is a strategy that has proved effective in the past and could serve again today: " offshore balancing." It's less ambitious than President Bush's grand plan to spread democracy throughout the Middle East, but it would be much better at protecting actual U.S. East: Know the Limits of U.S. Power", Newsweek, November 29th 2008, June 30th 2010, http://www.newsweek.com/id/171261, KONTOPOULOS) interests. The United States would station its military forces outside the region. And "balancing" would mean we'd rely on regional powers like Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia to check each other. Washington would remain diplomatically engaged, and when necessary would assist the weaker side in a conflict. It would also use its air and naval power to respond quickly to unexpected threats. But--and this is the key point--America would put boots on the ground only if the local balance of power seriously broke down and one country threatened to dominate the others. This approach might strike some as cynical. It would do little to foster democracy or promote human rights. But Bush couldn't deliver on those promises anyway, and it is ultimately up to individual countries to determine their own political systems. It is hardly cynical to base U.S. strategy on a realistic appraisal of American interests and a cleareyed sense of what U.S. power can and cannot accomplish. Offshore balancing is nothing new: the United States pursued such a strategy in the Middle East quite successfully during much of the Cold War. America helped Iraq contain revolutionary Iran in the 1980s. Then, when Iraq's conquest of Kuwait in 1990 threatened to tilt things in Baghdad's favor, the United States assembled a multinational coalition to smash Saddam Hussein's military machine. OFFSHORE BALANCING SOLVES ECONOMY Offshore balancing saves the US economy Mearsheimer, 08 Ph.D., Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, International Relations Theorist (John, "Middle The relative inexpensiveness of this approach is particularly attractive in the current climate. The U.S. financial bailout has been hugely expensive, and it's not clear when the economy will recover. In this environment, America simply cannot afford to be fighting endless wars across the Middle East, or anywhere else. Remember that Washington has already spent $600 billion on the Iraq War, and the tally is likely to hit more than $1 trillion before that conflict is over. Imagine the added economic consequences of a war with Iran. Offshore balancing would not be free--the United States would still have to maintain a sizable expeditionary force and the capacity to move it quickly--but would be a lot cheaper than the alternative . Global nuclear war Mead 09 (Walter Russell, Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, New Republic, February 4, East: Know the Limits of U.S. Power", Newsweek, November 29th 2008, June30th 2010, http://www.newsweek.com/id/171261, KONTOPOULOS) http://www.tnr.com/politics/story.html?id=571cbbb928874d81854292e83915f5f8&p=2] So far, such halfhearted experiments not only have failed to work; they have left the societies that have tried them in a progressively worse position, farther behind the frontrunners as time goes by. Argentina has lost ground to Chile; Russian development has fallen farther behind that of the Baltic states and Central Europe. Frequently, the crisis has weakened the power of the merchants, industrialists, financiers, and professionals who want to develop a liberal capitalist society integrated into the world. Crisis can also strengthen the hand of religious extremists, populist radicals, or authoritarian traditionalists who are determined to resist liberal capitalist society for a variety of reasons. Meanwhile, the companies and banks based in these societies are often less established and more vulnerable to the consequences of a financial crisis than more established firms in wealthier societies. As a result, developing countries and countries where capitalism has relatively recent and shallow roots tend to suffer greater economic and political damage when crisis strikesas, inevitably, it does. And, consequently, financial crises often reinforce rather than challenge the global distribution of power and wealth. This may be happening yet again. None of which means that we can just sit back and enjoy the recession. History may suggest that financial crises actually help capitalist great powers maintain their leadsbut it has other, less reassuring messages as well. If financial crises have been a normal part of life during the 300year rise of the liberal capitalist system under the Anglophone powers, so has war. The wars of the League of Augsburg and the Spanish Succession; the Seven Years War; the American Revolution; the Napoleonic Wars; the two World Wars; the cold war: The list of wars is almost as long as the list of financial crises. Bad economic times can breed wars. Europe was a pretty peaceful place in 1928, but the Depression poisoned German public opinion and helped bring Adolf Hitler to power. If the current crisis turns into a depression, what rough beasts might start slouching toward Moscow, Karachi, Beijing, or New Delhi to be born? The United States may not, yet, decline, but, if we can't get the world economy back on track, we may still have to fight. OFFSHORE BALANCING SOLVES ECONOMY AND FREE TRADE History proves Offshore balancing increases trade and the economy He, 07 Assistant Professor of Political Science at Georgia State University (Kai, "The Hegemon's Choice between Power and Security: Explaining U.S. Policy toward Asia after the Cold War", American Political Science Association, August 30th 2007, July 27th 2010, Galileo, p. 2528, KONTOPOULOS) More importantly, as offshore balancing suggests, the United States started to withdraw some troops from Asia to meet defense budget cuts in 1990. In Asia, the Bush administration planned to reduce U.S. forces by 1012%, about 14,000 to 15,000 personnel out of 135,000 forward deployed in the region in 1990.70 It was reported that the U.S. planned to reduce over 100,000 U.S. forces in Asia from 1990 to 2000.71 In 1992, the U.S. withdrew its troops from Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base in the Philippines. Although the U.S. later signed or strengthened its military agreements with some ASEAN states, such as the logistical support arrangement with Singapore in 1992, the military bases closed in Southeast Asia were not replaced. The strategic rationale behind the U.S. military withdrawals from Asia under the Bush and the first Clinton administrations follows what the offshore balancing strategy suggests. Offshore balancing argues that the United States should preserve its military primacy in the western hemisphere by reducing its overseas commitments. As an offshore balancer, the U.S. should stand on the sideline to watch power struggles among regional powers in Asia. The United States will not militarily involve or play the "balancer" role in Asia until one state, such as China or Japan, tries to dominate the region. In addition, offshore balancing emphasizes the importance of military mobility and cuttingedge technology in future warfare because the United States needs to rapidly project its military power from its own hemisphere to Asia if necessary. Compatible with offshore balancing, the U.S. Department of Defense argued in the early 1990s that "by continuing to deploy around 6% of total forces... the United States could still be a credible `regional balancer'" in the AsiaPacific.72 Moreover, U.S. military claimed that due to the advanced military and information technologies, the United States did not need permanent military bases to project its power in Asia. These "wining on the cheap" and "placenotbase" arguments were widely criticized as unrealistic either because of its overestimation of capability in the region or because of its underestimation of military budget needs to implement such a strategy. 73 However, if the strategic goal of the United States was not to prevent great power wars in Asia in the first place, but to become a balancer by last resort, this minimal deployment strategy of the United States in Asia was well justified in the early 1990s. After coming to power in 1993, President Clinton basically continued the Bush's security retreat in Asia. The BottomUp Review issued by the Secretary of Defense in 1993 still suggested further cutting the defense budget by $100 billion worldwide, and military reduction in Asia continued until 1995.74 In addition, Clinton learned a good lesson from Bush's defeat in the election, so that he set the domestic economy rather than security as the first priority of foreign policy. Multilateralism, therefore, became an important diplomatic tool for the U.S. to open the Asian market and revive the U.S. economy in the first Clinton administration. Initiated by Australia and Japan, the AsianPacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) was established in Canberra in 1989 with the aim to promote regional economic cooperation as well as tackle economic pressures from the European Union (EU) and the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The major reason for the United States to support APEC was rooted in the declining economic leverage of the United States in the AsiaPacific in the early 1990s. As Donald Crone observes, "For the U.S., the prospect of extensive erosion of security and economic positions in the Pacific induced new enthusiasm for regional cooperation [in the 1990s]."75 President Clinton placed economic revival through APEC as the top priority of U.S. foreign policy toward Asia. In 1993, the Clinton administration announced the "three pillars" of its foreign policy: economic growth, military strength, and support for democracy.76 Although cutting military spending and withdrawing troops might temporarily relieve the budgetary pressure, the foundation of U.S. power and influence lied in its domestic economy. One of the reasons for U.S. economic difficulties in the early 1990s was mounting trade deficits with Asian countries. Therefore, the Clinton Administration applied an "Asia first and trade first" policy through the building of APEC. As Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs stated in March 1993, "Economics is increasingly supplanting military considerations on our foreign policy agenda. More than ever our national security depends on our economic strength. With domestic renewal now America's highest priority, trade and investment are critical. And no region is more central for American economic interests than the world's most dynamic one--Asia."77 In July 1993, Clinton started his first overseas visits to Japan and South Korea and officially launched his "New Pacific Community" policy toward Asia. The economic essential of Clinton's "New Pacific Community" policy was to build a "more open regional and global economy" in the Asia Pacific. APEC, therefore, became the perfect vehicle for the U.S. to pursue its economic liberalization and free trade policy in the region. In November 1993, the U.S. elevated the APEC meeting from the ministerial level to the leaders' summit and invited the free and open trade and investment no later than the year 2010 and the developing economies no later than the year 2020.78 In the 1995 cooperation. There are mainly two reasons for the United States to embrace APEC in the first Clinton administration. First, t he U.S. intended to leaders of APEC to Seattle for an unprecedented summit in the AsiaPacific. The 1994 APEC meeting, with U.S. efforts, passed the "Bogor Goals"--the first timetable for achieving free and open trade and investment in the AsiaPacific. The industrialized economies committed to the goal of APEC meeting held in Osaka, Japan, APEC members adopted the Osaka Action Agenda (OAA) which provided a framework for implementing the "Bogor Goals" through trade and investment liberalization, business facilitation and sectoral activities, underpinned by policy dialogues, economic and technical resume its leadership through multilateralism. Although U.S. power was seemingly in decline due to domestic economic constraints, the United States was still confident of being the dominant power in Asia after the cold war. Through multilateral institutions the U.S. could legitimize its eroding leadership with its stilldominantpower in the region. It is true that the United States had to compromise its freedom of action and interests in multilateral institutions. However, declining hegemony forced the United States to accept this price for the return of leadership . Second, APEC was a multilateral means for the U.S. to push for free trade and economic liberalization in the region for the sake of its domestic economic revival. Since the 1980s, the U.S. had encountered serious trade deficits with its Asian allies, especially with Japan. After the Cold War trade deficits accompanying domestic economic recessions made it imperative for the U.S. to solve this trade imbalance problem with Asia. President Clinton stated in the 1993 APEC meeting in Seattle, " We [the U.S.] do not intend to bear the cost of our military presence in Asia and the burdens of regional leadership only to be shut out of the benefits of growth that stability brings...we must use every means available in the Pacific, as elsewhere, to promote a more open world economy..."79 The reasons for the U.S. to push for a "more open economy" in Asia are straightforward. First, the U.S. economy is productive, technological, dynamic, exportcompetitive. Free market and economic liberalization benefit the U.S. economy more than Asian economies. Second, APEC, a multilateral arrangement, has many institutional functions facilitating economic liberalization. For example, multilateral negotiations can reduce transaction costs that the U.S. has to pay for bilateral negotiations with individual countries. In addition, as Ellis Krauss suggests, APEC "would enable the U.S. to work with the other countries of the region to pressure Japan to promote change [to open its domestic market] in a less offensive and more effective way than the bilateral pressure had done."80 Last, economic liberalization echoed U.S. liberal beliefs that free trade and increased economic interdependence would diminish prospects for wars.81 In sum, the relative decline of U.S. hegemony in the early 1990s led George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton to conduct offshore balancing and multilateralism to cope with the strategic uncertainty after the cold war. The strategic goal of Bush's military withdrawal and Clinton's APEC policy is to protect U.S. military security and economic interests in the region . However, when its domestic economy revived in the middle of the 1990s, U.S. policymakers began to change their perceptions of U.S. hegemony and consequently adopted new strategies in Asia. Economic decline causes global nuclear war Mead 09 (Walter Russell, Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, New Republic, February 4, http://www.tnr.com/politics/story.html?id=571cbbb928874d81854292e83915f5f8&p=2] So far, such halfhearted experiments not only have failed to work; they have left the societies that have tried them in a progressively worse position, farther behind the frontrunners as time goes by. Argentina has lost ground to Chile; Russian development has fallen farther behind that of the Baltic states and Central Europe. Frequently, the crisis has weakened the power of the merchants, industrialists, financiers, and professionals who want to develop a liberal capitalist society integrated into the world. Crisis can also strengthen the hand of religious extremists, populist radicals, or authoritarian traditionalists who are determined to resist liberal capitalist society for a variety of reasons. Meanwhile, the companies and banks based in these societies are often less established and more vulnerable to the consequences of a financial crisis than more established firms in wealthier societies. As a result, developing countries and countries where capitalism has relatively recent and shallow roots tend to suffer greater economic and political damage when crisis strikesas, inevitably, it does. And, consequently, financial crises often reinforce rather than challenge the global distribution of power and wealth. This may be happening yet again. None of which means that we can just sit back and enjoy the recession. History may suggest that financial crises actually help capitalist great powers maintain their leadsbut it has other, less reassuring messages as well. If financial crises have been a normal part of life during the 300year rise of the liberal capitalist system under the Anglophone powers, so has war. The wars of the League of Augsburg and the Spanish Succession; the Seven Years War; the American Revolution; the Napoleonic Wars; the two World Wars; the cold war: The list of wars is almost as long as the list of financial crises. Bad economic times can breed wars. Europe was a pretty peaceful place in 1928, but the Depression poisoned German public opinion and helped bring Adolf Hitler to power. If the current crisis turns into a depression, what rough beasts might start slouching toward Moscow, Karachi, Beijing, or New Delhi to be born? The United States may not, yet, decline, but, if we can't get the world economy back on track, we may still have to fight. Free trade solves nuclear war Copley News Service, 99 (December 1) For decades, many children in America and other countries went to bed fearing annihilation by nuclear war. The specter of nuclear winter freezing the life out of planet Earth seemed very real. Activists protesting the World Trade Organization's meeting in Seattle apparently have forgotten that threat. The truth is that nations join together in groups like the WTO not just to further their own prosperity, but also to forestall conflict with other nations. In a way, our planet has traded in the threat of a worldwide nuclear war for the benefit of cooperative global economics. Some Seattle protesters clearly fancy themselves to be in the mold of nuclear disarmament or antiVietnam War protesters of decades past. But they're not. They're specialinterest activists, whether the cause is environmental, labor or paranoia about global government. Actually, most of the demonstrators in Seattle are very much unlike yesterday's peace activists, such as Beatle John Lennon or philosopher Bertrand Russell, the father of the nuclear disarmament movement, both of whom urged people and nations to work together rather than strive against each other. These and other war protesters would probably approve of 135 WTO nations sitting down peacefully to discuss economic issues that in the past might have been settled by bullets and bombs. As long as nations are trading peacefully, and their economies are built on exports to other countries, they have a major disincentive to wage war. That's why bringing China, a budding superpower, into the WTO is so important. As exports to the United States and the rest of the world feed Chinese prosperity, and that prosperity increases demand for the goods we produce, the threat of hostility diminishes. Many antitrade protesters in Seattle claim that only multinational corporations benefit from global trade, and that it's the everyday wage earners who get hurt. That's just plain wrong. First of all, it's not the militaryindustrial complex benefiting. It's U.S. companies that make hightech goods. And those companies provide a growing number of jobs for Americans. In San Diego, many people have good jobs at Qualcomm, Solar Turbines and other companies for whom overseas markets are essential. In Seattle, many of the 100,000 people who work at Boeing would lose their livelihoods without world trade. Foreign trade today accounts for 30 percent of our gross domestic product. That's a lot of jobs for everyday workers. Growing global prosperity has helped counter the specter of nuclear winter. Nations of the world are learning to live and work together, like the singers of antiwar songs once imagined. Those who care about world peace shouldn't be protesting world trade. They should be celebrating it. OFFSHORE BALANCING SOLVES IRAN AND SYRIA PROLIFERATION Offshore balancing prevents Iran and Syrian proliferation Mearsheimer, 08 Ph.D., Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, International Relations Theorist (John, "Middle East: Know Third, offshore balancing would reduce fears in Iran and Syria that the United States aims to attack them and the Limits of U.S. Power", Newsweek, November 29th 2008, July 2nd 2010, http://www.newsweek.com/2008/11/28/middleeastknowthelimitsofus power.html, KONTOPOULOS) remove their regimes--a key reason these states are currently seeking weapons of mass destruction. Persuading Tehran to abandon its nuclear program will require Washington to address Iran's legitimate security concerns and to refrain from overt threats. Iranian proliferation causes runaway prolif and nuclear war Kurtz, 06 (Stanley, senior fellow at the Ethics and Public Policy Center, "Our FalloutShelter Future", National Review Online, 8/28, http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=OWU4MDMwNmU5MTI5NGYzN2FmODg5NmYyMWQ4YjM3OTU=) Proliferation optimists, on the other hand, see reasons for hope in the record of nuclear peace during the Cold War. While granting the risks, proliferation optimists point out that the very horror of the nuclear option tends, in practice, to keep the peace . Without choosing between hawkish proliferation pessimists and dovish proliferation optimists, Rosen simply asks how we ought to act in a post proliferation world. Rosen assumes (rightly I believe) that proliferation is unlikely to stop with Iran. Once Iran gets the bomb, Turkey and Saudi Arabia are likely to develop their own nuclear weapons, for selfprotection, and so as not to allow Iran to take de facto culturalpolitical control of the Muslim world. (I think you've got to at least add Egypt to this list.) With three, four, or more nuclear states in the Muslim Middle East, what becomes of deterrence? A key to deterrence during the Cold War was our ability to know who had hit whom. With a small number of geographically separated nuclear states, and with the big opponents training satellites and specialized advanceguard radar emplacements on each other, it was relatively easy to know where a missile had come from. But what if a nuclear missile is launched at the United States from somewhere in a fully nuclearized Middle East, in the middle of a war in which, say, Saudi Arabia and Iran are already lobbing conventional missiles at one another? Would we know who had attacked us? Could we actually drop a retaliatory nuclear bomb on someone without being absolutely certain? And as Rosen asks, What if the nuclear blow was delivered against us by an airplane or a cruise missile? It might be almost impossible to trace the attack back to its source with certainty, especially in the midst of an ongoing conventional conflict. More Terror We're familiar with the horror scenario of a Muslim state passing a nuclear bomb to terrorists for use against an American city. But imagine the same scenario in a multipolar Muslim nuclear world. With several Muslim countries in possession of the bomb, it would be extremely difficult to trace the state source of a nuclear terror strike. In fact, this very difficulty would encourage states (or illcontrolled elements within nuclear states -- like Pakistan's intelligence services or Iran's Revolutionary Guards ) to pass nukes to terrorists. The tougher it is to trace the source of a weapon, the easier it is to give the weapon away. In short, nuclear proliferation to multiple Muslim states greatly increases the chances of a nuclear terror strike. Right now, the Indians and Pakistanis "enjoy" an apparently stable nuclear standoff. Both countries have established basic deterrence, channels of communication, and have also eschewed a potentially destabilizing nuclear arms race. Attacks by Kashmiri militants in 2001 may have pushed India and Pakistan close to the nuclear brink. Yet since then, precisely because of the danger, the two countries seem to have established a clear, deterrencebased understanding. The 2001 crisis gives fuel to proliferation pessimists, while the current stability encourages proliferation optimists. Rosen points out, however, that a multipolar nuclear Middle East is unlikely to follow the South Asian model. Deep mutual suspicion between an expansionist, apocalyptic, Shiite Iran, secular Turkey, and the Sunni Saudis and Egyptians (not to mention Israel) is likely to fuel a dangerous multipronged nuclear arms race. Larger arsenals mean more chance of a weapon being slipped to terrorists. The collapse of the world's nonproliferation regime also raises the chances that nuclearization will spread to Asian powers like Taiwan and Japan. And of course, possession of nuclear weapons is likely to embolden Iran, especially in the transitional period before the Saudis develop weapons of their own. Like Saddam, Iran may be tempted to take control of Kuwait's oil wealth, on the assumption that the United States will not dare risk a nuclear confrontation by escalating the conflict. If the proliferation optimists are right, then once the Saudis get nukes, Iran would be far less likely to make a move on nearby Kuwait. On the other hand, to the extent that we do see conventional war in a nuclearized Middle East, the losers will be sorely tempted to cancel out their defeat with a nuclear strike. There may have been nuclear peace during the Cold War, but there were also many "hot" proxy wars. If conventional wars break out in a nuclearized Middle East, it may be very difficult to stop them from escalating into nuclear confrontations. OFFSHORE BALANCING SOLVES MIDDLE EASTERN STABILITY, TERRORISM, IRAN PROLIFERATION Offshore balancing would solve Middle Eastern Stability, Terrorism and Iranian proliferation Mearsheimer, 08 Ph.D., Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, International Relations Theorist (John, "Middle The strategy has three particular virtues. First, it would significantly reduce the chances that we would get involved in East: Know the Limits of U.S. Power", Newsweek, November 29th 2008, June30th 2010, http://www.newsweek.com/id/171261, KONTOPOULOS) another bloody and costly war like Iraq. America doesn't need to control the Middle East with its own forces; it merely needs to ensure that no other country does. Second, offshore balancing would ameliorate America's terrorism problem. Foreign occupiers generate fierce resentment. Keeping America's military forces out of sight would minimize the anger created by having them stationed on Arab soil. Third, offshore balancing would reduce fears in Iran and Syria that the United States aims to attack them and remove their regimes--a key reason these states are currently seeking weapons of mass destruction. Persuading Tehran to abandon its nuclear program will require Washington to address Iran's legitimate security concerns and to refrain from overt threats. Nuclear war from Middle East war Steinbach, 02 (John, Israeli Nuclear weapons: a threat to piece, 3/3 http://www.converge.org.nz/pma/mat0036.htm) Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war. Seymour Hersh warns, "Should war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would now be a strong probability."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is gaining momentum (and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major (if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use , if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon- for whatever reason- the deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration ." Extinction from terrorism SidAhmed, 04 (Mohamed, Managing Editor for AlAhali, "Extinction!" August 26September 1, Issue no. 705, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm) A nuclear attack by terrorists will be much more critical than Hiroshima and Nagazaki , even if and this is far from certain the weapons used are less harmful than those used then, Japan, at the time, with no knowledge of nuclear technology, had no choice but to capitulate. Today, the technology is a secret for nobody. So far, except for the two bombs dropped on Japan, nuclear weapons have been used only to threaten. Now we are at a stage where they can be detonated. This completely changes the rules of the game. We have reached a point where anticipatory measures can determine the course of events. Allegations of a terrorist connection can be used to justify anticipatory measures, including the invasion of a sovereign state like Iraq. As it turned out, these allegations, as well as the allegation that Saddam was harbouring WMD, proved to be unfounded. What features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This could lead to a third world war, from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without winners and losers. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers. would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the negative OFFSHORE BALANCING SOLVES MIDDLE EASTERN STABILITY, TERRORISM, IRAN PROLIFERATION Iranian proliferation causes runaway prolif and nuclear war Kurtz, 06 (Stanley, senior fellow at the Ethics and Public Policy Center, "Our FalloutShelter Future", National Review Online, 8/28, http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=OWU4MDMwNmU5MTI5NGYzN2FmODg5NmYyMWQ4YjM3OTU=) Proliferation optimists, on the other hand, see reasons for hope in the record of nuclear peace during the Cold War. While granting the risks, proliferation optimists point out that the very horror of the nuclear option tends, in practice, to keep the peace . Without choosing between hawkish proliferation pessimists and dovish proliferation optimists, Rosen simply asks how we ought to act in a post proliferation world. Rosen assumes (rightly I believe) that proliferation is unlikely to stop with Iran. Once Iran gets the bomb, Turkey and Saudi Arabia are likely to develop their own nuclear weapons, for selfprotection, and so as not to allow Iran to take de facto culturalpolitical control of the Muslim world. (I think you've got to at least add Egypt to this list.) With three, four, or more nuclear states in the Muslim Middle East, what becomes of deterrence? A key to deterrence during the Cold War was our ability to know who had hit whom. With a small number of geographically separated nuclear states, and with the big opponents training satellites and specialized advanceguard radar emplacements on each other, it was relatively easy to know where a missile had come from. But what if a nuclear missile is launched at the United States from somewhere in a fully nuclearized Middle East, in the middle of a war in which, say, Saudi Arabia and Iran are already lobbing conventional missiles at one another? Would we know who had attacked us? Could we actually drop a retaliatory nuclear bomb on someone without being absolutely certain? And as Rosen asks, What if the nuclear blow was delivered against us by an airplane or a cruise missile? It might be almost impossible to trace the attack back to its source with certainty, especially in the midst of an ongoing conventional conflict. More Terror We're familiar with the horror scenario of a Muslim state passing a nuclear bomb to terrorists for use against an American city. But imagine the same scenario in a multipolar Muslim nuclear world. With several Muslim countries in possession of the bomb, it would be extremely difficult to trace the state source of a nuclear terror strike. In fact, this very difficulty would encourage states (or illcontrolled elements within nuclear states -- like Pakistan's intelligence services or Iran's Revolutionary Guards ) to pass nukes to terrorists. The tougher it is to trace the source of a weapon, the easier it is to give the weapon away. In short, nuclear proliferation to multiple Muslim states greatly increases the chances of a nuclear terror strike. Right now, the Indians and Pakistanis "enjoy" an apparently stable nuclear standoff. Both countries have established basic deterrence, channels of communication, and have also eschewed a potentially destabilizing nuclear arms race. Attacks by Kashmiri militants in 2001 may have pushed India and Pakistan close to the nuclear brink. Yet since then, precisely because of the danger, the two countries seem to have established a clear, deterrencebased understanding. The 2001 crisis gives fuel to proliferation pessimists, while the current stability encourages proliferation optimists. Rosen points out, however, that a multipolar nuclear Middle East is unlikely to follow the South Asian model. Deep mutual suspicion between an expansionist, apocalyptic, Shiite Iran, secular Turkey, and the Sunni Saudis and Egyptians (not to mention Israel) is likely to fuel a dangerous multipronged nuclear arms race. Larger arsenals mean more chance of a weapon being slipped to terrorists. The collapse of the world's nonproliferation regime also raises the chances that nuclearization will spread to Asian powers like Taiwan and Japan. And of course, possession of nuclear weapons is likely to embolden Iran, especially in the transitional period before the Saudis develop weapons of their own. Like Saddam, Iran may be tempted to take control of Kuwait's oil wealth, on the assumption that the United States will not dare risk a nuclear confrontation by escalating the conflict. If the proliferation optimists are right, then once the Saudis get nukes, Iran would be far less likely to make a move on nearby Kuwait. On the other hand, to the extent that we do see conventional war in a nuclearized Middle East, the losers will be sorely tempted to cancel out their defeat with a nuclear strike. There may have been nuclear peace during the Cold War, but there were also many "hot" proxy wars. If conventional wars break out in a nuclearized Middle East, it may be very difficult to stop them from escalating into nuclear confrontations. OFFSHORE BALANCING SOLVES MIDDLE EASTERN DEMOCRACY Offshore balancing abandons Middle Eastern democratization Layne, 07 Mary Julia and George R. Jordan Professor of International Affairs at Texas A&M's George Bush School of Government and Public Service, Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, LL.M. in International Law from Virginia Law, J.D. from USC, and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute (Christopher, "Who Lost Iraq and Why It Matters The Case for Offshore Balancing", International Security Review, MIT Press, November 30th 2007, June30th 2010, p. 10, KONTOPOULOS) PDF Additionally, an offshore balancing strategy would abandon the current policy of promoting democratic transformation in the Middle East. The United States cannot successfully pick and chose winners in the region's politics. Although Washington may hope that friendly regimes in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan remain in power, it cannot ensure that they do. The tide of popular Islamism sweeping the region--which fuses religious radicalism, nationalism, and opposition to the West--imperils these regimes and inevitably will sweep some away. The United States should be prepared to let nature take its course. Indeed, in the Middle East, by identifying itself too closely with regimes in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan, the United States runs the double risk of becoming entrapped in potential domestic upheavals and thereby giving additional stimulus to radical Islamic terrorists who want to target the United States. OFFSHORE BALANCING SOLVES MIDDLE EASTERN STABILITY Offshore balancing solves Middle East stability and terrorism Layne, 09 Mary Julia and George R. Jordan Professor of International Affairs at Texas A&M's George Bush School of Government and Public Service, Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, LL.M. in International Law from Virginia Law, J.D. from USC, and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute (Christopher, "America's Middle East grand strategy after Iraq: the moment for offshore balancing has arrived", Review of International Studies, 2009, June 30th 2010, Galileo, KONTOPOULOS) PDF The US has reached a watershed in Iraq and the Middle East. Washington needs to revamp its overall regional grand strategy because the current strategy is in shambles. Although the security situation in Iraq has improved since late 2006, the nation remains extremely fragile politically and its future is problematic. On the other hand, things are unravelling in Afghanistan, where the insurgency led by the revitalised Taliban is spreading. The US and Iran remain on a collision course over Tehran's nuclear weapons programme and its larger regional ambitions. Moreover, the summer 2006 fighting in Lebanon weakened US Middle Eastern policy in four ways. First, it enhanced Iran's regional clout. Second, it intensified antiAmerican public opinion in the Middle East. Third, it fuelled a populist Islamic groundswell in the region that threatens to undermine America's key Middle East allies: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. Fourth, American policy in the Middle East has increased the terrorist threat to the US. The Bush administration's Middle East policy was a classic example of an antiwedge `strategy'. Rather than preventing the coalescence of forces hostile to the US, or deflecting their attention from the US, the Bush strategy has had the effect of unifying diverse groups against American interests. Instead of viewing them as discrete conflicts, the Bush administration regarded the conflict in Iraq, the `war on terror', unrest in Gaza and the West Bank, turmoil in Lebanon, and the confrontation with Iran as part of a single enterprise. This tendency to aggregate opponents rather than to peel them off was first evidenced in January 2002 when President Bush linked Iran and Iraq and North Korea as part of an `axis of evil'. Similarly, although Syria and Iran long have had an ambivalent relationship, the administration grouped them together rather than trying to split them apart. Bush also lumped together Sunni Islamic radical groups like AlQaeda and Hamas and Shiite fundamentalists like Muqtada al Sadr's Mahdi Army in Iraq, the Iranian regime, and Hezbollah and regarded them as a single, unitary menace. As Bush put it, `The Shia and Sunni extremists are different faces of the same totalitarian threat. Whatever slogans they chant, when they slaughter the innocent they have the same wicked purposes. They want to kill Americans, kill democracy in the Middle East, and gain the weapons to kill on an even more horrific scale.'15 Bush's comments manifested a vast ignorance of the cleavages in the Islamic world. Even worse, his policy of treating Sunni and Shiite radicals as a single threat may have acted as a selffulfilling prophecy a `glue strategy' that instead of dividing or neutralising opponents of the US, unified them and created threats that either would not otherwise exist, or would be much less potent. In the Middle East, an offshore balancing strategy wouldbreak sharply with the Bush administration's approach to the Middle East. As an offshore balancer, the US would redefine its regional interests, reduce its military role, and adopt a new regional diplomatic posture. It would seek to dampen the terrorist threat by removing the onthe ground US military presence in the region, and to quell rampant anti Americanism in the Islamic world by pushing hard for a resolution of the Israeli/ Palestinian conflict. The strategy would also avoid further destabilisation of the Middle East by abandoning the project of regional democratic transformation. Finally, as an offshore balancer, Washington would seek a diplomatic accommodation of its differences with Iran. Nuclear war from Middle East war Steinbach, 02 (John, Israeli Nuclear weapons: a threat to piece, 3/3 http://www.converge.org.nz/pma/mat0036.htm) Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war. Seymour Hersh warns, "Should war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would now be a strong probability."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is gaining momentum (and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major (if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use , if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon- for whatever reason- the deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration ." OFFSHORE BALANCING SOLVES MIDDLE EASTERN STABILITY Extinction from terrorism SidAhmed, 04 (Mohamed, Managing Editor for AlAhali, "Extinction!" August 26September 1, Issue no. 705, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm) A nuclear attack by terrorists will be much more critical than Hiroshima and Nagazaki , even if and this is far from certain the weapons used are less harmful than those used then, Japan, at the time, with no knowledge of nuclear technology, had no choice but to capitulate. Today, the technology is a secret for nobody. So far, except for the two bombs dropped on Japan, nuclear weapons have been used only to threaten. Now we are at a stage where they can be detonated. This completely changes the rules of the game. We have reached a point where anticipatory measures can determine the course of events. Allegations of a terrorist connection can be used to justify anticipatory measures, including the invasion of a sovereign state like Iraq. As it turned out, these allegations, as well as the allegation that Saddam was harbouring WMD, proved to be unfounded. What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This could lead to a third world war, from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without winners and losers. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers. OFFSHORE BALANCING SOLVES TERRORISM Offshore balancing solves recruits that fuel terrorism Layne, 07 Mary Julia and George R. Jordan Professor of International Affairs at Texas A&M's George Bush School of Government and Public Service, Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, LL.M. in International Law from Virginia Law, J.D. from USC, and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute (Christopher, "Who Lost Iraq and Why It Matters The Case for Offshore Balancing", International Security Review, MIT Press, November 30th 2007, June 30th, 2010, KONTOPOULOS) PDF Contrary to the administration, the presence of U.S. troops in Iraq and the Middle East increases American vulnerability to terrorism by reinforcing the widespread perception in the Islamic world that Washington is pursuing a neo colonial policy to further its own imperial ambitions. The huge U.S. politicomilitary footprint in the region, including Iraq, is the primary driver of Middle Eastern terrorism, and has garnered thousands of recruits for various radical terrorist groups. Contrary to the administration, Islamic radicals do not hate the United States because of its freedom; they hate the United States because of its policies. As University of Chicago political scientist Robert Pape argues, offshore balancing "is America's best strategy for the Persian Gulf " because the "mere presence of tens of thousands of U.S. troops in the region is likely to fuel continued fear of foreign occupation that will fuel antiAmerican terrorism in the future."39 Similarly, Harvard's Stephen Walt who also favors a U.S. offshore balancing strategy in the Middle East, observes, "The U.S. does have important interests in the Middle East--including access to oil and the need to combat terrorism-- but neither objective is well served by occupying the region with its own military forces."40 Indeed, maintaining American military dominance in the Persian Gulf and overthrowing nasty regimes in the Middle East are not effective policies to reduce the terrorist threat to the United States. Tactically speaking, terrorism is best combated through good intelligence (including collaboration with U.S. allies), covert operations, and strengthening America's homeland defenses. Extinction SidAhmed, 04 (Mohamed, Managing Editor for AlAhali, "Extinction!" August 26September 1, Issue no. 705, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm) A nuclear attack by terrorists will be much more critical than Hiroshima and Nagazaki , even if and this is far from certain the weapons used are less harmful than those used then, Japan, at the time, with no knowledge of nuclear technology, had no choice but to capitulate. Today, the technology is a secret for nobody. So far, except for the two bombs dropped on Japan, nuclear weapons have been used only to threaten. Now we are at a stage where they can be detonated. This completely changes the rules of the game. We have reached a point where anticipatory measures can determine the course of events. Allegations of a terrorist connection can be used to justify anticipatory measures, including the invasion of a sovereign state like Iraq. As it turned out, these allegations, as well as the allegation that Saddam was harbouring WMD, proved to be unfounded. What features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This could lead to a third world war, from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without winners and losers. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers. Offshore balancing removes troops which is the root cause of terrorism Layne, 07 Mary Julia and George R. Jordan Professor of International Affairs at Texas A&M's George Bush School of Government and Public Service, Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, LL.M. in International Law from Virginia Law, J.D. from USC, and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute (Christopher, "Who Lost Iraq and Why It Matters The Case for Offshore Balancing", International Security Review, MIT Press, November 30th 2007, June30th 2010, p. 8, KONTOPOULOS) PDF would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the negative Not only would an offshore balancing strategy break sharply with the current approach to the Middle East, but it would likely garner much needed domestic support as well.38 By adopting such a strategy, the United States would redefine its regional interests, revamp its military role, and adopt a new diplomatic posture. Offshore balancing must also incorporate a new approach to energy security. It would seek to dampen the terrorist threat by removing the ontheground U.S. military presence in the region, and to quell rampant anti Americanism in the Islamic world by pushing hard for a resolution of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. It would seek a diplomatic accommodation of its differences with Iran. Most importantly, the strategy would avoid further destabilization of the Middle East by abandoning the project of democratic transformation. OFFSHORE BALANCING SOLVES TERRORISM Offshore balancing solves terrorism Layne, 07 Mary Julia and George R. Jordan Professor of International Affairs at Texas A&M's George Bush School of Government and Public Service, Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, LL.M. in International Law from Virginia Law, J.D. from USC, and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute (Christopher, "Balancing Act", The American Conservative, September 10th 2007, July 27th 2010, Galileo, p. 2, KONTOPOULOS) PDF If policymakers are serious about reducing America's exposure to the Islamic terrorist attacks, the way to do so is to adopt a new strategy that would lower the U.S. profile in the region-- what securitystudies scholars call " offshore balancing." As Pape argues, offshore balancing "is America's best strategy for the Persian Gulf" because the "mere presence of tens of thousands of U.S. troops in the region is likely to fuel continued fear of foreign occupation that will fuel anti American terrorism in the future." Similarly, Harvard's Stephen Walt, who also favors a U.S. offshorebalancing strategy in the Middle East, observes, "The U.S. does have important interests in the Middle East-- including access to oil and the need to combat terrorism--but neither objective is well served by occupying the region with its own military forces." Even Michael Lind, who is skeptical that offshore balancing is a good strategy for the United States to follow in Europe and East Asia, believes it is the best grand strategy option for the United States in the Middle East. OFFSHORE BALANCING SOLVES WAR Offshore balancing solves war best Layne, 09 Mary Julia and George R. Jordan Professor of International Affairs at Texas A&M's George Bush School of Government and Public Service, Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, LL.M. in International Law from Virginia Law, J.D. from USC, and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute (Christopher, "America's Middle East grand strategy after Iraq: the moment for offshore balancing has arrived", Review of International Studies, 2009, June 30th 2010, Galileo, KONTOPOULOS) PDF While not generally conceived of as a wedge strategy, offshore balancing is a way that an insular great power can neutralise threats to its security. By acting as an offshore balancer, an insular great power can accomplish two vital grand strategic tasks. First, because its wouldbe adversaries invariably live in dangerous neighbourhoods, by truly being `offshore' and nonthreatening, an insular great power can deflect the focus of other states' security policies away from itself. Simply put, if an offshore power stands on the sidelines, other great powers will compete against each other, not against it. It can thus enhance its security simply because the dynamics of balanceofpower politics invariably will draw wouldbe competitors in other regions into rivalries with each other. The fact that noninsular states must worry constantly about possible threats from nearby neighbours is a factor that historically has worked to increase the relative power position of insular states. Thus, as Paul Kennedy notes, after 1815 a major reason that Britain's interests were not challenged by an overwhelming coalition was due to `the preoccupation of virtually all European statesman with continental power politics' because it `was the moves of their neighbors, not the usually discreet workings of British sea power, which interested them'. 12 OFFSHORE BALANCING SOLVES TRANSITION WARS Offshore balancing solves the transition He, 07 Assistant Professor of Political Science at Georgia State University (Kai, "The Hegemon's Choice between Power and Security: Explaining U.S. Policy toward Asia after the Cold War", American Political Science Association, August 30th 2007, July 27th 2010, Galileo, p. 20, KONTOPOULOS) Therefore, if the declining hegemon initiates a war against rising powers, the war will accelerate, rather than slow down, the pace of the hegemon's decline. Offshore balancing is a better strategy for the declining hegemon because it will help the hegemon avoid unnecessary extraregional wars. If any hostile power intends to dominate other regions and possibly threaten the hegemon's security at home, as Nazi Germany did during World War II, the offshore balancing strategy also dictates the hegemon to use force to conduct military balancing as the last resort. Offshore balancing smoothes the transition He, 07 Assistant Professor of Political Science at Georgia State University (Kai, "The Hegemon's Choice between Power and Security: Explaining U.S. Policy toward Asia after the Cold War", American Political Science Association, August 30th 2007, July 27th 2010, Galileo, p. 3435, KONTOPOULOS) When U.S. policymakers perceive a declining hegemony in that the power gap between the hegemon and others is narrowed rather than widened, U.S. policymakers begin to change their hierarchic view on the international system. The rapid decline of relative power causes U.S. policymakers to worry about security imposed by anarchy even though the United States may remain the most powerful state in the system during the process of decline. Offshore balancing and multilateralism, therefore, become two possible policy options for the United States to maximize its security under anarchy. The possible budget constraints during U.S. decline may lead to military withdrawals from overseas bases. In addition, the United States becomes more willing to pay the initial "lockin" price of multilateral institutions in order to constrain other states' behavior through institutions for its own security. OFFFSHORE BALANCING SOLVES USIRAN WAR Offshore balancing solves USIran War Layne, 07 Mary Julia and George R. Jordan Professor of International Affairs at Texas A&M's George Bush School of Government and Public Service, Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, LL.M. in International Law from Virginia Law, J.D. from USC, and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute (Christopher, "Balancing Act", The American Conservative, September 10th 2007, July 27th 2010, Galileo, p. 3, KONTOPOULOS) PDF Adoption of an offshore balancing strategy would require overhauling U.S. strategy toward the entire Middle East, not just Iraq. With respect to Iran, an offshore balancing strategy would rule out war. While a nucleararmed Iran hardly is desirable, neither is it, as Bush repeatedly has proclaimed, "intolerable," because it could be contained and deterred successfully by the United States. Israel's security with respect to Iran is guaranteed by its own formidable nucleardeterrent capabilities--something hysterical neocons conveniently forget--and just as it did in Europe during the Cold War, the U.S. can extend its own deterrence umbrella to protect its other clients in the region. Given the overwhelming American advantage in both nuclear and conventional military capabilities, Iran is not going to risk national suicide by challenging America's security commitments in the region. Extinction Hirsch, 06 (Jorge Hirsch (San Diego Union Tribune) January 3, 2006 "America's nuclear ticking bomb" http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20060103/news_mz1e3hirsch.html) If only conventional bombs are used in an unprovoked U.S. or Israeli aerial attack against Iran's facilities, Iran is likely to retaliate with missiles against coalition forces in Iraq and against Israel, as well as possibly a ground invasion of southern Iraq, that the 150,000 U.S. troops in Iraq would not be able to withstand. Iranian missiles could potentially contain chemical warheads, and it certainly would be impossible to rule out such possibility. Iran has signed and ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (in 1993 and 1997 respectively), however it is still likely to have supplies, as determined by the U.S. State Department in August 2005. Early use by the United States of lowyield nuclear bombs with better bunkerbusting ability than conventional bombs targeting Iranian nuclear, chemical and missile installations would be consistent with the new U.S. nuclear weapons doctrine and could be argued to be necessary to protect the lives of 150,000 U.S. soldiers in Iraq and of Israeli citizens. It would also send a clear message to Iran that any response would be answered by a far more devastating nuclear attack, thus potentially saving both American and Iranian lives. However, the nuclear threshold is a line of no return. Once the United States uses a nuclear weapon against a nonnuclear adversary, the 182 countries that are signatories of the Nuclear NonProliferation treaty will rightly feel at risk, and many of them will rush to develop their own nuclear deterrent while they can. A new world with many more nuclear countries, and a high risk of any regional conflict exploding into allout nuclear war, will be the consequence. The scientific community (which created nuclear weapons) is alarmed over the new U.S. nuclear weapons policies. A petition to reverse these policies launched by physicists at the University of California San Diego has gathered over 1,500 physicists' signatures including eight Nobel laureates and many prominent members of the U.S. scientific establishment (http://physics.ucsd.edu/petition/). Scientists object strongly to the concept of WMD, that lumps together nuclear weapons with other "weapons of mass destruction" and blurs the sharp line that separates immensely more destructive nuclear weapons from all other weapons. An escalating nuclear war could lead to the destruction of bombs targeting underground installations versus those targeting cities or armies. civilization. There is no fundamental difference between small nuclear bombs and large ones , nor between nuclear OFFSHORE BALANCING BEST AVAILABLE Even if they win their offense offshore balancing is the best available option Mearsheimer, 08 Ph.D., Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, International Relations Theorist (John, "Middle East: Know the Limits of U.S. Power", Newsweek, November 29th 2008, July 2nd 2010, http://www.newsweek.com/2008/11/28/middleeastknowthelimitsofus power.html, KONTOPOULOS) A final, compelling reason to adopt this approach is that nothing else has worked. After the Gulf war, the Clinton administration pursued a "dual containment" strategy: instead of using Iraq and Iran to check each other, the United States began trying to contain both. As a result, both came to view the United States as a bitter enemy. The policy also required the United States to deploy large numbers of troops in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, which helped persuade Osama bin Laden to declare war on America. Great power solves comparatively better it also decreases overstretch Walt and Ikenberry, 07 *Professor of International Affairs at Harvard University and **Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University (*Stephen and **G. John, "Offshore Balancing or International Institutions? The Way Forward for U.S. Foreign Policy", Debate at the Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown Journal of World Affairs, Fall/Winter 2007, July 2nd 2010, Volume 14, Issue 1, KONTOPOULOS) PDF *This was a debate between Walt and Ikenberry, the card quotes Walt A better, more realistic strategy would be one of offshore balancing. It recognizes the U nited States doesn't need to control other parts of the world or tell other societies how to govern their own internal processes. It just needs to maintain local balances of power to ensure that key areas of the world aren't dominated by hostile powers. For example, we have to make sure that Persian Gulf oil doesn't fall under the control of a single hostile power. Intervening with our own forces should only be a last resort, partly because other countries see U.S. power as potentially dangerous. Offshore balancing recognizes that U.S. power can do many good things, but the United States is not good at running other societies and we should stay out of that business. It calls for limiting our global military presence because that presence generates resentment, fuels more terrorism, and threatens our liberty at home. Finally, offshore balancing recognizes that there are limits to U.S. power. OFFSHORE BALANCING AT: HAPPENING NOW The US isn't acting as an offshore balancer now Layne, 09 Mary Julia and George R. Jordan Professor of International Affairs at Texas A&M's George Bush School of Government and Public Service, Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, LL.M. in International Law from Virginia Law, J.D. from USC, and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute (Christopher, "America's Middle East grand strategy after Iraq: the moment for offshore balancing has arrived", Review of International Studies, 2009, June 30th 2010, Galileo, KONTOPOULOS) PDF The US, of course, has not acted as an offshore balancer. Rather, for more than sixty years it consciously has sought extraregional hegemony in Europe, East Asia and the Middle East.14 Rather than acting as a `wedge' strategy, American primacy especially now that the Cold War has ended now threatens to act more like a kind of glue that unifies other states, and, increasingly, nonstate actors like Al Qaeda, in resistance to America's expansive geopolitical and ideological ambitions. The operational differences between the strategies of primacy and offshore balancing canbe illustrated by examining how each would deal with the most pressing foreign policy issue facing the US today: the Middle East. OFFSHORE BALANCING AT: IMPOSSIBLE Empirically, offshore balancing works Mearsheimer, 08 Ph.D., Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, International Relations Theorist (John, "Middle East: Know the Limits of U.S. Power", Newsweek, November 29th 2008, July 2nd 2010, http://www.newsweek.com/2008/11/28/middleeastknowthelimitsofus power.html, KONTOPOULOS) Offshore balancing is nothing new: the United States pursued such a strategy in the Middle East quite successfully during much of the Cold War. America helped Iraq contain revolutionary Iran in the 1980s. Then, when Iraq's conquest of Kuwait in 1990 threatened to tilt things in Baghdad's favor, the United States assembled a multinational coalition to smash Saddam Hussein's military machine. OFFSHORE BALANCING AT: PRIMACY IS BEST Offshore balancing solves comparatively best Layne, 09 Mary Julia and George R. Jordan Professor of International Affairs at Texas A&M's George Bush School of Government and Public Service, Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, LL.M. in International Law from Virginia Law, J.D. from USC, and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute (Christopher, "America's Middle East grand strategy after Iraq: the moment for offshore balancing has arrived", Review of International Studies, 2009, June 30th 2010, Galileo, KONTOPOULOS) PDF Primacy's neorealist critics have outlined an alternative grand strategy that increasingly resonates with the American public: offshore balancing.3 Its proponents believe that offshore balancing can do a better job than primacy of enhancing American security and matching US foreign policy objectives with the resources available to support them. The driving factor behind offshore balancing is its proponents' recognition that the US has a `hegemony' problem. America's strategy of primacy increases US vulnerability to a geopolitical backlash whether in the guise of countervailing great power coalitions, or terrorist attacks and alienates public opinion in large swaths of the globe, including Europe and the Middle East. Offshore balancing is based on the assumption that the most vital US interests are preventing the emergence of a dominant power in Europe and East Asia a `Eurasian hegemon' and forestalling the emergence of a regional (`oil') hegemon in the Middle East. Only a Eurasian hegemon could pose an existential threat to the US. A regional hegemon in the Middle East could imperil the flow of oil upon which the US economy, and the economies of the advanced industrial states depend. As an offshore balancer, the US would rely on the tried and true dynamics of the balance of power to thwart any states with hegemonic ambitions. An offshore balancing strategy would permit the US to withdraw its ground forces from Eurasia (including the Middle East) and assume an overthehorizon military posture. If and only if regional power balances look to be failing would the US reinsert its troops into Eurasia. Offshore balancing contrasts sharply with primacy because primacists fear a world with independent, multiple poles of power. Primacy is based on the belief that it is better for the US to defend its allies and clients than to have them defend themselves. Offshore balancers, on the other hand, believe for an insular great power like the US, the best strategy is to rely on a balance of power approach that devolves to other states the costs and risks of their defense. OFFSHORE BALANCING AT: WITHDRAWAL SOLVES Withdrawal doesn't solve Layne, 07 Mary Julia and George R. Jordan Professor of International Affairs at Texas A&M's George Bush School of Government and Public Service, Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, LL.M. in International Law from Virginia Law, J.D. from USC, and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute (Christopher, "Who Lost Iraq and Why It Matters The Case for Offshore Balancing", International Security Review, MIT Press, November 30th 2007, June 30th, 2010, p.6, KONTOPOULOS) PDF The United States should revamp its overall regional grand strategy because the current strategy--not the tactics--is in shambles. Iraq remains convulsed by conflict. In Afghanistan, the insurgency led by the revitalized Taliban is spreading. The United States and Iran remain on a collision course. Moreover, the summer 2006 fighting in Lebanon enhanced Iran's regional influence, intensifying antiAmerican public opinion and fueling a populist Islamic groundswell that threatens America's key regional allies: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. Thus, Iraq and Iran now form only part of a larger question: What grand strategy should the United States pursue in the Middle East? In late 2006, there was speculation that the report of the Iraq Study Group--chaired by former Secretary of State James A. Baker, III, and former Congressman Lee Hamilton (DIN)--would provide the Bush administration with political cover for reducing U.S. troop levels in Iraq and disengaging from active combat operations. However, President Bush took precisely the opposite tack. Instead of reducing U.S. troop levels, the administration ordered a "surge" to increase American forces in Iraq. Instead of disengaging from combat operations, the surge strategy has made the pacification of Baghdad (along with the suppression of insurgent operations in Diyala and Anbar provinces) the primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq. And, instead of seeking rapprochement with Tehran and Damascus, the administration has turned up the heat. The administration's current policies will magnify difficulties in the Middle East. Rather than seeking regime change in Iran, Washington should attempt to reach a diplomatic modus vivendi with Tehran. In Iraq, the United States should disengage its troops from combat operations and withdraw all of its forces as expeditiously as logistical constraints permit. To the extent it is necessary to prevent foreign jihadists from entering Iraq, or pursue terrorist targets there, Washington should rely on airpower based overthehorizon, not on ground troops. If the Democraticcontrolled Congress and public opinion fail to force the Bush administration to reverse its course the next administration must move swiftly to extricate the United States from Iraq. On its own, however, withdrawal is not a sufficient prescription for U.S. policy. Iraq and Iran need to be integrated into a broader framework: a new regional U.S. strategy based on offshore balancing. **A2: HEG GOOD** 1 Empirically denied Kagan cites GeorgeRussia and ChinaTaiwan conflicts as being the scenario for nuclear escalation, south Ossetia war a year AFTER the card war written proves even if superpowers intervene it won't go nuclear 2 We control the internal link to escalation: U.S. withdrawal and a concurrent shift to multipolarity would prevent American involvement in major power wars. Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2006 "The Peace of Illusions" p 170 By devolving full responsibility for their defense to U.S. allies, offshore balancing would take advantage of the unique geostrategic advantages that allow the United States to benefit from multipolarity, exercise a free hand strategically, and avoid being automatically engulfed in Eurasian conflicts because of its alliance commitments. As an offshore balancer, the United States would reap security advantages from a reversion to multipolarity. The United States is far removed from powerful rivals and shielded from them both by geography and its own hard power. Consequently, as an insular great power, the United States is far less vulnerable to the effects of "instability" than are the major powers of Eurasia, and it could--and should--insulate itself from possible future Eurasian great power wars. For the United States, the risk of conflict and the possible exposure of the American homeland to attack, rather than arising from any direct threat to the United States itself; derive directly from the overseas commitments mandated by hegemony's allencompassing definition of U.S. interests. A/T HOTSPOT ESCALATION MOD 3 their kagan ev is horrible, in ununderlined parts it concedes other nations would diplomatically resolve their problems because of the nuclear deterrent offshore balancing would bring, and even if it was nuclear major powers wouldn't get drawn in 4 Heg doesn't solve war US lacks influence it used to have to influence conflicts Mastanduno 9 (Michael, Professor of Government at Dartmouth, World Politics 61, No. 1, Ebsco, DB) During the cold war the United States dictated the terms of adjustment. It derived the necessary leverage because it provided for the security of its economic partners and because there were no viable alter natives to an economic order centered on the United States. After the cold war the outcome of adjustment struggles is less certain because the United States is no longer in a position to dictate the terms. The United States, notwithstanding its preponderant power, no longer enjoys the same type of security leverage it once possessed, and the very success of the U.S.centered world economy has afforded America's supporters a greater range of international and domestic economic options. The claim that the United States is unipolar is a statement about its cumulative economic, military, and other capabilities.1 But preponderant capabilities across the board do not guarantee effective influence in any given arena. U.S. dominance in the international security arena no longer translates into effective leverage in the international economic arena. And although the United States remains a dominant international economic player in absolute terms, after the cold war it has found itself more vulnerable and constrained than it was during the golden economic era after World War II. It faces rising economic challengers with their own agendas and with greater discretion in international economic policy than America's cold war allies had enjoyed. The United States may continue to act its own way, but it can no longer count on getting its own way. 1 Empirically denied their leiber evidence was written before the genocide in Darfur, and yet again, America did not do ANYTHING to stop the genocide. UN invervention proves there's only a risk MULTIPOLAR forums solve this back 2 Genocide is only a pretense for American interventionism heg doesn't access their terminal impact Lind, 2007 (Mike, Policy Director for New American Growth Foundation, Beyond American Hegemony, http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2007/beyond_american_hegemony_5381) In the Balkans, a major strategic goal of the Kosovo war was reassuring Germany so it would not develop a defense policy independent of the U.S.dominated NATO alliance. But Milosevic's Yugoslavia could not be accused of developing WMD, so it had to be accused of something else if the American public were to support the war. In fact it was guilty of a war crime ethnic cleansing. But the Clinton Administration and supporters of intervention talked about "genocide", a much more serious charge. Needless to say, criminal as it is, ethnic cleansing using terror to frighten an ethnic group into leaving a country is the opposite of genocide, the extermination of an ethnic group, which requires that they be trapped, not expelled. When the Nazis settled on the Final Solution, they took measures to prevent Jews from escaping Europe. The point is not to argue that ethnic cleansing should not be discouraged and punished by the international community, or that proliferation is not a problem or that the regimes called rogue states are not threats to their neighbors and world order. The point is rather that these phenomena have been used as public rationales for recent wars and threatened wars whose real purpose was either the reassurance of regional allies like Germany and Japan or the dissuasion of potential enemies like Russia and China (Kosovo, North Korea), or the removal of regimes that threatened America's military freedom of action as the postCold War hegemon of the Middle East (the Iraq War). The genocide in Rwanda was real, but the United States did not intervene because unlike America's wouldbe permanent protectorates in Europe, Asia and the Middle East Africa contains no great powers or critical power resources, and therefore is marginal to the U.S. hegemony strategy. Pakistan fits the definition of a rogue state, but it is a U.S. ally and as long as it remains friendly to the United States, it can be permitted to retain nuclear weapons. This kind of hypocrisy is made inevitable by the hegemony strategy itself. Because the American public would not support wars and threats of war in the interest of reassuring allies, dissuading competitors and preventing proliferation, its supporters have a choice between abandoning the strategy or deceiving the public about the true ends of U.S. foreign policy. For the last 15 years, they have chosen the latter. A/T GENOCIDE MOD 3 the regional security forums fostered by multipolarity are net more likely to solve genocide, empirically proven with the UN. A/T ROGUE STATE MOD 1 they do not access this, thayer indicates that it is TROOP WITHDRAWALS that are the primary sense of empowerment for rogue states, this mod is inevitable because of the plan 2 Rogue States are exaggerated to sell policies to the public no risk of nuclear attack or WMD terrorism Lind, 2007 (Mike, Policy Director for New American Growth Foundation, Beyond American Hegemony, http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2007/beyond_american_hegemony_5381) "Rogue state" is a term of emotional propaganda, not sober analysis. The roguestate rationale is employed when American leaders wish to rally support for a policy whose actual purpose increasing or reinforcing American military hegemony in its European, Asian or Middle Eastern sphere of influence cannot be explained to the public. Instead, the American public is told that this or that rogue state North Korea, Iran or Iraq is a direct threat to the American people and the American homeland, as it will be able to lob missiles at the United States or to give terrorists nuclear bombs or other WMD for use on American soil. In the case of North Korea, for example, U.S. policy is motivated largely, although not solely, by the fear that if Japan loses confidence in America's willingness to protect it, Japan may obtain its own nuclear deterrent and renationalize its foreign policy, emerging from the status of a semisovereign U.S. protectorate to that of an independent military great power once again. But no president can tell the American public that the United States must be willing to lose 50,000 or more American lives in a war with North Korea for fear that Japan will get nuclear weapons to defend itself. Therefore the public is told instead that North Korea might give nuclear weapons to nonstate actors to use to destroy New York, Washington and other American cities, or that North Korean missiles can strike targets in North America. If Iran were to obtain nuclear weapons, its purpose almost certainly would be defensive to deter the United States, Israel or any other state from attacking it. The American public would not support a preventive war against Iran on the lunatic theory that it would cheaper to attack Iran before it gets nuclear weapons than to attack Iran after it gets them. Therefore, neoconservative hawks seek to persuade the public that Iran, like North Korea, might either bombard Kansas or give nuclear weapons to Islamist terrorists, or that Iran's viciously antiSemitic leadership might use nuclear weapons against Israel. (Annihilating Israeli Arabs and Palestinians alongside Israeli Jews would seem to be an odd way to promote the Palestinian cause but then, Iran's leaders, like the leaders of any country that opposes the United States, are said to be "insane.") 1 Empirically denied, the bush necon regime failed to get a twostate solution, there is NO WAY that hegemony under obama will be enough to get the Israeli conservatives to compromise with the Palestinians. 2 Turn: Heg enables Israeli expansionism and kills the motivation for a peace process Maher, 2010 (Stephen, Staff writer for the Electronic Intifada, U.S Hegemony, not "the lobby", behind complicity with Israel, http://electronicintifada.net/v2/article11232.shtml) Indeed, the US's policy towards Israel and the Palestinians is not to achieve an end to the occupation, nor to bring about respect for Palestinian rights in fact, it is the actor primarily responsible for preventing these outcomes. To the US, Israel's "Operation Defensive Shield" in 2002 had sufficiently punished the Palestinians and their compliant USbacked leadership for their intransigence at Camp David. While the Palestinian Authority was already acting as Israel's "subcontractor" and "collaborator" in suppressing resistance to Israeli occupation, in the paraphrased words of former Israeli Foreign Minister Shlomo Ben Ami, former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's deliberate destruction of Palestinian institutions provided the opportunity to rebuild them, and ensure an even greater degree of US control. The settlement and annexation programs help guarantee Israeli control over the most valuable Palestinian land and water resources, ensuring Israel will remain a dominant society not easily pressured by its neighbors. To help achieve these goals, the US shields Israeli expansion behind a "peace process" in hopes that given enough time the Palestinians will concede more and more of what was once theirs. The primary concern is to present the appearance that the US and Israel are ardently crusading for peace, battling against those who oppose this noble objective. Though it is true that people across the region are appalled and outraged by Israeli crimes, such anger is a small consideration next to the strategic gain of maintaining a strong, dependent ally in the heart of the Middle East. The reconstitution of an even more tightlycontrolled Palestinian Authority, with General Keith Dayton directly supervising the Palestinian security forces, enabled the US to meet these goals while more effectively suppressing resistance to the occupation. Likewise, redeploying Israeli soldiers outside of Gaza allowed Sharon a free hand to continue the annexation of the West Bank while being heralded internationally as a "great man of peace." A/T PEACE PROCESS MOD 3 US has no influence in the middle east cant mediate the conflict Narwani, 10 Senior Associate @ Oxford University (Sharmine, "Washington Just Lost the Middle East in a Big Way", May 24 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sharminenarwani/washingtonjustlost the_b_586222.html It's official. There is no longer any serious "cost" for defying the United States in the global arena. Unable to win wars or deliver diplomatic coups and struggling to maintain our economic equilibrium Washington has lost the fundamental tools for global leadership. And no place does this impotence manifest more vividly than the modern Middle East. Our pointless and protracted wars in Afghanistan and Iraq will be the last time we will launch a major battle in the region. That massive show of flexing brawn over brain burst a global perception bubble about our intentions, capabilities and reason. This credibility was compromised further with our irrational support of Israel's attacks on Lebanon and Gaza in 2006 and 2008/9 respectively. And by the double standards employed over Israel's violations of international law and its illegal nuclear weapons stash particularly when viewed against the backdrop of our startling rhetoric over Iran's nuclear program. But nothing highlights our irrelevance more than two recent developments: 1) The US's inability today to convene even perfunctory peace talks between Israelis and Palestinians, let alone push through a negotiated solution and this after 19 years of a "USsponsored" peace process. 2) The US's inability to achieve a resolution with Iran over its nuclear program. The only breakthrough in this longwinded effort to tame Iran's nuclear aspirations was struck by Turkey and Brazil last week. In short, the US seems incapable of resolving even a traffic dispute in the Middle East. It is Qatar that stepped in to broker a deal between Hezbollah and the Lebanese government in 2008, and is knee deep in negotiating a solution to the conflict in Darfur. Syria helped gain the release of prisoners in Iran and Gaza. And now Turkey and Brazil have cajoled Iran into accepting an agreement that the US, France, England, Germany, Russia and China could not. We have been rendered irrelevant, despite our insistence on involving ourselves with every peep heard in the Mideast. 1 Empirically denied American interventionism in places like Taiwan only make belligerence and escalation more likely Korean war proves? 2 their leiber evidence indicates that it is US MILITARY PRESENCE that reaffirms the commitment needed for asian instability, the plan does the opposite. There's only a risk that the plan solves this better. 3 Turn: Hegbased stability is unsustainable multilateral regional alliances key to solve Khoo and Smith, 2002 (Nick and Michael, The Future of American Hegemony in the AsiaPacific: A Concert in Asia or a clear Pecking Order?, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 56, No. 1, pp.65 81, 2002) US concerns about East Asian stability are warranted. If the history of the twentieth century is any guide, Washington will continue to have its hands full dealing with the AsiaPacific. Historic animosities4 and unresolved Cold War disputes,5 combined with more recent territorial disputes ranging from the South China Sea to the East China Sea make for a volatile region (Freidburg 2000a; Freidburg 1993/94b; Betts 1993/94). To complicate matters, there is the issue of how to deal with China, a rising power and traditional hegemon in the region (Khalilzad 1999; Betts and Christiensen 2000; Shambaugh 1994; Goldstein 1997/ 98: Johnston and Ross 1999: Roy 1994; Shinn 1996). Until the East Asian financial crisis of 1997, drawing attention to these underlying elements of instability that twenty years of economic growth had obscured would have been deemed unneces sarily alarmist. However, the succeeding years since 1997 have overturned many of the previously accepted assumptions about the evolving security environment in the AsiaPaci? c. As a result of the economic crisis, governments have fallen in Indonesia, Thailand, and South Korea, or come perilously close to the precipice, as in Malaysia, and have made only faltering political and economic progress since. Tougher times are still ahead. While there was a brief bout of optimism during 1999/2000 at the slight, though very patchy, economic recovery (Holland 2000) and the seeming return of a semblance of political stability, with the global recessionary forces setting in, uncertainty has increased.6 Furthermore, in the aftermath of the events of 11 September, the open secret of Southeast Asian politics that the region is a haven for Islamic extremist groups has become evident for all to see. The revelations that fundamentalist Islamic groups linked with the AlQaeda movement maintain a network of cells in Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and Malaysia could not have come at a worse time (see Mydans 2001; Lander 2001;Far Eastern Economic Review2001; Asian Wall Street Journal2001). In Northeast Asia, China is struggling internally to maintain social and political stability as it reforms its economy to adapt to the terms it acceded to in negotiating its entry into the World Trade Organization. Moreover, issues affecting regional stability that have hitherto received insufficient attention include the ongoing separatist conflicts in Indonesia, the world's fourth largest state (in terms of population). Internal secession movements currently exist in Aceh (Murphy 2001; Chandrasekaran 2000a; Dhume 2000), the Moluccas Islands (Pereira 2001) and Irian Jaya (Maynard 2000). Additionally, tensions remain over the recent independence of East Timor (Tante et al.2000), while ethnic conflict is of real concern in Kalimantan (Chandrasekaran 2001b; Sims 2001). In the midst of this tumult, what is required, some observers maintain, is a stable and predictable pattern of multilateralbased diplomacy to manage rivalry and reduce tensions. Before the onset of the 1997/98 AsiaPaci? nancial crisis, much diplomatic and c ? scholarly opinion held that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) could provide the basis for a new era in regional security management (Acharya 1993a: 37). In particular, its panPaci? c offshoot, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was invested with high hopes. Established in 1994, the ARF is a heterogeneous multilateral grouping intended to address regional issues in an ostensibly transformed postCold War era. Before the crisis struck, the ARF, it was maintained, would extend the harmonious and inclusive practices of the ASEAN way across the Paci? c (see Leifer 1996a). By bringing together both the ASEAN states and twelve dialogue partners including China, Japan, the United States, Australia and the European Union into nonconfrontational dialogue, it was hoped that the security of the AsiaPaci? c would be guaranteed through process oriented confidence building. A particular goal of the ARF in this respect, according to Leifer, was `to educate an irredentist China in the canons of good regional citizenship and to sustain the active engagement of the United States in regional affairs'(Leifer 1995b). A/T ASIAN STABILITY MOD 1 The sinking of the Chenoan after the lieber card was written proves American hegemony only fosters beilligerence in North Korea, there's only a risk a shift would solve back the reason they feel threatened enough to attack 2 Lieber indicates that the lynchpin of stability in korea is AMERICAN TROOP PRESENCE they don't access this because the plan results in the global perception of american abandonment of its troop commitments abroad, only a risk of allied prolif and stability without multipolarity 3 American hegemony in Asia ensures involvement in possibly nuclear war with North Korea. Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2006 "The Peace of Illusions" p 1645 America's East Asian strategy is most immediately challenged by North Korea. Although Pyongyang claims it has nuclear weapons, it is uncertain whether it actually does. If it does not presently have them, however, it certainly is close to having some weapons in hand, and--unless something happens either diplomatically or militarily to interrupt its weapons development program--its arsenal could grow considerably during the next few years. A/T KOREA MOD (1/2) Moreover, Pyongyang currently has ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear warheads against targets in South Korea and Japan, and it could havesome intercontinental missile capability in a decade or so. The North Korean regime's unpredictability, its nuclear ambitions, and the military standoff along the 38th parallel between North Korean forces and U.S. and South Korean troops make the peninsula a volatile place. Conflict is not inevitable, but neither is it unimaginable. If diplomacy fails to bring about a North Korean agreement to dismantle its nuclear weapons, the United States may decide to strike preemptively in an attempt to destroy Pyongyang's nuclear facilities .0 It is impossible to know whether this would spark an allout war on the peninsula . On the other hand, fearing it might be the target of such strikes or a U.S. campaign to bring about regime change, North Korea might lash out irrationally in ways that confound the predictions of deterrence theory. Given that the American homeland currently is not vulnerable to North Korean retaliation, the U.S.deterrent umbrella should dissuade Pyongyang from using nuclear weaponsto attack civilian or military targets in South Korea or Japan. Whether North Korean actually would be deterred, though, is a huge unknown. Three things are known, however. First, if North Korea has nuclear weapons, U.S. troops in South Korea, and possibly in Japan, are hostages." Second, even a non-nuclear conflict on the peninsula would be costly to the United States (notwithstanding the fact that the United States ultimately would prevail on the battlefield). Third, U.S. troops in South Korea act as a tripwire, which ensures that, if war does occur, the United States automatically will be involved. 4 Multipolarity solves the impact Khripunov, 2009 (Igor, Russian Staff Writer for The Korea Times, Multipolarity and Korean Crisis, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2009/06/137_47614.html) The SCO is made up of emerging world powers united by their opposition to ``U.S. hegemony" and their desire to promote a ``multipolar" world of roughly equal great powers. The body's membership includes Russia, China and six Central Asian states. India, Iran, Pakistan and a few others took part in the proceedings as observers. The SCO members issued a summit declaration reaffirming their primary goal of nurturing multipolarity and preserving stability across Eurasia. Published on June 16, the Yekaterinburg Declaration emphasized such vital elements of the SCO mission as improving joint research into effective solutions to global and regional problems, drawing on the organization's growing potential and international prestige. The current flareup of tensions following North Korea's second nuclear test on May 25 was among the top agenda items debated by the participants, some of whom recommended the resumption of the sixparty talks. The problem is that Pyongyang's bellicose rhetoric and fingerpointing have been so extreme this time as to rule out an early resumption of negotiations under the sixparty format. In the meantime, a new forum must be found to constructively engage North Korea and lay the groundwork for the sixparty talks to resume in a less volatile atmosphere. Why not the Shanghai Cooperation Organization? Russia and China are the major drivers of this organization and are the closest to Pyongyang, not only geographically but also ideologically, economically and spiritually. They both grasp the new, serious risks to themselves posed by the geopolitical realignment brought on by the North's recent nuclear and missile tests. Japan continues to build up its military power, including a stateoftheart ballisticmissile defense system, South Korea is rapidly modernizing and expanding its own armed forces, and the United States is reinforcing its military presence in the region and having second thoughts about cutbacks to its own missile defenses. To restore some balance, Russia and China must approach the crisis on the Korean Peninsula with new urgency, innovative diplomacy and persistence. If they take a wait andandsee attitude, they will soon face radically different, stark realities likely to work against their vital geopolitical interests. For example, the economic implications are critical. Russia is opening up its energy resources to the East, China is asserting itself as the dominant power in the region and both Moscow and Beijing are struggling with the fallout from the global financial and economic crisis. For Russia, in particular, persistent instability on the peninsula has kept wary countries from joining Far Eastern regional infrastructure projects championed by Moscow. The Medvedev administration has a real and growing stake in settling matters. It is difficult to foresee what form the mechanism for such engagement would take, or the likely outcome of an SCONorth Korean parley. But as the current SCO chair, Russia can put the SCO option to the test. For a young organization, the SCO has compiled an impressive record of orchestrating largescale programs to combat terrorism and drug trafficking. Its agenda has farreaching educational, cultural and other dimensions. Possible advantages from new multilateral diplomacy would include more transparency and predictability, greater participation in joint regional projects, and dialogue among new partners. Originally established to pursue multipolarity, the SCO must now fulfill its great and asyet untapped potential. The time has come for bold action rather than walking the thin line between coercion and inducements to get North Korea involved in negotiations. A/T KOREA MOD (2/2) 1 Their impact evidence assumes a nuclear armed and military capable that their i/l evidence specifically says has fallen apart, there is NO reason why NATO is key any longer to regional stability 2 Heg based alliances ensure US drawin into multiple nuclear conflicts Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2006 "The Peace of Illusions" p 169 Rather than being instruments of regional pacification, today America's alliances are transmission belts for war that ensure that the U.S. would be embroiled in Eurasian wars. In deciding whether to go war in Eurasia, the United States should not allow its hands to be tied in advance. For example a non--great power war on the Korean Peninsula--even if nuclear weapon were not involved--would be very costly. The dangers of being entangled in a great power war in Eurasia, of course, are even greater, and could expose the American homeland to nuclear attack. An offshore balancing grand strategy would extricate the U nited States from the danger of being entrapped in Eurasian conflicts by its alliance commitments. A/T NATO MOD 3 NATO is no longer on the brink total reformation has caused full recovery PREFER THIS, IT POSTDATES Sperling and Webber 09 (James SperlingProfessor of Political Science at the University of Akron, Mark WebberProfessor of International Politics and Head of the Department of Politics, International Relations and European Studies Loughborough University, International Affairs, Volume 85, NATO: from Kosovo to Kabul, http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgibin/fulltext/122368466/PDFSTART) This view of a NATO apparently perched permanently at the edge of collapse is problematic on at least three counts. First, the narrative of crisis is clouded by imprecision--at what point a crisis becomes terminal and precisely what NATO's dissolution would look like are rarely, if ever, specified. Second, it falls foul of what might be termed the `Peter cried "Wolf!"' syndrome. NATO has faced imminent collapse so often that it is difficult to take seriously the latest judgement that its days are numbered Third, and as the list above suggests, . NATO seems to possess an inexhaustible capacity for recovery, a characteristic NATO pessimists largely ignore. Of course, mere survival is not enough; what matters equally is how far and how well survival reflects a more thoroughgoing adaptation to new circumstances. NATO's efforts to do just that, however imperfect or illjudged, is the real story of the last two decades. The epithets of decline, dissolution and even death are, in this connection, misleading; while they allude to the very real problems NATO has encountered, they usually refer to a single operational experience or historical moment. Longerterm processes of change are, consequently, ignored. In fact, from 1989 to 2009 the alliance has engaged in a ceaseless process of transformation-- of structure and organization, of operations, partnerships and membership. Located squarely in the middle of all this activity is OAF. 1 Their Kagan evidence doesn't assume 3 years of change in space power, the chinese are rapidly expanding and their impact is inevitable 2 U.S. hegemony will force space weaponization which causes space racing resulting in extinction. Noam Chomsky 4/24/2004 "an interview with Noam Chomsky," http://www.dissidentvoice.org/April2004/Mars0424.htm Well the most visible and publicized implementation was the invasion of Iraq, but there was another one which was important and hasn't been much discussed. The Bush administration immediately moved to expand offensive military capacity. They immediately moved to undermine international treaties. It terminated negotiations on an enforceable bio weapons treaty, undermined ratification of old bio-weapons treaties. The air force space command immediately announced plans to move from it called control of space to ownership of space, which A/T AIR/SPACE MOD is exactly consistent with the security strategy, that no one can challenge our total domination. What does ownership of space mean? Well that's presented in leaked plans, you can find them. It means putting space platforms in orbit from which you can launch offensive weapons, highly destructive weapons, without warning and instantaneously with first strike authority. It was also just reported that the Pentagon is developing hypersonic planes which will orbit in space, enter the atmosphere at the last minute so they can't be detected and instantaneously drop highly destructive precision weaponry. The world is under very tight surveillance so you can detect if somebody is walking across the street in Ankara. Now others react to that threat, so Russian defense spending has predictably sharply increased since Bush came in, by American calculation it might have tripled. Just a couple of weeks ago the Russian had their first major military maneuvers in the last two decades. They very pointedly said this is in response to US escalation. The US is developing low yield nuclear weapons which is in violation of international treaties and the Russians understand, as do strategic analysts, that their purpose is to attack the command bunkers that control their retaliatory nuclear systems, so they're going to react to it. The Bush administration just announced that it is going to employ a missile defense system. Everybody knows that a missile defense system is an offensive weapon, it's a first strike weapon. There's universal agreement on this by both sides. We know how the US reacted to this when the Russians made a slight move in that direction by placing, in 1968, a small ABM system around Moscow. The US reacted at once by targeting it with offensive nuclear weapons, targeting the rear outposts with nuclear weapons so they would overwhelm any possible defense. Do you think the Russians will react differently? No they're saying straight out that they've adopted Bush's first strike doctrine; that they're deploying their offensive missiles, which they claim are much more sophisticated and are on computer controlled automated launch. American strategic analysts call that an accident waiting to happen. These things are going to misfire. The American systems which are much more sophisticated have a three minute period during which human intervention can prevent automated response, the Russian systems are worse. Computer errors are daily occurrences in the US computer system. Think what they're going to be like in the Russian systems. You are asking for a disaster. The Chinese are surely going to respond to a so called missile defense system since it eliminates their strategic nuclear capacity, so instead of having twenty missiles targeting the United States they'll build it up and probably have a submarine launched capacity. That sets off a new cycle. China increases its missile capacity, India responds. India increases it and Pakistan responds. You get a ripple effect. This is extraordinarily dangerous. Do we want Pakistan to increase its offensive nuclear capacity? Have a look at how their missiles are controlled. These moves are deliberately, consciously, raising the threat to survival . And its not that Wolfowitz and Rumsfeld and so on want the world destroyed, it just doesn't matter much to them, those risks aren't important as compared to what its important, dominating the world by force and dismantling the hated welfare state measures at home, that's important. In comparison if you threaten to blow up the world, if you increase the threat of terror, well that's OK, that's the way the cookie crumbles. 1 Their impact evidence is from 1993, doesn't assume revitalized NATO or the EU, which significantly reduced the likliness of any future European war. The fractured Europe of '93 doesn't exist in any form today 2 Turn: Hegemony is spurring EU competition to U.S dominance Kerans 9 Strategic Cultural Foundation at Global Research ["Commercial Standards and the Decline of U.S. Hegemony" http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=14663 ] Less wellestablished is the study of the manner in which different categories of capitalist regimes influence each other. At times, of course, such influences are overt, and get plenty of attention, as when the IMF or World Bank under US direction demands prolaissez faire policies as a condition of largescale loans to a struggling state, for example. Where the influence is subtle and unintentional, however, it can go largely unnoticed. Such has been the case regarding the European Union's influence on the US and quite a few other countries since the close of the Cold War. The EU has waged an increasingly potent effort to control commercial standards that have long underlain the global hegemony of US corporations. The story deserves close attention,[1] for it sheds light both on a power shift A/T EUROPE MOD away from the US, and on the potential for enlightened society to resist domination by enormously wealthy and well organized special interests 3 U.S. preponderance is spurring softbalancing now these indirect efforts will turn into a hardline counterweight unless the U.S. begins to withdraw. Robert A. pape (Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago) summer 2005 "soft balancing against the United States" Inernational Security The George W. Bush administration's national security strategy, which asserts that the United States has the right to attack and conquer sovereign countries that pose no observable threat, and to do so without international support, is one of the most aggressively unilateral U.S. postures ever taken. Recent international relations scholarship has wrongly promoted the view that the United States, as the leader of a unipolar system, can pursue such a policy without fear of serious opposition. The most consequential effect of the Bush strategy will be a fundamental transformation in how major states perceive the United States and how they react to future uses of U.S. power. Major powers are already engaging in the early stages of balancing behavior against the United States, by adopting "softbalancing" measures that do not directly challenge U.S. military preponderance but use international institutions, economic statecraft, and diplomatic arrangements to delay, frustrate, and undermine U.S. policies. If the Bush administration continues to pursue aggressive unilateral military policies, increased soft balancing could establish the basis for hard balancing against the United States. To avoid this outcome, the United States should renounce the systematic use of preventive war, as well as other aggressive unilateral military policies, and return to its traditional policy governing the use of force -- a case-by-case calculation of costs and benefits. 4 Only a risk American hegemony draws the U.S into a European war and this time the French have nukes. 1 Their evidence doesn't assume the economic crisis of 2009, China bought even more U.S bonds, there's only a risk China rise would be less affected by american hegemonic decline because of the inter conectivity of their financial markets 2 Turn: The economic system the U.S. has built and protected ensures rapid redistribution of power which hastens hegemonic decline. Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2006 "The Peace of Illusions" p 1512 With stunning rapidity, China has emerged as a dominant factor in theglobal economy and is spearheading East Asia's drive to displace the United States as the locus of economic and technological leadership in the interna-tional economy.'' This trend, which includes China's great power emer-gence, highlights an important paradox of hegemonic stability theory. Over time, a liberal hegemon becomes the victim of the very open international economic system it put A/T ECON MOD in place, because openness facilitates the diffusion of economic, technological, and organizational skills to other states, whichcauses the hegemon to lose its "comparative advantage " over them.71This dynamic is too frequently overlooked in current discussions of U.S. grandstrategy (and trade policy). The perverse grand strategic consequence ofAmerica's hegemonic role in the international economic system is that byacting in accordance with hegemonic stability theory's dictates, the United States is helping to accelerate a change in the relative distribution of power in the international system. As America's relative economic power wanes, others will have decreasing incentives to bandwagon with the United States.The ongoing redistribution of global power is bringing forward the day when eligible states will be strong enough economically to challenge U.S. preponderance militarily. 3 Their evidence doesn't assume a decline to peaceful multipolarity, US trade ensures that even if regional powers do emerge, they won't fight with the United States because of globalisation 4 No Impact China is already surpassing the U.S in importance to the global economy Layne, 09 Mary Julia and George R. Jordan Professor of International Affairs at Texas A&M's George Bush School of Government and Public Service, Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, LL.M. in International Law from Virginia Law, J.D. from USC, and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute (Christopher, "The Waning of U.S. Hegemony--Myth or Reality? A Review Essay", International Security, Vol. 34, No. 1, Summer 2009, July 6th 2010, Galileo, p. 1718, KONTOPOULOS) PDF Toward multipolarity? The ascent of new great powers would be the strongest evidence of multipolarization, and the two most important indicators of whether this is happening are relative growth rates and shares of world GDP.46 Here, there is evidence that as the NIC, Khanna, Mahbubani, and, to a point, Zakaria contend, global economic power is flowing from the United States and Europe to Asia.47 The shift of economic clout to East Asia is important because it could propel China's ascent--thus hastening the relative decline of U.S. power--and also because emerging regional multipolarity could trigger future major power war. China, of course, is the poster child for Asia's rise, and many analysts-- including the NIC, Khanna, and (implicitly) Mahbubani and Zakaria--agree that China is the rising power most likely to challenge U.S. hegemony.48 Unsurprisingly, Brooks and Wohlforth are skeptical about China's rise, and they dismiss the idea that China could become a viable counterweight to a hegemonic United States within any meaningful time frame.49 Their analysis, however, is static. For sure, the United States still has an impressive lead in the categories they measure.50 Looking ahead, however, the trend lines appear to favor China, which already has overtaken the United States as the world's leading manufacturer--a crown the United States wore for more than a century. 51 China also may overtake the United States in GDP in the next ten to fifteen years. In 2003 Goldman Sachs predicted that China would pass the United States in GDP by 2041, but in 2008 it revised the time frame to 2028.52 And, in early 2009, the Economist Intelligence Unit predicted that China's GDP would surpass the United States' in 2021.53 Empirically, then, there are indications that the unipolar era is drawing to a close, and that the coming decades could witness a power transition.54 1 Empirically Denied Colonialism, 9/11 and recent terror attacks prove that American hegemony only provokes arab hatred and terrorist attack 2 AlQaeda was born because of US adventurism in Afghanistan against the Soviets, proves the "freedom fighters" we support today could be the "terrorists" of the next generation 3 Terrorists attack due to US Heg Layne 9 (Layne, Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute, literary and national editor of the Atlantic, Review of International Studies (2009), 5/25/9, "America's Middle East grand strategy after Iraq: the moment for offshore balancing has arrived", Cambridge Journals, DB) In addition to soft balancing, asymmetric strategies are another type of non traditional balancing that is being employed to contest US primacy. When A/T TERRORISM MOD employed by states, asymmetric strategies mean the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities. Regional powers especially those on the US hit list like Iran and Saddam Hussein's Iraq cannot slug it out toetotoe against the US' dominant hightech conventional forces. Because they are threatened by the US, however, these states seek other methods of offsetting American power, and dissuading Washington from using its military muscle against them. WMD especially the possession of nuclear weapons is one way these states can level the strategic playing field and deter the US from attacking them. Terrorism is another asymmetric strategy one employed by nonstate actors like AlQaeda and similar jihadist groups to resist US dominance. The use of asymmetric strategies to oppose American power especially in the Middle East where US policy has an imperial dimension illustrates the dictum that empires inevitably provoke resistance. 4 Cross apply their terrorism impact we have empirics on our side. Absent colonialism and american support for unpopular regimes abroad, terrorist organisations will no longer have the recruiting they need to remain terrorism 5 Heg can't solve terrorism Nafaa 8 (Hassan, Secretary General of Arab Thought Forum, Amman, Jordan, 9/24/08, AlAhram Weekly Online, "Collapse of Empire," http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2008/915/op1.htm, DB) Any incoming US president must bear in mind several lessons from the lean years of the Bush presidency. The first is that it is dangerous to link terrorism , which poses a real threat not just to one society or country, with imperial ambitions. The American insistence on pursuing its project of global hegemony behind the guise of the war on terror was ultimately detrimental to both causes. The hegemonic project is on the verge of collapse after the US has been sapped of enormous resources while terrorism has become more widespread. In the future, if the US intends to deal seriously with a drive to end terrorism, it must detach that drive from its imperial ambitions. 6 Hegemony causes terrorism Muzaffar 8 President of the International Movement for a Just World, author, political scientist (Chandra, "Hegemony, Terrorism, and War is Democracy the Antidote," Widener Law Review, Vol.13, No.361, p.361) AlQaeda, the world's most notorious terrorist network, was, in a sense, a response to the most obvious manifestation of global hegemony, namely, military power. As soon as the United States had established a military base in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, in 1991, immediately after the Kuwait War, the alQaeda leader, Osama bin Laden, announced to the world that he would attack Dhahran. He considered the establishment of an "infidel" military base in Islam's holiest land--Saudi Arabia, where Islam's two holiest cities, Mecca and Media, are situated--an act of sacrilege.1 In June 1996, alQaeda was allegedly involved in a bomb attack upon the base, killing 19 American airmen and wounding 250 others. Two years later, alQaeda targeted U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. This was followed by the 2000 assault on a U.S. warship, the USS Cole, off the coast of Yemen. A/T TERRORISM MOD 7 The invasion of Afghanistan is the primary motive for terrorist attacks Muzaffar 8 President of the International Movement for a Just World, author, political scientist (Chandra, "Hegemony, Terrorism, and War is Democracy the Antidote," Widener Law Review, Vol.13, No.361, p.361) After 911, U.S. global hegemony continued to provoke alQaeda and other terrorist outfits. Since the U.S. and its allies had invaded Afghanistan in October 2001 in order to oust the Taliban regime that was protecting Osama, the invasion became the justification for further terrorist attacks. The Bali bombings of October 2002 , purportedly carried out by a group affiliated with al Qaeda, the Jemaah Islamiyyah, were primarily to avenge the Afghan invasion . Then in March 2003, the U.S. and its allies embarked upon a second military invasion. This time the target was Iraq. One year after Iraq was conquered, alQaeda struck again; it was responsible for a dastardly carnage at a Madrid railway station. The unconcealed aim was to compel the Spanish government to withdraw its soldiers from the U.S. led force in Iraq. AlQaeda succeeded in its objective. If we reflect upon alQaeda attacks, it is obvious that the military, political, and economic dimensions of U.S. hegemony figure prominently on its radar screen. It is seldom acknowledged, however, that the cultural dimension of hegemony has also been a consideration. For instance, during their trial, a couple of the Bali bombers inveighed against Western cultural imperialism and how it was destroying the identity and integrity of indigenous communities. By arguing that hegemony in all its manifestations breeds terrorism, we are in no way condoning terrorism. AlQaeda's deliberate targeting of noncombatants and civilians in general--in East Africa, on 911, in Bali, in Madrid--has been condemned by rightthinking people everywhere. Leading Muslim theologians and scholars have not only denounced alQaeda's misdeeds from a humanitarian perspective, but have also castigated Osama and his underlings as men who have shamele 1 Empirically Denied Karzai and the Saudis are all corrupt dictatorships sustained by American hegemony, proves they can never solve the case impacts 2 Turn: Hegemony destroys democratic orders and stifles democratic movements to sustain dominion over the middle east Lockard, 2005 (Joe, Professor of English at Arizona State University, Hegemonic Democracy in the Middle East, http://www.tikkun.org/article.php/Lockardhegemonicdemocracy) Impoverishment of the word "democracy" has been a hallmark of Bush administration foreign policy, although this is hardly the first U.S. administration to engage in selective or nearcomplete blindness towards antidemocratic practice in the Middle East. That official blindness, part of the U.S. policies that have effectively overlooked denials of civil and human rights in return for oil and stable regional alliances, has been a bipartisan work of decades. The current administration, however, has hit dizzying new heights of chutzpah as the putative sponsor of popular electoral democracy in the Middle East. George W. Bush would read signs for wonders, interpreting current events--the election of an Iraqi puppet government, powerless Saudi municipal elections, Mubarak's careerend grudging permission for hamstrung electoral opposition, and a prospective pullback of Syrian troops in Lebanon--as the arrival of radical new changes. These developments change literally nothing in terms of streetlevel democracy and realization of human rights; rather, they are the means of collaboration with U.S. imperial power, regime stabilization through minor gestures, and realpolitik accommodation of changing political environments in order to sustain authoritarian rule. Thus more accurately interpreted, the U.S. neoconservative vision of democracy concerns the consolidation of hegemony in the name of creating responsive political institutions. A truly democratic Middle East, on the other hand, would eliminate repressive governments that have allied themselves with U.S. interests and revolutionize societies throughout the region. Civil rights activists like Saad ElDin Ibrahim and other democratic reformers in Egypt would be able to speak from outside prisons. A fundamentally democratized Middle East might be inimical to the United States as a global superpower and leading energy consumer, but it would be fully consonant with at least one historic American ideal. A/T DEMOCRACY MOD 3 Insert witty analytics you can think of off the top of your head ...
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