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Unformatted text preview: SDI 2010 1 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0
Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0...................................................................................................................................... 1 ***New Advantages***............................................................................................................................................ 3 IAC Central Asia Advantage ................................................................................................................................. 3 IAC Central Asia Advantage ................................................................................................................................. 4 IAC Central Asia Advantage ................................................................................................................................. 5 Central Asia Advantage Afghan Stability Key........................................................................................................ 6 Central Asia Advantage Stability k/t Moderates...................................................................................................... 7 Central Asia Advantage Impact ............................................................................................................................. 8 Central Asia Advantage Impact ............................................................................................................................. 9 SCO 1AC................................................................................................................................................................ 10 SCO 1AC................................................................................................................................................................ 11 SCO 1AC................................................................................................................................................................ 12 SCO 1AC................................................................................................................................................................ 13 SCO 1AC................................................................................................................................................................ 14 SCO 1AC................................................................................................................................................................ 15 SCO 1AC................................................................................................................................................................ 16 SCO 1AC................................................................................................................................................................ 17 SCO 1AC................................................................................................................................................................ 18 SCO 1AC................................................................................................................................................................ 19 SCO 1AC................................................................................................................................................................ 20 SCO 1AC................................................................................................................................................................ 21 Iran 1AC................................................................................................................................................................. 22 Iran 1AC................................................................................................................................................................. 23 Iran 1AC................................................................................................................................................................. 24 Iran 1AC................................................................................................................................................................. 26 Iran 1AC................................................................................................................................................................. 27 Iran 1AC................................................................................................................................................................. 28 Iran 1AC................................................................................................................................................................. 29 ***Inherency Extensions***................................................................................................................................... 31 Failure Inevitable.................................................................................................................................................... 31 Failure Inevitable ................................................................................................................................................... 32 Withdrawal Inevitable............................................................................................................................................. 33 AT: 2011 Deadline Firm.......................................................................................................................................... 34 AT: 2011 Deadline Firm ......................................................................................................................................... 35 AT: 2011 Deadline Firm ......................................................................................................................................... 36 AT: 2011 Deadline Firm ......................................................................................................................................... 37 AT: 2011 Deadline Firm ......................................................................................................................................... 39 ***Pakistan Advantage Extensions***.................................................................................................................... 40 Pakistan Advantage Troops Destabilize................................................................................................................ 40 Pakistan Advantage Troops Destabilize................................................................................................................ 41 Pakistan Advantage Troops Destabilize................................................................................................................ 42 Pakistan Advantage Troops Destabilize ............................................................................................................... 43 Pakistan Advantage Troops Destabilize ............................................................................................................... 44 Pakistan Advantage Destabilizes Government...................................................................................................... 45 Pakistan Advantage AT Withdrawal Instability Turn............................................................................................ 46 Pakistan Advantage AT Withdrawal Instability Turn ........................................................................................... 47 Pakistan Advantage AT "Smaller presence increases anti-Americanism".............................................................. 48 Pakistan Advantage Instability Proliferation .................................................................................................... 49 Pakistan Advantage Instability Proliferation..................................................................................................... 50 Pakistan Advantage AT "Weapons are safe"......................................................................................................... 51 Pakistan Advantage AT "Alt Causes Instability".................................................................................................. 52 Pakistan Advantage AT "India won't strike"........................................................................................................ 54 Pakistan Advantage Indo-Pak Nuclear War Impacts.............................................................................................. 55 Pakistan Advantage Indo-Pak Nuclear War Impacts............................................................................................. 56 SDI 2010 2 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE Pakistan Advantage Indo-Pak Nuclear War Impacts............................................................................................. 57 Pakistan Advantage Indo-Pak Nuclear War Impacts............................................................................................. 58 Pakistan Advantage Indo-Pak Nuclear War Impacts............................................................................................. 59 Pakistan Advantage Indo-Pak Nuclear War Impacts ............................................................................................ 60 Pakistan Advantage Indo-Pak Nuclear War Impacts............................................................................................. 61 Pakistan Advantage Indo-Pak Nuclear War Impacts.............................................................................................. 62 Pakistan Advantage Coup Impact......................................................................................................................... 63 Pakistan Advantage Coup Proliferation ............................................................................................................ 64 Pakistan Advantage AT "No Coup"...................................................................................................................... 65 Pakistan Advantage AT "No Coup"...................................................................................................................... 66 ***Hegemony Advantage Extensions***................................................................................................................ 67 Hegemony Advantage Afghanistan Overstretch............................................................................................... 68 Hegemony Advantage AT Withdrawal Hurts Heg................................................................................................ 69 Hegemony Advantage AT Withdrawal Hurts Heg................................................................................................ 70 Hegemony Advantage AT Recession/Dollar Low................................................................................................. 71 ***2AC Add-ons***............................................................................................................................................... 72 Japan 2AC............................................................................................................................................................... 72 Japan 2AC............................................................................................................................................................... 73 Turkey 2AC............................................................................................................................................................ 74 Turkey 2AC............................................................................................................................................................ 75 Brazil 2AC.............................................................................................................................................................. 76 Brazil 2AC.............................................................................................................................................................. 77 ***Withdrawal Good/Solvency***......................................................................................................................... 78 Withdrawal Solves Terrorism.................................................................................................................................. 79 Withdrawal Solves Terrorism.................................................................................................................................. 80 Withdrawal Solves Stability.................................................................................................................................... 81 Withdrawal Solves Stability Afghan Forces.......................................................................................................... 82 Withdrawal Solves Stability AT: Troops Key....................................................................................................... 83 Withdrawal Solves Stability AT: Troops Key ...................................................................................................... 84 Withdrawal Solves Stability AT: Taliban Resurgence........................................................................................... 85 AT: Withdrawal Destabilizes Inevitable .............................................................................................................. 86 Troops Fail Taliban ............................................................................................................................................. 87 Troops Fail ANA ................................................................................................................................................. 88 Troops Fail Nation Building.................................................................................................................................. 89 AT: Taliban Victory Bad........................................................................................................................................ 90 AT: NATO Still there.............................................................................................................................................. 91 ***AT Off Case Arguments***.............................................................................................................................. 92 AT: NATO DA Pakistan Stability Solves ............................................................................................................ 93 SDI 2010 3 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE ***New Advantages*** IAC Central Asia Advantage
Increased U.S. engagement in Afghanistan is pushing insurgents into Central Asia destabilizing the region Ditz 2009 Jason Ditz is the managing news editor for Antiwar.com Anti-War.com "NATO Chief: Afghan Surge Could Drive Taliban Into Central Asia;Will Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan Become Next Battlefronts in Terror War?" http://news.antiwar.com/2009/06/24/nato-chief-afghan-surge-coulddrive-taliban-into-central-asia/ June 24, 2009 Commenting on a recent spate of Taliban attacks in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer admitted that it was possible that as the international forces escalate military operations in Afghanistan, the insurgency might move north into Central Asia's former Soviet states. "If people want to cross borders, NATO cannot prevent that. If extremists want to cross borders into Central Asia to continue their horrific work there, NATO cannot possibly stop that," Scheffer conceded. He added that NATO's current mandate doesn't allow it to conduct operations in those nations. Since the 2001 US-led invasion of Afghanistan, the former Taliban government has grown in influence in neighboring nations, particularly Pakistan where the group's presence has led to the founding of several sympathetic groups among the tribesmen along the border. US officials, including Joint Chiefs chairman Admiral Michael Mullen have expressed concern that the massive surge meant to cope with the growing violence in Afghanistan would worsen the situation in Pakistan, where insurgents are already stretching the government to its limit. This is the first time officials have conceded the danger of the surge extends beyond Pakistan, into Afghanistan's northern neighbors. A minimalist policy must be enacted now to avoid the loss of control and stability in Central Asia Simon and Stevenson, Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and Professor of Strategic Studies at the US Naval War College, 2009 "Afghanistan: How Much is Enough?", Survival, 51: 5, 47 -- 67 Accessed via University of Kansas June 24, 2010 The upshot is that only if the United States establishes a well-calibrated limited policy now will it have the political flexibility to sustain it over the longer-term and thereby to effectively contain the jihadist threat in Central Asia. If, on the other hand, the Obama administration promises more than it can deliver in Afghanistan, a reprise of Vietnam may occur: once failure becomes clear, domestic support will evaporate, the administration will be compelled to withdraw precipitously, and the United States will lose considerable traction in the region. SDI 2010 4 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE IAC Central Asia Advantage
Central Asian instability will inevitably draw in major powers Peimani, PhD International Relations, 2002 Dr. Hooman Peimani has a PhD in International Relations with a focus on regional security from Queen's University, Canada. As a researcher/analyst, he specializes in political, economic and military/security issues pertaining to West and South Asia. Failed Transition, Bleak Future: War and Instability in Central Asia and the Caucasus, 142 http://books.google.com/books?id=MlxZjPQ9SFwC&pg=PP1&dq="Failed+Transition,+Bleak+Future: +War+and+Instability+in+Central+Asia+and+the+Caucasus"&hl=en&ei=uO0nTK6EDcO88gbyiL3EDw&sa=X&o i=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CCUQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=The%20impact%20of%20war %20and%20instability%20in%20the%20Caucasus%20or%20Central%20Asia%20will%20not%20be%20confined %20to%20the%20countries%20immediately%20affected.%20Any%20local%20conflict&f=false The impact of war and instability in the Caucasus or Central Asia will not be confined to the countries immediately affected. Any local conflict could escalate and expand to its neighboring countries, only to destabilize its entire respective region. Furthermore, certain countries with stakes in the stability of Central Asia and/or the Caucasus could well be dragged into such a conflict, intentionally or unintentionally. Regardless of the form or extent of their intervention in a future major war, the sheer act of intervention could further escalate the war, increase the human suffering, and plant the seeds for its further escalation. Needless to say, this could only further contribute to the devastation of all parties involved and especially of the "hosting" CA or Caucasian countries. In fact, certain factors could even kindle a military confrontation between and among the five regional and non-regional states with long-term interests in Central Asia and the Caucasus. This scenario could potentially destabilize large parts of Asia and Europe. The geographical location of the two regions as a link between Asia and Europe--shared to different extents by Iran, Turkey, and Russia-- creates a "natural" geographical context for the expansion of any regional war involving those states to other parts of Asia and Europe. Added to this, Iran, China, Turkey, Russia, and the United States all have ties and influence in parts of Asia and Europe. They are also members of regional organizations such as the Economic Cooperation Organization (Iran and Turkey) or military organizations such as NATO (Turkey and the United States). These geographical, political, economic and military ties could help expand any conflict in which they are involved. For all the reasons mentioned, war and instability in the countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia will be bad news for a great number of countries, near or far. It is therefore in the interest of all the potential parties to any future military conflict in the two regions to avoid actions that could instigate it. They should also refrain from acts that could unnecessarily escalate such conflicts should they occur. On the contrary, they should employ all their powers to contain and to end such conflicts. Perhaps more importantly than any of these, they should all contribute to the efforts of the Caucasian and CA countries to revitalize their economics and resolve their disputes with their neighboring states or within their own national boundaries. One should hope that, for the sake of peace and stability, Iran, China, Turkey, Russia, and the United States will find enough incentives to become contributing partners to a process of economic growth and peaceful resolution of conflicts in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Otherwise, there is little doubt that the current pace of events in the two regions is heading toward a period of war and instability, with a devastating result for the exhausted Caucasian and CA countries. This development will contain a great potential for escalation, with severe implications for the security of many other countries in Asia and Europe. SDI 2010 5 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE IAC Central Asia Advantage
This results in nuclear war Ahrari, Prof of National Security @ the Armed Forces Staff College, 2001 M. EHSAN AHRARI has been Professor of National Security and Strategy of the Joint and Combined Warfighting School at the Armed Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia, since 1994. He also served as Associate Dean of the Joint and Combined Warfighting School from 1995-96. From 1990-94 he was Professor of Middle East and Southwest Asian Studies at the U.S. Air War College at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Prior to joining the Department of Defense, Dr. Ahrari taught at universities in Mississippi, North Carolina, New Jersey, and Illinois. He also served as Visiting Presidential Scholar at New York University during the summer of 1979, Visiting Scholar at University of California-Berkeley during the summer of 1984, and Visiting Scholar at the Hoover Institution during the summer of 1992. Dr. Ahrari's areas of specialization include U.S. foreign and defense policy issues related to the Middle East and Central Asia, nuclear proliferation in Southern Asia, and information-based warfare, with a special focus on the Peoples' Republic of China. He is the author of eight books and dozens of articles in professional journals in the United States, United Kingdom, Norway, and, India. Dr. Ahrari has also lectured, in addition to in the United States, in a number of European, Asian and Middle Eastern countries, and at the NATO headquarters in Mons, Belgium. Jihadi Groups, Nuclear Pakistan and the New Great Game, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ssi/jihadi.pdf, August 2001 South and Central Asia constitute a part of the world where a well-designed American strategy might help avoid crises or catastrophe. The U.S. military would provide only one component of such a strategy, and a secondary one at that, but has an important role to play through engagement activities and regional confidencebuilding. Insecurity has led the states of the region to seek weapons of mass destruction, missiles, and conventional arms. It has also led them toward policies which undercut the security of their neighbors. If such activities continue, the result could be increased terrorism, humanitarian disasters, continued lowlevel conflict and potentially even major regional war or a thermonuclear exchange. A shift away from this pattern could allow the states of the region to become solid economic and political partners for the United States, thus representing a gain for all concerned. SDI 2010 6 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE Central Asia Advantage Afghan Stability Key
Afghanistan instability spills over into Central Asia and draws in great powers Lal, PhD and political Scientist at RAND, 2006
Dr. Rollie Lal is a Political Scientist at RAND. She is a South Asia and East Asia specialist, with extensive experience analyzing the foreign relations and internal dynamics of India and Pakistan, the national interests of India and China, and the strategic relations of India, China, and Japan. Rand Publications: "Central Asia and its Asian Neighbors" December 7, 2007 http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG440.pdf The relationship between the Central Asian states and their neighbors is complex and heavily influenced by the situation in Afghanistan. Afghanistan forms the link between regions, and it has endured a great deal of meddling from various sides, as in the past few decades, the United States, Pakistan, India, Iran, Russia, Uzbekistan, and other countries have attempted to push for a friendly government in Afghanistan. Since September 11, 2001, and the fall of the Taliban, Afghanistan has also gained in importance as a feasible key transport route for increased trade and security cooperation between the countries of Central Asia and India and Pakistan.1 Stability in Afghanistan has had a profound effect on Central Asian security as both religious radicalism and drugs emanating from Afghanistan threaten the region. During the Afghan-Soviet war, the United States in effect, through Pakistan, supported fundamentalist Islamic teachings and military training of Afghan, Pakistani, and other Central Asian militants in an effort to expel the Soviet Union from Afghanistan.2 The growth of Islamic fundamentalism from the Afghan-Soviet war accelerated the spread of a religious ideology throughout the formerly communist countries. The Taliban trained Uzbek, Tajik, and Uighur radicals, spurring the growth of destabilizing fundamentalist movements throughout the region.3 In 1992, leaders of the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) fled Tajikistan to take refuge and regroup in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, and Russia.4 During the 1990s, Afghanistan also became a haven for the IMU.5 Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan all moved to support the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance in the 1990s in the hopes of defeating the fundamentalist threat.6 The Central Asian states remain concerned by the continued presence of militants in Afghanistan and, now, Pakistan, and also by the booming drug trade that passes through Afghanistan and Central Asia into Europe and Russia.7 Narcotics flow from Afghanistan via multiple routes in the region to foreign markets, and populations of these transit corridors are increasingly consumers of the drugs as well. Traffickers transport opiates north through Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan on to Russia, and west through Iran and Turkmenistan to Turkey and Europe.8 Tajikistan has made efforts to stem the flow of drugs across its border from Afghanistan, establishing two antidrug agencies in Afghanistan to coordinate military and nonmilitary operations with international troops and Afghan forces in the border areas.9 Since the fall of the Taliban, many local leaders have retained considerable power and maintain some ability to destabilize the Kabul government. In addition, various renegade militant groups and remnants of the Taliban continue to operate in parts of Afghanistan, particularly near the Pakistani border. The ability of these groups to move nimbly across the border to evade counterterrorism forces and border patrols has been a cause for consternation among Afghan border patrols has been a cause for consternation among Afghanistan's neighbors. Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan are concerned that Afghanistan could revert to a haven for terrorist training, sending the militants back into their countries to de- stabilize regimes.11 A political vacuum in Afghanistan has traditionally drawn its neighboring countries in to compete for influence. Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan have an interest in fostering trade and transport linkages both with and through Afghanistan, but they face difficulties in maintaining security for the routes.12 Iran has been successful in moving forward with an agreement to trade goods with Uzbekistan through Afghanistan. This agreement has facilitated Uzbekistan's access to needed ports for export.13 SDI 2010 7 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE Central Asia Advantage Stability k/t Moderates
Stability in Central Asia is key to winning the war for the hearts and minds of moderate Muslims Millan, Colonel in the U.S. Army, 2003
Joseph Millan, U.S. Army Colonel, USAWC Stratgy Research Project, "Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan: A Global, Strategic Nemesis." April 7, 2003 http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc? Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA414543 Second, a stable Afghanistan could very well translate into a more stable and prosperous Central Asia. A stable Central Asia has many important consequences since it is an Islamic region more moderate than the rest of the Islamic world. With most of the rest of the Islamic 12 world having an unfavorable view of the United States, this is an opportunity for the United States to make positive inroads into the Islamic psyche to moderate their feelings toward them. It can potentially assist in moderating Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan. And if Pakistan moves toward a moderate government and moderate policies, then relations with India could possibly stabilize. Third, on the economic front, it can lead to a more stable oil source in the Caspian Basin located east of the Central Asian states, around the Caspian Sea. This would minimize the influence of the Middle East oil cartel and decrease the United States' and other nations' reliance on Middle East oil and potentially stabilize or lower world oil prices. If in the course of stabilizing and rebuilding the country, Afghanistan is able to significantly eradicate the poppy, major relief to other countries who are having problems with organized crime, drug addiction, and HIV/AIDS will be welcomed and they will have the opportunity to get ahead of their problems. Stability in this region will have major impacts on the world for decades to come. SDI 2010 8 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE Central Asia Advantage Impact
Intrastate and ethnic conflict in central Asia draws in great powers Tsepkalo, Belarus' Ambassador to the U.S., 1998 Valery V. Tsepkalo is Belarus' Ambassador to the United States. Foreign Affairs, "The Remaking of Eurasia," March 1998/April 1998 l/n THE PERILS of the post-Soviet vacuum are starkly visible in Central Asia. The region enjoyed a long period of stability under Soviet rule, but the demise of the U.S.S.R. has left an agglomeration of territories in which the various peoples' overriding ethnic attachments make the five new countries vulnerable to both internal conflict and meddling by outsiders. Resurgent religion has also become a divisive force. Attempts by Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, Afghanistan, the United States, and China to influence events only upset the balance between clans and increase the chances of conflict. Conversely, intrastate conflict and ethnic wars have the potential to drag in outside states. Developments in neighboring Afghanistan, torn by a century of civil strife, may have particularly powerful reverberations. So long as former President Mohammad Rabbani and Ahmad Shah Massoud, relying mainly on ethnic Tajiks, and General Abdul Rashid Dostam, an Uzbek, held the northern part of the country, with Russian border guards protecting the frontier with Tajikistan and neutralizing the Tajik opposition, the situation in the region was unhappy but predictable. But when the militant theology students of the Taliban, backed by Muslim fundamentalists from Pakistan, overthrew Dostam, panic broke out in both Central Asia and Russia. Then the Taliban were driven out of the north, and everyone calmed down a bit. But Afghan politics is an unpredictable seesaw. If the Taliban find an ally among the other armed Afghan groups and Russia further reduces its presence in the region, zealous and battle-hardened Taliban troops could invade Tajikistan or Uzbekistan. Worse, the Taliban could reach an agreement with Tajikistan's opposition Islamic Renaissance Party. Then Uzbekistan, with its historic Tajik centers of Bukhara and Samarkand, would be in danger. If peace agreements for Tajikistan are implemented and the Islamic Renaissance Party gains power there, the Afghan-Tajik border will become more porous, since the party still has bases and allies in Afghanistan. In that situation, Russian border guards could be forced to leave, opening a direct route from Afghanistan to Europe. It may well be that silk will not be the only commodity to travel along this route. SDI 2010 9 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE Central Asia Advantage Impact
Obfuscated interests and security guarantees by third parties make this the most likely scenario for escalation. Blank, Ph.D. and USSR expert for the Strategic Studies Institute, 2000 STEPHEN J. BLANK has served as the Strategic Studies Institute's expert on the Soviet bloc and the post-Soviet world since 1989. Prior to that he was Associate Professor of Soviet Studies at the Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education, Maxwell Air Force Base, and taught at the University of Texas, San Antonio, and at the University of California, Riverside. Dr. Blank is the editor of Imperial Decline: Russia's Changing Position in Asia, coeditor of Soviet Military and the Future, and author of The Sorcerer as Apprentice: Stalin's Commissariat of Nationalities, 1917-1924. He has also written many articles and conference papers on Russian, Commonwealth of Independent States, and Eastern European security issues. Dr. Blank's current research deals with proliferation and the revolution in military affairs, and energy and security in Eurasia. He holds a B.A. in History from the University of Pennsylvania, and a M.A. and Ph.D. in History from the University of Chicago. "US Military Engagement with Transcaucasia and Central Asia", http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/docs/Blank2000.pdf In 1993 Moscow even threatened World War III to deter Turkish intervention on behalf of Azerbaijan. Yet the new Russo-Armenian Treaty and Azeri-Turkish treaty suggest that Russia and Turkey could be dragged into a confrontation to rescue their allies from defeat. 72 Thus many of the conditions for conventional war or protracted ethnic conflict in which third parties intervene are present in the Transcaucasus. For example, many Third World conflicts generated by local structural factors have a great potential for unintended escalation. Big powers often feel obliged to rescue their lesser proteges and proxies. One or another big power may fail to grasp the other side's stakes since interests here are not as clear as in Europe. Hence commitments involving the use of nuclear weapons to prevent a client's defeat are not as well established or apparent. Clarity about the nature of the threat could prevent the kind of rapid and almost uncontrolled escalation we saw in 1993 when Turkish noises about intervening on behalf of Azerbaijan led Russian leaders to threaten a nuclear war in that case.73 Precisely because Turkey is a NATO ally, Russian nuclear threats could trigger a potential nuclear blow (not a small possibility given the erratic nature of Russia's declared nuclear strategies). The real threat of a Russian nuclear strike against Turkey to defend Moscow's interests and forces in the Transcaucasus makes the danger of major war there higher than almost everywhere else. As Richard Betts has observed, The greatest danger lies in areas where (1) the potential for serious instability is high; (2) both superpowers perceive vital interests; (3) neither recognizes that the other's perceived interest or commitment is as great as its own; (4) both have the capability to inject conventional forces; and, (5) neither has willing proxies capable of settling the situation.74 Russian perceptions of the Transcaspian's criticality to its interests is tied to its continuing efforts to perpetuate and extend the vast disproportion in power it possesses relative to other CIS states. This power and resource disproportion between Russia and the smaller states of the Transcaspian region means that no natural equilibrium is possible there. Russia neither can be restrained nor will it accept restraint by any local institution or power in its pursuit of unilateral advantage and reintegration. 75 SDI 2010 10 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE SCO 1AC
SCO-NATO Cooperation --- Withdrawal forces regional players to negotiate --- SCO will step up, solves stability and Indo-Pak relations Prashad '09
(Vijay,- Chair of South Asian History and Director of International Studies at Trinity College, Hartford, CT "Afghanistan: The Regional Alternative to Escalation" http://www.apimovement.com/viewpoint/afghanistanregional-alternative-escalation)
More US troops are being prepared for Afghanistan. The President charged them with (1) defeating or degrading the Taliban; (2) building the Afghan National Army. We have thrown in our lot with Hamid Karzai's government. Its association with warlords is uncontestable (his own brother is an opium kingpin). Our enemy is the Taliban, which recruits a family each time we accidentally kill one civilian. And we have offered the coldest shoulder to the forces of progress, like the former parliamentarian Malalai Joya (one of the first acts of the Karzai government in 2002 was to ban the communists, and he has himself refused to create the kind of political parties that might undermine warlordism). Obama's enunciated goals seem impossible. Departure in 2011 is a chimera; it is thrown like magic to assuage those with anxiety about a long-term commitment. Withdrawal will be silenced by the monstrous anger of guns. The United States-NATO Occupation has ill-defined signposts, and those that are defined will be difficult to reach. There is a better alternative to escalation, which is to make the stability of Afghanistan a regional responsibility, and to withdraw in a very timely fashion. The regional partners with the greatest stake in the stability of Afghanistan, such as Iran, India, Pakistan, China and the various Central Asian republics, will not begin a genuine process if the US-NATO Occupation persists. Why would the Chinese or the Iranians get their hands dirty if this means that their work will reward the US with military bases at Bagram and Kabul? A prerequisite for their entry into the process is the withdrawal of the US, and a pledge that no permanent
military bases will remain in the region. This is not a marker that the US is willing to put on the table. It is committed to empire. Obama said at West Point, "We have no interest in occupying your country." That is true if the definition of occupation is a 19th century one. But a 21st century occupation is conducted via military bases and extra-territorial privileges, by free trade agreements and dispensations for certain corporations. The high walls of the bases and the hum of the drones is enough to distort the fine sentiments in Obama's phrase. When the Taliban was in power (1996-2001), the regional states formed the Shanghai Cooperation Alliance (it was the Shanghai Five in 1996, and by 2001, the SCO). The members included the various Central Asian states that border Afghanistan, Russia, and China with observer status for India, Iran, Pakistan and Mongolia. The SCO was formed to create trust on the borders of the new Republics, which were once part of the USSR, and China. In July 2001, the SCO acknowledged that the "cradle of terrorism, separatism and extremisms is the instability in Afghanistan." They pledged to work together to undermine the Taliban , and the various political Islamists in the region. It was to be a long process, but not one without possibility. None of the neighbors wanted to see the Taliban emirate exported; they had national interests at stake. And they had influence over a landlocked country whose only ally was Pakistan, itself beholden to China for diplomatic cover and much else. Pressure could have come, but time did not permit. A few days after 9/11, elements in the Taliban reached out to the US. They wanted political cover to turn over Osama Bin Laden, and to save their own emirate. This was an important opening, but the Bush administration decided to snub them. In mid-October, the Taliban's no. 3, Haji Abdul Kabir told reporters. "We would be ready to hand [Bin Laden] over to a third country" if the bombing ended. Once more, Bush demurred. It was not his style to negotiate. This is when the Afghan war was lost: not at Tora Bora but at a press conference at Jalalabad. If the US had taken the Taliban up on this offer, Bin Laden would have been in custody in a third country and tried in an international court. Instead, the US backed one group of nasty warlords (the Northern Alliance) against The SCO continues to have influence in the region. This summer, the Taliban leadership sent a letter to the SCO, asking it to intervene against the Occupation. These are the leaders of the insurgency on the ground, not
the Taliban, throwing to the wind the progressive forces within Afghan society. The SCO was also disregarded. This was a costly mistake. the "moderates" who decamped to Saudi Arabia for a Mecca meeting with their funders and the Karzai government (as reported in Asharq alAwsat in October 2008). Those who went to Mecca, such as Mullah Mohammed Tayeb Agha and Wakil Ahmad Mutawakkil, are not linked to the Taliban resurgence (indeed, its spokesperson, Zabihullah Mujahid, denied that they spoke for the Taliban). On the other hand, the letter to the SCO came from the Quetta Shura Taliban, the inner sanctum controlled by Mullah Omar. Since September 2009, the Quetta Shura has been trying to play up its "nationalist" credentials, including distancing itself from al-Qaeda, whose own regional leaders have continued their tirade against nationalism of all kinds. Mullah Omar's Eid message on September 19 called the Taliban "a robust Islamic and nationalist movement," a statement that earned a rebuke from the leading Salafi cleric, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi. The Salafis worry that the Taliban will go the way of Khalid Meshal's Hamas. No division of the umma, the Muslim nation, for the hard-core jihadis. There is daylight between the Taliban and alQaeda. Which is why it reached out to the SCO. Of course the SCO is sitting on its hands, but it is able. The regional solution will be difficult, given that it would have to scrub off the effects of thirty years of warfare. The SCO is not going to welcome the Taliban with open arms and hand over Kabul to Mullah Omar. [Card Continued No Text Removed] SDI 2010 11 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE SCO 1AC
[Card Continued No Text Removed]
After 2001, the US welcomed the warlords into Kabul, handed them the keys to the kingdom and gave them a tacit amnesty for their grievous crimes (even making Ahmed Shah Masood, a ghastly warlord, the nation's icon). Such a positive fate does not seem to be on the horizon for the Taliban. It will come above ground with much less fanfare. The Taliban and the warlords obviously command a following in Afghanistan (something that was not true in the 1970s). Thanks to US, Saudi and Pakistani funding and assistance, the warlords and the Taliban have become a social force and have to be combated politically. The US and the Saudis cannot broker their entry into the political process. But the SCO has a better chance. Right after the Taliban fled in 2001, the US convened a "donor's conference" in Bonn, where Europe, Japan and the US gathered to promise money for the reconstruction of the country. No one invited the SCO players. This has not changed. Europe, Japan and the US, the countries with the least legitimacy in Afghanistan are the ones calling the shots. Rather than
conference calls with Brussels (the NATO headquarters), and Paris and London, and Kabul (with the shaky government of Karzai), the Obama administration should have called a political conference of the SCO, to see what it would have taken to hand over the Afghan imbroglio to them. The SCO met in Bishkek (capital of Kyrgyzstan) on November 24 to discuss the problem of the region, and made all kinds of suggestions. None of these are operational till the US-NATO withdraws from Kabul. China is the only power in the region with the wealth and expertise to genuinely rebuild Afghanistan (people might criticize its development policy in Africa, but mark this: Chinese investment enters countries in Africa without IMF-type conditionalities and Chinese engineers and managers live in modest conditions, not creating the kind of high-overhead NGO lifestyles of the European and US humanitarian workers). India and Pakistan have competing interests in Afghanistan. Their Cold War is fought between their Afghan proxies. If the SCO were responsible for the situation, India and Pakistan would be forced to work together. India's sober reaction to the Mumbai attacks of 2008, and to the two bombings of its Kabul
embassy have shown the Pakistani civilian leadership that it is prepared to negotiate in a serious fashion. On December 2, the Indian government announced, for the first time in decades, that it would begin to withdraw troops from Jammu and Kashmir. The moment is nigh for the Pakistani civilian leadership to put itself at the center of diplomatic discussions in the region, to isolate the ISI and the Pakistani military who have otherwise defined Pakistan's Afghan policy. But an escalation is going to set this backwards: more bloodshed in the northern borderlands of Pakistan will inflame the population, and it might set in motion a forward policy not only into Afghanistan but also its twin, Kashmir. If all this happens, I fear for the future of South Asia. In a decade it will resemble West Asia. Both broken by empire. The US media has portrayed the escalation of the Occupation in a very simplistic fashion: either the US solves the problem, or the Taliban returns. This is a false choice, one that assumes that only the US can act, the White Knight riding in to save the world. America is not exceptional. Others are ready. But they don't want to act unless they have a commitment that the US is not going to use their blood and treasure to build its empire. It's reverse causal --- the plan increases regional cooperation with NATO --- solves DA's to withdrawal Katz '09
(Mark,- professor of government and politics at George Mason University "Assessing an Afghanistan Withdrawal" 9-9 http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/Detail/?lng=en&id=105801) The impact of a US/NATO withdrawal, then, could well be to make these neighboring and nearby governments feel more vulnerable, and thus more willing to increase or initiate cooperation with the US and NATO to contain al-Qaida and the Taliban within Afghanistan. This is not to say that the US and NATO will be better off after a complete withdrawal from Afghanistan or a partial one from the south. Withdrawal will surely have some negative consequences. But not withdrawing will also have negative consequences if the US/NATO intervention becomes even less popular in Afghanistan and the West than it is now. Even if a withdrawal from Afghanistan results in the worst case scenario its opponents predict, this is highly likely to be mitigated by non-Pashtuns inside Afghanistan or the governments of neighboring and nearby countries acquiring the incentive to increase (or in some cases, initiate) security cooperation with the US and NATO against the common threat. Just as
maintaining or increasing US/NATO military involvement in Afghanistan will not necessarily lead to victory, withdrawal will not necessarily lead to defeat there. SDI 2010 12 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE SCO 1AC
This is key to meaningful SCO-NATO cooperation Afrasiabi '09
(Kaveh,- former political science professor at Tehran University "Unlikely bedfellows in Afghanistan" http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KC18Df02.html) Due to their geographical proximity to Afghanistan and the threats of conflict spillover, the SCO members are naturally concerned about the security meltdown in Afghanistan. As a result, it is not far-fetched to anticipate a near-term breakthrough over SCO-NATO cooperation on Afghanistan. This would be despite lingering SCO suspicions of NATO's "out of area" operations in their backyard. NATO's decision to put on hold the accession of Georgia and Ukraine dampens these suspicions. The key issue is the nature of any possible SCO-NATO cooperation. In 2005, the SCO and Afghanistan set up a liaison group based in Beijing to deal with drug trafficking, cross-border crime and intelligence-sharing. But not much has happened and then-president Vladimir Putin's 2004 call for a SCO "security belt" around Afghanistan to stop the drug trade has not materialized This is partly because the SCO is still in the process of self-definition, and unlike NATO, or for that matter the Moscowdominated Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), it lacks the identity of a military bloc. In a recent interview, the SCO secretary general, Bolat Nurgaliev, stated that "any physical involvement by the SCO in Afghanistan has not been contemplated so far". But with NATO admittedly failing to secure Afghanistan, the NATO leadership may now be amenable to the idea of a co-security partnership with SCO. This could begin with the low-security issues of drug trafficking and arms smuggling. This would parcel out a slice of the Afghan security pie to the SCO, traditionally viewed with suspicion in the US and European capitals as a potential rival to NATO. In a separate development, according to a source at the UN, China is leaning in favor of a UN peacekeeping force for Afghanistan to which it would contribute, this in contrast to Russia's cool reception of this option. At the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations, which is a major organizer of The Hague Afghan conference, the idea of sending blue helmets to guard Afghanistan's porous borders is under serious consideration. Whether or not the SCO and NATO can cooperate on low-security issues depends on each organization's sober "threat analysis" and NATO's firm conclusion that it cannot handle Afghanistan alone. But, perhaps more important than any decision by the SCO and NATO leaders is whether India and Pakistan can stop competing and begin to cooperate on Afghanistan. SDI 2010 13 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE SCO 1AC
Hegemonic decline is inevitable, SCO-NATO cooperation beginning in Afghanistan is key to a stable transition to multi-polarity, solves global regional competition, including global resource and US-Sino conflict Albright '10
(Scott,- B.A. in Political Science, former Marine and author of the blog Iraqwarvets, current grad student in U.S.-Sino relations "Forging a NATO-SCO Relationship" http://www.chinausrelations.com/nato-sco-relationship.html) Is the SCO trying to push NATO out of Afghanistan and Central Asia? Is the SCO and NATO at odds over security arrangements in the region, or are the two organizations cooperating in a joint effort to eliminate terrorism and extremism? Some scholars argue that Russia and China have cooperated through the SCO to not only counterbalance NATO, but to hedge the United States out of its role as world superpower. NATO and the SCO work under the auspices of the United Nations, which, if the two groups were to work more cooperatively, could become more effective in providing regional and global security. This cooperative approach will create a more multi-polar world, which can benefit China, Russia, the U.S. and the rest of the globe
if careful attention is paid to how the evolution of such a relationship develops. A more multi-polar world will benefit the United States who has carried the burden of providing most of the costs for NATO operations in Afghanistan, and previously in Bosnia and Kosovo. By taking some of this burden off the U.S. in Afghanistan, the SCO could help to remove some of the risks the U.S. is taking when trying to resolve security issues, which both China and the U.S. understand to be of concern in
Afghanistan. Tension over U.S. missile defense strategy in Eastern Europe and NATO's expansionism eastward has alarmed Moscow who recently used military force in Georgia in defiance of NATO's activities in Eastern Europe . Russia and China's often bold stance against the U.S. and NATO make it difficult for tensions to ease, but cooperation on some levels have also provided beneficial outcomes for the world at large. A recent nuclear summit had
all the nuclear powers promising to take measures that will prevent weapons grade uranium and plutonium from getting into the hands of terrorists. This type of cooperation is exactly the type that is needed for a peaceful multi-polar world to exist. The SCO is not the only multinational organization in Central and Southwest Asia counter balancing the United States' presence there. The goal of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which consists of Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, is to preserve territorial integrity and seek closer cooperation with multilateral institutions such as the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the SCO, and NATO (GlobalSecurity.org). Russia has stated that its goal is not to create a Warsaw Pact II through the CSTO; however Russia's multilateral approach to extending its influence in the region has the potential to weaken American power, and even to strengthen Chinese influence by encouraging Central Asian states to not fully commit to American and NATO powers alone. China and Russia share similar goals in weakening American hegemony, as both countries would benefit from a more multi-polar world by being able to better assert their own power in global affairs. This multi-polar world already exists to some degree however. China is re-writing the rules of western created international institutions through its growing power and economic strength. In Southeast Asia the Yuan is the common currency of exchange, and China's technological advances may soon mean more
Chinese control over the Internet. The current Internet Protocol version 4 system is running out of space for IP addresses, and China is betting that it will be able to host trillions of new addresses using IPv6, which links an IP address to a specific device. Because each computer, cell phone, or other Internet-using device will have its own unique address, the CCP will be able to easier monitor those who are using them all across the globe (Faroohar 36-39). The United States' power will be challenged by the economic growth of other nations as wel l. By 2050 it is estimated that the combined economies of Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC) will be larger than the G6 in U.S. dollars (Wilson). By utilizing their new economic powers these countries will inevitably change the structure of international politics and will create a multi-polar world where the United States is no longer seen as a sole superpower. The new multi-polar world taking shape does not necessarily mean an increase in armed conflict in Central and Southwest Asia or any other part of the globe though. Cooperation between the SCO and NATO in Afghanistan is the best option for resolving any conflict member states have regarding energy security and political stability in the region, and such cooperation will be a foundation to work from when resolving conflicts in other parts of the globe. By accepting some of the policies of the SCO and other multinational organizations in Afghanistan, the United States may lose whatever leverage it has in obtaining its own goals in the area, but resisting China and the SCO could be just as damaging. Because the United States has paved the way
for economic growth in Afghanistan by providing the security necessary for Chinese and other foreign companies to operate there, its interests should also not be ignored by the SCO. But for the United States to truly benefit from its activities in Afghanistan and Central and Southwest Asia it must engage in bilateral discussions with China and other powers in the region. Such bilateral discussions will help to shape the direction of multilateral talks between SCO and NATO members and will provide guarantees about the future of Sino-American relations in regards to each country's interests in Afghanistan and the surrounding regions. NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer was invited to attend an SCO summit meeting in 2009, and during a June 25, 2009 press conference he was questioned about the level of cooperation with the SCO and CSTO. In response to these questions he said, "You saw the Secretary General of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on one of the panels. . . I would qualify this as interaction we have with the SCO. [Card Continues --- No Text Removed] SDI 2010 14 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE SCO 1AC
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We do not have that as we speak, as you know, with the CSTO, but the SCO, you have seen here represented in the person of the Secretary General." NATO and SCO officials should attend each other's meetings to help gain a better understanding of what their goals are and how they can cooperate better. There has been plenty of time for both organizations to improve their relationships, but both have been hesitant to take the appropriate steps toward cooperation. Stephen Blank, professor at the Strategic Studies
Institute, U.S. Army War College, argues that NATO officials should not attend SCO meetings because NATO cannot "legitimately accept the CSTO and SCO as authoritative security providers without denying the sovereign right of Central Asian states to make their own defense arrangements as they see fit. That is a clearly unacceptable position. While the severity and the urgency of the Afghan crisis is obvious to all; there are several good reasons why it would be a mistake to attend the SCO meeting and to recognize the CSTO. These are no ordinary security organizations" (Blank 15). I completely disagree with this argument and believe that the U.S. and China should take the lead in pushing NATO and the SCO closer together for the mutual benefits they can both receive. The Future of Sino-American Relations A 2005 International Security journal article by Aaron L. Friedberg asks if conflict between China and the U.S. is inevitable. Friedberg explains how China's new rise in global power may threaten the interests of the United States, but that the west should not worry too much
because of China's eagerness to participate in international institutions. Friedberg says that "the more deeply embedded China becomes in the web of regional and global institutions, the more the beliefs and expectations of its leaders will come to conform to the merging universal consensus that those institutions embody" (Friedberg 36). But the SCO is not a western produced global institution, and the beliefs and expectations of China's leaders do not have to conform to those of the western world when they have their own institutions to make others conform to. That is why I believe that western institutions such as NATO should actively engage the SCO so that a universal consensus over global security issues can emerge. So how are the relationships of SCO and NATO member states affected by the situation in
Afghanistan, and what does all this mean for the future of Sino-American relations? Perhaps cooperative agreements can be worked out that will improve the situation in Afghanistan, or maybe the SCO and NATO will bump heads on issues in the region for years to come. The future depends on the actions taken by officials within these organizations. Questions regarding the future of the SCO-NATO relationship are not easy to answer, but they must be addressed because people across the globe are affected by the decisions of NATO and SCO members whose actions in Afghanistan and Central and Southwest Asia could bring war, or peace and stability, not just to Afghanistan, but to people across the planet. Cooperation, understanding, open
dialogue, and clear objectives are vital to the development of a peaceful SCO-NATO relationship, which is driven by the economies and political motives of China and the United States more so than any other members. Bilateral and multilateral security policies in both the United States and China will set the tone for the future of the SCO-NATO relationship and more direct dialogue between China and the United States can only benefit both countries. Conclusion By looking at the past one can see that China and the United States have never attacked the other's territory by conventional military means. One can also see that the two countries relationships have been slippery at times, and that indirect armed conflict has occurred. Both the United States and China have had rocky relationships with Russia in the past, and all three have had different alliances that have had different interests in Central and Southwest Asia. The domestic affairs
of each country have shaped foreign policy at times, and at other times foreign policy did not reflect domestic affairs at all. Currently the United States and China have leading roles in NATO and the SCO which are both pursuing similar interests in Afghanistan and its neighbors. Because the interests have similar themes, they also can cause conflict if the appropriate steps toward cooperation are not taken. The U.S. and China's competition for natural resources poses a danger if either country becomes too aggressive in their efforts to obtain these resources. Cooperation and dialogue between NATO and the SCO can prevent future conflict from occurring, but it is also important for the United States and China to engage in high level bilateral talks with each other and other countries in Central and Southwest Asia. By focusing on this area, and particularly Afghanistan, the two countries and their multinational counterparts can benefit tremendously. Joint ventures between American and Chinese companies in Afghanistan can help to create a more secure Sino-American-Afghan relationship. Such a venture requires a multinational security force to ensure these companies can operate safely until Afghanistan is
capable of providing its own security. Joint security and anti-terrorist operations between China and the United States, along with their multinational counterparts, in Afghanistan and other nearby places could foster a cooperative relationship that could bring stability to the region. Such cooperation should not endanger the sovereignty of Afghanistan or any neighboring country
however, and the United Nations should take the necessary steps to ensure neither the SCO nor NATO become too aggressive or more powerful than the international community they represent within the United Nations. SDI 2010 15 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE SCO 1AC
Specifically, Energy conflicts between member states will intensify competition in the Artic and Baltic Sea Region Lin '09
(Christina,- Visiting Fellow at American Institute for Contemporary German Studies and Researcher for Jane's Information Group. Aug 19th, http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/showArticle3.cfm? article_id=17881&topicID=31 Accessed 7.19.10)
Moreover, this meeting was followed by the ninth SCO summit in Yekaterinburg, Russia on 15-16 June, where Russia concurrently hosted the first meeting of BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) heads of states. The outcome of the BRIC meeting was a call to restructure the global financial architecture while the SCO summit produced an agreement to establish an SCO currency (to supplant the U.S. dollar as the dominant reserve currency), in addition to settling issues of NATO in Afghanistan, Iran's SCO membership, and other regional se- curity issues. Given SCO's increased presence in Afghanistan, outgoing NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer in a July Chatham House conference discussed NATO's new strategic concept and the need to engage other organizations--"I believe NATO should also develop closer contacts with the Arab League, the Organization of the Islamic Conference--and indeed the Shanghai Cooperation Organization"--in a "comprehensive approach" to new security challenges. Indeed, the increasing role of the Sino-Russian-led SCO in Afghanistan and its interaction with NATO and the
West will have important impli- cations for transatlantic relations. Energy Security and SCO as an Emerging Military Alliance The SCO began as the "Shanghai Five" of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan in 1996 to resolve border disputes after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It was institutionalized in 2001 when Uzbekistan joined and became the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Over the years, SCO watchers have witnessed its transformation from a loose interest-based collection of authoritarian states involved in resolving border disputes and counter-terrorism, to a formidable energy bloc when it established the Energy Club in 2007 (and calls to form a gas OPEC), to an increasingly militarized security bloc with joint military exercises. While not yet a military alliance, there seems to be a trajectory toward militarization of the organization, as outlined in a 2007 paper published by Lt. Colonel Dr. Marcel de Haas of the Royal Netherlands Army. This is measured by: (1) Increased security cooperation; (2) Increased CSTO-SCO ties; (3) Militarization of Energy Security; and (4) Connection with the West. First, despite denials of the military nature of the SCO, in 2007 for the first time a political summit (Bishtek 2007) was amalgamated with war games (Peace Mission 2007). Hitherto defense ministers were the highest-ranking officials to participate in the military exercises, thus the heads of states' presence at the war game was perhaps signaling SCO's determination to be in command of regional security. This trend is underscored by the increasingly ambitious nature of SCO military exercises from bilateral to multilateral to joint all-SCO level. Second, SCO policy documents may include the concept of "military assistance" (e.g., attack against one is an attack against all). In October 2007 SCO (a political-economic organization) signed defense agreements with CSTO (a political-military organization). Since "military assistance" is a key element of a mature security alliance such as CSTO, and because SCO signed a defense agreement with a purely military organization, this may promulgate the SCO toward a more military trajectory. Third, CSTO-SCO cooperation is tied into the increasing military aspects of energy security, such as guarding security of oil and gas pipelines against terrorist attacks, protecting railway lines, and deploying rapid reaction forces. In light of SCO's new cooperation with CSTO, this may lead to eventual standing of reaction forces in the near future regarding energy security. Finally, SCO is increasing ties with NATO--which has arrangements for cooperation with all SCO states except China. Since the 1990s, NATO has had bilateral cooperation with five central Asian states within the Partnership for Peace (PfP) framework, as well as with Russia via the NATO-Russia Council since 2002. In November 2005 SCO developed a contact group in Afghanistan and has had oper- ational cooperation with NATO. It is looking to expand its military operations westward from central Asia. Militarization of Energy Security and SCO Challenges to NATO Moreover, energy security is an issue where China's economic priority and Russia's military priority converge within the SCO. Some pundits have opined that the Sino-Russian axis in the SCO is one merely of convenience and
mutual interests, not necessarily a partnership at the strategic level. China is an energy importer and focused on economic growth, while Russia is an energy exporter and focused on military growth. However, militarization of an economic issue such as energy security is where Sino-Russian interests converge. This is underscored by the recent Russian national se- curity
strategy unveiled on 12 May 2009 on the theme of security through economic development, and the military power necessary to protect security of energy supply. Due to insecurity of energy supply and dependency on the U.S. for protection of SLOCs (sea lines of communication) that connect vital energy resources in the Middle East and Africa, China has tried to hedge itself and adopted a military "string of pearls" strategy in an effort to create access to ports and airfields, develop special diplomatic relationships, and modernize military forces that extend from the South China Sea through the Strait of Malacca, across the Indian Ocean, and on to the Arabian Gulf.10Each "pearl" is a nexus of Chinese geopolitical or military presence, such as upgraded military facilities on Hainan Island, an upgraded airstrip on Woody Island located in the Paracel archipelago, a container shipping facility on Chittagong, Bangladesh, construction of a deep water port in Burma, a navy base in Gwadar, Pakistan, or increasing ties with Iran in the Persian Gulf. It is also undergoing rapid naval modernization, including aircraft carrier ambitions to eventually challenge U.S. naval dominance. Similarly, Russia is increasing militarization of its energy security policy. The Russo-German Nord Stream pipeline that would run under the Baltic Sea has met stiff resistance from other Baltic littoral nations due to negative implications for this proposed pipeline--increased EU energy dependency on Russia, constraints on small members to act as regional security providers if energy security is undermined, and increased Russian military presence in the Baltic region. [Card Continues No Text Removed] SDI 2010 16 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE SCO 1AC
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Sweden for one fears the risk of Nord Stream as a catalyst for increased Russian military presence and intelligence surveillance, especially in light of Putin proclaiming that during the construction phase, Russia's BalticSea Navy would protect Nord Stream pipelines. The risers and pipelines are excellent platforms for sensors of various kinds--radars, hydro-acoustic systems and sonar to act as eyes and ears for monitoring the system, as well as intelligence surveillance. This would provide Russian intelligence an edge in the Baltic Sea concerning all air, surface, and sub-surface activities--especially around Estonia, Finland, Sweden, and Denmark, and subsequently NATO members' military exercises. This is indeed a realistic risk, given Russia's past history of installing fiber optic cable along the Yamal pipeline without first informing
the Polish government.Sweden has thus stipulated that Nord Stream needs approval of all countries whose territories will be traversed by the pipeline. Should the Russians build pipelines without approval of countries in the region, the Swedish military has drawn up plans to sabotage the pipeline if and when it is built. The Sino-Russian strategic partnership is further reinforced by increased bilateral joint military ex- ercises. On 28 April 2009, at a Moscow meeting between Russian and Chinese defense ministers, both announced closer military cooperation and as many as twenty-five joint maneuvers to be staged this year in a demonstration of strengthening the Sino-Russian axis and underscored the SCO's growing military role. From Afghanistan to Militarization of the Arctic--NATO's New Arena Indeed, concerns on militarization of energy security in light of the Russo-German Nord Stream in the Baltic are carried over to carbon-resource exploitation in the Arctic--both of which consist part of the "High North."In 2007 Norway and Germanyunveiled plans to exploit
some of the Arctic's vast energy reserves.Germany imports 40 percent of its natural gas from Russia--the highest within the EU--so it needs to carefully calibrate its energy-dependent relationship on Russia with its relations to NATO and the Arctic region--NATO's new energy security arena. Since August 2007 when Russia staked territorial claims on the sea bed of the North Pole with a titanium flag , this has unleashed militarization of the Arctic region by other littoral states, all of which are NATO or NATO PfP members except Russia: U.S., Canada, Iceland, Denmark, Norway, Finland, and Sweden. U.S. interests in the Arctic region
culminated in the January 2009 U.S. Arctic Policy Report (NSPD- 66), underscoring U.S. national security interests in the region and presenting the U.S. as "prepared to operate either independently or in conjunction with other states to safeguard these interests... [including] such matters as missile defense and early warning; deployment of sea and air systems for strategic sealift, strategic deterrence, maritime presence, and maritime security operations; and ensuring freedom of navigation and over flight." It also underscored the need to preserve global maritime mobility of U.S. armed forces throughout the Arctic region and sovereign rights over ex- tensive marine areas including natural resources. 2008 U.S. Geological Survey estimated that 25 percent of the world's oil and gas reserves lie in the Arctic, which is increasingly accessible due to climate change and melting of the polar ice caps. Moreover, in 2007 a Russian press source stated that the Northwest Passage, running through the Arctic Ocean along Russia's northern coast, is the shortest way from Europe to Asia and the Pacific coast of the Americas, enabling shorter transport of oil and gas from Arctic deposits. On 27 March 2009 Russia subsequently released its own Arctic policy paper entitled, "The Foundations of State Policy of Russian Federation in Arctic Area for the Period Up to 2020 and Beyond," declaring its intent to develop Arctic military forces to protect the continental shelf that would become the nation's leading resource base by 2020. A few days later, Canadian officials announced similar plans to create a 500-strong Army unit for Far North operations, followed by Denmark creating a new Arctic military command in June. Even without an Arctic coastline, China had sent its icebreaker, the Snow Dragon, on its third Arctic expedition in summer of 2008 and has earned observer status to the Arctic Council. It is seeking to install its long-term deep-sea monitoring system in the Arctic. NATO is thus becoming involved in the Arctic race for hydrocarbon resources. On 28-29 January this year, NATO held a meeting in Iceland entitled "Security Prospects in the High North" to address militarization of energy security. General John Craddock, then-Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), suggested that while the Arctic was not yet a region of conflict, environmental and geopolitical developments risk potential military conflict among the eight stakeholders. Indeed, there has already been increased Russo-Canadian regional tension since 2007 over the disputed territoryof the Lomonosov Ridge, a
1,200 mile underwater mountain range running close to the Pole. NORAD spokesperson Michael Kucharek said Canadian and U.S. fighter jets have been scrambled more than twenty times since early 2007 to perform visual identification of Russian bombers and to direct them away from North American airspace. The Arctic is a vital Russian strategic region not only for energy resources but also for nuclear de- terrent capabilities. Given U.S./NATO missiles, satellite radars, and interceptor missile facilities
around the world and in space, a key place for Russian deterrence/retaliatory capacity against a nuclear first strike is under the polar ice cap. On 7 July 2007, a RIA Novosti article reported that, "A Sineva ICBM24[...] was fired in the summer of 2006 from the North Pole by the submarine Yekater- inburg [...] Under a thick icecap the submarine remains invisible to hostile observation satellites till the last moment. As a result , a retaliatory nuclear strike would be sudden and unavoidable." A Russ- ian naval commander underscored the
importance of Russian strategic submarines operating under Arctic ice: "This training is needed to help strategic submarines of the Russian Fleet head for the Arctic ice region, which is the least vulnerable to an adversary's monitoring, and prepare for a re- sponse to a ballistic missile strike in the event of a nuclear conflict [...] to preserve strategic sub- marines--it is necessary to train Russian submariners to maneuver under the Arctic ice."Thus, Arctic polar ice caps are a key Russian submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM)26 strategy of deception and deterrence. Given German energy interests in the High North--with a Norwegian joint energy venture in the Arctic and the Nord Stream venture with Russia in the Baltic--Germany needs to tread carefully in its relations with Russia and with NATO allies. The militarization of the High North between Russia and NATO members and partners will impact German energy interests as well as wider geopolitical interests. SDI 2010 17 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE SCO 1AC
Absent mediation, Baltic energy tension causes NATO-Russian miscalculation --- Neg takeouts are wrong
Rozoff '09 (Richard,- author and geopolitical analyst. he is editor of Stop NATO and a frequent contributor to Global Research "Baltic Sea: Flash Point For NATO-Russia Conflict" http://rickrozoff.wordpress.com/2009/08/27/baltic-sea-flashpoint-for-nato-russia-conflict/ Accessed 4.1.09)
Neither Europe nor the world required a further reminder of the fact, but Miliband's words foreshadowed a concrete implementation for NATO military plans in Europe as two weeks later his government proposed "that Nato member states should set up a standing force of 3,000 troops that would be permanently committed to defending the Alliance's collective territory from any future attack."  At last week's NATO defense ministers meeting in Krakow, Poland Britain's Defence Secretary John Hutton argued "that [a] standing force should be created to underpin Nato's Article 5 commitment to the mutual defence of any member state that finds itself under threat" and "that the creation of the standing force would be reassuring to Nato's eastern European members above all the Baltic states...."  American expatriate and current Estonian president Toomas Hendrik Ilves had anticipated Hutton by two weeks when at the Munich Conference he advocated: "No longer can we assume that international aggression, (as opposed to the civil wars of the Balkans) is excluded as a possibility in Europe....We can and must revisit the assumptions held in the past 17 years about the use of military force in Europe and we must follow our own legislation to ensure that we not become politically hostage to energy supplied by an outside power....NATO itself must deal with the new paradigm of in area armed aggression...." Between the Munich and the Krakow
gatherings NATO's Baltic clients performed their appointed roles with Lithuanian Defense Minister Rasa Jukneviciene stating she plans to tell her American counterpart Robert Gates "that Lithuania would like to see NATO and the United States expand their presence in the Baltics, considering the nervousness that has followed Russia's invasion of Georgia in August."  Not since the end of World War II, since the advent of the nuclear era, have major powers, ones moreover united in the world's first global military bloc, so openly brandished plans for military action in Europe and just as indisputably named their intended target. NATO has been pounding a steady, relentless drumbeat for the activation of its collective military plans in the Baltic Sea region and all it will take to bring that about is something as otherwise insignificant as the crash of an Estonian government website or Western proxies in Ukraine refusing to pay standard market prices for Russian natural gas. Nothing more. SDI 2010 18 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE SCO 1AC
Escalation is guaranteed --- outweighs all other scenarios for nuclear war Rozoff '09
(Richard,- author and geopolitical analyst. he is editor of Stop NATO and a frequent contributor to Global Research "Baltic Sea: Flash Point For NATO-Russia Conflict" http://rickrozoff.wordpress.com/2009/08/27/baltic-sea-flashpoint-for-nato-russia-conflict/ Accessed 4.1.09) In such an environment of international lawlessness and heightened alarm over military threats, otherwise minor contretemps and even fears of a neighbor's and potential adversary's intents can spark a conflict and a conflagration. The world has been on edge for a decade now and a form of numbing has set in with many of its inhabitants; a permanent condition of war apprehension and alert has settled over others, particularly those in areas likely to be directly affected. Over the past six years the worst and most immediate fears have centered on the prospects of three major regional conflicts, all of which are fraught with the danger of eventual escalation into nuclear exchanges. The three are a renewed and intensified Indian-Pakistani conflict, an outbreak of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula and an attack by the U.S., Israel or both in unison against Iran. The first would affect neighbors
both in possession of nuclear weapons and a combined population of 1,320,000,000. The second could set Northeast Asia afire with China and Russia, both having borders with North Korea, inevitably being pulled into the vortex. The last could lead to an explosion in the Persian Gulf and throughout the Middle East, with the potential of spilling over into the Caspian Sea Basin, Central and South Asia, the Caucasus and even the Balkans, as the U.S. and NATO have strategic air bases in Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey, Iraq, Afghanistan and, at least for the time being, Kyrgyzstan that would be employed in any major assault on Iran, and the latter would retaliate against both land- and sea-based threats as best it could. In the event that any of the three scenarios reached the level of what in a humane and sensible world would be considered the unthinkable the use of nuclear weapons the cataclysmic consequences both for the respective regions involved and for the world would be incalculable. Theoretically, though, all three nightmare models could be geographically contained. There is a fourth spot on the map, however, where most any spark could ignite a powder keg that would draw in and pit against each other the world's two major nuclear powers and immediately and ipso facto develop into a world conflict. That area is the Baltic Sea region. In 2003, months before NATO would grant full membership to the Baltic nations of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, the Russian Defense Minister at the time, Sergei Ivanov, warned that such a development would entail the deployment of NATO, including American, warplanes "a three-minute flight away from St. Petersburg," Russia's second largest city. And just that occurred. NATO air patrols began in 2004 on a three month rotational basis and U.S. warplanes just completed their second deployment on January 4 of this year. Had history occurred otherwise and Soviet warplanes alternated with those of fellow Warsaw Pact nations in patrolling over, say, the St. Lawrence Seaway or the Atlantic Coast off Nova Scotia, official Washington's response wouldn't be hard to imagine or long in coming. A 2005 report by the Natural Resources Defense Council confirmed that the U.S. maintained 480 nuclear bombs in Europe, hosted by six NATO allies, Belgium, Britain, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and Turkey. More recent estimates indicate that over 350 American nuclear weapons remain in Europe to the present time. If the six above-mentioned nations continue to host nuclear arms, what would new NATO members Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania the first and third currently governed by former U.S. citizens, president Toomas Hendrik Ilves and Valdas Adamkus, respectively deny the Pentagon? NATO-Russia competition over the Arctic goes nuclear Wallace and Staples `10
(Michael,- Professor Emeritus at the University of British Columbia and Steven, President of the Rideau Institute in Ottawa. "Ridding the Arctic of Nuclear Weapons: A Task Long Overdue" http://www.arcticsecurity.org/ docs/arctic-nuclear-report- web.pdf Accessed 7.1.10) Jayantha Dhanapala, President of Pugwash and former UN under-secretary for disarmament affairs, summarized the situation bluntly: "From those in the international peace and security sector, deep concerns are being expressed over the fact that two nuclear weapon states the United States and the Russian Federation, which together own 95 per cent of the nuclear weapons in the world converge on the Arctic and have competing claims. These claims, together with those of other allied NATO countries Canada, Denmark, Iceland, and Norway could, if unresolved, lead to conflict escalating into the threat or use of nuclear weapons."61 Many will no doubt argue that this is excessively alarmist, but no circumstance in which nuclear powers find themselves in military confrontation can be taken lightly. The current geo-political threat level is nebulous and low for now, according to Rob Huebert of the University of Calgary, "[the] issue is the uncertainty as Arctic states and nonArctic states begin to recognize the geo-political/economic significance of the Arctic because of climate change." 62 SDI 2010 19 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE SCO 1AC
Failure to handle the transition from U.S. Hegemony ignites every scenario for nuclear war Kagan `07
(Robert,- senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace "End of Dreams, Return of History", 7/19, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2007/07/end_of_dreams_return_of_histor.html) This is a good thing, and it should continue to be a primary goal of American foreign policy to perpetuate this relatively benign international configuration of power. The unipolar order with the United States as the predominant power is unavoidably riddled with flaws and contradictions. It inspires fears and jealousies. The United States is not immune to error, like all other nations, and because of its size and importance in the international system those errors are magnified and take on greater significance than the errors of less powerful nations. Compared
to the ideal Kantian international order, in which all the world 's powers would be peace-loving equals, conducting themselves wisely, prudently, and in strict obeisance to international law, the unipolar system is both dangerous and unjust . Compared to any plausible alternative in the real world, however, it is relatively stable and less likely to produce a major war between great powers. It is also comparatively benevolent, from a liberal perspective, for it is more conducive to the principles of economic and political
liberalism that Americans and many others value. American predominance does not stand in the way of progress toward a better world, therefore. It stands in the way of regression toward a more dangerous world. The choice is not between an American-dominated order and a world that looks like the European Union. The future international order will be shaped by those who have the power to shape it. The leaders of a postAmerican world will not meet in Brussels but in Beijing, Moscow, and Washington. The return of great powers and great games If the world is marked by the persistence of unipolarity, it is nevertheless also being shaped by the reemergence of competitive national ambitions of the kind that have shaped human affairs from time immemorial. During the Cold War, this historical tendency of great powers to jostle with one another for status and influence as well as for wealth and power was largely suppressed by the two superpowers and their rigid bipolar order. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has not been powerful enough, and probably could never be powerful enough, to suppress by itself the normal ambitions of nations. This does not mean the world has returned to multipolarity, since none of the large powers is in range of competing with the superpower for global influence. Nevertheless, several large powers are now competing for regional predominance, both with the United States and with each other. National ambition drives China's foreign policy today, and although it is tempered by prudence and the desire to appear as unthreatening as possible to the rest of the world, the Chinese are powerfully motivated to return their nation to what they regard as its traditional position as the preeminent power in East Asia. They do not share a European, postmodern view that power is pass; hence their now two-decades-long military buildup and modernization. Like the Americans, they
believe power, including military power, is a good thing to have and that it is better to have more of it than less. Perhaps more significant is the Chinese perception, also shared by Americans, that status and honor, and not just wealth and security, are important for a nation. Japan, meanwhile, which in the past could have been counted as an aspiring postmodern power -- with its pacifist constitution and low defense spending -- now appears embarked on a more traditional national course. Partly this is in reaction to the rising power of China and concerns about North Korea 's nuclear weapons. But it is also driven by Japan's own national ambition to be a leader in East Asia or at least not to play second fiddle or "little brother" to China. China and Japan are now in a competitive quest with each trying to augment its own status and power and to prevent the other 's rise to predominance, and this competition has a military and strategic as well as an economic and political component. Their competition is such that a nation like South Korea, with a long unhappy history as a pawn between the two powers, is once again worrying both about a "greater China" and about the return of Japanese nationalism. As Aaron Friedberg commented, the East Asian future looks more like Europe's past than its present. But it also looks like Asia's past. Russian foreign policy, too, looks more like something from the nineteenth century. It is being driven by a typical, and typically Russian, blend of national resentment and ambition. A postmodern Russia simply
seeking integration into the new European order, the Russia of Andrei Kozyrev, would not be troubled by the eastward enlargement of the EU and NATO, would not insist on predominant influence over its "near abroad," and would not use its natural resources as means of gaining geopolitical leverage and enhancing Russia 's international status in an attempt to regain the lost glories of the Soviet empire and Peter the Great. But Russia, like China and Japan, is moved by more traditional great-power considerations, including the pursuit of those valuable if intangible national interests: honor and respect. Although Russian leaders complain about threats to their security from NATO and the United States, the Russian sense of insecurity has more to do with resentment and national identity than with plausible external military threats. 16 Russia's complaint today is not with this or that weapons system. It is the entire post-Cold War settlement of the 1990s that Russia resents and wants to revise. But that does not make insecurity less a factor in Russia 's relations with the world; indeed, it makes finding compromise with the Russians all the more difficult. One could add others to this list of great powers with traditional rather than postmodern aspirations. India 's regional ambitions are more muted, or are focused most intently on Pakistan, but it is clearly engaged in competition with China for dominance in the Indian Ocean and sees itself, correctly, as an emerging great power on the world scene. In the Middle East there is
Iran, which mingles religious fervor with a historical sense of superiority and leadership in its region. 17 Its nuclear program is as much about the desire for regional hegemony as about defending Iranian territory from attack by the United States. [Card Continues No Text Removed] SDI 2010 20 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE SCO 1AC
[Card Continues No Text Removed] Even the European Union, in its way, expresses a pan-European national ambition to play a significant role in the
world, and it has become the vehicle for channeling German, French, and British ambitions in what Europeans regard as a safe supranational direction. Europeans seek honor and respect, too, but of a postmodern variety. The honor they seek is to occupy the moral high ground in the world, to exercise moral authority, to wield political and economic influence as an antidote to militarism, to be the keeper of the global conscience, and to be recognized and admired by others for playing this role. Islam is not a nation, but many Muslims express a kind of religious nationalism, and the leaders of radical Islam, including al Qaeda, do seek to establish a theocratic nation or
confederation of nations that would encompass a wide swath of the Middle East and beyond. Like national movements elsewhere, Islamists have a yearning for respect, including self-respect, and a desire for honor. Their national identity has been molded in defiance against stronger and often oppressive outside powers, and also by memories of ancient superiority over those same powers. China had its "century of humiliation." Islamists have more than a century of humiliation to look back on, a humiliation of which Israel has become the living symbol, which is partly why even Muslims who are neither radical nor fundamentalist proffer their sympathy and even their support to violent extremists who can turn the tables on the dominant liberal West, and particularly on a dominant America which implanted and still feeds the Israeli cancer in their midst. Finally, there is the United States itself. As a matter of national policy stretching back across numerous administrations, Democratic and Republican, liberal and conservative, Americans have insisted on preserving regional predominance in East Asia; the Middle East; the Western Hemisphere; until recently, Europe; and now, increasingly, Central Asia.
This was its goal after the Second World War, and since the end of the Cold War, beginning with the first Bush administration and continuing through the Clinton years, the United States did not retract but expanded its influence eastward across Europe and into the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. Even as it maintains its position as the predominant global power, it is also engaged in hegemonic competitions in these regions with China in East and Central Asia, with Iran in the Middle East and Central Asia, and with Russia in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. The United States, too, is more of a traditional than a postmodern power, and though Americans are loath to acknowledge it, they generally prefer their global place as "No. 1" and are equally loath to relinquish it. Once having entered a region, whether for practical or idealistic reasons, they are remarkably slow to withdraw from it until they believe they have substantially transformed it in their own image. They profess indifference to the world and claim they just want to be left alone even as they seek daily to shape the behavior of billions of people around the globe. The jostling for status and influence among these ambitious nations and would-be nations is a second defining feature of the new post-Cold War international system. Nationalism in all its forms is back, if it ever went away, and so is international competition for power, influence, honor, and status. American predominance prevents these rivalries from intensifying -- its regional as well as its global predominance. Were the United States to diminish its influence in the regions where it is currently the strongest power, the other nations would settle disputes as great and lesser powers have done in the past: sometimes through diplomacy and accommodation but often through confrontation and wars of varying scope, intensity, and destructiveness. One novel aspect of such a multipolar world is that most of these powers would possess nuclear weapons. That could make wars between them less likely, or it could simply make them more catastrophic. It is easy but also dangerous to underestimate the role the United States plays in providing a measure of stability in the world even as it also disrupts stability. For instance, the United
States is the dominant naval power everywhere, such that other nations cannot compete with it even in their home waters. They either happily or grudgingly allow the United States Navy to be the guarantor of international waterways and trade routes, of international access to markets and raw materials such as oil. Even when the United States engages in a war, it is able to play its role as guardian of the waterways. In a more genuinely multipolar world, however, it would not. Nations would compete for naval dominance at least in their own regions and possibly beyond. Conflict between nations would involve struggles on the oceans as well as on land. Armed embargos, of the kind used in World War i and other major conflicts, would disrupt trade flows in a way that is now impossible. Such order as exists in the world rests not merely on the goodwill of peoples but on a foundation provided by American power. Even the European Union, that great geopolitical miracle, owes its founding to American power, for without it the European nations after World War ii would never have felt secure enough to reintegrate Germany. Most Europeans recoil at the thought, but even today Europe 's stability depends on the guarantee, however distant and one hopes unnecessary, that the United States could step in to
check any dangerous development on the continent. In a genuinely multipolar world, that would not be possible without renewing the danger of world war. People who believe greater equality among nations would be preferable to the present American predominance often succumb to a basic logical fallacy. They believe the order the world enjoys today exists independently of American power. They imagine that in a world where American power was diminished, the aspects of international order that they like would remain in place. But that 's not the way it works. International order does not rest on ideas and institutions. It is shaped by configurations of power. The international order we know today reflects the distribution of power in the world since World War ii, and especially since the end of the Cold War. A different configuration of power, a multipolar world in which the poles were Russia, China, the United States, India, and Europe, would produce its own kind of order, with different rules and norms reflecting the interests of the powerful states that would have a hand in shaping it. Would that international order be an improvement? Perhaps for Beijing and Moscow it would. But it is doubtful that it would suit the tastes of enlightenment liberals in the United States and Europe. The current order, of course, is not only far from perfect but also offers no guarantee against major conflict among the world 's great powers. Even under the umbrella of unipolarity, regional conflicts involving the large powers may erupt. War could erupt between China and Taiwan and draw in both the United States and Japan. War could erupt
between Russia and Georgia, forcing the United States and its European allies to decide whether to intervene or suffer the consequences of a Russian victory. Conflict between India and Pakistan remains possible, as does conflict between Iran and Israel or other Middle Eastern states. These, too, could draw in other great powers, including the United States. Such conflicts may be unavoidable no matter what policies the United States pursues. SDI 2010 21 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE [Card Continues No Text Removed] SCO 1AC
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But they are more likely to erupt if the United States weakens or withdraws from its positions of regional dominance. This is especially true in East Asia, where most nations agree that a reliable American power has a stabilizing and pacific effect on the region. That is certainly the view of most of China 's neighbors. But even China, which seeks gradually to supplant the United States as the dominant power in the region, faces the dilemma that an American withdrawal could unleash an ambitious, independent, nationalist Japan. In Europe, too, the departure of the United States from the scene -- even if it remained the world's most powerful nation -- could be destabilizing. It could tempt Russia to an even more overbearing and potentially forceful approach to unruly
nations on its periphery. Although some realist theorists seem to imagine that the disappearance of the Soviet Union put an end to the possibility of confrontation between Russia and the West, and therefore to the need for a permanent American role in Europe, history suggests that conflicts in Europe involving Russia are possible even without Soviet communism. If the United States withdrew from Europe -- if it adopted what some call a strategy of "offshore balancing" -- this could in time increase the likelihood of conflict involving Russia and its near neighbors, which could in turn draw the United States back in under unfavorable circumstances. It is also optimistic to imagine that a retrenchment of the American position in the Middle East and the assumption of a more passive, "offshore" role would lead to greater stability there. The vital interest the United States has in access to oil and the role it plays in keeping access open to other nations in Europe and Asia make it unlikely that American leaders could or would stand back and hope for the best while the powers in the region battle it out. Nor would a more "even-handed" policy toward Israel, which some see as the magic key to unlocking peace, stability, and comity in the Middle East, obviate the need to come to Israel 's aid if its security became threatened. That commitment, paired with the American commitment to protect strategic oil supplies for most of the world, practically ensures a heavy American military presence in the region, both on the seas and on the ground. The subtraction of American power from any region would not end conflict but would simply change the equation. In the Middle East, competition for influence among powers both inside and outside the region has raged for at least two centuries. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism doesn 't change this. It only adds a new and more threatening dimension to the competition, which neither a sudden end to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians nor an immediate American withdrawal from Iraq would change. The alternative to American predominance in the region is not balance and peace. It is further competition. The region and the states within it remain relatively weak. A diminution of American influence would not be followed by a diminution of other external influences. One could expect deeper involvement by both China and Russia, if only to secure their interests. 18 And one could also expect the more powerful states of the region, particularly Iran, to expand and fill the vacuum. It is doubtful that any American administration would voluntarily take actions that could shift the balance of power in the Middle East further toward Russia, China, or Iran. The world hasn 't changed that much. An American withdrawal from Iraq will not return things to "normal" or to a new kind of stability in the region. It will produce a new instability, one likely to draw the United States back in again. The alternative to American regional predominance in the Middle East and elsewhere is not a new regional stability. In an era of burgeoning nationalism, the future is likely to be one of intensified competition among nations and nationalist movements. Difficult as it may be to extend American predominance into the future, no one should imagine that a reduction of American
power or a retraction of American influence and global involvement will provide an easier path. SDI 2010 22 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE Iran 1AC
The surge has inflamed Iranian fears of American military presence, power-bombing cooperation on drugs, the insurgency and terrorism Mitra Farnik is the pseudonym of an Iranian writer and political analyst based in Washington DC Jan. 15th , 2009 http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/LA15Ak02.html Accessed 7.13.10
Though Tehran shares Washington's desire for the Taliban to be neutralized, it is wary of an increased American military presence in Afghanistan, even if this is aimed at achieving such a goal. Since the 2001 United States invasion of Afghanistan, the US and Iran have engaged in a complicated competition for influence that has been swayed by events on the ground in Afghanistan but also ideological battles inside both Iran and America. This competition has been tempered by the reality of shared interests and objectives between Washington and Tehran that include the establishment of security and the removal of al-Qaeda and the Taliban from Afghanistan, reconstruction of the country, and the fight against narcotics. These shared interests created an optimistic atmosphere with the election of Obama to the US presidency, the priority he gave to the security of Afghanistan, and the appointment of Richard Holbrooke as special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Iran's participation and Holbrooke's encounter with Iran's Deputy foreign Minister Mehdi Akhundzadeh at a conference on Afghanistan on April 1, 2009, was seen as a promising sign regarding future cooperation between Iran and other world powers on how to deal with the deepening problems in Afghanistan. However, events in both Afghanistan and Iran, including contested elections, as well the decision by the Obama administration to send more American troops to Afghanistan, in all likelihood have further delayed the prospects of TehranWashington cooperation in that country despite shared interests. SDI 2010 23 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE Iran 1AC
Troop withdrawal is Iran's biggest sticking point toward greater cooperation in Afghanistan, gradual withdrawal is key --- its vital to prevent drug trafficking and instability in Afghanistan and Pakistan
Hillary Mann Leverett is CEO of Strategic Energy and Global Analysis (STRATEGA), a political risk consultancy, 7/8 2010 http://www.raceforiran.com/iran%E2%80%99s-strategic-stake-in-afghanistan-hillary-mann-leverett-inforeign-policy Accessed 7.12.10
On Iran's core interests in Afghanistan: "Iran years. has a strategic stake in Afghanistan that has not changed in the last nine Tehran's overriding interest is to prevent Afghanistan (with its long and lawless border with Iran) from being used as a platform from which to attack or undermine the Islamic Republic or to weaken Iran's
standing as a regional power. To prevent Afghanistan from being used as an anti-Iranian platform, the Islamic Republic has worked, over many years, to form relationships with Afghan players who could keep Iran's Afghan enemies (principally the Taliban but also other anti-Shiite and anti-Persian groups) and their external supporters (principally Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, two of Iran's most important regional antagonists) in check. To this end, Iran has worked to strengthen and unite Afghanistan's Shiite Hazara and other Dari/Persian-speaking communities (which together comprise about 45 percent of the population) as a counterweight to anti-Iranian, pro-Saudi, and pro-Pakistani elements among Afghan Pashtuns (roughly 42 percent of the population). The Hazara and other Dari/Persian-speaking communities were, of course, the core of the Northern Alliance that fought the Taliban during the 1990s, and were supported by India and Russia as well as Iran." On allegations of Iranian support for the Taliban: "Iran knows from bitter experience that the Hazara and the other Dari/Persian-speaking communities provide, at best, inadequate protection for Iranian interests in Afghanistan, because they cannot govern the country in a way that keeps it relatively stable and minimizes Pakistani and Saudi influence. So, alongside its alliances with the Hazara and the other Dari/Persian-speaking groups, Iran has also cultivated ties to some Pashtun elements in Afghanistan and supported the country's Pashtun President, Hamid Karzai. As part of its cultivation of ties to Pashtun elements, Iran has almost certainly reached out to some Taliban factions. But I would wager a substantial sum that America's `ally' Pakistan is providing vastly more support to the Afghan Taliban than anything the Islamic Republic might be doing. And Tehran remains strongly opposed to the Taliban's resurgence as a major force in Afghan politics, for two reasons. First, the Taliban have traditionally persecuted Iran's Afghan allies--especially the Shia Hazara--and have even murdered Iranian diplomats. Second, Tehran sees the Taliban as a pawn for the expansion of Pakistani and Saudi influence in Afghanistan... In the political and security vacuum that is today's Afghanistan, Karzai's effort to engage the Taliban is generating deep unease among Iran's allies in Afghanistan's Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara communities. Already, the leadership of these non-Pashtun communities--who also dominate the upper echelons of the Afghan military --are organizing to resist, by force, any serious attempt at power-sharing between Karzai's government and the Taliban. If the Taliban's political influence across Afghanistan continues to grow--particularly in an environment conditioned by what Tehran sees as America's strategic and tactical incompetence--Iran will support its Afghan allies as they `push back' against a resurgent Taliban." [Note from Flynt Leverett: The Washington Post's Colum Lynch reported this week on his "Turtle Bay" blog at www.ForeignPolicy.com that the Obama Administration's "Afpak" special envoy Richard Holbrooke is in New York this week "to help Afghanistan negotiate the removal of select Taliban members from a U.N. anti-terror blacklist, according to senior U.N.-based officials".] On the complementarity of Iranian and U.S. goals in Afghanistan: "As Tehran pursues this strategy of multiple alliances within Afghanistan, it must also assess the evolving role of the United States there and the implications of the U.S. posture toward Iran for Iran's Afghanistan policy. If the United States and NATO could convince Iran that they want an independent and stable Afghanistan that would be friendly to Iran, then U.S./NATO and Iranian strategies and tactics could complement each other very constructively. (This was very much the case in the months following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, when I was one of a small number of U.S. officials engaged in ongoing discussions with Iranian counterparts about how to deal with Afghanistan and al-Qaeda, and U.S. and Iranian policies regarding these issues were rather closely coordinated.) But, if Tehran perceives Washington as hostile to its interests--which, unfortunately, is currently the case, given the Obama administration's drive to impose sanctions and continued use of covert operations to undermine the Islamic Republic--then Iranian policymakers will regard the United States, along with America's Pakistani and Saudi allies, as part of the complex of anti-Iranian external players that Iran needs to balance against in Afghanistan. In this context, Iran has a strong interest in preventing U.S. troops in Afghanistan from being used to attack Iran directly, used as covert operatives to undermine the Iranian government, or used to strengthen Iran's regional rivals." On Iran's reaction to a drawdown in U.S. military forces in Afghanistan: "In
contrast to the United States, which seems at least to be looking for a viable exit strategy from Afghanistan, there is no exit strategy for Iran. Iran publicly calls for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan, partly because U.S. forces there could be used against Iran. But Tehran also calls for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan because Iranian policymakers believe that the extended U.S. presence there is seen by much of the population as an occupation and that it is this occupation which is fueling an increasingly fierce cycle of violence and instability. From Tehran's perspective, this cycle of violence and instability empowers Iran's Afghan adversaries,
principally the Taliban, and their external backers, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, both of which are regional rivals to the Islamic Republic. [Card Continues No Text Removed] SDI 2010 24 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE Iran 1AC
[Card Continues No Text Removed] From an Iranian standpoint, the most constructive American strategy would have been for the United States to begin a gradual but steady withdrawal of troops a few years ago when that could have helped shape a
political settlement based on power sharing among all of Afghanistan's major constituencies. From an Iranian perspective, such a settlement could have included the Pashtun, though, at least at the time, not necessarily the Taliban, and would have given Iran's Afghan allies--who, at the time, were also America's allies--the upper hand. Today, Iran is concerned that, as America belatedly positions itself to begin withdrawing forces from Afghanistan next year, the Obama administration still has no coherent strategy regarding President Karzai's drive for a political deal--a deal which, because of mistakes made by Washington, must now include the Taliban and its chief external backers, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia... Iran is concerned that the United States' interest in fostering sufficient stability in Afghanistan for long enough to allow U.S. troops to begin leaving next year will lead Washington to drop the "red lines" it has imposed on Taliban participation in a political process. Iran is concerned that Pakistan and Saudi Arabia will be able to use the Taliban's unchecked involvement in a power-sharing arrangement as a proxy to expand their influence in Afghanistan at Tehran's expense and to threaten the Islamic Republic. Under these circumstances, Iran will intensify its support for key players among the Hazara, Tajik, and Uzbek groups, just as it did during the civil war that broke out after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and after the Taliban took power in Kabul in 1996. These dynamics raise the risks of renewed civil war in Afghanistan--a civil war that would simultaneously be a proxy war among Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, the country's most powerful external players. These were precisely the conditions under which al-Qaeda found sanctuary and thrived in Afghanistan Post-conflict stabilization in Afghanistan requires recognizing and working with the integral connections between Afghanistan's internal balance of power and the broader balance of power among major states in the Middle East, Central Asia, and South Asia. And that means cooperation with Iran is essential to stabilizing Afghanistan and, by extension, Pakistan. Following 9/11, Iran worked with the United States on the short-term project of
during the 1990s." On Iran and post-conflict stabilization in Afghanistan: " overthrowing the Taliban--but with the long-term goal of prompting Washington to reconsider its hostile posture toward the Islamic Republic. In effect, the Iranians hoped that cooperation with the United States would facilitate a U.S.-Iranian "grand bargain"--but this approach did not work, largely because of American resistance to a broader opening to Iran. Cooperation in Afghanistan spills over --- improves overall relations and cooperation in other areas --- specifically solves drug trafficking Rensselaer Lee, Senior Fellow @ the Foreign Policy Research Institute and President of Global Advisory Services, July 7th, 2006, Baltimore Sun Though increasingly at odds on nuclear proliferation and other issues, the United States and Iran have strong incentives to cooperate in one area of mutual concern: containment of Afghanistan's $2.8 billion opium and heroin business, the world's largest. Iran's interest in the matter is obvious: About 60 percent of Afghan opiate exports (opium, morphine and heroin) cross into Iran each year en route to consumers in Russia, Europe and Iran itself. An estimated 3 million Iranians, 4 percent to 5 percent of the entire population, consume opiates, the largest
percentage of any country. Accordingly, Iran has to spend as much as $800 million each year, or 1.3 percent of its budget, on drug control, about twice as much in relative terms as the United States. The U.S. interest relates largely to its nation-building objectives in Afghanistan, which are under constant threat from the centrifugal forces unleashed by the drug trade. As many observers have noted, access to drug-related funds supports the pretensions of assorted regional warlords and renascent Taliban insurgents, hampering the central government's ability to extend its writ beyond Kabul. Additionally, Afghanistan's role as pre-eminent supplier of heroin to the European market heightens the interest of Washington's coalition partners in containing Afghan drug flows. Because of Afghanistan's difficulties in suppressing the drug traffic, which now accounts for an estimated one-third of the country's total (licit and illicit) gross domestic product, U.S. officials see stepped-up enforcement on the borders of neighboring states as a near-term necessity. Washington provides some law enforcement assistance to Pakistan and to Central Asian states. But a containment strategy is unlikely to work effectively unless coordinated with Iran, which is the transit country of choice for Afghan drug smugglers . Iran also might be brought into a
long-term partnership with the coalition in scaling back Afghan poppy cultivation, the source of more than 90 percent of the world's opiates - for example, by contributing to underfunded crop substitution and alternative programs for poppy farmers. Some currents of U.S. official opinion might welcome direct engagement with Iran on drugs. This year, the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs issued a glowing report on Iran's anti-drug performance. The report cited "overwhelming evidence" of Iran's commitment to ensure that drugs leaving Afghanistan don't reach its citizens and its "sustained national political will" in combating drug production and trafficking. Of course, the United States lacks direct diplomatic ties with Iran and maintains no counter narcotics presence or initiatives in that country. Yet the absence of such ties does not preclude a relationship on drugs. For example, the U.S. Interests Section in Havana includes a Coast Guard "drug information specialist"; Cuba and the United States cooperate in maritime interdiction operations; and agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration visit the island to interview and extract information from foreign drug traffickers held in Cuban prisons. A U.S.-Iranian dialogue on drugs wouldn't necessarily solve Iran's drug abuse problems or mitigate the burgeoning authority crisis in Afghanistan. Also, Iran and the United States might differ in even a modicum of cooperation in an area of significant international concern would be a major step forward. Unlike the Cuban case, in which diplomacy is hostage to entrenched domestic interests, such cooperation might lay the groundwork for improved relations in other areas, or at least create a better atmosphere for more consequential exchanges on nuclear-strategic issues.
their expectations of the type of political order that should take shape in that country. Yet SDI 2010 25 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE SDI 2010 26 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE Iran 1AC
Two Impacts --- 1st --- Drug Trafficking --Failure to control opium tanks Iran's economy and stability Lionel Beehner, 9-14-06, Council on Foreign Relations, Afghanistan's Role in Iran's Drug Problem The recent boom in Afghan opium production, propelled by a resurgent Taliban, has had an increasing impact on Iranians--both young and old--across the border. Iran has an estimated 3 million drug users and "by many accounts, the world's worst heroin problem," says Peter Reuter, a drug expert and professor at the University of Maryland. The rise in drug use and smuggling has strained Iran's police forces and prisons, as well as its economy, and aggravated rifts along the population's main fault lines: young versus old, religious versus
secular, modernist versus traditional. Drug abuse in Iran often gets overshadowed by other issues--namely Tehran's nuclear program--but experts say, if left unchecked, it may leave Iran with large social, demographic, and health problems for generations. SDI 2010 27 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE Iran 1AC
Economic collapse causes Iranian adventurism Asia Times '07 (May 30th -- http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/IE30Ak03.html) What strategic consequences ensue from Iran's economic misery? Broadly speaking, the choices are two.
In the most benign scenario, Iran's clerical establishment will emulate the Soviet Union of 1987, when then-prime minister Mikhail Gorbachev acknowledged that communism had led Russia to the brink of ruin in the face of vibrant economic growth among the United States and its allies. Russia no longer had the resources to sustain an arms race with the US, and broke down under the pressure of America's military buildup. The second choice is an imperial adventure. In fact, Iran is engaged in such an adventure, funding and
arming Shi'ite allies from Basra to Beirut, and creating clients selectively among such Sunnis as Hamas in Palestine. I continue to predict that Iran will gamble on adventure rather than go the way of Gorbachev. A fundamental difference in sociology distinguishes Iran from the
Soviet Union at the cusp of the Cold War. Josef Stalin's terror saw to it that the only communist true believers left alive were lecturing at Western universities. All the communists in Russia were dead or in the gulags. By the 1980s, only the most cowardly, self-seeking, unprincipled careerists had survived to hold positions of seniority in the communist establishment. Only in the security services were a few hard and dedicated men still active, including Vladimir Putin. These were men who saw no reason to fight for communism 70 years after the Russian Revolution. The US would intervene to secure Caspian oil interests Sokolsky & Lesser `2K (Richard,- Distinguished Research Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University and Ian,- director of studies at the Pacific Council on International Policyhttp://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1245/MR1245.ch2.pdf)
Over the next ten to fifteen years, a variety of threats could interfere with Western access to energy supplies from the Persian Gulf, the Caspian Basin, and North Africa. They include: military aggression in which critical oil production and transportation facilities are seized by Iraq or Iran; civil wars, coups, internal upheaval, and terrorism that would shut down the flow of energy from major energyproducing regions for a prolonged period; regional and domestic conflicts that would reduce but not halt energy supplies; and decisions by national governments that could curtail oil production and exports, thus affecting geopolitical alignments in critical regions. These distinctions are important because they would affect perceptions of energy security and hence decisions by allied governments to use force to ensure access to energy supplies. The first threat, invasion with a view toward controlling key oil-producing installations, remains a key focus of U.S. defense planning. The consequences of these facilities' falling under the control of a government hostile to Western interests merit continued vigilance on the part of the West to ensure that such an invasion continues to be deterred or, if it happens, that the invasion could be halted before achieving its goal. The impact is nuclear conflict Blank `2K
(Expert on the post-Soviet world at the Strategic Studies Institute, 2000 Stephen J., "US Military Engagement with Transcaucasia and Central Asia," June, http://www.milnet.com/pentagon/Russia-2000-assessment-SSI.pdf) In 1993 Moscow even threatened World War III to deter Turkish intervention on behalf of Azerbaijan. Yet the new Russo-Armenian Treaty and Azeri-Turkish treaty suggest that Russia and Turkey could be dragged into a confrontation to rescue their allies from defeat. 72 Thus many of the conditions for conventional war or protracted ethnic conflict in which third parties intervene are present in the Transcaucasus. For example, many Third World conflicts generated by local structural factors have a great potential for unintended escalation. Big powers often feel obliged to rescue their lesser proteges and proxies. One or another big power may fail to grasp the other side's stakes since interests here are not as clear as in Europe. Hence commitments involving the use of nuclear weapons to prevent a client's defeat are not as well established or apparent. Clarity about the nature of the threat could prevent the kind of rapid and almost uncontrolled escalation we saw
in 1993 when Turkish noises about intervening on behalf of Azerbaijan led Russian leaders to threaten a nuclear war in that case. 73 Precisely because Turkey is a NATO ally, Russian nuclear threats could trigger a potential nuclear blow (not a small possibility given the erratic nature of Russia's declared nuclear strategies). The real threat of a Russian nuclear strike against Turkey to defend Moscow's interests and forces in the Transcaucasus makes the danger of major war there higher than almost everywhere else. As Richard Betts has observed, The greatest danger lies in areas where (1) the potential
for serious instability is high; (2) both superpowers perceive vital interests; (3) neither recognizes that the other's perceived interest or commitment is as great as its own; (4) both have the capability to inject conventional forces; and, (5) neither has willing proxies capable of SDI 2010 28 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE
settling the situation.74 Iran 1AC
Refugee flows from Iranian instability spills-into China causing Uighurs to spark internal strife. Swaine '06
(as internally quoted in this Radio Free Europe piece. Michael Swaine specializes in Chinese security and foreign policy at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace RFE April 19th -http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/04/91cc6541-2efa-4cad-b668-9aaf6226a96a.html) Looking For Support On Iran. Iran may not be as close a neighbor to China as North Korea, Swaine said, but trouble in Tehran could mean trouble with Muslim Uighurs in western China. "North Korea is right on [China's] border, and that represents a major threat of instability that they don't want to have to deal with," Swaine said. "And Iran also is not at all far from their border and represents, in its position in the Islamic world and in terms of Islamic fundamentalism, a potential threat for the Chinese in the western parts of their country, and they don't want to have that kind of increase in Islamic fundamentalism as a result of a meltdown in Iran or some increasing instability threaten their interests in that areas as well." That causes Taiwan to move for independence, triggering US/China war Klintworth `94 (Gary, Fmr Senior Rsrch Northeast Asia Project Australian Journal of International Affairs Nov., p. 219)
China also has many problems, not least the degradation of its environment, population pressure, rising expectations, infrastructural bottlenecks, political factionalism, the Deng succession, a crisis of legitimacy for the Chinese Communist Party, the politics of corruption, regional disparities, a rising crime rate, the erosion of state authority and roving masses, numbering up to 130 million, of underemployed or dissatisfied peasants in several inland provinces.45 There are demands for independence by ethnic minorities in Tibet and Xinjiang. Given these considerations, it is by no means certain that the country will remain intact, and it
may be premature, therefore, to talk about China as a great power that can dominate the neighboring region or project power and influence far from its physical borders.46 The breakup of China or at the very least a weak government in Beijing, might unleash fissiparous tendencies in China's outer regions, including Taiwan and Hong Kong. This could trigger intervention by outside powers, such as Japan, the US, Britain and India that in turn, would provoke a
strong military response from the PLA, if it was not meanwhile distracted trying to maintain law and order in the cities. The possibilities are endless and that is why, of the two alternatives, a disintegrating China poses the greatest risk to regional and global security. SDI 2010 29 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE Iran 1AC
2nd --- Relations --- US-Iran Relations are key to prevent Middle East War Dr. Nasser Hadian, Professor of Political Science, Tehran University Visiting Professor, Columbia University, 10-28- 2003, Federal
Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony, Iran: Security Threats & U.S. Policy Iran's Centrality and the Myth of Isolation: Iran is the most important linkage state in the Middle East. For the reasons of its geography, its revolution and ambitions, and its peculiar and jealously guarded sense of independence and thus centrality, all issues of importance in the Middle East from the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, proliferation, terrorism, future of Iraq, stability in Afghanistan, future of relations between Islam and the West, regional political change and reform, Persian Gulf security, to access to secure energy both in the Persian Gulf and the Caspian, etc., either by default or design, run in one way or the other, through Iran. Isolation of Iran is not an option. What underscores this centrality is the significance of US-Iran relations in
shaping Middle East dynamics; no other factor in the last 25 years has had a more transformative impact on this region than the Iranian revolution and the hostile nature of US-Iranian relations. Middle East instability results in global escalation and nuclear use Ian O. Lesser, Woodrow Wilson Center Public Policy Scholar and Adjunct Staff Member @ Rand, 2004, The Future Security Environment in the Middle East Several factors contribute to the prominence of WMD and ballistic missiles in Middle Eastern security today. First, the Middle East is the place where unconventional weapons and missiles have been used, at least in a limited, tactical fashion, in modern conflict. Egypt employed chemical weapons in Yemen in the 1960s, and Libya is alleged to have used them in
Chad. They were reportedly employed in Afghanistan and, more recently, in Sudan. Iraq used them against the Kurds, and they were employed on a large scale by both sides in the Iran-Iraq war. Missiles were used in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war (Egyptian Scuds and Syrian Frog-7s), in the "war of the cities" between Iran and Iraq, in the civil war in Yemen, and during the 1991 Gulf War. They have been fired, ineffectively, at Italian territory by Libya. Threats to employ these systems are a regular feature of confrontation in the region, and on its periphery. Second, even without use, the Middle East is a leading area of proliferation. Most of the world's leading WMD
proliferators are arrayed along an arc stretching from North Africa to Pakistan (and nuclear and missile tests in South Asia may affect proliferation norms in the Middle East). The presence of active conflicts and flashpoints across the region means that the possession of WMD is not just a matter of national prestige and strategic weight, but a very real factor in military balances and warfighting. Third, the prominence of WMD in the Middle Eastern security environment is accompanied by great uncertainty about the motivations and strategic culture of regional actors. The ways
of thinking about WMD, especially nuclear weapons and missiles, developed during the Cold War, are often assumed to have less relevance in a Middle Eastern setting. The question of whether "rogue" proliferators will act rationally and can be deterred in the conventional sense is unclear. In this and other contexts, the prospect of conflict involving WMD in the Middle East raises a variety of uncomfortable issues for Western strategists, and presumably for regional actors themselves. The ongoing Palestinian-Israeli confrontation, with the risk of regional escalation, lends greater weight and immediacy to these issues. Fourth, the
pace and character of WMD proliferation in the Middle East is of intense interest to extraregional actors. Russia, China, North Korea, and potentially others are leading suppliers of weapons, materials, and the technological know-how for developing indigenous capabilities. Pursuit of Middle East peace and access to the region's energy supplies are extraordinarily prominent issues in international affairs, and will compel continued American and Western attention. For these and other reasons, the region is demanding of Western military presence and intervention. Proliferation can interact with the Middle East peace process and stability in the Gulf and the Mediterranean. The potential for new nuclear powers in the region, coupled with the deployment of missiles of increasing range, could profoundly alter the calculus of Western intervention and engagement in the Middle East. So, too, could a shift
to a "world of defenses," operationally and strategically. And as the 2003 war against Iraq shows, the issue of WMD possession and potential use can be a casus belli in its own right. Finally, and to a growing extent, American concerns about WMD capabilities in the Middle East reflect a more profound concern about the security of the U.S. homeland itself, especially after September 11. The prominence of international terrorism with ties to the Middle East together with the growing lethality of the "new terrorism" pose the risk of terrorist use of WMD on American territory. The easy mobility of people, materials, and technology means that proliferation in the Middle East is not a remote phenomenon for the United States and its allies. Whether delivered by missiles or couriers, highly destructive weapons are the most dramatic illustration of the transregional character of the new security environment. The growing reach of these weapons challenges traditional notions of regional security. Asia, the Middle East, Europe, Eurasia, and the Western Hemisphere are now far more interdependent in security terms. The spread of WMD in the Middle East affects security on a global basis, and developments far afield can influence patterns of proliferation inside the region. SDI 2010 30 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE SDI 2010 31 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE ***Inherency Extensions*** Failure Inevitable
The U.S. cannot defeat the Taliban requires 100,000 reinforcements minimum Dorronsoro, scholar at the Carnegie Endowment expert on Afghanistan, 2009 Gilles Dorronsoro, a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment, is an expert on Afghanistan, Turkey, and South Asia. His research focuses on security and political development in Afghanistan, particularly the role of the International Security Assistance Force, the necessary steps for a viable government in Kabul, and the conditions necessary for withdrawal scenarios. Previously, Dorronsoro was a professor of political science at the Sorbonne, Paris and the Institute of Political Studies of Rennes. He also served as the scientific coordinator at the French Institute of Anatolian Studies in Istanbul, Turkey. "The Taliban's Winning Strategy in Afghanistan" http://carnegieendowment.org/files/taliban_winning_strategy.pdf The Taliban's strength explains why the reinforcements sent in 2009 (21,000 troops) cannot beat the Taliban in their southern and eastern strongholds. Sealing the border would be politically difficult, and the burden of doing so would fall primarily on the United States. In addition, it would take time, since the Taliban have the momentum. Defeating the Taliban would require at least 100,000 new reinforcements as long as the AfghanPakistani border remained open to insurgents. Neither the United States nor NATO is willing or able to pay the human and fiscal costs of reinforcements at this level. Even if they were, sealing the border would be extremely difficult in political and military terms and would take considerable time. There would also be a risk of the situation in the North deteriorating significantly in the meantime. Indeed, under the current strategy of concentrating new forces in the South and East, the Taliban will move the insurgency to the North. SDI 2010 32 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE Failure Inevitable
Escalation in Afghanistan empirically can't quell terrorism Karzai government, Pakistan sanctuary and loss of allied support make failure inevitable Walt and Belfer, Professor if International Affairs at Harvard and editor at Foreign Policy, 2009
Stephen M. Walt is Robert and Renee Belfer Professor of International Affairs at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government and a contributing editor at Foreign Policy. The Nation: Afghanistan: No Reason to Stay, December 2009 l/n We know the price will be high. The United States has spent more than $223 billion on the Afghan war since 2001, and it now costs roughly $65 billion annually. The actual bill will be significantly higher, however, as these figures omit the replacement cost of military equipment, veterans' benefits and other war-related expenses. Most important, more than 850 U.S. soldiers have already been killed and several thousand have been seriously wounded. And we are not close to winning. The Obama administration admits that the challenges are "daunting," and a recent pro-war report from the Center for American Progress said success will require "prolonged U.S. engagement using all elements of U.S. national power" for "as long as another 10 years." Success also requires creating an army and police force larger than the Afghan government can afford, which means Kabul will need U.S. assistance indefinitely. The bottom line: Staying in Afghanistan will cost many more dead American soldiers-and, inevitably, Afghan civilians-and hundreds of billions of additional dollars. But might the benefits be worth the costs? President Obama says we have to prevent Afghanistan from becoming "an even larger safe haven from which al-Qaeda would plot to kill more Americans." But defeating the Taliban in Afghanistan isn't the key to thwarting al-Qaeda. Indeed, even if our counterinsurgency and nation-building efforts exceed all expectations, the Afghan government will still have only limited authority over much of the country and will be unable to prevent al-Qaeda cells from relocating there. Moreover, al-Qaeda doesn't need lots of territory or elaborate bases to plot attacks and other conspiracies; all it needs are safe houses in various parts of the world and a supply of potential martyrs. Al-Qaeda clones already exist in Yemen, Somalia and elsewhere; so denying its founders a "safe haven" in Afghanistan will not make that network less lethal. If al-Qaeda is our main concern, fighting in Afghanistan is increasingly a distraction. Finally, America's odds of winning this war are slim. The Karzai government is corrupt, incompetent and resistant to reform. The Taliban have sanctuaries in Pakistan and can hide among the local populace, making it possible for them simply to outlast us. Pakistan has backed the Afghan Taliban in the past and is not a reliable partner now. Our European allies are war-weary and looking for the exits. The more troops we send and the more we interfere in Afghan affairs, the more we look like foreign occupiers and the more resistance we will face. There is therefore little reason to expect a U.S. victory. Fortunately, pulling U.S. troops out of Afghanistan will not make al-Qaeda stronger. If the Taliban regain power, they may conclude it is too risky to let Osama bin Laden return. But even if they did, a backward and landlocked country like Afghanistan is a poor location from which to attack the United States, which is why the 9/11 plot was conducted out of Hamburg, Germany. If al-Qaeda's founders have to hide somewhere, better in Afghanistan than anywhere else. And hide they will, because Afghanistan won't be a safe haven. Bin Laden could operate somewhat freely there before 9/11, because the United States wasn't going after him all-out. Those days are long gone. The Taliban will not be able to protect him from U.S. commandos, cruise missiles and armed drones. He and his henchmen will always have to stay in hiding, which is why even an outright Taliban victory will not enhance their position very much. In short, U.S. victory in Afghanistan won't put an end to al-Qaeda, and getting out won't make it more dangerous. And if the outcome in Afghanistan has little effect on the threat al-Qaeda poses, there is little reason to squander more American blood and treasure there. Obama's decision should be easy, given that the costs of the war are rising, the benefits are few and the odds of success are small. If he explains that calculus to the American people and says it is time to leave, most of them will agree. SDI 2010 33 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE Withdrawal Inevitable
Dips in violence are unsustainable the U.S. will lose poverty, corruption, and tribal divisions make nation building impossible Innocent and Carpenter, foreign policy analyst and vp for defense and foreign policy at the Cato Institute, 2009 Malou Innocent is a foreign policy analyst at the Cato Institute who focuses on Afghanistan and Pakistan. Ted Galen Carpenter, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at Cato, is the author of 8 and the editor of 10 books on international affairs. His most recent book is Smart Power: Toward a Prudent Foreign Policy for America. Escaping the Graveyard of Empires: A Strategy to Exit Afghanistan, Cato Institute 2009 The infusion of additional troops and the change of top-level commanders might dampen violence in the near term, but the intractable insurgency in the Afghanistan- Pakistan border region, as well as pervasive Afghan government corruption, will plague the country in the long term. Notwithstand- ing the results of Afghanistan's recent presidential elections, U.S. policy in the region was already committed to transforming what is a deeply divided, poverty stricken, tribal-based society into a self-sufficient, non-corrupt, sta- ble democracy. Such a project would require a multi-decade commitment--and even then there would be no assurance of success. In that respect, no tangible gains will outweigh the costs of maintaining such a military presence in this volatile region. The United States should narrow its objectives and start bringing the military mission to a close. SDI 2010 34 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE AT: 2011 Deadline Firm
Transition in 2011 will be based on conditions there is no real timeline for withdrawal LAT 6/16 Los Angeles Times Debate grows over Afghan drawdown plan June 16, 2010 l/n Recent setbacks in Afghanistan have intensified debate over the wisdom of the Obama administration's plan to begin withdrawing U.S. military forces next year and highlighted reservations among military commanders over a rigid timeline. At a Senate hearing Tuesday, Gen. David Petraeus, who oversees U.S. forces in the Mideast and Afghanistan, offered "qualified" support for President Barack Obama's plan to begin withdrawing troops in July 2011. "In a perfect world, Mr. Chairman, we have to be very careful with timelines," Petraeus said under questioning by Sen. Carl Levin, D-Mich., chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, who asked whether he supported the plan. Petraeus explained that the drawdown would be based on conditions in Afghanistan at the time. Levin asked whether his response was "a qualified yes, a qualified no or just a nonanswer?" "A qualified yes, Mr. Chairman," Petraeus responded. The reservation reflects longstanding uneasiness among military officials over the troop withdrawal timeline Obama announced in December. Many military officials have downplayed the significance of the start of the withdrawal and have said the rate of the drawdown would be based on conditions, emphasizing that the U.S. will not leave Afghanistan precipitously. But the timetable has put the military in uncomfortable positions, officials have said, forcing them to reassure skeptical Afghan leaders that U.S. troops will not leave quickly. Troops will leave next summer based on conditions there is no guarantee of a substantial drawdown Star-Ledger 6/18 The Star-Ledger (Newark, New Jersey) Stick to the deadline in Afghanistan June 18, 2010 l/n When he ordered his escalation of the war in Afghanistan, President Obama pledged that U.S. troops "will begin to come home" in the summer of 2011. Discouraging reports from the war zone should make him more determined to keep his promise -- and Americans more insistent on holding him to it. In his Capitol Hill testimony this week, Gen. David Petraeus -- the godfather of Obama's 30,000-troop Afghanistan surge -- sought mightily to carve out some wiggle room. "We have to be very careful with timelines," he told the Senate Armed Services Committee. The July 2011 deadline for beginning a troop withdrawal depends on the assumption that "conditions" are favorable, Petraeus said. But wait a minute. Another way to describe a withdrawal deadline that is based not on the calendar but on an amorphous and elusive set of "conditions" would be to call it an openended commitment. This is precisely what Obama said he was not giving to Afghanistan's corrupt, feckless and increasingly unreliable government. SDI 2010 35 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE AT: 2011 Deadline Firm
July 2011 is only a transition date Obama has said a significant number of troops will remain in Afghanistan post the deadline Politico 6/24 Politico.com Obama: No hasty Afghan exit June 24, 2010 l/n A day after replacing the top American general in Afghanistan, President Barack Obama said Thursday that U.S. troops could remain in significant numbers in the country well after his withdrawal timeline begins next summer. Though his plan calls for the start of a troop withdrawal in a year, "We did not say, starting in July 2011, suddenly there will be no troops from the United States or allied countries in Afghanistan," Obama said at a joint White House press conference with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev. "We didn't say we'd be switching off the lights and closing the door behind us," Obama said. "We said we'd begin a transition phase that would allow the Afghan government to take more and more responsibility." The answer was Obama's clearest description of his timetable for bringing troops home from the war - a schedule many analysts felt was unrealistic with the Afghanistan conflict growing more violent and difficult to manage. Obama's answer seemed to run counter to the description of the Afghanistan troop-withdrawal timeline Vice President Joe Biden gave to author Jonathan Alter. In a recently-published book on Obama's first year as president, Alter quotes Biden as saying, "in July of 2011, you're going to see a whole lot of people moving out. Bet on it." Biden's office, however, has since downplayed the statement, saying Biden had made a hurried, off-hand remark. Conditions will determine transition rate there is no definite drawdown date Murphy, Capitol Hill Bureau Chief and writer of the column The Capitolist for Politics Daily, 2009
Patricia Murphy is the Capitol Hill Bureau Chief and writer of the column The Capitolist for Politics Daily. She is the founder of Citizen Jane Politics, a non-partisan website for women, and is the former Executive Editor of The American Interest. Prior to working in journalism, she was a Capitol Hill staffer for nine years. She graduated from Vanderbilt University and holds a master's degree with honors from the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism. She has written for The New York Times Wire Service, appears regularly as a political analyst in national media, including CNN, MSNBC and Fox News Channel, and speaks frequently on new media, women voters and politics. Politicsdaily.com: "Obama's Timeline No Guarantee of Afghanistan Withdrawal, Senators Told," Politics Daily" December 2, 2009 http://www.politicsdaily.com/2009/12/02/senators-hammer-defense-chief-gates-and-adm-mullenon-afghanist/ Mullen assured senators of the Pentagon's support for the new strategy, which Obama developed after months of consultation with military and civilian leaders. "Every military leader in the chain of command, as well as those of the Joint Chiefs, was given voice throughout this process, and every one of us used it," Mullen said. As senators began to question the witnesses, the issue of when troops would begin withdrawing from Afghanistan took center stage. Although Obama said Tuesday night, "After 18 months, our troops will begin to come home," he later added, "We will execute this transition responsibly, taking into account conditions on the ground." SDI 2010 36 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE AT: 2011 Deadline Firm
Petraeus is in charge now and he thinks were in Afghanistan for the long haul Cole, professor of modern Middle Eastern and South Asian history at the University of Michigan, 2010 Salon.com via l/n: "How to tell what's what in Afghanistan" February 22, 2010 Monday Gen. David Petraeus, a straight shooter, admitted on "Meet the Press" Sunday that the Afghanistan war will take years and incur high casualties. His implicit defense of President Obama from Dick Cheney on the issues of torture and closing Guantanamo will make bigger headlines, but sooner or later the American public will notice the admission. The country is now evenly divided between those who think the U.S. can and should restore a modicum of stability before getting out, and those who want a quick withdrawal. The Marjah Campaign, the centerpiece of the new counter-insurgency strategy, is over a week old, and some assessment of this new, visible push by the U.S. military in violent Helmand Province is in order. There was never any doubt that the U.S. and NATO would win militarily, fairly easily occupying Marjah and nearby Nad Ali. Marjah at 85,000 or so is a city smaller than Ann Arbor, Michigan. The campaign is only significant in a larger social and political context. The questions are: 2011 does not guarantee withdrawal Murphy, Capitol Hill Bureau Chief and writer of the column The Capitolist for Politics Daily, 2009 Patricia Murphy is the Capitol Hill Bureau Chief and writer of the column The Capitolist for Politics Daily. She is the founder of Citizen Jane Politics, a non-partisan website for women, and is the former Executive Editor of The American Interest. Prior to working in journalism, she was a Capitol Hill staffer for nine years. She graduated from Vanderbilt University and holds a master's degree with honors from the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism. She has written for The New York Times Wire Service, appears regularly as a political analyst in national media, including CNN, MSNBC and Fox News Channel, and speaks frequently on new media, women voters and politics. Politicsdaily.com: "Obama's Timeline No Guarantee of Afghanistan Withdrawal, Senators Told," Politics Daily" December 2, 2009 http://www.politicsdaily.com/2009/12/02/senators-hammer-defense-chief-gates-and-adm-mullenon-afghanist/ Later, Sen. John McCain, the top Republican on the committee and the chief architect of the Iraq surge strategy, took Obama to task for announcing a date at all. "A withdrawal date only emboldens al-Qaida and the Taliban while dispiriting our Afghan partners and making it less likely that they will risk their lives to take our side in this fight," McCain said. He then vented to Mullen: "You either have a winning strategy and do as we did in Iraq -- once it's succeeded then we withdraw -- or we, as the president said, we will have a date beginning withdrawal of July 2011. Which is it? It's got to be one or the other." Mullen said Obama's 2011 target would be a "transition" date to begin shifting war-fighting and policing responsibilities to the Afghan government. But it would not necessarily be a date for withdrawal. "July 2011 is a day we start transitioning -- transferring responsibility and transitioning. It's not a date that we're leaving," Mullen said. "And the president also said that it will be based on conditions on the ground." Sen. Joe Lieberman, the independent Democrat on the committee, took a moment to praise Obama's decision as putting "our national security interests ahead of partisan political interests." But he, too, pressed Gates on whether American troops would begin to come home in 2011. "I want to ask you...if I'm correct in concluding that what will definitely begin in July of 2011 is a transfer of security responsibility to the Afghans, but may not include immediately a withdrawal of our forces from Afghanistan?" Lieberman asked Gates. "That is correct," he said. SDI 2010 37 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE AT: 2011 Deadline Firm
Significant US engagement in Afghanistan is likely to extend well beyond July 2011 mineral deposits, ethnic divisions, and Kyrgyzstan complications Srinivasan, Indian journalist ,6/21 Rajeev Srinivasan is an Indian journalist, blogger and Hindu rights activist. He was educated at Indian Institute of Technology, Madras and at Stanford Business School and works in software sales and is a marketing professional. He writes a regular opinion column for Indian web portal Rediff. "Minerals, Ethnic divisions, Kyrgyzstan, Is the US considering a long-term stay in Afghanistan?" http://news.rediff.com/column/2010/jun/21/rajeev-srinivasan-on-americas-afghan-plans.htm June 21, 2010 These are not good times for US President Barack Obama. Hailed as a saviour if not a messiah just 18 months ago, he is now reeling from several crises. The BP oil spell has left him looking incompetent and uncaring. The $1 trillion stimulus package may have avoided a Great Depression, but unemployment hovers near 10 percent. His big achievement, healthcare reform, has left a sour taste with almost all sections of society. But most of all, the Afghanistan quagmire is getting worse. Just this week, seven US soldiers were killed in a single day; the public is getting tired of body bags and elusive promises of success. Maybe there's a rethink. A series of unexpected events took place recently that, if put together, may signal a mid-course correction by the US: A report from the London School of Economics and the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University that emphasised the very high level of co-operation between Pakistan's government, Inter Services Intelligence and the Taliban. A major story in the New York Times about the discovery of large mineral deposits in Afghanistan. Severe ethnic riots, resulting in a breakdown of normal activity, in the republic of Kyrgyzstan, where an important US air force supply base in Manas is used to support the war effort. The resignations of Afghanistan's interior minister and security chief, among other things, taking responsibility for an attack on a loya jirga, but also suggesting a hardening of ethnic differences. Reports that Afghan President Karzai has lost faith in the ability of NATO forces to actually win the war. Reports that the much-anticipated counter-insurgency surge in Marjah, which was hailed at the time as momentous, has bogged down and that the rebels are gaining strength. All these have to be seen in the context of Obama's policy of increasing the number of soldiers on the ground first, and then beginning to wind down the US war effort and withdrawing troops in 2011, just in time to declare victory and use the halo effect to effortlessly win the 2012 presidential elections. That dream is, to put it mildly, in some jeopardy now. The Obama plan was to surge, bribe, declare victory and run like hell. They have done the surge part, and are in the process of bribing (usually the ISI and its pals), but it's not going well. The 'bribees' are not acting as expected -- Afghans seem to be taking the bribes and merrily continuing what they were doing anyway. The US's intent to declare victory and leave requires someone to be the 'keeper', as it were, of Afghanistan. The ISI has volunteered itself for this role. This is why it is intriguing that the LSE/Kennedy School report has come
out at this time. The Kennedy School is close to the US government, and so it is a fair conjecture that the US administration wants to put the screws on someone. At first glance, if you read the litany of things in this report, 'The Sun in the Sky: The relationship between Pakistan's ISI and Afghan insurgents', it sounds like a damning indictment of the ISI which is quite transparently the prime motivator, financier, and provider of cover to the Taliban and related groups. The ISI, says the report, 'orchestrates, supports and strongly influences' them. It 'provides huge support in training, funding, munitions and supplies', which is 'official ISI policy', not the work of some rogue elements. Furthermore, it is not just the ISI, it claims that Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari promised to release jailed Taliban leaders if they kept quiet about it. This amounts to 'collusion with the Taliban by an enemy State (Pakistan)', the bracket in the original. Interesting that an American is calling Pakistan an enemy State, not the trademarked 'major ally in the war on terror'. Unfortunately, the author, Matt Waldman, has the standard simplistic solution to all this: The way to end the ISI's cooperation with the Taliban 'is to address the fundamental causes of Pakistan's insecurity, especially its latent and enduring conflict with India'. Of course, if only India were to give Kashmir to Pakistan, the ISI would stop arming the Taliban, and Americans can go home. Simple! QED. The answer, therefore, is for India to give more: Which might explain Indian Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh's offer to 'walk the extra mile' and the latest euphemism, 'creative solutions' to the Kashmir problem. India must give up territory so that Americans can exit Afghanistan, in return for... exactly what? Eternal love and fellowship? Just like India sacrificed Tibet and got eternal love and friendship? Well, be that as it may, it is also possible that finally the US is recognising the obvious: the ISI has been running with the hares and hunting with the hounds from day one. Maybe the judicious leak is a way of putting the ISI on notice that it had better ratchet things down to some extent. Maybe the Obamistas are actually planning to stay for a while. Such an eventuality would explain why the New York Times, also known to be close to the US government, made such breathless noises about newly-discovered minerals in Afghanistan ('1 trillion worth!', 'Might fundamentally change the war!'). Perhaps Obama has decided that it is not such a good idea to exit in SDI 2010 38 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE 2011, possibly handing the terrorists a morale-boosting victory. This story about minerals is not new -- months ago, I heard about this from the intrepid foreign policy analyst, who goes by the name Pundita. She suggested this meant Americans would stay on: There was no way they would leave all this loot to the Chinese, who have already snapped up a giant copper mine. Perhaps the NYT minerals story is a red herring to divert attention away from the real issue of American failure in Afghanistan.
That failure is evident in the subdued talk about Marjah now; instead of the cocky self-assurance then, there is grim talk now of the difficulty in clearing the area and keeping in clear. No wonder it appears Karzai has lost faith in American staying power -- and even in their military tactics; and he is also probably tired of being painted as the villain and blamed for the failure of American plans. In this context, the resignations of interior minister Hanif Atmar and security chief Amrullah Saleh sent ominous signals. In particular, Saleh, an ex-aide of the assassinated military genius and commander of the Northern Alliance, Ahmed Shah Massoud, appears to have been one of the most competent ministers. And as an ethnic Tajik, his departure may signal increasing ethnic fractures in the Afghan government. It is easy to underestimate the impact of ethnic divisions in Central Asia. There are differences of opinion between the Pashtuns (Karzai is one and so are the Taliban) and the smaller Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara minorities. Sometimes these break into open warfare -- the Taliban, for instance, massacred Hazaras, and that was partly because the latter were Shia, so the Shia-Sunni religious divide can also be potent. A case in point about ethnic divisions is the sudden outburst of rioting and killing in neighboring Kyrgyzstan, where the Kyrgyz are apparently killing Uzbeks (which may be normal in Central Asia where majorities severely oppress minorities). This has an impact on the US -- if Manas air support base becomes less available for operations, it increases the US's dependence on Karachi and the ISI that much more. Thus, nothing seems to be going according to plan, and a gloomy headline in the NY Times suggesting that 'Setbacks cloud US plans to get out of Afghanistan'. No kidding. The Americans may have to accept they are in it for the long term: Afghanistan may not be another Vietnam, but a tar baby. They simply cannot cut and run. They have to clean up this unholy mess of their own making. It is time that America recognised that the problem is not Afghanistan, but the chimera Pakistan, an imaginary homeland. The very existence of Pakistan -- a state with no raison d'etre, is the root cause. The random Durand Line, that slices the Pashtun nation into Afghan and Pakistani areas, was never taken seriously by the Pashtuns, and the British-brokered treaty that created it expired in 1993. Until a united Pashtun nation is created including the appropriate areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan, this problem is going to fester: tribal loyalties run supreme in those mountains. SDI 2010 39 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE AT: 2011 Deadline Firm
US will stay for a long time Petraeus hearing proves Malou Innocent is a foreign policy analyst at the Cato Institute, "Petraeus Not the Only One Fatigued by Afghanistan" June 17, 2010 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/malouinnocent/petraeus-not-the-only-one_b_615620.html. To most people who follow developments in Afghanistan, it was clear that building a viable Afghan state would take more troops, more money, and more patience than the United States and its international partners could ever commit. These long-standing reservations were only intensified last November, when U.S. President Barack Obama announced plans for a 30,000-troop surge that would not only pacify population centers and train Afghan security forces, but also begin to wind down by July 2011--within 18 months of escalation. But at a Senate hearing on Tuesday (before U.S. CENTCOM commander General David Petraeus passed out from dehydration), it became glaringly obvious that "success," if it's even still achievable, will take far longer than July 2011. Under intense questioning from both Sens. Carl Levin and John McCain, Gen. Petraeus explained that the drawdown would be based on conditions at the time, adding, "In a perfect world, Mr. Chairman, we have to be very careful with
timelines." (It's not as if Gen. Petraeus promised the president that he can "train and hand over" the fight to Afghan security forces before next summer... Oh wait, he did.) SDI 2010 40 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE ***Pakistan Advantage Extensions*** Pakistan Advantage Troops Destabilize
Our presence in Afghanistan is destabilizing Pakistan Simpson, former US ambassador, 2009
Dan Simpson retired from the U.S. Foreign Service after 35 years of assignments to countries in Africa, the Middle East and Europe, including as U.S. ambassador to the Central African Republic, ambassador and special envoy to Somalia, and ambassador to the Democratic Republic of Congo. Pittsburgh Post-Gazette (Pennsylvania): Obama's Big Mistake; The Odds of Turning Around Afghanistan are Long Indeed, December 9, 2009 l/n It is at home that we should firm up our defenses. Our troops are tired and their equipment needs to be replaced and refitted. I don't even get the politics of Mr. Obama's decision. Wouldn't the right political move have been to start bringing our troops home before Christmas or at the first of the new year? If Mr. Obama doesn't think that jobs and the state of the U.S. economy are not the top priority of most Americans, he must be too busy making speeches and ripping off one-liners to have been listening in places like Allentown. The other show-stopper for Mr. Obama in deciding whether to escalate or to wrap up the Afghanistan affair should have been the link with Pakistan. The two countries are linked, with a fluid, disputed border between them, crossed constantly by not only the Taliban, but apparently by Osama bin-Laden, as well, if we believe a recent report that he was seen in eastern Afghanistan earlier this year. Pakistan is in grave trouble. On Friday an attack on a mosque in Rawalpindi, which is, in principle, controlled by the Pakistan military, killed more than 35 persons., Pakistan military headquarters was attacked in October, in response to a Pakistan military campaign at our behest in the Afghanistan border area.
Pakistan's president, Asif Ali Zardari, is considered to be hopelessly corrupt and is rapidly losing the little authority left to him. It is not beyond the pale to imagine that Washington would welcome a military coup d'etat in Pakistan, if for no other reason than that it would clarify the lines of authority in Islamabad. The U.S. response to the widespread trouble in Pakistan has been over the past two years to rain drone-borne missiles down on its most troubled areas, with more contemplated, including on Baluchistan, an area with little or no relevance to the situation in Afghanistan. This was one of the alternative ideas of Vice President Joe Biden, rejected by Mr. Obama. Troops escalation destabilizes Pakistan The Nation 2009 The Nation: Don't Escalate in Afghanistan, The Editors, February 4, 2009 http://www.thenation.com/article/dont-escalate-afghanistan President Barack Obama has wisely ordered an internal review of the administration's options in Afghanistan before proceeding with the current plan to send 30,000 more troops, which would nearly double the 32,000 fighting there. For the sake of the country, his presidency and the peace and stability of South Asia, Obama should take USled military escalation off the table. Instead he should focus on devising a regional strategy to stabilize Afghanistan and strengthen Pakistan. Escalating the occupation of Afghanistan would bleed us of the resources we need for economic recovery, further destabilize Pakistan, open a rift with our European allies and negate the positive effects of withdrawing from Iraq on our image in the Muslim world. Escalation would have all these negative consequences without securing a better future for the Afghan people or increasing US security. SDI 2010 41 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE Pakistan Advantage Troops Destabilize
Escalation angers Pakistani middle class their key to stability Zaidi, Pakistani analyst and policy development adviser, 2009 Mosharraf Zaidi, Mosharraf Zaidi is an American-educated Pakistani analyst and policy development adviser. He has worked as both a United States Agency for International Development (USAID) contractor on education and as an adviser to the British government's development arm. A strong supporter of Pakistan educational reform, Zaidi has become a widely followed columnist and contributing writer for newspapers in Pakistan, the United States, and the Middle East. The Nation: "The Best Wall of Defense", October 21, 2009, http://www.thenation.com/article/best-wall-defense The most dependable guarantor of Pakistani stability is Pakistan's emerging middle class, which has the most to lose in a civil conflict. This was the year Pakistan's middle class came of age, conquering some of the country's longest-festering demons. In March it forced the military to accept an independent judiciary, and in May it helped pressure the military to take on terrorists in Swat. The fight against terror in Pakistan has been expensive, with 7,000 civilians and 2,600 security personnel killed by terrorists since 2003. The notion that Pakistan can be stabilized by a sustained US troop buildup in Afghanistan is nonsensical. A military surge there would only buttress a fear-based, profit-motivated narrative of Pakistan that is cultivated by corrupt Pakistani elites. It is the Pakistani middle class that is the best wall of defense against instability--not US soldiers in Afghanistan. SDI 2010 42 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE Pakistan Advantage Troops Destabilize
Pakistan's stability is the worst surge victim Right Vision News 2010 Bangladesh: Obama's Af-Pak Idealism: Myths and Realities January 8, 2010 l/n
What is being overlooked is the nature of the strife. It is basically a Taliban-led-Pashtun war fighting foreign occupation. Obama paid no attention to the increasingly visible opposition to the Karzai government and the US occupation from the majority Pashtun population, which makes up the majority of the Taliban who are increasingly defining Afghanistan's civil war as an ethnic war against supporters of the old USbacked Northern Alliance, whose Tajik and Uzbek militants now constitute the majority in the Afghan National Army. The main strategic flaw in this war is that the US is seeing both the Afghan and Pakistan situations through the lens of the Northern Afghan politics that leads the Americans to believe that stability in Afghanistan comes via Pakistan, a position that ground realities reject as erroneous. Though the strategy is linked to Pakistan, yet there is no cardinal change in the policy towards Pakistan. However, it is for the first time that president Obama has acknowledged that relations with Pakistan have not been maintained by US on the basis of broader cooperation and mutual trust and respect. The Af-Pak is a neologism used within US foreign policy circles to designate Afghanistan and Pakistan as a single theater of war operations. The strategy puts Pakistan on the same level as Afghanistan, while on ground reality is quite the opposite. Afghanistan has no government and the country is completely destabilized, whereas Pakistan is not . President Obama's Af-pak policy disregards the most important regional dynamics and ignores the need for a broad regional diplomatic strategy. Moreover, the Indian element in the game did not figure in the speech, which ignored Islamabad's growing concerns vis-a-vis India's attempts to use the Afghan soil in its encirclement strategy. Islamabad is now apprehensive that the troop rise will lead to more US drone attacks and military involvement in its border areas. When extra US troops land in south Afghanistan the Taliban will make a tactical retreat across the porous border to Pakistan's tribal regions. Due to geographical proximity, intense operations in Helmand in summer 2010 may disturb peaceful Pashtun belt of Pakistan, specifically Balochistan and make that restive. The deeper US-NATO push into the southern conflict zones near the Durand Line could suck in Pakistani troops and heavy casualties. The threat of the campaign has already sparked a backlash of suicide attacks in cities, raising fears for Pakistan's stability, which may become the troop surge's worst victim. If things start to go wrong for the US, Pakistan could easily be made into a scapegoat. President Obama has acknowledged that Pakistan is pivotal for the new strategy to work. This makes it all the more necessary for Washington to adjust its policy approach to Islamabad's legitimate concerns The core policy elements involve longer-term reconstruction, rehabilitation and engagement of non-state actors in nation-building process to evolve a stable peace for all ethnic groups like Pastun, Hazara, Tajiks and Uzbeks. Unless a holistic politicomilitary and engagement-based development approach is adopted and the hearts and minds of the people involved are won, particularly the biggest Pashtun segment, Afghanistan will remain a conflict zone benighting peace prospects in the region. SDI 2010 43 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE Pakistan Advantage Troops Destabilize
No strategy can succeed at countering the insurgents. Escalation only results in a radicalized Pakistani population The Nation 2009 The Nation: Don't Escalate in Afghanistan, The Editors, February 4, 2009 http://www.thenation.com/article/dont-escalate-afghanistan It is doubtful that even a major counterinsurgency could succeed. Indeed, it may only engender more resistance and encourage support for the Taliban in Pakistan to stop what would be seen as the advancement of US and Indian interests. If we learned anything from the British and the Soviets, it is that Afghans fiercely resist outside powers and that some in Pakistan are eager to prevent outsiders from controlling its neighbor, especially if those outsiders have good relations with India. Afghanistan is called "the burial ground of empires" for good reason. In recent Congressional testimony Defense Secretary Robert Gates seemed to rule out the more ambitious goal of stabilizing Afghanistan, suggesting instead the narrower goal of preventing it from being a launching pad for terrorism. But he acknowledged even that would require more troops. Gates did not explain why he would commit more troops to keep Afghanistan from being a terrorist haven when Al Qaeda already operates freely in parts of Pakistan and when the Taliban and Islamist terror groups have sanctuaries in Pakistan's tribal areas. Indeed, the effect of military operations in Afghanistan has been to push Islamists across the border into the tribal areas and Pakistan's North West Frontier Province. The key to defeating Al Qaeda and its extremist protectors lies with the Pakistani government and its ability to control its remote territories. But there's the rub: major groups within Pakistan's military and intelligence services are reluctant to act against Pakistan's extremists for fear it would help the United States and India gain control over Afghanistan. Thus military escalation would likely counter our efforts to get Pakistan's government to secure its territory against Al Qaeda. Worse, expanding the war may only deepen divisions in Pakistan and further weaken its fragile democratic government. Even if US escalation achieves the limited goal of denying Al Qaeda a presence in Afghanistan, it could lead to the destabilization of Pakistan, with devastating implications for regional and international security. As Andrew Bacevich, a retired Army colonel and professor of history and international relations at Boston University, recently wrote, "To risk the stability of that nucleararmed state in the vain hope of salvaging Afghanistan would be a terrible mistake." By any measure, the disintegration of nuclear Pakistan would pose a much greater threat to our national security than would the continued presence of Al Qaeda in remote border areas. In fact, the value of Afghanistan and Pakistan as Al Qaeda safe havens is greatly exaggerated. Pakistan's tribal areas are of limited use in training extremists to blend into US society or learn how to fly airplanes or make explosives (most of the planning for the 9/11 attacks took place in Germany and Florida, not Afghanistan). Nor is this remote, isolated area a good location for directing a terror campaign, recruiting members or threatening global commerce. That is why Al Qaeda is a decentralized network whose leaders in Pakistan can offer little more than moral support and encouragement. American safety thus depends not on eliminating these faraway safe havens but on commonsense counterterrorist and security measures--intelligence cooperation, police work, border control and the occasional surgical use of special forces to disrupt imminent terrorist attacks. SDI 2010 44 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE Pakistan Advantage Troops Destabilize
Enhanced US presence in Afghanistan intensifies anti-American sentiments in Pakistan, raises proliferation risks and emboldens both the Taliban and al-Qaeda Simon and Stevenson, Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and Professor of Strategic Studies at the US Naval War College, 2009 "Afghanistan: How Much is Enough?", Survival, 51: 5, 47 -- 67 Accessed via University of Kansas June 24, 2010 Pitfalls of the current policy The Obama administration's instincts favouring robust counter-insurgency and state-building in Afghanistan reflect the 1990s-era US and European predilection for peacekeeping, reconstruction and stabilisation, and the multilateral use of force for humanitarian intervention, deployed to positive effect in the Balkans and withheld tragically in Rwanda. To the extent that this mindset was premised on an expansion of the rule of law to hitherto poorly and unjustly governed areas, such as Somalia and Bosnia, it reflects the broader conception of counter-terrorism adopted after 11 September. Insofar as it favours collective action by major powers with the unambiguous endorsement of the UN Security Council, it is also consistent with the Obama administration's rejection of Bush-era unilateralism. And an aggressive internationalist approach to spreading democracy and the rule of law, notwithstanding the shortsightedness and inefficacy of the Bush doctrine, is admirable and in some instances appropriate.6 In this case, however, it is more likely to hurt than help. While a larger US military footprint might help stabilise Afghanistan in the short term, the effects of collateral damage and the aura of US domination it would generate would also intensify antiAmericanism in Pakistan. This outcome, in turn, would frustrate both core American objectives by rendering it politically far more difficult for the Pakistani government to cooperate with Washington (and easier for the quasi-independent Inter-Services Intelligence to collude with the Taliban and al-Qaeda), thus making it harder for the United States to defeat al- Qaeda. It would also increase radicalisation in Pakistan, imperil the regime and raise proliferation risks, increasing rather than decreasing pressure on India to act in the breach of American ineffectuality. SDI 2010 45 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE Pakistan Advantage Destabilizes Government
Presence further deteriorates Islamabad's authority and emboldens militias Innocent and Carpenter, foreign policy analyst and vp for defense and foreign policy at the Cato Institute, 2009 Malou Innocent is a foreign policy analyst at the Cato Institute who focuses on Afghanistan and Pakistan. Ted Galen Carpenter, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at Cato, is the author of 8 and the editor of 10 books on international affairs. His most recent book is Smart Power: Toward a Prudent Foreign Policy for America. Escaping the Graveyard of Empires: A Strategy to Exit Afghanistan, Cato Institute 2009 In this respect, and perhaps most impor- tant, is the belief that our presence in the region helps Pakistan, when in fact the seem- ingly open-ended U.S. presence in Afghanistan risks creating worse problems for Pakistan. Amassing troops in Afghanistan feeds the perception of a foreign occupation, spawning more terrorist recruits for Pakistani militias and thus placing undue stress on an already weakened nation. Christian Science Monitor correspondent Anand Gopal finds, "In late 2007, as many as 27 groups merged to form an umbrella Taliban movement, the Tehreek-e-Taliban, under guer- rilla leader Baitullah Mehsud." He continues, "Three of the most powerful, oncefeuding commanders--Mr. Mehsud and Maulavi Naz- eer of South Waziristan and Hafiz Gul Behadur of North Waziristan--formed an alliance in response to US airstrikes."24 America's presence has already caused major problems for the government in Islamabad, which is deeply unpopular for many reasons, including its alignment with U.S. policies.25 There are also indications that it has raised ten- sions in Uzbekistan and other Central Asian countries. For Islamic militants throughout the region, the U.S. occupation of Afghanistan-- like the occupation of Iraq--is an increasingly potent recruiting tool. Only by prolonging our military presence do we allow the Taliban, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hizb-e Islami, the Haqqani network, and even Pakistani Taliban militants to reframe the conflict and their posi- tion within it as a legitimate defense against a foreign occupation. In this respect, policymak- ers should recognize that not everyone willing to resist U.S. intervention is necessarily an ene- my of the United States. Most importantly, we must understand that not every Islamic funda- mentalist is a radical Islamist, let alone one who is hell-bent on launching a terrorist attack against the American homeland. SDI 2010 46 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE Pakistan Advantage AT Withdrawal Instability Turn
Not Unique Pakistan is not stable now, and US troop presence is the root cause. Our Bacevich, Kristof, and Fuller ev all prove this. US withdraw would not boost parties seeking to de-stabilize Pakistan Paul R. Pillar is director of graduate studies at Georgetown University's Security Studies Program and a former national intelligence officer for the Near East and South Asia. The National Interest. March/April 2010 http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=22916 THE WEAKNESS of the rationale for pressing the fight in Afghanistan has led many supporters of that war to say that the real concern is next door in Pakistan. Visions of mad mullahs getting
their hands on Pakistani nuclear weapons are tossed about, but exactly how events in Afghanistan would influence the future of Pakistan does not get explained. The connection seems to be based on simple spatial thinking about instability spreading across borders, rather like the Cold War imagery of red paint oozing over the globe. A Taliban victory in Afghanistan would not bring any significant new resources to bear on conflict in Pakistan, which has a population five times as large and an economy ten times as big as its South Asian neighbor. Nor would it offer Pakistani militants a safe haven any more attractive or useful than the one they already have in Pakistan's own Federally Administered
Tribal Areas. US troop presence radicalizes Pakistan brings together unrelated forms of animosity Malou Innocent is a foreign policy analyst at the Cato Institute, "5 Basic Reasons the US Should Leave Afghanistan" June 24, 2010 available at: http://craigconsidine.wordpress.com/2010/06/24/5-basic-reasons-the-us-should-leaveafghanistan/ Moreover, if America's interests lie in ensuring the virus of anti-American radicalism does not infect the rest of the region, discontinuing policies that add more fuel to violent religious radicalism should be the first order of business. The dominant political force within Pakistan is not radical fundamentalist Islam, but rather a desire for a sound economy and basic security. But the foreign troop presence risks uniting otherwise disparate militant groups from both sides of the border against a hostile occupation of the region. US troop presence hurts Pakistan stability pushes the conflict and discourages terror coop Paul R. Pillar is director of graduate studies at Georgetown University's Security Studies Program and a former national intelligence officer for the Near East and South Asia. The National Interest. March/April 2010 http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=22916 Pakistanis themselves offer the most authoritative take on how, if at all, U.S. military operations in Afghanistan affect security challenges within their own country. The Pakistanis have expressed concern that to the degree those operations are successful, they will merely push militants across the Durand Line (just as bin Laden and his colleagues were pushed across eight years ago). The unpopularity among most Pakistanis of any U.S. military operations in the region also limits Islamabad's political ability to cooperate with the United States in pursuing Washington's goals, including counterterrorist objectives. SDI 2010 47 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE Pakistan Advantage AT Withdrawal Instability Turn
U.S. presence is comparatively more destabilizing than withdrawal pushing insurgents into Pakistan and public hostility Bandow, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, 2009 Doug Bandow is a senior fellow athe Cato Institute. He is a former special assistant to President Reagan and the author of several books, including Foreign Follies: America's New Global Empire. Cato Institute: "Recognizing the Limits of American Power in Afghanistan" October 31, 2009 http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=10924 Blogger Paul Mirengoff contended that "Ceding Afghanistan to [America's main] enemy would have serious adverse implications for Pakistan." The Washington Post worried: "success by the [Taliban] movement in toppling the government of either country would be a catastrophe for the interests of the United States and major allies such as India." Others predict a veritable regional disaster if the U.S. withdraws. However, a semi-stable, semi-workable Afghan state doesn't necessarily work to Pakistan's advantage. First, how would it affect Islamabad's most serious security concern--the regional balance with India? Pakistan strongly supported the Taliban regime pre-9/11 for a reason. Second, Afghans enjoying the benefits of peace might not welcome jihadists and terrorists, encouraging the latter to remain in Pakistan's largely autonomous border provinces. Most important, Pakistan seems more likely to be destabilized by an endless, escalating conflict than a Taliban advance. Islamabad's vulnerabilities are obvious, with a weak civilian government facing a complex mix of poverty, instability, insurgency, and terrorism. Unfortunately, the war in neighboring Afghanistan exacerbates all of these problems. Argued Hoh: "Our presence in Afghanistan has only increased destabilization and insurgency in Pakistan." First, the war has pushed Afghan insurgents across the border. Second, cooperation with unpopular U.S. policy has reinforced the Zardari government's appearance as an American toady. Ever-rising American demands further undercut Pakistani sovereignty and increase public hostility. SDI 2010 48 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE Pakistan Advantage AT "Smaller presence increases antiAmericanism"
First Their evidence assume a partial withdrawal. Plan envisions a gradual, but complete, withdrawal Withdrawal best solves anti-American resentment Andrew J. Bacevich, IR prof @ Boston University, The Atlanta Journal-Constitution December 8, 2009 lexis
So the war launched as a prequel to Iraq now becomes its sequel, with little of substance learned in the interim. To double down in Afghanistan is to ignore the unmistakable lesson of Bush's thoroughly discredited "global war on terror": Sending U.S. troops to fight interminable wars in distant countries does more to inflame than to extinguish the resentments giving rise to violent anti-Western jihadism. Under the guise of cleaning up Bush's mess, Obama has chosen to continue Bush's policies. No doubt pulling the plug on an ill-advised enterprise involves risk and uncertainty. It also entails acknowledging mistakes. It requires courage. Yet without these things, talk of change will remain so much hot air. The larger the US presence, the greater the Pashtun's discontent
Selig Harrison, Director of the Asia Program at the Washington-based Center for International Policy, available via the Middle East Online "Afghanistan's Ethnic Split" First Published 10-28-09 http://www.middle-eastonline.com/english/opinion/?id=35320. Alexander the Great, the British Raj and the Red Army all learned the hard way that the Pashtuns, Afghanistan's largest and historically dominant ethnic group, will unite to fight a foreign occupation force simply because it is foreign. As Howard Hart, a former CIA station chief in Pakistan, recently told The New York Times, "The very presence of our forces in the Pashtun areas is the problem. The more troops we put in, the greater the opposition." The tenacity of the Taliban insurgency is rooted in opposition to an occupation that is, in this case, a
particularly distasteful one to the Pashtuns. The U.S. infidel is hated for Persian Gulf and Middle East policies - especially unconditional support for Israel - that are perceived as anti-Muslim. But there are other factors that explain the strength of the Taliban. Some are widely written about: drug money, popular anger at corrupt warlords and support from Pakistani intelligence agencies. One factor of special sensitivity and importance that receives almost no attention either in the public debate about Afghanistan or in the internal policy battles of the Obama administration may well be the most important: the domination of the Afghan armed forces, police, secret police and intelligence agencies by leaders of the Tajik ethnic minority, who use their U.S.-backed power in Kabul to lord it over their historic Pashtun rivals. Pashtun kings ruled Afghanistan from its inception in 1747 until the overthrow of the monarchy in 1973. Initially limited to the Pashtun heartland in the south and east, the Afghan state gradually conquered the neighbouring Tajik, Hazara and Uzbek areas to the north and west. Today, Pashtuns make up an estimated 42 per cent of a population of 28 million; Tajiks make up 27 per cent. Yet Tajik generals hold the key levers of power in Kabul because they happened to be in the right place at the right time during the confused months when U.S. forces overthrew the Taliban in 2001. During the struggle against the Soviet occupation, the Tajiks built up a militia in the Panjshir Valley, north of Kabul, that had close CIA ties. Later, it acquired allies in neighbouring areas and became the Northern Alliance, which fought the Pashtun-based Taliban government that ruled from 1996 until 2001. When the victorious U.S. forces marched into Kabul, the Northern Alliance was there too, and with U.S. help a clique of Tajik generals seized the key security posts in the new government. The Bush administration, wanting to give a Pashtun face to the initial interim government, installed Hamid Karzai as President. He, too, had long-standing CIA ties and was the only Pashtun leader acceptable to the Tajik in-group headed by Muhammad Fahim. Mr. Fahim vetoed other more popular Pashtun figures identified with the last Pashtun king, Mohammed Zahir Shah, notably Abdul Sattar Sirat. The United States later blocked Pashtun efforts to make Mohammed Zahir Shah president of the second transitional government, which ruled from 2002 until a constitution was adopted and Mr. Karzai was elected president in 2004. Now, the Tajiks are riding high. In Mr. Karzai's recent bid for a second term (in elections widely regarded as rigged), Mr. Fahim was his running mate as first vice-president. Army chief of staff Bismillah Khan Mohammadi has made fellow Tajiks his key corps commanders, and about 70 per cent of his battalion commanders are Tajiks, making it difficult to enlist Pashtuns. The Tajik-dominated National Security Directorate, a sprawling network of intelligence and secret police agencies, systematically harasses Pashtun leaders who seek to contest Tajik control. The U.S. has painted itself into a corner in Afghanistan from which there can be no graceful escape. If the U.S. seeks to end Tajik dominance and shifts to a pro-Pashtun policy, there could well be a Tajik backlash and an uncontrollable, ethnically defined civil war. Yet a continuation of the status quo will only deepen Pashtun discontent. SDI 2010 49 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE Pakistan Advantage Instability Proliferation
Instability causes proliferation of nuclear weapons Albright, physicist and President of the ISIS, 2001 David Albright, a physicist, is President of the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) in Washington, D.C. He directs the project work of ISIS, heads its fundraising efforts, and chairs its board of directors. In addition, he regularly publishes and conducts scientific research. He has written numerous assessments on secret nuclear weapons programs throughout the world. Securing Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Complex: Paper1 commissioned and sponsored by the Stanley Foundation for the 42nd Strategy for Peace Conference, Strategies for Regional Security (South Asia Working Group), October 25-27, 2001, http://www.isisonline.org/publications/terrorism/stanleypaper.html During times of relative political and social normalcy, the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is probably adequate and could be expected to improve consistent with other nuclear programs worldwide. However, fallout from Pakistan's decision to cooperate with the United States following the September 11th terrorist attacks may severely test Pakistan's security system throughout its nuclear weapons complex. Instability in Pakistan could make its nuclear weapons and stocks of nuclear explosive material dangerously vulnerable to theft. If domestic instability leads to the downfall of the current Pakistani government, nuclear weapons and the means to make them could fall into the hands of a government hostile to the United States and its allies. Proliferation leads to extinction Utgoff 2 Victor A Utgoff, Deputy Director of Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of Institute for Defense Analysis, Summer 2002, Survival, p. 87-90
In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed towards a world that will mirror
the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear "six shooters" on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather together on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations. SDI 2010 50 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE Pakistan Advantage Instability Proliferation
Instability threatens control over nuclear material Albright, physicist and President of the ISIS, 2001 David Albright, a physicist, is President of the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) in Washington, D.C. He directs the project work of ISIS, heads its fundraising efforts, and chairs its board of directors. In addition, he regularly publishes and conducts scientific research. He has written numerous assessments on secret nuclear weapons programs throughout the world. Securing Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Complex: Paper1 commissioned and sponsored by the Stanley Foundation for the 42nd Strategy for Peace Conference, Strategies for Regional Security (South Asia Working Group), October 25-27, 2001, http://www.isisonline.org/publications/terrorism/stanleypaper.html If Pakistan suffers extreme instability or civil war, additional threats to its strategic nuclear assets are possible: Loss of Central Control of Storage Facilities--Clear lines of communication and control over weapons, weapons components, and fissile material may be broken or lost entirely. Coup--In the most extreme case, a coup takes place and the new regime attempts to gain control of the nuclear complex. Foreign governments may intervene to prevent hostile forces from seizing the strategic nuclear assets. In the current situation, Pakistan must also increasingly worry that experts from the nuclear complex could steal sensitive information or assist nuclear weapons programs of other countries or terrorist groups. The information could include classified nuclear weapons manufacturing data, exact storage locations of weapons or fissile material, security and access control arrangements, or operational details about the weapons. SDI 2010 51 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE Pakistan Advantage AT "Weapons are safe"
Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is vulnerable their "safeguards" actually leave them more open to terrorist manipulation Seymour M. Hersh is a United States Pulitzer Prize winning investigative journalist and author based in Washington, D.C. He is a regular contributor to The New Yorker magazine on military and security matters. The New Yorker November 16, 2009 lexis Safeguards have been built into the system. Pakistani nuclear doctrine calls for the warheads (containing an enriched radioactive core) and their triggers (sophisticated devices containing highly explosive lenses, detonators, and krytrons) to be stored separately from each other and from their delivery devices (missiles or aircraft). The goal is to insure that no one can launch a warhead-in the heat of a showdown with India, for example-without pausing to put it together. Final authority to order a nuclear strike
requires consensus within Pakistan's ten-member National Command Authority, with the chairman-by statute, President Zardari-casting the But the safeguards meant to keep a confrontation with India from escalating too quickly could make the arsenal more vulnerable to terrorists. Nuclear-security experts have war-gamed the process and concluded that the triggers and other elements are most exposed when they are being moved and reassembled-at those moments there would be fewer barriers between an outside group and the bomb. A consultant to the intelligence community said that in one war-gamed scenario disaffected
deciding vote. members of the Pakistani military could instigate a terrorist attack inside India, and that the ensuing crisis would give them "a chance to pick up bombs and triggers-in the name of protecting the assets from extremists." SDI 2010 52 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE Pakistan Advantage AT "Alt Causes Instability"
First not all instability is the same Our Ricks ev proves that India is mostly concerned about Pakistan being taken-over by extremists. Other forms of instability don't access our internal link to Indian pre-emption. Second US presence is the vital internal link to de-stabilizing Pakistan Malou Innocent is a foreign policy analyst at the Cato Institute, "Myth v. Fact: Afghanistan" Huffington Post September 4th, 2009 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/malou-innocent/myth-v-fact-afghanistan_b_277411.html. Finally, and most importantly, while America has a vital interest in ensuring Pakistan does not become weakened, its America's own policies that are pushing the conflict over the border and destabilizing the nuclear-armed country. Airstrikes from unmanned drones are strengthening the very jihadist forces America seeks to defeat by allowing militants to exploit the popular resentment felt from the accidental killing of innocents. On August 12, the U.S. special envoy for the region, Richard Holbrooke, told an audience at the Center for American Progress that the porous border and its surrounding areas serve as a fertile recruiting ground for al Qaeda. One US military official, speaking on the condition of anonymity, called airstrikes from U.S. unmanned drones "a recruiting windfall for the Pakistani Taliban." Citizens living outside the ungoverned tribal areas also detest drones. A recent poll conducted by Gallup Pakistan for Al-Jazeera found that a whopping 59 percent believed the U.S. was the greatest threat to Pakistan. If America's interests lie in ensuring the virus of anti-American radicalism does not infect the rest of the region, discontinuing policies that add more fuel to violent religious radicalism should be the first order of business. Their Baloch argument is wrong Baloch insurgents pose no real threat to Pakistan stability. Shahid R. Siddiqi began his career in the Pakistan Air Force. Later, he worked as a broadcaster with Radio Pakistan and remained the Islamabad bureau chief of an English weekly magazine `Pakistan & Gulf Economist'. "Why Insurgency in Balochistan Cannot Succeed" Foreign Policy Journal March 30, 2010 http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2010/03/30/why-insurgency-in-balochistan-cannot-succeed/2/ With the experience of recent counter-insurgency operations that the Pakistan Army gained in Swat and Waziristan and for other reasons, there is no chance of Balochistan becoming another Bangladesh. Some of the conditions that will prevent this insurgency from succeeding are: the much smaller size of the Baloch population a mere 2.5 million dispersed over a vast area; the very small size of their resistance, which according to an estimate employs only 3000- 5000 foot soldiers; tribal and sub-tribal rivalries that weaken the insurgency; lack of broad tribal support for secession from Pakistan, including the Pashtun tribes; the inability of India to cross the international border to intervene in Balochistan; and the ability of the army and the air force to mobilize at a short notice and the relative ease with which both can conduct operations, if it finally comes to military action. Poverty is not the root cause of insurgent violence studies are inconclusive Denis Dragovic has spent three years in senior leadership positions working for US based NGOs inside Iraq. He has over ten years of experience in Asia, Middle East and Africa both in emergency response capacities and transitioning programs into post-conflict environments. The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance October 5, 2009 http://jha.ac/2009/10/05/terrorism-and-the-aid-industry-a-back-to-basics-plan/ Alan Krueger and Jitka Maleckova found in their 2002 study that better economic conditions and higher levels of educational attainment have a positive correlation to the support of terrorism. Empirical research by Alberto Abadie of Harvard University found that countries with intermediate levels of political freedom and high linguistic fractualization were better indicators of the rate and severity of terrorist acts rather than poverty. While in a November 2006 Foreign Policy survey including 9,000 interviews in 8 Muslim countries showed that twenty five percent of self proclaimed `radicals' enjoy "above average or very high income levels" compared to twenty one percent of `moderates'. Anecdotal evidence similarly supports the argument that poverty is not a root cause of terrorism. Nasra Hassan, after interviewing two hundred and fifty Palestinian militants and associates of militants, reported in the November 2001 New Yorker, "None of them were uneducated, desperately poor, simple minded, or depressed. Many were middle class and, unless they were fugitives, held paying jobs. Two were the sons of millionaires." SDI 2010 53 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE SDI 2010 54 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE Pakistan Advantage AT "India won't strike"
Indian restraint is not guaranteed Pakistani instability makes New Delhi especially nervous Stratfor Strategic Forecasting -- March 9, 2009 -http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090306_part_6_obama_administration_and_south_asia
But Pakistan continues to search for a middle ground. Unwilling to see the domestic backlash that would result from cutting ties to its former militant proxies, Islamabad wants to reach an understanding with certain Islamist militants and sympathizers within the military and among the Pakistani Taliban and Kashmiri Islamists to halt attacks at least inside Pakistan. The Pakistanis are also pursuing a complex strategy to sow divisions within Pakistan's northwest tribal network in an attempt to corner tribes that harbor al Qaeda and other foreign militants. The problem with these middle-ground strategies is that making deals with the Pakistani Taliban and the tribes that support them only emboldens the militants and usually entails a private understanding to redirect the insurgent focus across the border into Afghanistan, where it becomes Kabul's and This is where Pakistan becomes a royal headache for the United States. Pakistan is a supply chain not only for the jihadists, but also for U.S. and NATO troops fighting the war in Afghanistan.
Washington's problem. The United States is tied to Pakistan in two fundamental ways: While U.S. and NATO forces must rely on increasingly unreliable Pakistani supply routes to fight the war in Afghanistan, Pakistan -- fearful that the United States and India will establish a long-term strategic partnership -- has the incentive to keep the jihadist insurgency boiling (preferably in Afghanistan) in order to keep the Americans committed to an alliance with Islamabad, however complex that alliance might be. Moving forward, U.S. strategy for Pakistan will be aimed toward cutting those links, beginning with the supply-route issue. The United States is trying to develop alternate routes through Central Asia (which would come at a high political and logistical price) to supply the war in Afghanistan from the north. Less reliance on Pakistan means less leverage for Islamabad over Washington when the United States applies more pressure on Pakistan to take risks and "do more" at home in battling the insurgency. That said, Washington will not be able to ignore the fact that Pakistan is currently in a very fragile state -- politically, economically and militarily. This makes any U.S. action in Pakistan, including airstrikes against high-value targets, all the more precarious as Islamabad tries to hold the country together. The more destabilized Pakistan becomes, the more nervous India will become; the November 2008 Mumbai attacks illustrated the extent to which Islamabad's grip had loosened over its militant proxies. India took no retaliatory military action in response to the attacks for fear of destabilizing Pakistan further and giving the Islamist militant forces already operating in Pakistan an excuse to redirect their focus on India. But India also has to contend with the reality that a number of jihadist forces in Pakistan have a strong interest in forcing Pakistan and India into conflict ,
which would divert Pakistani military attention to the east and give the Taliban and al Qaeda more breathing room. It follows, then, that the perpetrators of the Mumbai attacks would at least attempt follow-on attacks in India to push the South Asian rivals into conflict. If and when a large-scale attack occurs, Indian military restraint cannot be assured, especially in the event
that a more hard-line Hindu nationalist government comes to power in upcoming Indian elections. In such a scenario, the United States will have to once again devote its efforts toward preventing India and Pakistan from coming to blows and from detracting even further from U.S. war efforts in Afghanistan. SDI 2010 55 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE Pakistan Advantage Indo-Pak Nuclear War Impacts
Tensions, secrecy and a willingness to use nuclear weapons make South Asia the most likely scenario for nuclear conflict Ganguly, Krepon, and Tahir-Kheli, professor of poli sci @ Hunter College, president of the Henry L. Stimson Center, and Pakistan-American political scientist and ambassador, 1999 Sumit Ganguly:**Dr. Ganguly is Professor of Political Science at Hunter College of the City University of New York. He is the author of The Origins of War in South Asia (Second Edition, 1994) and Between War and Peace: The Crisis in Kashmir (forthcoming). Michael Krepon:**Mr. Krepon is President of the Henry L. Stimson Center and coeditor of Crisis Prevention, Confidence Building, and Reconciliation in South Asia (1995). Dr. Prof. Shirin R. Tahir-Kheli is a Pakistani-American political scientist and an Ambassador. In 2008, she was the senior advisor for women's empowerment to the United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and was Senior director for Democracy, Human Rights and International Operations at the UN Security Council from 20032005. She has served 5 Republican presidential administrations since 1980. CDI Show Transcript: Nuclear War Between India and Pakistan? December 13, 1999 http://www.cdi.org/adm/1214/transcript.html II. IS THERE A DANGER OF NUCLEAR WAR? GANGULY: ... there is some legitimate concern about the possibility of war and the war escalating to the nuclear level. NARRATOR: According to most observers, the likeliest cause of a nuclear war in South Asia is the fight for control of Kashmir. The dispute over Kashmir predates Indian and Pakistani independence from British colonial rule in 1947. Even though Kashmir had a largely Muslim population, its Hindu monarch chose to join India, rather than Pakistan. Pakistan felt cheated.
GANGULY: For Pakistan, as the homeland for Muslims, as the homeland for Muslims in South Asia, it was vitally important to incorporate Kashmir, because otherwise Pakistan would not be complete... NARRATOR: Mushahid Husain, the Pakistani government's Minister of Information, recalls that Pakistan's proposed solution, which calls for a popular vote in Kashmir to decide that territory's fate, has been endorsed by the United Nations. But the Indian authorities have thus far resisted. HUSAIN: There are UN resolutions, resolutions of the United Nations, which say there should be a plebescite in Kashmir, and let the people of Kashmir decide whether they want to go with India or Pakistan. NARRATOR: Still no agreement exists to settle the dispute, which at times has reached the pitch of holy war. KREPON: Pakistan wants international help in resolving the Kashmir dispute with India. HUSAIN: Let us focus on resolving Kashmir, because now, after the nuclear tests between, the Indian and Pakistani tests, there is an inextricable linkage between Kashmir and the larger issue of peace, stability and security in South Asia. KREPON: Pakistan is seeking to get that help by pointing to the Kashmir dispute as a nuclear flashpoint. And to lend credence to that, Pakistan has heated up that line of control, with a lot of firing and a lot of violence. India has responded in kind. So it's a very dangerous game. NARRATOR: Some observers had hoped that a balance of nuclear terror in South Asia would have a sobering effect on relations between India and Pakistan. But thus far the specter of nuclear war has failed to quell the violence in Kashmir. (border ceremony. more Kashmir gore) KHELI: institutions like the intelligence agencies think they have much greater leeway than they might actually have, thinking the envelope is that much further to push. Because if war is unthinkable, that gives greater latitude. So in all ways I think it makes the potential for war more likely. NARRATOR: But could escalation of the Kashmir conflict lead to a nuclear war? Unlike the more experienced nuclear powers, India and Pakistan do not have a clear, published doctrine of when and how nuclear weapons would be used in a war. But leaders in both countries do stress that their nuclear weapons are only a deterrent, and
not an offensive weapon. CHANDRA: We have said that we will never undertake a first use. NARRATOR: Naresh Chandra is India's Ambassador to the United States. CHANDRA: We have clarified that we viewed our nuclear capabilities as a deterrent, not as a means of projecting aggressive designs on any neighbor. NARRATOR: Pakistani officials have echoed India's claim that its nuclear arsenal is also for defensive purposes. HUSAIN: Of course, we say Pakistan's bomb is meant only for security and self-defense. NARRATOR: But wherever there are nuclear weapons, there is an implied willingness to use them. And both India and Pakistan are today developing and testing new medium-range missiles, which could potentially carry nuclear warheads. The climate of tension, secrecy, and mistrust which surrounds these missile programs may present the greatest nuclear danger in South Asia. SDI 2010 56 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE Pakistan Advantage Indo-Pak Nuclear War Impacts
Opaque development and lack of control measures mean escalation is likely Ganguly, Krepon, and Tahir-Kheli, professor of poli sci @ Hunter College, president of the Henry L. Stimson Center, and Pakistan-American political scientist and ambassador, 1999 Sumit Ganguly:**Dr. Ganguly is Professor of Political Science at Hunter College of the City University of New York. He is the author of The Origins of War in South Asia (Second Edition, 1994) and Between War and Peace: The Crisis in Kashmir (forthcoming). Michael Krepon:**Mr. Krepon is President of the Henry L. Stimson Center and coeditor of Crisis Prevention, Confidence Building, and Reconciliation in South Asia (1995). Dr. Prof. Shirin R. Tahir-Kheli is a Pakistani-American political scientist and an Ambassador. In 2008, she was the senior advisor for women's empowerment to the United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and was Senior director for Democracy, Human Rights and International Operations at the UN Security Council from 2003-2005. She has served 5 Republican presidential administrations since 1980. CDI Show Transcript: Nuclear War Between India and Pakistan? December 13, 1999 http://www.cdi.org/adm/1214/transcript.html III. INDIA AND PAKISTAN: HOW WOULD A NUCLEAR WAR START? KREPON: Neither India nor Pakistan has the ability to read what each other is doing with its missile programs. They don't have the intelligence capabilities. And this is a very jittery region. So if a missile moves, if a missile is flight-tested, people go on edge. NARRATOR: In the tense environment of South Asia, missile tests and other military exercises, including nuclear tests, could be misinterpreted as actual preparations for war. As each side responds to the other's movements, a state of rising mutual alarm could erupt into a crisis. In such an event, whatever controls exist over the use of nuclear weapons could break down. GANGULY: One of the real shortcomings is that neither decision-makers in India nor Pakistan thought of what they would do the day after. They were so enamored of the nuclear weapons themselves, and the ability to test nuclear weapons, that no-one gave adequate thought to what kinds of command and control would we like. NARRATOR: The lack of established safety and control measures increases the risk of an accidental or unauthorized nuclear explosion in a crisis, which could set off an all-out nuclear war. SDI 2010 57 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE Pakistan Advantage Indo-Pak Nuclear War Impacts
War in the region will instantly kill 1/5th of humanity; break the nuclear taboo and cause extinction Ganguly, Krepon, and Tahir-Kheli, professor of poli sci @ Hunter College, president of the Henry L. Stimson Center, and Pakistan-American political scientist and ambassador, 1999 Sumit Ganguly:**Dr. Ganguly is Professor of Political Science at Hunter College of the City University of New York. He is the author of The Origins of War in South Asia (Second Edition, 1994) and Between War and Peace: The Crisis in Kashmir (forthcoming). Michael Krepon:**Mr. Krepon is President of the Henry L. Stimson Center and coeditor of Crisis Prevention, Confidence Building, and Reconciliation in South Asia (1995). Dr. Prof. Shirin R. Tahir-Kheli is a Pakistani-American political scientist and an Ambassador. In 2008, she was the senior advisor for women's empowerment to the United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and was Senior director for Democracy, Human Rights and International Operations at the UN Security Council from 20032005. She has served 5 Republican presidential administrations since 1980. CDI Show Transcript: Nuclear War Between India and Pakistan? December 13, 1999 http://www.cdi.org/adm/1214/transcript.html NARRATOR: Regardless of how a nuclear war might start in South Asia, there is little doubt that it would be the worst disaster of modern times. KHELI: ... this is a weapon of horror, and the consequences of its use would be disastrous for both sides. KREPON: There have been some studies of the consequences of a nuclear exchange by South Asians. And they've all arrived at the same conclusion. That the use of a nuclear weapon is very likely to cause casualties far in excess of those that were incurred in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. GANGULY: The costs would make Hiroshima look like a minor skirmish.... There is no point of surviving a nuclear war. In fact the survivors might actually envy the people who died. NARRATOR: Some of the world's most densely populated cities could be destroyed, and water and land resources, upon which countless millions of people depend, could be rendered toxic forever. A region already underdeveloped, and at times unstable, might never recover from such devastation. Apart from the inconceivable costs in lives lost and environmental damage, a nuclear war in South Asia would threaten stability all over the world. GANGULY: I think politically it would have a devastating effect on international relations. Because there has been a nuclear taboo since Hiroshima and Nagasaki. People have come to the brink, have stared into the abyss and then pulled back.... And I worry that once that nuclear taboo is broken, what consequences that has for the future of the taboo. And most international relations scholars agree on this. NARRATOR: Just as there is agreement on the destructiveness of a nuclear war in South Asia, there is widespread agreement that the United States has a role to play in helping to avert such a nuclear nightmare.
V. AVERTING A NUCLEAR WAR: A ROLE FOR THE U.S. NARRATOR: There are two important roles the United States can play in averting a crisis in South Asia. We can share our experience and expertise in matters related to safety and controls over nuclear weapons. And we can use our international standing to reduce tensions in the region by helping to negotiate and support a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir conflict, just as we have done recently in the Middle East, Northern Ireland, and the Balkans. KHELI: I think that one of the most important things the United States and others in the international community can do is to very actively--not just encourage--but push India and Pakistan into normalization between the two of them.... NARRATOR: Ironically, one potential avenue for increased cooperation between India and Pakistan is in the field of nuclear weapons. In order to guard against the possibility of an accident or miscalculation leading to a nuclear disaster, India and Pakistan must be willing to share information about each other's nuclear weapons programs. OAKLEY: ... they're gonna have to work it out for themselves. I'm glad they've begun to talk to each other, and they've begun to talk to each other about just this. How they can have better early warning, how they could make sure they don't accidentally touch off a conflict by surprising the other side, more transparency, all these things... HUSAIN: We feel that it is essential that nuclear rules of the game be established now between India and Pakistan. More so after both have become nuclear powers. And the U.S. can play a role in helping devise and establish and implement these nuclear rules of the game. NARRATOR: The door is open for the United States to counsel these new nuclear neighbors on the importance of clear, published guidelines on the use of nuclear weapons. In addition, the United States can use its experiences with the Soviet Union to help India and Pakistan implement safety and control measures. GANGULY: I know this is completely heretical to the non-proliferation community in this country, but I would work both with India and Pakistan to suggest things like Permissive Action Links... These are various kinds of technological devices which ensure that nuclear weapons are not accidentally fired, for example. That command and control of nuclear weapons remains fairly tight--under fairly tight controls. NARRATOR: But in order to lend its experience and support to any nuclear dialogue between India and Pakistan, the United States must be willing to change its view of South Asia as a strategically unimportant region, and rethink our chilly diplomatic posture toward both India and Pakistan. HUSAIN: This region includes 1.2 billion people. One fifth of humanity. And this is the only region with two nuclear-armed adversaries. SDI 2010 58 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE Pakistan Advantage Indo-Pak Nuclear War Impacts
War between India and Pakistan is the most likely scenario for escalation and nuclear use. Khan, M.D. political activist and leader of the Pakistani Marxist organization The Struggle, 2002 Lal Khan, M.D., is a revolutionary political activist and Trotskyist political theorist. He is the leading figure and main theorist in the International Marxist Tendency, alongside Alan Woods. He is a doctor of Medicine, although he no longer practices this profession for the sake of his revolutionary activities. In response to the coup attempt of 2002 in Venezuela, he helped found the Hands Off Venezuela campaign. He is currently the leader of the Pakistani Marxist organization The Struggle, and editor of its newspaper. Socialist View Point, Vol 2, No. 6, India and Pakistan: Millions threatened with a Nuclear Holocaust, http://www.socialistviewpoint.org/june_02/June_02_12.html, June 2002 An Armageddon is threatening the very existence of more than one-fifth of the human race which inhabits the South Asian subcontinent. After three and a half wars in the 54 years after a traumatic partition, India and Pakistan are poised for another clash. This could unravel into a horrifying scenario--the threat of the first nuclear exchange between two of the poorest states in the world. 54 years of independence has not only devastated society and plunged them into misery, poverty and disease, but has brought them to the brink of mutual annihilation. The core issue around which the preceding conflicts took place and the present threatening war looms is Kashmir. Left behind by the British as an unresolved issue, it has become a festering wound on the body of the Indian subcontinent. In the last fifty years the ruling elites have used and abused the "Kashmir issue" for domestic consumption.
The British and later American imperialism have been more than happy with the Kashmir issue being used a ploy to enhance their policy of divide and rule in the Indian subcontinent. The masses of Kashmir have been brutalized, exploited and subjected to severe oppression both by India and Pakistan. Indian-occupied Kashmir has been subjected to military aggression and a continual saga of torture, rape and genocide at the hands of the Indian army. The conditions in the approximately onethird of Kashmir under Pakistani occupation have been no less perilous. The masses in this part of Kashmir have had to endure severe hardships, poverty and disease. Kashmir is the focus of the most terrible danger because, for most of the players involved in it, the continuing conflict works. It works for the fundamentalist zealots, who have found an escape from grinding poverty through the guns, the cash and prestige it attracts. That is true of both the indigenous Kashmiri fighters and the "guest mujahideen", the so-called Arab-Afghans trained and sponsored by the CIA in the past, and lately by the ISI (Pakistan intelligence services). Trouble in Kashmir also works for the Pakistani ruling classes. They have used the Kashmir issue to curb internal dissent and repress the workers movements. Musharraf's announcements of a crackdown on the militants ring more than a touch hollow. Lately, the prospect of an all-out war has also become increasingly attractive to India's rulers. War talk and fulmination against Islamic militancy have successfully removed all reports from the pages of India's newspapers of the excesses of the BJP hardliners in Gujarat, where more than 1,000 Muslims have been killed in a 10-week religious pogrom. Conflict and crisis also allow India to ignore the average Kashmiri's main woes --the nagging injustices, brutal rule, rigged elections, national oppression, police torture and rampant murders by the Indian army. For the Pakistani state Kashmir is one of its reasons to exist--without it the generals could hardly justify the military consuming more than one third of the national They are on the verge of a conflict which can not only devastate both societies but could also deal a severe blow to the interests of the ruling elites themselves. With about a million troops massed along the line of control and the 3,000 km international border, any accident could ignite a war with disastrous consequences.
budget. But now the Kashmir issue has unravelled into a threat for the ruling elites of the subcontinent with a vengeance. Indian soldiers display the bodies of suspected militants killed during an encounter in Kashmir January 30, 2002. Indian and Pakistani troops exchanged heavy fire across a cease-fire line in the disputed region. It is not clear who a "suspected militant" is. The prime minister of India, Vajpayee, has landed himself in an unenviable dilemma. With their ranting anti-Pakistan jingoism and constant harping on Bush's doctrine of the "war against terror", they have gone too far. According to K. K Nayyar, a retired Indian rear admiral: "The Indians cannot afford to back down without looking silly to the Pakistanis.... Conventional war is inevitable and the later it takes place the fiercer will be the campaign and the higher the death toll." But what is the reality of the background to the present standoff? If we look beyond the rhetoric of "cross border terrorism" the reasons turn out to be very different. The accusation that the Musharraf regime is directly behind the Dec 13 attack on the Indian parliament and subsequently the May 14 attack on Kaluchak, Jammu is not substantiated by evidence and is, politically speaking, utterly implausible. The Musharraf dictatorship is not so foolish or nave as to impose even further pressure on itself under circumstances when the regime is struggling for survival at home. The Indian government has refused to make this distinction, effectively holding Musharraf responsible for any failure to end cross-border terrorist attacks. It is like the tactics used by Israel, which is using the same dishonest, spurious and untenable arguments. They also make no distinction between actual terrorist perpetrators and the country that harbors them. Since this is the same rationale that the Bush administration used to justify its assaults on Afghanistan, it makes it much more difficult for Washington to bring this distinction to India's attention, although it clearly wants to prevent a war from breaking out between India and Pakistan, as it pursues separate alliances with both countries. The situation is extremely fragile. Since Musharraf is not in full control, there is simply no guarantee that another terrorist attack will not take place, any more than one can guarantee even after the US war on Afghanistan that there will never be another terrorist attack on the US. On the other hand, exactly what New Delhi is planning remains a mystery. "Wait and watch," was Vajpayee's dark warning last week in Srinagar. What will India do? The first step New Delhi was considering was to abandon a treaty that ensures the free flow of three rivers, including the Indus, which originate in Indian-administered Kashmir and run through the mountains to irrigate Pakistan's breadbasket in Punjab and Sindh. This would be a serious blow to Pakistan, which is already in the grip of a severe drought. A second option would be surgical strikes by the Indian air force and commando teams on "Jihadi" training camps in Pakistani-controlled Kashmir. The third is a pounding of Pakistani posts along the "line of control" in Kashmir, followed by a limited invasion to push it back a few kilometres and allow India to take and block the passes used by the militants crossing into Indian-occupied Kashmir. With the intensifying socio-economic crisis in India, the hype of its present rulers passed into the domain of insanity. Inflated with the delusion of Indian military superiority over Pakistan, New Delhi is talking about its "determination" to call Pakistan's "nuclear bluff". That is to say, Pakistan must not be allowed to believe that it can shield itself from a serious conventional military defeat in at least a "limited" territorial incursion by threatening to launch its nuclear weapons. There are elements in leading positions within the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) and Rashtriya Sewayamsevak Sang (RSS)--which is really the controlling body within the family of organisations of which the BJP is the electoral wing--who want more. They genuinely believe that Pakistan must be dismembered and destroyed. That such an approach could be a recipe for the most incredible disaster does not faze these Hindu fanatics. This is hardly surprising, given the similarity of their mind-set to their Islamic extremist counterparts in Pakistan. SDI 2010 59 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE Pakistan Advantage Indo-Pak Nuclear War Impacts
[Khan continued no text removed] There are also domestic reasons for this insane behavior. The NDA (the ruling alliance in India) was in severe crisis, which could have led to the fall of the BJP from power, especially after the Gujarat imbroglio. The BJP needs a war or at least a period of strong and sustained war tensions--before it brings forward the date of the next general elections. The Congress and other bourgeois opposition parties have timidly succumbed to the BJP's fanatical warmongering. This has further added to the war hysteria which has engulfed the supposedly "secular" Indian society even more than in theocratic Pakistan. The leadership of the communist and left parties has failed to launch a movement to stop this madness. The preservation of "democracy", "elected government", "Indian national integrity" and other justifications for the "two stages" policy, have given a free hand to the BJP reactionary regime to indulge in this chauvinist discourse without any major resistance from within. In Pakistan the regime somehow decided to pour petrol on the flames in Kashmir while America was immersed in the Taliban mess. That clearly was a serious miscalculation. The ISI had been transferring its recruits and religious mercenaries to Kashmir just as the Americans were trying to bomb al Qaeda and Taliban into oblivion. But in the present scenario, with the reversal of the Kashmir policy, it is not just the Musharraf regime which is at stake but the whole Pakistani state, its ideological foundations; the very historical justification for its existence and its reactionary roots--all are threatened. The Kashmir issue has been the "cornerstone" of the domestic and foreign policy of the Pakistani theocratic state ever since its inception. Hence it is next to impossible for Musharraf to give up this policy completely. However, the tough speech by Musharraf on May 27 was a case of defiant rhetoric cloaking a hidden retreat. The general did give orders for the incursions into India to be halted and rebel camps dismantled and the Americans have been enlisted to verify that this happens. But the ISI's officers out in the hills of Pakistani Kashmir may not be as willing as Musharraf is said to be to end the bleeding of India. Furious with general Musharraf for betraying them in Afghanistan and perhaps now in Kashmir, the Islamic fundamentalists have every reason to seek to destabilise him. There is plenty that could still go wrong. More terrorist acts, like the May 14 slaughter of soldiers' wives and children or the December 13 attack on the Indian parliament could trigger an Indian reprisal. Even if a conventional war erupts, the devastation unleashed would be much more than the total destruction incurred in all the previous Indo-Pak wars. Moreover, it is far from clear that such a war could be limited in duration or territorial scope, as visualized. Militarily, neither the Indian army nor air force or the Navy is structured to conduct such precise surgical operations. India has 1,303,000 people in its armed forces plus 5, 35,000 reservists. Pakistan has 612,000 troops and 513,000 reservists. India is believed to have 60 nuclear warheads, compared with Pakistan's 25. The Indian air force has 1,200 aircraft including 132 helicopters, most of them armed. The Pakistan air force has 410 planes and 34 unarmed helicopters. India has one aircraft carrier, while Pakistan has none. India also has 19 submarines, 25 destroyers and a flotilla of 93 boats for carrying missiles, troops and assault aircraft. (Source: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London) India is spending 10 billion rupees a month and Pakistan at least half as much. The rising costs of the "war effort" are playing havoc with the economies of both the countries and the poverty, price hikes and misery of the masses on both sides are worsening dangerously. These are societies where the children have no shoes but the elites have nuclear weapons that cost billions of dollars. It is true that India has a much larger army and military arsenal, but if we examine the balance of military forces, it would not be a walkover. There are many unknown and unpredictable factors. For example, if a "conventional war" should break out, the question is who, how and when will it be stopped? Who exactly will determine when the "limit" has been crossed and enough damage has been done--for Pakistan to resort to the use of nuclear weapons? The former head of the ISI and present communication minister, Lt Gen Javed Ashraf (who is famous for his reactionary and barbarous attitude towards the workers), recently said: "If Pakistan's existence is threatened it will use nuclear weapons." That is clear enough. In the madness which now rules on both sides, they do not even try to imagine the implications of a nuclear exchange. Nor those blind followers from primitive sections of society who danced with joy and distributed sweets in India and Pakistan when these tests were detonated in May 1998. Current estimates are that 12 million people would be killed outright in a nuclear exchange between the two warring countries and countless more millions would linger on, dying slowly, painfully and horribly.
Taking Hoffman's 1 megaton blast as an example, those within an area of say 6 square miles will be killed by the gamma rays emitted by the blast. They will be the lucky ones. They will have no warning, no idea as to what it was that cooked them. Outside the circle for another ten miles or so every living thing, human or animal, will be instantly blinded by the bright light from the explosion whether their eyes be open or closed. The initial gamma burst will be followed a tenth of a second later, by a multi-spectral heat blast, followed over the next few seconds by a pressure wave which will cause all living beings in its way to bleed from every orifice of their bodies. The wave will be accompanied by high velocity winds about 70 miles per hour as far as 6 miles from the epicenter. These will be carrying dangerous debris causing multiple wounds and injuries. The wave and winds will cause the death of many and those that survive over perhaps an area of 150 square miles will later suffer from vomiting, skin rashes and unquenchable thirst. Their hair will fall out in clumps, and their skin will peel off. The mushroom-shaped cloud will dissipate within an hour and then comes the invisible and intractable radiation, spreading death and disease over a large area. The clouds that drift with the wind will carry a deadly cargo for thousands of miles, over international borders into countries which have no involvement in the India-Pakistan dispute. Cancer, leukemia and other genetic damage by radioactive material will strike generations to come. SDI 2010 60 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE Pakistan Advantage Indo-Pak Nuclear War Impacts
The conflict will go nuclear
Davidson, award winning science reporter, 2002 Keay Davidson is a science reporter for the San Francisco Examiner. He is also a recipient of CSICOP's Responsibility in Journalism Award. Davidson has been a science writer for newspapers since 1979: the San Francisco Chronicle (2000-present), the San Francisco Examiner (1986-2000), the Los Angeles Times San Diego bureau (1981-85), and the Orlando, Fla. Sentinel Star (1979-1981). He has written three books, most recently the first biography of Carl Sagan, and is finishing a biography of Thomas S. Kuhn. Also, he has won the AAAS and NASW science journalism awards, and has written for numerous magazines such as Scientific American, New Scientist and National Geographic. The San Francisco Chronicle, CRISIS IN KASHMIR; Nuclear threat has world on edge; Tensions highest since Cold War -- carnage, environmental destruction could reach far beyond region, June 7, 2002 l/n It is more than 50 years since India and Pakistan achieved independence from Britain, and since then the two South Asian nations have argued and squabbled -- incessantly and sometimes bloodily -- over the contested state of Kashmir. The possibility that the conflict could go nuclear has haunted the region since 1974, when India first detonated an atomic bomb in response to China's development of nuclear weapons a decade earlier. In 1972, Pakistan began a nuclear weapons program shortly after its loss of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in a war with India. If a nuclear war between the two countries broke out, millions of survivors might be disabled, blinded or deafened by the nuclear thunderclaps. Radioactive fallout might poison soil and rivers and crops across South Asia and points beyond. A new Dark Age of political chaos -- exploited by religious demagogues, hightech warlords and neighboring powers with their own strategic ambitions -- might descend upon these impoverished lands.
As to how many warheads each side has, in addition to conventional forces, estimates vary. ASSESSING COUNTRIES' BOMBMAKING ABILITIES India's known plutonium reserves indicate it has the potential to assemble at least 65 weapons, according to veteran defense analyst Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. In theory, India and Pakistan could make even more bombs through clever designs and miniaturization techniques, similar to those the United States and Soviet Union developed during the Cold War to "get more bang for the buck," as the nation's weapons designers loved to say. In 1998, Indian officials said they had enough fissile material to make 125 bombs. Other Western estimates go as high as 200 Indian warheads. Pakistan has enough weapons-grade, highly enriched uranium to assemble up to 25 bombs, according to analysts at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Also, Pakistan's heavy-water research reactor at Khushab, which was completed in the mid-1990s, is "estimated to be capable of generating enough plutonium for between one and two nuclear weapons annually," Cordesman notes. Fallout from nuclear blasts could travel hundreds or thousands of miles, even around the world, depending on prevailing winds, weather conditions and how close to the ground the blasts occur. Low-altitude blasts, which are more likely to destroy hardened targets such as bunkers, could boost mountains of "radioactivated" dirt into the sky. The resulting fallout could rain across Asia, spoiling farmland across an overpopulated continent already desperate for every inch of tillable soil. FALLOUT MAY SPARE AMERICAS, EUROPE Even if winds blew fallout around the world, however, the radioactivity would be so diluted it would have negligible health impact on Europe and the Americas, some experts say. "Neither side seems to pay (in) public much attention to factors like fallout, collateral damage from inaccurate strikes, and problems with reliable calculation of height of burst," Cordesman notes in "The India-Pakistan Military Balance," a report he recently wrote for the Center for Strategic and International Studies. As a result, the report said, "Either side could launch a strike with far more civilian casualties than it planned, triggering a much higher level of retaliatory escalation than it intended."
Western analysts are divided, though, on whether the India-Pakistan conflict is a nuclear disaster in the making or an overblown crisis. Each side's apparent confidence that it can militarily and politically navigate through the quarrel without plunging into an atomic abyss is justified, according to some experts, who accuse Westerners of underestimating the maturity and sophistication of the Pakistani and Indian leaders. SDI 2010 61 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE Pakistan Advantage Indo-Pak Nuclear War Impacts
[Davidson continued no text removed] "There is almost a racist tendency to depict these guys as a bunch of mango republic nut jobs, and they aren't," says one high-placed U.S. analyst, referring to Indian and Pakistani leaders. The analyst, who has extensive field experience in Pakistan, declined to be identified. Still, surprise shocks can ruin politicians' best-laid plans, transforming semi-stable regional tensions into bloody cataclysms, just as the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914 hurled Europe into World War I, other observers warn. "The dynamics of the situation could overcome the carefully scripted plans of the political leaders if there's one (more) major terrorist attack" on India by militants operating out of Pakistan or the Pakistani-run sector of Kashmir, warns Joseph Cirincione, director of the nonproliferation project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, D.C. "I'm very pessimistic," Cirincione adds. "Unless the United States can delay this for two more weeks, I think we're going to go to war, and it has a very high probability of going nuclear."
Analysts believe the next few weeks are decisive because India is unlikely to take military action after the summer monsoon season starts in late June. The seasonal rains would make it difficult to move troops and equipment through the mountainous terrain of Kashmir. Defense strategists in India, which has by far the greater conventional military might, have discussed several major options including: -- A "salami strategy" in which the Indian army would incrementally seize slices, or small pieces, of Pakistani territory. Then the Indian government would use these "slices" as pawns in peace negotiations, promising to return the territory in return for Pakistani concessions. -- Making bold strikes against Pakistani military bases. One problem with trying to obliterate these bases in Pakistan is that the Indian forces might well obliterate U.S. military forces stationed at these bases in connection with al Qaeda opposition operations in Afghanistan. -- Launching conventional air raids against Pakistan from Indian aircraft carriers positioned in the Indian Ocean. Having a much weaker navy, Pakistan would have trouble responding directly to such attacks. PAKISTAN ALREADY 'A FAILING STATE' The trouble with such Indian schemes is that they must succeed without oversucceeding. That's because Pakistan is already politically unstable, held together mainly by its army, according to some Western experts. If Pakistan collapsed under a crushing Indian onslaught, then there'd be no entity left to control Pakistani guerrillas just beyond India's border -- unless India itself took on that task. "what people mean by a failing state," Cirincione says. "If there is no Pakistani government, then there's nobody to crack down on and there'll be an increase in terrorist attacks" against India. Thereafter, for India, "it starts to look a lot like Vietnam." And that raises the specter of nuclear war: If Pakistan thinks its survival is threatened, its surviving leaders, whether civilian or military, might deploy nuclear weapons as desperate last-minute defenses.
Pakistan already is In recent years, Western analysts have conducted many computer-assisted scenarios about hypothetical India-Pakistan nuclear wars. These "war games" simulate conventional and nuclear conflicts. One such scenario was described in a report co-written in the late 1990s by David Shlapak, an international policy analyst at the Rand think tank whose experience with war gaming goes back to the Cold War. The report depicts a hypothetical India-Pakistan war that breaks out in 2005. Participants in the scenario "gamed" what happened next. They based their actions on their knowledge of the region and its leadership. Here's what they anticipated: "In the spring of 2006, India dramatically increases its counterinsurgency operations in both Kashmir and Punjab, and the rebels are pushed into precipitate retreat," the Rand report says. "Pakistan responds by infiltrating a number of special forces teams, which attack military installations supporting the Indian operations. "India mobilizes for war," the report continues, "and launches major attacks all along the international border, accompanied by an intense air campaign. . . . As Indian forces continue to press forward, Pakistan detonates a small fission (nuclear) bomb on an Indian armored formation in an unpopulated area of the desert border region; it is unclear whether the weapon was intended to go off over Pakistani or Indian territory. "India responds by destroying a Pakistani air base with a two-weapon nuclear attack. Condemning the 'escalation' to homeland attacks, Pakistan attacks the Indian city of Jodhpur with a 20-kiloton weapon and demands cessation of hostilities." Then "India strikes Hyderabad with a weapon estimated to be 200 kilotons and threatens 10 times more destruction if any more nuclear weapons are used. Pakistan offers a cease-fire in place." The war game ends shortly after the cease-fire . The report doesn't estimate the likely number of deaths in such a war. Some other scenarios have estimated the number of dead in an India-Pakistan war at up to 17 million. The report also details the extreme difficulty of post-atomic war Western humanitarian efforts in the region, where the atomic blasts have rendered many air fields inaccessible. SDI 2010 62 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE Pakistan Advantage Indo-Pak Nuclear War Impacts
Nuclear escalation over Kashmir is likely empirics and the lack of a psychosocial barrier against first use Ganguly, Krepon, and Tahir-Kheli, professor of poli sci @ Hunter College, president of the Henry L. Stimson Center, and Pakistan-American political scientist and ambassador, 1999
Sumit Ganguly:**Dr. Ganguly is Professor of Political Science at Hunter College of the City University of New York. He is the author of The Origins of War in South Asia (Second Edition, 1994) and Between War and Peace: The Crisis in Kashmir (forthcoming). Michael Krepon:**Mr. Krepon is President of the Henry L. Stimson Center and coeditor of Crisis Prevention, Confidence Building, and Reconciliation in South Asia (1995). Dr. Prof. Shirin R. Tahir-Kheli is a Pakistani-American political scientist and an Ambassador. In 2008, she was the senior advisor for women's empowerment to the United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and was Senior director for Democracy, Human Rights and International Operations at the UN Security Council from 2003-2005. She has served 5 Republican presidential administrations since 1980. CDI Show Transcript: Nuclear War Between India and Pakistan? December 13, 1999 http://www.cdi.org/adm/1214/transcript.html
NARRATOR: India and Pakistan each exploded five nuclear devices in a series of weapons tests last May, raising worldwide concern about the possibility of nuclear war on the Indian subcontinent. What led to the recent nuclear tests? And where does the world go from here? Can the nuclear neighbors, long mired in a bloody territorial dispute, resolve their differences before it is too late? This week, America's Defense Monitor will explore the grim possibility of nuclear war between India and Pakistan India and Pakistan's recent atomic explosions raised the specter of nuclear war in an already tense region. The nuclear neighbors have fought each other in three separate wars in the past half-century. India also shares a border with China, and a territorial dispute there led to war in 1962. KHELI: In a sense, the psychological barrier against war isn't there in South Asia...
NARRATOR: Shirin Tahir-Kheli, a former staff member of the National Security Council, is a distinguished scholar at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. KHELI: ... when it's necessary, either as a last resort, or when it's thrust upon the leadership, war is talked about, which is unsettling. NARRATOR: The region's most volatile dispute is the conflict between India and Pakistan over control of Kashmir--a picturesque, mostly Islamic territory which lies at the northern end
of the India-Pakistan border. Today, Kashmir is divided between India and Pakistan along a 500-mile Line of Control. But throughout Kashmir, militant groups favoring Indian control, Pakistani control, or Kashmiri independence continue to battle each other and the authorities. During the past decade, violent conflict in Kashmir has claimed nearly 30,000 lives, and created countless refugees. Michael Krepon is President of the Stimson Center, an influential, non-partisan organization seeking to reduce nuclear dangers. He warns that as bloody as the conflict in Kashmir has been, it could get worse. KREPON: There is a very dangerous game of chicken going on in South Asia.... the fear is that the fighting that's going on now across the line of control that separates Kashmir will escalate in ways that neither side really wants, but that neither side has the capability to defuse. I. WHAT LED TO THE NUCLEAR TESTS
NARRATOR: Nearly a quarter-century ago, in the wake of three wars with Pakistan and defeat in a border war with China, the Indian government of Indira Gandhi exploded a nuclear device in what it termed a 'peaceful nuclear test'. Since India's first nuclear explosion, observers have suspected both India and Pakistan of secretly building nuclear weapons.
OAKLEY: ...Indians having fought a war with China and seeing China test, they decided they'd better get the nuclear capability. Then there was a war between India and Pakistan, and Indians tested, so Pakistan said, 'we'd better have a nuclear capability.' NARRATOR: Robert Oakley is a visiting fellow at the National Defense University, and served as the United States' Ambassador to Pakistan during the Bush Administration. OAKLEY: I think the primary Indian motivation was desire to be seen and to be treated as a major power, analogous to China. India feels they should be treated the same way the Chinese are treated, they're burning with resentment that they haven't been. NARRATOR: Last May, India and Pakistan each exploded five nuclear weapons. While the tests came as a surprise to much of the international community, close observers describe them as one more step in the struggle for power and prestige in South Asia that has been in progress for decades. India and Pakistan are home to more than a billion people. Both possess well-equipped military forces. And, both countries have had the capability to produce nuclear weapons for years. But in the eyes of the world, China is the
only country in the region with 'great power' status. This is largely because of China's nuclear arsenal, complete with inter-continental ballistic missiles. SDI 2010 63 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE Pakistan Advantage Coup Impact
A coup causes nuclear war with India. Albright, physicist and President of the ISIS, 2001 David Albright, a physicist, is President of the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) in Washington, D.C. He directs the project work of ISIS, heads its fundraising efforts, and chairs its board of directors. In addition, he regularly publishes and conducts scientific research. He has written numerous assessments on secret nuclear weapons programs throughout the world. Securing Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Complex: Paper1 commissioned and sponsored by the Stanley Foundation for the 42nd Strategy for Peace Conference, Strategies for Regional Security (South Asia Working Group), October 25-27, 2001, http://www.isisonline.org/publications/terrorism/stanleypaper.html
Several observers have suggested that if Pakistan suffers a coup by forces hostile to the United States, the US military should be ready to provide security over the nuclear weapons (or even to take the weapons out of Pakistan entirely) without the permission of the Pakistani authorities.13 Others have raised the possibility of asking President Musharraf to allow the United States or China to take possession of Pakistan's nuclear weapons during a coup. Although such responses appear possible in theory, their implementation could be extremely difficult and dangerous. A U.S. military action to seize or cripple Pakistan's strategic nuclear assets may encourage India to take similar action, in essence to finish the job. Even if India does nothing, a new Pakistani government may launch any remaining nuclear weapons at U.S. forces or against India. In addition, removing the nuclear weapons would not be enough. The new government would inherit the facilities to make nuclear weapons. Extensive bombing would thus be required at several nuclear sites, including the relatively large Khushab reactor and New Labs reprocessing plant. These types of attacks risk the release of a large amount of radiation if they are to ensure that the facility is not relatively quickly restored to operation. For example, bombing the facility so as to bring the roof down on the reactor core or hot cells is unlikely to be sufficient. Such harsh contingencies may be important to consider in order to protect the vital interests of the United States and its allies. A better strategy, however, is to take appropriate steps to minimize the likelihood that such catastrophic scenarios materialize. Pakistani Coup causes nuclear conflict in South Asia Paul Wallis co-founder of Stroma and, during 2002, was elected a Fellow of the Institute of Analysts and Programmers. He also blogs at keystonesandrivets.com and has had his articles appear in Digital Journal Digital Journal -- August 18th 2008 http://www.digitaljournal.com/article/258755
If you were looking for the definition of a horrendously complex, contradictory, brutal, political situation, you need look no further than Pakistan. There is a place called Pakistan, but you'd have to look hard to find a society which could be called a single society. There are social groups within social groups. The tribal lands are both national and extra-national. The politics are convoluted, and the administration is complex in terms of political factions and alignments. Islamic groups are hostile, both to the US and the Pakistani moderates. The army is a social force, when it feels like it. The moderates themselves are divided, but have common ground in their democratic position, which is diametrically opposed to the Islamic position and the army's occasional forays into dictatorship. To simplify matters not at all, to the east is India, the perceived probable enemy. To the west is Iran, whose influence is rightly seen as potentially dangerous given Iran's tendency to support its fan clubs in other countries. Pakistan is also a nuclear armed nation, with approximately 150 deliverable warheads. If the Taliban style Islamists were to take over Pakistan, the whole region could become a nuclear war zone, if any of their rhetoric ever came true. SDI 2010 64 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE Pakistan Advantage Coup Proliferation
A coup in Pakistan presents multiple scenarios for nuclear proliferation Albright, physicist and President of the ISIS, 2001
David Albright, a physicist, is President of the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) in Washington, D.C. He directs the project work of ISIS, heads its fundraising efforts, and chairs its board of directors. In addition, he regularly publishes and conducts scientific research. He has written numerous assessments on secret nuclear weapons programs throughout the world. Securing Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Complex: Paper1 commissioned and sponsored by the Stanley Foundation for the 42nd Strategy for Peace Conference, Strategies for Regional Security (South Asia Working Group), October 2527, 2001, http://www.isis-online.org/publications/terrorism/stanleypaper.html Multiple vulnerabilities exist in a nuclear weapons complex. Transportation of sensitive items is often viewed as one of the weakest links. Accordingly, many countries involved in transporting fissile material or nuclear weapons have invested heavily in better securing their transports. Insider threats are a recurring problem. The situation in the former Soviet Union highlights this threat. Groups or individuals may violate security rules for a variety of reasons, including profit, settling a grudge, or religious or ideological motives. Violators may try to gain control over sensitive items for their own use or to transfer these items to another state or to other non-state actors. A special concern is that Pakistan will suffer another coup. A new leadership can be expected to place a high priority on seizing the country's nuclear assets. The threat of theft or diversion of fissile material or nuclear weapons falls into three general areas: Outsider Threat--The possibility that armed individuals or groups from outside a facility gain access and steal weapons, weapons components or fissile material. Insider Threat--The possibility that individuals who work at a facility will remove fissile material, nuclear weapons, or weapons components without proper authorization. Insider/Outsider Threat--The possibility that insiders and outsiders conspire together to obtain fissile materials, weapons, or weapon components. Proliferation leads to extinction Utgoff 2 Victor A Utgoff, Deputy Director of Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of Institute for Defense Analysis, Summer 2002, Survival, p. 87-90
In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed towards a world that will mirror
the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear "six shooters" on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather together on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations. SDI 2010 65 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE Pakistan Advantage AT "No Coup"
Pakistani Coup is feasible Neg ev too dated The Business Times Singapore editorial staff November 12, 2009 lexis The respected New Yorker magazine in its latest issue claims that the US has been negotiating highly sensitive agreements with the Pakistani military about the security of its nuclear arsenal. The Americans think that fundamentalists within the Pakistani military might stage a coup or take control of some nuclear weapons or even divert a warhead, it reported. Understandably, Pakistan has strongly denied any such talks. But whatever is going on concerning the nuclear arsenal issue, the general security situation in Pakistan is clearly deteriorating. The US, which perhaps has the most
influence over the political establishment in Islamabad, should take notice and help the civilian government with more money and war material. As well, Washington must give far more in development aid for schools, hospitals and transport networks immediately. Pakistan Army would not necessarily block a coup they're radicalizing now Seymour M. Hersh is a United States Pulitzer Prize winning investigative journalist and author based in Washington, D.C. He is a regular contributor to The New Yorker magazine on military and security matters. The New Yorker November 16, 2009 lexis Others are less sure. "Nuclear weapons are only as safe as the people who handle them ," Pervez Hoodbhoy,
an eminent nuclear physicist in Pakistan, said in a talk last summer at a Nation and Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy forum in New York. For more than two decades, Hoodbhoy said, "the Pakistan Army has been recruiting on the basis of faithfulness to Islam. As a consequence, there is now a different character present among Army officers and ordinary soldiers. There are half a dozen scenarios that one can imagine." There was no proof either that the most dire scenarios would be realized or that the arsenal was safe,
he said. SDI 2010 66 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE Pakistan Advantage AT "No Coup"
Public opposition will not block Pakistani support for extremism opposition to US presence in Afghanistan is too great Right Vision News, "Anger among Pakistanis against U.S. on the rise" July 4, 2010 lexis Pakistanis lashed out Friday at the US, blaming its alliance with their government and its presence in Afghanistan for spurring two suicide bombers to kill 45 people at Data Darbar. The reactions showed the challenge facing Washington and the Pakistani government when it comes to rallying public support against the extremism that has scarred the country. On Friday, few
Pakistanis interviewed saw militants at the root of the problem. ''America is killing Muslims in Afghanistan and in our tribal areas (with missile strikes), and militants are attacking Pakistan to express anger against the government for supporting America,'' said Zahid Umar, 25, who frequently visit the shrine. Pakistanis are suffering because of American policies and aggression in the region, said Mohammed Asif, 34, who runs an auto workshop in Lahore. He and others said the attacks would end if the US would pull out of Afghanistan. Washington ''is encouraging Indians and Jews to carry out attacks'' in Pakistan, said Arifa Moen, 32, a teacher in the central city of Multan. Pakistani officials condemned the bombings, using language they have frequently used to try to convince the population that the fight against militancy is not one they can ignore. ''Those who still pretend that we are not a nation at war are complicit in these deaths,'' said Farahnaz Ispahani, a spokeswoman for Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari. The US Embassy issued a statement Friday condemning the attack and saying it ''demonstrates the terrorists' blatant disregard for the lives of the Pakistani people and the future of this country.'' The suicide bombings have fueled anger against Pakistan's weak police forces, who appear helpless to stop the killings. In the hours after Thursday's bombings, demonstrators gathered outside the shrine to protest the security lapse, only to be dispersed after police fired into the air and threw rocks at them. Senior Lahore government official Khusro Pervez said recent intelligence alerts about possible attacks lacked details. ''The intelligence agencies alerted us that terrorists could target prominent places, shrines and mosques in Lahore. They mentioned names of major places as a possible target, but no specific information was available to us,'' he said SDI 2010 67 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE ***Hegemony Advantage Extensions*** SDI 2010 68 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE Hegemony Advantage Afghanistan Overstretch
Imperial Overstretch will make hegemony unsustainable despite efforts to boost soft power Obama's escalation in Afghanistan risks decline Shor, prof of U.S. social and cultural history @ Wayne State University, 2010
Francis Shor is a social and cultural historian working primarily in a 20th century United States context. Professor Shor has published extensively in several areas. Publications include 2009 Routledge Press book, Dying Empire: U. S. Imperialism and Global Resistance, and the entry on the "American Century" in the 2009 Sharpe Encyclopedia of the Culture Wars. Journal of Critical Globalization Studies, Issue 2, "War in the Era of Declining U.S. Global Hegemony" http://www.criticalglobalisation.com/Issue2/JCGS_Issue2_War_and_Declining_US_Hegemony. html
Another very real dilemma for U.S. military imperialism and their global strategies, particularly as a consequence of the wars on Iraq and Afghanistan, is imperial overstretch. Both in terms of the eventual costs, estimated in the trillions of dollars just in the case of the war on Iraq, and the continuing drain on military personnel, these wars have further underscored the inherent contradictions of U.S. military imperialism and its war strategies. Even with active troops, counting the National Guard and Reserves, numbering over 2 million, the U.S. military has so depleted its human resources that it has resorted to extending tours in ways that have lowered morale and created even more internal dissent about deployment. Attempts to offset these problems by higher pay inducements, expansion of the numbers, and use of private contractors have only exacerbated the overall contradictions endemic in maintaining the kind of global garrison embodied by U.S. military imperialism. According to world-systems scholar Giovanni Arrighi, besides having
`jeopardized the credibility of U.S. military might,' the war and occupation of Iraq may be one of the key components underlying the `terminal crisis of U.S. hegemony,' albeit without diminishing the U.S. role as `the world's pre-eminent military power' (2005, p. 80). Nonetheless, as pointed out by other scholars (Johnson, 2004; Mann, 2003; Wallerstein, 2003), imperial overstretch was central to the demise of previous empires and now threatens the death of a U.S. empire also bent on fighting debilitating and self-destructive wars. Clearly, the pursuit of such wars also engenders resistance abroad and potential dissent at home, the latter, however, contingent on some fundamental understanding of the whys and wherefores of prosecuting war. Certainly, resistance to a militarized U.S. foreign policy is evident in various guises, from local insurgencies to global protests. Irrespective of the form such resistance may take, including insurgencies that engage in terror, the U.S. will encounter resistance as long as it insists on imposing its sense of order in the world. In effect, a
`system of global domination resting largely on military force, or even the threat of force, cannot in the greater scheme of things consolidate its rule on a foundation of legitimating beliefs on values' (Boggs, 2005, p. 178). On the other hand, U.S. perception of that resistance, whether by the ruling elite, corporate media, or the public at large, is filtered through an ideological smokescreen that either labels that resistance as "terrorism" or some primitive from of knownothing anti-Americanism. Part of the inability to recognize the reality of what shapes the lives of others is the persistence of a self-image of U.S. benevolence or innocence, even in the face of the realities spawned by U.S. intervention and occupation. Also, what remains both contentious and difficult to face is the degree to which the United States, especially in its pursuit of global dominance through military imperialism, has become, to quote Walter Hixson, a `warfare state, a nation with a propensity for initiating and institutionalizing warfare' (2008, p. 14). For Hixson the perpetuation of that warfare state requires reaffirming a national identity whose cultural hegemony at home can provide ideological cover for `nation building, succoring vicious regimes, bombing shelling, contaminating, torturing and killing hundreds of thousands of innocents, and destroying enemy others' (2008, p. 304). As the bodies pile up, however, the ability to maintain hegemony abroad and even at home is eroded. Yet, war, as a political strategy, remains a compulsive choice by those elite forces in the United States waging a losing struggle to retain global hegemony. As argued by one fierce critic of U.S. military imperialism: `All presidents, whether Democrats or Republicans, have sought to shape the contours of politics worldwide. This global mission and fascination with military power has entangled [U.S.] priorities and stretched its resources over and over again' (Kolko, 2006, p. 95). Although imperial overstretch is even more pronounced in the aftermath of the recent world-wide economic crisis and the proliferation of conflicts in new regions, the fundamental bi-partisan commitment by the political elite to exercising, in the words of President Barack Obama, "global leadership" will continue (quoted in Bacevich, 2008, pp. 79-80). Of course, there will be nuances in the exercise of that global leadership. Given the massive violations of international and U.S. laws by the Bush Administration, from abrogation of the Geneva Conventions to renditions to torture and domestic spying, it is not surprising to see President Obama repudiating some of the most egregious policies while retaining others. Although the adoption of these positions by President Obama is certainly part of the restoration of U.S. standing, and, hence, hegemony in the international arena, this new administration is wedded to prosecuting war aggressively in Afghanistan with the expansion of U.S. troops and in Pakistan with increasing attacks by U.S. drones and forays by U.S. Special Forces. SDI 2010 69 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE Hegemony Advantage AT Withdrawal Hurts Heg
Withdraw would not hurt the US's global image Paul R. Pillar is director of graduate studies at Georgetown University's Security Studies Program and a former national intelligence officer for the Near East and South Asia. The National Interest. March/April 2010 http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=22916 My sparring partner asserts that backing away from the commitment in Afghanistan would damage U.S. credibility--a logic eerily reminiscent of the chief rationale for the war in which I served as an army officer: the one in Vietnam. The idea was as unexamined and invalid then as it is now. Governments (or terrorist groups) simply do not calculate other governments' credibility that way.1 Nagl's reference in this regard to how Pakistan would revisit "its recent decisions to fight against the Taliban" is odd given that the most
recent decision--announced during a visit by the U.S. secretary of defense, no less--is that the Pakistani army would not launch any new offensives for as much as a year. Withdraw is the best option for US hegemony troop tradeoffs and US image Malou Innocent is a foreign policy analyst at the Cato Institute, "No More Troops for Afghanistan" This article appeared in the Huffington Post on September 16, 2009. Available at: http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=10550
As public support for the war in Afghanistan hits an all-time low, Joint Chiefs Chairman Admiral Mike Mullen has endorsed an increase in U.S. forces there. But President Obama should strongly resist any calls to add more troops. The U.S. and NATO military presence of roughly 110,000 troops is more than enough to carry out the focused mission of training Afghan forces. Committing still more troops would only weaken the authority of Afghan leaders and undermine the U.S.'s ability to deal with security challenges elsewhere in the world. The Senate hearings this week on Afghanistan are displaying the increased skepticism
among many top lawmakers toward a war that is rapidly losing public support. At a Senate Armed Service Committee hearing, Senator Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) asked Mullen, "Do you understand you've got one more shot back home?" alluding to polls showing most Americans oppose Sadly, a common view among policymakers and defense that if America pours in enough time and resources--possibly hundreds of thousands of troops for another 12 to 14 years--Washington could really turn Afghanistan around. But while military leaders like Gen. Stanley McChrystal say a new strategy must be forged to "earn the support of the [Afghan] people," Washington does not even have the support of the American people. The U.S. does not have the patience, cultural knowledge or legitimacy to transform what is a deeply divided, poverty-stricken, tribal-based society into a self-sufficient, non-corrupt, and stable electoral democracy. And even if Americans did commit several hundred thousand troops and pursued decades of armed nation-building--in the middle of an economic downturn, no less--success would hardly be guaranteed, especially in a country notoriously suspicious of outsiders and largely devoid of
the war and oppose sending more troops. "Do you understand that?" officials is central authority. The U.S. and its allies must instead narrow their objectives. A long-term, large-scale presence is not necessary to disrupt al Qaeda, and going after the group does not require Washington to pacify the entire country. Denying a sanctuary to terrorists that seek to attack the U.S. can be done through aerial surveillance, retaining covert operatives for discrete operations against specific targets, and ongoing intelligencesharing with countries in the region. Overall, remaining in Afghanistan is more likely to tarnish America's reputation and undermine U.S. security than would withdrawal. SDI 2010 70 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE Hegemony Advantage AT Withdrawal Hurts Heg
Allies already perceive that the US is going to cut and run Obama's soft deadline proves ANNE FLAHERTY and PAULINE JELINEK, both writers for the Associated Press Washington Examiner 06/17/10 http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/politics/congress/general-says-july-2011-is-not-afghanexit-date-but-tied-to-how-war-is-going-at-the-time-96473414.html Much of the debate on Capitol Hill has focused on when U.S. troops should leave. Obama's promise to start the withdrawal in July 2011 helped him with Democrats. But it prompted Republican charges that the U.S. was encouraging the Taliban and demoralizing its allies by setting a hard and fast withdrawal date. To allay these fears, military officials have repeatedly said the number of troops and how soon they would leave will depend entirely on how the war is going. They did so again Wednesday. "We're just not going to know until we get much closer to July
2011 how many troops and where they'll come from, the pace and the place," Mullen said. During a House hearing Wednesday, California Republican Rep. Buck McKeon asked Petraeus what conditions would have to be in place for troops to leave. Petraeus said there would have to be better security and governance, and an Afghan security force able to contribute to that stability. Asked what happens if those conditions don't Petraeus' remarks were not likely to change that perception among many Afghans that U.S. support for the war is ebbing. Afghans still have bitter memories of the 1980s and early 1990s, when the U.S. promised not to abandon the region after the withdrawal of the Soviet Union -- then did just that. Civil war and the rise of the Taliban to power followed. "Many Afghan officials and officers, and allied officers and diplomats, are at best confused and at worst privately believe that we will leave,"
exist, Petraeus said he would recommend a delay in the withdrawal. "If that's what's necessary, that's what I will do," he said. wrote Anthony Cordesman with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in an analysis published Wednesday. SDI 2010 71 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE Hegemony Advantage AT Recession/Dollar Low
Cutting military spending solves all economic issues the plan can put 1 trillion back into the US economy. Barney Frank and Ron Paul US Representatives to Congress Huffington Post July 6, 2010 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rep-barney-frank/why-we-must-reduce-milita_b_636051.html It is irrefutably clear to us that if we do not make substantial cuts in the projected levels of Pentagon spending, we will do substantial damage to our economy and dramatically reduce our quality of
life. We are not talking about cutting the money needed to supply American troops in the field. Once we send our men and women into battle, even in cases where we may have opposed going to war, we have an obligation to make sure that our servicemembers have everything they need. And we are not talking about cutting essential funds for combating terrorism; we must do everything possible to prevent any recurrence of the mass murder of Americans that took place on September 11, 2001. Immediately after World War II, with much of the world devastated and the Soviet Union becoming increasingly aggressive, America took on the responsibility of protecting virtually every country that asked for it. Sixtyfive years later, we continue to play that role long after there is any justification for it, and currently American military spending makes up approximately 44% of all such expenditures worldwide. The nations of Western Europe now collectively have greater resources at their command than we do, yet they continue to depend overwhelmingly on American taxpayers to provide for their defense. According to a recent article in the New York Times, "Europeans have boasted about their social model, with its generous vacations and early retirements, its national health care systems and extensive welfare benefits, contrasting it with the comparative harshness of American capitalism. Europeans have benefited from low military spending, protected by NATO and the American nuclear umbrella." When our democratic allies are menaced by larger, hostile powers, there is a strong argument to be made for supporting them. But the notion that American taxpayers get some benefit from extending our military might worldwide is deeply flawed. And the idea that as a superpower it is our duty to maintain stability by intervening in civil disorders virtually anywhere in the world often generates anger directed at us and may in the end do more harm than good. We believe that the time has come for a much quicker withdrawal from Iraq than the President has proposed. We both voted against that war, but even for those who voted for it, there can be no justification for spending over $700 billion dollars of American taxpayers' money on direct military spending in Iraq since the war began, not including the massive, estimated long-term costs of the war. We have essentially taken on a referee role in a civil war, even mediating electoral disputes. In order to create a systematic approach to reducing military spending, we have convened a Sustainable Defense Task Force consisting of experts on military expenditures that span the ideological spectrum. The task force has produced a detailed report with specific recommendations for cutting Pentagon spending by approximately $1 trillion over a ten year period. It calls for eliminating certain Cold War weapons and scaling back our commitments overseas. Even with these changes, the United States would still be immeasurably stronger than any nation with which we might be engaged, and the plan will in fact enhance our security rather than diminish it. We are currently working to enlist the support of other members of Congress for our initiative. Along with our colleagues Senator Ron Wyden and Congressman Walter Jones, we have addressed a letter to the President's National Committee on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, which he has convened to develop concrete recommendations for reducing the budget deficit. We will make it clear to leaders of both parties that substantial reductions in military spending must be included in any future deficit reduction package. We pledge to oppose any proposal that fails to do so. In the short term, rebuilding our economy and creating jobs will remain our nation's top priority. But it is essential that we begin to address the issue of excessive military spending in order to ensure prosperity in the future. We may not agree on what to do with the estimated $1 trillion in savings, but we do agree that nothing either of us cares deeply about will be possible if we do not begin to face this issue now. Plan net boosts the US economy Jacob Hornberger is founder and president of The Future of Freedom Foundation "Immediately Withdraw from Afghanistan Too" February 9, 2009 http://www.fff.org/blog/jghblog2009-02-09.asp Finally, the withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Afghanistan (and Iraq) would have the additional bonus of strengthening the U.S. economy by immediately reducing federal borrowing and expenditures by hundreds of billions of dollars. Given that out-of-control federal spending is threatening our nation with bankruptcy and ruin, a major reduction in federal spending would be a good thing. SDI 2010 72 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE ***2AC Add-ons*** Japan 2AC
Japan is rethinking its security partnership with the US--Afghanistan diverts Obama's attention necessary to prevent erosion of US-Japanese relations Walt, Professor of International Affairs @ Harvard, 2009
Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Rene Belfer professor of international affairs at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, where he served as academic dean from 2002-2006. He previously taught at Princeton University and the University of Chicago, where he served as master of the social science collegiate division and deputy dean of social sciences. He has been a resident associate of the Carnegie Endowment for Peace and a guest scholar at the Brookings Institution, and he has also been a consultant for the Institute of Defense Analyses, the Center for Naval Analyses, and Singapore's S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. December 3, 2009 http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/12/03/the_hidden_costs_of_the_afghan_escalation But there is another cost to digging in deeper in Afghanistan. Obama has now bet the future of his presidency on being able to achieve something he can describe as "success" there, and he has only 18 months to do it. He's shackled with a sluggish economy that is unlikely to turn around soon, so there
are going to be plenty of disaffected voters by 2012. The Dems are going to lose a bunch of seats in the midterms, making it even tougher to pass domestic legislation that might win broad voter approval. And having alienated a lot of the people who worked their butts off for him in 2008 (because they thought he would be different), he's going to have a hard time generating the sort of grass roots enthusiasm that won him the White House in the first place. Progressive Dems won't switch sides, but some of them will stay home. He may even have trouble getting Shepard Fairey's endorsement if Afghanistan doesn't turn around fast. All this means that Obama will have to devote a lot of time and attention and political capital to the war in Afghanistan, an impoverished land-locked country of modest strategic importance. Meanwhile, life will go on in the rest of the world, and U.S. relations with a number of far more important countries will not receive the attention they should. Here are three examples. 1. The new Japanese government is actively rethinking its security partnership with the United States, and while I don't think we should rush to accommodate all of their concerns, we certainly ought to be paying very close attention. But having just returned from a quick Asian trip, Obama is likely to put relations with Japan (and other key Asian allies) on the back burner. That would be a mistake, because a significant erosion in the U.S. position there would have far more significant effects than the outcome of the Afghan campaign. Mapping out a long-term security strategy for Asia will take time and attention, and that's precisely what Obama doesn't have right now.
2. The democratic government of Turkey has been carving out a more independent and influential position at the crossroad of Europe and Asia. Its recent
decision to reject Israeli participation in a scheduled NATO military exercise (which led to the exercise being canceled) is one sign of this new independence, as is its more active engagement with Syria and Iran. This development is not necessarily a bad thing, if Turkey uses its growing influence constructively. But it is a new feature of the global scene that calls for sustained attention and a nuanced U.S. response, and I'll bet it doesn't get either. 3. Brazil is becoming a more independent and less deferential power here in the Western hemisphere. President Lula de Silva has opened more than 30 embassies around the world since 2003, remains on good terms with Venezualan strongman Hugo Chavez, has defended Iran's nuclear research program, and recently hosted Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Brasilia. Obama and Lula have exchanged letters on some of these issues, and Brasilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim has said there is "no crisis" between the two countries. But he has also said that the two countries "are in different latitudes" and "must get used to disagreeing." A stronger and more assertive Brazil will also create new diplomatic opportunities for other Latin American countries (who have long resented U.S. dominance in the Western hemisphere), as well as opportunities for other great powers. And might this herald a gradual erosion of the Monroe Doctrine? None of the developments poses an immediate threat to vital U.S. interests, but all could use some adroit attention on Washington's part and a sophisticated strategy for dealing with them. But my guess is that they will get short shrift, because Obama's attention and a lot of the intellectual oxygen in Washington will be sucked up by the endless debate on AfPak.
You might reply that I'm being too pessimistic, because Obama has a talented administration that is deep in foreign policy expertise and nobody expects the President to do everything himself. He can turn these problems over to DoD, the NSC staff, and the State Department while he focuses laser-like on Central Asia (and the economy). I wish I could believe that, but I haven't seen much evidence of a smoothly running foreign policy apparatus so far. What I read suggests that the White House holds tight control on the main lines of policy, and apart from the president himself (who does show occasional flashes of strategic vision), I still can't figure out who's in charge of the big picture. So in addition to the human and financial costs of the decision to escalate in Afghanistan, throw in the opportunity costs. There are only 24 hours in a day and seven days in a week, and a lot of important issues are going to get less attention than they deserve. SDI 2010 73 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE Japan 2AC
THE US-JAPAN ALLIANCE PREVENTS EAST ASIAN MISCALC Mochizuki 96 Michael Mochizuki, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, Brookings, September 1996, Japan Quarterly p. 21 In the context of East Asia, how closely Japan is in step with the United States will be an important factor in the calculations of potential aggressors. Any sign that these two powers are at odds during a crisis might tempt the provocative state to escalate tensions. This will increase the possibility of miscalculation and war. In other words, the odds of a peaceful resolution of crises will be greater when the United States and Japan stand together. CONFLICT IN EAST ASIA TRIGGERS GOES NUCLEAR AND COLLAPSES THE GLOBAL ECONOMY Landay 2000 Jonathan S. Landay, national security and intelligence correspondent, March 10, 2000, Knight Ridder/Tribune News Service, "Top administration officials warn stakes for U.S. are high in Asian conflicts," p. Lexis Few if any experts think China and Taiwan, North Korea and South Korea, or India and Pakistan are spoiling to fight. But even a minor miscalculation by any of them could destabilize Asia, jolt the global economy and even start a nuclear war. India, Pakistan and China all have nuclear weapons, and North Korea may have a few, too. Asia lacks the kinds of organizations, negotiations and diplomatic relationships that helped keep an uneasy peace for five decades in Cold War Europe. "Nowhere else on Earth are the stakes as high and relationships so fragile," said Bates Gill, director of northeast Asian policy studies at the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank. "We see the convergence of great power interest overlaid with lingering confrontations with no institutionalized security mechanism in place. There are elements for potential disaster." In an effort to cool the region's tempers, President Clinton, Defense Secretary William S. Cohen and National Security Adviser Samuel R. Berger all will hopscotch Asia's capitals this month. For America, the stakes could hardly be higher. There are 100,000 U.S. troops in Asia committed to defending Taiwan, Japan and South Korea, and the United States would instantly become embroiled if Beijing moved against Taiwan or North Korea attacked South Korea. While Washington has no defense commitments to either India or Pakistan, a conflict between the two could end the global taboo against using nuclear weapons and demolish the already shaky international nonproliferation regime. In addition, globalization has made a stable Asia _ with its massive markets, cheap labor, exports and resources _ indispensable to the U.S. economy. Numerous U.S. firms and millions of American jobs depend on trade with Asia that totaled $600 billion last year, according to the Commerce Department. SDI 2010 74 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE Turkey 2AC
Checking Turkey's attempts to gain more independence from Western defenses require active engagement by Obama Afghanistan trades-off Walt, Professor of International Affairs @ Harvard, 2009
Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Rene Belfer professor of international affairs at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, where he served as academic dean from 2002-2006. He previously taught at Princeton University and the University of Chicago, where he served as master of the social science collegiate division and deputy dean of social sciences. He has been a resident associate of the Carnegie Endowment for Peace and a guest scholar at the Brookings Institution, and he has also been a consultant for the Institute of Defense Analyses, the Center for Naval Analyses, and Singapore's S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. December 3, 2009 http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/12/03/the_hidden_costs_of_the_afghan_escalation But there is another cost to digging in deeper in Afghanistan. Obama has now bet the future of his presidency on being able to achieve something he can describe as "success" there, and he has only 18 months to do it. He's shackled with a sluggish economy that is unlikely to turn around soon, so there are going to be plenty of disaffected voters by 2012. The Dems are going to lose a bunch of seats in the midterms, making it even tougher to pass domestic legislation that might win broad voter approval. And having alienated a lot of the people who worked their butts off for him in 2008 (because they thought he would be different), he's going to have a hard time generating the sort of grass roots enthusiasm that won him the White House in the first place. Progressive Dems won't switch sides, but some of them will stay home. He may even have trouble getting Shepard Fairey's endorsement if Afghanistan doesn't turn around fast. All this means that Obama will have to devote a lot of time and attention and political capital to the war in Afghanistan, an impoverished land-locked country of modest strategic importance. Meanwhile, life will go on in the rest of the world, and U.S. relations with a number of far more important countries will not receive the attention they should. Here are three examples.
1. The new Japanese government is actively rethinking its security partnership with the United States, and while I don't think we should rush to accommodate all of their concerns, we certainly ought to be paying very close attention. But having just returned from a quick Asian trip, Obama is likely to put relations with Japan (and other key Asian allies) on the back burner. That would be a mistake, because a significant erosion in the U.S. position there would have far more significant effects than the outcome of the Afghan campaign. Mapping out a long-term security strategy for Asia will take time and attention, and that's precisely what Obama doesn't have right now. 2. The democratic government of Turkey has been carving out a more independent and influential position at the crossroad of Europe and Asia. Its recent decision to reject Israeli participation in a scheduled NATO military exercise (which led to the exercise being canceled) is one sign of this new independence, as is its more active engagement with Syria and Iran. This development is not necessarily a bad thing, if Turkey uses its growing influence constructively. But it is a new feature of the global scene that calls for sustained attention and a nuanced U.S. response, and I'll bet it doesn't get either.
3. Brazil is becoming a more independent and less deferential power here in the Western hemisphere. President Lula de Silva has opened more than 30 embassies around the world since 2003, remains on good terms with Venezualan strongman Hugo Chavez, has defended Iran's nuclear research program, and recently hosted Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Brasilia. Obama and Lula have exchanged letters on some of these issues, and Brasilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim has said there is "no crisis" between the two countries. But he has also said that the two countries "are in different latitudes" and "must get used to disagreeing." A stronger and more assertive Brazil will also create new diplomatic opportunities for other Latin American countries (who have long resented U.S. dominance in the Western hemisphere), as well as opportunities for other great powers. And might this herald a gradual erosion of the Monroe Doctrine? None of the developments poses an immediate threat to vital U.S. interests, but all could use some adroit attention on Washington's part and a sophisticated strategy for dealing with them. But my guess is that they will get short shrift, because Obama's attention and a lot of the intellectual oxygen in Washington will be sucked up by the endless debate on AfPak. You might reply that I'm being too pessimistic, because Obama has a talented administration that is deep in foreign policy expertise and nobody expects the President to do everything himself. He can turn these problems over to DoD, the NSC staff, and the State Department while he focuses laser-like on Central Asia (and the economy). I wish I could believe that, but I haven't seen much evidence of a smoothly running foreign policy apparatus so far. What I read suggests that the White House holds tight control on the main lines of policy, and apart from the president himself (who does show occasional flashes of strategic vision), I still can't figure out who's in charge of the big picture. So in addition to the human and financial costs of the decision to escalate in Afghanistan, throw in the opportunity costs. There are only 24 hours in a day and seven days in a week, and a lot of important issues are going to get less attention than they deserve. SDI 2010 75 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE Turkey 2AC
Turkish support for U.S. policy is key to power projection in the Middle East Shattuck 95 John, Federal News Service, September 26, Lexis Turkey, as both you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Hoyer have indicated, is a long-time friend and strategic ally that serves important U.S. interests in a vital yet troubled region of the world. Geographically, economically, politically, and culturally, Turkey stands at the crossroads of Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia. It is a democratic, secular, Muslim country in a region with little in the way of democratic tradition. Turkey provides valuable support for U.S. policy in the region. As a committed member of NATO, Turkey strengthens Western defenses and extends the reach of the West into an unstable part of the world. It participated on the side of the U.N. coalition in the Gulf War, continues to support Operation Provide Comfort and the enforcement of U.N. sanctions on Iraq, and has been a significant contributor to UNPROFOR, the U.N. force in the former Yugoslavia and humanitarian assistance in Bosnia. The impact is super-power conflict Mead 8 Walter Russell, sr. fellow on the Council on Foreign Relations, January 1, pg. http://opinionjournal.com/editorial/?id=110011063 The end of America's ability to safeguard the Gulf and the trade routes around it would be enormously damaging--and not just to us. Defense budgets would grow dramatically in every major power center, and Middle Eastern politics would be further destabilized, as every country sought political influence in Middle Eastern countries to ensure access to oil in the resulting free for all. The potential for conflict and chaos is real. A world of insecure and suspicious great powers engaged in military competition over vital interests would not be a safe or happy place. Every ship that China builds to protect the increasing numbers of supertankers needed to bring oil from the Middle East to China in years ahead would also be a threat to Japan's oil security--as well as to the oil security of India and Taiwan. European cooperation would likely be undermined as well, as countries sought to make their best deals with Russia, the Gulf states and other oil rich neighbors like Algeria. America's Persian Gulf policy is one of the chief ways through which the U.S. is trying to build a peaceful world and where the exercise of American power, while driven ultimately by domestic concerns and by the American national interest, provides vital public goods to the global community. The next American president, regardless of party and regardless of his or her views about the wisdom of George W. Bush's invasion of Iraq, will necessarily make the security of the Persian Gulf states one of America's very highest international priorities. SDI 2010 76 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE Brazil 2AC
Developments of Brazilian assertiveness demand greater attention from Obama to avoid the creation of a coalition of Latin American states resentful of U.S. dominance in the western hemisphere Walt, Professor of International Affairs @ Harvard, 2009
Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Rene Belfer professor of international affairs at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, where he served as academic dean from 2002-2006. He previously taught at Princeton University and the University of Chicago, where he served as master of the social science collegiate division and deputy dean of social sciences. He has been a resident associate of the Carnegie Endowment for Peace and a guest scholar at the Brookings Institution, and he has also been a consultant for the Institute of Defense Analyses, the Center for Naval Analyses, and Singapore's S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. December 3, 2009 http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/12/03/the_hidden_costs_of_the_afghan_escalation But there is another cost to digging in deeper in Afghanistan. Obama has now bet the future of his presidency on being able to achieve something he can describe as "success" there, and he has only 18 months to do it. He's shackled with a sluggish economy that is unlikely to turn around soon, so there are going to be plenty of disaffected voters by 2012. The Dems are going to lose a bunch of seats in the midterms, making it even tougher to pass domestic legislation that might win broad voter approval. And having alienated a lot of the people who worked their butts off for him in 2008 (because they thought he would be different), he's going to have a hard time generating the sort of grass roots enthusiasm that won him the White House in the first place. Progressive Dems won't switch sides, but some of them will stay home. He may even have trouble getting Shepard Fairey's endorsement if Afghanistan doesn't turn around fast. All this means that Obama will have to devote a lot of time and attention and political capital to the war in Afghanistan, an impoverished land-locked country of modest strategic importance. Meanwhile, life will go on in the rest of the world, and U.S. relations with a number of far more important countries will not receive the attention they should. Here are three examples.
1. The new Japanese government is actively rethinking its security partnership with the United States, and while I don't think we should rush to accommodate all of their concerns, we certainly ought to be paying very close attention. But having just returned from a quick Asian trip, Obama is likely to put relations with Japan (and other key Asian allies) on the back burner. That would be a mistake, because a significant erosion in the U.S. position there would have far more significant effects than the outcome of the Afghan campaign. Mapping out a long-term security strategy for Asia will take time and attention, and that's precisely what Obama doesn't have right now. 2. The democratic government of Turkey has been carving out a more independent and influential position at the crossroad of Europe and Asia. Its recent decision to reject Israeli participation in a scheduled NATO military exercise (which led to the exercise being canceled) is one sign of this new independence, as is its more active engagement with Syria and Iran. This development is not necessarily a bad thing, if Turkey uses its growing influence constructively. But it is a new feature of the global scene that calls for sustained attention and a nuanced U.S. response, and I'll bet it doesn't get either. 3. Brazil is becoming a more independent and less deferential power here in the Western hemisphere. President Lula de Silva has opened more than 30 embassies around the world since 2003, remains on good terms with Venezualan strongman Hugo Chavez, has defended Iran's nuclear research program, and recently hosted Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Brasilia. Obama and Lula have exchanged letters on some of these issues, and Brasilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim has said there is "no crisis" between the two countries. But he has also said that the two countries "are in different latitudes" and "must get used to disagreeing." A stronger and more assertive Brazil will also create new diplomatic opportunities for other Latin American countries (who have long resented U.S. dominance in the Western hemisphere), as well as opportunities for other great powers. And might this herald a gradual erosion of the Monroe Doctrine? None of the developments poses an immediate threat to vital U.S. interests, but all could use some adroit attention on Washington's part and a sophisticated strategy for dealing with them. But my guess is that they will get short shrift, because Obama's attention and a lot of the intellectual oxygen in Washington will be sucked up by the endless debate on AfPak.
You might reply that I'm being too pessimistic, because Obama has a talented administration that is deep in foreign policy expertise and nobody expects the President to do everything himself. He can turn these problems over to DoD, the NSC staff, and the State Department while he focuses laser-like on Central Asia (and the economy). I wish I could believe that, but I haven't seen much evidence of a smoothly running foreign policy apparatus so far. What I read suggests that the White House holds tight control on the main lines of policy, and apart from the president himself (who does show occasional flashes of strategic vision), I still can't figure out who's in charge of the big picture. So in addition to the human and financial costs of the decision to escalate in Afghanistan, throw in the opportunity costs. There are only 24 hours in a day and seven days in a week, and a lot of important issues are going to get less attention than they deserve. SDI 2010 77 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE Brazil 2AC
US-Brazilian relations are key to human rights, environmental protection, democracy, and nonproliferation Barbosa 00, Brazilian Ambassador to US [Rubens Antonio, House Committee on International Relations Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Federal News Service, July 26, LN] bg Few other moments in the history of Brazil-US relations have witnessed the degree of cooperation and convergence of values and interests that our countries share today. A mature dialogue and mutual trust currently characterize our bilateral relationship, which has greatly benefited from convergent positions on a wide variety of subjects, including the promotion of interamerican cooperation, respect for human rights, protection of the environment, support for democracy, consolidation of the multilateral trading system and defense of non-proliferation, to mention just a few. Together with a growing U.S. awareness of the importance of the Brazilian economy and society, this common perspective has enabled our governments to develop a very special relationship, confirmed by the fact that Brazil is listed among the 10 U.S. strategic partners. SDI 2010 78 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE ***Withdrawal Good/Solvency*** SDI 2010 79 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE Withdrawal Solves Terrorism
Just the announcement of a definitive withdrawal date will start to quell anti-American sentiment Leaver, policy outreach director for the Foreign Policy In Focus project at the Institute for Policy Studies, 2009 Yes Magazine: "How to Exit Afghanistan: Five pillars of an exit strategy for Afghanistan," http://www.yesmagazine.org/peace-justice/how-to-exit-afghanistan, October 1, 2009
A Plan to Avoid the Graveyard of Empires Afghanistan has often been called the "Graveyard of Empires." The reference applies to a much different time in history, but with no promising options on the table for ending the war, we need to make sure it doesn't become applicable once again. Create an Exit Strategy. General McChrystal's plan offers no timetable or exit strategy, beyond warning that the next 12-18 months are critical--a timeframe that New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman bandied about so freely in Iraq that guesstimates like McChrystal's became known as "Friedman Units"--they imply an interminable series of indefinite extensions. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has rejected outright a timetable for withdrawal. But with NATO partners, Britain, France, and Germany calling for a timeline, this option should be examined more closely. The first and most important effect of a timetable would be to disarm the Taliban's argument that the "occupiers" will never leave. It promises that at some point the war in Afghanistan will end with a negotiated peace treaty. Figuring out what that treaty should say and constructing a timetable to meet those conditions should be the next step in Afghanistan. Given the Karzai government's lack of legitimacy and the relative political strength of the Taliban, negotiations must include a wide range of Afghans. Key principles for a treaty should include:
Deny Al-Qaeda Safe Haven. Most analysts would argue that keeping Afghanistan (and other countries across the globe) free from al-Qaeda and other terrorist networks should be a primary objective for global security. But the manner in which this can be achieved is under fierce debate. Occupation and invasion should be off the table. Instead, under the provisions of Chapter VII of the UN charter, nation states have the right to adequately protect themselves from imminent attack. One primary example of this was the capture of Khaled Sheikh Mohamed, who was not nabbed in a military raid but by a coordinated police action. This approach should be coupled with an international effort to track and capture members of terrorist networks. Too much of the debate has focused on who rules Afghanistan, rather than on our goal of isolating al-Qaeda. The United States shouldn't try to determine who can be in the government, how it is chosen, or how it rules, so long as that government abides by an agreement not to harbor alQaeda, and to work with the international community to enforce that agreement. The Taliban, while its treatment of women and harsh rule are reprehensible, is not itself a threat to the United States. Commit to Development. Afghanistan is one of the most underdeveloped nations in the world. Funding for development has been far below needed levels. The country urgently needs basic infrastructure. Without roads, access to markets, better agricultural inputs, or available credit, local businesses can't start up or thrive. Such levels of commerce are needed to help combat the lucrative drug trade and raise the population out of poverty. With few natural resources and a government highly dependent on international contributions, dedicated funding from the international community is needed. However, aid provided so far has not been successful. Too many projects are planned, designed, and implemented with far too little involvement from Afghans. Failure to learn from the successes of development projects that work hand-in-hand with the local population--such as the one described in Greg Mortenson's book, Three Cups of Tea--has doomed many of these projects. Aid should go directly to Afghan-led organizations, coupled with strong auditing by international agencies. Withdraw all Combat Troops. Foreign troops on the ground (and drone attacks from the air) have been the most important tool for recruiting in terrorist networks. A commitment to withdrawing all combat troops will help deflate the recruitment for these groups. If the Afghan National Army is to replace them and contribute to the security of Afghanistan, it will require human rights training and a central government by which it can be held
accountable. Further training must be refocused and fall under a common set of guidelines, including oversight under the Leahy Law that suspends training funding for any groups involved in human rights abuses. Separate Pakistan from Afghanistan. No essay on Afghanistan these days seems to omit the problems arising in Pakistan. It is wrong to see the distinct challenges facing these two countries as one struggle; the U.S. history in Pakistan requires a far different approach. The United States must address directly with Pakistan the growing threat of al-Qaeda and the Taliban in that country. Clearly there are other steps to be taken, but these are the most important and should be the starting point for negotiations. As much as the citizens of United States and the world want President Obama to succeed in fixing Afghanistan, the policies that are under discussion are most likely to put us one more "Friedman Unit" away from a resolution. With more civilians and soldiers bound to perish during that time, it's time for a fundamentally different approach--one that can greatly diminish the greatest threats to the United States and at the same time, start Afghanistan on the road to recovery. SDI 2010 80 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE Withdrawal Solves Terrorism
Troops cost the hearts and minds of Afghanistan people
The Nation 2009 The Nation: Don't Escalate in Afghanistan, The Editors, February 4, 2009 http://www.thenation.com/article/dont-escalate-afghanistan There's no denying that the situation has deteriorated over the past few years; the Taliban now threaten to take over large parts of Afghanistan. But more US forces will not bring stability. We are losing the war not because we have had too few troops but because our presence has turned the Afghan people against us, swelling the ranks of the Taliban. Any good will the US military once enjoyed has long since been destroyed by airstrikes that have killed civilians. Human Rights Watch reports that at least 321 Afghan civilians died in NATO or US air raids in 2007. According to the UN, many more were killed the following year. Sending more troops will not win back the hearts and minds of their loved ones. The conspicuous corruption of the Karzai government has also taken a toll. The United States is now viewed as propping up an unpopular regime that New York Times reporter Dexter Filkins describes as seeming "to exist for little more than the enrichment of those who run it," and "contributing to the collapse of public confidence...and to the resurgence of the Taliban." SDI 2010 81 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE Withdrawal Solves Stability
Withdrawal now solves instability in the region and precludes the reemergence of al Qaeda Bandow, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, 2010
Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute. A former special assistant to president Ronald Reagan, he is the author of several books, including Foreign Follies: America's New Global Empire (Xulon). He is also a fellow with the American Conservative Defense Alliance. The Australian, Afghan War Has Stopped Making Sense, January 6, 2010 By pursuing the intervention, Obama is repeating the mistake he accused Bush of making in the context of Iraq Washington is full of ivory-tower warriors who have never been anywhere near a military base WITH al-Qa'ida dispersed, Afghanistan, though a human tragedy, doesn't matter much to the US or its allies. Rather than allow the Afghan mission to slide into nation-building, the Obama administration should begin withdrawing US forces from Afghanistan. Afghanistan originally looked like the good war. Consolidating power in a reasonably democratic government in Kabul was never going to be easy, but the Bush administration tossed away the best chance of doing so by prematurely shifting military units to Iraq. The Obama administration now is attempting the geopolitical equivalent of shutting the barn doors after the horses have fled. The situation is a mess. The Karzai government is illegitimate, corrupt and incompetent. Taliban forces and attacks are increasing. Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, admits that Afghanistan is ``deteriorating''. Yet Barack Obama is sending an additional 30,000 American troops. He argued that ``our overarching goal remains the same: to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qa'ida'' and refused to ``set goals that go beyond our responsibility, our means or our interests''. Yet the President appears to have done precisely the latter. Even after the build-up, the US and its allies will have only a few thousand more personnel than the Soviet Union did during its failed occupation. And Western forces will be barely one-fifth the numbers contemplated by US anti-insurgency doctrine. Given its forbidding terrain and independent culture, it is easy to understand why Afghanistan acquired a reputation as the graveyard of empires. Kabul has had periods of peaceful, stable rule, but by indigenous figures who respected local autonomy, as under the 20th-century monarchy. The only sensible argument for staying is, as Obama put it, ``to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qa'ida''. But that already has been done. Al-Qa'ida has been reduced largely to symbolic importance, as most terrorist threats now emanate from localised jihadist cells scattered about the globe. US National Security Adviser Jim Jones estimates that there are just 100 al-Qa'ida operatives now in Afghanistan. Even if the Taliban returned to power, it might not welcome back the group whose activities triggered American intervention. Nor would al-Qa'ida necessarily want to come back, since a Taliban government could not shield terrorists from Western retaliation. Pakistan offers a better refuge, and there are plenty of other failed states -- Yemen comes to mind -- in which terrorists could locate. Far more important than Afghanistan is nuclear-armed Pakistan. However, continued fighting in the former is more likely to destabilise the latter than increased Taliban influence. SDI 2010 82 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE Withdrawal Solves Stability Afghan Forces
Foreign fighters undermine Afghan efforts at defeating the insurgency that would otherwise be successful Nelson and Farmer, director of journalism program at Point Loma Nazarene University and Telegraph correspondent in Kabul, 2009
Dean Nelson founder and director of the journalism program at Point Loma Nazarene University in San Diego. Ben Farmer is a Daily Telegraph correspondent in Kabul The Daily Telegraph (London) 'We beat them before, by letting Afghans do the job' November 13, 2009 l/n GEN Abdul Rashid Dostum, the controversial former Afghan warlord, has warned Washington that sending more US troops to Afghanistan will simply hamper its war against the Taliban insurgency. Only an Afghan-led solution can bring victory, he believes. His comments in an interview with The Daily Telegraph were made as the American ambassador to Kabul, Gen Karl Eikenberry, warned President Obama not to send thousands more US soldiers to shore up President Hamid Karzai's regime. Gen Dostum, an ethnic Uzbek, was a central military leader in the Northern Alliance which drove the Taliban from Kabul in 2001 with support from US special forces. He believes success then was based on Afghan-led troops fighting for the future of their own families. Today, he said, the number of senior Afghan military casualties was negligible because US and Nato commanders were calling the shots. "The Afghan military failure is a question of commitment and morale: the more foreign money and troops the less Afghans see this war as theirs,'' he said. "In the past six years, I have not heard of one Afghan officer of captain or major rank killed in battle. "During this same period hundreds of Americans and other Nato soldiers have been killed. This is a major embarrassment for the Afghan government and its people. He said the current Afghan military leadership had become far too dependent on following Western forces, put ting US and Nato personnel at greater risk. Gen Dostum remains influential in Afghanistan - his support helped President Karzai's re-election earlier this month - despite allegations of human rights abuses. SDI 2010 83 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE Withdrawal Solves Stability AT: Troops Key
Only a political solution can bring stability to Afghanistan Khosa, research fellow with the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2010
Raspal Khosa is a research fellow with the Australian Strategic Policy Institute. He recently returned from a NATOsponsored tour of Afghanistan. The Austrailian: Coalition Disg in for Battle for Kandahar, April 23, 2010 Political shaping that is a necessary prelude to military operations is already in progress. President Hamid Karzai and his senior ministers are conducting meetings with Pashtun tribal elders and clergy to gain their support. However, Kandahar is a hostile political environment for the Afghan government. The people of Kandahar city -- Afghanistan's southern Pashtun capital -- remain wary of Kabul's domination of the country. The insurgency is fundamentally a political problem that requires a political solution. Any counterinsurgency campaign will fail if the host government is not determined to win. And right now in Afghanistan there is no overriding political consensus for victory. Moreover, there is deep distrust between Karzai and the international community. He accuses Western leaders of wilfully undermining him, whereas the latter regard him as an uncertain strategic partner. These positions are hardening despite Obama stating he wants to build a lasting partnership with Afghanistan founded on mutual interests and respect. SDI 2010 84 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE Withdrawal Solves Stability AT: Troops Key
Moral and resources are depleted more troops will not stabilize the region BBC 2010 BBC Monitoring South Asia Political Pakistan author says "flawed" US policies turned Afghan victory into lost battle, Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, May 25, 2010 l/n
Optimistic assessment looks good on paper but not on ground. The US converted its victory over Afghanistan into a losing battle because of its flawed policies. Now that it has decided to quit, it wants to reverse the order by converting defeat into victory. In the first case when the US enjoyed all the advantages, it had relied entirely on its military muscle; even now when it has become economically, politically and militarily weak, it intends to do the same with slight modification of befriending the reconcilable Taleban and reintegrating them. Emphasis is however still on use of brute force. The US technological and military superiority would have been of consequence had it duped resistances forces and lured them to come out in the open and fight face to face pitched battles. Appreciating their limitations in positional war, the Taleban are rightly resorting to guerrilla tactics and are not pushed for time. Having learnt that foreign troop's withdrawal would commence in a year's time, they would prefer to lie low till then. What concerns them the most is public support which till now is on their side! Unless Helmand is fully stabilized and people won over, it may not be possible for the coalition forces to undertake next offensive in Kandahar planned in June-July this year. Outcome of operations in Helmand is therefore critical and will set the pace for future undertakings. So far coalition forces have met with little success to gather support of people of Helmand since they have already spilt too much of blood. Excessive collateral damage inflicted upon the Pashtuns as a result of ruthless bombardment by US-NATO pilots and trigger happy troops for nine years has germinated deep hatred in them. With such level of animosity, it will be erroneous to expect that majority of Pashtun fighters as well as non-fighters would trust USA and fall prey to its inducements. It is also absurd and hypocritical to invite the Taleban to join the puppet regime of Karzai and at the same time launch an offensive to kill them and destroy their homes and property. The ANA is non-Pashtun heavy and anti-Pashtuns while the policemen are corrupt and addicted to opium and cannabis and hated by people. One in every four combat soldiers quit ANA during the last year. High rate of desertion is another cause of concern for the US. Absent without leave (AWOL) cases are also on the increase. Due to high rate of AWOL, combat strength on duty remains 26000 out of 38000 (19 per cent absentees). Gen McChrystal called in his August 2009 strategy paper for increasing ANA to 134000 by October 2010 and ultimately to 240,000. To expect the two outfits to do any good and win over the locals will be unrealistic. It will take another 1-2 years intense training to make the ANA battle worthy and perform independently. Surge in Afghanistan has widened the troops to resources ratio. Several American forward operating bases are experiencing food and water shortages. Already the foreign troops are suffering from multiple stress traumas and are in low morale. Lack of comforts would further dip their morale. While situation is in a flux, the Taleban are sticking to their guns that there will be no peace talks before the withdrawal of foreign troops from their country. SDI 2010 85 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE Withdrawal Solves Stability AT: Taliban Resurgence
Increased troop presence empirically destabilizes the region; a minimalist approach won't risk Taliban resurgence Pakistan will check their efforts Simon and Stevenson, Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and Professor of Strategic Studies at the US Naval War College, 2009 "Afghanistan: How Much is Enough?", Survival, 51: 5, 47 -- 67 Accessed via University of Kansas June 24, 2010
Finally, within the operational environment of Afghanistan and Pakistan themselves, the alternative to a minimalist approach is likely to be not the controlled and purposeful escalation envisaged by the current policy but rather a pernicious spiral with an indeterminate outcome. If the United States continues to respond to the threat of al-Qaeda by deepening intervention in Afghanistan and Pakistan, al-Qaeda and the Taliban will rejoin with heightened terrorist and insurgent operations that bring further instability. Indeed, that appears to be happening. In August 2009, as US ground commanders requested more troops, Admiral Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on CNN described the situation in Afghanistan as `serious and deteriorating' and the Taliban as having `gotten better, more sophisticated, in their tactics'.28 The United States' next logical move would be to intensify pressure, raising civilian casualties, increasing political pressure on the Kabul and Islamabad regimes, and ultimately weakening them, which would only help al-Qaeda and the Taliban. In fact, some evidence of this dynamic has already materialised, as the Pakistani government has faced difficulties in dealing with hundreds of thousands of Pakistanis displaced by the military campaign, undertaken at Washington's behest, in the Swat Valley. Certainly worries about Islamabad's ability to handle the Taliban on its own are justified. Some Taliban members are no doubt keen on regime change in favour of jihadists, as noted by Bruce Riedel, who headed up the Obama administration's -day policy review.29 But Pakistan's military capabilities should not be given short shrift. The Pakistani army, however preoccupied by India, is seasoned and capable, and able to respond decisively to the Taliban should its activities reach a critical level of destabilisation. Inter-Services Intelligence, devious though it may be, would be loath to allow the transfer of nuclear weapons to the Taliban. SDI 2010 86 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE AT: Withdrawal Destabilizes Inevitable
Instability is intrinsic to the region centuries of tribal warmaking and rebellion Innocent and Carpenter, foreign policy analyst and vp for defense and foreign policy at the Cato Institute, 2009
Malou Innocent is a foreign policy analyst at the Cato Institute who focuses on Afghanistan and Pakistan. Ted Galen Carpenter, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at Cato, is the author of 8 and the editor of 10 books on international affairs. His most recent book is Smart Power: Toward a Prudent Foreign Policy for America. Escaping the Graveyard of Empires: A Strategy to Exit Afghanistan, Cato Institute 2009 Myth #2: America's Presence Prevents the Region's Implosion Some analysts, including Carnegie Endow- ment senior associate Robert Kagan, insist that were the United States to evacuate Afghan- istan, the political and military vacuum left by our departure would lead to serious instability throughout the region.19 But instability, in the sense of a perpetually anarchic state of nature dominated by tribal warlords and pervasive bloodshed, has characterized the region for decades--even centuries. Thus, the claim that Afghanistan would be destabilized if the United States were to decrease its presence is misleading, since Afghanistan will be chroni- cally unstable regardless. Most Americans are simply oblivious to the region's history. Numerous tribes along the border of northwest Pakistan and southern and eastern Afghanistan have a long history of war-mak- ing and rebellion, now erroneously branded as "Talibanism."20 King's College London profes- sor Christian Tripodi, an expert on British colonial-era tribal policy, explains what British administrators confronted when dealing with Pashtun tribes along what is today the frontier between Afghanistan and Pakistan: What the British refused to grasp was that tribal raiding and violence was not necessarily a product of poverty or lack of opportunity. The tribes viewed raid- ing as honourable and possibly quite fun, an activity that was centuries old, rooted in their culture and one of those things that defined a man in a society that placed a premium upon indepen- dence and aggression.21 Contrary to the claims that we should use the U.S. military to stabilize the region and reduce the threat of terrorism, a 2008 study by the RAND Corporation found that U.S. poli- cies emphasizing the use of force tend to create new terrorists. In "How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qai'da," Seth Jones and Martin Libicki argue that the U.S. military "should generally resist being drawn into com- bat operations in Muslim societies, since [a U.S. military] presence is likely to increase ter- rorist recruitment."22 SDI 2010 87 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE Troops Fail Taliban
Foreign presence and strategy to disrupt the Taliban are self-defeating Dorronsoro, scholar at the Carnegie Endowment expert on Afghanistan, 2009
Gilles Dorronsoro, a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment, is an expert on Afghanistan, Turkey, and South Asia. His research focuses on security and political development in Afghanistan, particularly the role of the International Security Assistance Force, the necessary steps for a viable government in Kabul, and the conditions necessary for withdrawal scenarios. Previously, Dorronsoro was a professor of political science at the Sorbonne, Paris and the Institute of Political Studies of Rennes. He also served as the scientific coordinator at the French Institute of Anatolian Studies in Istanbul, Turkey. "The Taliban's Winning Strategy in Afghanistan" http://carnegieendowment.org/files/taliban_winning_strategy.pdf
Rather than a weakness, the local autonomy of Taliban commanders is necessary due to the nature of guerilla warfare, and in fact, it constitutes a strength. The Taliban are not confused or in conflict over who is in charge in a particular district or province. Foreign observers recalling Iraq may wishfully imagine exploiting competition or infighting among Taliban commanders, but the fissures are not there.2 Ironically, the IC is unwittingly helping the Taliban maintain its cohesion by killing those commanders in the field most capable of opposing the central shura. Prime examples are Mullah Akhtar Osmani, killed in December 2006, Mullah Berader in August 2007, and Mullah Dadullah in May 2007. Evidence of the resilient character of the Taliban's structure is the fact that the IC's killing of major leaders and its battlefield victories have not reversed the Taliban's momentum. In fact, the Taliban have always been able to regroup after tactical setbacks due to the resilience of their political structure. Neither the deaths of senior Taliban military commanders, nor the severe losses in 2005 in the Arghandab Valley, stopped the movement. SDI 2010 88 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE Troops Fail ANA
A host of obstacles make an effective Afghan army 10 years away at best Barry and Hirsh 2009
John Barry is a Newsweek national security correspondent. Michael Hirsh is the former Foreign Editor and chief diplomatic correspondent for Newsweek and is now senior editor for the Washington bureau. Newsweek: Mission Impossible? December 14, 2009 l/n How quickly can the afghan army stand up, so American troops can stand down? It's a question that could determine the success or failure of President Obama's "surge" in Afghanistan. The U.S. training program faces some formidable challenges in meeting Obama's 18-month timeline. Among the many issues: the problem of the "professional recruit." So ingrained is corruption and double-dealing in Afghan society that the country's meager Army finds itself sometimes recruiting the same men over and over again--scamsters who make off with guns and equipment each time.
Afghan Defense Minister Abdul Rahim Wardak recently described to a U.S. official how one man signed up for the Afghan Army five times. Deserting after a couple of months, he would sell his rifle for a good price, shave his beard, sign up again--and then regrow it. He was finally recognized on his sixth attempt, the official, who didn't want to be named discussing a private conversation, tells NEWSWEEK. "Everyone's heard of these professional recruits," says Chris Mason, who retired from the State Department in 2006 after working on Afghanistan for five years. "They sign up, get $120 a month and three hots [meals] and a cot. Then they desert, sell their equipment on Chicken Street in Kabul, and do it again." The stories, Mason says, illustrate how hard it is to answer even so basic a question as how big the Afghan Army really is. Obama and his ground commander, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, hope to create an Afghan Army of 134,000 by October 2010 (the president set aside McChrystal's further goal of 240,000 as "too large and too far out," a senior administration official told reporters at a White House briefing). But is 134,000 even attainable? Mason and Thomas Johnson, an Afghanistan expert at the Naval Postgraduate School, think not. "Projections of a 134,000-man force by 2010 or a 240,000-man [Army] in the future are absurd," they wrote in a study in Military Review, the Army's professional journal, that's caused a stir. But Lt. Gen. Richard Formica, who until this fall ran the program to train the Afghan Army, thinks McChrystal's goal is "going to be difficult but achievable." Retired Lt. Gen. James Dubik, who ran the program to train the new Iraqi Army and went to Afghanistan earlier this year, cautiously echoes Formica's optimism, though, he warns, "the training program was very well thought out, but now it will have to be changed." The biggest hurdles, Dubik and others say, are the shortage of bases and training schools; a lack of senior and noncommissioned officers; too little equipment; a near-total absence of support functions like logistics, communications, and medical services; and the Army's deep ethnic divisions. The bottom line, says a former U.S. general involved in many training missions who didn't want to be named casting doubt on the effort: "I can't think of anything like this that's been done in less than 10 years." SDI 2010 89 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE Troops Fail Nation Building
Nation building efforts in Afghanistan will inevitably fail geography, tribal structures, ethnic divides and poverty Innocent, Foreign Policy Analyst at the Cato Institute, 2009 "Myth v. Fact: Afghanistan" September 4, 2009 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/malou-innocent/myth-v-fact-afghanistan_b_277411.html
Myth # 4: We Can Have a Successful Nation-Building Mission in Afghanistan The U.S. Army and Marine Corps' Counterinsurgency Field Manual states, "Soldiers and Marines are expected to be nation builders as well as warriors rebuilding infrastructure and basic services." That sentiment is shared by many of the people informing administration policy. Stephen Biddle, civilian advisor to General Stanley McChrystal, America's top commander in Afghanistan, said a critical requirement for the success in Afghanistan "is providing enough of an improvement in Afghan governance to enable the country to function without us." But like many within the Obama administration, Biddle's advice is more goal than strategy. First, Afghanistan has yet to demonstrate the capability to function as a cohesive, modern, nation state, with or without us -- and perhaps never will. Many tribes living in rural, isolated, and sparsely populated provinces have little interest cooperating with "foreigners," a relative term considering the limited contact many have with their country's own central government. Second, arguments supporting a multi-decade commitment of "armed nation building" -- the words of another civilian advisor to the mission, Anthony Cordesman -- overlook whether such an ambitious project can be done within costs acceptable to the American public. Our attempt to transform what is a deeply divided, poverty stricken, tribal-based society -- while our own country faces economic peril -- is nothing short of ludicrous, especially since even the limited goal of creating a self-sufficient, non-corrupt, stable electoral democracy would require a multi-decade commitment-and even then there'd be no assurance of success. SDI 2010 90 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE AT: Taliban Victory Bad
The Taliban won't resume control if we withdraw they pose zero existential risk to the U.S. Innocent and Carpenter, foreign policy analyst and vp for defense and foreign policy at the Cato Institute, 2009
Malou Innocent is a foreign policy analyst at the Cato Institute who focuses on Afghanistan and Pakistan. Ted Galen Carpenter, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at Cato, is the author of 8 and the editor of 10 books on international affairs. His most recent book is Smart Power: Toward a Prudent Foreign Policy for America. Escaping the Graveyard of Empires: A Strategy to Exit Afghanistan, Cato Institute 2009 Moreover, the worst-case scenario--the res- urrection of the Taliban's fundamentalist regime--does not threaten America's sover- eignty or physical security. Many policymakers who call for an indefinite military presence in Afghanistan conflate bin Laden's network--a transnational jihadist organization--with the Taliban --an indigenous Pashtun-dominated movement. But the Taliban and other parochi- al fighters pose little threat to the sovereignty or physical security of the United States. The fear that the Taliban will take over a contigu- ous fraction of Afghan territory is not com- pelling enough of a rationale to maintain an indefinite, large-scale military presence in the region, especially since the insurgency is largely confined to predominately Pashtun southern and eastern provinces and is unlikely to take over the country as a whole, as we saw in the 1990s. The Taliban wont harbor al Qaeda empiric reluctance and self-preservation Innocent and Carpenter, foreign policy analyst and vp for defense and foreign policy at the Cato Institute, 2009
Malou Innocent is a foreign policy analyst at the Cato Institute who focuses on Afghanistan and Pakistan. Ted Galen Carpenter, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at Cato, is the author of 8 and the editor of 10 books on international affairs. His most recent book is Smart Power: Toward a Prudent Foreign Policy for America. Escaping the Graveyard of Empires: A Strategy to Exit Afghanistan, Cato Institute 2009 Even if the Taliban were to reassert them- selves amid a scaled down U.S. presence, it is not clear that the Taliban would again host al Qaeda. In The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11, Lawrence Wright, staff writer for New Yorker magazine, found that before 9/11 the Taliban was divided over whether to shel- ter Osama bin Laden.14 The terrorist financier wanted to attack Saudi Arabia's royal family, which, according to Wright, would have defied a pledge Taliban leader Mullah Omar made to Prince Turki al-Faisal, chief of Saudi intelligence (19772001), to keep bin Laden under control. The Taliban's reluctance to host al Qaeda's leader means it is not a fore- gone conclusion that the same group would provide shelter to the same organization whose protection led to their overthrow. SDI 2010 91 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE AT: NATO Still there
NATO is eager to withdraw US departure gives them a way out Manfredi, specialist on Afghanistan insurgencies and advisor to the Belgian foreign affairs committee on Middle East policy, 2009
Federico Manfredi is a specialist on insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan. He was an advisor to the Belgian foreign affairs committee on policy in the Middle East and Central Asia. World Policy Journal, "Rethinking U.S. Policy in Afghanistan" Winter 2008/2009 President Obama should take note: the current U.S. policy towards Afghanistan is not working. It has failed to stabilize the country and to produce a viable government. In addition, the U.S Army and the NATO-led coalition are stirring popular anger and civil strife. Time is running out. NATO is not going to remain in Afghanistan forever, and the United States cannot afford to alienate its closest allies (not to mention the folly of going it alone in another counterinsurgency). Instead, the United States could agree with its NATO allies on a timetable for withdrawal. It could also spur the tentative negotiations between the Karzai government and the nationalist faction of the Taliban movement, and thus avert the impending slide towards another full-blown civil war. Mr. Obama promised that once he is sworn into office he will provide at least two additional combat brigades to support the coalition's efforts in Afghanistan. In the short run, this show of force may increase the coalition's bargaining leverage by proving that the United States is serious about Afghanistan. If accompanied by a commitment to direct peace talks with the Taliban, Obama's move could actually facilitate a negotiated settlement to the conflict. But unless the United States engages the Taliban, this surge is not going to work. The Taliban are not Al Qaeda--they are Afghans, and they will continue to fight an open-ended war until their country is free from foreign troops. SDI 2010 92 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE ***AT Off Case Arguments*** SDI 2010 93 Afghanistan Affirmative 1.0 RRSE AT: NATO DA Pakistan Stability Solves
A destabilized Pakistan will deteriorate NATO and the US-European security guarantee Watt and Tempko, the Guardian's chief political correspondent and twice Pulitzer Prize nominee as a foreign correspondent for one of America's leading newspapers, 2007
Nicholas Watt is the Guardian's chief political correspondent. Ned Temko, a twice Pulitzer Prize nominee as a foreign correspondent for one of America's leading newspapers. The Observer (England) "News: Failure in Afghanistan risks rise in terror, say generals: Military chiefs warn No. 10 that defeat could lead to change of regime in Pakistan" July 15, 2007 l/n BRITAIN'S MOST senior generals have issued a blunt warning to Downing Street that the military campaign in Afghanistan is facing a catastrophic failure, a development that could lead to an Islamist government seizing power in neighbouring Pakistan. Amid fears that London and Washington are taking their eye off Afghanistan as they grapple with Iraq, the generals have told Number 10 that the collapse of the government in Afghanistan, headed by Hamid Karzai, would present a grave threat to the security of Britain. Lord Inge, the former chief of the defence staff, highlighted their fears in public last week when he warned of a 'strategic failure' in Afghanistan. The Observer understands that Inge was speaking with the direct authority of the general staff when he made an intervention in a House of Lords debate. 'The situation in Afghanistan is much worse than many people recognise,' Inge told peers. 'We need to face up to that issue, the consequence of strategic failure in Afghanistan and what that would mean for Nato. . . We need to recognise that the situation - in my view, and I have recently been in Afghanistan - is much, much more serious than people want to recognise.' Inge's remarks reflect the fears of serving generals that the government is so overwhelmed by Iraq that it is in danger of losing sight of the threat of failure in Afghanistan. One source, who is familiar with the fears of the senior officers, told The Observer : 'If you talk privately to the generals they are very very worried. You heard it in Inge's speech. Inge said we are failing and remember Inge speaks for the generals.' Inge made a point in the Lords of endorsing a speech by Lord Ashdown, the former Liberal Democrat leader, who painted a bleak picture during the debate. Ashdown told The Observer that Afghanistan presented a graver threat than Iraq. 'The consequences of failure in Afghanistan are far greater than in Iraq,' he said. 'If we fail in Afghanistan then Pakistan goes down. The security problems for Britain would be massively multiplied. I think you could not then stop a widening regional war that would start off in warlordism but it would become essentially a war in the end between Sunni and Shia right across the Middle East.' 'Mao Zedong used to refer to the First and Second World Wars as the European civil wars. You can have a regional civil war. That is what you might begin to see. It will be catastrophic for Nato. The damage done to Nato in Afghanistan would be as great as the damage done to the UN in Bosnia. That could have a severe impact on the Atlantic relationship and maybe even damage the American security guarantee for Europe.' Ashdown said two mistakes were being made: a lack of a co-ordinated military command because of the multinational 'hearts and minds' Nato campaign and the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom offensive campaign against the Taliban. There was also insufficient civic support on, for example, providing clean water. ...
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