RRSe Afghanistan 2AC Blocks - SDI 2010 1 2AC Afghanistan...

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Unformatted text preview: SDI 2010 1 2AC Afghanistan RRSe Afghanistan 2AC Blocks Afghanistan 2AC Blocks...................................................................................................................1 SCO Add-On.......................................................................................................................................3 SCO Add-On.......................................................................................................................................4 SCO Add-On.......................................................................................................................................5 SCO Add-On.......................................................................................................................................6 SCO Add-On.......................................................................................................................................7 SCO Add-On.......................................................................................................................................8 Iran Add-On.......................................................................................................................................9 Iran Add-On.....................................................................................................................................10 Iran Add-On.....................................................................................................................................11 Pakistan Add-On..............................................................................................................................12 Pakistan Add-On..............................................................................................................................13 Pakistan Add-On..............................................................................................................................14 Hegemony Add-On Expenses Internal......................................................................................15 Hegemony Add-On Expenses Internal .....................................................................................16 Hegemony Add-On Reserves Internal.......................................................................................17 AT: Safe Haven ...............................................................................................................................18 AT: Safe Haven................................................................................................................................19 AT: Safe Haven................................................................................................................................20 AT: Safe Haven................................................................................................................................21 AT: Safe Haven................................................................................................................................22 AT: Safe Haven................................................................................................................................23 ***DISADVANTAGES***............................................................................................................24 2AC Obama Good Link Turn.....................................................................................................25 2AC Obama Good Link Turn ....................................................................................................26 2AC Obama Good Link Turn.....................................................................................................27 2AC Obama Good Link Turn.....................................................................................................28 2AC Obama Good Impact Turn Accidents ...........................................................................29 2AC Obama Good Impact Turn US-Russian Relations.........................................................31 2AC Obama Good Impact Turn Prolif....................................................................................33 2AC Obama Good Impact Turn Terrorism............................................................................35 2AC Obama Good Impact Turn NMD.....................................................................................37 2AC Obama Bad--Impact Turn...................................................................................................38 2AC Obama Bad--Impact Turn...................................................................................................39 2AC Obama Bad--Impact Turn ..................................................................................................40 2AC Obama Bad--Impact Turn...................................................................................................41 2AC Obama Bad II Impact Turn...............................................................................................42 2AC Obama Bad II Impact Turn ..............................................................................................43 IAR Obama Bad II Impact Turn Uniqueness ......................................................................44 IAR Obama Bad II Impact Turn Accidents/Prolif...............................................................45 IAR Obama Bad II Impact Turn Extinction ........................................................................46 IAR Obama Bad II Impact Turn Israel Strike Iran.............................................................47 IAR Obama Bad II Impact Turn Proliferation ....................................................................48 2AC Midterms Link Turn...........................................................................................................49 SDI 2010 2 2AC Afghanistan RRSe 2AC Midterms Link Turn...........................................................................................................50 2AC Midterms Link Turn...........................................................................................................51 IAR N/U Extension Fundraising..............................................................................................52 IAR N/U Extension Fundraising..............................................................................................53 IAR Link Turn Extension GOP Spin......................................................................................54 2AC NATO DA.................................................................................................................................55 2AC NATO DA.................................................................................................................................56 2AC NATO DA.................................................................................................................................57 IAR NATO DA Squo Solves Accidents/Prolif...........................................................................58 2AC CMR DA...................................................................................................................................59 2AC CMR DA...................................................................................................................................60 2AC CMR DA...................................................................................................................................61 2AC Karzai DA................................................................................................................................62 2AC Karzai DA................................................................................................................................63 2AC Karzai DA ATTA Impact...................................................................................................64 2AC Karzai DA Russia Impact...................................................................................................65 2AC Reverse Spending....................................................................................................................66 2AC Reverse Spending....................................................................................................................67 2AC Guam DA .................................................................................................................................68 2AC Guam DA Impact Turn.......................................................................................................69 2AC Guam DA Impact Turn.......................................................................................................70 2AC Guam DA Impact Turn.......................................................................................................71 2AC Guam DA Impact Turn.......................................................................................................72 IAR Guam DA Regional Stability..............................................................................................74 ***COUNTERPLANS***..............................................................................................................75 Conditionality Bad...........................................................................................................................75 2AC Consult Pakistan.....................................................................................................................76 2AC Consult Pakistan.....................................................................................................................77 2AC Silk Road CP............................................................................................................................78 2AC Silk Road CP............................................................................................................................79 2AC Silk Road CP............................................................................................................................80 2AC Silk Road CP............................................................................................................................82 2AC Rules of Engagement CP........................................................................................................83 2AC Rules of Engagement CP........................................................................................................84 2AC Overstretch CP........................................................................................................................85 2AC Overstretch CP........................................................................................................................86 2AC Pakistan CP..............................................................................................................................87 2AC Pakistan CP .............................................................................................................................88 2AC SCO CP.....................................................................................................................................89 2AC SCO CP.....................................................................................................................................90 ***Topicality***..............................................................................................................................91 2AC T Substantial (Some Percentage)..........................................................................................91 SDI 2010 3 2AC Afghanistan RRSe SCO Add-On Withdrawal forces regional players to negotiate --- SCO will step up, solves stability and Indo-Pak relations Prashad '09 (Vijay,- Chair of South Asian History and Director of International Studies at Trinity College, Hartford, CT "Afghanistan: The Regional Alternative to Escalation" http://www.apimovement.com/viewpoint/afghanistanregional-alternative-escalation) More US troops are being prepared for Afghanistan. The President charged them with (1) defeating or degrading the Taliban; (2) building the Afghan National Army. We have thrown in our lot with Hamid Karzai's government. Its association with warlords is uncontestable (his own brother is an opium kingpin). Our enemy is the Taliban, which recruits a family each time we accidentally kill one civilian. And we have offered the coldest shoulder to the forces of progress, like the former parliamentarian Malalai Joya (one of the first acts of the Karzai government in 2002 was to ban the communists, and he has himself refused to create the kind of political parties that might undermine warlordism). Obama's enunciated goals seem impossible. Departure in 2011 is a chimera; it is thrown like magic to assuage those with anxiety about a long-term commitment. Withdrawal will be silenced by the monstrous anger of guns. The United States-NATO Occupation has ill-defined signposts, and those that are defined will be difficult to reach. There is a better alternative to escalation, which is to make the stability of Afghanistan a regional responsibility, and to withdraw in a very timely fashion. The regional partners with the greatest stake in the stability of Afghanistan, such as Iran, India, Pakistan, China and the various Central Asian republics, will not begin a genuine process if the US-NATO Occupation persists. Why would the Chinese or the Iranians get their hands dirty if this means that their work will reward the US with military bases at Bagram and Kabul? A prerequisite for their entry into the process is the withdrawal of the US, and a pledge that no permanent military bases will remain in the region. This is not a marker that the US is willing to put on the table. It is committed to empire. Obama said at West Point, "We have no interest in occupying your country." That is true if the definition of occupation is a 19th century one. But a 21st century occupation is conducted via military bases and extra-territorial privileges, by free trade agreements and dispensations for certain corporations. The high walls of the bases and the hum of the drones is enough to distort the fine sentiments in Obama's phrase. When the Taliban was in power (1996-2001), the regional states formed the Shanghai Cooperation Alliance (it was the Shanghai Five in 1996, and by 2001, the SCO). The members included the various Central Asian states that border Afghanistan, Russia, and China with observer status for India, Iran, Pakistan and Mongolia. The SCO was formed to create trust on the borders of the new Republics, which were once part of the USSR, and China. In July 2001, the SCO acknowledged that the "cradle of terrorism, separatism and extremisms is the instability in Afghanistan." They pledged to work together to undermine the Taliban, and the various political Islamists in the region. It was to be a long process, but not one without possibility. None of the neighbors wanted to see the Taliban emirate exported; they had national interests at stake. And they had influence over a landlocked country whose only ally was Pakistan, itself beholden to China for diplomatic cover and much else. Pressure could have come, but time did not permit. A few days after 9/11, elements in the Taliban reached out to the US. They wanted political cover to turn over Osama Bin Laden, and to save their own emirate. This was an important opening, but the Bush administration decided to snub them. In mid-October, the Taliban's no. 3, Haji Abdul Kabir told reporters. "We would be ready to hand [Bin Laden] over to a third country" if the bombing ended. Once more, Bush demurred. It was not his style to negotiate. This is when the Afghan war was lost: not at Tora Bora but at a press conference at Jalalabad. If the US had taken the Taliban up on this offer, Bin Laden would have been in custody in a third country and tried in an international court. Instead, the US backed one group of nasty warlords (the Northern Alliance) against the Taliban, throwing to the wind the progressive forces within Afghan society. The SCO was also disregarded. This was a costly mistake. The SCO continues to have influence in the region. This summer, the Taliban leadership sent a letter to the SCO, asking it to intervene against the Occupation. These are the leaders of the insurgency on the ground, not the "moderates" who decamped to Saudi Arabia for a Mecca meeting with their funders and the Karzai government (as reported in Asharq al-Awsat in October 2008). Those who went to Mecca, such as Mullah Mohammed Tayeb Agha and Wakil Ahmad Mutawakkil, are not linked to the Taliban resurgence (indeed, its spokesperson, Zabihullah Mujahid, denied that they spoke for the Taliban). On the other hand, the letter to the SCO came from the Quetta Shura Taliban, the inner sanctum controlled by Mullah Omar. Since September 2009, the Quetta Shura has been trying to play up its "nationalist" credentials, including distancing itself from al-Qaeda, whose own regional leaders have continued their tirade against nationalism of all kinds. Mullah Omar's Eid message on September 19 called the Taliban "a robust Islamic and nationalist movement," a statement that earned a rebuke from the leading Salafi cleric, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi. The Salafis worry that the Taliban will go the way of Khalid Meshal's Hamas. No division of the umma, the Muslim nation, for the hard-core jihadis. There is daylight between the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Which is why it reached out to the SCO. Of course the SCO is sitting on its hands, but it is able. The regional solution will be difficult, given that it would have to scrub off the effects of thirty years of warfare. The SCO is not going to welcome the Taliban with open arms and hand over Kabul to Mullah Omar. [Card Continued No Text Removed] SDI 2010 4 2AC Afghanistan RRSe SCO Add-On [Card Continued No Text Removed] After 2001, the US welcomed the warlords into Kabul, handed them the keys to the kingdom and gave them a tacit amnesty for their grievous crimes (even making Ahmed Shah Masood, a ghastly warlord, the nation's icon). Such a positive fate does not seem to be on the horizon for the Taliban. It will come above ground with much less fanfare. The Taliban and the warlords obviously command a following in Afghanistan (something that was not true in the 1970s). Thanks to US, Saudi and Pakistani funding and assistance, the warlords and the Taliban have become a social force and have to be combated politically. The US and the Saudis cannot broker their entry into the political process. But the SCO has a better chance. Right after the Taliban fled in 2001, the US convened a "donor's conference" in Bonn, where Europe, Japan and the US gathered to promise money for the reconstruction of the country. No one invited the SCO players. This has not changed. Europe, Japan and the US, the countries with the least legitimacy in Afghanistan are the ones calling the shots. Rather than conference calls with Brussels (the NATO headquarters), and Paris and London, and Kabul (with the shaky government of Karzai), the Obama administration should have called a political conference of the SCO, to see what it would have taken to hand over the Afghan imbroglio to them. The SCO met in Bishkek (capital of Kyrgyzstan) on November 24 to discuss the problem of the region, and made all kinds of suggestions. None of these are operational till the US-NATO withdraws from Kabul. China is the only power in the region with the wealth and expertise to genuinely rebuild Afghanistan (people might criticize its development policy in Africa, but mark this: Chinese investment enters countries in Africa without IMFtype conditionalities and Chinese engineers and managers live in modest conditions, not creating the kind of high-overhead NGO lifestyles of the European and US humanitarian workers). India and Pakistan have competing interests in Afghanistan. Their Cold War is fought between their Afghan proxies. If the SCO were responsible for the situation, India and Pakistan would be forced to work together. India's sober reaction to the Mumbai attacks of 2008, and to the two bombings of its Kabul embassy have shown the Pakistani civilian leadership that it is prepared to negotiate in a serious fashion. On December 2, the Indian government announced, for the first time in decades, that it would begin to withdraw troops from Jammu and Kashmir. The moment is nigh for the Pakistani civilian leadership to put itself at the center of diplomatic discussions in the region, to isolate the ISI and the Pakistani military who have otherwise defined Pakistan's Afghan policy. But an escalation is going to set this backwards: more bloodshed in the northern borderlands of Pakistan will inflame the population, and it might set in motion a forward policy not only into Afghanistan but also its twin, Kashmir. If all this happens, I fear for the future of South Asia. In a decade it will resemble West Asia. Both broken by empire. The US media has portrayed the escalation of the Occupation in a very simplistic fashion: either the US solves the problem, or the Taliban returns. This is a false choice, one that assumes that only the US can act, the White Knight riding in to save the world. America is not exceptional. Others are ready. But they don't want to act unless they have a commitment that the US is not going to use their blood and treasure to build its empire . SDI 2010 5 2AC Afghanistan RRSe SCO Add-On This is key to meaningful SCO-NATO cooperation Afrasiabi '09 (Kaveh,- former political science professor at Tehran University "Unlikely bedfellows in Afghanistan" http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KC18Df02.html) Due to their geographical proximity to Afghanistan and the threats of conflict spillover, the SCO members are naturally concerned about the security meltdown in Afghanistan. As a result, it is not far-fetched to anticipate a near-term breakthrough over SCO-NATO cooperation on Afghanistan. This would be despite lingering SCO suspicions of NATO's "out of area" operations in their backyard. NATO's decision to put on hold the accession of Georgia and Ukraine dampens these suspicions. The key issue is the nature of any possible SCO-NATO cooperation. In 2005, the SCO and Afghanistan set up a liaison group based in Beijing to deal with drug trafficking, cross-border crime and intelligence-sharing. But not much has happened and then-president Vladimir Putin's 2004 call for a SCO "security belt" around Afghanistan to stop the drug trade has not materialized This is partly because the SCO is still in the process of self-definition, and unlike NATO, or for that matter the Moscowdominated Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), it lacks the identity of a military bloc. In a recent interview, the SCO secretary general, Bolat Nurgaliev, stated that "any physical involvement by the SCO in Afghanistan has not been contemplated so far". But with NATO admittedly failing to secure Afghanistan, the NATO leadership may now be amenable to the idea of a co-security partnership with SCO. This could begin with the low-security issues of drug trafficking and arms smuggling. This would parcel out a slice of the Afghan security pie to the SCO, traditionally viewed with suspicion in the US and European capitals as a potential rival to NATO. In a separate development, according to a source at the UN, China is leaning in favor of a UN peacekeeping force for Afghanistan to which it would contribute, this in contrast to Russia's cool reception of this option. At the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations, which is a major organizer of The Hague Afghan conference, the idea of sending blue helmets to guard Afghanistan's porous borders is under serious consideration. Whether or not the SCO and NATO can cooperate on low-security issues depends on each organization's sober "threat analysis" and NATO's firm conclusion that it cannot handle Afghanistan alone. But, perhaps more important than any decision by the SCO and NATO leaders is whether India and Pakistan can stop competing and begin to cooperate on Afghanistan. SDI 2010 6 2AC Afghanistan RRSe SCO Add-On Cooperation solves energy conflicts between member states which will intensify competition in the Artic and Baltic Sea Region Lin '09 (Christina,- Visiting Fellow at American Institute for Contemporary German Studies and Researcher for Jane's Information Group. Aug 19th, http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/showArticle3.cfm? article_id=17881&topicID=31 Accessed 7.19.10) Moreover, this meeting was followed by the ninth SCO summit in Yekaterinburg, Russia on 15-16 June, where Russia concurrently hosted the first meeting of BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) heads of states. The outcome of the BRIC meeting was a call to restructure the global financial architecture while the SCO summit produced an agreement to establish an SCO currency (to supplant the U.S. dollar as the dominant reserve currency), in addition to settling issues of NATO in Afghanistan, Iran's SCO membership, and other regional se- curity issues. Given SCO's increased presence in Afghanistan, outgoing NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer in a July Chatham House conference discussed NATO's new strategic concept and the need to engage other organizations--"I believe NATO should also develop closer contacts with the Arab League, the Organization of the Islamic Conference--and indeed the Shanghai Cooperation Organization"--in a "comprehensive approach" to new security challenges. Indeed, the increasing role of the Sino-Russian-led SCO in Afghanistan and its interaction with NATO and the West will have important impli- cations for transatlantic relations. Energy Security and SCO as an Emerging Military Alliance The SCO began as the "Shanghai Five" of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan in 1996 to resolve border disputes after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It was institutionalized in 2001 when Uzbekistan joined and became the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Over the years, SCO watchers have witnessed its transformation from a loose interest-based collection of authoritarian states involved in resolving border disputes and counter-terrorism, to a formidable energy bloc when it established the Energy Club in 2007 (and calls to form a gas OPEC), to an increasingly militarized security bloc with joint military exercises. While not yet a military alliance, there seems to be a trajectory toward militarization of the organization, as outlined in a 2007 paper published by Lt. Colonel Dr. Marcel de Haas of the Royal Netherlands Army. This is measured by: (1) Increased security cooperation; (2) Increased CSTO-SCO ties; (3) Militarization of Energy Security; and (4) Connection with the West. First, despite denials of the military nature of the SCO, in 2007 for the first time a political summit (Bishtek 2007) was amalgamated with war games (Peace Mission 2007). Hitherto defense ministers were the highest-ranking officials to participate in the military exercises, thus the heads of states' presence at the war game was perhaps signaling SCO's determination to be in command of regional security. This trend is underscored by the increasingly ambitious nature of SCO military exercises from bilateral to multilateral to joint all-SCO level. Second, SCO policy documents may include the concept of "military assistance" (e.g., attack against one is an attack against all). In October 2007 SCO (a political-economic organization) signed defense agreements with CSTO (a political-military organization). Since "military assistance" is a key element of a mature security alliance such as CSTO, and because SCO signed a defense agreement with a purely military organization, this may promulgate the SCO toward a more military trajectory. Third, CSTO-SCO cooperation is tied into the increasing military aspects of energy security, such as guarding security of oil and gas pipelines against terrorist attacks, protecting railway lines, and deploying rapid reaction forces. In light of SCO's new cooperation with CSTO, this may lead to eventual standing of reaction forces in the near future regarding energy security. Finally, SCO is increasing ties with NATO--which has arrangements for cooperation with all SCO states except China. Since the 1990s, NATO has had bilateral cooperation with five central Asian states within the Partnership for Peace (PfP) framework, as well as with Russia via the NATO-Russia Council since 2002. In November 2005 SCO developed a contact group in Afghanistan and has had oper- ational cooperation with NATO. It is looking to expand its military operations westward from central Asia. Militarization of Energy Security and SCO Challenges to NATO Moreover, energy security is an issue where China's economic priority and Russia's military priority converge within the SCO . Some pundits have opined that the Sino-Russian axis in the SCO is one merely of convenience and mutual interests, not necessarily a partnership at the strategic level. China is an energy importer and focused on economic growth, while Russia is an energy exporter and focused on military growth. However, militarization of an economic issue such as energy security is where Sino-Russian interests converge. This is underscored by the recent Russian national se- curity strategy unveiled on 12 May 2009 on the theme of security through economic development, and the military power necessary to protect security of energy supply. Due to insecurity of energy supply and dependency on the U.S. for protection of SLOCs (sea lines of communication) that connect vital energy resources in the Middle East and Africa, China has tried to hedge itself and adopted a military "string of pearls" strategy in an effort to create access to ports and airfields, develop special diplomatic relationships, and modernize military forces that extend from the South China Sea through the Strait of Malacca, across the Indian Ocean, and on to the Arabian Gulf.10Each "pearl" is a nexus of Chinese geopolitical or military presence, such as upgraded military facilities on Hainan Island, an upgraded airstrip on Woody Island located in the Paracel archipelago, a container shipping facility on Chittagong, Bangladesh, construction of a deep water port in Burma, a navy base in Gwadar, Pakistan, or increasing ties with Iran in the Persian Gulf. It is also undergoing rapid naval modernization, including aircraft carrier ambitions to eventually challenge U.S. naval dominance. Similarly, Russia is increasing militarization of its energy security policy. The Russo-German Nord Stream pipeline that would run under the Baltic Sea has met stiff resistance from other Baltic littoral nations due to negative implications for this proposed pipeline--increased EU energy dependency on Russia, constraints on small members to act as regional security providers if energy security is undermined, and increased Russian military presence in the Baltic region. SDI 2010 7 2AC Afghanistan RRSe SCO Add-On Sweden for one fears the risk of Nord Stream as a catalyst for increased Russian military presence and intelligence surveillance, especially in light of Putin proclaiming that during the construction phase, Russia's BalticSea Navy would protect Nord Stream pipelines. The risers and pipelines are excellent platforms for sensors of various kinds--radars, hydro-acoustic systems and sonar to act as eyes and ears for monitoring the system, as well as intelligence surveillance. This would provide Russian intelligence an edge in the Baltic Sea concerning all air, surface, and sub-surface activities--especially around Estonia, Finland, Sweden, and Denmark, and subsequently NATO members' military exercises. This is indeed a realistic risk, given Russia's past history of installing fiber optic cable along the Yamal pipeline without first informing the Polish government.Sweden has thus stipulated that Nord Stream needs approval of all countries whose territories will be traversed by the pipeline. Should the Russians build pipelines without approval of countries in the region, the Swedish military has drawn up plans to sabotage the pipeline if and when it is built. The Sino-Russian strategic partnership is further reinforced by increased bilateral joint military ex- ercises. On 28 April 2009, at a Moscow meeting between Russian and Chinese defense ministers, both announced closer military cooperation and as many as twenty-five joint maneuvers to be staged this year in a demonstration of strengthening the Sino-Russian axis and underscored the SCO's growing military role. From Afghanistan to Militarization of the Arctic--NATO's New Arena Indeed, concerns on militarization of energy security in light of the Russo-German Nord Stream in the Baltic are carried over to carbon-resource exploitation in the Arctic--both of which consist part of the "High North."In 2007 Norway and Germanyunveiled plans to exploit some of the Arctic's vast energy reserves.Germany imports 40 percent of its natural gas from Russia--the highest within the EU--so it needs to carefully calibrate its energydependent relationship on Russia with its relations to NATO and the Arctic region--NATO's new energy security arena. Since August 2007 when Russia staked territorial claims on the sea bed of the North Pole with a titanium flag, this has unleashed militarization of the Arctic region by other littoral states, all of which are NATO or NATO PfP members except Russia: U.S., Canada, Iceland, Denmark, Norway, Finland, and Sweden. U.S. interests in the Arctic region culminated in the January 2009 U.S. Arctic Policy Report (NSPD66), underscoring U.S. national security interests in the region and presenting the U.S. as "prepared to operate either independently or in conjunction with other states to safeguard these interests... [including] such matters as missile defense and early warning; deployment of sea and air systems for strategic sealift, strategic deterrence, maritime presence, and maritime security operations; and ensuring freedom of navigation and over flight." It also underscored the need to preserve global maritime mobility of U.S. armed forces throughout the Arctic region and sovereign rights over ex- tensive marine areas including natural resources. 2008 U.S. Geological Survey estimated that 25 percent of the world's oil and gas reserves lie in the Arctic, which is increasingly accessible due to climate change and melting of the polar ice caps. Moreover, in 2007 a Russian press source stated that the Northwest Passage, running through the Arctic Ocean along Russia's northern coast, is the shortest way from Europe to Asia and the Pacific coast of the Americas, enabling shorter transport of oil and gas from Arctic deposits. On 27 March 2009 Russia subsequently released its own Arctic policy paper entitled, "The Foundations of State Policy of Russian Federation in Arctic Area for the Period Up to 2020 and Beyond," declaring its intent to develop Arctic military forces to protect the continental shelf that would become the nation's leading resource base by 2020. A few days later, Canadian officials announced similar plans to create a 500-strong Army unit for Far North operations, followed by Denmark creating a new Arctic military command in June. Even without an Arctic coastline, China had sent its icebreaker, the Snow Dragon, on its third Arctic expedition in summer of 2008 and has earned observer status to the Arctic Council. It is seeking to install its long-term deep-sea monitoring system in the Arctic. NATO is thus becoming involved in the Arctic race for hydrocarbon resources. On 28-29 January this year, NATO held a meeting in Iceland entitled "Security Prospects in the High North" to address militarization of energy security. General John Craddock, then-Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), suggested that while the Arctic was not yet a region of conflict, environmental and geopolitical developments risk potential military conflict among the eight stakeholders. Indeed, there has already been increased Russo-Canadian regional tension since 2007 over the disputed territoryof the Lomonosov Ridge, a 1,200 mile underwater mountain range running close to the Pole. NORAD spokesperson Michael Kucharek said Canadian and U.S. fighter jets have been scrambled more than twenty times since early 2007 to perform visual identification of Russian bombers and to direct them away from North American airspace. The Arctic is a vital Russian strategic region not only for energy resources but also for nuclear de- terrent capabilities. Given U.S./NATO missiles, satellite radars, and interceptor missile facilities around the world and in space, a key place for Russian deterrence/retaliatory capacity against a nuclear first strike is under the polar ice cap. On 7 July 2007, a RIA Novosti article reported that, "A Sineva ICBM24[...] was fired in the summer of 2006 from the North Pole by the submarine Yekater- inburg [...] Under a thick icecap the submarine remains invisible to hostile observation satellites till the last moment. As a result, a retaliatory nuclear strike would be sudden and unavoidable." A Russ- ian naval commander underscored the importance of Russian strategic submarines operating under Arctic ice: "This training is needed to help strategic submarines of the Russian Fleet head for the Arctic ice region, which is the least vulnerable to an adversary's monitoring, and prepare for a re- sponse to a ballistic missile strike in the event of a nuclear conflict [...] to preserve strategic sub- marines--it is necessary to train Russian submariners to maneuver under the Arctic ice."Thus, Arctic polar ice caps are a key Russian submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM)26 strategy of deception and deterrence. Given German energy interests in the High North--with a Norwegian joint energy venture in the Arctic and the Nord Stream venture with Russia in the Baltic--Germany needs to tread carefully in its relations with Russia and with NATO allies. The militarization of the High North between Russia and NATO members and partners will impact German energy interests as well as wider geopolitical interests. SDI 2010 8 2AC Afghanistan RRSe SCO Add-On Escalation is guaranteed --- outweighs all other scenarios for nuclear war Rozoff '09 (Richard,- author and geopolitical analyst. he is editor of Stop NATO and a frequent contributor to Global Research "Baltic Sea: Flash Point For NATO-Russia Conflict" http://rickrozoff.wordpress.com/2009/08/27/baltic-sea-flashpoint-for-nato-russia-conflict/ Accessed 4.1.09) In such an environment of international lawlessness and heightened alarm over military threats, otherwise minor contretemps and even fears of a neighbor's and potential adversary's intents can spark a conflict and a conflagration. The world has been on edge for a decade now and a form of numbing has set in with many of its inhabitants; a permanent condition of war apprehension and alert has settled over others, particularly those in areas likely to be directly affected. Over the past six years the worst and most immediate fears have centered on the prospects of three major regional conflicts, all of which are fraught with the danger of eventual escalation into nuclear exchanges. The three are a renewed and intensified Indian-Pakistani conflict, an outbreak of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula and an attack by the U.S., Israel or both in unison against Iran. The first would affect neighbors both in possession of nuclear weapons and a combined population of 1,320,000,000. The second could set Northeast Asia afire with China and Russia, both having borders with North Korea, inevitably being pulled into the vortex. The last could lead to an explosion in the Persian Gulf and throughout the Middle East, with the potential of spilling over into the Caspian Sea Basin, Central and South Asia, the Caucasus and even the Balkans, as the U.S. and NATO have strategic air bases in Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey, Iraq, Afghanistan and, at least for the time being, Kyrgyzstan that would be employed in any major assault on Iran, and the latter would retaliate against both land- and sea-based threats as best it could. In the event that any of the three scenarios reached the level of what in a humane and sensible world would be considered the unthinkable the use of nuclear weapons the cataclysmic consequences both for the respective regions involved and for the world would be incalculable. Theoretically, though, all three nightmare models could be geographically contained. There is a fourth spot on the map, however, where most any spark could ignite a powder keg that would draw in and pit against each other the world's two major nuclear powers and immediately and ipso facto develop into a world conflict. That area is the Baltic Sea region. In 2003, months before NATO would grant full membership to the Baltic nations of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, the Russian Defense Minister at the time, Sergei Ivanov, warned that such a development would entail the deployment of NATO, including American, warplanes "a three-minute flight away from St. Petersburg," Russia's second largest city. And just that occurred. NATO air patrols began in 2004 on a three month rotational basis and U.S. warplanes just completed their second deployment on January 4 of this year. Had history occurred otherwise and Soviet warplanes alternated with those of fellow Warsaw Pact nations in patrolling over, say, the St. Lawrence Seaway or the Atlantic Coast off Nova Scotia, official Washington's response wouldn't be hard to imagine or long in coming. A 2005 report by the Natural Resources Defense Council confirmed that the U.S. maintained 480 nuclear bombs in Europe, hosted by six NATO allies, Belgium, Britain, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and Turkey. More recent estimates indicate that over 350 American nuclear weapons remain in Europe to the present time. If the six above-mentioned nations continue to host nuclear arms, what would new NATO members Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania the first and third currently governed by former U.S. citizens, president Toomas Hendrik Ilves and Valdas Adamkus, respectively deny the Pentagon? SDI 2010 9 2AC Afghanistan RRSe Iran Add-On Troop withdrawal is Iran's biggest sticking point toward greater cooperation in Afghanistan, gradual withdrawal is key --- its vital to prevent drug trafficking and instability in Afghanistan and Pakistan Hillary Mann Leverett is CEO of Strategic Energy and Global Analysis (STRATEGA), a political risk consultancy, 7/8 2010 http://www.raceforiran.com/iran%E2%80%99s-strategic-stake-in-afghanistan-hillary-mann-leverett-inforeign-policy Accessed 7.12.10 On Iran's core interests in Afghanistan: "Iran has a strategic stake in Afghanistan that has not changed in the last nine years. Tehran's overriding interest is to prevent Afghanistan (with its long and lawless border with Iran) from being used as a platform from which to attack or undermine the Islamic Republic or to weaken Iran's standing as a regional power. To prevent Afghanistan from being used as an anti-Iranian platform, the Islamic Republic has worked, over many years, to form relationships with Afghan players who could keep Iran's Afghan enemies (principally the Taliban but also other anti-Shiite and anti-Persian groups) and their external supporters (principally Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, two of Iran's most important regional antagonists) in check. To this end, Iran has worked to strengthen and unite Afghanistan's Shiite Hazara and other Dari/Persian-speaking communities (which together comprise about 45 percent of the population) as a counterweight to anti-Iranian, pro-Saudi, and pro-Pakistani elements among Afghan Pashtuns (roughly 42 percent of the population). The Hazara and other Dari/Persian-speaking communities were, of course, the core of the Northern Alliance that fought the Taliban during the 1990s, and were supported by India and Russia as well as Iran." On allegations of Iranian support for the Taliban: "Iran knows from bitter experience that the Hazara and the other Dari/Persian-speaking communities provide, at best, inadequate protection for Iranian interests in Afghanistan, because they cannot govern the country in a way that keeps it relatively stable and minimizes Pakistani and Saudi influence. So, alongside its alliances with the Hazara and the other Dari/Persian-speaking groups, Iran has also cultivated ties to some Pashtun elements in Afghanistan and supported the country's Pashtun President, Hamid Karzai. As part of its cultivation of ties to Pashtun elements, Iran has almost certainly reached out to some Taliban factions. But I would wager a substantial sum that America's `ally' Pakistan is providing vastly more support to the Afghan Taliban than anything the Islamic Republic might be doing. And Tehran remains strongly opposed to the Taliban's resurgence as a major force in Afghan politics, for two reasons. First, the Taliban have traditionally persecuted Iran's Afghan allies--especially the Shia Hazara--and have even murdered Iranian diplomats. Second, Tehran sees the Taliban as a pawn for the expansion of Pakistani and Saudi influence in Afghanistan... In the political and security vacuum that is today's Afghanistan, Karzai's effort to engage the Taliban is generating deep unease among Iran's allies in Afghanistan's Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara communities. Already, the leadership of these non-Pashtun communities--who also dominate the upper echelons of the Afghan military--are organizing to resist, by force, any serious attempt at power-sharing between Karzai's government and the Taliban. If the Taliban's political influence across Afghanistan continues to grow-- particularly in an environment conditioned by what Tehran sees as America's strategic and tactical incompetence--Iran will support its Afghan allies as they `push back' against a resurgent Taliban." [Note from Flynt Leverett: The Washington Post's Colum Lynch reported this week on his "Turtle Bay" blog at www.ForeignPolicy.com that the Obama Administration's "Afpak" special envoy Richard Holbrooke is in New York this week "to help Afghanistan negotiate the removal of select Taliban members from a U.N. anti-terror blacklist, according to senior U.N.-based officials".] On the complementarity of Iranian and U.S. goals in Afghanistan: "As Tehran pursues this strategy of multiple alliances within Afghanistan, it must also assess the evolving role of the United States there and the implications of the U.S. posture toward Iran for Iran's Afghanistan policy. If the United States and NATO could convince Iran that they want an independent and stable Afghanistan that would be friendly to Iran, then U.S./NATO and Iranian strategies and tactics could complement each other very constructively. (This was very much the case in the months following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, when I was one of a small number of U.S. officials engaged in ongoing discussions with Iranian counterparts about how to deal with Afghanistan and al-Qaeda, and U.S. and Iranian policies regarding these issues were rather closely coordinated.) But, if Tehran perceives Washington as hostile to its interests-- which, unfortunately, is currently the case, given the Obama administration's drive to impose sanctions and continued use of covert operations to undermine the Islamic Republic--then Iranian policymakers will regard the United States, along with America's Pakistani and Saudi allies, as part of the complex of anti-Iranian external players that Iran needs to balance against in Afghanistan. In this context, Iran has a strong interest in preventing U.S. troops in Afghanistan from being used to attack Iran directly, used as covert operatives to undermine the Iranian government, or used to strengthen Iran's regional rivals." On Iran's reaction to a drawdown in U.S. military forces in Afghanistan: "In contrast to the United States, which seems at least to be looking for a viable exit strategy from Afghanistan, there is no exit strategy for Iran. Iran publicly calls for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan , partly because U.S. forces there could be used against Iran. But Tehran also calls for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan because Iranian policymakers believe that the extended U.S. presence there is seen by much of the population as an occupation and that it is this occupation which is fueling an increasingly fierce cycle of violence and instability. From Tehran's perspective, this cycle of violence and instability empowers Iran's Afghan adversaries, principally the Taliban, and their external backers, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, both of which are regional rivals to the Islamic Republic. SDI 2010 10 2AC Afghanistan RRSe Iran Add-On From an Iranian standpoint, the most constructive American strategy would have been for the United States to begin a gradual but steady withdrawal of troops a few years ago when that could have helped shape a political settlement based on power sharing among all of Afghanistan's major constituencies. From an Iranian perspective, such a settlement could have included the Pashtun, though, at least at the time, not necessarily the Taliban, and would have given Iran's Afghan allies--who, at the time, were also America's allies--the upper hand. Today, Iran is concerned that, as America belatedly positions itself to begin withdrawing forces from Afghanistan next year, the Obama administration still has no coherent strategy regarding President Karzai's drive for a political deal--a deal which, because of mistakes made by Washington, must now include the Taliban and its chief external backers, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia... Iran is concerned that the United States' interest in fostering sufficient stability in Afghanistan for long enough to allow U.S. troops to begin leaving next year will lead Washington to drop the "red lines" it has imposed on Taliban participation in a political process. Iran is concerned that Pakistan and Saudi Arabia will be able to use the Taliban's unchecked involvement in a power-sharing arrangement as a proxy to expand their influence in Afghanistan at Tehran's expense and to threaten the Islamic Republic. Under these circumstances, Iran will intensify its support for key players among the Hazara, Tajik, and Uzbek groups, just as it did during the civil war that broke out after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and after the Taliban took power in Kabul in 1996. These dynamics raise the risks of renewed civil war in Afghanistan--a civil war that would simultaneously be a proxy war among Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, the country's most powerful external players. These were precisely the conditions under which al-Qaeda found sanctuary and thrived in Afghanistan during the 1990s." On Iran and post-conflict stabilization in Afghanistan: "Post-conflict stabilization in Afghanistan requires recognizing and working with the integral connections between Afghanistan's internal balance of power and the broader balance of power among major states in the Middle East, Central Asia, and South Asia. And that means cooperation with Iran is essential to stabilizing Afghanistan and, by extension, Pakistan. Following 9/11, Iran worked with the United States on the short-term project of overthrowing the Taliban--but with the long-term goal of prompting Washington to reconsider its hostile posture toward the Islamic Republic. In effect, the Iranians hoped that cooperation with the United States would facilitate a U.S.-Iranian "grand bargain"--but this approach did not work, largely because of American resistance to a broader opening to Iran. Cooperation in Afghanistan spills over --- improves overall relations Rensselaer Lee, Senior Fellow @ the Foreign Policy Research Institute and President of Global Advisory Services, July 7th, 2006, Baltimore Sun Though increasingly at odds on nuclear proliferation and other issues, the United States and Iran have strong incentives to cooperate in one area of mutual concern: containment of Afghanistan's $2.8 billion opium and heroin business, the world's largest. Iran's interest in the matter is obvious: About 60 percent of Afghan opiate exports (opium, morphine and heroin) cross into Iran each year en route to consumers in Russia, Europe and Iran itself. An estimated 3 million Iranians, 4 percent to 5 percent of the entire population, consume opiates, the largest percentage of any country. Accordingly, Iran has to spend as much as $800 million each year, or 1.3 percent of its budget, on drug control, about twice as much in relative terms as the United States. The U.S. interest relates largely to its nation-building objectives in Afghanistan, which are under constant threat from the centrifugal forces unleashed by the drug trade. As many observers have noted, access to drug-related funds supports the pretensions of assorted regional warlords and renascent Taliban insurgents, hampering the central government's ability to extend its writ beyond Kabul. Additionally, Afghanistan's role as pre-eminent supplier of heroin to the European market heightens the interest of Washington's coalition partners in containing Afghan drug flows. Because of Afghanistan's difficulties in suppressing the drug traffic, which now accounts for an estimated one-third of the country's total (licit and illicit) gross domestic product, U.S. officials see stepped-up enforcement on the borders of neighboring states as a near-term necessity. Washington provides some law enforcement assistance to Pakistan and to Central Asian states. But a containment strategy is unlikely to work effectively unless coordinated with Iran, which is the transit country of choice for Afghan drug smugglers . Iran also might be brought into a long-term partnership with the coalition in scaling back Afghan poppy cultivation, the source of more than 90 percent of the world's opiates - for example, by contributing to underfunded crop substitution and alternative programs for poppy farmers. Some currents of U.S. official opinion might welcome direct engagement with Iran on drugs. This year, the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs issued a glowing report on Iran's anti-drug performance. The report cited "overwhelming evidence" of Iran's commitment to ensure that drugs leaving Afghanistan don't reach its citizens and its "sustained national political will" in combating drug production and trafficking. Of course, the United States lacks direct diplomatic ties with Iran and maintains no counter narcotics presence or initiatives in that country. Yet the absence of such ties does not preclude a relationship on drugs. For example, the U.S. Interests Section in Havana includes a Coast Guard "drug information specialist"; Cuba and the United States cooperate in maritime interdiction operations; and agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration visit the island to interview and extract information from foreign drug traffickers held in Cuban prisons. A U.S.Iranian dialogue on drugs wouldn't necessarily solve Iran's drug abuse problems or mitigate the burgeoning authority crisis in Afghanistan. Also, Iran and the United States might differ in their expectations of the type of political order that should take shape in that country. Yet even a modicum of cooperation in an area of significant international concern would be a major step forward. Unlike the Cuban case, in which diplomacy is hostage to entrenched domestic interests, such cooperation might lay the groundwork for improved relations in other areas, or at least create a better atmosphere for more consequential exchanges on nuclear-strategic issues . SDI 2010 11 2AC Afghanistan RRSe Iran Add-On US-Iran Relations are key to prevent Middle East War Dr. Nasser Hadian, Professor of Political Science, Tehran University Visiting Professor, Columbia University, 10-28- 2003, Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony, Iran: Security Threats & U.S. Policy Iran's Centrality and the Myth of Isolation: Iran is the most important linkage state in the Middle East . For the reasons of its geography, its revolution and ambitions, and its peculiar and jealously guarded sense of independence and thus centrality, all issues of importance in the Middle East from the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, proliferation, terrorism, future of Iraq, stability in Afghanistan, future of relations between Islam and the West, regional political change and reform, Persian Gulf security, to access to secure energy both in the Persian Gulf and the Caspian , etc., either by default or design, run in one way or the other, through Iran. Isolation of Iran is not an option. What underscores this centrality is the significance of US-Iran relations in shaping Middle East dynamics; no other factor in the last 25 years has had a more transformative impact on this region than the Iranian revolution and the hostile nature of US-Iranian relations. Middle East instability results in global escalation and nuclear use Ian O. Lesser, Woodrow Wilson Center Public Policy Scholar and Adjunct Staff Member @ Rand, 2004, The Future Security Environment in the Middle East Several factors contribute to the prominence of WMD and ballistic missiles in Middle Eastern security today. First, the Middle East is the place where unconventional weapons and missiles have been used, at least in a limited, tactical fashion, in modern conflict. Egypt employed chemical weapons in Yemen in the 1960s, and Libya is alleged to have used them in Chad. They were reportedly employed in Afghanistan and, more recently, in Sudan. Iraq used them against the Kurds, and they were employed on a large scale by both sides in the Iran-Iraq war. Missiles were used in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war (Egyptian Scuds and Syrian Frog-7s), in the "war of the cities" between Iran and Iraq, in the civil war in Yemen, and during the 1991 Gulf War. They have been fired, ineffectively, at Italian territory by Libya. Threats to employ these systems are a regular feature of confrontation in the region, and on its periphery. Second, even without use, the Middle East is a leading area of proliferation. Most of the world's leading WMD proliferators are arrayed along an arc stretching from North Africa to Pakistan (and nuclear and missile tests in South Asia may affect proliferation norms in the Middle East). The presence of active conflicts and flashpoints across the region means that the possession of WMD is not just a matter of national prestige and strategic weight, but a very real factor in military balances and warfighting. Third, the prominence of WMD in the Middle Eastern security environment is accompanied by great uncertainty about the motivations and strategic culture of regional actors. The ways of thinking about WMD, especially nuclear weapons and missiles, developed during the Cold War, are often assumed to have less relevance in a Middle Eastern setting. The question of whether "rogue" proliferators will act rationally and can be deterred in the conventional sense is unclear. In this and other contexts, the prospect of conflict involving WMD in the Middle East raises a variety of uncomfortable issues for Western strategists, and presumably for regional actors themselves. The ongoing Palestinian-Israeli confrontation, with the risk of regional escalation, lends greater weight and immediacy to these issues . Fourth, the pace and character of WMD proliferation in the Middle East is of intense interest to extraregional actors. Russia, China, North Korea, and potentially others are leading suppliers of weapons, materials, and the technological know-how for developing indigenous capabilities. Pursuit of Middle East peace and access to the region's energy supplies are extraordinarily prominent issues in international affairs, and will compel continued American and Western attention. For these and other reasons, the region is demanding of Western military presence and intervention. Proliferation can interact with the Middle East peace process and stability in the Gulf and the Mediterranean. The potential for new nuclear powers in the region, coupled with the deployment of missiles of increasing range, could profoundly alter the calculus of Western intervention and engagement in the Middle East. So, too, could a shift to a "world of defenses," operationally and strategically. And as the 2003 war against Iraq shows, the issue of WMD possession and potential use can be a casus belli in its own right. Finally, and to a growing extent, American concerns about WMD capabilities in the Middle East reflect a more profound concern about the security of the U.S. homeland itself, especially after September 11. The prominence of international terrorism with ties to the Middle East together with the growing lethality of the "new terrorism" pose the risk of terrorist use of WMD on American territory. The easy mobility of people, materials, and technology means that proliferation in the Middle East is not a remote phenomenon for the United States and its allies. Whether delivered by missiles or couriers, highly destructive weapons are the most dramatic illustration of the transregional character of the new security environment. The growing reach of these weapons challenges traditional notions of regional security. Asia, the Middle East, Europe, Eurasia, and the Western Hemisphere are now far more interdependent in security terms. The spread of WMD in the Middle East affects security on a global basis, and developments far afield can influence patterns of proliferation inside the region. SDI 2010 12 2AC Afghanistan RRSe Pakistan Add-On US troops in Afghanistan increase extremism amongst the Pashtun people this destabilizes Pakistan. Graham E. Fuller is a former CIA station chief in Kabul and a former vice-chair of the CIA's National Intelligence Council. He is author of numerous books on the Middle East, including "The Future of Political Islam." The Christian Science Monitor, December 2, 2009 available via Lexis-Nexis Academic Many decades ago, as a fledgling CIA officer in the field, I was naively convinced that if the facts were reported back to Washington correctly, everything else would take care of itself in policymaking. The first loss of innocence comes with the harsh recognition that "all politics are local" and that overseas realities bear only a partial relationship to foreign-policy formulation back home. So in President Obama's new policy directions for Afghanistan, what goes down in Washington politics far outweighs analyses of local conditions. I had hoped that Obama would level with the American people that the war in Afghanistan is not being won, indeed is not winnable within any practicable framework. Obama possesses the intelligence and insight to grasp these realities. But such an admission - however accurate - would sign the political death warrant of a president to be portrayed as having snatched defeat out of the jaws of "victory." The "objective" situation in Afghanistan remains a mess. The details are well known. Senior commanders acknowledge that we are not now winning hearts and minds in Afghanistan; indeed, we never can, and certainly not at gunpoint. Most Pashtuns will never accept a US plan for Afghanistan's future. The non-Pashtuns - Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, etc. - naturally welcome any outside support in what is a virtual civil war. America has inadvertently ended up choosing sides. US forces are perceived by large numbers of Afghans as an occupying army inflicting large civilian casualties. The struggle has now leaked into Pakistan - with even higher stakes. Obama's policies would seem an unsatisfying compromise among contending arguments. Thirty thousand more troops will not turn the tide; arguably they present more American targets for attack. They will heighten traditional xenophobia against foreigners traipsing through Pashtun villages and homes. It is a fool's errand to persuade the locals in Pashtun territory that the Taliban are the enemy and the US is their friend. Whatever mixed feelings Pashtuns have toward the Taliban, they know the Taliban remain the single most important element of Pashtun political life; the Taliban will be among them long after Washington tires of this mission. The strategy of the Bush era envisioned Afghanistan as a vital imperial outpost in a post-Soviet dream world where hundreds of overseas US bases would cement US global hegemony, keeping Russia and China in check and the US on top. That world vision is gone - except to a few Washington diehards who haven't grasped the new emerging global architectures of power, economics, prestige, and influence. The Taliban will inevitably figure significantly in the governance of almost any future Afghanistan, like it or not. Future Taliban leaders, once rid of foreign occupation, will have little incentive to support global jihadi schemes - they never really have by choice. The Taliban inherited bin Laden as a poison pill from the past when they came to power in 1996 and have learned a bitter lesson about what it means to lend state support to a prominent terrorist group. The Taliban with a voice in power will have every incentive to welcome foreign money and expertise into the country, including the Pashtun regions - as long as it is not part of a Western strategic package. An austere Islamic regime is not the ideal outcome for Afghanistan, but it is by far the most realistic. To reverse ground realities and achieve a markedly different outcome is not in the cards and will pose the same dilemma to Obama next year. Meanwhile, Pakistan will never be willing or able to solve Washington's Afghanistan dilemma. Pakistan's own stability has been brought to the very brink by US demands that it solve America's self-created problem in Afghanistan. Pakistan will eventually be forced to resolve Afghanistan itself - but only after the US has gone, and only by making a pact with Taliban forces both inside Afghanistan and in Pakistan itself. Washington will not accept that for now, but it will ultimately be forced to fairly soon. Maybe the Pakistanis can root out bin Laden, but meanwhile, Al Qaeda has extended its autonomous franchises around the world, and terrorists can train and plan almost anywhere in the world; they do not need Afghanistan. By now, as in so many other elements of the Global War on Terror, the US has become more part of the problem than part of the solution. We are sending troops to defend troops that themselves constitute an affront to Afghan nationalism. Only expeditious American withdrawal from Afghanistan will prevent exacerbation of the problem. Afghans must face the complex mechanics of internal struggle and reconciliation. They have done so over long periods of their history. The ultimate outcome is of greater strategic consequence to Pakistan, Russia, China, Iran, India, and others in the region than to the US. Europe and Canada have lost all stomach for this mission that is now promoted primarily in terms of "saving NATO" for future (and obsolescent) "out of area" struggles in a world in which Western strategic preferences can no longer predominate. SDI 2010 13 2AC Afghanistan RRSe Pakistan Add-On State collapse risks take-over by extremist entities in Pakistan Arianna Huffington is an author and syndicated columnist. She is best known as co-founder of the news website The Huffington Post. For the relevant portion of the evidence, she internally quotes Robert Baer, a former CIA field operative LA Times October 14th 2009 http://www.latimes.com/sns-200910141852tmsahuffcoltq--ma20091014oct14,0,6163789,full.story The number of those on both sides of the political spectrum who share Biden's skepticism is growing. At the beginning of September, George Will called for the U.S. to pull out of Afghanistan and "do only what can be done from offshore, using intelligence, drones, cruise missiles, air strikes and small, potent Special Forces units." Former Bush State Department official and current head of the Council on Foreign Relations Richard Haas argued in The New York Times that Afghanistan is not, as Obama insists, a war of necessity. "If Afghanistan were a war of necessity, it would justify any level of effort," writes Haas. "It is not and does not. It is not certain that doing more will achieve more. And no one should forget that doing more in Afghanistan lessens our ability to act elsewhere." In "Rethink Afghanistan," Robert Greenwald's powerful look at the war (and a film Joe Biden should see right away), Robert Baer, a former CIA field operative says, "The notion that we're in Afghanistan to make our country safer is just complete bulls--t. . . . What it's doing is causing us greater danger, no question about it. Because . . . the more we fight in Afghanistan, the more the conflict is pushed across the border into Pakistan, the more we destabilize Pakistan, the more likely it is that a fundamentalist government will take over the army . . . and we'll have al-Qaida-like groups with nuclear weapons." The risk of extremists running Pakistan forces India's hand causing pre-emptive nuclear conflict in South Asia Thomas Ricks is the author of Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2003-05, which was a no. 1 New York Times bestseller and a finalist for the Pulitzer Prize in 2007. He is special military correspondent for The Washington Post, senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security and a contributing editor for Foreign Policy magazine. Washington Post October 21, 2001 http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A27875-2001Oct20?language=printer The prospect of Pakistan being taken over by Islamic extremists is especially worrisome because it possesses nuclear weapons. The betting among military strategists is that India, another nuclear power, would not stand idly by, if it appeared that the Pakistani nuclear arsenal were about to fall into the hands of extremists . A preemptive action by India to destroy Pakistan's nuclear stockpile could provoke a new war on the subcontinent. The U.S. military has conducted more than 25 war games involving a confrontation between a nuclear-armed India and Pakistan, and each has resulted in nuclear war, said retired Air Force Col. Sam Gardiner, an expert on strategic games. SDI 2010 14 2AC Afghanistan RRSe Pakistan Add-On Nuclear war between India and Pakistan causes global extinction. Fai 1 [Dr. Ghulam Nabi, Executive Director of the Washington-based Kashmiri American Council, "India Pakistan Summit and the Issue of Kashmir," 7/8/2001, Washington Times, http://www.pakistanlink.com/Letters/...uly/13/05.html] The foreign policy of the United States in South Asia should move from the lackadaisical and distant (with India crowned with a unilateral veto power) to aggressive involvement at the vortex. The most dangerous place on the planet is Kashmir, a disputed territory convulsed and illegally occupied for more than 53 years and sandwiched between nuclear-capable India and Pakistan. It has ignited two wars between the estranged South Asian rivals in 1948 and 1965, and a third could trigger nuclear volleys and a nuclear winter threatening the entire globe. The United States would enjoy no sanctuary. This apocalyptic vision is no idiosyncratic view. The Director of Central Intelligence, the Department of Defense, and world experts generally place Kashmir at the peak of their nuclear worries. Both India and Pakistan are racing like thoroughbreds to bolster their nuclear arsenals and advanced delivery vehicles. Their defense budgets are climbing despite widespread misery amongst their populations. Neither country has initialed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, or indicated an inclination to ratify an impending Fissile Material/Cut-off Convention. SDI 2010 15 2AC Afghanistan RRSe Hegemony Add-On Expenses Internal US presence in Afghanistan will inevitably hurt American hegemony because of large expenses Malou Innocent is a foreign policy analyst at the Cato Institute who focuses on Afghanistan and Pakistan; and Ted Galen Carpenter is vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at Cato, Cato Institute 2009 available at: http://www.scribd.com/doc/19645403/Escaping-thequotGraveyard-of-Empiresquot-A-Strategy-to-Exit-Afghanistan-Cato-White-Paper. Myth #3: Withdrawal Would Erode America's Global Status Former national security adviser Henry Kissinger, Council on Foreign Relations schol- ar Stephen Biddle, and many others, concede that the war in Central Asia will be long, expensive, and risky, yet they claim it is ulti- mately worth waging because a withdrawal would boost jihadism globally and make America look weak.26 But what we've invested in the Afghanistan mission could all fall apart whether we withdraw tomorrow or 20 years from now. In fact, if leaving would make America look weak, trying to stay indefinitely while accomplishing little would appear even worse. If the issue is preventing U.S. soldiers from having died in vain, pursuing a losing strategy would not vindicate their sacrifice. And trying to pacify all of Afghanistan, much less hoping to do so on a permanent basis, is a losing strategy. Regardless, some people invoke memories of America's ignominious withdrawals from Viet- nam, Somalia, and Lebanon to muster support for an open-ended commitment. President Bush in 2007 claimed that withdrawing from Vietnam emboldened today's terrorists by compromising U.S. credibility. "Here at home," he said, "some can argue our withdrawal from Vietnam carried no price to American credibility, but the terrorists see things differently."27 Michael Rubin of the American Enterprise Institute agrees with that reasoning, writing that "the 1983 withdrawal from Lebanon and the retreat from Somalia a decade later emboldened Islamists who saw the United States as a paper tiger."28 When opinion leaders in Washington talk about "lessons learned" from Vietnam, Somal- ia, Lebanon, and other conflicts, they typically draw the wrong lesson: not that America should avoid intervening in someone else's domestic dispute, but that America should nev- er give up after having intervened, no matter what the cost.29 But the longer we stay and the more money we spend, the more we'll feel com- pelled to remain in the country to validate the investment. A similar self-imposed predicament plagued U.S. officials during the war in Vietnam: After 1968 it became increasingly clear that the survival of the [government of South Vietnam] was not worth the cost of securing it, but by then the United States had another rationale for stay- ing--prestige and precedent setting. The United States said the [South Vietnamese government] would stand, and even those in the administration now long convinced of the hollowness of the domino argument could agree that a U.S. failure in South Vietnam might endanger vital US national interests elsewhere or in the future.30 For decades, the fear of America losing the world's respect after withdrawing from a con- flict has been instrumental in selling the American public bad foreign policy. Perhaps most troubling about the reflexively "stay the course" mentality of some Americans is the widespread insensitivity about the thou- sands of people--civilian and military, domestic and foreign --killed, maimed, and traumatized in war. But when the stakes seem unrelated to vital national interests, the American public rightly resents their country's interference in third party problems, and is extremely skeptical of nation building. History shows that, sooner or later, disenchantment will manifest in public and congressional opposition. After nearly a decade in Afghanistan, even the memory of 9/11 might not be sufficient to outweigh the sacrifice in blood and treasure. Perhaps the most important argument against the "withdrawal is weak-kneed" meme is that America's military roams the planet, controls the skies and space, faces no peer competitor, and wields one of the planet's largest nuclear arsenals. America is responsible for almost half of the world's military spend- ing and can project its power around the globe. Thus, the contention that America would appear "weak" after withdrawing from Afghanistan is ludicrous. Unfortunately, bureaucratic inertia and a misplaced conception of Washington's moral obligations (an argument that more often than not legitimizes America's military occu- pation of a foreign people) threaten to trap the United States in Afghanistan for decades. Overall, remaining in Afghanistan is more likely to tarnish America's reputation and undermine U.S. security than would withdrawal. SDI 2010 16 2AC Afghanistan RRSe Hegemony Add-On Expenses Internal Afghanistan is particularly expensive this makes hegemonic decline inevitable Chalmers Johnson is an American author and professor emeritus of the University of California, San Diego. He was a consultant for the CIA from 19671973, and led the Center for Chinese Studies at the University of California, Berkeley for years Mother Jones July 30th, 2009 http://motherjones.com/politics/2009/07/three-good-reasons-liquidate-our-empire?page=2 According to a growing consensus of economists and political scientists around the world, it is impossible for the United States to continue in that role while emerging into full view as a crippled economic power. No such configuration has ever persisted in the history of imperialism. The University of Chicago's Robert Pape, author of the important study Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (Random House, 2005), typically writes: " America is in unprecedented decline. The self-inflicted wounds of the Iraq war, growing government debt, increasingly negative current-account balances and other internal economic weaknesses have cost the United States real power in today's world of rapidly spreading knowledge and technology. If present trends continue, we will look back on the Bush years as the death knell of American hegemony." There is something absurd, even Kafkaesque, about our military empire. Jay Barr, a bankruptcy attorney, makes this point using an insightful analogy: "Whether liquidating or reorganizing, a debtor who desires bankruptcy protection must provide a list of expenses, which, if considered reasonable, are offset against income to show that only limited funds are available to repay the bankrupted creditors. Now imagine a person filing for bankruptcy claiming that he could not repay his debts because he had the astronomical expense of maintaining at least 737 facilities overseas that provide exactly zero return on the significant investment required to sustain them... He could not qualify for liquidation without turning over many of his assets for the benefit of creditors, including the valuable foreign real estate on which he placed his bases." In other words, the United States is not seriously contemplating its own bankruptcy. It is instead ignoring the meaning of its precipitate economic decline and flirting with insolvency. Nick Turse, author of The Complex: How the Military Invades our Everyday Lives (Metropolitan Books, 2008), calculates that we could clear $2.6 billion if we would sell our base assets at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean and earn another $2.2 billion if we did the same with Guantnamo Bay in Cuba. These are only two of our over 800 overblown military enclaves. Our unwillingness to retrench, no less liquidate, represents a striking historical failure of the imagination. In his first official visit to China since becoming Treasury Secretary, Timothy Geithner assured an audience of students at Beijing University, "Chinese assets [invested in the United States] are very safe." According to press reports, the students responded with loud laughter. Well they might. In May 2009, the Office of Management and Budget predicted that in 2010 the United States will be burdened with a budget deficit of at least $1.75 trillion. This includes neither a projected $640 billion budget for the Pentagon, nor the costs of waging two remarkably expensive wars. The sum is so immense that it will take several generations for American citizens to repay the costs of George W. Bush's imperial adventures -- if they ever can or will. It represents about 13% of our current gross domestic product (that is, the value of everything we produce). It is worth noting that the target demanded of European nations wanting to join the Euro Zone is a deficit no greater than 3% of GDP. Thus far, President Obama has announced measly cuts of only $8.8 billion in wasteful and worthless weapons spending, including his cancellation of the F-22 fighter aircraft. The actual Pentagon budget for next year will, in fact, be larger, not smaller, than the bloated final budget of the Bush era. Far bolder cuts in our military expenditures will obviously be required in the very near future if we intend to maintain any semblance of fiscal integrity. 2. We Are Going to Lose the War in Afghanistan and It Will Help Bankrupt Us One of our major strategic blunders in Afghanistan was not to have recognized that both Great Britain and the Soviet Union attempted to pacify Afghanistan using the same military methods as ours and failed disastrously. We seem to have learned nothing from Afghanistan's modern history -- to the extent that we even know what it is. Between 1849 and 1947, Britain sent almost annual expeditions against the Pashtun tribes and sub-tribes living in what was then called the North-West Frontier Territories -- the area along either side of the artificial border between Afghanistan and Pakistan called the Durand Line. This frontier was created in 1893 by Britain's foreign secretary for India, Sir Mortimer Durand. U.S. hegemony solves nuclear war. Zalmay Khalilzad (Dep. Secretary of Defense) Spring 1995 The Washington Quarterly A world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and receptive to American values--democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, renegade states, and low level conflicts. Finally, US leadership would help preclude the rise of another global rival, enabling the US and the world to avoid another cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. SDI 2010 17 2AC Afghanistan RRSe Hegemony Add-On Reserves Internal The Afghanistan war depletes the reserve of US ground forces this will get exploited by adversaries. George Friedman is an American political scientist. He is the chief intelligence officer, and CEO of the private intelligence corporation Stratfor. Prior to Stratfor, Friedman spent almost twenty years in academia, teaching political science at Dickinson College. During this time, he regularly briefed senior commanders in the armed services as well as the U.S. Army War College Stratfor "The 30-Year War in Afghanistan" June 29, 2010 http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100628_30_year_war_afghanistan From the grand strategic point of view, the United States needs to withdraw from Afghanistan, a landlocked country where U.S. forces are dependent on tortuous supply lines. Whatever Afghanistan's vast mineral riches, mining them in the midst of war is not going to happen. More important, the United States is overcommitted in the region and lacks a strategic reserve of ground forces. Afghanistan ultimately is not strategically essential, and this is why the United States has not historically used its own forces there. Obama's attempt to return to that track after first increasing U.S. forces to set the stage for the political settlement that will allow a U.S. withdrawal is hampered by the need to begin terminating the operation by 2011 (although there is no fixed termination date). It will be difficult to draw coalition partners into local structures when the foundation -- U.S. protection -- is withdrawing. Strengthening local forces by 2011 will be difficult. Moreover, the Taliban's motivation to enter into talks is limited by the early withdrawal. At the same time, with no ground combat strategic reserve, the United States is vulnerable elsewhere in the world, and the longer the Afghan drawdown takes, the more vulnerable it becomes (hence the 2011 deadline in Obama's war plan). In sum, this is the quandary inherent in the strategy: It is necessary to withdraw as early as possible, but early withdrawal undermines both coalition building and negotiations. The recruitment and use of indigenous Afghan forces must move extremely rapidly to hit the deadline (though officially on track quantitatively, there are serious questions about qualitative measures) -- hence, the aggressive operations that have been mounted over recent months. But the correlation of forces is such that the United States probably will not be able to impose an acceptable political reality in the time frame available. Thus, Afghan President Hamid Karzai is said to be opening channels directly to the Taliban, while the Pakistanis are increasing their presence. Where a vacuum is created, regardless of how much activity there is, someone will fill it. Therefore, the problem is to define how important Afghanistan is to American global strategy, bearing in mind that the forces absorbed in Iraq and Afghanistan have left the United States vulnerable elsewhere in the world. The current strategy defines the Islamic world as the focus of all U.S. military attention. But the world has rarely been so considerate as to wait until the United States is finished with one war before starting another. Though unknowns remain unknowable, a principle of warfare is to never commit all of your reserves in a battle -- one should always maintain a reserve for the unexpected. Strategically, it is imperative that the United States begin to free up forces and re-establish its ground reserves. U.S. hegemony solves nuclear war. Zalmay Khalilzad (Dep. Secretary of Defense) Spring 1995 The Washington Quarterly A world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and receptive to American values--democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, renegade states, and low level conflicts. Finally, US leadership would help preclude the rise of another global rival, enabling the US and the world to avoid another cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. SDI 2010 18 2AC Afghanistan RRSe AT: Safe Haven Beating the Taliban is not tantamount to beating Al Qaeda--the decentralized nature of their network means sanctuary in Afghanistan is not vital to their agenda Dorronsoro, scholar at the Carnegie Endowment expert on Afghanistan, 2009 Gilles Dorronsoro, a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment, is an expert on Afghanistan, Turkey, and South Asia. His research focuses on security and political development in Afghanistan, particularly the role of the International Security Assistance Force, the necessary steps for a viable government in Kabul, and the conditions necessary for withdrawal scenarios. Previously, Dorronsoro was a professor of political science at the Sorbonne, Paris and the Institute of Political Studies of Rennes. He also served as the scientific coordinator at the French Institute of Anatolian Studies in Istanbul, Turkey. FIXING A FAILED STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN http://carnegieendowment.org/files/dorronsoro_fixing_failed_strategy2.pdf What is the importance of Afghanistan for al-Qaeda? The Taliban's significance for al-Qaeda tends to be overstated. The Taliban are not key to the survival of al-Qaeda. Its sanctuary is in Pakistan, and the security of al-Qaeda is linked to its relationship with Pakistani radical movements and tribes. So beating the Taliban does not mean beating al-Qaeda. Even if the Taliban are marginalized in Afghanistan, that would not signify a clear victory against al-Qaeda because it is a network that can easily move to another place or be quickly reorganized. The argument that the presence of U.S. troops in Afghanistan keeps alQaeda at bay in Pakistan and that a withdrawal would enlarge al-Qaeda's sanctuary is weak for two reasons. First, the Taliban are in control of large areas of the Afghan countryside, but al-Qaeda has chosen not to be there. As an international network, it needs cities and access to modern communication technologies--neither of which the Taliban offer. Second, the social, political, and security situation of Pakistan's border area makes it a safer haven for al-Qaeda. SDI 2010 19 2AC Afghanistan RRSe AT: Safe Haven Al-Qaeda doesn't need Afghanistan other failed states offer safer havens Bandow, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, 2009 Doug Bandow is a senior fellow athe Cato Institute. He is a former special assistant to President Reagan and the author of several books, including Foreign Follies: America's New Global Empire. Cato Institute: "Recognizing the Limits of American Power in Afghanistan" October 31, 2009 http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=10924 The most serious argument against withdrawal is that al-Qaeda would gain additional "safe havens." Fred Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute argued that "Afghanistan is not now a sanctuary for al-Qaeda, but it would likely become one again if we abandoned it." Richard Holbrooke, the Obama administration's special envoy to South Asia, contended: "without any shadow of a doubt, al-Qaeda would move back into Afghanistan, set up a larger presence, recruit more people and pursue its objectives against the United States even more aggressively." Preventing this is "the only justification for what we're doing," he insisted. Yet there is no evidence that al-Qaeda has moved into territory currently governed by the Taliban. Even Taliban-controlled Afghanistan would not be a genuine safe haven. Noted Stephen Walt of the Kennedy School: "The Taliban will not be able to protect [bin Laden] from U.S. commandos, cruise missiles and armed drones. He and his henchmen will always have to stay in hiding, which is why even an outright Taliban victory will not enhance their position very much." Indeed, anti-terrorism expert Marc Sageman observed in recent congressional testimony: "there is no reason for al-Qaeda to return to Afghanistan. It seems safer in Pakistan at the moment." Other options include other failed or semi-failed states, such as Somalia and Yemen. The defuse jihadist movement which has organized most of the terrorist plots since 9/11 has found adequate safe havens even in Europe. No wonder Stephen Biddle of the Council on Foreign Relations admitted, while calling for continuing "a war effort that is costly, risky and worth waging--but only barely so," that preventing al-Qaeda from moving back into Afghanistan was "the weakest argument for waging the kind of war we are now waging." The U.S. doesn't have the resources necessary to wage war everywhere terrorists might conceivably seek a safe haven and need not do so in any case. SDI 2010 20 2AC Afghanistan RRSe AT: Safe Haven Withdrawal won't create a terrorist sanctuary UAVs and covert ops can check al-Qaeda Innocent and Carpenter, foreign policy analyst and vp for defense and foreign policy at the Cato Institute, 2009 Malou Innocent is a foreign policy analyst at the Cato Institute who focuses on Afghanistan and Pakistan. Ted Galen Carpenter, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at Cato, is the author of 8 and the editor of 10 books on international affairs. His most recent book is Smart Power: Toward a Prudent Foreign Policy for America. Escaping the Graveyard of Empires: A Strategy to Exit Afghanistan, Cato Institute 2009 Given the nature of the conflict in Afghani- stan, a definitive, conventional "victory" is not a realistic option. Denying a sanctuary to terrorists who seek to attack the United States does not require Washington to pacify the entire country, eradicate its opium fields, or sustain a long-term military presence in Central Asia. From the sky, U.S. unmanned aerial vehicles can monitor vil- lages, training camps, and insurgent compounds. On the ground, the United States can retain a small number of covert operatives for intelligence gathering and discrete operations against specific targets, as well as an additional small group of advisers to train Afghan police and military forces. The United States should withdraw most of its forces from Afghanistan within the next 12 to 18 months and treat al Qaeda's presence in the region as a chronic, but manageable, problem. SDI 2010 21 2AC Afghanistan RRSe AT: Safe Haven Taliban will not allow al-Qaeda shelter safe haven myth debunked Walt, Professor of International Affairs @ Harvard, 2009 Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Rene Belfer professor of international affairs at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, where he served as academic dean from 2002-2006. He previously taught at Princeton University and the University of Chicago, where he served as master of the social science collegiate division and deputy dean of social sciences. December 3, 2009 The "safe haven" myth, Foreign Policy, August 18, 2009 http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/08/18/the_safe_haven_myth At an appearance before the Veterans of Foreign Wars yesterday, President Obama defended U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, calling it a "war of necessity." He claimed that "our new strategy has a clear mission and defined goals -- to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda and its extremist allies," and he declared that "If left unchecked, the Taliban insurgency will mean an even larger safe haven from which al Qaeda would plot to kill more Americans. So this is not only a war worth fighting. This is fundamental to the defense of our people." This is a significant statement. In effect, the president was acknowledging that the only strategic rationale for an increased commitment in Afghanistan is the fear that if the Taliban isn't defeated in Afghanistan, they will eventually allow al Qaeda to re-establish itself there, which would then enable it to mount increasingly threatening attacks on the United States. This is the kind of assertion that often leads foreign policy insiders to nod their heads in agreement, but it shouldn't be accepted uncritically. Here are a few reasons why the "safe haven" argument ought to be viewed with some skepticism. First, this argument tends to lump the various groups we are contending with together, and it suggests that all of them are equally committed to attacking the United States. In fact, most of the people we are fighting in Afghanistan aren't dedicated jihadis seeking to overthrow Arab monarchies, establish a Muslim caliphate, or mount attacks on U.S. soil. Their agenda is focused on local affairs, such as what they regard as the political disempowerment of Pashtuns and illegitimate foreign interference in their country. Moreover, the Taliban itself is more of a loose coalition of different groups than a tightly unified and hierarchical organization, which is why some experts believe we ought to be doing more to divide the movement and "flip" the moderate elements to our side. Unfortunately, the "safe haven" argument wrongly suggests that the Taliban care as much about attacking America as bin Laden does. Second, while it is true that Mullah Omar gave Osama bin Laden a sanctuary both before and after 9/11, it is by no means clear that they would give him free rein to attack the United States again. Protecting al Qaeda back in 2001 brought no end of trouble to Mullah Omar and his associates, and if they were lucky enough to regain power, it is hard to believe they would give us a reason to come back in force. Third, it is hardly obvious that Afghan territory provides an ideal "safe haven" for mounting attacks on the United States. The 9/11 plot was organized out of Hamburg, not Kabul or Kandahar, but nobody is proposing that we send troops to Germany to make sure there aren't "safe havens" operating there. In fact, if al Qaeda has to hide out somewhere, I'd rather they were in a remote, impoverished, land-locked and isolated area from which it is hard to do almost anything. The "bases" or "training camps" they could organize in Pakistan or Afghanistan might be useful for organizing a Mumbai-style attack, but they would not be particularly valuable if you were trying to do a replay of 9/11 (not many flight schools there), or if you were trying to build a weapon of mass destruction. And in a post-9/11 environment, it wouldn't be easy for a group of al Qaeda operatives bent on a Mumbia-style operation get all the way to the United States. One cannot rule this sort of thing out, of course, but does that unlikely danger justify an open-ended commitment that is going to cost us more than $60 billion next year? SDI 2010 22 2AC Afghanistan RRSe AT: Safe Haven [Walt Continued no text removed] Fourth, in the unlikely event that a new Taliban government did give al Qaeda carte blanche to prepare attacks on the United States or its allies, the United States isn't going to sit around and allow them to go about their business undisturbed. The Clinton administration wasn't sure it was a good idea to go after al Qaeda's training camps back in the 1990s (though they eventually did, albeit somewhat half-heartedly), but that was before 9/11. We know more now and the U.S. government is hardly going to be bashful about attacking such camps in the future. (Remember: we are already doing that in Pakistan, with the tacit approval of the Pakistani government). Put differently, having a Taliban government in Kabul would hardly make Afghanistan a "safe haven" today or in the future, because the United States has lots of weapons it can use against al Qaeda that don't require a large U.S. military presence on the ground. Fifth, as well-informed critics have already observed, the primary motivation for extremist organizations like the Taliban and Al Qaeda is their opposition to what they regard as unwarranted outside interference in their own societies. Increasing the U.S. military presence and engaging in various forms of social engineering is as likely to reinforce such motivations as it is to eliminate them. Obama is hoping that a different strategy will eventually undercut support for the Taliban and strengthen the central government, but it is still an open question whether more American involvement will have positive or negative effects. If we are in fact making things worse, then we may be encouraging precisely the outcome we are trying to avoid. Sixth, one might also take comfort from the Soviet experience. When the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, the mujaheddin didn't "follow them home." Were the United States to withdraw from Aghanistan and the Taliban to regain power (or end up sharing power, which is more likely), going after the United States won't even be on their "to do" list. One can of course make a moral argument for an extended commitment in Afghanistan, but that's not the argument Obama made (and it probably wouldn't sell very well here at home). For a realist, the "safe haven" argument is the only possible rationale for a large military commitment in Afghanistan. But the case is actually quite dubious, and somebody in the administration really ought to take a hard look at it. I doubt anyone will, however, because Obama is now committed, and his administration is filled with "can-do" types who never saw an international problem they didn't think the United States could fix.I sure hope they're right and I'm wrong, but I also wish that I didn't have that feeling quite as often as I seem to these days. SDI 2010 23 2AC Afghanistan RRSe AT: Safe Haven A Taliban led Afghanistan will not harbor al -Qaeda Simpson, former US ambassador, 2009 Dan Simpson retired from the U.S. Foreign Service after 35 years of assignments to countries in Africa, the Middle East and Europe, including as U.S. ambassador to the Central African Republic, ambassador and special envoy to Somalia, and ambassador to the Democratic Republic of Congo. Pittsburgh Post-Gazette (Pennsylvania): Obama's Big Mistake; The Odds of Turning Around Afghanistan are Long Indeed, December 9, 2009 l/n Mastering Afghanistan has been a matter of despair for Alexander the Great, the British and the Soviet Union. It is the size of Texas, with a difficult terrain, hard climate, an opium-dependent economy and people who generally unite around only one thing -- repelling any foreign power that tries to take over their country. Whatever could make us imagine that we and our reluctant NATO allies, a crooked Afghan government and unreliable, sometimes dangerous Afghan security forces, can now with 30,000 more American troops bring order to the place? The assumption that it is possible after we have tried to do so unsuccessfully for eight years is so improbable that it makes me look for unsaid reasons behind Mr. Obama's decision. The Afghans' general abhorrence of foreign rule is also a good reason to be less worried about al-Qaida coming back into Afghanistan with the Taliban if we left. The Afghans consider al-Qaida foreigners, as they are. None of the 9/11 attackers were Afghans. And the Afghans are fully aware of what hosting al-Qaida in their country the last time cost them in terms of lives and independence. The idea that we have to beat al-Qaida or the Taliban -- they aren't the same -- in Afghanistan and Pakistan or we will have to fight them in Steubenville is silly, a remnant of the myth of America as "the" world power that we carried as part of our political baggage from the end of the Soviet Union in 1990 until Iraq began singeing our feathers after the 2003 invasion. If al-Qaida is a threat to America in Afghanistan, is it not also in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia and even in Saudi Arabia, the origin of 15 out of the 19 9/11 attackers? Do we have 100,000 troops and $150 billion to spend on our security in each of those countries? SDI 2010 24 2AC Afghanistan RRSe ***DISADVANTAGES*** SDI 2010 25 2AC Afghanistan RRSe 2AC Obama Good Link Turn Won't pass a) Key GoP members not on board Washington Independent 7-19 Video: Daschle Pushes for New START Ratification, Lexis Today at the Center for American Progress, former Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle (D-S.D.) urged the Senate to ratify the New START nuclear arms reduction treaty, arguing that it would enhance the countrys national security and allow America to lead by example on the global stage. He noted that seven current GOP senators approved of President Reagans original START treaty but have not voiced support for New START " and with Sen. Joe Liebermans (I-Conn.) backing, their yes votes would give the treaty the 67 votes needed to pass. b) Concern about sacrificing missile defense Defense News, William Matthews, "Republicans Continue Assault on New START Treaty," 7-20-10, DA 7-22-10, http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4716346&c=AME&s=LAN Republicans led by Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., hammered at the New START Treaty when the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee held its fourth hearing on the arms reduction pact with Russia on July 20. Democrats defended the treaty as necessary to reduce U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals and to permit the United States to resume inspections of Russian nuclear sites. But skeptics dominated the hearing. McCain set a curmudgeonly tone when he asked Gen. Kevin Chilton, chief of the U.S. Strategic Command, if he agreed with a U.S. State Department assessment that "any cheating by the Russians would have little, if any effect." "Senator, I do agree with that in my ..." Chilton started to reply. "You do agree with it?" McCain interrupted with exaggerated astonishment. Chilton explained that cheating on the START Treaty by the Russians would have little effect on the United States' ability to maintain an. The New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) would reduce the number of deployed nuclear warheads for the United States and Russia to 1, effective deterrent force of submarine-launched and intercontinental ballistic missiles. "I believe that we're in a good position vis-a-vis the Russians in this regard." "Well, what this explains to the casual observer's mind, general, is if it doesn't have any consequences, if they do any cheating, what's the point in having a treaty?" McCain demanded550 each. Each now has about 2,200 deployed warheads and thousands more in storage or awaiting disposal. The treaty was signed in April by U.S. President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, but must be ratified by the U.S. Senate and the Russian parliament. Taking their cues from McCain, other Republicans on the Armed Services Committee attacked various facets of the treaty. Sen. George LeMieux, R-Fla., faulted the treaty for not covering tactical nuclear weapons, in which, he said, Russia has a 10 to one advantage. Tactical weapons pose a threat because they are mobile, thus hard to monitor and easier to proliferate, LeMieux said. He also criticized the treaty, contending that Russia has already reduced its stockpile to about the 1,550 level, so the United States is extracting no concessions from Russia by agreeing to that level. Sen. Scott Brown, R-Mass., complained that the New START Treaty "punted" on the matter of tactical weapons, and wanted to know "where are the teeth" in the treaty if the Russians violate it. The United States has a range of possible responses, said James Miller, principal deputy undersecretary of defense for policy. They range from political actions to raising the alert level on U.S. strategic weapons to increasing the number of deployed warheads on U.S. missiles and bombers. That should serve as a disincentive for the Russians to cheat, Miller said. Sen. Susan Collins, R-Maine, complained that the treaty doesn't require the Russians to supply the United States with missile telemetry for warhead verification purposes. Miller said that telemetry isn't needed because the United States will be able to conduct on-site inspections of Russian missiles. Collins also complained that the new treaty provides for fewer on-site inspections than the old one did. Miller said the new treaty permits 18 inspections while the old one permitted 28. But there are only 35 sites in Russia to be inspected compared to 70 in the Soviet Union when the old treaty went into effect. So, proportionally, the new treaty permits more inspections than the old one did, he said. Republicans questioned whether the treaty would impair U.S. efforts to improve missile defense systems in the United States and in Europe. And they did not appear satisfied by repeated assurances that the treaty would not, and that the United States would proceed with SDI 2010 26 2AC Afghanistan RRSe missile defense improvements. 2AC Obama Good Link Turn WON'T PASS RUSSIAN SPY SCANDAL. NYT 7-1-10. The roundup of a suspected Russian spy ring did more than disrupt a years-old deep-cover operation inside the United States -- it cast a shadow over President Obama's effort to transform the relationship between the two countries. The timing of the arrests, coming barely 72 hours after President Dmitri A. Medvedev's White House visit, frustrated Mr. Obama's team. But as prosecutors assemble their case, Mr. Obama has resolved not to let the ghosts of the 20th century get in the way of his goals in the 21st. Mr. Obama's administration said Wednesday that it would not expel Russian diplomats and it expressed no indignation that its putative partner was spying on it. Mr. Obama's plan is to largely ignore the issue publicly, leaving it to diplomats and investigators to handle, while he moves on to what he sees as more important matters. "We would like to get to the point where there is just so much trust and cooperation between the United States and Russia that nobody would think of turning to intelligence means to find out things that they couldn't find out in other channels," Philip Gordon, the assistant secretary of state in charge of Russia, told reporters. "We're apparently not there yet. I don't think anyone in this room is shocked to have discovered that." But the spy scandal could embolden critics who argue that Mr. Obama has been overly optimistic about his capacity to reset a relationship freighted by longstanding suspicion and clashing interests. The episode could complicate Mr. Obama's efforts to persuade the Senate to approve the new arms control treaty he negotiated with Mr. Medvedev. "It ought to reset our rosy view of Russia and remind us that Russia is not a trustworthy ally," Senator Christopher S. Bond of Missouri, the ranking Republican on the Senate intelligence committee, said in an interview. Harking back to Ronald Reagan's approach, Mr. Bond said: "We have to deal with them. But wasn't there a great Plan popular with the Right and Left at a minimum, no genuine opposition Malou Innocent is a foreign policy analyst at the Cato Institute, "Leaving Afghanistan moves beyond left vs. right" Politico March 10th 2010 http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0310/34158.html The resolution's substance and timing are revealing. For there are growing signs that some on the political right have new reservations about our continued military involvement in Afghanistan. Consider the measure's three GOP cosponsors, including Rep. Tim Johnson (Ill.), who last year earned an 80 percent favorable rating from the American Conservative Union. There is a growing bipartisan realization that our troops are being deployed to prop up a regime Washington doesn't trust, for goals our president can't define. Concern has begun to escalate among lawmakers of both parties that this prolonged military adventure is weakening the country militarily and economically. During a recent discussion about Afghanistan policy with Kucinich, he stressed Congress' power of the purse and the need to rein in the current expansive definition of executive powers. But, in private conversations, many leading congressional conservatives sound eerily similar to Kucinich -- supposedly the darling of the far left. (These legislators have not yet come out publicly in support of a withdrawal strategy -- still a politically tough step for any self-described conservative.) To politicians of any stripe, the costs on paper of staying in Afghanistan are jarring. The Pentagon is requesting an extra $33 billion to escalate combat operations, on top of the $65 billion already authorized for FY 2010. The Pentagon found that each additional 1,000 U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan would cost about $1 billion a year. The U.S. Agency for International Development has spent more than $7.8 billion on Afghanistan reconstruction since 2001, including building and refurbishing 680 schools and training thousands of civil servants. Walter Pincus, of The Washington Post, reported that the Army Corp of Engineers spent $4 billion last year on 720 miles of roads to transport troops in and around the war-ravaged country. It will spend another $4 to $6 billion this year, for 250 more miles. To be sure, conservatives and liberals part ways on the ramifications of those exorbitant outlays. Kucinich and others on the left, naturally, argue that these great sums of money are needed for major spending projects here at home -- pet issues like health care, infrastructure or education. But conservatives are no longer able to ignore the argument, presented by myself and other libertarians that these large expenditures are economically unsustainable -- whether military or domestic. To a small but growing chorus of war critics on the right, these funds would be better left unspent that is, returned to the taxpayers. War should no longer be a left-right issue. It's a question of scarce resources and limiting the power of government. The immense price tag for war in Afghanistan can no longer be swept under the carpet or dismissed as an issue owned by peaceniks and pacifists. It's time for conservatives to be philosophically consistent on the nature of limited government and return to their noninterventionist roots. Before a neoconservative strain pervaded today's GOP, the party had a tradition of war criticism -- rooted in the conviction that government uses war as a tool to amass more money and power. Many conservatives used to deride nation-building as a utopian venture that had little to do with the nation's real interests. That deep suspicion of state power now has given way to an embrace of interventionist policies. But there is a growing, if nascent, bipartisan consensus on bringing this war to a close. SDI 2010 27 2AC Afghanistan RRSe 2AC Obama Good Link Turn WITHDRAWAL Has Public support. STEINHAUSER 9. [June 30 -- Paul, CNN Deputy Political Director, "CNN Poll: Americans overwhelming support moving US combat troops out of Iraqi cities" CNN Online] A new national poll suggests that nearly three-quarters of all Americans support the plan to withdraw most U.S. combat troops from Iraqi cities and towns, even though most believe that the troop movements will lead to an increase in violence in that country. The CNN/Opinion Research Corporation poll released on Tuesday morning comes on the same day as the long-anticipated deadline for American troops to pull out of Iraqi towns and cities. The U.S. military has been gradually moving its combat troops out of Iraq's population centers for months to meet the deadline agreed by Washington and Baghdad. Since January the Americans have handed over or shut down more than 150 bases across the country, leaving U.S. troops in a little over 300 locations in Iraq that will gradually be handed over to Iraqi control. The Iraqi government describes Tuesday's pullout as National Sovereignty Day." Seventy-three percent of Americans questioned in the poll favor the withdrawal of US combat troops from Iraqi cities and towns, with 26 percent opposed. "This plan has widespread bipartisan support," says CNN Polling Director Keating Holland. "Seventy two percent of Democrats and 74 percent of Republicans favor this move." The poll indicates that 52 percent think the level of violence in Iraqi cities will increase after U.S. troops withdraw, with 32 percent saying things will remain the same and 15 percent feeling that the level of violence will decrease. If violence does increase, the poll suggests Americans are quite clear about how to respond. "Nearly two-thirds say that the U.S. should not send combat troops back into Iraqi population centers even if there is a significant increase in the number of violence attacks." Holland notes. "Americans seem to believe that once the Iraqis are in charge, it's up to them to solve any future problems." The overall war in Iraq remains unpopular, with only about a third the public supporting the U.S. war in that country. . POPULARITY KEY TO OBAMA'S AGENDA KEY TO GARNER SWING VOTES. Silver 8 (Nate, Political Analyst published in the Guardian, the New Republic and CNN, and cited by the New York Times, "Who Are the Swing Senators?" December 4, http://www.fivethirtyeight.com/2008/12/who-are-swing-senators.html) In practice, there will be a group of four or five senators in each party who line up just to either side of the 60-seat threshold and will find that they're suddenly very much in demand. If Obama's approval ratings are strong, he should have little trouble whipping the couple of Republican votes he needs into shape, and should clear 60 comfortably on key issues. But, if Obama proves to be unpopular, there remain enough conservative, red-state Democratic senators to deny him a simple majority on key issues, much less 60 votes. SDI 2010 28 2AC Afghanistan RRSe 2AC Obama Good Link Turn NO RISK OF A LINK VOTES ON START ARE IDEOLOGICAL. KORB 6-25-10. [Lawrence, a part-time resident of Sugar Hill, senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, former assistant secretary of defense during the Reagan administration, "U.S. Senate must ratify New START" Atlanta Journal Constitution -- lexis] Unfortunately, in the poisonous partisan atmosphere that dominates Washington these days, it appears likely some senators will oppose the New START Treaty either because they don't want to give President Obama a "win" heading into the midterm elections or because of an illogical impulse to oppose or distrust something that that the president supports simply because he supports it. WINNERS WIN. Singer 9 (Jonathan -- senior writer and editor for MyDD. Singer is perhaps best known for his various interviews with prominent politicians. His interviews have included John Kerry, Walter Mondale, Bob Dole, Michael Dukakis, and George McGovern, Barack Obama, John Edwards, and Tom Vilsack. He has also also interviewed dozens of senatorial, congressional and gubernatorial candidates all around the country. In his writing, Singer primarily covers all aspects of campaigns and elections, from polling and fundraising to opposition research and insider rumors. He has been quoted or cited in this capacity by Newsweek, The New York Times, USA Today, The Politico, and others. My Direct Democracy, 3-3-09, http://www.mydd.com/story/2009/3/3/191825/0428) From the latest NBC News-Wall Street Journal survey: Despite the country's struggling economy and vocal opposition to some of his policies, President Obama's favorability rating is at an all-time high. Two-thirds feel hopeful about his leadership and six in 10 approve of the job he's doing in the White House. "What is amazing here is how much political capital Obama has spent in the first six he stands at the end of this six weeks with as much or more capital in the bank." Peter Hart gets at a key point. Some believe that political capital is finite, that it can be used up. To an extent that's true. But it's important to note, too, that political capital can be regenerated -- and, specifically, that when a President expends a great deal of capital on a measure that was difficult to enact and then succeeds, he can build up more capital. Indeed, that appears to be what is happening with Barack Obama, who went to the mat to pass the stimulus package out of the gate, got it passed despite near-unanimous opposition of the Republicans on Capitol Hill, and is being rewarded by the American public as a result. Take a look at the numbers. President Obama now has a 68 percent favorable weeks," said Democratic pollster Peter D. Hart, who conducted this survey with Republican pollster Bill McInturff. "And against that , rating in the NBC-WSJ poll, his highest ever showing in the survey. Nearly half of those surveyed (47 percent) view him very positively. Obama's Democratic Party earns a respectable 49 percent favorable rating. The Republican Party, however, is in the toilet, with its worst ever showing in the history of the NBC-WSJ poll, 26 percent favorable. On the question of blame for the partisanship in Washington, 56 percent place the onus on the Bush administration and another 41 percent place it with President Obama seemingly benefiting from his ambitious actions and the Republicans sinking further and further as a result of their knee-jerked opposition to that agenda, there appears to be no reason not to push forward on anything from universal healthcare to energy reform to ending the war in Iraq. on Congressional Republicans. Yet just 24 percent blame Congressional Democrats, and a mere 11 percent blame the Obama administration. So at this point , SDI 2010 29 2AC Afghanistan RRSe 2AC Obama Good Impact Turn Accidents First, their Montreal Gazette evidence is non-unique its from 2009 and if START hasn't passed yet than either the impact is just not true or it should've happened already. Second, START causes nuclear accidents transportation. Dr. David A. Cooper is a Senior Research Fellow in the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction at the National Defense University and a former Director of Strategic Arms Control Policy at the Department of Defense., July 30, 2009, "Aligning disarmament to nuclear dangers: off to a hasty START?;," lexis In theory, further strategic offensive reductions should equate tofewer nuclear weapons to worry about. However, in practice post-START is unlikely to result in any Russian cuts that would not have happened in any case through the continuing attrition of its strategic posture. Moreover, depending on what counting rules apply, the reductions considered would not necessarily translate into fewer aggregate warheads; neither START nor the Moscow Treaty currently limits nondeployed warhead stockpiles. Indeed, from a nuclear security perspective, warheads deployed on strategic delivery platforms may be more secure in the near term than those removed (whether permanently or temporarily while awaiting dismantlement) to potentially less secure storage facilities. Moreover, the physical removal itself raises heightened risks because transportation is inherently the most vulnerable link in anuclear weapon's custody chain. Finally, post-START will not apply to the sources of Russia's greatest nuclear security risks: several thousand nonstrategic nuclear weapons and stockpiles of weapons-grade fissile material. Third, START reduction useless-no risk of miscalc accidents. Adam Lowther, PhD, is a faculty researcher and defense analyst at the Air Force Research Institute, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, Winter 2009, "The Logic of the Nuclear Arsenal," Strategic Studies Quarterly, www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2009/Winter/lowther.pdf The second argument made by abolitionists suggests that "In today's war waged on world order by terrorists, nuclear weapons are the ultimate means of mass devastation."14 It is then suggested that the United States must disarm to encourage the remaining nuclear weapons states to follow suit--as will those states developing nuclear weapons. With nation-states disarmed, there will be no place for terrorists to acquire fissile material which they can use to construct a nuclear bomb for use against the United States. The logic of this view is problematic for several reasons. First, there is a lack of evidence to support such an assertion. History does not provide a wealth of occasions in which analogous efforts led to similar results. To the contrary, American nuclear disarmament is likely to be viewed by some countries as American weakness and an opportunity to accomplish foreign policy objectives absent American interference. The failure of the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty disarmament efforts after World War I played an important role in the remilitarization of the Axis Powers in the 1930s and left the United States unprepared for World War II.15 Utopian views of a world without war left the United States open to attack and played a role in events leading to the outbreak of World War II. The wave of localized conflicts that followed the end of the Cold War may be indicative of a world free of nuclear weapons and the restraint they engender.16 Extended deterrence plays an important role in mitigating conflict by giving America's allies the confidence that the United States is protecting them while also serving as a warning to adversaries. Absent such an umbrella, stability may decline. Second, to support the abolitionist position, readers are persuaded that American conventional capabilities are a substitute for nuclear weapons. The Bush administration's "New Triad" was partially built on this view. This leads to a logical conclusion that conventional and nuclear forces generate the same strategic effect. But, if this is true, conventional forces are also a threat to stability and must also be reduced or eliminated. In fact, there is little reason to believe that the world will be more stable without nuclear weapons but with an overwhelming US conventional capability. Because America's adversaries know they cannot match US conventional capabilities, nuclear weapons may become an even more attractive option. Fear of US conventional capabilities is a driving force behind nuclear weapons programs in North Korea and Iran, not the fear of America'snuclear arsenal.17 SDI 2010 30 2AC Afghanistan RRSe Fourth, start cuts don't solve accidents current safeguards solve. Adam Lowther, PhD, is a faculty researcher and defense analyst at the Air Force Research Institute, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, Winter 2009, "The Logic of the Nuclear Arsenal," Strategic Studies Quarterly, www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2009/Winter/lowther.pdf The next line in the abolitionist argument focuses on the potential for accidental detonation, miscalculation leading to a nuclear holocaust, and proliferation. , in the 60-year history of the bomb there has never been an accidental detonation, much less a nuclear holocaust. To suggest that these events are inevitable is a historical. Current nuclear controls separate arming codes from weapons handlers and launch officers until a presidential decision is made and require multiple levels of verifica tion before a weapon can be armed and released. The high level of security that currently exists would be heightened even more if the United States While it is true that these risks exist were to continue development of the RRW, which modernizers have ad vocated for a number of years. This is also true of current modernization efforts in , American and Russian ICBMs have been detargeted, demonstrating a reduction in the level of tension between the two nations.32 Thus, it is accurate to say that American ICBMs no longer sit on "launch on warning" status.33 Most important, the notion that ICBMs sit on a "hair trigger" alert is not correct and never was. Thus, from a technical perspective, the probability of rapid cataclysmic miscalculation leading to a nuclear holocaust is highly improbable . With more than 60 years of experience with nuclear weapons, there is also a low probability of political miscalculation. Neither the president of the United States nor his counterpart in Moscow has ever "miscalculated" and launched a nuclear weapon. Rather than expecting miscalculation, a better approach may be to Russia and China.31 Additionally assist other nuclear powers in developing the sound practices that have led to six decades of American and Russian restraint . SDI 2010 31 2AC Afghanistan RRSe 2AC Obama Good Impact Turn US-Russian Relations First, their Montreal Gazette card is non-unique its from 2009 and if start hasn't passed yet than either the impact is just not true or it should've happened already. Second, even with start relations will be low. Peter Brookes Senior Fellow, National Security Affairs and Chung Ju-Yung Fellow for Policy Studies, Asian Studies Center, 1/25 2010, "O's Year of Foreign-Policy Fumbles," http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed012510f.cfm Russia: Washington-Moscow ties are increasingly cold, despite White House affections. Sensing weakness, Russia is now holding America's European, anti-Iran missile-defense system hostage to strategic-arms-control reduction talks -- an Obama priority. Worse, Washington cuddles with Moscow despite Russia's occupation of Georgia's South Ossetia and Abkhazia; we've even put Georgia's (and Ukraine's) NATO membership on ice to appease the Bear. Obama's Russia policy has left other former Soviet states nervous, too. Skipping ceremonies on the 20th anniversary of the Berlin Wall's fall only bolstered the sense of indifference New Europe now feels from the New World. Third, 5 alt causes to low relations Cohen 6/25/09 (Ariel, Senior Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Security in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, "The U.S. Agenda for the Obama-Medvedev Summit,") Moscow has crystallized a policy of negativity toward the U.S., which includes the following five planks: No to NATO enlargement that includes Georgia and Ukraine; No to U.S. missile defense in Europe; No to a robust joint policy designed to halt the Iranian nuclear arms and ballistic missiles program; No to the current security architecture in Europe; and No to the U.S. dollar as reserve currency and the current global economic architecture (Western-dominated International Monetary Fund and World Bank). Moscow's complaints have included allegations that the United States is interfering in Russia's internal affairs by promoting democracy, human rights, and the rule of law; supporting NGOs; and generally being "preachy," didactic, and heavy handed. Over the last few years, Fourth, empirically denied, US-Russia relations were bad during the cold war but the conflict did not go nuclear. Fifth, Alt cause- missile defense will hurt relations despite START RIA Novotsi, 2/24 2010, "Russian, U.S. lawmakers split by missile shield in new START pact," http://en.rian.ru/russia/20100224/157991674.html Russia's parliament is unlikely to ratify a new strategic arms reduction deal that does not include a link to missile defenses, a senior Russian lawmaker said on Wednesday after U.S. colleagues warned such a link would not get past the Senate. "The issue of interrelationship between a strategic arms reduction treaty and the missile defense system has always been and remains a key issue of Russian-U.S. accords in the spheres of arms control," Konstantin Kosachyov, head of the State Duma committee for international relations, told RIA Novosti. "If the connection between the strategic arms reduction treaty and missile defense is not exhaustively fixed by the sides in preparing the treaty... this would automatically create obstacles for subsequent ratification of the document in the State Duma and create additional difficulties for further advance in cutting strategic offensive weapons," he added. Kosachyov, in Washington for a joint session of U.S. and Russian lawmakers, told reporters on Tuesday that U.S. counterparts said the Senate was unlikely to ratify any document that included a formal linkage between the arms cuts and missile shield. Officials say an agreement between Russia and the United States to replace the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, which expired on December 5 last year, is nearly ready and could be struck in the next two Medvedev and Barack Obama, made replacing START 1, the cornerstone of post-Cold War arms control, a part of their broader efforts to "reset" bilateral ties strained in recent years. Russia, which views U.S. plans to deploy elements of its missile defense system in Europe as a direct threat to its security, has said further cuts in offensive nuclear weapons would not be practical if the sides did not put limits on nuclear defense projects, which could create an atmosphere of distrust. Washington says the missile shield is needed to guard against potential Iranian strikes and would pose no threat to Russia, but in a clear move to ease Moscow's concerns, Obama last year scrapped plans to deploy interceptor missiles in Poland and a radar in the Czech Republic. Earlier this year, however, Romania and Bulgaria said they were in talks with Obama's administration on deploying elements of or three weeks. The Russian and U.S. presidents, Dmitry SDI 2010 32 2AC Afghanistan RRSe the U.S. missile shield on their territories from 2015. Despite his warnings of obstacles in getting any treaty through the Russian parliament, Kosachyov hinted that the concerns of the U.S. Senate meant the linkage between arms cuts and missile defense was unlikely to be included in the new pact. Sixth, deterrence checks any US-Russia conflict. Seventh, Relations are resilient DesMoines Register 8/26/09 ("Renew the focus on relations of U.S., Russia,") In recent years, U.S.-Russia relations have again taken a turn for the worse. Both nations have routinely portrayed the other in negative terms. Mutual distrust and suspicions have grown over many political, defense and economic issues. We have returned to describing each other in stereotypes.The 50th anniversary of Khrushchev's visit is an excellent opportunity to focus again on the importance of better U.S.-Russia relations, honest dialogue and shared need to tackle nuclear and other global challenges. As President Barack Obama said in Moscow in early July, "But I believe that on the fundamental issues that will shape this century , Americans and Russians share common interests that form a basis for cooperation." SDI 2010 33 2AC Afghanistan RRSe 2AC Obama Good Impact Turn Prolif First, Ratifying START doesn't solve prolif. Philippines News Agency 2/1010, "U.S. Senate Republicans could use START to derail Obama's disarmament agenda, says arms expert," lexis As the START talks drag on, some experts have expressed concern that it could make it harder for the U.S. to convince the rest of the world to strengthen the NPT at the WHAT'S AT STAKE upcoming review conference in May. "A failure to get a START agreement would be a very serious blow to any idea that there is a credible commitment to zero nuclear weapons," former the U.S.'s success with Russia over an arms control deal will not directly affect the international nuclear disarmament agenda. "I hope I don't sound overly negative but I don't think this phase of START will have much effect on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)," he said. "It's a modest reduction and it really doesn't get at the real NPT issues, which is partly the test ban and really low levels of nuclear weapons down into the hundreds." What would be groundbreaking is if the U.S. ratified the CTBT, which rests on the agreement that non-nuclear states will not pursue atomic weapons as long as nuclear states halt testing their own. "It is the principle quid for the quo," said Graham . "I think we're running out of time in terms of having a strong NPT and there's nothing more important than that for us." U.S. Ambassador to Russia James Collins told Agence France-Presse. But besides gaining political leverage, says Graham, (PNA/Xinhua) Second, US nuke cuts don't spill over- only increases prolif The New Deterrent Working Group Et Al 09 (HONORABLE HENRY F. COOPER Former Director of the Defense Strategic Initiative (SDI); Former U.S. Representative to the Defense and Space Talks ,HONORABLE PAULA DESUTTER Former Assistant Secretary of State Bureau of Verification, Compliance and Implementation ,FRANK J. GAFFNEY, JR.,Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy (Acting) , PETER HUESSY President, GeoStrategic Analysis, Inc. , HONORABLE SVEN F. KRAEMER Former Director of Arms Control, National Security Council, 1981-1987 , ADMIRAL JAMES "ACE" LYONS, JR., U.S. NAVY (RET.) Former Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, VICE ADMIRAL ROBERT MONROE, U.S. NAVY (RET.) Former Director, Defense Nuclear Agency; Former Director of Navy Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) ,DR. ROBERT L. PFALTZGRAFF, JR. Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies, The Fletcher School, Tufts University; Founder and President, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis We have already seen evidence that cuts in the American nuclear arsenal do not translate into lessened proliferation of nuclear weapons around the world. U.S. warhead levels have been dramatically reduced from 12,000 deployed weapons in 1981 to roughly 2,200 in 2009. Yet, concerns about nuclear proliferation are, if anything, more acute than they were at the time of the signing of the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This disconnect has been particularly evident in the past decade. According to Thomas P. D'Agostino, the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration: "As of the end of 2007, the total [U.S.] stockpile was almost 50 percent below what it was at the start of this millennium... On December 18, 2007, a decision was announced to further reduce the nuclear weapons stockpile by another fifteen the U.S. nuclear stockpile will be less than one-quarter of its size at the end of the Cold War--the smallest stockpile in more than 50 years." Nonetheless, more countries now have nuclear arsenals than ever, and still more are poised to acquire them. Although Libya and Iraq are no longer pursuing nuclear arsenals, North Korea has a small stockpile of such weapons, Iran is striving to develop them, and the situation in Pakistan is unstable. Given the nature of the latter regimes, it strains credulity to argue that a robust American nuclear deterrent has been the driving force behind their nuclear buildups. The trends suggest, to the contrary, that an American deterrent posture perceived as inadequate translates into greater proliferation than does a strong one. As the Strategic Posture Commission pointed out in its final report issued in May, 2009, as U.S. nuclear forces have declined in number and quality over the past decade, Russia has made numerous nuclear threats against our allies. These percent by 2012. This means direct threats have been made from the level of senior generals all the way up to that of the Russian president, and they have continued despite high-level protests from the Bush administration. In addition to the numerous threats of direct targeting, Russia has also Third, just because countries have nuclear weapons does not mean they will use them and proliferate. SDI 2010 34 2AC Afghanistan RRSe Third, Reudcing nuclear weapons doesn't solve proliferation Hussey 09 (Peter Hussey, May 29, 2009, Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century - Important Questions Need AnsweringSenior Defense Associate of the National Defense University Association and President of GeoStratic Analysis, http://www.aim.org/guest-column/nuclear-deterrence-in-the-21st-century-importantquestions-need-answering/) First, he said, let's review the basics. Most importantly, there is no regime which can be created to verify with high confidence the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. And even should the United States eliminate all its weapons, nuclear weapons elsewhere would continue to exist. And just as important, the knowledge of how to build nuclear weapons would continue to exist as well. Second, outlaw or rogue states will continue to want nuclear weapons to pursue their hegemonic and totalitarian goals. They will do so not because they want to match the U.S. nuclear capabilities but because they know our overwhelming conventional capability can prevent or deter their plans for aggression. other major powers will continue to make themselves our adversaries and they will keep their nuclear weapons. Our allies will also look to us to provide a nuclear umbrella and if we do not do so, many of them will seek to build their own nuclear weapons. Third, SDI 2010 35 2AC Afghanistan RRSe 2AC Obama Good Impact Turn Terrorism First, its as easy to gain access to nuclear weapons as it is to touch the sky. Second, Doesn't solve terrorism - start doesn't improve global nuclear security. Dr. David A. Cooper is a Senior Research Fellow in the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction at the National Defense University and a former Director of Strategic Arms Control Policy at the Department of Defense., July 30, 2009, "Aligning disarmament to nuclear dangers: off to a hasty START?;," lexis Finally, loose nuke dangers extend well beyond Russia and its neighbors , as recent events in Pakistan aptly illustrate. But post-START will not address this dimension of the problem even indirectly. It would not even offer a useful template for others to emulate, since theglobal solution lies not in Cold War-era verification archetypes, but rather in expanding the cooperative threat reduction model and in improving national capacities and multinational collaboration in law enforcement, border security, and maritime and air interdiction. (28) Nor do the negotiations offer a potential lever with which to pry better Russian cooperation since Moscow is already foursquare behind such efforts, as exemplified by its coleading the U.S.-sponsored GlobalInitiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. On balance, then, post-STARToffers little, if any, remediation for nuclear security dangers. Third, no rational country would give terrorist organizations nukes-they're afraid of backlash. Fourth, Reductions in nuclear weapons won't stop nuclear terror. Adam Lowther, PhD, is a faculty researcher and defense analyst at the Air Force Research Institute, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, Winter 2009, "The Logic of the Nuclear Arsenal," Strategic Studies Quarterly, www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2009/Winter/lowther.pdf The second argument made by abolitionists suggests that "In today's war waged on world order by terrorists, nuclear weapons are the ultimate means of mass devastation ."14 It is then suggested that the United States must disarm to encourage the remaining nuclear weapons states to follow suit--as will those states developing nuclear weapons. With nation-states disarmed, there will be no place for terrorists to acquire fissile material which they can use to construct a nuclear bomb for use against the United States. The logic of this view is problematic for several reasons. First, there is a lack of evidence to support such an assertion. History does not provide a wealth of occasions in which analogous efforts led to similar results. To the contrary, American nuclear disarmament is likely to be viewed by some countries as American weakness and an opportunity to accomplish foreign policy objectives absent American interference. The failure of the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty disarmament efforts after World War I played an important role in the remilitarization of the Axis Powers in the 1930s and left the United States unprepared for World War II.15 Utopian views of a world without war left the United States open to attack and played a role in events leading to the outbreak of World War II. The wave of localized conflicts that followed the end of the Cold War may be indicative of a world free of nuclear weapons and the restraint they engender.16 Extended deterrence plays an important role in mitigating conflict by giving America's allies the confidence that the United States is protecting them while also serving as a warning to adversaries. support the abolitionist position, readers are persuaded that American conventional capabilities are a substitute for nuclear weapons. The Bush administration's "New Triad" was partially built on this view. This leads to a logical conclusion that conventional and nuclear forces generate the same strategic effect. But, if this is true, conventional forces are also a threat to stability and must also be reduced or eliminated. In fact, there is little reason to believe that the world will be more stable without nuclear weapons but with an overwhelming US conventional capability. Because America's adversaries know they Absent such an umbrella, stability may decline. Second, to SDI 2010 36 2AC Afghanistan RRSe cannot match US conventional capabilities, nuclear weapons may become an even more attractive option. Fear of US conventional capabilities is a driving force behind nuclear weapons programs in North Korea and Iran, not the fear of America'snuclear arsenal.17 SDI 2010 37 2AC Afghanistan RRSe 2AC Obama Good Impact Turn NMD START KILLS MISSILE DEFENSE IF IT DOESN'T THE RUSSIANS WILL PULL OUT. HEINRICHS 10. [Rebeccah, adjunct fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, and a former military legislative assistant for House Armed Services Committee member Trent Franks, "Hearing on what START treaty means for missile defense" The Hill -- 6/17] Despite Obama administration officials' original claims to the contrary, the New START treaty does address missile defense -- in the Preamble, no less. It states that there is a connection between offensive and defensive weapons and that our current system does not threaten Russia's offensive weapons. The Russians want to keep it that way, and even submitted a unilateral statement to make perfectly clear that the treaty, "may be effective and viable only in conditions where there is no qualitative or quantitative build-up in the missile defense system capabilities of the United States of America." The Russians have made it quite clear that they will withdraw from the treaty if the U.S. builds a robust missile defense system. And the Obama administration knows this and wants ratification regardless . As Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy James N. Miller, Jr. casually admitted in his testimony, since the U.S. has only thirty ground-based interceptors and Russia plans to field over 1,000 ballistic missiles, Washington could build much more substantial missile defenses without appreciably challenging Russian forces. Yet President Obama is effectively promising President Medvedev he will ensure that the U.S. remains exposed to Russia's massive nuclear arsenal. This was exactly what President Reagan intended to move us away from when he announced his plan to deploy defenses that would render all nuclear missiles obsolete. Miller went on to explain that the Obama administration's missile defense proposal, known as the European Phased Adaptive Approach, will not affect the U.S.-Russian strategic balance. PAA is Obama's substitute for the Bush administration's plan to establish permanent bases in Europe for interceptors similar to those we now have in California and Alaska. Even though the Bush plan would not have been able to defend the U.S. against Russian missiles, the Kremlin protested its deployment on grounds that it would. The PAA will be deployed in four stages, the last of which will have the exact same capability that the Bush plan was going to have: The ability to knock down long-range missiles from Iran before they reach Europe or the U.S. And not only will it have the same capability, it will have added advantages because it will be sea-based, making it mobile and adaptable. If the Russians had a problem with Bush's plan, they're really going to choke on Obama's -- unless of course they think he has no intention of following through on it. As a senior Russian official told Nixon Center president Dimitri Simes, "I can't quote you unequivocal language from President Obama or Secretary Clinton in conversations with us that there would be no strategic missile defenses in Europe, but everything that was said to us amounts to this." SDI 2010 38 2AC Afghanistan RRSe 2AC Obama Bad--Impact Turn YES CAP AND TRADE INCLUSION REID PUSH. SAMUELSOHN 7-13-10. [Darren, staffwriter, "Reid warms to July climate vote" Politico -http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0710/39677.html DA 7/13/10] Senate Democratic leaders are set to roll the dice this month on a comprehensive energy and climate bill, including a cap on greenhouse gases from power plants, even though they don't yet have the 60 votes needed to move the controversial plan. Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.) confirmed Tuesday that he would gamble on the high-stakes legislation -- much as he undertook health care and Wall Street reform -- that for now remains in the rough-draft stage but that will soon be the subject of intense negotiations. "Whatever I bring to the floor, I want to get 60 votes," Reid told POLITICO shortly after announcing his strategy for a full Senate debate as early as the week of July 26 . Reid confirmed the bill will have four parts: an oil spill response; a clean-energy and job-creation title based on work done in the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee; a tax package from the Senate Finance Committee; and a section that deals with greenhouse gas emissions from the electric utility industry. WILL PASS BUSINESS SUPPORT. MURRAY 7-16. [James, Business Green writer, "Senate clears path for run at climate legislation" 2010 http://www.businessgreen.com/business-green/news/2266590/senate-clears-path-run-climate -- DA 7/16/10] The Senate last night passed Barack Obama's financial reform bill, finally clearing the way for a vote on controversial climate change legislation. The president had signalled that he would throw his full weight behind trying to secure the 60 Senate votes needed to pass a comprehensive energy and climate change bill as soon as the proposed overhaul of financial regulation was completed. Speculation is now mounting that the Senate could debate a draft climate bill put forward by Democrat senator John Kerry and independent senator Joe Lieberman within the next few weeks after Senate majority leader Harry Reid hinted that he was preparing to move forward with the latest revised version of the bill. Senators Kerry and Lieberman have been circulating a 667-page draft version of the bill that scales back previous plans for an economy-wide emissions trading scheme in favour of a narrower carbon-pricing mechanism that initially focuses solely on energy utilities. The proposals have secured support from a number of influential business groups and energy firms and Kerry and Lieberman are confident that the scaled-back proposals, which also include substantial support for renewable- and nuclear-energy projects, can win over the Republican votes needed to pass through the Senate. Prefer our ev--cites key senators and businesses pushing cap and trade--it is better predictor of passage POLITICAL CAPITAL IS IRRELEVANT -- EMPIRICALLY PROVEN. Bond & Fleisher 96. [Jon R. and Richard, professor in Political Science - Texas A&M and Professor in Political Science. Fordham 1996. "The President in Legislation"] In sum, the evidence presented in this chapter provides little support for the theory that the president's perceived leadership, skills are associated with success on roll call votes in Congress. Presidents reputed as highly skilled do not win consistently more often than should be expected. Even the effects of the partisan balanced Congress, the president's popularity, and, the cycle of decreasing influence over the course of his term. Presidents reputed as unskilled do not win consistently less often relative to. Moreover, skilled presidents do not win significantly more often than unskilled presidents on either important votes or close votes, in which skills have the greatest potential to affect the outcome . Because of the difficulty of establishing a definitive test of the skills theory, some may argue that it is premature to reject this explanation of presidential success based on the tests reported in this chapter. It might be argued that these findings by themselves do not deny that leadership skill is an important component of presidential-congressional relations. Failure to find systematic effects in general does not necessarily refute the anecdotes and case studies demonstrating the importance of skills. SDI 2010 39 2AC Afghanistan RRSe 2AC Obama Bad--Impact Turn CAP AND TRADE KEY TO CHEMICAL INDUSTRY BOOSTS DEMAND. CAMPOY 9. [ANA, journalist, "Chemical makers poised to gain in new cap and trade system" Wall Street Journal Jun 5] With legislation pending in Congress that could put a price on greenhouse-gas emissions, the energy-gulping chemical industry is trying to position itself to emerge as an unlikely winner. Chemical makers are one of the biggest energy users among manufacturers, expelling about 5% of U.S. carbon dioxide emissions, according to government data. They face heavy costs under a proposed system to cap emissions that would require the industry to purchase permits to pollute. But a so-called cap-and-trade system would also boost demand for some chemical companies' products, from insulation to solar-panel components, because those products would help others cut back on the energy use. "This is really our sweet spot," said Calvin Dooley, chief executive of the American Chemistry Council, an industry trade group. CHEMICAL INDUSTRY KEY TO SOLVE DISEASES. NRC 2. [National Research Council Committee on Challenges for Chemical Sciences in the 21st century "National Security and Homeland Defense" -- P 28.] Many drugs are produced by either chemical synthesis or biosynthetic processes. Recent advances in synthetic organic chemistry, catalysis, biotechnology, and combinatorial chemistry have made it possible to synthesize many chemicals that are not found in nature or have heretofore been difficult to produce. Current chemical drugs, such as antibiotics, used to combat infectious diseases are threatened by bacterial abilities to quickly mutate into a drug-resistant form. Concern also exists for purposefully genetically modified organisms used for terrorist attacks. Consequently, there is a need to constantly develop new chemical drugs for fighting infectious diseases caused by new biological agents. As we know more about human genomics, many new drugs, whether small-molecule chemicals or large proteins, can be developed to better target the diseases. EPIDEMICS CAUSE EXTINCTION. South China Morning Post 96 (1-4 Avi, quoting Dr. Ben-Abraham, called "one of the 100 greatest minds in history" by Mensa "Leading the way to a cure for AIDS," P. Lexis) Two decades of intensive study and research in the field of virology have convinced him of one thing: in place of natural and manmade disasters or nuclear warfare, humanity could face extinction because of a single virus , deadlier than HIV. "An airborne virus is a lively, complex and dangerous organism," he said. "It can come from a rare animal or from anywhere and can mutate constantly. If there is no cure, it affects one person and then there is a chain reaction and it is unstoppable. It is a tragedy waiting to happen." That may sound like a far-fetched plot for a Hollywood film, but Dr Ben -Abraham said history has already proven his theory. Fifteen years ago, few could have predicted the impact of AIDS on the world. Ebola has had sporadic outbreaks over the past 20 years and the only way the deadly virus - which turns internal organs into liquid - could be contained was because it was killed before it had a chance to spread. Imagine , he says, if it was closer to home: an outbreak of that scale in London, New York or Hong Kong. It could happen anytime in the next 20 years - theoretically, it could happen tomorrow. SDI 2010 40 2AC Afghanistan RRSe 2AC Obama Bad--Impact Turn CAP AND TRADE KEY TO RENEWABLES SHIFT KEY TO COMPETITIVENESS. Hawkins 7 (David -- director of the Climate Center at the National Resources Defense Council. Gristmill November 28 -th http://gristmill.grist.org/story/2007/9/28/11254/2676) Between now and 2030 over $17 trillion will be invested globally to meet the growing demand for energy service s. Nearly all of this will be spent on fuels and conversion methods selected by private sector actors chasing profitability . The challenge is to focus the incredible power of these private sector actors on energy investments that minimize carbon emissions. To move at the pace and scale required to prevent the worst impacts of global warming we need policies that make clean energy products and services a superior business proposition. Policies that require a clear and steady reduction in emissions will move the private sector in the right direction faster than any government funded program by itself. With a schedule of declining caps on emissions as the law of the land, entrepreneurs in firms large and small will know there is a growing market for clean energy innovations . They will help the nation meet targeted emissions reduction at the lowest possible cost. Nordhaus and Shellenberger ignore the reality of the energy marketplace when they argue that the most important policy to drive new technology is a large government funded program. While incentive funding measures can be an important complementary strategy for clean energy deployment, by themselves they will not move the private sector at the required pace. In arguing for "breakthrough" technologies rather than deployment of today's clean energy solutions, Nordhaus and Shellenberger are peddling the same false choice the Bush administration has used to justify its retrograde policies for the past seven years. The convenient truth is that with intelligent policies to make clean energy more profitable we can get started today and we can set in motion the forces that will deliver the additional breakthroughs we need in the coming decades. This is not an "environmentalist" pipe dream. It is the judgment of the leaders of 27 of the largest American businesses , who have joined with NRDC and others in the U.S. Climate Action Partnership (USCAP), calling for a mandatory declining cap on U.S. global warming emissions. Its members include large energy producers and consumers such as Shell, Rio Tinto, Duke Energy, and Alcoa. These Fortune 500 companies recognize that their future business model depends upon the shift to low carbon technologies and efficiencies made possible through a national program of required emission reductions . COMPETITIVENESS KEY TO HEG. SEGAL 4. [ADAM, Senior Fellow in China Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, Foreign Affairs, "Is America Losing Its Edge?" November / December 2004, http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20041101facomment83601/adam-segal/is-america-losing-its-edge.html] The United States' global primacy depends in large part on its ability to develop new technologies and industries faster than anyone else. For the last five decades, U.S. scientific innovation and technological entrepreneurship have ensured the country's economic prosperity and military power. It was Americans who invented and commercialized the semiconductor, the personal computer, and the Internet; other countries merely followed the U.S. lead. Today, however, this technological edge-so long taken for granted-may be slipping, and the most serious challenge is coming from Asia. Through competitive tax policies, increased investment in research and development (R&D), and preferential policies for science and technology (S&T) personnel, Asian governments are improving the quality of their science and ensuring the exploitation of future innovations. The percentage of patents issued to and science journal articles published by scientists in China, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan is rising. Indian companies are quickly becoming the second-largest producers of application services in the world, developing, supplying, and managing database and other types of software for clients around the world. South Korea has rapidly eaten away at the U.S. advantage in the manufacture of computer chips and telecommunications software. And even China has made impressive gains in advanced Although the United States' technical dominance remains solid, the globalization of research and development is exerting considerable pressures on the American system. Indeed, as the United States is learning, globalization cuts both ways: it is both a potent catalyst of U.S. technological innovation and a significant threat to it . The United States will never be able to prevent rivals from developing new technologies; it can remain dominant only by continuing to innovate faster than everyone else. But this won't be easy; to keep its privileged position in the world, the United States must get better at fostering technological entrepreneurship at home. technologies such as lasers, biotechnology, and advanced materials used in semiconductors, aerospace, and many other types of manufacturing. GLOBAL NUCLEAR WAR. KHALILZAD 95. [ZALMAY, Zalmay, Rand Corporation, The Washington Quarterly] Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation , threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system. SDI 2010 41 2AC Afghanistan RRSe 2AC Obama Bad--Impact Turn CAP AND TRADE KEY TO INNOVATION. Yelin-Kefer 1. [Jennifer, Yale Law School, Spring 2001; M.E.S., Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, 1998, Stanford Environmental Law Journal, January 20 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 221] In light of these shortcomings, tradable permits were first conceived as a possible pollution control strategy in 1968. 24 By 1974, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had begun to incorporate economic incentives into the Clean Air Act, allowing the regulated community to vary regulatory standards within defined regions. 25 These initial changes were followed by a flurry of congressional initiatives advocating the use of economic incentives in legislation. 26 Trading has "become the darling of innovative regulators and business people in the United States," 27prompting one commentator to conclude that "there is now virtual consensus that incentive instruments ... are presumptively superior to conduct-based technology standards and fixed performance standards." 28 INNOVATION KEY TO THE ECONOMY. DONAHUE 8. [Thomas, president and CEO of the United States Chamber of Commerce, "Innovation is essential to economic growth" Huffington Post, Oct 7 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tom-donohue/post_203_b_132695.html -- DA 7/16/10] Given the urgent challenges confronting the American economy, why do I want to devote today's column to protecting intellectual property (IP) and preventing IP theft, counterfeiting, and piracy? Because America's ability to compete in the global economy and create 21st century jobs for our children and grandchildren depend on our ability to lead the world in innovation . And the key to innovation is intellectual property. A culture of innovation and respect for IP rights have long been a source of America's competitive advantage. In 2006, the United States led the world in global patent filings, accounting for more than one-third of the total. This was spurred by industry investing more than $223 billion in research and development. America's IP-intensive industries have created 18 million jobs for U.S. workers--jobs that usually pay better and are expected to grow faster over the next decade than the national average. Staying on the cutting edge of innovation means not only growth and jobs, but also the potential to find cures for deadly America's innovation advantage will be challenged as emerging economies--such as China, India, and Russia--learn that innovation and IP rights are fundamental to economic growth. As government and the private sector in these countries begin to invest in innovation, the United States must do more to retain our position as the world's idea factory. We must also address the concerted effort by diseases, sources of clean energy, and other products and services yet to be dreamed of. some governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and activists that seek to weaken IP rights around the world. For example, NGOs have tried to hijack the World Health Organization in order to undermine respect for pharmaceutical patents. This jeopardizes American jobs as well as the possibility of finding the next wonder drug. Congress recently took a step to address this threat by passing the PRO-IP Act of 2008. This important legislation will strengthen civil and criminal IP laws, increase law enforcement resources at the federal and state levels, and create an intellectual property enforcement coordinator in the White House . America's success in the 21st century economy will be inextricably linked to our ability to innovate . The U.S. Chamber of Commerce and its Global Intellectual Property Center are leading the fight to ensure that IP and innovation are respected around the world. To learn more about our efforts to grow the economy, create good-paying American jobs, and solve global challenges through innovation, visit www.uschamber.com/ip. THE IMPACT IS GLOBAL GREAT POWER WARS. Mead 9 [Walter Russell, Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, New Republic, February 4, http://www.tnr.com/politics/story.html?id=571cbbb9-2887-4d81-8542-92e83915f5f8&p=2] So far, such half-hearted experiments not only have failed to work; they have left the societies that have tried them in a progressively worse position, farther behind the front-runners as time goes by. Argentina has lost ground to Chile; Russian development has fallen farther behind that of the Baltic states and Central Europe. Frequently, the crisis has weakened the power of the merchants, industrialists, financiers, and professionals who want to develop a liberal capitalist society integrated into the world. Crisis can also strengthen the hand of religious extremists, populist radicals , or authoritarian traditionalists who are determined to resist liberal capitalist society for a variety of reasons. Meanwhile, the companies and banks based in these societies are often less established and more vulnerable to the consequences of a financial crisis than more established firms in wealthier societies. As a result, developing countries and countries where capitalism has relatively recent and shallow roots tend to suffer greater economic and political damage when crisis strikes--as, inevitably, it does. And, consequently, financial crises often reinforce rather than challenge the global distribution of power and wealth. This may be happening yet again. None of which means that we can just sit back and enjoy the recession. History may suggest that financial crises actually help capitalist great powers maintain their leads--but it has other, less If financial crises have been a normal part of life during the 300-year rise of the liberal capitalist system has war. The wars of the League of Augsburg and the Spanish Succession; the Seven Years War; the American Revolution; the Napoleonic Wars; the two World Wars; the cold war: The list of wars is almost as long as the list of financial crises. Bad economic times can breed wars. Europe was a pretty peaceful place in 1928, but the Depression poisoned German public opinion and helped bring Adolf Hitler to power. If the current crisis turns into a depression, what rough beasts might start slouching toward Moscow, Karachi, Beijing, or New Delhi to be born? The United States may not, yet, decline, but, if we can't get the world economy back on track, we may still have to fight. reassuring messages as well. under the Anglophone powers, so SDI 2010 42 2AC Afghanistan RRSe 2AC Obama Bad II Impact Turn Cap n' trade is dead Klein 7-19 (Ezra Klein American blogger for the Washington Post columnist for Newsweek. associate editor for The American Prospect and American liberal[1], "Cap-and-trade is dead", DA: 7/22/10, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ezra klein/2010/07/were_not_getting_a_pri ce_on_ca. htm l) You can't pass what you can't say: Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid played dumb last week when a reporter asked him if the energy and climate bill headed to the floor would come with a "cap" on greenhouse gas emissions. "I don't use that," the Nevada Democrat replied. "Those words are not in my vocabulary. We're going to work on pollution." One of my rules in politics is that whichever side is resorting to framing devices is losing. In 2004, when Democrats became obsessed with George Lakoff, it's because they felt unpopular and looking for a quick fix. And in 2006, when they took the Congress back, it wasn't because they found a new slogan. It was because the Iraq War and Jack Abramoff had made the Republicans toxic. In 2008, it was exhaustion with George W. Bush and a cratering economy. Post-9/11 frame theory wouldn't have said run the black guy with the name "Hussein." If cap-and-trade is so unpopular that its primary legislative advocates can't mention it, then it's dead. The BP oil spill offered a chance to change the fundamentals on the issue and Democrats decided against trying to use the disaster as a galvanizing moment for climate legislation. Word games don't offer a similar opportunity. START IS THE TOP OF OBAMA'S AGENDA. BELLINGER 6-11-10. [John, partner at Arnold & Porter LLP and an adjunct senior fellow in international and national security law at the Council on Foreign Relations "Without White House muscle, treaties left in limbo" Washington Post] Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last month in favor of the new START treaty with Russia. President Obama signed the nuclear arms reduction agreement April 8 in Prague and submitted the voluminous treaty documentation for Senate ratification just four weeks later. The lightning speed at which this was sent to the Senate and a Cabinet-level hearing scheduled reflects START's importance to the administration . But the priority the Obama administration has placed on START contrasts sharply with its approach to other international agreements pending before the Senate. START WON'T PASS THE HILL7-2-10. A U.S.-Russia arms treaty is teetering in the Senate, lacking support from Republicans and set back by an alleged spy ring. The White House was hoping that the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), signed three months ago by President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, would move quickly through the Senate. But now it may not get a vote on the floor until after the November elections. The pact to reduce warheads, missiles and launchers in both countries could be cleared by the Foreign Relations Committee this month, but that timetable could also be pushed back. While a simple majority is enough to pass it through the panel, 67 votes will be needed for ratification by the full Senate. The House does not vote on treaties. Given the partisanship of the upper chamber and the midterm elections four months away, there is little chance of securing the vote of every Senate Democrat and the backing of least eight Republicans anytime soon. START is the foundation of US Russian relations and failure to extend collapses US Cred and global nonprolif Lugar, '08 (Richard, Washington Times, 7/18) By contrast, administration officials testified to the importance of START during Senate consideration of the Moscow Treaty in 2003. This is not a mere technical issue - the foundation of the U.S.-Russian strategic relationship is about to expire and with it, the key basis for trust between the two sides. This should be an easy call for President Bush: both President Dmitry Medvedev and former President, now Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin favor extending START. Failure to renew START will be seen worldwide as weakening the international nuclear nonproliferation regime and a further sign to many foreign leaders and experts that U.S. nonproliferation policy is adrift. SDI 2010 43 2AC Afghanistan RRSe 2AC Obama Bad II Impact Turn Collapsing US-Russian cooperation will increase global missile sales and the risk of conflict --it will destroy U.S. leadership Simes 7 [Dimitri, President of the Nixon Center and Publisher of The National Interest, Foreign Affairs, "Losing Russia; The Costs of Renewed Confrontation," Nov/Dec -- lexis] But if the current U.S.-Russian relationship deteriorates further, it will not bode well for the United States and would be even worse for Russia. The Russian general staff is lobbying to add a military dimension to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and some top officials are beginning to champion the idea of a foreign policy realignment directed against the West. There are also quite a few countries, such as Iran and Venezuela, urging Russia to work with China to play a leading role in balancing the United States economically, politically, and militarily. And post-Soviet states such as Georgia, which are adept at playing the United States and Russia off against each other, could act in ways that escalate tensions. Putin's stage management of Moscow's succession in order to maintain a dominant role for himself makes a major foreign policy shift in Russia unlikely. But new Russian leaders could have their own ideas -- and their own ambitions -- and political uncertainty or economic problems could tempt them to exploit nationalist sentiments to build legitimacy. If relations worsen, the UN Security Council may no longer be available -- due to a Russian veto -- even occasionally, to provide legitimacy for U.S. military actions or to impose meaningful sanctions on rogue states. Enemies of the United States could be emboldened by new sources of military hardware in Russia, and political and security protection from Moscow. International terrorists could find new sanctuaries in Russia or the states it protects. And the collapse of U.S.-Russian relations could give China much greater flexibility in dealing with the United States. It would not be a new Cold War, because Russia will not be a global rival and is unlikely to be the prime mover in confronting the United States. But it would provide incentives and cover for others to confront 7. Washington, with potentially catastrophic results. Cap n' Trade Doesn't collapse the economy BARR 9. [Colin, senior writer, "Forget $100 oil. $80 oil is a problem" CNN Money Nov 18 -http://money.cnn.com/2009/11/18/news/economy/oil.prices.fortune/index.htm DA 7/16/10] None of this is to say a further rise in energy prices would necessarily send the economy into a tailspin. While consumers are still strapped, behavior changes should make the economy less vulnerable. U.S. oil consumption has slid 9% since 2007, Kopits notes. Americans also drove 3% fewer miles in the latest year through August than they did two years earlier, according to data from the Transportation Department. Hamilton points out that car sales reverted to depressed levels after the government's Cash for Clunkers promotion ended in August. Hillard G. Huntington, executive director at the Energy Modeling Forum at Stanford University, said that while oil markets remain exposed to a possible supply disruption, he believes the memory of last year's record prices is fresh enough that another oil shock is unlikely. Cap n' trade doesn't kill competitiveness Their Feldstein 9 card assumes manufacturer's in general, not utility companies which the version of cap n' trade in consideration is. CAP AND TRADE DOESN'T CAUSE PRICE SPIKES. Parry and Pizer 7 (Ian and William, Senior Fellows at Resources for the Future, Regulation, Vol 30 No 3, Fall 2007, p.21)Second, the problem of permit price volatility can be addressed through provisions like "safety valves" and, to a lesser extent, permit banking and permit borrowing. With a safety valve, firms can buy additional permits from the government in periods when the permit price reaches a specified trigger level. This effectively relaxes the permit cap in that period, thereby keeping a ceiling on permit prices when permits would otherwise have been in excessive demand. Coupling a very tight cap with a safety valve would almost completely stabilize prices. Alternatively, transitory permit price spikes might be ironed out by allowing firms to borrow permits from the government during periods of high permit prices and pay them back through more stringent emissions control in some future period. Similarly, permit banking helps to create a floor under permit prices; under this mechanism, in periods when the demand for permits is slack because abatement costs are low, firms have an incentive to abate more in order to hold over some allowances for use in future periods when they expect higher permit prices. While still subject to fluctuations driven by longer-term price expectations, these mechanisms at least remove short-term volatility. Although arrangements for banking and borrowing permits strengthen the need for new financial institutions, such institutions would probably develop quickly and at relatively low cost. SDI 2010 44 2AC Afghanistan RRSe IAR Obama Bad II Impact Turn Uniqueness Cap n' trade dead - Reid abandons Walsh 7-22 (Bryan Walsh, writer for environment and energy at TIME magazine, "Cap and Trade is Dead (Really, Truly, I'm Not Kidding). Who's to Blame?" DA: 7/23/10) http://ecocentric.blogs.time.com/2010/07/22/cap-and-trade-is-dead-really-truly-im-not-kidding-whos-to-blame/? xid=rss-topstories The headline has been written countless times, but this time it is true: carbon cap-and-trade of any sort will not come out of this Congress--and perhaps it never will. Instead of comprehensive economy-wide carbon cap that Senator John Kerry had urged--and that the House had already passed a year ago--or even the compromise utility-only cap bill that had been suggested as an alternative, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid announced today that he would move forward next week on a bill that only deals with the BP oil spill and a few other low-profile energy policies. The reason was simple, according to Reid--politics: It's easy to count to 60. I could do it by the time I was in eighth grade. My point is this, we know where we are. We know we don't have the votes [for a bill capping emissions]. This is a step forward. Dems have abandoned the effort Boston Globe, " Senate leaders abandon effort to pass climate change bill until fall ," 7/22, http://www.boston.com/news/politics/politicalintelligence/2010/07/senate_leaders.html, Alex Agne Senate leaders acknowledged today they have no chance of passing a comprehensive climate change bill any time soon, saying they would abandon the effort for the time being and take it up again in the fall. Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts, standing with Majority Leader Harry Reid, and White House energy advisor Carol Browner, said a year of work had still not produced a deal that could gain GOP support. "We've always known from day one that to pass comprehensive energy reform, you've got to have 60 votes," said Kerry, who has led the effort in the Senate on a "cap-and-trade'' bill to limit greenhouse gas emissions. "As we stand here today we don't have one Republican vote." The House passed an energy bill last year, but the Senate's filibuster rules have prevented it from acting. SDI 2010 45 2AC Afghanistan RRSe IAR Obama Bad II Impact Turn Accidents/Prolif START Key solve accidents, theft, prolif and relations Montreal Gazette 9. [July 4, "Duck and cover or a world without nukes?" -- http://www.montrealgazette.com/story_print.html? id=1759991&sponsor=] Still, Blair and many others say the need for the U.S. and Russia to show leadership is even more pressing, to remove not only the ever-present Cold War possibility of a world-ending nuclear accident, but the 21st-century threat of nukes falling into terrorist hands. Much has been made of the need to press the "reset" button on the strained relations of late between the White House and the Kremlin. Medvedev struck a conciliatory note this week when he called for a new era in relations with Washington, based on a "purely pragmatic" agenda. Thomas Graham, a retired U.S. diplomat and Clinton-era arms-control ambassador, said Russian and U.S. cooperation on arms control, including a new START treaty, would pay dividends in a much broader sense . "For too long in this post-Cold War world, the two former Cold War adversaries have remained in a semi-hostile relationship ," Graham said. "There could be a serious threat of broader nuclear-weapon proliferation . Many people are concerned about the Iranian nuclear program. ... This administration, I believe, correctly understands that we cannot effectively deal with either of those issues, and many others as well, without close co-operation with the Russian Federation." Officials from both countries are already hammering out the details of an agreement that would replace the START 1 treaty, which expires Dec. 5. Though the Moscow-Washington relationship is tangled in a web of tension over the U.S. missile-defence-shield plans for Europe, and NATO's eastward expansion, positive signals emerged from the Kremlin yesterday on one front: Medvedev's spokesman said he and Obama would sign a side deal that would allow the U.S. military transit of goods through Russian territory to Afghanistan. The main goal would be a new START framework that would essentially see both sides slashing their nuclear-warhead stockpiles by one-quarter, down to about 1,500 warheads each. Despite the spread of nuclear-weapons arsenals to such countries as China, Pakistan, India and elsewhere, nine out of every 10 nuclear bombs on the planet are under the control of the White House and the Kremlin. Lilia Shevtsova, of the Moscow office of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, suggests that a renewed version of START will not necessarily make the world a safer place. "When you start counting nukes, you start talking disarmament and verification procedure. It's a sign not of mutual trust - it's rather a sign of lack, an absence of mutual trust," Shevtsova said. Charles Ferguson, a senior fellow with the Council on Foreign Relations, says if Russia and the U.S. were to go so far as to cut their arsenals down to 1,000 each, other nuclear countries could begin to compete with them. For Blair, it's well past the time to abandon long-held suspicions and animosities. After walking his Ottawa luncheon crowd through his Paris doomsday vision, Blair piles on more scenarios. If there were an accidental launch of weapons that triggered all-out nuclear war between Russia and the U.S., 119 million people in each country would die in the initial exchange. That would include 15 million around the Kremlin in Moscow. A city like Chicago or Ottawa would be gone within the hour. "We've pushed our luck as far as we can; now we need a policy. So to put it bluntly, there are two paths that stretch before us: We either bury our weapons or we're buried by them," Blair said. Extinction American Prospect, 2/26/01 The bitter disputes over national missile defense (NMD) have obscured a related but dramatically more urgent issue of national security: the 4,800 nuclear warheads -- weapons with a combined destructive power nearly 100,000 times greater than the atomic bomb that leveled Hiroshima -- currently on "hair-trigger" alert. Hair-trigger alert means this: The missiles carrying those warheads are armed and fueled at all times. Two thousand or so of these warheads are on the intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) targeted by Russia at the United States; 1,800 are on the ICBMs targeted by the U nited States at Russia; and approximately 1,000 are on the submarine-based missiles targeted by the two nations at each other. These missiles would launch on receipt of three computer-delivered messages. Launch crews -- on duty every second of every day -- are under orders to send the messages on receipt of a single computer-delivered command. In no more than two minutes, if all went according to plan, Russia or the United States could launch missiles at predetermined targets: Washington or New York; Moscow or St. Petersburg. The early-warning systems on which the launch crews rely would detect the other side's missiles within tens of seconds, causing the intended -- or accidental -- enemy to mount retaliatory strikes. "Within a half-hour, there could be a nuclear war that would extinguish all of us," explains Bruce Blair. "It would be, basically, a nuclear war by checklist, by rote." SDI 2010 46 2AC Afghanistan RRSe IAR Obama Bad II Impact Turn Extinction START FAILURE GUARANTEES EXTINCTION -- this is the fastest and most likely scenario HALLAM 9. [John, Editor of Nuclear Flashpoints, John Burroughs and Marcy Fowler, Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy, NPT Preparatory Committee, Steps Toward a Safer World -- APRIL 27] Why did an article in the September 2008 edition of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, entitled 'avoiding human extinction' give a list of measures needed to avoid that, with lowering the operating status of nuclear weapon systems (along with their elimination) topping the rather consequential 'to - do' list, even before climate - change measures and incoming large asteroids? Why over the years has this issue been thought so important at such a high level? The US and Russia undeniably keep a large number (estimated by Blair at 2,654 by Kristensen more recently 2,300) of nuclear warheads (both land - based ICBMs and SLBMs) in a status in which they can be launched at roughly 2 minutes or less notice. This fact is never seriously disputed. The core of the issue is that standard operating procedures envisage extremely short decision making timeframes, and these are imposed by the simple fact of having some missiles on quick - launch status. Careful and measured decision-making in such a situation is simply not possible. Yet the consequences of such decisions are truly apocalyptic. Recent research by US scientists (Toon and Robock 2008/9) on the effects of the use of US and Russian arsenals indicates that even at levels down to 1000 warheads, the use by malice, madness, miscalculation or malfunction of the 'on alert' portions of US and Russian strategic nuclear forces would be essentially terminal for civilization. Maintaining arsenals in an unstable configuration was insanely risky during the Cold War, when there were even larger numbers of warheads on alert and when there were just too many occasions on which it would be fair to say that the world came just too close to ending. There is even less reason, now that the cold - war confrontation has supposedly ended, to maintain nuclear forces in these dangerous configurations. Yet in spite of denials and obfuscations from those who wish to maintain existing postures they are indeed so maintained. President Obama, in his election manifesto, promised to negotiate with Russia to lower the operational status of nuclear weapon systems. It is vital that this promise is not forgotten. The talks between the US and Russia on the successor to the START Treaty are an ideal opportunity to take action to implement Obama's promises to negotiate with Russia to achieve lower operational status of nuclear weapon systems. SDI 2010 47 2AC Afghanistan RRSe IAR Obama Bad II Impact Turn Israel Strike Iran START prevents an Israeli preemptive strike on Iran RIA Novosti, Sept 22 2009, "Can Medvedev help Obama?," lexis U.S. President Barack Obama is facing "a perfect storm of a week amid foreign policy challenges," which includes a meeting with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev on September 23 and chairing a special UN Security Council session on non-proliferation and disarmament. Its goal is to exchange more radical disarmament by nuclear powers in return for wider global efforts to prevent further proliferation. It is logical that the Russian and the American presidents will meet ahead of the General Assembly session on nuclear weapons to discuss progress in the drafting of a new bilateral strategic arms reduction treaty . The previous treaty will expire on December 5, 2009. If Moscow and Washington agree to cut their nuclear weapons to 1,500-1,675 charges and 500 delivery vehicles, as Russia has proposed, it will set a very good example for other nuclear and threshold countries. Their ability to agree on this sensitive issue may influence the attitudes of India, Pakistan, Iran, South Korea and Israel to the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty. It may also discourage Israel from delivering a preemptive strike at Iran, and Arab countries from acquiring nuclear weapons. In short, it is a complex foreign policy formula with a large number of variables. To put it bluntly, the next week will determine the world's choice between making progress and marking time (or worse still, rolling back) in the sphere of non-proliferation and disarmament. It will definitely determine the future of Russian-American relations, which may become healthier during Obama's presidency than they have been in the past 20 years. Extinction Ivashov 2007 (General Leonid, vice-president of the Academy on geopolitical affairs. He was the chief of the department for General affairs in the Soviet Union's ministry of Defense, secretary of the Council of defense ministers of the Community of independant states (CIS), chief of the Military cooperation department at the Russian federation's Ministry of defense and Joint chief of staff of the Russian armies, Iran: the Threat of a Nuclear War, http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=5309) What might cause the force major event of the required scale? Everything seems to indicate that Israel will be sacrificed. Its involvement in a war with Iran - especially in a nuclear war - is bound to trigger a global catastrophe. The statehoods of Israel and Iran are based on the countries' official religions. A military conflict between Israel and Iran will immediately evolve into a religious one, a conflict between Judaism and Islam. Due to the presence of numerous Jewish and Muslim populations in the developed countries, this would make a global bloodbath inevitable. All of the active forces of most of the countries of the world would end up fighting, with almost no room for neutrality left. Judging by the increasingly massive acquisitions of the residential housing for the Israeli citizens, especially in Russia and Ukraine, a lot of people already have an idea of what the future holds. However, it is hard to imagine a quiet heaven where one might hide from the coming doom. Forecasts of the territorial distribution of the fighting, the quantities and the efficiency of the armaments involved, the profound character of the underlying roots of the conflict and the severity of the religious strife all leave no doubt that this clash will be in all respects much more nightmarish than WWII. SDI 2010 48 2AC Afghanistan RRSe IAR Obama Bad II Impact Turn Proliferation Failure on START collapses global non proliferation Barry, '09 (Patrick, National Security Network, 7/7, http://www.democracyarsenal.org/2009/07/memo-start-is-urgent-legitimacy-mattersand-afghanistan-is-difficult.html) First, its a little troubling to see Brose argue that negotiating an update (or bridge) to START is "not a pressing issue." Spearheaded by Reagan, and signed by George H.W. Bush, START is the most significant arms-reduction agreement in the last 20 years. It is set to expire THIS YEAR. For that to happen without a follow-on would deal a serious blow to the nonproliferation regime. Suggesting the issue is not urgent is just naive. I have to assume that Brose just didn't mean to say it. Also, no one seriously thinks that the Obama administration was ever hanging its Iran policy on the hope that a U.S. - Russia nuclear deal would persuade Iran's leaders to "give up their nuclear aspirations," an accusation Brose falls just short of making. But it is true that part of harmonizing diplomatic pressure is lending legitimacy to your actions. By recommitting to the international nonproliferation regime, the Administration signals to allies, enemies, and fence-sitters alike that it intends to take international agreements seriously. Is this the magic bullet for building a coalition to solve the Iran problem? Or course not. But the Obama administration is right to calculate that upholding the nonproliferation regime (as opposed to gutting it...Bush...cough, cough) is a surer way of pressuring Iran to denuclearize. Proliferation causes extinction. Taylor -02 [Stuart Taylor, Senior Writer with the National Journal and editor at Newsweek, Legal Times, 9-16-2002] The truth is, no matter what we do about Iraq, if we don't stop proliferation, another five or 10 potentially unstable nations may go nuclear before long, making it ever more likely that one or more bombs will be set off anonymously on our soil by terrorists or a terrorist government. Even an airtight missile defense would be useless against a nuke hidden in a truck, a shipping container, or a boat. [Continues...] Unless we get serious about stopping proliferation, we are headed for "a world filled with nuclear-weapons states, where every crisis threatens to go nuclear," where "the survival of civilization truly is in question from day to day," and where "it would be impossible to keep these weapons out of the hands of terrorists, religious cults, and criminal organizations." So writes Ambassador Thomas Graham Jr., a moderate Republican who served as a career arms-controller under six presidents and led the successful Clinton administration effort to extend the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The only way to avoid such a grim future, he suggests in his memoir, Disarmament Sketches, is for the United States to lead an international coalition against proliferation by showing an unprecedented willingness to give up the vast majority of our own nuclear weapons, excepting only those necessary to deter nuclear attack by others. SDI 2010 49 2AC Afghanistan RRSe 2AC Midterms Link Turn Not Unique--Dems will win -- Financial Reform Victory MSNBC 7/22/10 http://firstread.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2010/07/22/4728940-obama-agenda-financial-reform-signed-into-law The New York Times: `President Obama signed a sweeping expansion of federal financial regulation on Wednesday, signaling perhaps the Democrats' last major legislative victory before the midterm elections in November, which could recast the Congressional landscape." The GOP wont take control of either house no agenda and media coverage prefer this evidence it is predictive Green 7/19 Joshua Green is a senior editor of The Atlantic and a weekly political columnist for the Boston Globe. http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2010/07/has-the-gop-hit-a-wall/59987/ Most of the professional political prognosticators believe the Democrats are going to get shellacked in the mid-term elections, quite possibly losing the House and maybe even the Senate (see, for example, today's WSJ front page). I've been slower than most to come around to this viewpoint mainly because a) the Democrats have accomplished a lot of what they promised to (health care, Wall Street reform, etc.) and b) I don't detect a compelling Republican alternative. Let me hasten to add: I don't pore over poll numbers in the manner of a Charlie Cook and therefore my viewpoint is entirely impressionistic; if I were putting money on the outcome, I'd bet on Charlie and not on me. That said, one reason for my reluctance to fully embrace the Armageddon-for-Democrats scenario has to do with the rhythms of how the media cover the two parties, and how I expected them, at some point, to change. When a single party holds power, that party appropriately tends to be the focus of attention. But when the possibility that the other party might take over becomes real--and we're certainly at that point--the attention starts to shift. This always struck me as a potential problem. I don't really imagine that Republicans plan to repeal health care or the new financial regulations (although, who knows?). But they haven't offered up much in the way of a compelling alternative agenda. This shortcoming was on glaring display yesterday when two top Republicans, Pete Sessions and John Cornyn, appeared on "Meet the Press." As MSNBC's "First Read" team pointed out this morning: Over the course of several minutes, both Sessions and Cornyn were unable or unwilling to discuss what Republicans would specifically do on the deficit, etc., if they take back control of Congress. Sessions said that the GOP would: 1) ensure that the government live within its means, and 2) read the actual legislation. But when NBC's David Gregory demanded specifics and details of painful choices Republicans were willing to make, Sessions didn't offer a single one. I'd go even further and characterize the Republicans' inability to answer the question as being similar in nature to Ted Kennedy's devastating inability in 1980 to explain to Roger Mudd why he wanted to be president. Obviously, the scale of the two examples is not quite the same. Anger at Democrats and the White House may well be strong enough that they're in for major losses regardless. But if Republicans can't find a way to answer Gregory's question, and soon--and I can't think what that answer would be--then I'd expect their gains to be on the lower end of the prognosticators' estimates. And that might not be enough to capture the House or the Senate. SDI 2010 50 2AC Afghanistan RRSe 2AC Midterms Link Turn Reduced military presence in Afghanistan drains capital congressional public and defense industry opposition - fears of looking weak on defense trump Zakaria, 10 (Rafia, Director Amnesty International USA, BBC, 7/1) From a military and strategic perspective, Gen McChrystal's departure signals the difficulties in implementing COIN, or the 'counter-insurgency' doctrine, popularized by the American military. Focused on using a large troop presence to secure areas and win the support of the local population, COIN came under severe scrutiny during the Afghanistan review earlier this year. As the now infamous article in the Rolling Stone magazine indicates, when the decision to order larger troop numbers was made, it seemed that Gen McChrystal had won and President Obama was committed to devoting the resources that would translate into dividends in Afghanistan. Of course, as pointed out by Max Boot of the Council on Foreign Relations in an op-ed article published by The New York Times the day after the general's resignation, troop levels in Afghanistan still remained far below those in Iraq and many promised reinforcements had not arrived. The lacklustre success of the Marja offensive and the increasing number of casualties -- coming as they did before the initiation of an even riskier campaign in Kandahar -- also signalled the increasing intractability of implementing a strategy that would yield dividends in the form of winning over Afghan hearts and minds. The above reflects some of the challenges in implementing a strategy that has been touted as the magic solution for the Afghanistan problem. Ironically, however, the biggest challenges in implementing COIN lie not in the logistics of war-making or the forbidding terrain of Afghanistan but the juxtaposition of the American civilian-military power dynamic in a post 9/11 world. While the supremacy of the political branches of the government over the military and the unquestioned status of the president as the commander in chief is one of the cornerstones of American democracy, it also places certain decision-making challenges on the political branches. In the post 9/11 culture of fear, political figures -- be they in Congress or in the executive branch -- have made the provision of security a staple of their political campaigns. Candidates running for Congress, the Senate and even local offices continue to be reluctant to evaluate the efficacy of existing strategies and remain committed to seeing counter-terrorism as a political issue rather than a military one. The American public in turn unquestionably believes in the necessity of endless counter-terror dollars in making the homeland secure, thus making the political appeal of pandering to their fears a staple of electoral politics. Resultantly, the political branches of the US government are unwilling to make unpopular decisions regarding foreign wars. Military strategy is thus dictated by the political demands of being tough on terrorists and producing low-cost victories that respond to the population's insatiable demand for security. Even those such as Vice President Biden, who were vehemently opposed to the increase of troops in Afghanistan, remain politically committed to the idea that the quick elimination of the bad guys is crucial to American security. Even as the demands of the military change in response to unconventional warfare, American elected representatives refuse to close down bases and stop manufacturing equipment designed for a Cold War world, for fear of eliminating jobs and angering constituents. The consequence is that the war in Afghanistan has become a primarily political campaign outsourced to the United States military, which is then expected to deliver the political material to orchestrate campaign narratives that present candidates as being committed to national security, rather than actually producing positive results in places such as Afghanistan. SDI 2010 51 2AC Afghanistan RRSe 2AC Midterms Link Turn GOP won't make big gains democrats' victories and increased GOP criticism The Week 7/21 http://theweek.com/article/index/205194/can-republicans-take-the-senate-too Republicans don't have an agenda to back up the hype: Sorry, I'm not buying the "Armageddon-forDemocrats scenario," says Joshua Green in The Atlantic. Democrats have delivered much of what they promised and, historically, the voters' tendency to gripe about the party in power decreases once it's clear the other party could actually take over. As that happens, voters will see that the Republicans simply don't have a "compelling alternative agenda." And you can't beat something with nothing. GOP control of either house unlikely democrats fundraising advantage AP 7/21 http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5hYjbUlsNUOnV3oxrZxm7wWDyr48wD9H3NILO0 WASHINGTON -- House Democrats are setting aside more than $7 million for television advertising to help endangered incumbents, a sign that the party's final march toward November's midterms likely will be spent on defense, according to a plan obtained by The Associated Press. Ad strategies show the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee reserving time in media markets represented by incumbents who are top Republican targets. The plan, which describes the final month of campaign planning, shows the DCCC already focused on about 20 contests that political operatives in both parties say are the most competitive. Democrats have set aside almost a half million dollars for ads to help Rep. Stephanie Herseth Sandlin remain South Dakota's sole representative in the House during the final two weeks before the election. Democrats also appear willing to spend $617,000 to help Reps. Tom Perriello and Glenn Nye in Virginia during their final three weeks of campaigning. Pennsylvania, home to several contested House races, could see almost $1.3 million in DCCC ads during the last month before the election. In all, the first wave of Democratic air time reserved would cost the committee $7.7 million. Democrats face a tough political climate this year amid voter frustration with President Barack Obama and the Democratic agenda. Polls show a drop in support for the party, with economic woes and job losses taking a toll. A strong anti-establishment sentiment is expected to boost Republicans. Democrats control 255 seats in the House, with 178 Republicans and two vacancies. The GOP needs to gain 40 seats to capture control. The DCCC has a 2-to-1 edge over Republicans in campaign cash. Fundraising reports released Tuesday show the Democrats with $34 million banked, and the National Republican Congressional Committee with $17 million in cash on hand. Reserving the ad time doesn't require the party to go ahead with the ads. Political campaigns from both parties typically reserve the air time well before they need it. But the 26 media markets discussed in the advertising plan -- from Spokane, Wash., to Burlington, Vt. -- are all defensive and underscore Democratic recognition of the challenge the party faces to retain the majority. The ad plan also telegraphed to Republican candidates that those races would be costly for them. While some individual GOP candidates have outraised their Democratic foes, they cannot rely on national Republicans to counter with party-created ads and many have spent at a far faster pace than the Democrats. Withdrawal alienates all constituencies and republicans will aggressively use the plan to make dems look weak on defense Stephen Biddle, Senior Fellow for Defense Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, July-August 2009, "Is It Worth It? The Difficult Case for War in Afghanistan," The American Interest Online, http://www.the-americaninterest.com/article.cfm?piece=617 However, reversing policy and disengaging would be no easier for Obama. It would be the wrong course on the merits. Politically, it would commit the Administration to a policy now supported by only 17 percent of the electorate. It would play into the traditional Republican narrative of Democratic weakness on defense, facilitate widespread if ill-founded Republican accusations of the Administration's leftist radicalism, and risk alienating moderate Democrats in battleground districts whose support the President will need on other issues. However bad the news may look if the United States fights on, withdrawal would probably mean a Karzai collapse and a Taliban victory, an outcome that would flood American TV screens with nightmarish imagery. SDI 2010 52 2AC Afghanistan RRSe IAR N/U Extension Fundraising Disclosure controversy and internal problems mean the RNC can't get out the vote donor concern and party debt Politico 7/21 http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0710/40042.html Republican National Committee Treasurer Randy Pullen has submitted financial disclosure reports to reflect nearly $2 million in debts that he asserted had been hidden from committee officials the latest in a series of internal problems that many Republicans feel could undermine the party's chances of big gains in the November election. Pullen's action is significant because it comes just months after RNC chairman Michael Steele attempted to deal with some widely publicized fundraising controversies at the committee by firing much of his staff and bringing in a team charged with imposing more discipline in the RNC's operations. Now, Republican circles once again are swirling with rumors about possible audits and a new round of firings just before the election season is about to begin in earnest. The RNC on Wednesday issued a rare joint statement by its two top attorneys, Tom Josefiak and Michael Toner, blaming the tardy payments in part on internal efforts to streamline and improve the system. "With the arrival of a new chief of staff and financial director several months ago, the RNC began a thorough review of invoices and contracts to ensure the legitimacy of billings, the extent of services provided in connection with those billings and the overall fiscal discipline of the committee," the attorneys said. "Also at the direction of Chairman Steele, the RNC has conducted a thorough internal procedures review, which has included a careful review of invoices received and paid to further ensure that the RNC's monthly FEC reports are as comprehensive and accurate as possible," they added. Pullen, who also amended the committee's May filing to show that the RNC was carrying more than $3 million in unreported debt in April, said improvements have been made at the committee to ensure RNC board members are kept up-to-date. The committee's undisclosed debt was first reported by the Washington Times. "There was a time when it was difficult to get information. Procedures are being put in place this month to make sure things are captured in a timely way," Pullen said in an interview with POLITICO. But Pullen, who also is the Arizona Republican Party chairman, said the committee's financial strength remains a concern. "Fundraising has been very difficult," he said, adding that the recession has made it even more so. "Everybody is aware of that and everybody has concerns." Internal problems and unhappiness with Steele's leadership have also been a factor in attracting donors, which could present a problem for the RNC in fulfilling its main campaign obligation overseeing and implementing the party's expensive and sophisticated get-out-the-vote effort. SDI 2010 53 2AC Afghanistan RRSe IAR N/U Extension Fundraising Double the funds mean dems can begin ads early using money to reverse momentum Zeleny 7/20 Jeff Zeleny reporter for NYT http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/20/a-financial-bright-spot-for-democrats/ The Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee ended the month of June with twice as much money in the bank as the National Republican Congressional Committee, according to fund-raising figures released Tuesday, an advantage that Democratic leaders hope will help protect their majority in the midterm elections. Both parties raised $9 million in June, which was the most lucrative month for the Republican committee since July 2008. Yet at the midpoint of the year, the D.C.C.C. still had $34 million compared to $17 million for the N.R.C.C. The financial edge one of the biggest bright spots for the party allows the Democratic committee to invest in more competitive races across the country. The money will allow some of the party's candidates to begin their television advertising campaigns earlier in an effort to hold onto their seats in a challenging political environment. In November, Republicans must win 39 seats to take control of the House. While the Republican committee still falls significantly short in the head-to-head fund-raising competition, the party has improved its financial standing from a year ago. Representative Pete Sessions of Texas, chairman of the National Republican Congressional Committee, told reporters Tuesday that Democrats may have a financial advantage, but that Republicans would have enough money to remain competitive. "We learned in '06 that money isn't everything," Mr. Sessions said, adding that Republicans had more money in 2006, but Democrats still won control of the House. Representative Greg Walden of Oregon, the deputy chairman of the Republican committee, said Tuesday that improvements to the Republican fund-raising operation highlight the party's turn-of-fortunes from a year ago. "Remember, 18 months ago? We Republicans were treated like mold, not really alive but you couldn't kill us either," Mr. Walden said. "A lot has changed in 18 months." On the Senate side of the campaign, Democrats outperformed Republicans in June, raising $7 million compared to $4 million. But the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee has only a slight edge in the amount of money on hand, with $22 million, compared to $20 million for the National Republican Senatorial Committee. SDI 2010 54 2AC Afghanistan RRSe IAR Link Turn Extension GOP Spin The GoP will use this weakness as a wedge issue Lake 10 Eli, Nat'l Security Correspondent for Washington Times, April, The 9/14 Presidency, Reason Magazine If you believe the president's Republican critics, Barack Obama takes a law enforcement approach to terrorism. His FBI came under fire for reading Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the Nigerian national who nearly blew up an airplane on Christmas, his constitutional rights. His attorney general was blasted for wanting to give 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed a criminal trial in lower Manhattan. Republican Sen. Scott Brown rode to his historic upset victory in Massachusetts in part due to this slogan: "In dealing with terrorists, our tax dollars should pay for weapons to stop them, not lawyers to defend them." Every sign suggests the GOP will make terrorism a wedge issue in the 2010 midterm elections. "As I've watched the events of the last few days," former vice president Dick Cheney said shortly after the Abdulmutallab attack, "it is clear once again that President Obama is trying to pretend we are not at war." Inciting fear in the public ensures a backlash against incumbents Rothenberg 9 Stuart Rothenberg, Editor of the The Rothenberg Political Report and a regular columnist for Roll Call Newspaper, 3-20-2009, "Should Democrats Worry About Obama Disconnect in 2010?,"http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2009/03/should_democrats_worry_about_o.html Their fear is that even if Obama remains personally popular, voters will not look kindly on their party's candidates for Congress and governor if the economy remains weak and the public mood is sour and frightened. And even if the economy is showing signs of life, public concern over the deficit, taxes or cultural issues could drive turnout among voters wanting - you guessed it - change. The concern is well-founded, and you don't have to believe me to take this danger seriously. SDI 2010 55 2AC Afghanistan RRSe 2AC NATO DA There is zero warrant in the INC Fox evidence as to why withdrawal hurts cohesioncredibility and cohesion are not synonymous withdrawal restores cohesion that is key to their scenario Continued occupation pits allies against one another destroys NATO cohesion Manfredi, specialist on Afghanistan insurgencies and advisor to the Belgian foreign affairs committee on Middle East policy, 2009 Federico Manfredi is a specialist on insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan. He was an advisor to the Belgian foreign affairs committee on policy in the Middle East and Central Asia. World Policy Journal, "Rethinking U.S. Policy in Afghanistan" Winter 2008/2009) The current U.S. strategy in Afghanistan is failing. The United States and its NATO-led allies are ensnared in an increasingly bloody war that is straining the cohesiveness of the North Atlantic alliance . Furthermore, large numbers of Afghans have grown disillusioned with the government of Hamid Karzai, and have come to view the foreign armies that support it with cynicism and downright hostility. The rationale for pursuing the war, on the other hand, is based on largely unjustified fears of what might come if the United States and its al- lies were to withdraw. But Afghanistan need not become another Vietnam. Seven years after ousting the Taliban regime, the United States and its NATO allies are still struggling to hold back a mounting insurgency. According to Human Rights Watch, in 2005, conflict-related violence killed 1,500 Afghans; in 2006, at least 3,000; and in 2007, more than 8,000. The year 2008 got off to a particularly rocky start, with Kandahar experiencing the bloodiest spate of suicide bombings in Afghanistan's history. In June, the Taliban staged a daring assault on Kandahar's main prison, freeing over 1,000 prisoners and embarrassing the Afghan national police. Less than one month later, the bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul became the most devastating attack on the capital since the beginning of the insurgency. The escalating conflict also took a toll on the United States and its allies, with 2008 clearly standing out as the deadliest year (thus far) for the international coalition. General David Petraeus, head of the U.S. military's Central Command, recently admitted: "Obviously the trends in Afghanistan have been in the wrong direction, and I think everyone is rightly concerned about them ." The Atlantic Council of the United States put it more succinctly in a report chaired by General James L. Jones, the new U.S. national security advisor, who also served as NATO's supreme military commander until 2006: "Make no mistake, NATO is not winning in Afghanistan." In turn, ever more dangerous military operations are generating tensions and divisions within the North Atlantic alliance. The U.S. secretary of defense, Robert Gates, continues to lament that some member states refuse to deploy troops to southern Afghanistan. He has said that NATO could become a two-tiered alliance, with "some allies willing to fight and die...and others who are not." Gates also chided member states fighting in the south, namely Great Britain, Canada, and the Netherlands, saying, "I'm worried we have some military forces that don't know how to do counterinsurgency." In return, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper pledged to withdraw Canadian troops from Afghanistan by 2011. (The announcement came in the midst of a national electoral campaign.) In fact, public officials in most NATO countries simply cannot afford higher military casualties in the face of domestic constituencies increasingly opposed to any involvement in Afghanistan. Eventually, some member states, perhaps Italy or Germany, may decide to give in to electoral pressures and withdraw unilaterally. However, such a withdrawal would set an unpleasant precedent for NATO, and thus weaken an alliance that is essential to maintaining stability in the Balkans and containing an increasingly belligerent Russia. NATO is obsolete--no impact Rene de Nevers, Assistant Professor of Public Administration at the Maxwell School at Syracuse University, Spring 2007, International Security What role does NATO play in combating terror? NATO's missions have expanded dramatically since the end of the Cold War, and most of the United States' closest allies are members of the alliance. Nevertheless, NATO plays, at best, a supportive role in U.S. efforts to combat terrorism. The alliance contributes to preventive and defensive missions to address the threat of terrorism, and its consequence management plans aim to respond to terrorist attacks and to mitigate their effects. But many of the essential activities of the fight against terrorism occur outside NATO, through bilateral cooperation or loose coalitions of the willing. Three factors help to explain NATO's minor role in combating terrorism: shifts in alignments and threat perceptions caused by systemic changes, the alliance's limited military capabilities, and the nature of the fight against terror itself. Over time the consequences of NATO's limited role could be severe. If NATO's strongest members do not seek to address their core security threats within the alliance, NATO may have difficulty sustaining its military value. SDI 2010 56 2AC Afghanistan RRSe 2AC NATO DA A destabilized Pakistan will deteriorate NATO and the US-European security guarantee Watt and Tempko, the Guardian's chief political correspondent and twice Pulitzer Prize nominee as a foreign correspondent for one of America's leading newspapers, 2007 Nicholas Watt is the Guardian's chief political correspondent. Ned Temko, a twice Pulitzer Prize nominee as a foreign correspondent for one of America's leading newspapers. The Observer (England) "News: Failure in Afghanistan risks rise in terror, say generals: Military chiefs warn No. 10 that defeat could lead to change of regime in Pakistan" July 15, 2007 l/n BRITAIN'S MOST senior generals have issued a blunt warning to Downing Street that the military campaign in Afghanistan is facing a catastrophic failure, a development that could lead to an Islamist government seizing power in neighbouring Pakistan. Amid fears that London and Washington are taking their eye off Afghanistan as they grapple with Iraq, the generals have told Number 10 that the collapse of the government in Afghanistan, headed by Hamid Karzai, would present a grave threat to the security of Britain. Lord Inge, the former chief of the defence staff, highlighted their fears in public last week when he warned of a 'strategic failure' in Afghanistan. The Observer understands that Inge was speaking with the direct authority of the general staff when he made an intervention in a House of Lords debate. 'The situation in Afghanistan is much worse than many people recognise,' Inge told peers. 'We need to face up to that issue, the consequence of strategic failure in Afghanistan and what that would mean for Nato. . . We need to recognise that the situation - in my view, and I have recently been in Afghanistan - is much, much more serious than people want to recognise.' Inge's remarks reflect the fears of serving generals that the government is so overwhelmed by Iraq that it is in danger of losing sight of the threat of failure in Afghanistan. One source, who is familiar with the fears of the senior officers, told The Observer : 'If you talk privately to the generals they are very very worried. You heard it in Inge's speech. Inge said we are failing and remember Inge speaks for the generals.' Inge made a point in the Lords of endorsing a speech by Lord Ashdown, the former Liberal Democrat leader, who painted a bleak picture during the debate. Ashdown told The Observer that Afghanistan presented a graver threat than Iraq. 'The consequences of failure in Afghanistan are far greater than in Iraq,' he said. 'If we fail in Afghanistan then Pakistan goes down. The security problems for Britain would be massively multiplied. I think you could not then stop a widening regional war that would start off in warlordism but it would become essentially a war in the end between Sunni and Shia right across the Middle East.' 'Mao Zedong used to refer to the First and Second World Wars as the European civil wars. You can have a regional civil war. That is what you might begin to see. It will be catastrophic for Nato. The damage done to Nato in Afghanistan would be as great as the damage done to the UN in Bosnia. That could have a severe impact on the Atlantic relationship and maybe even damage the American security guarantee for Europe.' Ashdown said two mistakes were being made: a lack of a co-ordinated military command because of the multinational 'hearts and minds' Nato campaign and the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom offensive campaign against the Taliban. There was also insufficient civic support on, for example, providing clean water. SDI 2010 57 2AC Afghanistan RRSe 2AC NATO DA No Impact--the alliance is resilient Kwok 05 (James, staff writer at the Harvard International Review, "Mending NATO: Sustaining the Transatlantic Relationship," Defining Power, Vol. 27 (2) Summer, http://hir.harvard.edu/articles/1344/) <The greatest misperception of the transatlantic relationship is that the United States is incapable of seeing eyeto-eye on any issue with Europe. The eminent political scientist Robert Kagan has pointed out that the prevailing attitude toward the transatlantic relationship is usually described as that between "cowboys" and stiff Eurocrats. That the two peoples are diametrically opposed is completely false. Both sides of the Atlantic have the same fundamental beliefs in free markets, liberal government, and democracy. This dedication to liberalism and open societies was not only evident in the joint NATO peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia and Croatia, but also most recently in Ukraine. Then-Secretary of State Colin Powell worked closely with his opposite numbers in Brussels--NATO's headquarters--to ensure that the elections occurring in 2004 went smoothly and according to plan. NATO, while playing no military role in the Iraq War, recently has spearheaded the Training Implementation Mission in Iraq, which seeks to create a self-sufficient Iraqi army. If argument has made the relationship tenuous, it certainly has not paralyzed NATO.> The status quo solves their impact START solve prolif and accidents Montreal Gazette 9. [July 4, "Duck and cover or a world without nukes?" -- http://www.montrealgazette.com/story_print.html? id=1759991&sponsor=] Still, Blair and many others say the need for the U.S. and Russia to show leadership is even more pressing, to remove not only the ever-present Cold War possibility of a world-ending nuclear accident, but the 21st-century threat of nukes falling into terrorist hands. Much has been made of the need to press the "reset" button on the strained relations of late between the White House and the Kremlin. Medvedev struck a conciliatory note this week when he called for a new era in relations with Washington, based on a "purely pragmatic" agenda. Thomas Graham, a retired U.S. diplomat and Clinton-era arms-control ambassador, said Russian and U.S. co-operation on arms control, including a new START treaty, would pay dividends in a much broader sense. "For too long in this post-Cold War world, the two former Cold War adversaries have remained in a semi-hostile relationship," Graham said. "There could be a serious threat of broader nuclear-weapon proliferation. Many people are concerned about the Iranian nuclear program. ... This administration, I believe, correctly understands that we cannot effectively deal with either of those issues, and many others as well, without close co-operation with the Russian Federation." Officials from both countries are already hammering out the details of an agreement that would replace the START 1 treaty, which expires Dec. 5. Though the Moscow-Washington relationship is tangled in a web of tension over the U.S. missile-defence-shield plans for Europe, and NATO's eastward expansion, positive signals emerged from the Kremlin yesterday on one front: Medvedev's spokesman said he and Obama would sign a side deal that would allow the U.S. military transit of goods through Russian territory to Afghanistan. The main goal would be a new START framework that would essentially see both sides slashing their nuclearwarhead stockpiles by one-quarter, down to about 1,500 warheads each. Despite the spread of nuclear-weapons arsenals to such countries as China, Pakistan, India and elsewhere, nine out of every 10 nuclear bombs on the planet are under the control of the White House and the Kremlin. Lilia Shevtsova, of the Moscow office of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, suggests that a renewed version of START will not necessarily make the world a safer place. "When you start counting nukes, you start talking disarmament and verification procedure. It's a sign not of mutual trust - it's rather a sign of lack, an absence of mutual trust," Shevtsova said. Charles Ferguson, a senior fellow with the Council on Foreign Relations, says if Russia and the U.S. were to go so far as to cut their arsenals down to 1,000 each, other nuclear countries could begin to compete with them. For Blair, it's well past the time to abandon long-held suspicions and animosities. After walking his Ottawa luncheon crowd through his Paris doomsday vision, Blair piles on more scenarios. If there were an accidental launch of weapons that triggered all-out nuclear war between Russia and the U.S., 119 million people in each country would die in the initial exchange. That would include 15 million around the Kremlin in Moscow. A city like Chicago or Ottawa would be gone within the hour. "We've pushed our luck as far as we can; now we need a policy. So to put it bluntly, there are two paths that stretch before us: We either bury our weapons or we're buried by them," Blair said. SDI 2010 58 2AC Afghanistan RRSe IAR NATO DA Squo Solves Accidents/Prolif START IS THE TOP OF OBAMA'S AGENDA. BELLINGER 6-11-10. [John, partner at Arnold & Porter LLP and an adjunct senior fellow in international and national security law at the Council on Foreign Relations "Without White House muscle, treaties left in limbo" Washington Post] Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last month in favor of the new START treaty with Russia. President Obama signed the nuclear arms reduction agreement April 8 in Prague and submitted the voluminous treaty documentation for Senate ratification just four weeks later. The lightning speed at which this was sent to the Senate and a Cabinet-level hearing scheduled reflects START's importance to the administration . But the priority the Obama administration has placed on START contrasts sharply with its approach to other international agreements pending before the Senate. START Key to US non prolif credibility, global support for non proliferation and arms control and marginalization of nuclear weapons Granoff, '09 (Jonathan, President Global Security Initiative, http://www.gsinstitute.org/gsi/pubs/03_26_09_NPT.pdf) A high priority therefore is for the United States and Russia to agree on means to verify and make irreversible the reductions. The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (WMDC) recommends negotiation of a new treaty that would further cut strategic forces and also provide for verified dismantlement of warheads withdrawn under SORT.8 In negotiating SORT, the Bush administration rejected a detailed agreement spelling out transparency and verification measures on the grounds that Cold Warstyle arms control is no longer necessary and that the United States has no interest in determining together with Russia the size and composition of the two countries' arsenals. This approach overlooks that Cold War or no, the two countries need to regulate their nuclear relationship; "partnership" is not necessarily forever . Further, accounting for warheads and verifying reductions is essential to achieving marginalization and elimination of nuclear weapons globally. Verification is needed to bring greater security to the rest of the world because the rest of the world is properly concerned with the efficacy of the disarmament and arms reduction efforts of the U nited States and Russia. The Administration's recent overtures will bolster good will internationally when progress is made and such progress is presented to the NPT parties as formally reinforcing the NPT process. Bilateral steps must be contextualized as reinforcing the multilateral institutions. SDI 2010 59 2AC Afghanistan RRSe 2AC CMR DA LOW CMR NOW- INCONSISTENT WITHDRAWAL DATES AND MCCRYSTAL OWENS 7/19 (Mackubin T, Associate Dean of Academics for Electives and Directed Research and Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval War College, 7/19/2010, "The McChrystal Affair And US Civil-Military Relations," DA: 7/22/2010//JLENART) Writing before the 2008 election, Richard Kohn, the eminent historian and student of US civil-military relations, predicted that "the new administration, like its predecessors, will wonder to what extent it can exercise civilian 'control.' If the historical pattern holds, the administration will do something clumsy or overreact, provoking even more distrust simply in the process of establishing its own authority." Recent events demonstrate that he was correct. In late June of this year, it was reported that Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the top US military commander in Afghanistan, and members of his staff had criticized top Obama administration officials. The story, published in Rolling Stone, quoted officers on McChrystal's staff making disparaging remarks about the vice president, the national security adviser, and the president himself. Gen. McChrystal was summoned to Washington D.C., where he offered his resignation, which the president accepted. This episode illustrates that U.S. civilmilitary relations remain problematic. The real danger is not a threat to civilian control of the military, but the lack of trust between civilians and the military. This is a problem on both sides. News reports indicate that President Obama's civilian aides have been deeply suspicious of the military, accusing them of intentionally "boxing the president in" through a series of coordinated leaks to the media during last year's policy review. For its part, many officers see the Obama administration setting up the military to take the blame should the American enterprise in Afghanistan fail. The seeds of the problem that led to Gen. McChrystal's removal as U.S. commander in Afghanistan go back several months. In keeping with his promise to reinvigorate the effort in Afghanistan, President Obama announced in March a "comprehensive new strategy . . . to reverse the Taliban's gains and promote a more capable and accountable Afghan government," pledging to properly resource this "war of necessity." The new operational strategy called for a counterinsurgency approach (like that of the surge in Iraq) and focused on the security of the population; it rejected the "counterterrorism" approach (which NATO had followed during the Bush years) that used special operations forces and air strikes launched from unmanned aircraft to hunt down and kill al Qaeda terrorists. President Obama even replaced the U.S. commander in Afghanistan, General David McKiernan, with Gen. McChrystal, who had been General Petraeus's right-hand man in Iraq when a counterinsurgency strategy was successfully implemented. But when McChrystal indicated in a confidential study completed in August that more troops would be needed to pursue the president's strategy, President Obama did nothing. Admiral Michael Mullen, chairman of the joint chiefs, told Congress that more troops would be needed; and experts suggested that the number of additional soldiers and Marines necessary to execute the new strategy was thirty to forty thousand. But this was apparently a truth Obama did not want to hear. In contrast to George Bush in 2007, who pursued what he thought was the right approach in Iraq despite the unpopularity of his decision, President Obama apparently began to rethink his Afghanistan policy out of concern that his base would not support any troop increase. His decision to send 30,000 more troops to Afghanistan while simultaneously indicating that they would be leaving by the middle of 2011 only helped to frustrate the military. A "population-centric" counterinsurgency approach , after all, depends on convincing the Afghan population that there is no expiration date on U.S. security guarantees. Several clumsy missteps by the administration reinforced the perception that the president's actions were motivated by political factors rather than strategic ones. These included an attempt by retired Marine General James Jones, the national security adviser, to intimidate military commanders in Afghanistan into reducing their troop requests to a politically acceptable level, and a White House directive to the Pentagon not to forward a request for more troops. The most serious mistake, reported in the Wall Street Journal, was that the White House ordered General McChrystal not to testify before Congress. Thus, the administration appeared to be muzzling the military. News reports indicated that officers on General McChrystal's staff and elsewhere were wondering why, after having declared the conflict there a "war of necessity," the president had not provided the necessary means to fight it properly. They wondered why, having selected McChrystal to turn things around in Afghanistan, President Obama had not supported him the way that George Bush supported Petraeus in Iraq. It is easy to see the truth of Kohn's prediction that a clumsy step by the administration would sow distrust on the part of the soldiers, thereby increasing civil-military tensions, but the steps taken by some in the military made the situation worse. First someone leaked General McChrystal's strategic assessment to Bob Woodward of the Washington Post. Then an article published by McClatchy quoted anonymous officers to the effect that McChrystal would resign if the president did not give him what he needed to implement the announced strategy. Problematic as the administration's actions may have been, such leaks by military officers were simply unacceptable. It seems clear that Gen. McChrystal had no choice but to offer his resignation in the wake of the Rolling Stone story and the president had no choice but the accept it. If nothing else, Gen. McChrystal had created a command climate that did not discourage disrespectful speech on the part of the military for civilian authorities. Success in Afghanistan requires healthy civil-military relations and these depend on trust. The good news is that the new generals put in place in the aftermath of the McChrystal affair-Marine General James Mattis as commander, US Central Command, and Gen. David Petraeus as the commander of the effort in Afghanistan proper-both understand the importance of professionalism and trust in fostering healthy civil-military relations. SDI 2010 60 2AC Afghanistan RRSe 2AC CMR DA LOW CMR INEVITABLE IN THE CONTEXT OF AFGHANISTAN- MCCRYSTAL'S REPORT HADDICK 9 (Robert, Managing Editor of the Small Wars Journal, "This Week at War: McChrystal Plays Defense," September, Foreign Policy Magazine, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/09/04/this_week _at_war_mcchrystal_plays_defense?page=0,0//JLENART) Gen. Stanley McChrystal's report on the situation in Afghanistan is likely to strain relations between the Obama administration and the uniformed military. The arrival of McChrystal's report in Washington is likely to spark its own low-level war of finger-pointing and blame-shifting between civilian policymakers in the White House and McChrystal's staff and defenders in the Pentagon. This strain in civil-military relations could last through the duration of the U.S. military's involvement in Afghanistan and beyond. McChrystal's report is supposedly secret, but anonymous staffers have already revealed its themes to the Washington Post. The goal of these staffers is to protect McChrystal and the uniformed military against White House officials they likely don't trust. These staffers have evidently concluded that they need to leak first in order to establish their position and put White House staffers on the defensive. The first task for McChrystal's report (and its leaking defenders) was to show how President Barack Obama's supposedly limited war aims actually result in broad, expensive, and open-ended goals for Afghanistan: Although the assessment, which runs more than 20 pages, has not been released, officials familiar with the report have said it represents a hard look at the challenges involved in implementing Obama's strategy for Afghanistan. The administration has narrowly defined its goal as defeating al-Qaeda and other extremist groups and denying them sanctuary, but that in turn requires a sweeping counterinsurgency campaign aimed at protecting the Afghan population, establishing good governance and rebuilding the economy. McChrystal's report has thus shifted responsibility over to the White House to either the rally the country and the Congress around a big nation-building campaign or to explicitly scale back the desired war aims. Next, according to the Washington Post, McChrystal's report lists numerous obstacles that could prevent success, barriers that are outside of the U.S. military's control: For instance, McChrystal thinks a greater push by civilian officials is vital to shore up local Afghan governments and to combat corruption, officials said. He is emphatic that the results of the recent Afghan presidential election be viewed as legitimate, but is also realistic in acknowledging that the goals of the government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai and the coalition are not always as closely aligned as they could be, they said. Separately, officials said, McChrystal's assessment finds that U.S. and other NATO forces must adopt a less risk-averse culture, leaving bases and armored vehicles to pursue insurgents on foot in a way that minimizes Afghan civilian deaths. In others words, McChrystal is saying, don't hold me responsible for success if Karzai's election is a fraud, civilian officials don't show up, or European soldiers are not allowed to patrol. The report illustrates the basic struggle between civilian policymakers and military commanders. Each side looks to the other to solve its problems. The White House staff is hoping that McChrystal will deliver a clear, highprobability war-winning strategy, a strategy that would reduce Afghanistan as an issue of concern. McChrystal, like all field commanders, wants his political masters to give him a realistic and measurable objective, with the resources needed to accomplish it. McChrystal's report implies a pessimistic outlook for U.S. success in Afghanistan. If he and his staff had an optimistic view about the Afghan challenge, there would have been no need to be so diligent about clarifying responsibility for what comes next. In the case of success, all would share the glory. McChrystal's report is a preemptive defense against blame and recrimination. That does not bode well for either the U.S. mission in Afghanistan or for civil-military relations. Civil military relations are resilient structural reinforcement mechanisms prevent their impact HOOKER 4 (Colonel Richard, Ph.D. from the University of Virginia in IR and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, Winter 2004, "Soldiers of the State: Reconsidering American Civil-Military Relations," Parameters, DA: 7/22/2010, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBR/is_4_33/ai_1118529 34///JLENART) The arguments advanced herein attempt to show that the dynamic tension which exists in civil-military relations today, while in many cases sub-optimal and unpleasant, is far from dangerous. Deeply rooted in a uniquely American system of separated powers, regulated by strong traditions of subordination to civilian authority, and enforced by a range of direct and indirect enforcement mechanisms, modern US civil-military relations remain sound, enduring, and stable. The American people need fear no challenge to constitutional norms and institutions from a military which--however aggressive on the battlefield--remains faithful to its oath of service. Not least of the Framer's achievements is the willing subordination of the soldiers of the state. SDI 2010 61 2AC Afghanistan RRSe 2AC CMR DA The link is not unique Afghanistan timeline, budget, DADT, restructuring King 9 ["Panel discusses civil-military relations at Fort Leavenworth, March 2009] "The president has arranged it so that he is free to ignore the advice of his uniformed chiefs and field commanders because he will have cover of General Jones by his side, and other senior military in his administration," Kohn said, "and at the same time demonstrates that he has been reaching out to the military and wants to have military judgment." The four areas where Kohn sees potential civil-military problems in the future are in Afghanistan, the budget, gays in the military and the restructuring of military forces away from Cold War structure. He said budgetary issues would create the most problems of those four areas. And Iraq Wong 9 [Dr. Leonard, Strategic Studies Institute,"Civil-Military Relations in a Post-9/11 World." Colloquium Breif, Strategic Studies Institute, No date, July 16 2010] The panel considered several factors as to why the current civil-military relationship may be different from the relationship in the past. First, there may be more acrimony and perceptions of disagreement. These perceptions result from changes in technology with blogs and emails providing faster access to leaks and disagreements. Or, it could be that the military is viewing its role as not only giving military advice, but also as setting things right. Finally, more civil-military tension may exist simply because of the increased politicization of the Iraq War. SDI 2010 62 2AC Afghanistan RRSe 2AC Karzai DA Non-unique: withdrawal from Afghanistan is inevitable and announcing the July 2011 transition date should have triggered the link--that's IAC Rogan evidence. Turn --- troop presence collapses Karzai cred --- sparks Pashtun backlash Pena `02 (Charles, Senior Defense Policy Analyst Cato Institute, "U.S. Troops Must Not Be Palace Guards", 7-31, http://cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=3559) Naturally, the immediate reaction was to demand more U.S. involvement in Afghanistan. Sen. Charles Hagel (RNeb.) believes that "we are going to have to take a look at ... more American involvement." According to Sen. Bob Graham (D-Fla.), "We're going to have to be more active in some of the security aspects." But more involvement--especially involvement that is a step toward nation-building--is exactly the wrong thing for the U.S. to do. And using U.S. military forces as bodyguards for Karzai is a step in the wrong direction. There is already considerable friction over the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan, especially after the U.S. air attacks on several Pashtun villages this month. Ethnic Pashtuns, who make up nearly half the population, are showing signs of losing faith in Karzai--particularly his ability to protect the political interests and physical safety of his own ethnic group. Indeed, bringing in outsiders for protection has generally been an indication of an Afghan leader's unpopularity. Ultimately, U.S. troops acting as Karzai's palace guard smacks of propping him up and reinforces perceptions that he is a U.S. puppet. This is a recipe for a disaster like the fall of the shah of Iran in 1979, not a prescription for a stable government. More important, the national security of the United States does not require a stable, democratic, multiethnic, representative government in Afghanistan. Even if Afghanistan reverted to its traditional form of governance--a decentralized system with a nominal national government but with most power held by regional leaders--U.S. security interests demand only that whatever government is in power not provide haven and support for Al Qaeda terrorists. If U.S. troops become a security force for Karzai and traditional rivalries between ethnic factions continue, the U.S. is likely to be drawn into Afghanistan's internal power struggles (exactly what Washington seeks to avoid by not committing troops to the international peacekeeping effort), thus creating incentives and targets for terrorism. In the end, it is impossible to keep an intervening party's actions from altering the power calculations of all the rival factions. Invariably, the outside party will do something that is seen as benefiting one side's interests at the expense of all others'. And the outside party then becomes a target for violence. It will be a big mistake for the U.S.--originally seen as the liberator of Afghanistan from oppressive Taliban rule--if the Afghan people come to view the U.S. military presence as an invading and occupying military force. The U.S. military has better things to do than guard Karzai. Osama bin Laden is still at large. Al Qaeda and the Taliban have fled to neighboring Pakistan. If American blood is to be spilled, it should be against the perpetrators of the Sept. 11 attacks, not in taking a bullet for a foreign president. Link turn outweighs the link --- dependence on outside influence is the worst thing possible for Karzai Robichaud `04 (Carl, Program Officer The Century Foundation, Afghanistan Watch, 10-5, http://www.afghanistanwatch.org/newsletterarchive/listserv10-5-04.htm) A darker possibility is that Karzai is seen as a foreign puppet, like so many Afghan leaders in the past. His campaign rivals--and Taliban propagandists--have marked Karzai as weak, ineffective, out-of-touch with Afghans, and, most disparagingly, beholden to foreigners. One of Karzai's opponents complained to the New York Times a few weeks ago, "Mr. Karzai can go with American helicopters and American bodyguards to 10 provinces in one day. What can we do?" The result: Karzai could win big with the help of his foreign sponsors but lack the legitimacy with common Afghans to assert more control over his lawless country. SDI 2010 63 2AC Afghanistan RRSe 2AC Karzai DA The turn outweights the link--presence gets media hype and is always spun negatively Goodhand and Sedra `06 (Jonathon, Lecturer Development Studies U. London, and Mark, Research Associate Bonn Center for International Conversion, "Bargains for Peace?: Aid, Conditionalities, and Reconstruction in Afghanistan", http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2006/20060800_cru_goodhand_sedra.pdf) Secondly, donors' desire for visibility and autonomy risks undermining the goals of state-building and the renegotiation of a social contract. Although a `light foot-print' approach to the reconstruction process was promised at its outset, in Kabul there is the perception of an overbearing and sometimes bullying international community. A `shadow state' of advisors and consultants have been brought in to compensate for capacity deficits within the government: `It is impossible to determine where government policies begin and IFI influence ends' (Carlin, 2004: 4). Although coordination and consultative mechanisms were established, such as the Afghan Development Forum and the Consultative Groups, they rely on voluntary compliance and reporting. SDI 2010 64 2AC Afghanistan RRSe 2AC Karzai DA ATTA Impact No Impact Afghanistan and Pakistan already signed the trade agreement BBC News 7/19 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-10679464 19 July 2010 Last updated at 22:53 ET Afghanistan and Pakistan agree key trade agreement Afghanistan and Pakistan have signed a key trade agreement allowing Afghan lorries to use a land route through Pakistan to carry goods to India. The deal also gives landlocked Afghanistan access to Pakistani ports to boost its trade with other nations. Correspondents say the deal marks a real effort to ease tensions between the two neighbours. The accord was signed during the visit to the region by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. In an interview with the BBC's Kim Ghattas in the Pakistani capital Islamabad, Mrs Clinton spoke of the need to bring the two countries closer together. She also said said Washington wanted Pakistan to do more to tackle Islamist militants. 'Signal' The deal between Afghanistan and Pakistan was signed by the trade ministers at a ceremony in Islamabad. Afghan Finance Minister Omar Zakhilwal, who played a key role in the difficult talks, described the agreement as "historic". The pact allows Afghan lorries to transport goods to India along a sensitive Pakistani land route through the Wagah border crossing. There are certain to be many problems with the implementation of the accord, the BBC's Lyse Doucet in Kabul says. But Mr Zakhilwal said it was a signal that relations with Pakistan were improving on a rapid scale, setting a goal for other neighbours. Mistrust between Pakistan and neighbouring India still runs too deep to allow the deal to include Indian goods going to Afghanistan, our correspondent says. She adds that the presence of Mrs Clinton in Islamabad clearly helped to clinch the trade deal. All sides know that if there is to be greater co-operation on tackling a growing Taliban insurgency, including sanctuaries in Pakistan, relations have to start improving on all fronts, our correspondent says. SDI 2010 65 2AC Afghanistan RRSe 2AC Karzai DA Russia Impact No Impact--Karzai and Medvedev are at odds over drugs no cooperation any time soon AFP 6/26 http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jidl__o9faB2VhBJ98O35vLEWRYg Stop blaming Afghanistan for drugs: Karzai (AFP) Jun 26, 2010 KABUL -- President Hamid Karzai said Saturday Afghanistan was a victim in poppy cultivation and the drugs trade, calling on the rest of the world to stop the pointing finger at his country. War-ravaged Afghanistan is the world's largest heroin producer and has faced heavy criticism from Russia, where exports worth up to three billion dollars on their way to Europe fuel a drug epidemic. Speaking to hundreds of invitees to mark International Counter Narcotics Day, Karzai said Afghanistan had a drug problem but blame for the country's industry mostly lay at the feet of foreign countries and organised crime. "I do not want the international community, especially central Asian countries, to point fingers at us while we acknowledge our failures," he said. "We also know the drugs trade here is encouraged by foreigners and international mafia gangs," he added. Central Asian countries have recently criticised the Afghan government and US-backed NATO forces fighting Islamist rebels for not stopping the flow of drugs from the country's northern borders. Earlier this month, Russian president Dmitry Medvedev warned that the flood of heroin from Afghanistan was a key threat to the country's progress, as over 30,000 from his country died last year from its abuse. But Afghanistan has one million drug addicts itself and the vast majority of income from drugs went to organised crime groups outside the country, Karzai said. The president's own half-brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai, is said to have ties to Afghanistan's lucrative illegal opium trade, although he has consistently denied the accusations. Karzai also used his speech to assert that Afghanistan did not have an opium production industry until it was invaded by the Soviet Red Army in 1979. "Before the former Soviet Union's invasion, Afghanistan did not cultivate poppies, we had it in some parts but very limited quantities, we were not an opium producing country," he said. Karzai said the invasion, which initiated more than three decades of war, opened the space for organised crime and drugs. Afghanistan produces some 7,000 tonnes of opium a year and 3,000 tonnes of cannabis. Officials estimate that 657 tonnes of heroin are produced around the world, of which 430 tonnes reach the market while the rest is stored. SDI 2010 66 2AC Afghanistan RRSe 2AC Reverse Spending Non-Unique-It's already dead, armor trades off with the FCS program. Noah Shachtman 9 founder of DefenseTech.org, writer, graduate of Georgetown University` Pentagon Chief Rips Heart Out of Army's Future (April 6 Future', http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/04/gates-ripshear/#ixzz0uToix3Xs), In 2003, the U.S. Army introduced its plan to wage the wars of tomorrow. A fleet of light, networked, electricpowered combat vehicles would speed American forces into battle against another superpower military -- and win the fight almost instantly, thanks to its unmatched ability to out-think and out-maneuver any foe. The generals called the effort Future Combat Systems, or FCS, and figured the whole thing might cost $92 billion. But, it turns out, just about every assumption the Army had about its future was wrong. America's wars wound up being against terrorists and insurgents, not other big armies. The enemy weapons of choice in those fights -- metal-shredding roadside bombs -- made a priority of more armor, not less. The U.S. military-industrial complex's attempts to make the combat vehicles electric floundered. The projects to provide battlefield bandwidth fizzled. The already-massive budget for FCS grew, by some estimates, to a truly gargantuan $200 billion. And with every added billion and technology flop, the calls to rework or kill off FCS grew louder. Now, Defense Secretary Robert Gates is looking to all-but-end the Army's Future Combat Systems. In his proposal today to radically overhaul of Pentagon's arsenal, Gates said he wanted to scrap all eight of the vehicles at the heart of FCS -- including a next-gen tank, cannon and infantry carrier. "I have concluded that there are significant unanswered questions concerning the FCS vehicle design strategy. I am also concerned that, despite some adjustments, the FCS vehicles -- where lower weight, higher fuel efficiency, and greater informational awareness are expected to compensate for less armor -- do not adequately reflect the lessons of counterinsurgency and close-quarters combat in Iraq and Afghanistan," Gates said Turn: plan prevents FCS withdrawing troops means there is LESS justification for weapons systems the plan STOPS those from being funded Christian Science Monitor 3/29/2k10 ("Defense budget: After Afghanistan and Iraq withdrawal, a peace dividend?," pg online @ http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/David-R.-Francis/2010/0329/Defense-budgetAfter-Afghanistan-and-Iraq-withdrawal-a-peace-dividend da: 7/11 ) If and when these wars wind down, the US may receive an even bigger peace dividend in the form of overall defense cuts. Huge federal budget deficits will force them. Right now, neither Republicans nor Democrats in Congress are inclined to make serious cuts for fear of being called weak on defense. Without a war, however, members of Congress, particularly Democrats, may begin asking hard questions about weapons programs. There's much to cut, says Christopher Hellman of the National Priorities Project in Northampton, Mass. He calls the defense budget "bloated." The Obama budget set 2011 defense spending at $739 billion. This amounts to 19 percent of total federal outlays. Carl Conetta, director of the Project on Defense Alternatives in Cambridge, Mass., suspects defense spending could be cut as low as $650 billion without seriously damaging American security needs. To trim the deficit, Mr. Obama called for a freeze in discretionary spending but exempted defense. The US defense budget adds up, at the very least, to 47 percent of total worldwide defense spending. That reflects the US role as the sole superpower, the various US interests abroad, and the relatively high costs of the US military. During the Vietnam War, Presidents Kennedy and Johnson raised defense spending almost 50 percent in constant dollars. President Reagan, with his ambition to financially clobber the Soviet Union, raised defense outlays by more than 50 percent. No impact--budget pressures mean zero risk of weapons funding Congressional Quarterly Weekly 3/20/2k10 ("Defense's New Defender," pg nexis) Now Dicks, who has made a career largely of saying yes, will increasingly have to say no. He may come under increasing pressure to rein in Pentagon spending. Congress is weighing an Obama administration plan to freeze most domestic discretionary spending for three years. Although it would be exempt, the Pentagon is receiving just over half of U.S. discretionary appropriations this fiscal year, which could make its budget more of a target than usual for critics. Significant cuts are unlikely this year, but as U.S. military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan wanes, the record increases in defense spending since Sept. 11 will almost certainly become a thing of the past. Pressures inside the Pentagon are squeezing the defense budget, too. The cost of pay and benefits for a larger all-volunteer military force will conflict more sharply with weapons spending. These fiscal forces will lead to hard choices for Dicks, and he will have to cut programs that are not performing. "Dicks is a tough guy, even when he's on your side," said Thompson. SDI 2010 67 2AC Afghanistan RRSe 2AC Reverse Spending Turn: withdrawal undercuts support for defense spending guts weapons programs Congress Daily 6/21/2k10 ("Tough choices confront defense budget cutters," pg online @ http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0610/062110cdam2.htm) "A double tsunami is about to hit defense," said Adams, now a professor at American University. The first wave is a growing appetite for deficit reduction and spending control. The second wave, Adams said, is an anticipated reduction in troops deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan, making it both easier and more politically feasible to cut the defense budget. With tens of thousands of troops still deployed in both countries, most lawmakers -- particularly key members of the Armed Services committees from both parties -- would not tolerate cuts to the defense budget. In fact, many Republicans complain that the Obama administration isn't spending enough to acquire fighter aircraft and ships. But a peacetime environment would pave the way for significant defense cuts, as it has after most major military operations. And, there is no link presence in Afghanistan is supplemental spending doesn't free up any additional Pentagon funds No impact to energy weapons --A. Directed energy weapons are inevitable --- other countries and your National Defense Magazine evidence proves its a high DOD priority B. Not feasible --- same piece of evidence indicates massive technical challenges still persist C. Their impact card talks about how it might have the potential to BLIND the enemy, not extinction. Closing bases costs more money than it saves in the short term---and long-term savings are small Peters2k 9 (Katherine McIntire Peters, writer for Government Executive, August 12, 2009, "Defense budget portends difficult trade-offs," online: http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0809/081209kp1.htm //da: 7/14) Harrison's analysis also shows that predicted savings from program changes don't always materialize. He noted that the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure process, which resulted in the decision to shut down 22 major bases -about 7 percent of the military's network of installations -- was supposed to yield $40.1 billion in savings between 2005 and 2025. The Defense Department now estimates the savings will be $15.3 billion, but in the near term the department is spending more to close the bases than it is saving. SDI 2010 68 2AC Afghanistan RRSe 2AC Guam DA The DA has no link--all of their INC evidence is in the context of relocating troops currently stationed in Japan not Afghanistan There is no internal link--rotations in Afghanistan have been too long and frequent the troops would be brought home on break Not Unique--Iraq troops are coming home now Guam shift now--Okinawa base closure Eric Talmadge, AP staff writer, 6/22/2010, "US-Japan security pact turns 50, faces new strains," http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5islkPj_84APsquFWNdqr2kuTwDQwD9GG68080, da: 7/14 Uncertainty over a Marine base and plans to move thousands of U.S. troops to Guam are straining a postWorld War II security alliance Japan and the United States set 50 years ago, but Tokyo's new leader said Tuesday he stands behind the pact. Prime Minister Naoto Kan said he sees the arrangement as a crucial means of maintaining the balance of power in Asia, where the economic and military rise of China is looming large, and vowed to stand behind it despite recent disputes with Washington. Not Unique--Withdrawal from Afghanistan is inevitable that's IAC Rogan Troops will shift to Haiti--not Guam David Wood, Politics Daily chief military correspondent, 1/19/2010, "Haiti Disaster Opens New Front for Overstretched U.S. Military," http://www.politicsdaily.com/2010/01/19/haiti-disaster-opens-new-front-foroverstretched-u-s-military/, da:7/14] Now, 3,500 soldiers of the 82nd Airborne Division have been sent to Haiti, along with 1,700 Marines of the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit who embarked on the helicopter assault carrier USS Bataan and two amphibious ships for an uncertain duration. The 22nd MEU had just returned last month from a seven-month deployment. It is one of six similar units in the Marine Corps. As the United States was rushing troops, warships and rescue supplies to earthquake-ravaged Haiti Monday, gunmen and suicide bombers half a world away mounted coordinated attacks on Afghanistan's government in Kabul. Suicide bombers attacked ministry buildings and gun battles blazed for four hours as U.S.-backed President Hamid Karzai gamely swore in new cabinet members at the nearby presidential palace. The twin crises -- a long-term humanitarian disaster nearby and a distant war seemingly spinning out of control -- bookend the immense security challenges facing the United States as the Obama administration completes its first year in office. It was just six weeks ago, as Obama announced his decision to send 30,000 more troops to Afghanistan, that the president acknowledged his struggle to respond to the multiple crises that seem to press in from all sides. "As president, I refuse to set goals that go beyond our responsibility, our means, or our interests,'' Obama declared in a speech at West Point. But, he added pointedly, "I must weigh all of the challenges that our nation faces. I don't have the luxury of committing to just one. '' That was before Haiti. U.S. officials now anticipate a large and long-term U.S. intervention in Haiti, including a major security role that will demand a commitment of troops and resources from an already stretched military. The U.S. Army currently has 95,000 soldiers in Iraq, 43,000 in Afghanistan (along with 35,000 U.S. Marines, sailors and airmen), 18,000 in Korea and 132,000 deployed elsewhere, from Kosovo and Kuwait to Qatar. Tens of thousands more troops are headed to Afghanistan this spring and summer. Altogether, before Haiti's earthquake struck Jan. 12, more than half the Army's 556,680 active-duty soldiers are already deployed or forwardstationed overseas. SDI 2010 69 2AC Afghanistan RRSe 2AC Guam DA Impact Turn Relocating troops in Guam deters China, solves U.S.-Japan relations, and increases U.S. power projection Burgess '07, Richard R. Burgess is a political analyst, "Guam's Return to Prominence", DA: 7/23/10, http://www.military.com/forums/0,15240,123418,00.html The 2006 agreement between the United States and Japan to shift 8,000 U.S. Marines from bases in Japan to the island of Guam by 2014 is likely to have more far-reaching implications than just a change of address for some units of the Marine Corps' III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF). The move is accelerating the return to prominence of Guam in the U.S. defense posture and fostering a higher level of cooperation among the U.S. armed forces in the Pacific region. Rear Adm. Gary A. Engle, former commander of the Pacific Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command, said the advent of the Marines creates the opportunity for forces on Guam "to be a model of jointness in how we operate." Guam has been the hub of joint military exercises in recent years, including Exercise Valiant Shield 2006 in June, which included three aircraft carrier strike groups operating together, along with other Navy ships and aircraft, Coast Guard units, and Air Force and Marine Corps aircraft. Exercise Resultant Fury in December 2004 involved joint sea strike exercises with Air Force, Marine Corps and Navy aircraft. Guam, which is located 3,500 miles west of Hawaii and 1,300 miles southeast of Japan, is the largest and southernmost island of the Marianas Island chain. With a population of 160,000, Guam hosts more than 12,000 military personnel and their family members. The island supports two major facilities: Naval Base Guam, home to three attack submarines and a submarine tender, and Anderson Air Force Base, home to a Navy helicopter squadron and rotating deployments of Air Force bombers and tankers. The other islands in the Marianas chain form the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas, which has an agreement with the United States for training facilities and hosting one of the Military Sealift Command's three Maritime Prepositioning Force squadrons. One of the islands, Farallon de Medinilla, is an uninhabited 200-acre island leased in 1976 for 100 years and is the Pacific Fleet's only U.S.-controlled range available for live-fire training for forward-deployed naval forces. Acquired from Spain in 1898 as a result of the Spanish-American War, Guam became a territory of the United States and emerged as an important refueling station. Captured by Japan in 1941, it was retaken by U.S. forces in a bitter battle in 1944 and was an important logistics base for the remainder of the Pacific campaign. During the Cold War, Guam was a base for ballistic-missile submarines and patrol planes to counter Soviet submarines. During the Vietnam War, it was the launching point for B-52 bombers on long-range strikes on Vietnam. In the 1990s, the post-Cold War drawdown left U.S. force levels on Guam at low ebb. U.S. forces began building up in Guam in 2002 when the Navy moved the first of three attack submarines to the naval base, placing them closer to deployment regions, saving time in transit and freeing more time for operations. The Navy expects to move two more submarines there. The Air Force has begun rotational deployments of B-1, B-2 and B-52 bombers to Guam. "Guam has several advantages, including its position in the Western Pacific," said Air Force Lt. Gen. Dan Leaf, deputy commander of the U.S. Pacific Command and the military's point man on the build-up in Guam. "The fact that there's an existing [Department of Defense] infrastructure is another advantage because of the significant amount of land" held by DoD. U.S. sovereignty over the island is another advantage, making use of forces more flexible and free from host-country political considerations regarding foreign policy, deployments and status-of-forces agreements. The move of 8,000 Marines and an estimated 9,000 family members -- mostly from Okinawa -- is driven not by military strategy but the result of negotiations between the United States and Japan to reduce the social tension and environmental impact of large numbers of U.S. troops and aircraft on the small island. Moving the Marines to Guam places them more than 1,000 miles further from the Far East and potential flashpoints such as the Korean peninsula and the Taiwan Straits. "There's no free lunch to putting forces inward," Leaf said, noting that Guam is an "excellent choice for that rebasing. Normally, forces based in the Pacific are also global forces and may be needed outside our area of responsibility. Guam will provide a good location for that kind of response as well." "To be able to sustain our posture in the Western Pacific more efficiently and effectively, we need to restructure our basing and operating posture throughout the region, and Guam can make a huge contribution to that," said Tom Donnelly, senior advisor in the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. "There's some value in distance in that you are out of immediate strike range of China's power-projection capabilities ," he said. Guam "could certainly serve as an excellent patrol base and important inter-theater staging base, and relatively secure rear area in event of a crisis or conflict, particularly one extending over a period of time." The Air Force plans to stage Global Hawk long-range surveillance unmanned aerial vehicles at Andersen beginning in April 2007, bolstering plans to make Guam "a hub for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and strike operations -- a good composite capability to provide forces for the Pacific region," Leaf said. "The agreement reached between Japan and the United States [on May 1] represents the strength of our alliance and adjusting that alliance to current conditions and to the needs and desires of both nations," he said. The relocation agreement includes a commitment by the government of Japan to pay approximately $6.9 billion of the anticipated $10.3 billion cost to move Marines and their families to Guam. The Marines have not yet determined which units of the III MEF will move to Guam, and the specifics of the restructuring of bases in Okinawa are still being worked out between the United States and Japan. Engle foresees requirements for new barracks and family housing, plus improvements to the airfield, schools, commissaries and exchanges, as well as new utility systems, roads and waste facilities. Improvements already are in the SDI 2010 70 2AC Afghanistan RRSe 2AC Guam DA Impact Turn works or were recently completed to accommodate an increased Air Force and Navy presence, including a new hangar, medical facility, fitness complex, high school, middle school and an upgrade to a water treatment facility. Plans for the Northern Marianas are less defined, but the Navy, stressing the importance of working closely with the commonwealth, is looking at the possibility of increasing training facilities on the islands. One island, Tinian, has been used by Marine Corps units for training. Pacific Command and the Navy are coordinating closely with the government of Guam and the island localities regarding anticipated construction on the island. In September, Leaf met with government officials, town mayors, contractor associations and the Chamber of Commerce to discuss the basing plans. Guam's representative in Congress, Madeleine Z. Bordallo, said the build-up will "provide an economic boost to the island with opportunities for new jobs, increased tax revenues for the government, increased utilization of Guam's hotels, businesses, restaurants and the like and other corollary positive impacts." "The governor and Guam's local leaders are working toward partnering arrangements in all places possible," she said. "Further, we can predict now that increased revenue that will come in to the government of Guam can provide new opportunities to be dedicated to improving Guam's aging infrastructure." "Bordallo has also strongly encouraged the Department of Defense to use environmentally friendly technologies in their development, such as developing green housing or pursuing renewable power projects," said her spokesman, Joseph Duenas. "Specific warfighting training facilities, such as small arms weapons ranges, will have to meet the stringent requirements of federal law in order to minimize risk to the local environment and habitat." Congress authorized $193 million in military construction funds for Guam in the fiscal year 2007 National Defense Authorization Act, a $31 million increase over 2006 funding. "Guam is likely to see between $400 million and $1 billion in military construction in military construction each year for a period of six to 10 years," Bordallo said. She also noted the potential of a North Korean ballistic-missile threat to Guam, which is within striking distance of North Korean missiles under development. "Guam's residents recognize and fully value the protection provided by the missile defense capabilities of the U.S. military, including sea-based Aegis systems in the Pacific, Duenas said. "Further, Congresswoman Bordallo has encouraged the Pacific Command to expedite future plans to station a Patriot missile battery on Guam, something not expected until approximately 2012." Some elements of Guam's indigenous Chamorro population -- which comprises about 37 percent of the island's people -- oppose the build-up, claiming that the Chamorro suffer under U.S. "colonialization" and "militarization." On Oct. 4, self-described human rights activist Julian Aguon, of the Chamorro Cultural Development and Research Institute, addressed the Special Political and Decolonialization Committee of the U.N. general assembly, criticizing the status of Guam as a U.S. territory and declaring that U.S. "militarization" would result in volatile and irreversible consequences for the Chamorro culture and population. Aguon urged the U.N. committee "to pass a resolution condemning this massive transfer and build-up of Guam as a grave breach of duty." The overwhelming majority of Guam's residents are in favor of the build-up, Bordallo said, citing both the economic benefits and increased security.A survey commissioned in August by the Pacific Daily News, a newspaper published in Guam, indicated that 61 percent of Guamanians -- including 56 percent of Chamorros -- rated the military expansion of Guam as "a good thing." That's key to peace in the region Robert Ross, Professor of Politics at Boston College, International Security, vol 23, no 4, 1999 Finally, both full and partial U.S. withdrawal suffer from a common problem. Each would sacrifice U.S. primacy for the chimera of cheaper balancing. Because the benefits of primacy are many and valuable, the cost of maintaining primacy manageable and the risks of abandoning primacy great, the current balance of power is far preferable to a Sino-Japanese balance of power or a U.S.-China-Japan balance of power.The price of retrenchment would be U.S. security dependence on cooperation with Japan. American access to regional shipping lanes would depend significantly on the Japanese navy. U.S. cooperation with local maritime countries would similarly depend on Japanese forbearance. Japanese politics could have as great an impact on U.S. security as American politics. And this is the positive scenario. Should Japan prove uncooperative or should security dilemma dynamics erode cooperation, the United States would also depend on Chinese cooperation and Chinese politics to secure its interests in East Asia. A strong American presence maximizes the stability of the balance of power while offsetting the negative consequences of bipolarity through mitigation of the security dilemma. It is less costly than withdrawal. Current defense spending is well below Cold War levels, but it is sufficient to maintain maritime supremacy and a regional balance of power for the next thirty years. Well into the twenty-first century, the U.S.-China bipolar competition will be the most effective and inexpensive strategy for the United States to realize its vital regional interests. Other factors besides geography and structure affect stability. Democracy, interdependence, and formal multilateral security institutions can contribute to stability, but they are not necessary causes of stability. Nineteenth-century Europe experienced a relatively stable and peaceful order in the absence of widespread democracy, interdependence, and formal institutions. That all three factors are absent from contemporary East Asia does not necessarily mean there will be a greater prevalence of war, crises, and heightened conflict. This article has argued that geography contributes to regional stability and order because it shapes the a priori causes of conflict: capabilities, interests, and the security dilemma. SDI 2010 71 2AC Afghanistan RRSe 2AC Guam DA Impact Turn That solves extinction Ogura and Oh 1997 (Toshimaru and Ingyu, Economic Professors, Monthly Review, April) North Korea, South Korea, and Japan have achieved quasi- or virtual nuclear armament. Although these countries do not produce or possess actual bombs, they possess sufficient technological know-how to possess one or several nuclear arsenals. Thus, virtual armament creates a new nightmare in this region - nuclear annihilation. Given the concentration of economic affluence and military power in this region and its growing importance to the world system, any hot conflict among these countries would threaten to escalate into a global conflagration. SDI 2010 72 2AC Afghanistan RRSe 2AC Guam DA Impact Turn Guam base key to check Chinese expansion into the Pacific Kaplan, '97, Robert D. Kaplan is an American journalist, currently a National Correspondent for the Atlantic Monthly. His writings have also been featured in The Washington Post, The New York Times, The New Republic, The National Interest, Foreign Affairs and The Wall Street Journal, among other newspapers and publications, "How We Would Fight China", DA: 7/23/10/ https://teacherweb.com/ON/CASS/BC/HowWeWouldFightChinaTutorialDec11.pdf The Middle East is just a blip. The American military contest with China in the Pacific will define the twentyfirst century. And China will be a more formidable adversary than Russia ever was. For some time now no navy or air force has posed a threat to the United States. Our only competition has been armies, whether conventional forces or guerrilla insurgencies. This will soon change. The Chinese navy is poised to push out into the Pacific --and when it does, it will very quickly encounter a U.S. Navy and Air Force unwilling to budge from the coastal shelf of the Asian mainland. It's not hard to imagine the result: a replay of the decades-long Cold War, with a center of gravity not in the heart of Europe but, rather, among Pacific atolls that were last in the news when the Marines stormed them in World War II. In the coming decades China will play an asymmetric back-and-forth game with us in the Pacific, taking advantage not only of its vast coastline but also of its rear base--stretching far back into Central Asia--from which it may eventually be able to lob missiles accurately at moving ships in the Pacific. In any naval encounter China will have distinct advantages over the United States, even if it lags in technological military prowess. It has the benefit, for one thing, of sheer proximity. Its military is an avid student of the competition, and a fast learner. It has growing increments of "soft" power that demonstrate a particular gift for adaptation. While stateless terrorists fill security vacuums, the Chinese fill economic ones. All over the globe, in such disparate places as the troubled Pacific Island states of Oceania, the Panama Canal zone, and out-of-the-way African nations, the Chinese are becoming masters of indirect influence--by establishing business communities and diplomatic outposts, by negotiating construction and trade agreements. Pulsing with consumer and martial energy, and boasting a peasantry that, unlike others in history, is overwhelmingly literate, China constitutes the principal conventional threat to America's liberal imperium. Andersen Air Force Base, on Guam's northern tip, rep- resents the future of U.S. strategy in the Pacific. It is the most potent platform anywhere in the world for the projection of American military power. Landing there recently in a military aircraft, I beheld long lines of B-52 bombers, C-17 Globemasters, F/A-18 Hornets, and E-2 Hawkeye surveillance planes, among others. Andersen's 10,000-foot runways can handle any plane in the Air Force's arsenal, and could accommodate the space shuttle should it need to make an emergency landing. The sprawl of runways and taxiways is so vast that when I arrived, I barely noticed a carrier air wing from the USS Kitty Hawk, which was making live practice bombing runs that it could not make from its home port in Japan. I saw a truck filled with cruise missiles on one of the runways. No other Air Force base in the Pacific stores as much weaponry as Andersen: some 100,000 bombs and missiles at any one time. Andersen also stores 66 million gallons of jet fuel, making it the Air Force's biggest strategic gas-and-go in the world. Guam, which is also home to a submarine squadron and an expanding naval base, is significant because of its location. From the island an Air Force equivalent of a Marine or Army division can cover almost all of PACOM's area of responsibility. Flying to North Korea from the West Coast of the United States takes thirteen hours; from Guam it takes four. "This is not like Okinawa," Major General Dennis Larsen, the Air Force commander there at the time of my visit, told me. "This is American soil in the midst of the Pacific. Guam is a U.S. territory." The United States can do anything it wants here, and make huge investments without fear of being thrown out. Indeed, what struck me about Andersen was how great the space was for expansion to the south and west of the current perimeters. Hundreds of millions of dollars of construction funds were being allocated. This little island, close to China, has the potential to become the hub in the wheel of a new, worldwide constellation of bases that will move the locus of U.S. power from Europe to Asia. In the event of a conflict with Taiwan, if we had a carrier battle group at Guam we would force the Chinese either to attack it in port--thereby launching an assault on sovereign U.S. territory, and instantly becoming the aggressor in the eyes of the world--or to let it sail, in which case the carrier group could arrive off the coast of Taiwan only two days later. SDI 2010 73 2AC Afghanistan RRSe 2AC Guam DA Impact Turn This solves extinction. Straits Times (Singapore), 2000 ("Regional Fallout: No one gains in war over Taiwan," June 25th, Available Online via Lexis-Nexis) The high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -- horror of horrors -- raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -- truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation. There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else. SDI 2010 74 2AC Afghanistan RRSe IAR Guam DA Regional Stability Presence in Guam solves for regional stability Agnote, '10, Military analyst, "Makeover to Turn Guam into Key US Fortress, DA: 7/23/10, http://www.commondreams.org/headline/2010/01/12 The "overarching purpose" of beefing up Guam as a military fortress is "to provide mutual defense, deter aggression and dissuade coercion in the Western Pacific region, according to a draft impact report recently released by the U.S. Defense Department. The buildup will allow U.S. forces to respond to regional threats and crises in a "flexible" and "timely manner" as they work to "defend U.S., Japan and allied interests," the study says. "Moving these forces to Guam would place them on the furthest forward element of sovereign U.S. territory in the Pacific, thereby maximizing their freedom of action." Guam base is key to Asian stability Shirley Kan, Congressional Research Service Asian Security Affairs, and Larry Niksch, CRS Asian Affairs Specialist, 1/7/2010, "Guam: US Defense Deployments," www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22570.pdf, da: 7/15 Another rationale is the expansion of options that Guam offers to the evolving U.S. force structure. As Commander of PACOM, Admiral William Fallon expressed his vision for Guam as a staging area from which ships, aircraft, and troops can "surge" to the Asian theater. He stressed "flexibility," saying "we need to have forces ready to react," and we must have built-in flexibility" to meet emergencies (including disaster relief).9 In 2004, the Navy held "Summer Pulse 04," its first exercise to increase readiness to "surge" operations in response to a crisis or emergency. In June 2006, PACOM held the "Valiant Shield" exercise that brought three aircraft carriers to waters off Guam. A third rationale is the need to counter what commanders call the "tyranny of distance." PACOM, headquartered in Honolulu, has an area of responsibility that encompasses almost 60% of the world's population, over 50% of the earth's surface, the Pacific and Indian Oceans, 16 time zones, and five of seven U.S. defense treaties. U.S. forces on Guam are much closer to East Asia, where the United States has alliances with Australia, Japan, South Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines. The United States also has concerns in Asia about threats to peace and stability in the East China Sea, South China Sea and over terrorist threats in Southeast Asia, humanitarian crises, and security for sea lines of communication (SLOCs), particularly through the Straits of Malacca. Combat aircraft on Guam can reach Taiwan, Japan, Philippines, or the Korean peninsula in two to five hours.10 Moreover, Table 1 presents the shorter sailing distance and time from Guam to Manila in East Asia, compared to that from Honolulu, Seattle, and San Diego. SDI 2010 75 2AC Afghanistan RRSe ***COUNTERPLANS*** Conditionality Bad Conditionality is a reason to reject the negative team: It prevents responsible and coherent negation, justifying contradictions allows them to shift out of our offense, crushes aff ground and time, forces judge intervention and destroys quality of policy comparison by creating multiple worlds isn't reciprocal, is infinitely regressive, forces us to contradict ourselves and is not real world and therefore unpredictable. SDI 2010 76 2AC Afghanistan RRSe 2AC Consult Pakistan Perm- Do both Perm- Do the CP Perm- Consult Pakistan over whether the U.S. initiate a phased withdrawal from Afghanistan and do the plan regardless. Double Bind: either the perm solves because they say yes or they say "No" and the CP solves zero percent of the case. Pakistan will say No Simon and Stevenson, Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and Professor of Strategic Studies at the US Naval War College, 2009 "Afghanistan: How Much is Enough?", Survival, 51: 5, 47 -- 67 Accessed via University of Kansas June 24, 2010 It was clear even before the 11 September attacks that among Islamist groups, al-Qaeda posed the most dangerous strategic threat to the United States. Thus, after 11 September, the American priority was to unseat a regime the Taliban that was providing sanctuary and operational support to al-Qaeda, in order to prevent further attacks. Afghanistan was therefore the prime target. US officials knew that Pakistan had discreetly supported the Taliban for reasons largely unrelated to al-Qaeda's anti-Western and antiAmerican designs, and Washington's objective vis-a-vis Pakistan , subsidiary to that of eliminating Afghanistan as al-Qaeda's sanctuary and the Taliban as its patron, was to enlist Pakistan in ensuring the incapacity of al-Qaeda once coalition forces had succeeded in dislodging it. For a variety of familiar and well-documented reasons American military commanders' tactical misjudgments at Tora Bora, the intensity of Pashtuns' cross- border kinship, Pakistan's regional strategic interest in maintaining a degree of instability in Afghanistan, and Islamist influences in Pakistan's Inter- Services Intelligence directorate this effort to harness Pakistan as a robust counter-terrorism partner has not succeeded. Thus, eight years after the 11September attacks, the core al-Qaeda infrastructure has re-materialised in Pakistan. Relations high now--US aid LaFranchi 3/25/10 (Howard, staff writer for The Christian Science Monitor, widely accepted as an unbiased account for international news, US will expedite aid to Pakistan to fight Taliban and Al Qaeda; The relationship has often been stormy. But the US likes the way Pakistan is fighting Taliban extremists and Al Qaeda and is willing to speed along military aid. Help with nuclear power is another matter, lexis, DA: 7/22/10, MM) Improving US-Pakistan relations have been on display in Washington this week in a high-level strategic dialogue culminating in two mutually beneficial commitments: more American money in exchange for increased Pakistani dedication to fighting the Taliban and Al Qaeda. In talks headed by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton on the US side and Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi for the Pakistani delegation, the US agreed to accelerate the disbursement of about $2 billion in military payments to compensate Pakistan for its military operations against extremists in the regions bordering Afghanistan. In public remarks Wednesday, Minister Qureshi acknowledged he was a "happy man" after hearing reassurances of the US commitment to his country. He said Pakistan's resolve to defeat the forces of extremism it faces remains "undiminished" despite the losses its forces have suffered after more than a year of stepped-up military operations. "It is a matter of standing up for your principles and facing the consequences that come in its wake," he added. Past relationship was rockyThe US and Pakistan have had high-level discussions before over the course of an often stormy and mistrustful relationship. But the Obama administration wanted the two days of talks - which included congressional receptions and diplomatic soirees - to underscore that a page has been turned. One of the clearest signs of what Secretary Clinton called a "new day" in US-Pakistan relations was last year's passage of a $7.5 billion civilian development program to address Pakistan's education, infrastructure, water, energy, and other needs over the next five years. SDI 2010 77 2AC Afghanistan RRSe 2AC Consult Pakistan Zero solvency--their say yes cards are referring to drone strikes--Pakistan will think these will increase if troops withdrawal proves they would say no. Consult CPs are cheating they should lose1. Unpredictable and Infinitely regressive- there is an infinite number of actors to consult, the negative could change which country you want to consult at every tournament but the affirmative needs to be prepared for all 187 countries, it makes the literature base is unpredictable because we cant research specific turns. 2. It steals the entire aff- We can't leverage our plan against it because they do the whole thing, it's a hyper-PIC including 100% of the plan text. Moots the IAC, and forces us to debate ourselves. SDI 2010 78 2AC Afghanistan RRSe 2AC Silk Road CP 1. Perm do both 2. Perm do the CP then the plan 3. This CP has huge Solvency Deficits: A. SCO - They can't access any of our internal links into SCO, our Prashad 09 and Katz 09 evidence are all based off troop withdrawal. They can't solve for Baltic or Arctic relations, - that's Lin 09 and Rozoff 09 or provide the smooth transition needed between Hegemony and multipolarity needed to prevent extinction that's Albright '10. B. Iran they can't solve for US-Iran relations our internal links are based off troop withdrawal that's Farnik 09 C. Hegemony they don't solve for troop reserves that's Friedman '10 and they can't access our internal link into the economy that's Johnson 09 SDI 2010 79 2AC Afghanistan RRSe 2AC Silk Road CP 4. The CP can't solve for the root cause of instability Withdrawal now solves instability in the region and precludes the reemergence of al Qaeda Bandow, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, 2010 Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute. A former special assistant to president Ronald Reagan, he is the author of several books, including Foreign Follies: America's New Global Empire (Xulon). He is also a fellow with the American Conservative Defense Alliance. The Australian, Afghan War Has Stopped Making Sense, January 6, 2010 By pursuing the intervention, Obama is repeating the mistake he accused Bush of making in the context of Iraq Washington is full of ivory-tower warriors who have never been anywhere near a military base WITH al-Qa'ida dispersed, Afghanistan, though a human tragedy, doesn't matter much to the US or its allies. Rather than allow the Afghan mission to slide into nation-building, the Obama administration should begin withdrawing US forces from Afghanistan. Afghanistan originally looked like the good war. Consolidating power in a reasonably democratic government in Kabul was never going to be easy, but the Bush administration tossed away the best chance of doing so by prematurely shifting military units to Iraq. The Obama administration now is attempting the geopolitical equivalent of shutting the barn doors after the horses have fled. The situation is a mess. The Karzai government is illegitimate, corrupt and incompetent. Taliban forces and attacks are increasing. Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, admits that Afghanistan is ``deteriorating''. Yet Barack Obama is sending an additional 30,000 American troops. He argued that ``our overarching goal remains the same: to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qa'ida'' and refused to ``set goals that go beyond our responsibility, our means or our interests''. Yet the President appears to have done precisely the latter. Even after the build-up, the US and its allies will have only a few thousand more personnel than the Soviet Union did during its failed occupation. And Western forces will be barely one-fifth the numbers contemplated by US anti-insurgency doctrine. Given its forbidding terrain and independent culture, it is easy to understand why Afghanistan acquired a reputation as the graveyard of empires. Kabul has had periods of peaceful, stable rule, but by indigenous figures who respected local autonomy, as under the 20th-century monarchy. The only sensible argument for staying is, as Obama put it, ``to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qa'ida''. But that already has been done. Al-Qa'ida has been reduced largely to symbolic importance, as most terrorist threats now emanate from localised jihadist cells scattered about the globe. US National Security Adviser Jim Jones estimates that there are just 100 al-Qa'ida operatives now in Afghanistan. Even if the Taliban returned to power, it might not welcome back the group whose activities triggered American intervention. Nor would al-Qa'ida necessarily want to come back, since a Taliban government could not shield terrorists from Western retaliation. Pakistan offers a better refuge, and there are plenty of other failed states -- Yemen comes to mind -in which terrorists could locate. Far more important than Afghanistan is nuclear-armed Pakistan. However, continued fighting in the former is more likely to destabilise the latter than increased Taliban influence. SDI 2010 80 2AC Afghanistan RRSe 2AC Silk Road CP 5. Foreign fighters undermine Afghan efforts at defeating the insurgency that would otherwise be successful Nelson and Farmer, director of journalism program at Point Loma Nazarene University and Telegraph correspondent in Kabul, 2009 Dean Nelson founder and director of the journalism program at Point Loma Nazarene University in San Diego. Ben Farmer is a Daily Telegraph correspondent in Kabul The Daily Telegraph (London) 'We beat them before, by letting Afghans do the job' November 13, 2009 l/n GEN Abdul Rashid Dostum, the controversial former Afghan warlord, has warned Washington that sending more US troops to Afghanistan will simply hamper its war against the Taliban insurgency. Only an Afghan-led solution can bring victory, he believes. His comments in an interview with The Daily Telegraph were made as the American ambassador to Kabul, Gen Karl Eikenberry, warned President Obama not to send thousands more US soldiers to shore up President Hamid Karzai's regime. Gen Dostum, an ethnic Uzbek, was a central military leader in the Northern Alliance which drove the Taliban from Kabul in 2001 with support from US special forces. He believes success then was based on Afghan-led troops fighting for the future of their own families. Today, he said, the number of senior Afghan military casualties was negligible because US and Nato commanders were calling the shots. "The Afghan military failure is a question of commitment and morale: the more foreign money and troops the less Afghans see this war as theirs,'' he said. "In the past six years, I have not heard of one Afghan officer of captain or major rank killed in battle. "During this same period hundreds of Americans and other Nato soldiers have been killed. This is a major embarrassment for the Afghan government and its people. He said the current Afghan military leadership had become far too dependent on following Western forces, put ting US and Nato personnel at greater risk. Gen Dostum remains influential in Afghanistan - his support helped President Karzai's re-election earlier this month - despite allegations of human rights abuses SDI 2010 81 2AC Afghanistan RRSe 6. Withdrawal is a prerequisite to stability Leaver, policy outreach director for the Foreign Policy In Focus project at the Institute for Policy Studies, 2009 Yes Magazine: "How to Exit Afghanistan: Five pillars of an exit strategy for Afghanistan," http://www.yesmagazine.org/peace-justice/how-to-exit-afghanistan, October 1, 2009 A Plan to Avoid the Graveyard of Empires Afghanistan has often been called the "Graveyard of Empires." The reference applies to a much different time in history, but with no promising options on the table for ending the war, we need to make sure it doesn't become applicable once again. Create an Exit Strategy. General McChrystal's plan offers no timetable or exit strategy, beyond warning that the next 12-18 months are critical--a timeframe that New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman bandied about so freely in Iraq that guesstimates like McChrystal's became known as "Friedman Units"--they imply an interminable series of indefinite extensions. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has rejected outright a timetable for withdrawal. But with NATO partners, Britain, France, and Germany calling for a timeline, this option should be examined more closely. The first and most important effect of a timetable would be to disarm the Taliban's argument that the "occupiers" will never leave. It promises that at some point the war in Afghanistan will end with a negotiated peace treaty. Figuring out what that treaty should say and constructing a timetable to meet those conditions should be the next step in Afghanistan. Given the Karzai government's lack of legitimacy and the relative political strength of the Taliban, negotiations must include a wide range of Afghans. Key principles for a treaty should include: Deny Al-Qaeda Safe Haven. Most analysts would argue that keeping Afghanistan (and other countries across the globe) free from al-Qaeda and other terrorist networks should be a primary objective for global security. But the manner in which this can be achieved is under fierce debate. Occupation and invasion should be off the table. Instead, under the provisions of Chapter VII of the UN charter, nation states have the right to adequately protect themselves from imminent attack. One primary example of this was the capture of Khaled Sheikh Mohamed, who was not nabbed in a military raid but by a coordinated police action. This approach should be coupled with an international effort to track and capture members of terrorist networks. Too much of the debate has focused on who rules Afghanistan, rather than on our goal of isolating al-Qaeda. The United States shouldn't try to determine who can be in the government, how it is chosen, or how it rules, so long as that government abides by an agreement not to harbor alQaeda, and to work with the international community to enforce that agreement. The Taliban, while its treatment of women and harsh rule are reprehensible, is not itself a threat to the United States. Commit to Development. Afghanistan is one of the most underdeveloped nations in the world. Funding for development has been far below needed levels. The country urgently needs basic infrastructure. Without roads, access to markets, better agricultural inputs, or available credit, local businesses can't start up or thrive. Such levels of commerce are needed to help combat the lucrative drug trade and raise the population out of poverty. With few natural resources and a government highly dependent on international contributions, dedicated funding from the international community is needed. However, aid provided so far has not been successful. Too many projects are planned, designed, and implemented with far too little involvement from Afghans. Failure to learn from the successes of development projects that work hand-in-hand with the local population--such as the one described in Greg Mortenson's book, Three Cups of Tea--has doomed many of these projects. Aid should go directly to Afghan-led organizations, coupled with strong auditing by international agencies. Withdraw all Combat Troops. Foreign troops on the ground (and drone attacks from the air) have been the most important tool for recruiting in terrorist networks. A commitment to withdrawing all combat troops will help deflate the recruitment for these groups. If the Afghan National Army is to replace them and contribute to the security of Afghanistan, it will require human rights training and a central government by which it can be held accountable. Further training must be refocused and fall under a common set of guidelines, including oversight under the Leahy Law that suspends training funding for any groups involved in human rights abuses. Separate Pakistan from Afghanistan. No essay on Afghanistan these days seems to omit the problems arising in Pakistan. It is wrong to see the distinct challenges facing these two countries as one struggle; the U.S. history in Pakistan requires a far different approach. The United States must address directly with Pakistan the growing threat of al-Qaeda and the Taliban in that country. Clearly there are other steps to be taken, but these are the most important and should be the starting point for negotiations. As much as the citizens of United States and the world want President Obama to succeed in fixing Afghanistan, the policies that are under discussion are most likely to put us one more "Friedman Unit" away from a resolution. With more civilians and soldiers bound to perish during that time, it's time for a fundamentally different approach--one that can greatly diminish the greatest threats to the United States and at the same time, start Afghanistan on the road to recovery. SDI 2010 82 2AC Afghanistan RRSe 2AC Silk Road CP 7. Troops cost the hearts and minds of Afghanistan people - solves long-term stability The Nation 2009 The Nation: Don't Escalate in Afghanistan, The Editors, February 4, 2009 http://www.thenation.com/article/dont-escalate-afghanistan There's no denying that the situation has deteriorated over the past few years; the Taliban now threaten to take over large parts of Afghanistan. But more US forces will not bring stability. We are losing the war not because we have had too few troops but because our presence has turned the Afghan people against us, swelling the ranks of the Taliban. Any good will the US military once enjoyed has long since been destroyed by airstrikes that have killed civilians. Human Rights Watch reports that at least 321 Afghan civilians died in NATO or US air raids in 2007. According to the UN, many more were killed the following year. Sending more troops will not win back the hearts and minds of their loved ones. The conspicuous corruption of the Karzai government has also taken a toll. The United States is now viewed as propping up an unpopular regime that New York Times reporter Dexter Filkins describes as seeming "to exist for little more than the enrichment of those who run it," and "contributing to the collapse of public confidence...and to the resurgence of the Taliban." 8. If Karzai is the net-benefit, and if they read the Starr card the CP links to Karzai the card doesn't site Karzai, only Afghani leaders. SDI 2010 83 2AC Afghanistan RRSe 2AC Rules of Engagement CP The Counterplan has major solvency deficits: [ ] Pakistan -The Counterplan can't solve for our Pakistan advantage because solving for anti-American sentiments does not resolve the fact that presence pushes militants into the FATA and risks a coup and India preemptive strike that's Kristoff [ ] SCO Advantage -- The counterplan doesn't solve our SCO advantage because only withdrawal forces negotiation that's Prashad [ ] Hegemony The Counterplan can't solve doesn't increase strategic reserves, save money, or stop mission failure. It leaves troops in Afghanistan that's Friedman, Engelhardt, and Johnson [ ] Iran The Counterplan can't solve Iran US physical presence is the primary point of contention that's Farnick and Leverett CP Fails -- Efforts to limit civilian casualties fail Innocent'08 (Malou,- foreign policy analyst at the Cato Institute "Afghanistan: The Deadliest Month and It's Time to Get Out" http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=10369) Recently, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, who commanded special operations forces in Iraq and this month became the commander of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, said he wants to avoid more civilian deaths. Concern over civilian casualties makes sense in counterinsurgency, since the local population is the strategic center of gravity. I'll concede that the infusion of 21,000 more troops by the end of this year -- which Obama approved within his first 100 days in office -- may lead to a reduction in violence in the medium-term. But the elephant in the Pentagon is that the intractable cross-border insurgency will likely outlive the presence of international troops. Honestly, Afghanistan is not a winnable war by any stretch of the imagination.Regardless, some analysts, like former national security advisor Henry Kissinger, Council on Foreign Relations scholar Stephen Biddle, and many others, argue that America must not withdraw from Afghanistan, because doing so would boost jihadism globally and make America look weak. But if leaving would make America look weak, trying to stay indefinitely while accomplishing little would appear even worse.Take, for example, current operations to fight the Taliban, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the Haqqani network, and other jihadist groups in Afghanistan. Despite the best efforts of the U.S. military to avoid harming innocents, the sheer magnitude of air strikes means that civilian casualties are inevitable. Thus, the argument that U.S. forces must remain in Afghanistan (apparently indefinitely) to protect America's reputation is dubious, because prolonging combat operations will kill even more civilians and reinforce the narrative that militants are fighting against foreign occupiers.Sadly, the longer we stay in Afghanistan and the more money we spend, the more we'll feel compelled to remain in the country to validate the investment. A similar self-imposed predicament plagued U.S. officials during the war in Vietnam. Oddly enough, when opinion leaders in Washington talk about "lessons learned" from Vietnam and other conflicts, they typically draw the wrong lesson: not that America should avoid intervening in someone else's domestic dispute, but that America should never give up after having intervened, no matter what the cost. Driven by that misguided analysis, the United States risks repeating the same mistake in Afghanistan.Perhaps most troubling about the reflexive "stay the course" mentality of some Americans is the widespread insensitivity about the thousands of people -- civilian and military, domestic and foreign -- killed, maimed, and traumatized in war. But history shows that,sooner or later, disenchantment will manifest in public and congressional attitudes. After nearly a decade in Afghanistan, even the memory of 9/11 might not be sufficient to outweigh the sacrifice in blood and treasure. Perm: Do Both SDI 2010 84 2AC Afghanistan RRSe 2AC Rules of Engagement CP CP Links to Politics The costs of looking militarily weak on terrorism outweigh the political benefits of reducing civilian casualties Kolhatkar `04 [Sonali, Co-Director of Afghan Women's Mission, "What Are You Doing About Afghanistan," http://www.zmag.org/sustainers/content/2004-04/13kolhatkar.cfm] At the recent high-profile 9-11 Commission hearings Democrats and Republicans played the contest of "who was tougher on terrorism." Unfortunately, this amounted to proving who was capable of invading Afghanistan the earliest. No mention was made of the devastating effects of the U.S. bombing which resulted in the deaths of many more innocent Afghans than innocent Americans on 9-11 (bombs are still dropping and killing civilians). No mention was made of the use of internationally condemned cluster bombs whose legacy is itself terrorist. But most importantly, no mention was made of the U.S.'s own role in creating conditions for terrorism in Afghanistan over two decades ago, for which the Afghan people have been paying dearly. Congress opposes restrictions on military strategy designed to limit civilian deaths despite international pressure wants the military strategy to stay the course BBC `07 ["Paper blames international community for Afghanistan's current crisis," July 2, ln] Over the last month, civilian killings caused most probably by the American forces have increased in an unprecedented manner and our helpless people lost their lives in air strikes by these foreign forces. This issue is shocking to the extent that it worries UN officials and the international community as well as Afghan officials and people. Earlier, even Ban Ki-moon expressed concern over the rising civilian casualties in Afghanistan and called for coordination and more attention to ordinary people. Despite all these, and at a time when the foreign, American military forces are under mounting international pressure from the international community and the people and government of Afghanistan to be more precise and to improve coordination in military operations, no practical change has taken place and the killing of civilians continues. Meanwhile, instead of correcting their mistakes, NATO and American officials say their military strategy does not require any change and that they will continue their air assaults. The public hates the plan's restriction on military strategy Business Wire `07 ["Remarks by the Vice President to the Members of Veterans of Foreign Wars," Dec 7, ln] America is a country that keeps faith with the people of our military -- first when they wear the uniform, and then when they wear the proud title of veteran. Occasionally the political world needs to be reminded of its obligations to the military and to the veterans, and no one is better suited for that job than the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States. I have great admiration for this organization, for your tradition of advocacy, and the example of patriotism and service that VFW members provide for your fellow Americans. I'm pleased to be in your company today, and I bring respect and good wishes from the President of the United States, George W. Bush. (Applause.) [Continues...] Second, it is not the business of the United States Congress to micromanage military strategy. We simply cannot afford a situation in which the Commander-in-Chief sends in forces with a clear mission, and then Congress steps in to tie the hands of our commanders on the field. Third, Congress is making a partisan struggle out of an issue that should be nonpartisan. I don't believe the people of the nation want Congress to use defense appropriations as a bargaining chip in some kind of political debate. (Applause.) The men and women of the Armed Forces are not serving as Republicans, they're not serving as Democrats. They're serving as Americans who love their country and who have volunteered to defend it. Their care and protection should be a bipartisan national priority, not a means for anyone to score political points. SDI 2010 85 2AC Afghanistan RRSe 2AC Overstretch CP Perm- do both. Double Solvency outweighs risk of net benefit. Massive Solvency Deficits: [ ]Pakistan presence pushes militants across the border that's Fuller and Kristoff. Recruiting more forces means that our impacts escalate faster. [ ]Hegemony Presence in Afghanistan tarnish US credibility and costs more than any other conflict that's Johnson [ ] Iran--Iran perceives presence as encirclement it's the primary point of contention that's Farnik and Leveret [ ] SCO--US presence discourages SCO involvement that's Prashad CP Links to politics -- budget pressures mean increased incentives for military spur congressional opposition Navy Times, '09 (1/5, lexis) A decade of enhancements in military pay and benefits could come to an end in 2009. As a sagging national economy cuts U.S. tax revenues - and indirectly leads more people to consider joining the military as fewer people rush to get out - big benefits increases are a tougher sell in Congress. That could include what has become an eight-year tradition of setting the annual military pay raise ahead of private-sector wage growth. Budget-cutting efforts also lead lawmakers to take another look at some long-discussed proposals, like raising out-of-pocket costs for Tricare users, cutting taxpayer subsidies for commissaries, and consolidating commissaries with military exchanges. Cont... Congress may well settle for military raises that keep pace, but do not top, private-sector wage growth . Increased recruiting incentives causes political wrangling and budget fears Marine Corp Times, '07 (2/5, lexis) Justifying the need for more Marines comes with a hefty price tag. The additional troops will add about $2.5 billion a year to the Corps' budget, said Bob Work, a defense analyst for the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments."That's pretty substantial for a Marine Corps budget that's normally around $16 billion to $18 billion," he said. The buildup of people would cut the number of back-to-back rotations. Cont...The outcome with appropriators boils down to the overall political picture, Donnelly said, explaining that in addition to Iraq, political wrangling between parties, and Congress' overall plan to trim budgets, will also play a role . SDI 2010 86 2AC Afghanistan RRSe 2AC Overstretch CP Massive US troop presence in Afghanistan tanks US credibility. Paul G. Frost Spring '03 (http://www12.georgetown.edu/sfs/isd/military.pdf) A number of participants argued that expanded military presence in the Muslim world has a number of downsides for the U.S. First, several members argued that by occupying Iraq, we have taken a step down a "slippery slope" of empire, while lacking the human and political capital to sustain or even complete what we have begun in Iraq and Afghanistan. One member commented that the U.S. is acting like an "angry giant" and predicted that at some point global sentiment toward the U.S. will turn from fear and respect to resentment, dissipating our ability to influence and inspire throughout the globe. Another member countered that while the U.S. does not seek empire, it does seek the ability to confront and deal with threats wherever they appear,which is a reason for devising ways to send troops to faraway places without necessarily being stationed there permanently. Second, some members argued that the current approach is too heavily geared toward an unending, worldwide war against terror in which we will never be completel successful. Yet threats and problems other than terrorism remain. Prior to September 11, the administration was focused on China as an emerging threat.Worrisome trends of failing states in Africa and Latin America continue to multiply.However, we seem fixated on preparing for possible smaller wars in the "arc of instability" that runs from the Andean region in the Southern Hemisphere through North Africa to the Middle East and into Southeast Asia. As a result, our course could be in a state of continuous flux, driven by events as viewed through the single lens of countering terrorism. Their Hagenback evidence doesn't assume the SQ in Afghanistan, it's from 2006. Dating is critical because old evidence decreases in round education and fairness. SDI 2010 87 2AC Afghanistan RRSe 2AC Pakistan CP Perm- do both Massive Solvency Deficits: [ ]Hegemony Presence in Afghanistan tarnish US credibility and costs more than any other conflict that's Johnson [ ] Iran--Iran perceives presence as encirclement it's the primary point of contention that's Farnik and Leveret [ ] SCO--US presence discourages SCO involvement that's Prashad Doesn't solve Pakistan Advantage Foreign aid can't solve for the economy. Their internal link is empirically denied. 1AC Kristof and Fuller say US presence is the vital internal link, it furthers Pashtun extremism. Economics won't deter Pashtun militants. INC Stewart evidence is not solvency for the CP--it describes the CP's mechanism doesn't provide warrants as to how the CP stabilizes Pakistan or improves the economy. SDI 2010 88 2AC Afghanistan RRSe 2AC Pakistan CP CP is massively unpopular--global poverty act proves Open Congress 2008 ("5 Unpopular Bills That Will Be Back In The Next Session of Congress http://www.opencongress.org/articles/view/786-5-Unpopular-Bills-That-Will-be-Back-in-the-Next-Session-ofCongress DA: 7-23-10) Barack Obama's Global Poverty Act of 2007 is by far the most unpopular bill on OpenCongress. It has more than twice as many "nay" votes as than the next most unpopular bill. It also has a lot of "aye" votes, though I think a lot of that support came as a reaction to all the negative attention it has received. During the presidential campaign, Republicans referred to this bill more than any other to back up their argument that Obama is a big-spending Democrat. It's big thrust into the spotlight happened this summer when it was lambasted in a widespread Republican National Committee fundraising campaign entitled, "Good for America or Good for Obama?" Here's an excerpt: >It seems the Democrats' would-be president of the United States of America really believes that the rest of the world's problems, and approval, trump the interests of Americans when it comes to how we live our lives and where our money is spent. >[...] >A bill he has sponsored in the U.S. Senate, the so-called Global Poverty Act (S. 2433), would raise the amount of American tax dollars allocated to United Nations' redistribution efforts to $845 billion. > >That's $2,500 from every American taxpayer, when many in our country already are struggling to make ends meet. That $845 billion figure comes from a U.N. recommendation that developed countries should spend 0.7 percent of their GDP every year to in order to achieve the Millenium Development Goals, and it has stuck to the bill ever since. Nothing in the bill, however, would actually commit U.S. to any increased spending anywhere near that amount. In fact, the Congressional Budget Office, the nonpartisan agency in charge of attaching budget numbers to bills in Congress, found that the Global Poverty Act "would cost less than $1 million per year." There is one line in the bill, however, that could possibly lead to increased foreign aid spending. It directs the global poverty reduction strategy to make available "additional overall United States assistance levels as appropriate." The case could be made that President-elect Obama will use this part of the bill, if passed by Congress, to drastically increase foreign aid. But the bill is clearly focused on finding ways the U.S. can help reduce global poverty without actually spending more money, like improving the effectiveness of development assistance, coordinating our efforts with other countries, mobilizing businesses, NGOs, civil society, and public-private partnerships to help with the effort, and integrating principles of sustainable development. Aid is controversial Financial Gazette, 2002, reported by Africa News The United States has said it would like to increase the amount of funds from IDA through grants instead of loans. Europe has given the idea a frosty reception and even developing countries now seem against it. On Friday the G24 group of developing countries said it was not in the long-term interest of low income countries because it threatens the future of the fund altogether. IDA is financed by repayments from loans, so critics argue that giving the money out would chip away at the cash pool. This might be the case particularly if countries like the United States, which traditionally have difficulties getting foreign aid budgets approved by Congress, cannot come up with new funding pledges in the future. Aid is controversial Bangor Daily News, 2002 This possibility should especially interest Congress, which has been loath to expand the U.S. foreign aid budget and reluctant to get involved even when clear catastrophes were occurring in places such as Bosnia. The Sept. 11 attacks show that an isolationist stance is impossible, but there is a difference between a military response to a terrible attack and an invasion to kill a long-standing enemy. Exactly how that difference shapes policy is a fitting subject for congressional debate. SDI 2010 89 2AC Afghanistan RRSe 2AC SCO CP Perm do both; no competition Our Prashad evidence says that US withdrawal is a prerequisite to NATO/SCO and regional cooperation. Massive solvency deficit: [ ]Pakistan presence pushes militants across the border that's Fuller and Kristoff. Recruiting more forces means that our impacts escalate faster. [ ]Hegemony Presence in Afghanistan tarnish US credibility and costs more than any other conflict that's Johnson [ ] Iran--Iran perceives presence as encirclement it's the primary point of contention that's Farnik and Leveret Links to Karzai- SCO and NATO have been critical of Karzai an increased role for the SCO will undermine his credibility The SCO will not agree to effort suspicious of NATO Marcel de Haas is a senior researcher at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, 2009 http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2009/01/sco_central_asias_waking_giant.html Accessed 7.20.10 Perhaps inevitably, the SCO and Russia and China as its leading members regards Nato's increased presence in the region with some distrust. As long as Nato remains reluctant to enter into a dialogue with the SCO, such a cautious attitude looks set to linger, and may even intensify. Consideration also needs to be given, therefore, to the establishment of a Nato-China Council, along the lines of the Nato-Russia Council, and to the creation of arrangements that would facilitate greater cooperation with the SCO as a whole. Such cooperation would not bridge the main differences between SCO members and the west over issues like democratisation and human rights. Cooperation would also need to comprise much more than mere joint policy development, and should involve the practical pursuit of mutually beneficial, smaller-scale ad hoc projects. Nato and the SCO could work together on neutralising anti-personnel mines in Afghanistan, as well as other possible types of confidence-building measures, such as joint police training and counter-narcotics operations. Presence precludes solvency only withdrawal solves opium production Manfredi, specialist on Afghanistan insurgencies and advisor to the Belgian foreign affairs committee on Middle East policy, 2009 Federico Manfredi is a specialist on insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan. He was an advisor to the Belgian foreign affairs committee on policy in the Middle East and Central Asia. World Policy Journal, "Rethinking U.S. Policy in Afghanistan" Winter 2008/2009 Opium, the root source of heroin, of course, is another critical issue. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Afghanistan currently produces over 90 percent of the world's opium. While the Taliban certainly use their share of the revenues to finance the insurgency, everybody in Afghanistan seems to be living off the booming opium economy in one way or another. In 2008, for instance, opium cultivation alone employed some 2.4 million Afghans (10 percent of the total population). Government officials at the highest levels are also heavily involved in the drug trade. Among these notorious characters is allegedly Ahmed Wali Karzai, the president's younger brother. However, to date, not a single high-ranking government official has been prosecuted for drug-related corruption. It is worth remembering that, in early 2001, the Taliban regime had banned opium cultivation on the grounds that Islam prohibits all drugs. Within a few months, the Taliban had virtually wiped out the crop from the whole country. Opium production resumed and skyrocketed only after the Karzai government came to power. Undeniably, the Taliban now support poppy farmers, but this policy is for them an ideological paradox that they can justify only in terms of their struggle against the international coalition. Western governments must acknowledge that the exponential rise in opium production is largely a problem of their own making. So long as the West continues to wage war on the Taliban, opium production in Afghanistan will continue unabated. SDI 2010 90 2AC Afghanistan RRSe 2AC SCO CP The CP links to Politics transferring anti-narcotic efforts to regional authorities receives strong bipartisan opposition Washington Times, 8/14/05 The White House is planning a major shift in the U.S. military's counternarcotics role in Afghanistan, with a leading option involving the first-time use of American troops to attack opium-distribution points. The reassessment comes as both Democrats and Republicans warn that the current policy - which relies on the Afghan government to eradicate the poppy crop as the United States plays a support role - is simply not working. SDI 2010 91 2AC Afghanistan RRSe ***Topicality*** 2AC T Substantial (Some Percentage) 1. We Meet Plan reductes presence by 100% that is what elimination means we will not spike out of any percentage links 2. No ground loss We guarantee core of the topic ground. We will not shift. 3. Abusive interpretation there is zero literature on the percentage of reduction of military presence in Afghanistan. And interpretation is arbitrary there's no consistency in US Code. Jeffrey M. Colon, Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law, Winter 1997, San Diego Law Review, 34 San Diego L. Rev. 1, Lexis Academic n138. I.R.C. 877(e). Neither the statute nor the legislative history indicates how much of a reduction in taxes is necessary in order to constitute a "substantial" reduction. The meaning of "substantial" varies from one Code section to the other. Compare, e.g., I.R.C. 368(a)(1)(C) (West 1988 & Supp. 1996) (acquisition of "substantially all" of acquired company's assets for ruling purposes is 70% of gross assets and 90% of net assets (Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568)) with I.R.C. 1092 (West 1988 & Supp. 1996) ("substantial diminution" of risk of loss). 4. Counter interpretation Substantial means "actually existing" BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 6th Edition, 1990, p.1428 Belonging to substance; actually existing; real. 5. We meet our counter interpretation we reduce actual presence. 6. Prefer our interpretationBright line--it is either real or not Their interpretation requires a subjective determination of the right percentage to require. Exclusivity your definition is one of a million that just says a percentage in the same sentence as the word "substantial" it isn't exclusive or predictable 7. Topicality is not a voter we won't get out of a single disad by claiming our policy just isn't important enough. Ground loss cuts both ways because we would have to jettison solvency to shift out of anything. ...
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