RRSe Afghanistan Coin Aff - SDI 2010 RRSE 1 CT Affirmative...

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SDI 2010 1 RRSE CT Affirmative Counterterrorism Affirmative
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FYI – Defining COIN and CT The goal of a COIN strategy is to undermine public support for the insurgency. Boyle, IR prof @ University of St. Andrews, 2010 MICHAEL J. Lecturer in International Relations and a Research Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St Andrews. “Do counterterrorism and counterinsurgency go together?” http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/123318677/PDFSTART , date accessed: 7/26/2010 Such an approach is distinct from a traditional counterinsurgency model, which focuses alternately on direct (or coercive) and indirect (or ‘hearts and minds’) ways to separate insurgents from the local population .46 The counterinsurgency model of warfare is typically presented as a competition between the government and insurgents for the loyalties of the local population. 47 This competition can be waged through a variety of means, including the use of force but also involving the provision of security, governance and development. The goal of the COIN approach to warfare is to undermine public support for the insurgency and to build the capacity of the local government . Where its proponents tend to differ is on the best means towards achieving that end. Some advocate the direct use of force to destroy the insurgency before it can threaten the government ; others advocate starving the insurgency of popular support by winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of the population . In contrast with counterterrorism approaches, which focus on the sporadic but ruthless use of force against terrorist operatives to degrade their capabilities, both COIN schools of thought emphasize the discriminate use of violence against insurgents over a longer time period . The differences between these schools of thought are more stylistic than substantive. Both agree that the ultimate objective of counterinsurgency is to draw the population away from the insurgency and towards the government. The post 9-11 era has developed a more offensive/militarized counterterrorism model Boyle, IR prof @ University of St. Andrews, 2010 MICHAEL J. Lecturer in International Relations and a Research Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St Andrews. “Do counterterrorism and counterinsurgency go together?” http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/123318677/PDFSTART , date accessed: 7/26/2010 Today both counterterrorism and counterinsurgency can be understood as distinct models of warfare, with different starting assumptions and characteristics . To some extent, the development of counterterrorism as a model of warfare is new to the post-September 11 era. While counterinsurgency has long been recognized as a unique type of warfare, counterterrorism has traditionally been understood more broadly as offensive measures undertaken to stop an adversary from employing terrorism . As normally defined, it is a catch-all term that
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This note was uploaded on 02/23/2012 for the course DEBATE 101 taught by Professor None during the Spring '12 term at University of California, Berkeley.

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RRSe Afghanistan Coin Aff - SDI 2010 RRSE 1 CT Affirmative...

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