DDW10-General-Allied-Prolif(2)

DDW10-General-Allied-Prolif(2) - General Allied Prolif...

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Unformatted text preview: General Allied Prolif DDW2010 1 G ENERAL P ROLIFERATION 1NC (1/2)........................................................................................................................................2 2NC L INK /I NTERNAL L INK E XTENSIONS .....................................................................................................................................4 2NC L INK /I NTERNAL L INK E XTENSIONS .....................................................................................................................................5 2NC L INK E XTENSIONS P HYSICAL PRESENCE NEEDED ................................................................................................................6 2NC L INK E XTENSIONS W ITHDRAWAL U NDERMINES C ONFIDENCE ..............................................................................................7 A FF A2: U NIQUENESS (1/2).....................................................................................................................................................8 Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 1 General Allied Prolif DDW2010 2 General Proliferation 1NC (1/2) Forward deployment of U.S. troops is reassuring allies, but perception of commitment is wavering. Davis et al 09 (Jacquelyn Davis, Ex. VP Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Pres. IFPA and Prof. Intl. Sec. Studies Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy of Tufts U. and former DOD Consultant, Charles M. Perry , VP and Dir. Studies IFPA, and James L. Schoff, Associate Dir. Asia-Pacific Studies IFPA, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis White Paper, Updating U.S. Deterrence Concepts and Operational Planning: Reassuring Allies, Deterring Legacy Threats, and Dissuading Nuclear "Wannabes", February 2009, http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/Updating_US_Deterrence_Concepts.pdf, p. 7-8) In South Korea, the United States deployed as it still does a sizable contingent of U.S. Army and Air Force troops to deter a renewed North Korean attack and to signal U.S. resolve to escalate to whatever level might be necessary to repel such an at- tack, thereby underscoring Americas extended deterrent commitment to the Republic of Korea (ROK). In Japan, the United States Navy has home- ported one of its aircraft carriers at Yokosuka, while the Marines deployed forces on Okinawa, the Army at Camp Zama, and the Air Force at bases near Tokyo and Misawa, to reinforce the notion of extended deterrence. That said, the extended deterrence concept has not always seemed convincing to U.S. allies, and, were it not for the forward deployment of American troops, the willingness of the United States to put itself at risk to protect Allied interests would probably have been more widely questioned than it has been to date. Nonetheless, despite the fact that some U.S. allies, such as France and Israel, chose to go down the nuclear path themselves, most NATO nations, Japan, and even the ROK, despite putting into place the capacity for...
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This note was uploaded on 02/23/2012 for the course DEBATE 101 taught by Professor None during the Spring '12 term at University of California, Berkeley.

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DDW10-General-Allied-Prolif(2) - General Allied Prolif...

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