HMT Drones Aff CP Answers - SDI 2010 Drones Aff AT:...

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Unformatted text preview: SDI 2010 Drones Aff AT: Surveillance CP AT: CPs - Index AT: CPS - INDEX..........................................................................................................1 SURVEILLANCE CP 2AC POLICY.............................................................................2 SURVEILLANCE CP 2AC - K........................................................................................3 SURVEILLANCE CP K ANS - EXT...............................................................................4 AT: SURVEILLANCE CP EXT....................................................................................5 ......................................................................................................................................5 1 SDI 2010 Drones Aff AT: Surveillance CP Surveillance CP 2AC Policy TERRORISM - Focus on drones inevitably trades-off with other intelligence gathering effortsOnly banning drones ensures US ability to strike at the heart of the insurgency Flynn et al, 10 [Major General Michael T. Flynn, USA, Captain Matt Pottinger, USMC, Paul D. Batchelor, DIA, Published by the New American Security. The mission of the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) is to develop strong, pragmatic, and principled national security and defense policies that promote and protect American interests and values. Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan, Voices from the field, January 2010, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/press/AfghanIntel_Flynn_Jan2010_code507_voices.pdf] The tendency to overemphasize detailed information about the enemy at the expense of the political, economic, and cultural environment that supports it becomes even more pronounced at the brigade and regional command levels. Understandably galled by IED strikes that are killing soldiers, these intelligence shops react by devoting most of their resources to finding the people who emplace such devices . Analysts painstakingly diagram insurgent networks and recommend individuals who should be killed or captured. Aerial drones and other collection assets are tasked with scanning the countryside around the clock in the hope of spotting insurgents burying bombs or setting up ambushes. Again, these are fundamentally worthy objectives, but relying on them exclusively baits intelligence shops into reacting to enemy tactics at the expense of finding ways to strike at the very heart of the insurgency. These labor-intensive efforts, employed in isolation , fail to advance the war strategy and, as a result, expose more troops to danger over the long run . Overlooked amid these reactive intelligence efforts are two inescapable truths: 1) brigade and regional command analytic products , in their present form, tell ground units little they do not already know; and 2) lethal targeting alone will not help U.S. and allied forces win in Afghanistan ....
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HMT Drones Aff CP Answers - SDI 2010 Drones Aff AT:...

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