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Unformatted text preview: 1 Afghanistan Aff Afghanistan Aff......................................................................................................................1 ***1AC***..............................................................................................................................5 Afghanistan 1AC....................................................................................................................6 Afghanistan 1AC....................................................................................................................7 Afghanistan 1AC....................................................................................................................8 Afghanistan 1AC....................................................................................................................9 Afghanistan 1AC..................................................................................................................10 Afghanistan 1AC..................................................................................................................11 Afghanistan 1AC..................................................................................................................12 Afghanistan 1AC..................................................................................................................13 Afghanistan 1AC..................................................................................................................14 Afghanistan 1AC..................................................................................................................16 Afghanistan 1AC..................................................................................................................17 Afghanistan 1AC..................................................................................................................18 Afghanistan 1AC..................................................................................................................19 Afghanistan 1AC..................................................................................................................20 Afghanistan 1AC..................................................................................................................22 PLAN.....................................................................................................................................23 Afghanistan 1AC..................................................................................................................24 Afghanistan 1AC..................................................................................................................25 Afghanistan 1AC..................................................................................................................26 ***Losing Now/COIN Fails/Can't Win***......................................................................27 Losing Now...........................................................................................................................28 Losing Now...........................................................................................................................29 Losing Now...........................................................................................................................30 Losing Now...........................................................................................................................31 Losing Now...........................................................................................................................32 Losing Now...........................................................................................................................33 Losing Now...........................................................................................................................34 Losing Now...........................................................................................................................35 Losing Now...........................................................................................................................36 2 Losing Now...........................................................................................................................37 Losing Now--Allies...............................................................................................................38 COIN Fails............................................................................................................................39 COIN Fails............................................................................................................................40 COIN Fails............................................................................................................................41 COIN Fails............................................................................................................................42 COIN Fails--Backlash........................................................................................................43 COIN Fails--Casualties......................................................................................................44 Coin Fails--Collateral Damage.........................................................................................45 Uniqueness Trick.................................................................................................................46 A2: Spin Restores U.............................................................................................................47 A2: Iraq Proves....................................................................................................................48 A2: Victory Possible............................................................................................................49 A2: Withdrawal Total Withdrawal.............................................................................50 A2: Withdrawal Loses WOT.............................................................................................51 A2: Withdrawal Submarines Political Reform...............................................................52 ***Hegemony***.................................................................................................................53 Presence Unsustainable.......................................................................................................54 Overstretch Now..................................................................................................................55 Overstretch Now..................................................................................................................56 Overstretch Now--Logistics................................................................................................57 Overstretch Now--Structural.............................................................................................58 Overstretch--Deployment Cycles.....................................................................................59 Overstretch Now--Comparative........................................................................................60 Overstretch--Afghanistan I/L...........................................................................................61 Overstretch--Afghanistan I/L...........................................................................................62 No Middle East Heg.............................................................................................................63 A2: Afghan Minerals Solve Heg........................................................................................64 ***Regional Stability/Pakistan/Terror***......................................................................65 Presence Destabilizing--Region........................................................................................66 Pakistan Scenario--Destabilization...................................................................................67 Pakistan Scenario--Destabilization...................................................................................68 3 Pakistan Scenario--Destabilization..................................................................................69 Pakistan Scenario--India War..........................................................................................70 Pakistan Collapse Bad--War..............................................................................................72 Pakistan Scenario--Anti U.S. Sentiment.........................................................................73 Presence Bad--Radicalization...........................................................................................74 Presence Bad--Terrorism...................................................................................................75 Presence Bad--Terrorism...................................................................................................76 Instability Impact--Nuclear Terrorism...........................................................................77 Collapse Impact--Destabilization......................................................................................78 Instability Impact--Regional Stability.............................................................................79 Pakistan Key Flashpoint.....................................................................................................80 ***U.S. Pakistan Relations***...........................................................................................81 Presence Kills U.S.-Pakistani Relations...........................................................................82 US Pakistan Relations--Kashmir....................................................................................83 Indo-Pak War Impact.........................................................................................................84 ***Solvency***....................................................................................................................85 Corruption Now...................................................................................................................87 Corruption Impact--Lose War.........................................................................................88 Withdrawal Solves Corruption..........................................................................................89 Withdrawal Solves Corruption..........................................................................................90 Withdrawal Reconciliation...........................................................................................91 Karzai-Taliban Reconciling...............................................................................................92 Withdrawal Solves...............................................................................................................93 Reconciliation Good............................................................................................................94 Reconiliation Good..............................................................................................................95 Reconciliation Good............................................................................................................96 Reconciliation Good............................................................................................................97 No Reconciliation Now........................................................................................................98 Solvency--Reduces Anti-U.S. Sentiment.........................................................................99 Reconciliation Good--Strategic Depth..........................................................................100 ***Politics/Process***.......................................................................................................101 NM: Phased........................................................................................................................102 4 No Link--Politics...............................................................................................................103 Karzai- Cred Low..............................................................................................................104 A2: Grab Bag CP...............................................................................................................105 ***Counterplans***..........................................................................................................106 A2: ROE CP.......................................................................................................................107 A2: Foreign Grants CP.....................................................................................................108 A2: Pressure Pakistan CP................................................................................................109 A2: International Troop CP.............................................................................................110 A2: Pakistani Aid CP........................................................................................................111 A2: Condition Pakistan Aid CP.......................................................................................112 A2: Troop Surge CP..........................................................................................................113 5 ***1AC*** 6 Afghanistan 1AC Contention One: Afghanistan is a massive fail in the status quo Afghanistan is an unwinnable war--collateral damage, enemy will, and insurgent and terrorist mobility all confound traditional victory metrics Cohn, professor at Thomas Jefferson School of Law, 2010 (Marjorie, "Losing in Afghanistan" http://www.commondreams.org/view/2010/07/07 DA 7/1/10) There are other "depressing" aspects of this war as well. As Gen. Stanley McChrystal reported just days before he got the axe, there is a "resilient and growing insurgency" with high levels of violence and corruption within the Karzai government. McChrystal's remarks were considered "off message" by the White House, which was also irked by the general's criticisms of Obama officials in a Rolling Stone article. McChrystal believes that you can't kill your way out of Afghanistan. "The Russians killed 1 million Afghans and that didn't work." He and his successor, Gen. David Petraeus, likely disagree on the need to prevent civilian casualties (known as "Civ Cas"). McChrystal instituted some of the most stringent rules of engagement the U.S. military has had in a war zone: "Patrol only in areas that you are reasonably certain that you will not have to defend yourselves with lethal force." Commanders cannot fire on buildings or other places if they have reason to believe civilians might be present unless their own forces are in imminent danger of being overrun. And they must end engagements and withdraw rather than risk harming noncombatants. McChrystal knows that for every innocent person you kill, you create new enemies; he calls it "insurgent math." According to the Los Angeles Times, McChrystal "was credited with bringing about a substantial drop in the proportion of civilian casualties suffered at the hands of NATO's International Security Assistance Force and its Afghan allies." While testifying in Congress before he was confirmed to take McChrystal's place, Petraeus told senators that some U.S. soldiers had complained about the former's rules of engagement aimed at preventing civilian casualties. According to the Rolling Stone article, Obama capitulated to McChrystal's insistence that more troops were needed in Afghanistan. In his December 1 speech at West Point, the article says, "the president laid out all the reasons why fighting the war in Afghanistan is a bad idea: It's expensive; we're in an economic crisis; a decade-long commitment would sap American power; Al Qaeda has shifted its base of operations to Pakistan. Then," the article continued, "without ever using the words `victory' or `win,' Obama announced that he would send an additional 30,000 troops to Afghanistan, almost as many as McChrystal had requested." Both Obama and Petraeus no longer speak of "victory" over the Taliban; they both hold open the possibility of settlement with the Taliban. Indeed, Maj. Gen. Bill Mayville, chief of operations for McChrystal, told Rolling Stone, "It's not going to look like a win, smell like a win or taste like a win." The majority of Americans now oppose the war in Afghanistan. Fareed Zakaria had some harsh words for the war on his CNN show, saying that "the whole enterprise in Afghanistan feels disproportionate, a very expensive solution to what is turning out to be a small but real problem." Noting that CIA director Leon Panetta admitted that the number of Al Qaeda left in Afghanistan may be 50 to 100, Zakaria asked, "why are we fighting a major war" there? "Last month alone there were more than 100 NATO troops killed in Afghanistan," he said. "That's more than one allied death for each living Al Qaeda member in the country in just one month." Citing estimates that the war will cost more than $100 billion in 2010 alone, Zakaria observed, "That's a billion dollars for every member of Al Qaeda thought to be living in Afghanistan in one year." He queried, "Why are we investing so much time, energy, and effort when Al Qaeda is so weak?" And Zakaria responded to the argument that we should continue fighting the Taliban because they are allied with Al Qaeda by saying, "this would be like fighting Italy in World War II after Hitler's regime had collapsed and Berlin was in flames just because Italy had been allied with Germany." There is also division in the Republican ranks over the war. Republican National Committee chairman Michael Steele made some gutsy comments about the war in Afghanistan, saying it is not winnable and calling it a "war of Obama's choosing." (Even though George W. Bush first invaded Afghanistan, Obama made the escalation of U.S. involvement a centerpiece of his campaign.) Steele said that if Obama is "such a student of history, has he not understood that, you know, that's the one thing you don't do, is engage in a land war in Afghanistan? Everyone who has tried, over 1,000 years of history, has failed." Interestingly, Republicans Lindsey Graham and John McCain slammed Steele and jumped to Obama's defense. Rep. Ron Paul, however, agreed with Steele, saying, "Michael Steele has it right, and Republicans should stick by him." Obama will likely persist with his failed war. He appears to be stumbling along the same path that Lyndon Johnson followed. Johnson lost his vision for a "Great Society" when he became convinced that his legacy depended on winning the Vietnam War. It appears that Obama has similarly lost his way. 7 Afghanistan 1AC AND no matter what safety measures and strategies are adopted civilian casualties will continue to accumulate--we're fighting a war, not hosting a dinner party Dorronsoro, Carnegie Endowment for Peace analyst, 5/11/10 p. http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=40779 DA 7/15/10 There is structural tension, however, that has nothing to do with personal relationships. While Karzai wants to prevent civilian casualties, increased casualties will be inevitable with more fighting, even with a concerted effort by the United States to avoid them. Marja proves--actual attempts at COIN are massive failures sparking bloodshed Klein, Time columnist and author, 5/17/10 (Joe, "Losing in Afghanistan" http://swampland.blogs.time.com/2010/05/17/losing-in-afghanistan/ DA 7/1/10) The adage is: if you're not winning against a guerrilla insurgency, you're losing. We're not winning in Afghanistan. And our performance in Marja isn't helping any. Indeed, it hurts in several ways detailed in this excellent NY Times piece: But the insurgents' extensive intelligence network in Marja has remained intact, and they have been able to maintain a hold over the population through what residents have described as threats and assassinations. In April members of the Taliban visited one old man late at night and made him eat his aid registration papers, several residents said, a Mafia-style warning to others not to take government aid. At the beginning of May, a well-liked man named Sharifullah was beaten to death, accused of supporting the district chief and not paying taxes to the Taliban. His killing froze the community and villagers stopped going to the district administration. The fact is, no credible "government in a box" showed up in Marja when the U.S. Marines and some Afghan elements took it in February. The fact is, there is no credible long-term alternative to the Taliban. These results have two disastrous impacts on the impending battle--or something, whatever you want to call it--in Kandahar Province. It does not inspire confidence in the Afghan government's ability to govern the area after NATO troops seize it, especially since Kandahar is the Taliban heartland. And, as I've reported before, the fact that the best Afghan troops and police are playing whack-a-mole in Helmand Province removes a necessary component in any attempt to secure Kandahar. I must admit, again, I'm mystified about where this effort goes from here. Nothing I've heard from the U.S. military or other elements of our government leads me to believe we're on the right track here. Indeed, it raises serious questions about the use of counterinsurgency tactics in a situation where there is no credible partner--and especially in a situation (unlike Iraq) where the insurgents are neighbors, not foreigners. 8 Afghanistan 1AC Counterinsrugency operation failing--external support for militants and structural factors Babbin, former undersecretary of defense under Bush Sr., 5/4/10 (Jed, "Are We Losing in Afghanistan?" http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2010/05/04/are_we_losing_in_afghanistan_105426.html, DA 7/3/10) Are we losing Afghanistan to the resurgent Taliban? The facts and figures set out in the 152-page report the Pentagon sent Congress last week compel the conclusion that we are. The new report says that the Taliban regards 2009 as their most successful year. It says that violence in Afghanistan is at a level roughly double compared to the same period last year. And it concedes that all the counterinsurgency has accomplished so far has been to create "some islands of security...in a sea of instability and insecurity." In that roiling sea, the Taliban often retaliate against whole families or villages for cooperating with US forces. Last year, conservatives criticized Obama for spending months deliberating a new strategy for Afghanistan. As a result of the president ordering a strategic review of Afghanistan (the second of 2009), Gen. Stanley McChrystal submitted his report to the president on August 30 asking for at least 40,000 more troops. Obama delayed a decision until December 1 when he announced he would send an additional 30,000 troops ("McChrystal lite") and impose a deadline of July 2011 for US forces to begin to withdraw. In the end, however, Obama's three month delay is irrelevant because the deadline - even if it were extended by an equal period - cannot be met. McChrystal's August report to Obama stated that, "Failure to gain the initiative and reverse insurgent momentum in the near term (next 12 months) -- while Afghan security capacity matures -- risks an outcome where defeating the insurgency is no longer possible." Both Petraeus and McChrystal were unusually public in lobbying the president for the resources they sought. In October Petraeus said that our goals in Afghanistan would have to be changed -- meaning adjusted downward - if the president rejected the strategy revisions and increased resources he and McChrystal said were needed. The Obama-Petraeus-McChrystal counterinsurgency strategy - "COIN" in Pentagonese - is supposed to be based on the bible of counterinsurgency warfare, the late David Galula's "Counterinsurgency Warfare, Theory and Practice." Comparing Galula's bible and McChrystal's August 2009 report to the new Pentagon report reveals some alarming conclusions. COIN - as Galula wrote - aims to counter the insurgent's offer of a competing political system which it may impose by force or by protecting the populace from an unpopular government, providing better security and services than the government can. In Afghanistan, where the populace is a cacophony of tribal cultures and Kabul is unable to provide basic services (courts, security, economic pipelines) there is little reason for tribes and villages to adhere to any central government. The Taliban tax the opium crops, offer Islamic courts and local government services and - where villagers resist - impose them by terror. The new report cites eighty "Key Terrain" districts - population and economic activity centers, essential infrastructure locations and commerce routes - as well as lesser but still important forty-one additional "Area of Interest" districts. The report says that the ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) only has sufficient resources to operate the counterinsurgency in only forty-five of the eighty "Key Terrain" areas and three Areas of Interest. That the ISAF force is unable to provide security in so many Key Terrain areas and Areas of Interest is a principal reason for the April report's finding that the "population sympathizes with or supports the Afghan government in [only] 24%" of those areas. The aim of counterinsurgency, according to Galula, is "...to cut off, or at least reduce significantly, the contacts between the populace and the guerillas...This process of getting acquainted with the population may be speeded up if the occupied villages are divided into sections and each is assigned to a group of soldiers who will always work there." (emphasis added.)The Afghans know we are leaving next year and that our soldiers won't always be there to protect them. We are nine months into the year that Gen. McChrystal said would be determinative of our ability to defeat the Taliban. And, in fourteen months, President Obama's timeline requires us to begin a withdrawal. With government support among the populace in only 24% of the important areas of Afghanistan it is impossible for us to even raise that to 50% before August 2010 or, for that matter, by July 2011. And who is to say if 50% or 75% (or even 100%) would be enough given the critical support the Taliban receive from Iran and other Islamic states? Galula cites five types of outside support an insurgency can benefit from: moral (the "inevitability of Islam"), political (preventing by diplomacy support for the government), technical (military training), financial, and direct military support. The Taliban, according to the Pentagon report, receive funding from several Islamic states. Iran, the report says, provides "lethal assistance" to elements of the Taliban and predicts Iranian interference will continue for "the foreseeable future." 9 Afghanistan 1AC AND COIN Fails--too costly, can't ensure a political transition, can't overcome population dispersal, and ignores Pakistan Brooks 09. (David, Columnist for The New York Times, commentator on PBS NewsHour, editorial writer the Washington Times, reporter and op-ed editor for The Wall Street Journal, senior editor at The Weekly Standard, a contributing editor at Newsweek and The Atlantic Monthly, and a commentator on National Public Radio. "Clear, Hold and Duct Tape", The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/01/opinion/01brooks.html, 11-30, Accessed 7-16-10) But over the past few months, senior members of the Obama administration have lost some of their enthusiasm for COIN. It may be a good approach in the abstract, they say, but there are problems with applying it in this context. First, they say, COIN is phenomenally expensive. It consists of doing a lot of things at once - from increasing troop levels to nation-building - and doing them over a long period of time. America no longer has that kind of money, and Americans won't accept a new 10-year commitment having already been there for eight. Second, it may be possible to clear and hold territory, but it is looking less likely that we will be able to transfer it to any legitimate Afghan authority. The Karzai government is like an organized crime ring. The governing talent is thin. Plans to build a 400,000-man Afghan security force are unrealistic. Third, they continue, the population in Afghanistan is too dispersed for COIN to work properly. There would be a few bubbles of security, where allied troops are massed, but then vast sanctuaries for the insurgents. Fourth, COIN is too Afghan-centric and not enough Pakistan-centric. The real threats to U.S. interests are along the Afghan-Pakistani border or involve the destabilization of the Pakistani government. The COIN approach does little to directly address that. And all your offense is non-unique--Obama administration has mishandled the deadline announcement--we won't leave now but enemies and allies consider our departure a fait accompli Rogin, reporter at Foreign Policy, 6/29/10 p. http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/06/29/petraeus_withdrawal_timeline_does_not_mean_switchi ng_off_the_lights DA 7/12/10 But regardless of whether the administration sent mixed messages, the nuance of their time line policy has been misunderstood or ignored in the region, as various actors start to plan strategies with the expectation that U.S. troops are leaving. "In retrospect, despite all the caveats, it was a mistake to put such a date certain for the beginning of withdrawal," said Shuja Nawaz, director of the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council. "The word beginning was lost and it strengthens the ability of different interests to hedge, which is exactly what they've been doing." 10 Afghanistan 1AC Finally, COIN is really an acronym for nation building--but winning hearts and minds is hopeless at this point and the costs of staying outweigh the marginal benefits Ward 09 [Celeste, Celeste Ward is currently serving as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations in SOLIC&IC, with oversight of Department of Defense (DoD) policy development on reconstruction and stabilization activities and integrating DoD efforts across components and services, Ms. Ward was a Special Assistant to the Counselor at the State Department, Master's in Public Policy from Harvard University and a Bachelor of Arts from Stanford University, spent 20 months in Iraq, including 2006 as the political adviser to Gen. Peter Chiarelli, then operational commander of U.S. forces in the country, "Should the United States Withdraw from Afghanistan?", Cato Institute November/December Edition, http://www.cato.org/pubs/policy_report/v31n6/cpr31n6-3.html DA: 7-16-2010] CELESTE WARD: Over the last few years the violence in Afghanistan has come to be dubbed an "insurgency" that requires the application of a counterinsurgency strategy. This is in keeping with the general zeitgeist of "population-centric counterinsurgency" -- or COIN -- which has now risen to such prominence in U.S. defense and national security thinking that it borders on theology. COIN has become the overriding theme in discussions about not just present, but future, wars; a cultural movement in military defense circles, and, indeed, a worldview. As Colonel Gian Gentile at West Point has written, it has become the new American way of war. The problem is that counterinsurgency doctrine and theory impede our ability to accurately apprehend the nature and extent of our predicament in Afghanistan and are serving as an awkward stand-in for a rational strategy. The existence of a much ballyhooed manual -- the Army's Field Manual 3- 24 -- and perceived success in employing its precepts in Iraq are serving to obscure the real costs of the campaign in Afghanistan and provide a dangerous illusion concerning the limits of American power. A central problem with population centric COIN theory is that, at heart, it is really nation building. The theory emphasizes the population -- meeting its needs, establishing governmental legitimacy, developing economies and so on. Indeed some notable COIN adherents have even emphasized its potential to "change entire societies." So for those of you who argue that there is no strategy in Afghanistan, I would submit to you that, in effect, there is. It is implicit in the logic of COIN, and it is to transform Afghan society. But because the discussion is often wrapped in the more abstruse language of defense wonkery and larded with historical analogies and assumptions, the real strategic trade-offs -- the exorbitant costs of building a nation in a country with a history of no real central governance and that ranks 219th in per capita GDP -- are glossed over. I would argue that if General McChrystal had released not his counterinsurgency guidance but, instead, his "nationbuilding guidance," we'd be having a very different discussion. In addition to being the functional equivalent of nation building, there are a number of problems with counterinsurgency theory and doctrine itself. As just one example, a key precept is that we must win over the population. The theory goes that most of the population is unsure whose side they should be on, and we should influence that decision so that they will choose us. But this assumes that a foreign force such as ours could truly understand, never mind penetrate and manipulate the opinions and loyalties of an ancient tribal people. The conceit inherent in this notion goes mostly unremarked upon. By saying we're waging a counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan we are committing ourselves to a massive project of nation building in a country that one commentator recently described as "like walking into the Old Testament." It has become clich to note the administration has yet to articulate a real strategy in Afghanistan. I would submit that counterinsurgency -- as an operational concept and set of tactics -- has been in effect elevated to the status of a strategy. And calling it a counterinsurgency masks layers of complexity highly relevant to the outcome: tribal rivalry, ethnic conflict, the underlying struggle between tradition and modernity, and doubtless several others. By stripping away the jargon and slogans of counterinsurgency and instead exploring the problem of Afghanistan as it is, including a hard look at our real ends, ways, and means, we would not be "abandoning" Afghanistan as some have suggested. But were we to commit further American blood and treasure before such an analysis, all we would risk abandoning is our reason. 11 Afghanistan 1AC Contention Two is Whack-a-Mole--focusing our military strategy on Afghanistan pushes insurgents and militants into Pakistan where they are dangerously destabilizing Pakistan Coll, 2009 (Steven gave this in a testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and is a Foreign Relations Specialist at the New Heritage Foundation. "Afghanistan's Impact on Pakistan", New Heritage Foundation, http://www.newamerica.net/publications/resources/2009/afghanistans_impact_on_pakistan, October 7, July 15 2010) It seems useful to begin with an assessment of where U.S. interests in Pakistan are located. The success of Pakistan - that is, its emergence as a stable, modernizing, prosperous, pluralistic country, at peace with its neighbors and within its borders, and integrated economically in South and Central Asia - is important, even vital, not only to the United States but to the broader international community. The nuclear danger in South Asia alone argues for risk-taking investments in Pakistan's success. In addition, any durable American "exit strategy" from Afghanistan will depend upon the emergence of a stable Pakistan that is moving toward normalization with India and the reduction of extremism within its borders. For nearly four decades, Pakistan's struggle to achieve its constitutional and founding ideals of democracy, pluralism, and a culture rooted in a modernizing Islam have been impeded in part by the spillover effects of continual warfare in Afghanistan. These spillover effects have influenced the militarization of Pakistanis politics, encouraged the development of a "paranoid style" in Pakistani security doctrines, and more recently, helped to radicalize sections of the country's population. The United States today is a catalyzing power in this same, continual Afghan warfare. U.S. actions in Afghanistan since 2001 have amplified the debilitating spillover effects of the Afghan war on Pakistan. To name a few examples: The lightly resourced, complacent U.S. approach to Afghanistan following the ouster of the Taliban in late 2001 effectively chased Islamist insurgents into Pakistan, contributing to its destabilization. Dormant, often directionless U.S. diplomacy in the region failed to bridge the deepening mistrust among the Kabul, Islamabad, and New Delhi governments after 2001, or to challenge successfully the Pakistani military's tolerance of Islamist extremist groups, including the Afghan Taliban. In Pakistan itself, the U.S. relied for too long and too exclusively on former President Pervez Musharraf and failed to challenge his marginalization of political opponents or his coddling of Islamist extremists. During these years, narrowly conceived, transparently self-interested U.S. policies caused many Pakistanis to conclude, to some extent correctly, that the American presence in their region was narrowly conceived, self-interested, and ultimately unreliable. A recent poll of Pakistani public opinion carried out by the Pew Global Attitudes Project found that only sixteen percent of Pakistanis have a favorable view of the United States.1 That discouraging number has been more or less consistent since 2001; the only time it spiked, to just above twenty-five percent, was in 2006, after the United States pledged $500 million in aid to Pakistan and after it played a visible and significant role in an earthquake relief effort in Pakistani-held Kashmir. The Senate's recent unanimous passage of the Kerry-Lugar bill, providing $1.5 billion in aid to Pakistan for each of the next five years, offers a foothold to begin shifting U.S. policy in a more rewarding direction. However, it would be a mistake to underestimate the depth of the resentments and sources of instability in Pakistan that now confront the United States. A poll carried out by Gallup and Al Jazeera in July asked a sample of Pakistanis what constituted the biggest threat to Pakistan's security. Fifty-nine percent answered that it was the United States, followed by eighteen percent who named India and only eleven percent who named the Taliban. 12 Afghanistan 1AC War not winnable: U.S. presence only exacerbates problems encouraging a Pakistani collapse--presence is driving the eruption of global jihad Fuller, former CIA station chief in Kabul, 10/2/09 p. l/n in Christian Science Monitor DA 7/15/10 Many decades ago, as a fledgling CIA officer in the field, I was naively convinced that if the facts were reported back to Washington correctly, everything else would take care of itself in policymaking. The first loss of innocence comes with the harsh recognition that "all politics are local" and that overseas realities bear only a partial relationship to foreignpolicy formulation back home. So in President Obama's new policy directions for Afghanistan, what goes down in Washington politics far outweighs analyses of local conditions. I that the war in Afghanistan is not being won, indeed is not winnable within any practicable framework. Obama possesses the intelligence and insight to grasp these realities. But had hoped that Obama would level with the American people such an admission - however accurate - would sign the political death warrant of a president to be portrayed as having snatched defeat out of the jaws of "victory." The "objective" situation in Afghanistan remains a mess. The details are well known. Senior commanders acknowledge that we are not now winning hearts and minds in Afghanistan; indeed, we never can, and certainly not at gunpoint. Most Pashtuns will never accept a US plan for Afghanistan's future. The non-Pashtuns - Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, etc. - naturally welcome any outside support in what is a virtual civil war. America has inadvertently ended up choosing sides. US forces are perceived by large numbers of Afghans as an occupying army inflicting large civilian casualties. The struggle has now leaked into Pakistan - with even higher stakes. Obama's policies would seem an unsatisfying compromise among contending arguments. Thirty thousand more troops will not turn the tide; arguably they present more American targets for attack. They will heighten traditional xenophobia against foreigners traipsing through Pashtun villages and homes. It is a fool's errand to persuade the locals in Pashtun territory that the Taliban are the enemy and the US is their friend. Whatever mixed feelings Pashtuns have toward the Taliban, they know the Taliban remain the single most important element of Pashtun political life; the Taliban will be among them long after Washington tires of this mission. The strategy of the Bush era envisioned Afghanistan as a vital imperial outpost in a post-Soviet dream world where hundreds of overseas US bases would cement US global hegemony, keeping Russia and China in check and the US on top . That world vision is gone - except to a few Washington diehards who haven't grasped the new emerging global architectures of power, economics, prestige, and influence. The Taliban will inevitably figure significantly in the governance of almost any future Afghanistan, like it or not. Future Taliban leaders, once rid of foreign occupation, will have little incentive to support global jihadi schemes - they never really have by choice. The Taliban inherited bin Laden as a poison pill from the past when they came to power in 1996 and have learned a bitter lesson about what it means to lend state support to a prominent terrorist group. The Taliban with a voice in power will have every incentive to welcome foreign money and expertise into the country, including the Pashtun regions - as long as it is not part of a Western strategic package. An austere Islamic regime is not the ideal outcome for Afghanistan, but it is by far the most realistic. To reverse ground realities and achieve a markedly different outcome is not in the cards and will pose the same dilemma to Obama next year. Meanwhile, Pakistan will never be willing or able to solve Washington's Afghanistan dilemma. Pakistan's own stability has been brought to the very brink by US demands that it solve America's self-created problem in Afghanistan. Pakistan will eventually be forced to resolve Afghanistan itself - but only after the US has gone, and only by making a pact with Taliban forces both inside Afghanistan and in Pakistan itself. Washington will not accept that for now, but it will ultimately be forced to fairly soon. Maybe the Pakistanis can root out bin Laden, but meanwhile, Al Qaeda has extended its autonomous franchises around the world, and terrorists can train and plan almost anywhere in the world; they do not need Afghanistan. By now, as in so many other elements of the Global War on Terror, the US has become more part of the problem than part of the solution. We are sending troops to defend troops that themselves constitute an affront to Afghan nationalism. Only expeditious American withdrawal from Afghanistan will prevent exacerbation of the problem. Afghans must face the complex mechanics of internal struggle and reconciliation. They have done so over long periods of their history. The ultimate outcome is of greater strategic consequence to Pakistan, Russia, China, Iran, India, and others in the region than to the US. Europe and Canada have lost all stomach for this mission that is now promoted primarily in terms of "saving NATO" for future (and obsolescent) "out of area" struggles in a world in which Western strategic preferences can no longer predominate. In a crucial counterbalance to the mini-surge, Obama wisely establishes a date for genuine withdrawal in 2011 - thereby putting Kabul on notice to start solving its own problems. The "surge" may just be worth it if it enables Obama to put the US military and Kabul on notice that time is quickly running out to demonstrate genuine political and military progress - reflecting Gorbachev's ultimatum to the Red . Obama has only kicked the can down the road to a possibly even more difficult place both at home and abroad next year. Only with immense luck will his real goal - creation of the minimally acceptable terms for an American withdrawal - come into sight, providing a tiny fig leaf to mask what will essentially constitute a strategic American failure that was inherent in this situation nearly from the beginning in Army in Afghanistan when he came to power. So the ugly struggle continues with little prospect for genuine improvement. There are no good choices America's global military response to the challenge of 9/11. 13 Afghanistan 1AC U.S. presence is the key internal link to the attacks--EVEN IF the presence ameliorated some of its negative practices the spin is settled against the U.S. USA Today 7/2 (USA Today is a popular, national American daily newspaper published by the Gannett Company. "Pakistanis blame U.S. after shrine attack kills 42". USA Today. http://www.usatoday.com/ne ws/washington/2010-07-02-pakistan-us-strike_N.htm. 2010. July 15, 2010. Two suicide bombings that killed 42 at a popular Sufi shrine in Pakistan's east stirred outrage in this terror-scarred nation Friday. Several people blamed the U.S. presence in Afghanistan for spurring the attacks, while some faulted a minority sect that itself was viciously targeted weeks ago. The bombings of Lahore's Data Darbar shrine, the burial site of a famous Sufi saint, struck at the heart of the moderate Islam most Pakistanis practice. The assault wounded 180 people and again demonstrated the potency of militant groups that are linked to but operate far from the northwest tribal areas bordering Afghanistan. Thousands of people had gathered late Thursday at the green-domed shrine when bombs went off minutes apart in separate sections. The blasts ripped concrete from the walls, twisted metal gates and left the white marble floor awash with blood. Worshippers scattered as white plumes of smoke blanketed the area, footage showed. There was no claim of responsibility, but Islamist extremists consider Sufism to be heretical, and they have previously struck non-Sunni sects. Still, several Pakistanis interviewed Friday said the real root of the problem was the U.S. presence in Afghanistan and its missile strikes against militants in Pakistan's tribal regions. "America is killing Muslims in Afghanistan and in our tribal areas, and militants are attacking Pakistan to express anger against the government for supporting America," said Zahid Umar, 25, who frequently visits the shrine. Pakistanis are suffering because of American policies and aggression in the region, said Mohammed Asif, 34, who runs an auto workshop in Lahore. He and others said the attacks would end if the U.S. would pull out of Afghanistan. The U.S. Embassy issued a statement Friday condemning the attack, and saying it "demonstrates the terrorists' blatant disregard for the lives of the Pakistani people and the future of this country." Several other Pakistanis interviewed blamed the Ahmadis, a minority sect that has long faced discrimination in Pakistan. On May 28 in Lahore, gunmen and a suicide squad targeted two Ahmadi mosques, massacring at least 93 people. "I think the Ahmadis were behind the attack" on the Sufi shrine, said Lahore resident Mohammad Amir, accusing the sect of seeking revenge. He offered no evidence to back up his claim. Lahore, capital of Punjab province, is a key military, political and cultural hub. The city has witnessed several audacious attacks on diverse targets over the past two years, from crowded markets to Sri Lanka's cricket team. The Pakistani government has been criticized for lacking the will to crack down on militants in Punjab, the country's most populous and most powerful region. Many of the militants are part of now-banned groups launched with government support in the 1980s and '90s to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan and pressure archenemy India. Many of these groups have formed links with the Pakistani Taliban, which has recruited militants to carry out attacks in parts of Pakistan far from its sanctuary in the northwest. During Thursday's attack, the first bomber detonated his explosives in an underground room where visitors sleep and wash themselves before praying. Minutes later, a second bomber struck upstairs in a large courtyard in front of the shrine as people tried to flee. Police investigated a possible third blast, but concluded there were only two suicide bombers, whose heads were later found, said Khusro Pervez, a senior government official in Lahore. Overnight, the death toll rose to 42, he said. Police said 180 were wounded. Pakistani officials condemned the bombings, using language they have frequently used to try to convince the population that the fight against militancy is not one they can ignore. The efforts have had limited success in a country where anti-Americanism is widespread and engaging conspiracy theories is a national pastime. "Those who still pretend that we are not a nation at war are complicit in these deaths," said Farahnaz Ispahani, a spokeswoman for Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari. The attacks have fueled anger against Pakistan's weak police forces, who appear helpless to stop the killings. In the hours after Thursday's bombings, demonstrators gathered outside the shrine to protest the security lapse, only to be dispersed after police fired into the air and threw rocks at them. Pervez said recent intelligence alerts about possible attacks lacked details. "The intelligence agencies alerted us that terrorists could target prominent places, shrines and mosques in Lahore. They mentioned names of major places as a possible target, but no specific information was available to us," he said. Also Friday, militants attacked a security checkpoint on the outskirts of the northwestern city of Peshawar, killing three officers, said Safwat Ghayur, a regional commander of the Frontier Constabulary security force. He said officers also returned fire and killed some of the attackers. 14 Afghanistan 1AC U.S. military presence draws in Pakistan weakening their strategic depth and prompting a collapse of their state inviting Indian aggression Akhtar, senior ME analyst at Islam.net, 1/26/10 p. http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite? c=Article_C&cid=1262372328640&pagename=Zone-English-Muslim_Affairs%2FMAELayout DA 7/15/10 If it is a war against extremists and militancy inside Pakistan, it is a civil war because its origins stem from the US, NATO occupation of neighboring Afghanistan. The conflict should be seen as an extension of the ongoing resistance of the Afghan people to alien domination. It is inaccurate to say that the US invaded Afghanistan because of the 9/11 attacks by Al-Qaeda. Former BBC correspondent George Arney reported on September 18, 2001, that Niaz Naik, the former Pakistani foreign secretary, had told him that he was informed by US officials at a UN-sponsored international contact group on Afghanistan in Berlin during July that year that unless Osama bin Laden were handed over swiftly, America would take military action to kill or capture both Bin Laden and Mullah Omar. The wider objective, however, was to topple the Taliban regime and install a transitional government under King Mohammad Zahir Shah. The invasion was to take place in mid-October 2001. Mr. Naik went on to say that he doubted that the US would have abandoned its plan to invade Afghanistan even if Osama were handed over by the Taliban. Arney's story is corroborated by the Guardian correspondent David Leigh in his report published on September 26, 2001, in which he revealed that the Taliban had received specific warning by the US through secret diplomacy in Berlin in July that the Bush Administration would topple the entire regime militarily unless Osama is extradited to the US. This was part of the larger design of US military, industrial complex to bring about regime change in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran. As the US needed bases in Pakistan to accomplish its preplanned invasion of Afghanistan, the Bush Administration sought to use Islamabad as a cat's paw to pull the chestnuts out of the fire. Fortunately for President Bush, a usurper ruled there, devoid of all legitimacy, legal and moral, and he readily and willingly succumbed to US pressure and made a U-turn by severing all links with the Taliban. He even joined the war against Afghanistan instead of using his leverage with the Taliban to exhaust all means of peaceful settlement of the dispute. The entire region, including Pakistan, was declared a war zone by the US military command, and the flights of all passenger planes were prohibited over a certain altitude, while no merchant ships could enter the harbors of Pakistan, thus bringing maritime trade (which comprises approximately 95 percent of Pakistan's import-export trade) to a standstill. It is no wonder that Pakistan suffered a loss of 34 billion dollars because of its involvement in the Afghan war. America's War The sinister motive behind such acts of terror is to incite sectarian violence in Pakistan and lay the blame at the doors of religious extremists. As one can see, it was America's war that was imposed upon Pakistan. Whether Pakistan could have avoided the war is a matter of controversy among politicians and political observers. But the war has fuelled insurgency in Pakistan's hitherto peaceful tribal territory adjacent to Afghanistan. This insurgency shows no sign of abatement, as terrorist attacks on military and civilian centers in the capital and major cities of the North-West Frontier Province and Punjab continue with a vengeance, posing threat to the security of the state. In the meantime, routine predator strikes by the US in Waziristan have taken a heavy toll of civilian lives amid accusations of Islamabad's complicity in the piratical attacks on tribespeople, which prompts them to resort to retaliatory strikes on the perpetrators. Not satisfied with Pakistan's military operations in the tribal region, the US Administration has compelled Islamabad's fragile government to pull out its troops from the tense Indo-Pak border and deploy them in the restive tribal belt along the Pak-Afghan border. Now Pakistan faces existential threat from the Taliban and not India, a perception which the country's military leadership is not prepared to share, given the unresolved disputes with New Delhi, which triggered four wars during the last 62 years. At the same time, speculation (not entirely unfounded) is rife about the involvement of the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) and the former Blackwater (now christened Xe Services) in murder, mayhem, and gunrunning as evidenced by the armed Americans who drive consulate vehicles through cities and, when intercepted, refuse to disclose their identity. It is here that one recalls with dismay the role of General Stanley McChrystal, who until last year headed the Joint Special Operations Command, which runs drone attacks and targeted assassinations with the assistance of the operatives of the former Blackwater. This was revealed by Jeremy Scahill's investigative report published in the US weekly the Nation. That may, perhaps, solve the mystery 15 surrounding a series of assassinations of ulama belonging to various Islamic movements. The sinister motive behind such acts of terror is to incite sectarian violence in Pakistan and lay the blame at the doors of religious extremists. Similar death squads were organized by the CIA in El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua to carry out political assassinations of nationalists who were opposed to US intervention. At the time, the Sandinista government of Nicaragua complained to the International Court of Justice about the mining of Nicaraguan ports, the violation of the country's airspace, the killing and kidnapping of individuals on the Nicaraguan territory, and the threat or use of force by the US. The court in its decision in June 1986 held that the US was in breach of the customary rules of international law and international humanitarian law. The above case is titled the "Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua." The precedent set by this case may be invoked by Pakistan to prevent the US drone attacks on its territory. Once the piratical attacks of the US have stopped, the irritant in the tribal insurgency would have gone, paving the way for pacification of the conflict. If this were Pakistan's war, the government would have exercised its own judgment in dealing with the militants at home, either by conciliation or by resort to force. But Islamabad's so-called operation against militants is subordinated to US military designs in the region, aimed at the encirclement of the People's Republic of China and the control of the transit of gas pipelines from Central Asia to South Asia. It is not aimless that China expressed its concern over the concentration of US, NATO troops in the region. India fits in the American scheme of things, hence the US-India nuclear deal. Pakistan's National Interest Islamabad has adopted double standards in dealing with the Baluchistan militants and the Pashtun militants. In this emerging security environment, Pakistan will have to be content with its role as a junior partner of India. Therefore, the sooner Islamabad extricates itself from the US "war on terror," the better it is for its security and independence. Doesn't Islamabad realize that its military operation against the militants would leave its border with India vulnerable to a New Delhi offensive? If Pakistan permits the US to attack the suspected training centers of militants on its territory, will it be able to prevent India from doing so? With Islamabad embroiled in internecine strife, it cannot negotiate with India from a position of strength. It may be forced to make a compromise that might be detrimental to its national interest. Pakistan's preoccupation with tribal rebellion would not permit it to deal with separatist ethnic forces in Baluchistan. Undoubtedly, this is a threat to the territorial integrity of Pakistan. After the total failure of the military operation in Baluchistan, the federal government has come round to the painful conclusion that political and not military action can bring militancy to an end. Granting general amnesty to the dissidents and engaging them in a meaningful dialogue on contentious issues is a laudable initiative. The same gesture should be made to the militants in the tribal areas. But Islamabad has adopted double standards in dealing with the Baluchistan militants and the Pashtun militants, as if there were good militants and bad ones. This discriminatory policy would intensify the Pashtun insurgency and might drive them toward even more escalation. The rulers have seen the consequences of military operations in the former East Pakistan, Baluchistan, Karachi, Sind, and FATA (federally administered tribal areas). If anything, the situation has only worsened. The surge of US troops, the expansion of war beyond the borders of Afghanistan, and the attacks on Quetta and Muridke as envisaged by Obama's new strategy would mean that US troops are at war with the people of Pakistan. 16 Afghanistan 1AC South Asian conflict ensures nuclear winter Ghulam Nabi Fai, executive director of the Kashmiri American Council , July 8, 2001, The Washington Times, "The most dangerous place," p. B4 The most dangerous place on the planet is Kashmir, a disputed territory convulsed and illegally occupied for more than 53 years and sandwiched between nuclear-capable India and Pakistan. It has ignited two wars between the estranged South Asian rivals in 1948 and 1965, and a third could trigger nuclear volleys and a nuclear winter threatening the entire globe. The United States would enjoy no sanctuary. This apocalyptic vision is no idiosyncratic view. The director of central intelligence, the Defense Department, and world experts generally place Kashmir at the peak of their nuclear worries. Both India and Pakistan are racing like thoroughbreds to bolster their nuclear arsenals and advanced delivery vehicles. Their defense budgets are climbing despite widespread misery amongst their populations. Neither country has initialed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, or indicated an inclination to ratify an impending Fissile Material/Cut-off Convention 17 Afghanistan 1AC Contention Three: Never Start a Landwar in Asia: Deployment cycles in Afghanistan mean that the war is eroding American military readiness Defence Management 09 (Journal on authoritative analysis on an extensive array of defence topics including policy and strategy, procurement, logistics, human resources, training, aviation, the navy, military vehicles, and the defence estate, Defencemanagement, "Managing Overstretch", http://www.defencemanagement.com/feature_story.asp?id=11276, 2-06, Accessed 7-14-10) Overstretch in the Armed Forces is a complex and all too common problem caused both by the well known issues of current combat operations and recruitment along with the past administrative decisions made by commanders and ministers. The problem has grown in prominence over the last three years as the conflict in Afghanistan intensified. This has left the Armed Forces engaged in two medium sized conflicts along with various peacekeeping and mandatory deployment roles around the world. While operations in Iraq are scheduled to end in July, it could still take years for the Army and other parts of the Armed Forces to possibly return to a normal operating tempo due to the deployment strategies put in place by ministers and commanders. Operations in Afghanistan could require thousands of additional troops which would negate any gains from the withdrawal of troops from Iraq. By rule, overstretch in the Army is defined as a soldier serving for more than 415 days in a 30 month period while for the RAF the total amounts to 280 days over a 24 month period. The Royal Navy's guidelines are not known, but less than one per cent of all personnel, including Royal Marines were in violation of the so called harmony guidelines as of the end of 2008. Statistics for the other two branches paint a more diverse picture of how bad overstretch has become. Approximately 10.3 per cent of the entire Army has been in violation of the guidelines over the last year including the infantry where one third of all soldiers surpassed the separated allowance guidelines. Approximately 6.1 per cent of RAF personnel were deployed for longer than 280 days. The figures for the RAF would be far higher if the 280 days/24 months policy had not been instituted to replace the 140 days/12 month policy last year. "We urgently need to rectify the severe problem of overstretch. However, it will require the army to take decisions on reorganisation that it may find painful," Liberal Democrat shadow Defence Secretary Nick Harvey told Defencemanagement.com. As criticism from the opposition has grown, even the leadership of the MoD is admitting that there is a serious problem. "A gap of one year between operational deployments is not unusual and often soldiers are spending much of the year before a deployment away from home, in training and preparation. This is unacceptable," General Sir Richard Dannatt, chief of the general staff said in a speech recently in which he detailed proposals to overcome overstretch. Defence Secretary John Hutton concurred: "I think we have accepted that the strain of mounting two major operations, one in Iraq and one in Afghanistan, is creating very substantial strain and stress on our military forces." Why overstretch is occurring and how the issue can be resolved is a complex matter in itself. The obvious answer to the question of why overstretch is occurring is that current operations are taking their toll on British forces. The higher demand for troops has forced some to serve longer and more frequently in theatres of operation. The high demand is largely attributed to the six month deployment policy. In the US most deployments are 12-15 months. Britain maintains a strict six month policy which requires a massive redeployment twice a year. Factoring in the two combat operations and only so many infantry and support servicemen, it is clear why personnel are recalled for deployment so frequently. A heavy operational tempo ultimately creates a vicious cycle. Commanders need to send troops back sooner than required to keep troop numbers up but then many servicemen choose to leave the Forces when their contract is up due to the strain on their family and personal lives. 18 Afghanistan 1AC Afghanistan is a key vector--depletes reserves and flexibility Friedman 10 [George, Political Scientist and Author, Founger and CEO of the private intelligence corporation Stratrof, "Afghanistan: Obama continues America's longest war," http://www.speroforum.com /a/36034/Afghanistan-Obama-continues-Americas-longest-war, SperoNews 7/5/2010, DA 7/15/10 From the grand strategic point of view, the United States needs to withdraw from Afghanistan, a landlocked country where U.S. forces are dependent on tortuous supply lines. Whatever Afghanistan's vast mineral riches, mining them in the midst of war is not going to happen. More important, the United States is overcommitted in the region and lacks a strategic reserve of ground forces. Afghanistan ultimately is not strategically essential, and this is why the United States has not historically used its own forces there. Obama's attempt to return to that track after first increasing U.S. forces to set the stage for the political settlement that will allow a U.S. withdrawal is hampered by the need to begin terminating the operation by 2011 (although there is no fixed termination date). It will be difficult to draw coalition partners into local structures when the foundation -- U.S. protection -- is withdrawing. Strengthening local forces by 2011 will be difficult. Moreover, the Taliban's motivation to enter into talks is limited by the early withdrawal. At the same time, with no ground combat strategic reserve, the United States is vulnerable elsewhere in the world, and the longer the Afghan drawdown takes, the more vulnerable it becomes (hence the 2011 deadline in Obama's war plan). In sum, this is the quandary inherent in the strategy: It is necessary to withdraw as early as possible, but early withdrawal undermines both coalition building and negotiations. The recruitment and use of indigenous Afghan forces must move extremely rapidly to hit the deadline (though officially on track quantitatively, there are serious questions about qualitative measures) -- hence, the aggressive operations that have been mounted over recent months. But the correlation of forces is such that the United States probably will not be able to impose an acceptable political reality in the time frame available. Thus, Afghan President Hamid Karzai is said to be opening channels directly to the Taliban, while the Pakistanis are increasing their presence. Where a vacuum is created, regardless of how much activity there is, someone will fill it. And, U.S. presence in Afghanistan is on balance bad for primacy and global influence Cordesman, CSIS strategic analyst in the area of Afghanistan, 6/16/10 p. http://csis.org/publication/realism-afghanistan-rethinking-uncertain-case-war DA 7/15/10 Two critical questions dominate any realistic discussion of the conflict. The first is whether the war is worth fighting. The second is whether it can be won. The answers to both questions are uncertain. The US has no enduring reason to maintain a strategic presence in Afghanistan or Central Asia. It has far more important strategic priorities in virtually every other part of the world, and inserting itself into Russia's "near abroad," China's sphere of influence, and India's ambitions makes no real sense. Geography, demographics, logistics, and economics all favor other nations, and no amount of academic hubris can realistically model American reform of the "Stans" in ways that are costeffective relative to other uses of US resources. 19 Afghanistan 1AC US presence in Afghanistan results in mission failure and high costs that gut our hegemony Malou Innocent is a foreign policy analyst at the Cato Institute who focuses on Afghanistan and Pakistan; and Ted Galen Carpenter is vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at Cato, Cato Institute 2009 available at: http://www.scribd.com/doc/19645403/Escaping-the-quotGraveyard-ofEmpiresquot-A-Strategy-to-Exit-Afghanistan-Cato-White-Paper. Myth #3: Withdrawal Would Erode America's Global Status Former national security adviser Henry Kissinger, Council on Foreign Relations schol- ar Stephen Biddle, and many others, concede that the war in Central Asia will be long, expensive, and risky, yet they claim it is ulti- mately worth waging because a withdrawal would boost jihadism globally and make America look weak.26 But what we've invested in the Afghanistan mission could all fall apart whether we withdraw tomorrow or 20 years from now. In fact, if leaving would make America look weak, trying to stay indefinitely while accomplishing little would appear even worse. If the issue is preventing U.S. soldiers from having died in vain, pursuing a losing strategy would not vindicate their sacrifice. And trying to pacify all of Afghanistan, much less hoping to do so on a permanent basis, is a losing strategy. Regardless, some people invoke memories of America's ignominious withdrawals from Viet- nam, Somalia, and Lebanon to muster support for an open-ended commitment. President Bush in 2007 claimed that withdrawing from Vietnam emboldened today's terrorists by compromising U.S. credibility. "Here at home," he said, "some can argue our withdrawal from Vietnam carried no price to American credibility, but the terrorists see things differently."27 Michael Rubin of the American Enterprise Institute agrees with that reasoning, writing that "the 1983 withdrawal from Lebanon and the retreat from Somalia a decade later emboldened Islamists who saw the United States as a paper tiger."28 When opinion leaders in Washington talk about "lessons learned" from Vietnam, Somal- ia, Lebanon, and other conflicts, they typically draw the wrong lesson: not that America should avoid intervening in someone else's domestic dispute, but that America should nev- er give up after having intervened, no matter what the cost .29 But the longer we stay and the more money we spend, the more we'll feel com- pelled to remain in the country to validate the investment. A similar self-imposed predica- ment plagued U.S. officials during the war in Vietnam : After 1968 it became increasingly clear that the survival of the [government of South Vietnam] was not worth the cost of securing it, but by then the United States had another rationale for stay- ing--prestige and precedent setting. The United States said the [South Vietnamese government] would stand, and even those in the administration now long convinced of the hollowness of the domino argument could agree that a U.S. failure in South Vietnam might endanger vital US national interests elsewhere or in the future.30 For decades, the fear of America losing the world's respect after withdrawing from a con- flict has been instrumental in selling the American public bad foreign policy. Perhaps most troubling about the reflexively "stay the course" mentality of some Americans is the widespread insensitivity about the thou- sands of people--civilian and military, domestic and foreign--killed, maimed, and traumatized in war. But when the stakes seem unrelated to vital national interests, the American public rightly resents their country's interference in third party problems, and is extremely skeptical of nation building. History shows that, sooner or later, disenchantment will manifest in public and congressional opposition. After nearly a decade in Afghanistan, even the memory of 9/11 might not be sufficient to outweigh the sacrifice in blood and treasure. Perhaps the most important argument against the "withdrawal is weak-kneed" meme is that America's military roams the planet, controls the skies and space, faces no peer competitor, and wields one of the planet's largest nuclear arsenals. America is responsible for almost half of the world's military spend- ing and can project its power around the globe. Thus, the contention that America would appear "weak" after withdrawing from Afghanistan is ludicrous. Unfortunately, bureaucratic inertia and a misplaced conception of Washington's moral obligations (an argument that more often than not legitimizes America's military occu- pation of a foreign people) threaten to trap the United States in Afghanistan for decades. Overall, remaining in Afghanistan is more likely to tarnish America's reputation and undermine U.S. security than would withdrawal. 20 Afghanistan 1AC Afghanistan project wasting an immense amount of U.S. resources Englehardt 10 [Tom, author of The End of Victory Culture and consulting editor for Metropolitan Books, teaching fellow at Cal, Berkeley, "Imperial Overstretch in Afghanistan," Tom Dispatch, Common Dreams, 4/4, DA 7/19/10 Starting with that bomber's jacket, the event had a certain eerie similarity to George W. Bush's visits to Iraq. As Bush once swore that we would never step down until the Iraqis had stepped up, so Obama declared his war to be "absolutely essential." General Mohammad Zahir Azimi, a spokesman for the Afghan Defense Ministry, even claimed that the president had used the long-absent (but patented) Bush word "victory" in his meeting with Hamid Karzai. Above all, whatever the talk about beginning to draw down his surge troops in mid-2011 -- and he has so far committed more than 50,000 American troops to that country -- when it comes to the Afghan War, the president seemed to signal that we are still on Pentagon time. Particularly striking was his assurance that, while there would be "difficult days ahead... we also know this: The United States of America does not quit once it starts on something... [T]he American armed services does not quit, we keep at it, we persevere, and together with our partners we will prevail. I am absolutely confident of that." He assured his listeners, and assumedly Americans at home, that we will "finish the job" (however undefined), and made another promise as well: "I'm looking forward," he told the troops, "to returning to Afghanistan many times in the years to come." Many times in the years to come. Think about that and fasten your seatbelt. The U.S. evidently isn't about to leave Afghanistan anytime soon. The president seems to have set his watch to the Pentagon's clock, which means that, in terrible financial times, he is going to continue investing staggering sums of our money long-term in a perilous war in a distant land with terrible supply lines and no infrastructure. This represents a perfect Paul-Kennedy-style working definition of "imperial overstretch." Contrast this with the China-on-the-move that Michael Klare, Tom Dispatch regular and author of Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet, describes in his latest piece, "China's Global Shopping Spree." If the word "folly" doesn't come to mind, what does? On balance withdrawal and pseudo-defeat is better for our hegemony than continuing to throw money at the conflict in Afghanistan Goekler, professor of security and adaptive systems at Foreign Policy in Focus, 5/19/10 p. ln (John, Hello, "Has Anybody Seen Our Idea of Governance in Afghanistan?" DA 7/14/10) The Taliban take over? Let them. If they succeed in governing and create development and stability, the US wins. If they fail and destroy their popular support, the US wins. (Yes, it will be difficult for some of the Afghan people, but let's tell truths - the US didn't care about them before 9-11, and actions have pretty well demonstrated they haven't really cared since. And, honestly, would you rather have to wear a beard / burqa, or get smoked in an air strike?) Science tells us it that "complex adaptive systems" (which include all human organizations, whether your family, nation states, the Taliban or the LA Lakers) cannot be precisely predicted or controlled. The behaviors and outcomes manifested by the system emerge from the complex interactions among the 'initial conditions' (which continually "refresh"), the rules of the system, and the relationships among the 'agents', or members of the system. The above is an update of a response to David Kilcullen's 2/09 piece in Small Wars Journal titled, Crunch Time in AfghanistanPakistan, in which he called a "Prevent, Protect, Build, Hand-Off" strategy the only viable option. I suggested "Option C" - bail immediately. FULL TEXT Whew. I feel so much better now that POTUS has assured us the US has, "begun to reverse the momentum of the insurgency," in Afghanistan. Oh. Sorry. Just kidding. What it really made me think is that Mr. Obama needs to find advisors who haven't already drunk the Kool-Aid. And / or get his own meds checked. Here's why . . . Afghanistan is not a failing state. It is a non-state - a network of tribes that alternately compete and collaborate. It is a landscape of "sink holes" into which our idea of governance has fallen. The window to shift that reality (if it ever truly existed) certainly closed with the onset of the global economic implosion. The western commitment to Afghanistan would have died of 'donor fatigue' and overstretch sooner or later anyway, but the meltdowns and bailouts have pushed that moment up. It is better, therefore, to leave 21 now. What's the downside of an immediate departure? Loss of prestige? The US has none to lose with any of the groups they're attempting to defeat. Loss of deterrence? Misapplied force encourages rather than discourages resistance. The Taliban take over? Let them. If they succeed in governing and create development and stability, the US wins. If they fail and destroy their popular support, the US wins. (Yes, it will be difficult for some of the Afghan people, but let's tell truths - the US didn't care about them before 9-11, and actions have pretty well demonstrated they haven't really cared since. And, honestly, would you rather have to wear a beard / burqa, or get smoked in an air strike?) That al Qaeda will flourish? It's more an identity than an entity, and you can't defeat ideas with firepower. The instability in Afghanistan spills over into Pakistan? Too late. That outcome was pretty much assured when the US underwrote the original Muj back in the 80's and then walked away after the Red Army bolted. (If not in 1947, when parts of Pakistan were incorporated by force, while others were excluded by whim, such as splitting the Pashtun nation.) The Pakistan government falls and loses control over its nukes? We're not sure to what extent such control exists today. Nor that US presence and assistance to that government are not more destabilizing. That heroin will flood the world? Legalize drugs and kill a major funding source for criminals and insurgents. Then shift the DEA budget to recovery and development work. That Afghanistan will become a training ground (again) for terrorists? As long as there is a sea of disaffected people in which to swim, terrorists will exist. The solution is development and equity - not combat. Even if all the above were to occur, such outcomes are not necessarily more or less likely whether the US stays or goes. Science tells us it that "complex adaptive systems" (which include all human organizations, whether your family, nation states, the Taliban or the LA Lakers) cannot be precisely predicted or controlled. The behaviors and outcomes manifested by the system emerge from the complex interactions among the 'initial conditions' (which continually "refresh"), the rules of the system, and the relationships among the 'agents', or members of the system. So US prestige / deterrence may be damaged far more by overstretch than by withdrawal. Al Qaeda may become irrelevant even if the US leaves, or may flourish because of events far from Afghanistan. The Taliban may win simply by outlasting the invaders. (Remember, the US has to win. They only have to not lose.) Or it may lose because a US departure robs it of legitimacy, and what's left is a bunch of ignorant thugs the tribes eradicate. The Pakistani government may fall because of US support, or lack of it. Or simply implode from its internal inconsistencies. The Pak nukes may be captured by the OG's in such a collapse, or covertly handed over by the ISI in its ascendance. (Remember A Q Khan?) Or spirited away by a brilliant covert op. None of these outcomes necessarily emerge because of US presence or absence. They are not really within US control. (Though American policymakers cling to that illusion.) Most important, AfPak is nowhere near as great a strategic threat to the US as another $10 trillion of national debt. American military adventures in west and south Asia appear on course to add $3 trillion plus. A bloated 'defense' budget, corporate welfare and bailouts are on course to add the rest. Mission failure will wreck the U.S. hegemony Doug Bandow is a senior fellow athe Cato Institute. He is a former special assistant to President Reagan and the author of several books, including Foreign Follies: America's New Global Empire. Cato Institute: "Recognizing the Limits of American Power in Afghanistan" This article appeared in the Huffington Post on October 31, 2009 http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=10924 What are the alternatives? The status quo offers little hope of reversing the Taliban's gains. Concentrating allied troops in the cities might offer greater urban security but would concede most of the country to the insurgency. Accelerating training and equipping of the Afghan army and police would yield positive results only if the resulting forces proved to be competent and honest, as well as competently and honestly led. The better policy would be for Washington to begin drawing down its combat forces. The outcome might be Taliban conquest and rule, but equally likely is continuing conflict and divided governance amongst competing political factions, ethnic groups, and tribes. The resulting patchwork would be tragic, but the fighting would no longer be inflamed by outside intervention. Would adverse consequences extend beyond the region? The Economist hyperbolically fears that "defeat for the West in Afghanistan would embolden its opponents not just in Pakistan, but all around the world, leaving it more open to attacks." However, jihadists are most likely to attack Westerners when their grievances are ongoing. Groups based in Amman, London, Madrid, and Riyadh as well as America are more likely to act if the American government is killing more rather than fewer Muslims in Afghanistan. Moreover, escalation, followed by additional years of conflict and then ultimate defeat would multiply the harm to America's reputation. The Soviet Union made this mistake. Author Victor Sebestyen reviewed the minutes of meetings between Politburo and military officials and reported: "The Soviets saw withdrawal as potentially fatal to their prestige in the cold war, so they became mired deeper and deeper in their failed occupation." Even reformist Mikhail Gorbachev dithered out of fear of the impact on Moscow's image before finally withdrawing Soviet forces in 1989. 22 Afghanistan 1AC Hegemony is key to stopping nuclear war and all terminal impacts Niall Ferguson Laurence A. Tisch Professor of History @ Harvard University, Senior Fellow of the Hoover Institution When Empires Wane, 2004 http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html? id=110005244) Yet universal claims were an integral part of the rhetoric of that era. All the empires claimed to rule the world; some, unaware of the existence of other civilizations, maybe even believed that they did. The reality, however, was political fragmentation. And that remains true today. The defining characteristic of our age is not a shift of power upward to supranational institutions, but downward. If free flows of information and factors of production have empowered multinational corporations and NGOs (to say nothing of evangelistic cults of all denominations), the free flow of destructive technology has empowered criminal organizations and terrorist cells, the Viking raiders of our time. These can operate wherever they choose, from Hamburg to Gaza. By contrast, the writ of the international community is not global. It is, in fact, increasingly confined to a few strategic cities such as Kabul and Sarajevo. Waning empires. Religious revivals. Incipient anarchy. A coming retreat into fortified cities. These are the Dark Age experiences that a world without a hyperpower might find itself reliving. The trouble is, of course, that this Dark Age would be an altogether more dangerous one than the one of the ninth century. For the world is roughly 25 times more populous, so that friction between the world's "tribes" is bound to be greater. Technology has transformed production; now societies depend not merely on freshwater and the harvest but also on supplies of mineral oil that are known to be finite. Technology has changed destruction, too: Now it is possible not just to sack a city, but to obliterate it. For more than two decades, globalization has been raising living standards, except where countries have shut themselves off from the process through tyranny or civil war. Deglobalization--which is what a new Dark Age would amount to--would lead to economic depression. As the U.S. sought to protect itself after a second 9/11 devastated Houston, say, it would inevitably become a less open society. And as Europe's Muslim enclaves grow, infiltration of the EU by Islamist extremists could become irreversible, increasing trans-Atlantic tensions over the Middle East to breaking point. Meanwhile, an economic crisis in China could plunge the Communist system into crisis, unleashing the centrifugal forces that have undermined previous Chinese empires. Western investors would lose out, and conclude that lower returns at home are preferable to the risks of default abroad. The worst effects of the Dark Age would be felt on the margins of the waning great powers. With ease, the terrorists could disrupt the freedom of the seas, targeting oil tankers and cruise liners while we concentrate our efforts on making airports secure. Meanwhile, limited nuclear wars could devastate numerous regions, beginning in Korea and Kashmir; perhaps ending catastrophically in the Middle East. The prospect of an apolar world should frighten us a great deal more than it frightened the heirs of Charlemagne. If the U.S. is to retreat from the role of global hegemon--its fragile self-belief dented by minor reversals--its critics must not pretend that they are ushering in a new era of multipolar harmony. The alternative to unpolarity may not be multipolarity at all. It may be a global vacuum of power. Be careful what you wish for. 23 PLAN The United States federal government should withdraw at least a substantial amount of its presence from Afghanistan. 24 Afghanistan 1AC Contention Four: Solvency--Withdrawing eliminates the major cause of antiAmerican sentiment in the region and provides stabilization Bowman 07 [Bradley L, major and strategic plans and policy officer in the U.S. Army, assistant professor of American Politics, Policy, and Strategy at the United States Military Academy at West Point, and an MA in international relations from Yale University (2004) and a BS in American politics from the United States Military Academy at West Point (1995), "Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy," Parameters, ProQuest, Autumn 2001, DA 7/15/2010. Surveying the now familiar international and domestic polling data, Walt finds pervasive antiAmericanism around the world. According to polls that Walt cites, with only a few exceptions, majorities in other countries view the United States unfavorably, see US influence as negative, ascribe ulterior and self-serving motives to the US war on terrorism, and believe American foreign policy does not consider the interests of others. After identifying these well-known trends in international opinion, Walt moves to a provocative and important discussion of whether US values or policies explain this widespread anti-American sentiment. The author acknowledges that both play a role, but ultimately concludes by arguing that "the chief source of contemporary opposition is global reaction to specific policies-and especially the actions of the Bush Administration- and is not simply a response to US power or American values." While the debate regarding the causes of anti-Americanism is now ubiquitous, Walt provides a valuable and insightful contribution that is central to debates regarding US grand strategy. After all, policymakers must accurately identify the causes of global anti-Americanism before designing an effective strategy to ameliorate them. In other words, a successful prescription depends largely on an accurate diagnosis. If foreign governments and populations oppose the United States because of American values, as well as American power and influence, there is little to be done. However, if much of the ire directed toward the United States is a function of American policies, it follows that policy changes would likely alter these global perceptions. In the 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, the Bush Administration minimizes the role of US policy in explaining the emergence of Islamist terrorism, instead arguing that terrorism springs primarily from maladies pervasive in the Arab world. This debate is much more than a petty, academic squabble. The success or failure of the United States in the Long War will depend largely on an accurate and nuanced diagnosis of the problem. Walt's book offers a fairly persuasive counter-argument to the Bush Administration's point of view that will provide readers of all leanings with a more nuanced framework with which to analyze US grand strategy 25 Afghanistan 1AC Withdrawing US troops solves it lessens the risk of Pakistani instability Andrew J. Bacevich is professor of history and international relations at Boston University. "Winning In Afghanistan" December 31st 2008 http://www.newsweek.com/2008/12/30/winning-inafghanistan.html One of history's enduring lessons is that Afghans don't appreciate it when outsiders tell them how to govern their affairs--just ask the British or the Soviets. U.S. success in overthrowing the Taliban seemed to suggest this lesson no longer applied, at least to Americans. That quickly proved an illusion. In Iraq, toppling the old order was easy. Installing a new one to take its place has turned out to be infinitely harder. Yet the challenges of pacifying Afghanistan dwarf those posed by Iraq. Afghanistan is a much bigger country--nearly the size of Texas--and has a larger population that's just as fractious. Moreover, unlike Iraq, Afghanistan possesses almost none of the prerequisites of modernity; its literacy rate, for example, is 28 percent, barely a third of Iraq's. In terms of effectiveness and legitimacy, the government in Kabul lags well behind Baghdad--not exactly a lofty standard. Apart from opium, Afghans produce almost nothing the world wants. While liberating Iraq may have seriously reduced the reservoir of U.S. power, fixing Afghanistan would drain it altogether. Meanwhile, the chief effect of allied military operations there so far has been not to defeat the radical Islamists but to push them across the Pakistani border. As a result, efforts to stabilize Afghanistan are contributing to the destabilization of Pakistan, with potentially devastating implications. September's bombing of the Marriott hotel in Islamabad suggests that the extremists are growing emboldened. Today and for the foreseeable future, no country poses a greater potential threat to U.S. national security than does Pakistan . To risk the stability of that nuclear-armed state in the vain hope of salvaging Afghan-istan would be a terrible mistake . All this means that the proper U.S. priority for Afghanistan should be not to try harder but to change course . The war in Afghanistan (like the Iraq War) won't be won militarily. It can be settled--however imperfectly--only through politics. The new U.S. president needs to realize that America's real political objective in Afghanistan is actually quite modest: to ensure that terrorist groups like Al Qaeda can't use it as a safe haven for launching attacks against the West. Accomplishing that won't require creating a modern, cohesive nation-state. U.S. officials tend to assume that power in Afghanistan ought to be exercised from Kabul. Yet the real influence in Afghanistan has traditionally rested with tribal leaders and warlords. Rather than challenge that tradition, Washington should work with it. Offered the right incentives, warlords can accomplish U.S. objectives more effectively and more cheaply than Western combat battalions. The basis of U.S. strategy in Afghanistan should therefore become decentralization and outsourcing, offering cash and other emoluments to local leaders who will collaborate with the United States in excluding terrorists from their territory. This doesn't mean Washington should blindly trust that warlords will become America's loyal partners. U.S. intelligence agencies should continue to watch Afghanistan closely, and the Pentagon should crush any jihadist activities that local powers fail to stop themselves. As with the Israelis in Gaza, periodic airstrikes may well be required to pre-empt brewing plots before they mature. Were U.S. resources unlimited and U.S. interests in Afghanistan more important, upping the ante with additional combat forces might make sense. But U.S. power--especially military power--is quite limited these days, and U.S. priorities lie elsewhere. Rather than committing more troops, therefore, the new president should withdraw them while devising a more realistic--and more affordable--strategy for Afghanistan. U.S. withdrawal facilitates the beginning of a reconiliation with the Taliban Pakistan Patriot 7/18/10 ("Pakistan prepares for US withdrawal from Afghanistan", Categorized Pakistan, http://www.pakistanpatriot.com/?p=905, 2010, DA 7-19-10) This time around when Washington loses interest in Afghanistan, the Pakistanis are ready for the consequences. The last time around, Bharat (aka India) was able to forge an alliance with Iran and Russia and attempted to thwart the liberation of Afghanistan. This time around, Pakistan has already taken the Iranians in confidence and have a tactic understanding with Russia. This time around, the Chinese have a huge stake in a stable Afghanistan. Pakistan has been working with China on the future shape of Central Asia and peace in Pakistan. The current Afghan conflict will not be a repeat of history. There will be some kind of power sharing with at least some segments of the antioccupation insurgents. That process has already begun with the Karzai government pursuing reconciliation with some Afghan Taliban elements. But the Taliban has already been setting up local administration in areas where the central government has no power and where there is no significant challenge from international forces. Larry Goodson says today's Taliban has a more long-term outlook than the first-generation Taliban that ruled Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001. "Think back to the early Taliban," he said. "They were the worst governors in the world. They couldn't do anything. They didn't want to do anything. They didn't care. you've got guys out there trying to actually fill a gap that has been there because of the bad performance of the Karzai government." VOA In a telling story in the Times of India, a former US Ambassador is reciting Now all of a sudden the stories he was told by his masters in Delhi. NEW DELHI: Should Afghanistan be divided into two? Former US envoy to India, Robert Blackwill, has suggested that the US should effect a de facto partition of Afghanistan . The current counter-insurgency is not working, he says, because the Taliban don't see why they should negotiate peace when they haven't been defeated on the ground. The US, he suggests, will have to reconcile to the fact that the Taliban will control southern Afghanistan. They should be allowed to do so. 26 Afghanistan 1AC This reconiliation process facilitates the moderation of Taliban factions, giving them a role as stakeholders in the Afghani political process Cordesman, CSIS strategic analyst in the area of Afghanistan, 6/16/10 p. http://csis.org/publication/realism-afghanistan-rethinking-uncertain-case-war DA 7/15/10 The war is not going to be won by treating the power structure of Afghanistan as if it did not exist or as if it could be radically changed in the course of the next few years. The central government is not going to be empowered at the expense of key regional, geographic, ethnic, and sectarian divisions; or suddenly eliminate the role of tribalism and key families. Efforts to reshape governance to create a modern Western structure of "effective governance" that somehow transform all of Afghanistan are simply not going to work. The challenge is to co-opt the power structure, and control its worst elements and behavior, in ways that the Afghan people can accept as a better option than the Taliban. As one experienced aid worker put it, "it is to find their worst grievances, deal with them, and create conditions where they can move forward if they choose to do so." This means setting far less ambitious goals for reform and government capacity. It means accepting a major role for existing power brokers, if for no other reason than that there is no credible alternative. The issue is not Western concepts of governance, but what will make GIRoA "good enough" by Afghan popular standards Withdrawal guarantees regional security--presence is destabilizing Innocent 09 [Malou, foreign policy analyst at the CATO Institute who focuses on Afghanistan and Pakistan, U.S. Presence in Afghanistan Feeds Pakistan's Insurgency, CATO@Liberty, 6/10/09 DA 7/15/10] Yesterday's attack on Peshawar's Pearl Continental Hotel was the latest signal of Pakistan's growing Islamist insurgency. Since the raid by the Pakistani government on the Red Mosque (Lal Masjid) in Islamabad in July 2007, a wave of revenge attacks against the army and the government has been launched by loose networks of suicide bombers. It's possible, depending on the culprit, that the recent attack in Peshawar might have been retribution for the Pakistan army's month-long offensive against extremists in the country's northwest districts. While the United States hopes to eliminate the threat from extremists in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the knock-on effects from U.S.-NATO efforts to stabilize Afghanistan destabilize Pakistan. America's presence in the region feeds Pakistan's insurgency. If America's interests lie in stabilizing Pakistan, and ensuring that the virus of anti-American radicalism does not infect the rest of the country, the fundamental objective should be to get out of Afghanistan in a reasonable time frame. 27 ***Losing Now/COIN Fails/Can't Win*** 28 Losing Now US losing in Afghanistan now--multiple issues Cohn, professor at Thomas Jefferson School of Law, 2010 (Marjorie, "Losing in Afghanistan" http://www.commondreams.org/view/2010/07/07 DA 7/1/10) There are other "depressing" aspects of this war as well. As Gen. Stanley McChrystal reported just days before he got the axe, there is a "resilient and growing insurgency" with high levels of violence and corruption within the Karzai government. McChrystal's remarks were considered "off message" by the White House, which was also irked by the general's criticisms of Obama officials in a Rolling Stone article. McChrystal believes that you can't kill your way out of Afghanistan. "The Russians killed 1 million Afghans and that didn't work." He and his successor, Gen. David Petraeus, likely disagree on the need to prevent civilian casualties (known as "Civ Cas"). McChrystal instituted some of the most stringent rules of engagement the U.S. military has had in a war zone: "Patrol only in areas that you are reasonably certain that you will not have to defend yourselves with lethal force." Commanders cannot fire on buildings or other places if they have reason to believe civilians might be present unless their own forces are in imminent danger of being overrun. And they must end engagements and withdraw rather than risk harming noncombatants. McChrystal knows that for every innocent person you kill, you create new enemies; he calls it "insurgent math." According to the Los Angeles Times, McChrystal "was credited with bringing about a substantial drop in the proportion of civilian casualties suffered at the hands of NATO's International Security Assistance Force and its Afghan allies." While testifying in Congress before he was confirmed to take McChrystal's place, Petraeus told senators that some U.S. soldiers had complained about the former's rules of engagement aimed at preventing civilian casualties. According to the Rolling Stone article, Obama capitulated to McChrystal's insistence that more troops were needed in Afghanistan. In his December 1 speech at West Point, the article says, "the president laid out all the reasons why fighting the war in Afghanistan is a bad idea: It's expensive; we're in an economic crisis; a decade-long commitment would sap American power; Al Qaeda has shifted its base of operations to Pakistan. Then," the article continued, "without ever using the words `victory' or `win,' Obama announced that he would send an additional 30,000 troops to Afghanistan, almost as many as McChrystal had requested." Both Obama and Petraeus no longer speak of "victory" over the Taliban; they both hold open the possibility of settlement with the Taliban. Indeed, Maj. Gen. Bill Mayville, chief of operations for McChrystal, told Rolling Stone, "It's not going to look like a win, smell like a win or taste like a win." The majority of Americans now oppose the war in Afghanistan. Fareed Zakaria had some harsh words for the war on his CNN show, saying that "the whole enterprise in Afghanistan feels disproportionate, a very expensive solution to what is turning out to be a small but real problem." Noting that CIA director Leon Panetta admitted that the number of Al Qaeda left in Afghanistan may be 50 to 100, Zakaria asked, "why are we fighting a major war" there? "Last month alone there were more than 100 NATO troops killed in Afghanistan," he said. "That's more than one allied death for each living Al Qaeda member in the country in just one month." Citing estimates that the war will cost more than $100 billion in 2010 alone, Zakaria observed, "That's a billion dollars for every member of Al Qaeda thought to be living in Afghanistan in one year." He queried, "Why are we investing so much time, energy, and effort when Al Qaeda is so weak?" And Zakaria responded to the argument that we should continue fighting the Taliban because they are allied with Al Qaeda by saying, "this would be like fighting Italy in World War II after Hitler's regime had collapsed and Berlin was in flames just because Italy had been allied with Germany." There is also division in the Republican ranks over the war. Republican National Committee chairman Michael Steele made some gutsy comments about the war in Afghanistan, saying it is not winnable and calling it a "war of Obama's choosing." (Even though George W. Bush first invaded Afghanistan, Obama made the escalation of U.S. involvement a centerpiece of his campaign.) Steele said that if Obama is "such a student of history, has he not understood that, you know, that's the one thing you don't do, is engage in a land war in Afghanistan? Everyone who has tried, over 1,000 years of history, has failed." Interestingly, Republicans Lindsey Graham and John McCain slammed Steele and jumped to Obama's defense. Rep. Ron Paul, however, agreed with Steele, saying, "Michael Steele has it right, and Republicans should stick by him." Obama will likely persist with his failed war. He appears to be stumbling along the same path that Lyndon Johnson followed. Johnson lost his vision for a "Great Society" when he became convinced that his legacy depended on winning the Vietnam War. It appears that Obama has similarly lost his way. 29 Losing Now Counter-insurgency strategy continues to fail--Kandahar Klein, Time columnist and author, 5/17/10 (Joe, "Losing in Afghanistan" http://swampland.blogs.time.com/2010/05/17/losing-in-afghanistan/ DA 7/1/10) The adage is: if you're not winning against a guerrilla insurgency, you're losing. We're not winning in Afghanistan. And our performance in Marja isn't helping any. Indeed, it hurts in several ways detailed in this excellent NY Times piece: But the insurgents' extensive intelligence network in Marja has remained intact, and they have been able to maintain a hold over the population through what residents have described as threats and assassinations. In April members of the Taliban visited one old man late at night and made him eat his aid registration papers, several residents said, a Mafia-style warning to others not to take government aid. At the beginning of May, a well-liked man named Sharifullah was beaten to death, accused of supporting the district chief and not paying taxes to the Taliban. His killing froze the community and villagers stopped going to the district administration. The fact is, no credible "government in a box" showed up in Marja when the U.S. Marines and some Afghan elements took it in February. The fact is, there is no credible long-term alternative to the Taliban. These results have two disastrous impacts on the impending battle--or something, whatever you want to call it--in Kandahar Province. It does not inspire confidence in the Afghan government's ability to govern the area after NATO troops seize it, especially since Kandahar is the Taliban heartland. And, as I've reported before, the fact that the best Afghan troops and police are playing whack-a-mole in Helmand Province removes a necessary component in any attempt to secure Kandahar. I must admit, again, I'm mystified about where this effort goes from here. Nothing I've heard from the U.S. military or other elements of our government leads me to believe we're on the right track here. Indeed, it raises serious questions about the use of counterinsurgency tactics in a situation where there is no credible partner--and especially in a situation (unlike Iraq) where the insurgents are neighbors, not foreigners. Taliban continues to use coercive tactics to assert its relevance New York Times, 5/16/10 p. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/17/world/asia/17marja.html?_r=1&hp DA 7/2/10 Combat operations in Marja ended at the end of February and the military declared the battle won. But much of the local Taliban, including at least four mid-level commanders, never left, stashing their rifles and adopting the quiet farm life. A Taliban resurgence was not entirely unexpected, especially now as the poppy harvest ends, freeing men to fight, and as the weather warms up. But the military had seen Marja as a "clear and hold" operation in which the first part, clearing the district of militants, would be wrapped up fairly quickly. In fact, clearing has proved to be a more elusive goal. By April, life had picked up. People began coming forward to receive government handouts and farmers were happily taking money in return for destroying their poppy crops, whose opium provides a main source of Taliban financing. As villagers saw their neighbors benefiting, more were encouraged to approach the district administration as well, despite Taliban threats. The change was even more pronounced in the adjacent Nad-e-ali district, where the Taliban have been weakened and security improved thanks largely to the operation in Marja. But the insurgents' extensive intelligence network in Marja has remained intact, and they have been able to maintain a hold over the population through what residents have described as threats and assassinations. In April members of the Taliban visited one old man late at night and made him eat his aid registration papers, several residents said, a Mafia-style warning to others not to take government aid. At the beginning of May, a well-liked man named Sharifullah was beaten to death, accused of supporting the district chief and not paying taxes to the Taliban. His killing froze the community and villagers stopped going to the district administration. "The Taliban are everywhere, they are like scorpions under every stone, and they are stinging all those who get assistance or help the government and the Americans," Mr. Rahman, the farmer, said. 30 Losing Now Counterinsrugency operation failing--external support for militants and structural factors Babbin, former undersecretary of defense under Bush Sr., 5/4/10 (Jed, "Are We Losing in Afghanistan?" http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2010/05/04/are_we_losing_in_afghanistan_105426.html, DA 7/3/10) Are we losing Afghanistan to the resurgent Taliban? The facts and figures set out in the 152-page report the Pentagon sent Congress last week compel the conclusion that we are. The new report says that the Taliban regards 2009 as their most successful year. It says that violence in Afghanistan is at a level roughly double compared to the same period last year. And it concedes that all the counterinsurgency has accomplished so far has been to create "some islands of security...in a sea of instability and insecurity." In that roiling sea, the Taliban often retaliate against whole families or villages for cooperating with US forces. Last year, conservatives criticized Obama for spending months deliberating a new strategy for Afghanistan. As a result of the president ordering a strategic review of Afghanistan (the second of 2009), Gen. Stanley McChrystal submitted his report to the president on August 30 asking for at least 40,000 more troops. Obama delayed a decision until December 1 when he announced he would send an additional 30,000 troops ("McChrystal lite") and impose a deadline of July 2011 for US forces to begin to withdraw. In the end, however, Obama's three month delay is irrelevant because the deadline - even if it were extended by an equal period - cannot be met. McChrystal's August report to Obama stated that, "Failure to gain the initiative and reverse insurgent momentum in the near term (next 12 months) -- while Afghan security capacity matures -- risks an outcome where defeating the insurgency is no longer possible." Both Petraeus and McChrystal were unusually public in lobbying the president for the resources they sought. In October Petraeus said that our goals in Afghanistan would have to be changed -- meaning adjusted downward - if the president rejected the strategy revisions and increased resources he and McChrystal said were needed. The Obama-Petraeus-McChrystal counterinsurgency strategy - "COIN" in Pentagonese - is supposed to be based on the bible of counterinsurgency warfare, the late David Galula's "Counterinsurgency Warfare, Theory and Practice." Comparing Galula's bible and McChrystal's August 2009 report to the new Pentagon report reveals some alarming conclusions. COIN - as Galula wrote - aims to counter the insurgent's offer of a competing political system which it may impose by force or by protecting the populace from an unpopular government, providing better security and services than the government can. In Afghanistan, where the populace is a cacophony of tribal cultures and Kabul is unable to provide basic services (courts, security, economic pipelines) there is little reason for tribes and villages to adhere to any central government. The Taliban tax the opium crops, offer Islamic courts and local government services and - where villagers resist - impose them by terror. The new report cites eighty "Key Terrain" districts - population and economic activity centers, essential infrastructure locations and commerce routes - as well as lesser but still important forty-one additional "Area of Interest" districts. The report says that the ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) only has sufficient resources to operate the counterinsurgency in only forty-five of the eighty "Key Terrain" areas and three Areas of Interest. That the ISAF force is unable to provide security in so many Key Terrain areas and Areas of Interest is a principal reason for the April report's finding that the "population sympathizes with or supports the Afghan government in [only] 24%" of those areas. The aim of counterinsurgency, according to Galula, is "...to cut off, or at least reduce significantly, the contacts between the populace and the guerillas...This process of getting acquainted with the population may be speeded up if the occupied villages are divided into sections and each is assigned to a group of soldiers who will always work there." (emphasis added.)The Afghans know we are leaving next year and that our soldiers won't always be there to protect them. We are nine months into the year that Gen. McChrystal said would be determinative of our ability to defeat the Taliban. And, in fourteen months, President Obama's timeline requires us to begin a withdrawal. With government support among the populace in only 24% of the important areas of Afghanistan it is impossible for us to even raise that to 50% before August 2010 or, for that matter, by July 2011. And who is to say if 50% or 75% (or even 100%) would be enough given the critical support the Taliban receive from Iran and other Islamic states? Galula cites five types of outside support an insurgency can benefit from: moral (the "inevitability of Islam"), political (preventing by diplomacy support for the government), technical (military training), financial, and direct military support. The Taliban, according to the Pentagon report, receive funding from several Islamic states. Iran, the report says, provides "lethal assistance" to elements of the Taliban and predicts Iranian interference will continue for "the foreseeable future." 31 Losing Now 8 reasons why our presence in Afghanistan is unsustainable Ullman, enior adviser at Washington's Atlantic Council, 6/30/10 (Harian, "9 Reasons the U.S. is Losing in Afghanistan" http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/9-reasons-uslosing-afghanistan DA 7/3/10) First, the so-called AfPak strategy is backward. It should be called PakAf as Pakistan is the strategic center of gravity, not Afghanistan. Yet, virtually all of our energy and resources are going into Afghanistan. Second, the aim of the original strategy was to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qaida and prevent its return. Yet, there are perhaps only a handful of al-Qaida militants in Afghanistan. The rest have relocated to Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia and other ports of call. Third, the strategy was based on bringing a Western style of centralized government to Afghanistan. Yet that country and culture had always been and was likely always to be decentralized in its political structure. Fourth, as the Taliban became the surrogates for al-Qaida, the strategy focused on them. Yet, the crux of the problem is dealing with the Pashtuns and enfranchising them into the body politic. Fifth, while military forces can counter the Taliban, they cannot bring the necessary governance and governing process. Yet, we have failed to provide the civilian side of this equation and "government in a box" is a dangerous hoax. Sixth, success rests on a competent and legitimate government in Kabul. Yet, the Karzai government has failed to meet either criterion. Seventh, success is based on recruiting, training and maintaining effective and sufficient Afghan security forces. While the jury is still out, progress has been slow and episodic. Yet we haven't determined who will ultimately be responsible for paying these troops as, despite recent reports of finding a $1 trillion Afghan mineral reserve, that government will not have the billions to meet those bills. Eighth, despite our understanding of the need to appreciate local culture, that is a work in progress. Unfortunately, reports that many of our translators aren't fluent in Pashto or even Dari suggest that the difficulty of communicating a Western message to an Afghan audience has been increased many fold. Indeed, operations are often named in Dari even when they take place in Pashtun areas reinforcing this cultural unawareness. Finally, the strategy assumes a largely bilateral approach. Yet, only a regional solution that engages Afghanistan's neighbors is likely to produce a lasting effect. McChrystal sacking imperils the war effort Christian Science Monitor June. 23 2010 p. http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-SouthCentral/2010/0623/McChrystal-Rolling-Stone-remarks-spotlight-Afghanistan-withdrawal-timeline DA 7/12/10 Today, the fallout from comments made to Rolling Stone magazine could make him the gone-away general and, some say, jeopardize a counterinsurgency strategy he helped craft. McChrystal flew back to Washington overnight for an emergency meeting with President Obama, who yesterday spoke of the general's "poor judgment." Critics of the general argue that McChrystal is trying to box in Obama and challenge civilian supremacy over the US military. But others say his departure at a highly sensitive juncture could deal a severe blow to the war effort. "McChrystal has been one of the most successful NATO commanders in the country in the past nine years and now he's put in a strategy that is just being implemented," says Waliullah Rahmani at the Kabul Center for Strategic Studies. "If there are any changes in the command, I think it will tend to affect and slow the strategy. It would be very, very negative." 32 Losing Now Marjah offensive proves--its an "ulcer" Christian Science Monitor June. 23 2010 p. http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-SouthCentral/2010/0623/McChrystal-Rolling-Stone-remarks-spotlight-Afghanistan-withdrawal-timeline DA 7/12/10 A much-vaunted offensive around the southern town of Marjah last month, which was billed as the first major test of a counterinsurgency strategy that involves clearing out insurgents from an area and then quickly building a functional government to deliver services to local residents, has not delivered. Ahead of the operation, McChrystal predicted success and said he had a "government in a box" ready to be put in place. More recently, he said the area is like a "bleeding ulcer." An offensive originally scheduled for this month in Kandahar, the city where the Taliban first came to prominence, is currently delayed. 33 Losing Now No real ramifications for US involvement in Afghanistan military presence only hurts the US 5 reasons Innocent 6-23-2010 [Malou, Foreign Policy Analyst at the Cato Institute, member of the International Institute of Strategic Studies, appeared as a guest analyst on CNN, BBC News, Fox News Channel, Al Jazeera, Voice of America, CNBC Asia, and Reuters, Innocent has published reviews and articles on national security and international affairs in journals such as Survival, Congressional Quarterly, and Harvard International Review, dual Bachelor of Arts degrees in Mass Communications and Political Science from the University of California at Berkeley, and a Master of Arts degree in International Relations from the University of Chicago, "Away from McChrystal and Back to the Basics", Cato Institute, http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=11934 DA: 7-16-2010] Basic #1) Afghanistan does not constitute a vital interest to the United States. Don't believe the hype about Afghanistan being critical to America's security. Al Qaeda poses a manageable security problem, not an existential threat. And whatever economic value the region holds, Stephen Walt, citing Jack Synder's Myths of Empire, does a great job disputing the contention that Afghanistan is a strategic asset because it is brimming with natural resources. Basic #2) We Don't Need to Remain in Afghanistan to Protect Pakistan. It is commonly held by the foreign policy elites that if Washington abandoned Afghanistan to its fate, emboldened jihadist groups could spill into neighboring Pakistan, fatally weaken its government, and seize its nuclear weapons. This thinking is misguided. Malou Innocent is a foreign policy analyst at the Cato Institute, a libertarian think tank in Washington, D.C. She recently returned from a fact-finding trip to Afghanistan. Pakistan has an elaborate command and control system in place that complies with strict Western standards, and the country's warheads, detonators, and missiles are not stored fullyassembled, but are scattered and physically separated throughout the country. In short, the danger of militants seizing Pakistan's nuclear weapons in some Rambo-like scenario remains highly unlikely. Moreover, if America's interests lie in ensuring the virus of anti-American radicalism does not infect the rest of the region, discontinuing policies that add more fuel to violent religious radicalism should be the first order of business. The dominant political force within Pakistan is not radical fundamentalist Islam, but rather a desire for a sound economy and basic security. But the foreign troop presence risks uniting otherwise disparate militant groups from both sides of the border against a hostile occupation of the region. Basic #3) America and its international partners do not have to create a viable state in Afghanistan. Western officials often say our strategy is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda. But in order to accomplish that goal, they insist we must create a functioning national state there. Why? Beltway orthodoxy tells us that because extremists emerge from failed states, America must forcibly stabilize, liberalize, and democratize Afghanistan. This thinking is flawed for several reasons. First, this widely-accepted policy prescription falsely conflates the goal of a successful territorial pacification of Afghanistan with the conceptually simpler task of monitoring and punishing al Qaeda. The blueprint for an effective counterterrorism approach is the initial U.S.-led invasion in 2001, when small Special Forces teams, working in conjunction with local militias, assembled quickly and struck effectively and cheaply at its enemies. Second, as my Cato colleagues Chris Preble and Justin Logan point out, there's reason to doubt whether state failure or poor governance in itself poses a threat. Terrorists can move to governed spaces; rather than setting up in weak, ungoverned states, enemies can flourish in states that have formally recognized governments with the sovereignty to reject foreign interference. Basic #4) A costly, open-ended military occupation gives Osama bin Laden and his ilk exactly what they want. America's all-volunteer military force is fighting a protracted irregular war in the fifth poorest country in the world. We are inadvertently killing innocent civilians with little assurance that we can capture and kill more insurgents than our presence helps to recruit. Additionally, where is the moral outrage that we are trying to strengthen and expand a government widely despised by its own population? Given the flagrant graft and corruption of many Afghan leaders, begging and pleading our Afghan puppet/political piata Hamid Karzai to "govern better" and "tamp down corruption" is a Sisyphean task. Basic #5) A protracted guerrilla war will weaken the United States militarily and economically. As of only several months ago, the costs of staying in Afghanistan are jarring. The Pentagon is requesting an extra $33 billion to escalate combat operations, on top of the $65 billion already authorized for FY 2010. The Pentagon found that each additional 1,000 U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan would cost about $1 billion a year. In the end, the tabloid drama between the White House and McChrystal should give way to some sober assessments about whether this mission is winnable, and whether it is even worth winning. We will have learned nothing from this clumsy and embarrassing episode if we do not step back and reevaluate what the war in Afghanistan hopes to achieve -- and for whose benefit it is being waged. 34 Losing Now Losing now--multiple reasons--ally fatigue, artificial timeline, violence, Karzai's credibility, foreign aid is unrealistic, and Obama's footdragging Cordesman, CSIS strategic analyst in the area of Afghanistan, 6/16/10 p. http://csis.org/publication/realism-afghanistan-rethinking-uncertain-case-war DA 7/15/10 The current situation is the product of more than eight years of chronic under-resourcing, under-reaction, spin, self-delusion and neglect. It is the result of one of the worst examples of wartime leadership in American history. There is no magic route out of this situation, and the timing of an effective campaign has been complicated by a wide range of factors: * Karzai, who appeared to have already rigged the election in the summer of 2009, did not rely on power brokering to give him a majority. The controversy following the election consumed 4-6 months, divided Karzai from the US, has led to the resignation of key officials, and left GIRoA with far more uncertain legitimacy while sharply undermining US influence. This has affected every aspect of GIRoA and ANSF support for the war. * President Obama's review consumed 4 months of critical time in a 12-18 month campaign plan. The plans for the civilian surge were never credible and led to inevitable delays. Military movements had their own delays, and key elements of operational plans were too conceptual from the start and assumed far more rapid and easy progress in the hold and build phases than proved possible in test areas like Marja. * President Obama attempted to qualify the deadline he set in his speech for the beginning of US withdrawal in August 2011, but this message has failed to get across in spite of repeated efforts by senior US commanders and officials. Many Afghan officials and officers, and allied officers and diplomats, are at best confused and at worst privately believe that we will leave. Any visitor to Afghanistan also sees efforts at every level to rush operations in time to meet November 2010 and July 2011 reporting deadlines. The end result is that a vague de facto deadline exists. This deadline inevitably affects goals and expectations that have long been set at unrealistically high levels for both civil and military operations. The end result is often that operations and actions that have a far better chance of succeeding over six months to a year longer are being rushed in ways that sharply increase the risk of failure. Moreover, far too little tangible planning is being carried out for the period beyond August 2011, with a sharp decoupling of civil and military plans that separate the military campaign and transition to increasing ANSF responsibility from aid plans that often are far too conceptual and stovepiped and that effectively mark a premature return to "post-conflict reconstruction." * Allied war fatigue compounds the problem. Canadian and Netherlands' withdrawal in 2011, and recent Polish calls for withdrawal, are symbols of the fact that the legislatures and population of many ISAF countries no longer believe in this war. Some of this is unavoidable, given the length and cost of the conflict and the fact that the US obtained much of its present allied support by describing the mission as peacekeeping and post conflict reconstruction, and failed to show effective leadership between 2002 and 2008. * Much perhaps a majority of the foreign aid effort is still directed towards programs and goals that were set before the insurgency cast Afghanistan into a state of war. This effort remains decoupled from the real world security situation and the needs and perceptions of ordinary Afghans. Far too much aid planning and spending exists in a "bubble" that effectively tries to ignore the fact that the nation is at war. It is time that the entire civil effort, and all foreign aid, dealt with the reality that Afghanistan is at war and that aid in governance, economics, and the rule of law must be tailored to this fact, and be transparently accountable in the process. * Goals have been set for the development of the Afghan National Security Forces that emphasis force quantity over force quality. These goals may well rush a force into the field that is used up in the process, therefore denying a basis for transition from US and allied forces. The end result may well also delay operations and transition by using up key elements of the army and paramilitary ANCOP police force, or risk serious reversals if ISAF tries to rely on the force. The Army is effectively being pushed towards its present short-term force goal two years early, and the ANCOP force is still under so much stress that it has 80% attrition. Moreover, ISAF had only deployed 23% of the required trainers as of early May 2010. Giving NTM-A and the partnering effort even an additional year, and time to put more emphasis on quality and transition over quantity and immediate employment, could make the difference between strategic success and strategic failure. ISAF has shown considerable realism in adjusting its campaign plans to these facts, but they could still cost the US and its allies the war if a major shift does not take place from the present climate of "over-promise and under-perform" to an acceptance that deadlines do more to undercut support than to motivate, that plans must reflect real world time scales and realistic expectations and goals, and that credibility and leadership depend on "under-promising and over-performing." 35 Losing Now War is unwinnable and the spectre of defeat will overstretch and ruin the U.S. military Dorronsoro, Carnegie Endowment for Peace analyst, 5/11/10 p. http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=40779 DA 7/15/10 Current U.S. strategy in Afghanistan has not been successful and the security and political situations across the country continue to deteriorate. The coalition has failed to defeat the Taliban and there simply aren't examples of improvement on the ground. The situation is bad everywhere. Counterinsurgency in practice is different than how it was sold in Washington. The only place that counterinsurgency has been tried is in Marjah and the result has not been good, despite some early favorable press reports. There is no similar operation planned in the future. The upcoming offensive in Kandahar will not be counterinsurgency, because there is no way to clear a city of nearly one million people. Furthermore, military operations in Marjah and Kandahar are unlikely to alter the course or outcome of the war. The coalition could soon be overstretched with heavy fighting in the North and the ongoing Taliban surge in the East. The goal of "Afghanization" is unrealistic at this stage. The Afghan army will not be ready to take over the lead in fighting anytime soon and Afghanistan's unpopular government and weak institutions make transferring responsibility to the government impossible for the foreseeable future. With these grim realities, the coalition faces the risk of an endless engagement--with an unsustainable cost and intolerable loss of life-- that cannot be won militarily. The perception in Afghanistan is that the Taliban will be successful and the coalition will eventually withdraw. And without an ability to change the balance of power, the United States will need to negotiate an exit. Increased fighting erodes civilian support for the U.S. troops Dorronsoro, Carnegie Endowment for Peace analyst, 5/11/10 p. http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=40779 DA 7/15/10 Also, thousands of coalition troops will not make major gains in a city of almost one million inhabitants. Small tactical successes are within reach, and undoubtedly will be highlighted in U.S. media, but this will not shift support to the Afghan government. Coalition forces are not welcome in Pashtun areas and the heavy fighting will undoubtedly increase tensions and casualties on all sides, further eroding the coalition's political capital. 36 Losing Now Afghanistan is a "graveyard of empires." Our COIN strategy is failing and it is crushing our resolve Virginia Quarterly Review '10 ["Graveyard of Empires" University of Virginia, Spring 2010, ProQuest, DA 7/19/2010] Everything seemed to be going exactly to plan. For the first week after Operation Moshtarak was launched under cover of darkness on February 13, NATO and Afghan troops lived up to the offensive's lofty name - a Dari word meaning "together" selected to reinforce the operation s joint effort. The Afghan National Army made up some 60 percent of the thousands of troops advancing on the dusty redoubt of Marja, an agricultural town latticed with canals and ditches irrigating the poppy fields that made it a crossroads for heroin traffickers and pro-Taliban forces in the Helmand Province. Locals, as asked, voluntarily stayed in their homes to avoid IEDs emplaced by insurgents and shared intelligence with international commanders. Even Pakistan's Directorate for InterServices Intelligence (ISI) got in the act, arresting two "shadow governors" of Afghanistan's northern provinces and raiding a house in Karachi where Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the Taliban's military commander, was captured. Coming nearly nine months after General Stanley McChrystal was appointed by President Barack Obama to be commander of forces in Afghanistan, the coordinated action in the southern provinces and across the border in Pakistan appeared to be an astounding exoneration of the general's new counterinsurgency plan. And not a moment too soon. After eight long years of military stalemate and political neglect, US troops were scoring measurable victories, and the fresh focus on winning the confidence of ordinary Afghans appeared to be paying major dividends. For the first time since the shedding of burqas and shaving of beards in the exultant early days of the invasion, the Afghan people seemed to be rallying around NATO forces. Then, on February 21, troops sweeping for insurgents on the run from Mar ja intercepted Taliban radio chatter near the main road in Oruzgan Province. Little Bird helicopters, flown by elite US Special Forces, were called in. Pilots discovered a tight-knit convoy of two Land Cruisers and a pickup, all overloaded and riding low, lurching up the Khotal Chowzar mountain pass toward Daykondi Province. They concluded that the vehicles were heavy-laden with arms and insurgents. They opened fire, destroying the convoy. But when ground troops moved in to collect Taliban casualties, they instead found twenty-seven dead civilians - including at least four women and a child - and fourteen more wounded. These were ordinary Afghans, it turned out, fleeing the renewed violence. President Hamid Karzai swiftly denounced the attack as "unjustifiable" and called it "a major obstacle for an effective counterterrorism effort." The bitter irony: General McChrystal was nominated to be the top US and NATO commander in Afghanistan after a similar tragic bombing on May 4, 2009, killed more than 147 civilians, mostly women and children, in the village of Granai in the Bala Baluk District of Farah Province. Fed up with the rising civilian death toll of General David McKiernan's heavyhanded approach and fearing the political fallout it wrought within Afghanistan, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates ousted McKiernan, in hopes that McChrystal would install a smarter, nimbler strategy that favored "brainpower over firepower." The five stories that compose the portfolio for this issue trace the progress ofthat shift in strategy and its implementation, month by month: Jason Motlagh's summer-long investigation of the Granai bombing; J. Malcolm Garcia's account of the run-up to the chaotic reelection of President Karzai in August; Louie Palu's startling photographs of the rising violence in southern Afghanistan at the height of the fighting season; Elliott D. Woods's shattering description of how slow improvement under McChrystal's villagelevel diplomacy during the fall months could be undone by a single act of needless brute force; and Neil Shea's detailing of the anticipation and cabin fever of the long winter months, known as the talking season, and the outsize challenge US-led forces face in Afghanistan. Taken together, these stories reveal an irreconcilable tension between the urgency created by President Obama's establishment of a timeline for withdrawal from Afghanistan and the attempt to achieve that goal by the patient winning of its citizens' trust. In Mar ja, where military objectives were achieved rapidly, the long-term challenge of establishing order is off to a rocky start. Haji Zahir, the new government-appointed mayor, has only recently returned from a fifteen-year exile in Germany, and Rajiv Chandrasekaran, writing for the Washington Post, reported that tribal elders at their first meeting with Zahir were understandably skeptical that he could grasp - much less remedy - their problems. Afterward, John Kael Weston, a State Department official in attendance, grimly observed, "If the government doesn't deliver in two years, these gentlemen right here are going to be cheerleaders for the Taliban." That's a lot of pressure, under any circumstances, for a military trained for tactical operations and rescue-relief, not local politics and nation-building. But in Afghanistan, where the line between combat engagement and civilian aid is often blurred and where choices must be made at a moment's notice, countless lives are on the line. Still, it's not an impossible task. The tremendous show of rapid relief expertise in Haiti (as documented by Chris Hondros in this issue) and the ongoing friendly presence in Muslim Kosovo (as documented by Dimiter Kenarov) demonstrate that such American military missions are not fated to fail. The question is not whether our military can outmuscle a ragtag insurgency; it is more a matter of wills. The Taliban suspect that the American public will lose its stomach for this war. And they may be right. As we watch our troops struggle against years of pent up animosity toward US-led forces - and a generations -long commitment to opposing all invaders - it's easy to see how Afghanistan has earned its reputation as a "graveyard of empires." Obama succinctly summarized the situation in his December speech before the cadets at West Point. "Afghanistan is not lost, but for several years it has moved backwards," he said, before making a litany of recent woes. "Our new commander in Afghanistan - General McChrystal - has reported that the security situation is more serious than he anticipated. In short: the status quo is not sustainable." The president can hardly be challenged on this point, but whether his renewed resolve to improve the status quo will succeed or fail remains to be seen. What is clear: the war is now McChrystal's war, and Afghanistan - win or lose - is now Obama's. 37 Losing Now Victory in "The Graveyard of Empires" is a lost cause. The departure of Gen. McChrystal is symptomatic of defeat and the failure of the COIN strategy. Nizami '10 [Arif, former editor of The Nation, "Pakistan Army chief can make history by brokering Afghan peace deal" BBC Monitoring South Asia, 7/4/2010, lexis, DA 7/19/2010] Afghanistan, "the graveyard of empires" where no foreign invader since Genghis Khan has been able to get a foothold, is a lost cause for the West. The unceremonious exit of the top US commander in Afghanistan, Gen Stanley McChrystal over his acerbic and unflattering remarks in a magazine interview about President Obama, Vice President Biden and key members of his Afghanistan team, is symptomatic of this failure. The only debatable point left is not if, but when, the US and NATO troops will leave Afghanistan. Officially, the drawdown starts in July 2011, before Oabma's re-election for a second term. But Gen David H Petraeus who replaced McChrystal, in his confirmation hearings in the US Senate, claimed that the start of withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan was the "beginning of the process" and the US commitment to the country was an "enduring one." Thus, despite immense US domestic pressure to exit, the war that has become the longest war the US has fought on foreign soil could last still longer. The endgame does not seem to be very rosy for the US and its allies. They have already lost more than 1,000 troops in combat. However, the goal to win the hearts and minds of Afghans has eluded the foreign forces. In fact, there is increasing skepticism even in the US about the COIN (counterinsurgency) strategy much touted by its author Gen Petreaus and by his disgraced predecessor Gen McChrystal. Afghanistan is an unwinnable war. We must change our strategy in the so called "graveyard of empires" Hall, 2010 [Anthony L., London School of Economics, ""Obama: Why the 'obsession' over Afghanistan deadline?" McClatchy-Tribune Business News, 7/2/2010, ProQuest, DA 7/19/10] "The US legacy there will be distinguished either by a terminally wounded national pride as American forces beat a hasty retreat in defeat (following the Russian precedent in Afghanistan), or by tens of thousands of American soldiers being lost in Afghanistan's "graveyard of empires" as they continue fighting this unwinnable war (following America's own precedent in Vietnam) ... more troops only mean more sitting ducks for Taliban fighters." ('Without (or even with) more forces, failure in Afghanistan is likely', The iPINIONS Journal, September 23, 2009) Meantime, June 2010 has now become the deadliest month for coalition troops (with 102 killed) and this war, which was launched in October 2001, has now become the longest in U.S. history. Which begs the question: How much longer and how many more dead before the American people launch Vietnam-like protests to force Obama to end it? "Every eligible American should serve; not just the poor, dumb suckers who join the Army when they grow tired of flipping burgers. And with today's technology and access to information, people like VP Dick Cheney (who has been quoted as saying that he did not serve in Vietnam because "I had other priorities in the 60s than military service") and former President Bill Clinton (who did the same by feigning conscientious objection) won't be able to dodge the Draft quite so blithely. "So, forget the pissing contest in Congress over withdrawal plans and tell your Congressman to support the Draft to end these stupid wars in Iraq and Afghanistan!" 38 Losing Now--Allies Allies reluctant to provide enough troops Reuters 3/29/10 p. http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/LDE62S15U.htm DA 7/15/10 In addition to cleaning up Afghan governance, Obama's strategy hinges on building up the country's army and police forces to take over security responsibility, a process that has been hamstrung by a shortage of international trainers. The United States has struggled to convince its NATO allies in Afghanistan to fill the shortfall, and Mullen said one option might be to send more U.S. trainers to fill the gap. "We've asked and pushed our other partners to provide as many as possible. That continues ... We've come up short a few hundred," Mullen said. 39 COIN Fails COIN bad since it is expensive, no legitimate Afghan authority exists, the Afghan population is too dispersed, and COIN is too Afghan-centric and not Pakistancentric enough. Brooks 09. (David, Columnist for The New York Times, commentator on PBS NewsHour, editorial writer the Washington Times, reporter and op-ed editor for The Wall Street Journal, senior editor at The Weekly Standard, a contributing editor at Newsweek and The Atlantic Monthly, and a commentator on National Public Radio. "Clear, Hold and Duct Tape", The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/01/opinion/01brooks.html, 11-30, Accessed 7-16-10) But over the past few months, senior members of the Obama administration have lost some of their enthusiasm for COIN. It may be a good approach in the abstract, they say, but there are problems with applying it in this context. First, they say, COIN is phenomenally expensive. It consists of doing a lot of things at once - from increasing troop levels to nation-building - and doing them over a long period of time. America no longer has that kind of money, and Americans won't accept a new 10-year commitment having already been there for eight. Second, it may be possible to clear and hold territory, but it is looking less likely that we will be able to transfer it to any legitimate Afghan authority. The Karzai government is like an organized crime ring. The governing talent is thin. Plans to build a 400,000-man Afghan security force are unrealistic. Third, they continue, the population in Afghanistan is too dispersed for COIN to work properly. There would be a few bubbles of security, where allied troops are massed, but then vast sanctuaries for the insurgents. Fourth, COIN is too Afghan-centric and not enough Pakistan-centric. The real threats to U.S. interests are along the Afghan-Pakistani border or involve the destabilization of the Pakistani government. The COIN approach does little to directly address that. COIN fails- empirical evidence in Helmand proves The Economist 6-24. (Publication and analysis of world business and current affairs, providing authoritative insight and opinion on international news, world politics, business, finance, science and technology, as well as overviews of cultural trends and regular industry, business and country special reports, "After McChrystal", The Economist, http://www.economist.com/node/16432784? story_id=16432784, 2010, Accessed 7-16-10) This is a terrible moment for the generals to fall out with the politicians. In June Afghanistan surpassed Vietnam to become, by some measures, the longest campaign in America's history. More than 1,000 of its men and women have been killed and almost 6,000 injured. Yet the Taliban are rampant, assassinating tribal leaders and intimidating their people. A survey in 120 districts racked by insurgency, a third of Afghanistan's total, found little popular support for Mr Karzai. Over a third of their inhabitants backed the insurgents. Since November, when Mr Obama promised 30,000 more of his country's soldiers to the campaign, little has gone right. General McChrystal's plan was for a "surge" that would seize the initiative from the Taliban and create the scope for Afghanistan's government, backed by its army and police, to take charge. In practice that has not happened. Marja, a farming district in Helmand, was supposed to show how COIN would win over the people and send the Taliban packing. General McChrystal himself now calls Marja a "bleeding ulcer". Mr Karzai's supposedly corrupt half-brother was meant to go, but he remains in charge in Kandahar. Fanciful Pentagon talk of Afghanistan's huge mineral wealth smacks of desperation. America has, perhaps, until the end of the year to show that COIN can work. 40 COIN Fails COIN includes many unsuccessful practices Hughes 7-10. (Michael, Freelance journalist for Examiner.com and The Huffington Post and a geopolitical analyst for AlhurraTV, an international news network sponsored by the U.S. government that is broadcast across the Middle East, Europe and Africa, "Rules of engagement least of Petraeus's problems", http://www.examiner.com/x-30980-Afghanistan-Headlines-Examiner~y2010m7d10-Rules-ofenagement-are-the-least-of-Petraeuss-problems, 2010, Accessed July 16, 2010) Let's let history tells us why we are losing this war. Kalev I. Sepp of the the U.S. Naval post-graduate school conducted a study of 36 counterinsurgencies in the 20th century and identified a number of successful and unsuccessful practices, including the following that seem applicable to today's war. Unsuccessful Counterinsurgency Practices *Primacy of military direction of counterinsurgency *Priority to `kill-capture' enemy, not on engaging population *Special Forces focused on raiding The COIN Strategy can't win hearts and minds Bird 7-15. (Kai, American Pulitzer Prize-winning author and columnist, best known for his biographies of political figures, former Associate Editor of The Nation, Contributor to the Christian Science Monitor and Far Eastern Economic Review, and Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, "Afghanistan: Vietnam redux", Politico, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0710/39808.html, 2010, Accessed 7-16-10) Afghanization. Vietnamization. Surge. Gradual escalation. Corrupt dictators. Internal dissension. The war follows a familiar script. President Barack Obama has called Afghanistan a "war of necessity." President Lyndon B. Johnson felt the same about Vietnam -- a "tar baby" war he was reluctant to wage but felt compelled to escalate. So what is the difference between LBJ's strategy of "gradual escalation" and Obama's own reluctant, highly calibrated "surge"? In Vietnam, U.S. soldiers bore the brunt of the fighting for years, while Washington waited for Saigon to "Vietnamize" the war. So what is the difference between "Vietnamization" and Obama's hope that "Afghanization" will allow U.S. troops to scale down within a year? Until his recent dismissal, Gen. Stanley McChrystal was touted as a master of the U.S. Army's "new" counterinsurgency strategy. We are often reminded that his successor, Gen. David Petraeus, wrote the manual on COIN -- as if these tactics are wholly original. Have we forgotten the efforts of counterinsurgency generals like Edward Lansdale to "win the hearts and minds" of the Vietnamese? Lansdale, one basis for Graham Greene's "quite American," pioneered "black operations" and psychological warfare tactics against both the Filipino communist Huks guerrillas and the Viet Minh guerrillas of the 1950s. He was the McChrystal of his era. Meanwhile, McChrystal's recent failed efforts to secure Marja in the Taliban-infested region of Helmand province is strangely reminiscent of Gen. William Westmoreland's "strategic hamlet" program -- which also failed miserably to win any hearts and minds. 41 COIN Fails Finally, COIN is really an acronym for nation building--but winning hearts and minds is hopeless at this point and the costs of staying outweigh the marginal benefits Ward 09 [Celeste, Celeste Ward is currently serving as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations in SOLIC&IC, with oversight of Department of Defense (DoD) policy development on reconstruction and stabilization activities and integrating DoD efforts across components and services, Ms. Ward was a Special Assistant to the Counselor at the State Department, Master's in Public Policy from Harvard University and a Bachelor of Arts from Stanford University, spent 20 months in Iraq, including 2006 as the political adviser to Gen. Peter Chiarelli, then operational commander of U.S. forces in the country, "Should the United States Withdraw from Afghanistan?", Cato Institute November/December Edition, http://www.cato.org/pubs/policy_report/v31n6/cpr31n6-3.html DA: 7-16-2010] CELESTE WARD: Over the last few years the violence in Afghanistan has come to be dubbed an "insurgency" that requires the application of a counterinsurgency strategy. This is in keeping with the general zeitgeist of "population-centric counterinsurgency" -- or COIN -- which has now risen to such prominence in U.S. defense and national security thinking that it borders on theology. COIN has become the overriding theme in discussions about not just present, but future, wars; a cultural movement in military defense circles, and, indeed, a worldview. As Colonel Gian Gentile at West Point has written, it has become the new American way of war. The problem is that counterinsurgency doctrine and theory impede our ability to accurately apprehend the nature and extent of our predicament in Afghanistan and are serving as an awkward stand-in for a rational strategy. The existence of a much ballyhooed manual -- the Army's Field Manual 3- 24 -- and perceived success in employing its precepts in Iraq are serving to obscure the real costs of the campaign in Afghanistan and provide a dangerous illusion concerning the limits of American power. A central problem with population centric COIN theory is that, at heart, it is really nation building. The theory emphasizes the population -- meeting its needs, establishing governmental legitimacy, developing economies and so on. Indeed some notable COIN adherents have even emphasized its potential to "change entire societies." So for those of you who argue that there is no strategy in Afghanistan, I would submit to you that, in effect, there is. It is implicit in the logic of COIN, and it is to transform Afghan society. But because the discussion is often wrapped in the more abstruse language of defense wonkery and larded with historical analogies and assumptions, the real strategic trade-offs -- the exorbitant costs of building a nation in a country with a history of no real central governance and that ranks 219th in per capita GDP -- are glossed over. I would argue that if General McChrystal had released not his counterinsurgency guidance but, instead, his "nationbuilding guidance," we'd be having a very different discussion. In addition to being the functional equivalent of nation building, there are a number of problems with counterinsurgency theory and doctrine itself. As just one example, a key precept is that we must win over the population. The theory goes that most of the population is unsure whose side they should be on, and we should influence that decision so that they will choose us. But this assumes that a foreign force such as ours could truly understand, never mind penetrate and manipulate the opinions and loyalties of an ancient tribal people. The conceit inherent in this notion goes mostly unremarked upon. By saying we're waging a counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan we are committing ourselves to a massive project of nation building in a country that one commentator recently described as "like walking into the Old Testament." It has become clich to note the administration has yet to articulate a real strategy in Afghanistan. I would submit that counterinsurgency -- as an operational concept and set of tactics -- has been in effect elevated to the status of a strategy. And calling it a counterinsurgency masks layers of complexity highly relevant to the outcome: tribal rivalry, ethnic conflict, the underlying struggle between tradition and modernity, and doubtless several others. By stripping away the jargon and slogans of counterinsurgency and instead exploring the problem of Afghanistan as it is, including a hard look at our real ends, ways, and means, we would not be "abandoning" Afghanistan as some have suggested. But were we to commit further American blood and treasure before such an analysis, all we would risk abandoning is our reason. 42 COIN Fails And COIN will fail because of Restrictive Rules of Engagement or ROE's along with complications in costs and preventative threats Ward 09 [Celeste, Celeste Ward is currently serving as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations in SOLIC&IC, with oversight of Department of Defense (DoD) policy development on reconstruction and stabilization activities and integrating DoD efforts across components and services, Ms. Ward was a Special Assistant to the Counselor at the State Department, Master's in Public Policy from Harvard University and a Bachelor of Arts from Stanford University, spent 20 months in Iraq, including 2006 as the political adviser to Gen. Peter Chiarelli, then operational commander of U.S. forces in the country, "Should the United States Withdraw from Afghanistan?", Cato Institute November/December Edition, http://www.cato.org/pubs/policy_report/v31n6/cpr31n6-3.html DA: 7-16-2010] General Petraeus's review is welcome, but it must recognize that restrictive rules are symptoms of a larger problem. The experience of troops on the ground is part of the growing body of evidence that America's reliance on the prevailing theory of counterinsurgency, or "COIN," is at best problematic. The restrictive ROEs have been put in place because of modern COIN doctrine's central tenet: The way to succeed is to win over the population. Because the "people are the prize," the theory goes, they must not be unduly offended or harmed. This fundamental imperative is intended to drive all other aspects of the campaign. Certainly very few would argue against protecting innocent civilians; we have a moral and legal obligation to do so. Most Americans do not want US and NATO troops to be aggressors, and some would argue that the new restraint is a necessary corrective to heavy-handedness in the early years of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Indeed, the inadvertent killing of civilians in Afghanistan has been a perennial problem for the coalition. Yet despite the increasingly restrictive ROEs, recent reports suggest that civilian deaths have actually increased in 2010. Meanwhile, June was one of the deadliest months for US forces in the nine-year war. Focusing on the needs and views of the population also appeals to the democratic sensibilities of Western intellectuals. For all these reasons and more, the notion of winning over the population is intuitively attractive, and most analysis of it stops with its articulation. But allied forces on the ground may justifiably ask how "winning over" the population leads inexorably to the desired chain of events that ends in US and coalition success. And how will progress in implementing this open-ended mandate be credibly measured? How much of the population needs to be "won" and how is this manifested? Who should do the "winning?" Afghanistan war: General Petraeus rethinking rules of engagement Opinion: Afghanistan war: New rules of engagement don't pit civilians vs. soldiers Perhaps more important, there are serious questions about how achievable this objective is in Afghanistan. Recent research suggests that financial blandishments do not buy hearts and minds, and that pumping money into poor and troubled societies alienates more people than it wins. The US and its allies are providing billions in aid to a country with a per-capita GDP of less than $400 a formula destined to supercharge the very corruption that impedes the development of good governance and builds resentment among ordinary people. What if military restraint backfires and the population sees the US and NATO as weak and unable to defend them? And is it realistic to suppose that a foreign power could ever gain the trust and esteem of the largely tribal people of Afghanistan, whose suspicion of outsiders is legendary? Without such specifics, the theory is reduced to a large-scale charm offensive, with no means to link action with outcomes. But what is the alternative? Alienating the population and harming civilians will not help anyone either. The answer is that the administration should take the opportunity presented by the recent unexpected change in command to refine US objectives and the means for reaching them. The US and its allies are not in Afghanistan to win the enduring affection of the Afghan people, however commendable such instincts may be. Given a price tag of nearly $100 billion a year, more than 1,100 American lives (including at least 58 in June), incalculable strategic opportunity costs, and a debatable link to preventing threats to the US, it is critical that the administration provides a clear definition of America's purpose in Afghanistan and articulates more specifically how COIN theory will help achieve it. It is not enough to argue that "we did it in Iraq," since that proposition is also a matter of serious debate, and the conditions in Afghanistan are materially different. 43 COIN Fails--Backlash Withdrawal guarantees regional security--presence is destabilizing Innocent 09 [Malou, foreign policy analyst at the CATO Institute who focuses on Afghanistan and Pakistan, U.S. Presence in Afghanistan Feeds Pakistan's Insurgency, CATO@Liberty, 6/10/09 DA 7/15/10] Yesterday's attack on Peshawar's Pearl Continental Hotel was the latest signal of Pakistan's growing Islamist insurgency. Since the raid by the Pakistani government on the Red Mosque (Lal Masjid) in Islamabad in July 2007, a wave of revenge attacks against the army and the government has been launched by loose networks of suicide bombers. It's possible, depending on the culprit, that the recent attack in Peshawar might have been retribution for the Pakistan army's month-long offensive against extremists in the country's northwest districts. While the United States hopes to eliminate the threat from extremists in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the knock-on effects from U.S.-NATO efforts to stabilize Afghanistan destabilize Pakistan. America's presence in the region feeds Pakistan's insurgency. If America's interests lie in stabilizing Pakistan, and ensuring that the virus of anti-American radicalism does not infect the rest of the country, the fundamental objective should be to get out of Afghanistan in a reasonable time frame. 44 COIN Fails--Casualties COIN includes rules of engagement that put soldier's lives in danger Smith 7-12. (William, Republican member of the South Carolina House of Representatives, representing the 32nd District since 1992, and serving as the Speaker Pro Tempore since 2000. "A Flip of the COIN: the future of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan", http://iar-gwu.org/node/177, 2010, Accessed 7-15-10) What has not been discussed with any depth, however, was the other focus of Michael Hastings's piece: the current Rules of Engagement (ROE) for U.S. forces in Afghanistan. The questions surrounding this issue go straight to the heart of the larger U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. In his article, Hastings gives voice to a number of U.S. soldiers who feel that the ROE are far too binding. A number of quotes echo one soldier's assessment that, "[General McChrystal's] rules of engagement put soldiers' lives in even greater danger. Every real soldier will tell you the same thing." With General Petraeus now in control of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, many wonder if the ROE will change. Indeed, many wonder if General Petreaus will shift the tactical course of the war in Afghanistan. The ROE currently in force in Afghanistan stem largely from U.S. counterinsurgency strategy, COIN for short. 45 Coin Fails--Collateral Damage Civilian Casualties on the rise in Afghanistan BBC NEWS, 2010 (the largest broadcasting organisation in the world. Its mission is to enrich people's lives with programs that inform, educate and entertain. It is a public service broadcaster, established by a Royal Charter and funded by the licence fee that is paid by UK households. "Afghanistan: civilian casualties 'on the rise'" BBC NEWS. July 12 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10598764 July 19, 2010) Civilians are suffering most in the conflict. More than 1,000 Afghan civilians were killed in armed violence and security incidents in the first six months of 2010, a new Afghan study says. Afghanistan Rights Monitor says 1,074 civilians were killed between January and June - a slight increase compared with the same period in 2009. However, the number of people killed in Nato air strikes in the same period has halved, the report says. Changes to rules of engagement helped reduce that figure, the report says. Former Nato commander Gen Stanley McChrystal issued instructions in 2009 severely limiting the circumstances in which troops could call in an air strike or fire into buildings. The newly arrived coalition international forces commander, Gen David Petraeus, has vowed to carry on with the policy. Violence in Afghanistan is now at its worst since the conflict began in 2001, the report says. "The Afghan people have only witnessed and suffered an intensifying armed conflict over the past six months and insurgency has become more resilient, multi-structured and deadly," it adds. Violence has soared across Afghanistan in recent months, with 212 civilians killed during June alone, Afghanistan Rights Monitor says. Most of the deaths documented by the report were caused by insurgents, the report notes, with the widespread use of roadside bombs particularly deadly, killing almost 300 civilians. Suicide bombs were also a major cause of death, the organisation said. It does acknowledge that Nato-led forces have been trying hard to reduce civilian casualties, partly in response to pressure from the Afghan government. And the new counter-insurgency strategy introduced by Gen McChrystal does seem to have had some effect, the report says. According to its data, 94 Afghans were killed in air strikes between January and June 2010 - compared to 207 for the previous year. In all 210 civilians had died in the past six months as a result of Nato-led strikes, shootings and raids, the report said. "Dozens of people, including women and children, were shot dead during violent and barbaric intrusions, raids into houses and other counter-insurgency operations by US-Nato forces," the report's authors say. Whilst the deaths of foreign soldiers often make headlines, the widespread deaths of Afghan civilians receive much less attention. The United Nations has also charted rising civilian deaths in Afghanistan - it says 2,400 people were killed in 2009, up from 2,118 in 2008. 46 Uniqueness Trick Announcement of withdrawal should have already triggered your DA's Newsmax, 6/22/10 p. http://www.newsmax.com/InsideCover/carafano-mcchrystal-afghanistandeadline/2010/06/22/id/362770 DA 7/10/10 But Obama chose 30,000, near the middle option. "There was no other logic than I can't give the high number, because then it will seem like I'm giving in to the military, and I don't want to do the low number, because then I'll seem weak on defense," Carafano said. "I'll pick the middle number, because is the middle, which is nuts." And then the timeline sent all the wrong messages to our friends and enemies. "You can imagine why the military feels the president has boxed us in," Carafano said. "He's putting some restraints on this that actually make things worse." Deadline announcement should already trigger DA's Goodenough, international editor for CNS News, 6/23/10 p. http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/68268 (Patrick, "Obama's Troop Withdrawal" DA 7/15/10) At West Point last December, when Obama announced that 30,000 additional troops would be deployed to Afghanistan this year, he said the move would "allow us to begin the transfer of our forces out of Afghanistan in July of 2011." In an article for the New Delhi-based Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies Yash Malhotra, a retired Indian Army general, said that announcement had "signaled that the U.S. and its NATO allies no longer believed in the possibility of a military victory over the Taliban and were looking for a dignified exit." Deadlline sends a negative signal triggering DA's Goodenough, international editor for CNS News, 6/23/10 p. http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/68268 (Patrick, "Obama's Troop Withdrawal" DA 7/15/10) The committee's ranking Republican, Arizona Sen. John McCain, said he was troubled about signals being sent to allies and enemies alike. "I continue to worry a great deal bout the message we are sending in the region, about whether we're actually going to stay or not, and whether we are going to do what's necessary to succeed, rather than set an arbitrary timeline," he said. Despite US statements, the links are already triggered by deadline Rogin, reporter at Foreign Policy, 6/29/10 p. http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/06/29/petraeus_withdrawal_timeline_does_not_mean_switchi ng_off_the_lights DA 7/12/10 But regardless of whether the administration sent mixed messages, the nuance of their time line policy has been misunderstood or ignored in the region, as various actors start to plan strategies with the expectation that U.S. troops are leaving. "In retrospect, despite all the caveats, it was a mistake to put such a date certain for the beginning of withdrawal," said Shuja Nawaz, director of the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council. "The word beginning was lost and it strengthens the ability of different interests to hedge, which is exactly what they've been doing." 47 A2: Spin Restores U Perception has already locked the link--no spin control matters given regional interests and enemy propoganda Rubin, AEI resident fellow, 3/8/2010 p. http://www.aei.org/article/101753 DA 7/15/10 It is true, as Schlesinger points out, that Obama did not set a date for the completion of the withdrawal, but he signaled its finite nature. And herein lays the problem. The reason Obama spoke of a deadline was not to pressure Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai but rather to assuage constituencies in the United States increasingly wary of open-ended U.S. involvement in the country. But in the Middle East and South Asia, perception matters far more than reality. Diplomatic affairs expert Omar Sharifi, speaking on Afghan television, declared, "Today the Afghans unfortunately lost the game and failed to get a long-term commitment from the international community." Likewise, Afghan political analyst Ahmad Sayedi observed, "When the USA sets a timeline of 18 months for troop withdraw, this by itself boosts the morale of the opponents and makes them less likely to take any step towards reconciliation." It is absolutely correct to say that Obama did not say that all--or even a significant fraction--of U.S. troops would withdraw in July 2011, but this is what was heard not only by U.S. allies and adversaries in Afghanistan but also by the governments and media in regional states such as Pakistan, Iran, and even Russia. Indeed, it appears Obama's advisors recognized their error and scrambled to clarify. Speaking on Meet the Press, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared, "We're not talking about an exit strategy or a drop-dead deadline." On December 3, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said the withdrawal would "probably" take two to three years but that "there are no deadlines in terms of when our troops will all be out." He made an unannounced visit to Kabul to underline his message. Sayed Masud, a lecturer at Kabul University, spoke of how Obama's announcement "was a big mistake" that had weakened the morale of Afghan forces, which until then had been on the upswing. 48 A2: Iraq Proves Just because the surge worked in Iraq doesn't mean it will work in Afghanistan Lubold 5-8. (Gordon, Staff writer for The Christian Science Monitor, spent a month in Afghanistan to cover the marines fighting terrorism, "Afghanistan surge: Is the 'clear, hold, build' strategy working?", The Christian Science Monitor, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2010/0508/Afghanistan-surge-Is-theclear-hold-build-strategy-working, 2010, Accessed 7-16-2010) The goal of the surge is to "clear" key population centers of insurgents, then "hold" them to prevent insurgents from returning. The next step is to maintain law and order to allow Afghans to "build" normal lives. This is called a "clear, hold, build" strategy, which US forces also used in Iraq. What does the Iraq surge tell us about what might happen in Afghanistan? During the surge of forces in Iraq, which began in early 2007, the number of US casualties swelled. In January 2007, for example, there were 137,000 troops in Iraq and 86 coalition fatalities, according to icasualties.org. By May 2007, there were 148,000 American troops on the ground and 131 coalition fatalities. But that trend started to change when certain factors converged to help stabilize Iraq. One of those factors, many experts argue, was that the increasing number of troops created a critical mass to help stem the violence. By October, there were 166,000 American troops in Iraq, but the number of fatalities per month had dropped to 40. Afghanistan may be considerably different, and experts and military officials are reluctant to predict that the surge will work the same way in two distinctly different places. Iraq's relative homogeneity stands in stark contrast to the tribal and ethnic diversity of Afghanistan, where few village elders think alike, and are motivated by different things. Laundry list of reasons on why a troop surge in Afghanistan wouldn't work like it would in Iraq Siddiqi 7-9. (Shahid, Senior management positions in Pakistan, United States, Saudi Arabia and South Africa worked as a broadcaster and remained the Islamabad bureau chief of an English weekly magazine `Pakistan & Gulf Economist published from Karachi (Pakistan), freelance writer on political and geopolitical issues and his articles are carried by the daily newspapers Dawn and The Nation in Pakistan, German magazine Globalia and online publications such as Axis of Logic, Foreign Policy Journal and Middle East Times, "Shouldn't General Petraeus Hold His Dogs Of War?", Eurasia Review, 2010, Accessed 7-16-10) Although General Petraeus has been overseeing the war in Afghanistan from his perch in Iraq and execution of his Iraq-fame counterinsurgency doctrine that he gave to General McChrystal for a cut-andpaste application in Afghanistan, he will perhaps soon realize that "one doctrine suits all" approach does not work. Even the so-called success in Iraq was not attributable entirely to his counterinsurgency strategy or the troop surge. The conditions existing in Afghanistan are very different. His own strategy applied in Afghanistan by his protg failed because, among other reasons, the federal and provincial governments, the army, and the police are completely non-functional; and their functionality is a prerequisite for his strategy to succeed. He will be pitched against a tribal people, deeply religious, uncompromising and averse to foreign presence, who know their formidable terrain better than his men do, who are adept at fighting an irregular warfare and who are gaining strength despite the arrival of new troops. He will be working with a diplomatic team that operates on a different plane. His support at home is waning. And he has to follow a timetable set by his commander-in-chief, who is keen to wind up the war. 49 A2: Victory Possible Regional characteristics make victory unlikely Larison 7-6. (Daniel, Ph.D., Graduate from the University of Chicago, contributing editor at The American Conservative and writes a column for The Week online, "Fighting the right war in Afghanistan", http://theweek.com/bullpen/column/204689/fighting-the-right-war-in-afghanistan, 2010, Accessed 7-162010) Few wars suffer from as many popular misconceptions as the war in Afghanistan. It is a war being fought to deprive the Taliban of control of Kabul and shore up the Afghan government so that it does not collapse in the wake of a U.S. withdrawal, but the war will not end in the complete defeat of Taliban militias. Pashtun militias of one kind or another will continue to exist and they will remain proxies of elements within Pakistan's military and security services. Pakistan will be contesting Iran and India for influence in a weak Afghanistan for decades to come, and it is not going to abandon its well-established strategy of using proxies inside neighboring countries to project power. 50 A2: Withdrawal Total Withdrawal Withdrawal does not guarantee collapse--U.S. can choose alternate mechanisms of Pakistani stabilization Cordesman, CSIS strategic analyst in the area of Afghanistan, 6/16/10 p. http://csis.org/publication/realism-afghanistan-rethinking-uncertain-case-war DA 7/15/10 It should be noted, however, that the US may be forced into leaving Afghanistan regardless of its intentions to stay, or face conditions that make any stable form of victory impossible. Containment from the outside may be the only choice, and having to leave Afghanistan does not mean having to abandon Pakistan. Maintaining a major civil and military aid effort to Pakistan, and keeping US capabilities to work with Pakistan in UCAV and other strikes on insurgent networks is also an option. So is working with Russia to support a rebirth of the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan and to pin down the Taliban and other insurgents as much as possible. 51 A2: Withdrawal Loses WOT Afghanistan not the key battle ground--structural issues ensure terrorism in the future Cordesman, CSIS strategic analyst in the area of Afghanistan, 6/16/10 p. http://csis.org/publication/realism-afghanistan-rethinking-uncertain-case-war DA 7/15/10 Moreover, it is time to stop demonizing Bin Laden and Al Qa'ida and focus on the broader threat. Massive population increases, poverty, decaying educational and social infrastructure, culture shock and alienation, and failed secularism affect far too much of the Islamic world. Yemen and Somalia are only the two worst cases, and some form of extremist and terrorist threat is likely to be a regional constant for the next two decades regardless of whether the US and its allies win or lose in Afghanistan. Moreover, the trade-offs involved do raise serious questions about whether the same or a much lower investment in helping key allies like Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco would do far more to provide overall security. 52 A2: Withdrawal Submarines Political Reform Western style development is unrealistic and our presence will not determine in any direction that success Cordesman, CSIS strategic analyst in the area of Afghanistan, 6/16/10 p. http://csis.org/publication/realism-afghanistan-rethinking-uncertain-case-war DA 7/15/10 The definition of victory is as much at issue as the question of whether victory is possible. One thing seems clear: The impossible goals and dreams of rapid political and economic development, creation of a Western-style rule of law, and quick progress in human rights was never going to take place even if the challenge had really been post-conflict reconstruction and the insurgency had not been allowed to fester without serious opposition for half a decade. The Afghan Compact, a badly drafted Western constitution, and the Afghan National Development Plan were little more than idealistic dreams decoupled from Afghan realities and Afghan desires. More than eight years into the war, the last Presidential election is still a political nightmare, the legislative election is in limbo, and Afghan power brokers have become far stronger while Afghan capacity in governance has made limited progress Nearly 40% of the population is partially dependent on UN food aid for basic subsistence, and most Afghans have to do anything they can to survive whether this involves opium or what the West calls corruption. It is the Taliban that established the real rule of law in many areas, and the civil authorities and police remain largely corrupt and ineffective in much of the country. As for human rights, traditional Afghans remain traditional Afghans, and issues like the rights of women make token progress at best outside the areas where such rights already existed before the Taliban took over. 53 ***Hegemony*** 54 Presence Unsustainable Regional threat perceptions undercut any benefits provided by U.S. forces Rubin and Rashid, Dir. Of Intl Studies @ NYU and fellow @ Pacific Council 2008 p. l/n (Barnett and Ahmed, "From Great Game to Grand Bargain" Foreign Affairs DA 7/5/10) Some additional troops in Afghanistan could protect local populations while the police and the administration develop. They also might enable U.S. and NATO forces to reduce or eliminate their reliance on the use of air strikes, which cause civilian casualties that recruit fighters and supporters to the insurgency. U.S. General Barry McCaffrey, among others, has therefore supported a "generational commitment" to Afghanistan, such as the United States made to Germany and South Korea. Unfortunately, no government in the region around Afghanistan supports a long-term U.S. or NATO presence there. Pakistan sees even the current deployment as strengthening an India-allied regime in Kabul; Iran is concerned that the United States will use Afghanistan as a base for launching "regime change" in Tehran; and China, India, and Russia all have reservations about a NATO base within their spheres of influence and believe they must balance the threats from al Qaeda and the Taliban against those posed by the United States and NATO. Securing Afghanistan and its region will require an international presence for many years, but only a regional diplomatic initiative that creates a consensus to place stabilizing Afghanistan ahead of other objectives could make a long-term international deployment possible. War is an unwinnable quagmire Christian Science Monitor June. 23 2010 p. http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-SouthCentral/2010/0623/McChrystal-Rolling-Stone-remarks-spotlight-Afghanistan-withdrawal-timeline DA 7/12/10 Military analysts say McChrystal's testiness shows he knows that time is not on his side. Allies in the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which is the umbrella for the war effort, have been growing restless. Earlier this week, Sherard Cowper-Coles, the British special envoy to Afghanistan and a former ambassador here, stepped down from his job. He had questioned the wisdom of the troop surge and counterinsurgency here, worried it would only lead to a bloody and expensive quagmire, and favored negotiations with the Taliban. 55 Overstretch Now Overstretch in Afghanistan now--supply and infrastructure issues Englehardt 10 [Tom, author of The End of Victory Culture and consulting editor for Metropolitan Books, teaching fellow at Cal, Berkeley, "Imperial Overstretch in Afghanistan," Tom Dispatch, Common Dreams, 4/4, DA 7/19/10 Starting with that bomber's jacket, the event had a certain eerie similarity to George W. Bush's visits to Iraq. As Bush once swore that we would never step down until the Iraqis had stepped up, so Obama declared his war to be "absolutely essential." General Mohammad Zahir Azimi, a spokesman for the Afghan Defense Ministry, even claimed that the president had used the long-absent (but patented) Bush word "victory" in his meeting with Hamid Karzai. Above all, whatever the talk about beginning to draw down his surge troops in mid-2011 -- and he has so far committed more than 50,000 American troops to that country -- when it comes to the Afghan War, the president seemed to signal that we are still on Pentagon time. Particularly striking was his assurance that, while there would be "difficult days ahead... we also know this: The United States of America does not quit once it starts on something... [T]he American armed services does not quit, we keep at it, we persevere, and together with our partners we will prevail. I am absolutely confident of that." He assured his listeners, and assumedly Americans at home, that we will "finish the job" (however undefined), and made another promise as well: "I'm looking forward," he told the troops, "to returning to Afghanistan many times in the years to come." Many times in the years to come. Think about that and fasten your seatbelt. The U.S. evidently isn't about to leave Afghanistan anytime soon. The president seems to have set his watch to the Pentagon's clock, which means that, in terrible financial times, he is going to continue investing staggering sums of our money long-term in a perilous war in a distant land with terrible supply lines and no infrastructure. This represents a perfect Paul-Kennedy-style working definition of "imperial overstretch." Contrast this with the China-on-the-move that Michael Klare, Tom Dispatch regular and author of Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet, describes in his latest piece, "China's Global Shopping Spree." If the word "folly" doesn't come to mind, what does? Overstretch now--soldier rotations and public sentiment against Lazare 09 [Sarah, GI resistance organiser with Dialogues Against Militarism and Courage to Resist, The US army is overstretched and exhausted, says peace campaigner Sarah Lazare, The reality of life in Afghanistan, RAWA news, 12/26, DA 7/19/10] Many from within the ranks are openly declaring that they have had enough, allying with anti-war veterans and activists in calling for an end to the US-led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, with some active duty soldiers publicly refusing to deploy. This growing movement of military refusers is a voice of sanity in a country slipping deeper into unending war. The architects of this war would be well-advised to listen to the concerns of the soldiers and veterans tasked with carrying out their war policies on the ground. Many of those being deployed have already faced multiple deployments to combat zones: the 101st Airborne Division, which will be deployed to Afghanistan in early 2010, faces its fifth combat tour since 2002. "They are just going to start moving the soldiers who already served in Iraq to Afghanistan, just like they shifted me from one war to the next," said Eddie Falcon, a member of Iraq Veterans Against the War (IVAW), who served in Iraq and Afghanistan. "Soldiers are going to start coming back with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), missing limbs, problems with alcohol, and depression." Many of these troops are still suffering the mental and physical fallout from previous deployments. Rates of PTSD and traumatic brain injury among troops deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan have been disproportionately high, with a third of returning troops reporting mental problems and 18.5 per cent of all returning service members battling either PTSD or depression, according to a study by the Rand Corporation. As the occupation of Afghanistan passes its eighth year, with no clear progress, goals that remain elusive, and a high civilian death count, this war is coming to resemble the Iraq war that has been roundly condemned by world and US public opinion. The never-ending nature of this conflict belies the real project of establishing US dominance in the Middle East and control of the region's resources, at the expense of the Afghan civilians and US soldiers being placed in harm's way 56 Overstretch Now Troops overstretched now--tribal areas Hussain 7/11 [Tom, foreign correspondent for The National, US `realises it cannot win' Afghan war, The National, 2010, DA 7/19/10] Some Pakistani officials are convinced that the United States' ongoing military surge against the Taliban in Afghanistan is doomed, and that the diminishing western appetite for the war will position it as the key to a future political settlement, Pakistani analysts said. Pakistan's foreign policy leaders, notably its powerful army chief, consider the June 23 exit of Gen Stanley McChrystal as the commander of US forces in Afghanistan as indicative of a growing acceptance by the Obama administration that the conflict cannot be settled by force, they said. "It's the realisation that you cannot win," Imtiaz Gul, the chairman of the Centre for Research and Security Studies, an independent think-tank based in Islamabad, said in a recent interview. "For Pakistan, history has moved full circle. For the third time in as many decades, Pakistan is likely to be used to provide a face-saver for the US in Afghanistan," he said. Mr McChrystal was ostensibly forced to resign after he and his aides made disparaging remarks against key figures of the Obama administration in an interview with Rolling Stones magazine. However, the episode has been viewed in Islamabad in the context of the failure of US-led Nato forces to gain the support of the Afghan population during operations this year in the Taliban heartland of southern Afghanistan, the analysts said. The military surge has been accompanied by a three-fold increase in violence, according to a recent United Nations' report. The lack of military progress prompted Gen David Richards, the British army chief, to suggest in a June 27 interview with BBC Radio that talks with the Taiban should start "pretty soon". Vincent Desportes, a senior French general, was less subtle in a July 2 interview with Le Monde, saying the surge was "not working" and that the situation in Afghanistan "is worse than ever". "The British and the French have come around to what the Pakistani government has been saying all along: the military option is not going to get you anywhere," said Mr Gul, who is the author of a book about Pakistan's tribal regions bordering Afghanistan, The Most Dangerous Place. That interpretation of events in Afghanistan is finding voice in a more assertive Pakistani posture on issues in which its interests conflict with those of the US, the analysts said. Those include plans to acquire two nuclear power reactors from China, Pakistan's closest strategic partner, and import natural gas by pipeline from Iran. The US has spoken cautiously on both projects, rather than opposing them outright. Richard Holbrooke, the US special representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan, speaking to reporters in Islamabad on June 20, advised Pakistan to read the fine print of tough new unilateral US sanctions targeting Iran's energy and financial sector before "over-committing" to the pipeline. The US and other members of the 46-member Nuclear Suppliers Group also sought "clarification" from China on the nuclear reactor deal at the organisation's annual meeting in New Zealand in June. China did not respond to the pressure at the meeting, but its embassy in Washington told the US media on July 4 that the proposed supply of the two nuclear reactors, yet to be formally announced, is an extension of an existing deal under which Pakistan has already acquired two reactors for its Chashma Barrage power complex. Such US pressure, however subtle, is typical of the mistrust that characterises US-Pakistan relations, analysts said. "While we are `allies', the nuclear issue, along with India and terrorism, continues to cast a shadow," said Tanvir Ahmed Khan, a former secretary to Pakistan's ministry of foreign affairs. The analysts said Pakistan would leverage its influence among militant groups in Afghanistan, vital to any negotiated settlement, to deflect such pressure, as it had done during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s. Al Jazeera television reported in June that a meeting had taken place between Hamid Karzai, the Afghan president, and Sirajuddin Haqqani, who heads one of three major militant networks fighting Nato and Afghan government forces. Mr Haqqani is based in Pakistan's North Waziristan tribal region, prompting repeated calls from the US for a Pakistani military operation to be launched there. Pakistan has refused, saying its forces are overstretched because of operations against Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan militants in other tribal regions. 57 Overstretch Now--Logistics Afghanistan costs uniquely high--cause overstretch The National Journal 2/20/10 p. l/n DA 5/15/10 Politically, Obama's surge strategy in Afghanistan looks like a replay of George W. Bush's surge in Iraq. Logistically, it is much harder. " 'Don't even use Iraq as a comparison' is what we tell anybody in the logistics field going over there," said Lt. Col. Kirk Whitson, who has served a year in each country and also in the U.S. Central Command headquarters overseeing both wars. "In Iraq, logistics was on cruise control. In Afghanistan, it's graduate-level logistics to make it happen." Iraq is on one of the world's most trafficked waterways, the Persian Gulf, and is between two sets of U.S. allies -- Turkey to the north, Kuwait and Qatar to the south -- where the American military has been building up its infrastructure since before the 1991 Gulf War. Oil exports both required and financed ports, pipelines, and highways, complete with U.S.-style "mixing bowl" interchanges outside Baghdad. Decades of war and sanctions under Saddam Hussein frayed that infrastructure somewhat, but the late dictator also left Iraq pockmarked with palaces and army bases for U.S. military units to expropriate. Except in the Kurdish north, the terrain is flat and the population is concentrated along the major roads and rivers. Afghanistan, by contrast, is a landlocked country whose neighbors range from uneasy U.S. allies, such as Pakistan and Uzbekistan, to outright adversaries, such as Iran. Thirty years of war have devastated what little infrastructure the country had. In the south, scattered population centers are separated by deserts; in the east, they're divided by mountains. Winter brings storms and snow; spring brings floods. "Today the road was good; you go there tomorrow and it's flooded out and the bridge is gone," Whitson said. "That doesn't happen in Iraq, where the only thing you had to worry about weatherwise, sometimes, was sandstorms. Other than that, things just went as scheduled." Even when Afghanistan's weather cooperates, there may be no road to take. "In Iraq, you can get on a hardball [asphalt] road and drive to any location that you need to go to deliver supplies," Whitson said. "In Afghanistan, I had 15 locations that I couldn't drive to; I had no choice but to get the supplies in by air." All these difficulties send the cost of operations soaring. The annual cost per U.S. service member deployed in Afghanistan, on average, is $1.125 million, twice the $556,000 for Iraq, according to a study by Todd Harrison, senior fellow for defense budget studies at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Nor does the difference seem to reflect economies of scale for the larger force in Iraq, Harrison told National Journal, because the figures for Afghanistan have not dropped as the troop levels have risen: It is just that much more expensive a place to operate. The US Military is overstretched Wall Street Journal 10 ["McChrystal Forces Us to Focus Now Petraeus owes us a candid assessment of the Afghan effort." WSJ, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487049117045753272041101 43126.html, 6//25/10, DA 7/15/2010] The U.S. military is overstretched in every way, including emotionally and psychologically. The biggest takeaway from a week at U.S. Army War College in 2008 was the exhaustion of the officers. They are tired from repeat deployments, and their families are stretched to the limit, with children reaching 12 and 13 without a father at home 58 Overstretch Now--Structural Overstretch now- the war is a sure loss but our military and advisers are in denial Astore 6/3 [William, Retired lieutenant colonel (USAF) and author of Hindenburg: Icon of German Militarism, Doubling Down in Afghanistan: Why We Refuse to Fold a Losing Hand, TomDispatch, Huffington Post, 2010, DA 7/19/10] As Congress moves toward rubber-stamping yet another "emergency" supplemental bill that includes more than $33 billion for military operations, mainly to fund the latest surge in Afghanistan, maybe we should take a page from the new British government. Facing debilitating deficits, the conservative Tories and their Liberal Democrat partners are proposing painful cuts to governmental budgets, including military operations in Afghanistan. As the Independent put it, quoting a senior military source, "Essentially, the Americans know we are broke and we are getting blokes killed for no good reason. Whatever the [British Ministry of Defence] says, it absolutely isn't business as usual." In other words, an overstretched government, low on chips and recognizing a losing hand in Afghanistan, is finally moving to cut its losses, perhaps even to walk away from the table.To extend the metaphor in Afghanistan, we're engaged in a high-stakes poker match at our opponent's table, and his card sharks are remarkably adept at dealing from the bottom of the deck. Of course, we're alert enough to know that the game is fixed, but strangely, that only makes us more determined. We are, in fact, insistent that ultimately we'll make his table ours; in the meantime, we'll bribe or browbeat his bottom-dealers for better cards, bluff or shoot our way out of losing hands. Or so we gun-slinging Americans like to imagine. Meanwhile, back in the U.S., land of risk-takers and winners, our Washington beltway policymakers have become inured to the risks this sort of compulsive gambling entails. They continue to throw money and men on the table, no matter the odds in the unkindest of houses (and, whatever else they've been, Iraq and Afghanistan certainly haven't been kind to American agendas). Think about it. In the next year or two, no matter how well or how poorly we play our cards in Afghanistan, it doesn't appear that we'll seriously consider folding and walking away. Take, for example, our latest do-or-die offensive about to be launched in Kandahar, the country's second largest city, and environs. If all goes well this summer and the U.S. military wins a few hands in the Kandahar region, Washington's addictive mentality will doubtless take this as evidence that the tide has turned, our luck has changed. In short, we'll double down. And if our offensive goes poorly? Undoubtedly, Washington will take this as evidence that we had a chance, but didn't ante-up enough chips or simply hit a stretch of bad luck. Then, like compulsive gamblers everywhere, they'll insist on playing a few more hands, but this time just a little more smartly. In short, they'll double down. So, if they win, it's "we're on a roll"; if they lose, it's "next hand, baby, next hand." And what about President Obama's pledge to walk away from the Afghan poker table beginning in 2011? Fuggeddaboudit. Knowing When to Fold'em War, as any sane person knows, is a life-or-death gamble, usually at long odds -- and let's face it, we've been gambling at the longest odds for years now. It was never a smart move to invade either Afghanistan or Iraq, and then try to plant pseudodemocracies in soil that was unlikely to sustain them. In Afghanistan, it wasn't smart to squeeze local card sharks and tough guys even as they squeezed us, whether by stealing outright or forcing us to pay protection money in a rigged game. It wasn't smart to woo hearts and minds while busting heads and bodies ("aggressive interrogation") and plugging mid-level thugs ("targeted assassinations") with missiles and slugs, all the while knocking off far too many civilian noncombatants as we went. Under the pressure of so many losing hands, our tactics in Afghanistan have become increasingly erratic, swinging from idealistic plans for nation-building to pragmatic "clear-and-hold" counterinsurgency, from upbraiding Afghan leaders to uplifting them. Like a flustered gambler, we've lost all sense of the cards staring coldly back at us. 59 Overstretch--Deployment Cycles Overstretch in the Armed Forces is largely due to Afghanistan and creates a vicious cycle of deployment Defence Management 09 (Journal on authoritative analysis on an extensive array of defence topics including policy and strategy, procurement, logistics, human resources, training, aviation, the navy, military vehicles, and the defence estate, Defencemanagement, "Managing Overstretch", http://www.defencemanagement.com/feature_story.asp?id=11276, 2-06, Accessed 7-14-10) Overstretch in the Armed Forces is a complex and all too common problem caused both by the well known issues of current combat operations and recruitment along with the past administrative decisions made by commanders and ministers. The problem has grown in prominence over the last three years as the conflict in Afghanistan intensified. This has left the Armed Forces engaged in two medium sized conflicts along with various peacekeeping and mandatory deployment roles around the world. While operations in Iraq are scheduled to end in July, it could still take years for the Army and other parts of the Armed Forces to possibly return to a normal operating tempo due to the deployment strategies put in place by ministers and commanders. Operations in Afghanistan could require thousands of additional troops which would negate any gains from the withdrawal of troops from Iraq. By rule, overstretch in the Army is defined as a soldier serving for more than 415 days in a 30 month period while for the RAF the total amounts to 280 days over a 24 month period. The Royal Navy's guidelines are not known, but less than one per cent of all personnel, including Royal Marines were in violation of the so called harmony guidelines as of the end of 2008. Statistics for the other two branches paint a more diverse picture of how bad overstretch has become. Approximately 10.3 per cent of the entire Army has been in violation of the guidelines over the last year including the infantry where one third of all soldiers surpassed the separated allowance guidelines. Approximately 6.1 per cent of RAF personnel were deployed for longer than 280 days. The figures for the RAF would be far higher if the 280 days/24 months policy had not been instituted to replace the 140 days/12 month policy last year. "We urgently need to rectify the severe problem of overstretch. However, it will require the army to take decisions on reorganisation that it may find painful," Liberal Democrat shadow Defence Secretary Nick Harvey told Defencemanagement.com. As criticism from the opposition has grown, even the leadership of the MoD is admitting that there is a serious problem. "A gap of one year between operational deployments is not unusual and often soldiers are spending much of the year before a deployment away from home, in training and preparation. This is unacceptable," General Sir Richard Dannatt, chief of the general staff said in a speech recently in which he detailed proposals to overcome overstretch. Defence Secretary John Hutton concurred: "I think we have accepted that the strain of mounting two major operations, one in Iraq and one in Afghanistan, is creating very substantial strain and stress on our military forces." Why overstretch is occurring and how the issue can be resolved is a complex matter in itself. The obvious answer to the question of why overstretch is occurring is that current operations are taking their toll on British forces. The higher demand for troops has forced some to serve longer and more frequently in theatres of operation. The high demand is largely attributed to the six month deployment policy. In the US most deployments are 12-15 months. Britain maintains a strict six month policy which requires a massive redeployment twice a year. Factoring in the two combat operations and only so many infantry and support servicemen, it is clear why personnel are recalled for deployment so frequently. A heavy operational tempo ultimately creates a vicious cycle. Commanders need to send troops back sooner than required to keep troop numbers up but then many servicemen choose to leave the Forces when their contract is up due to the strain on their family and personal lives. 60 Overstretch Now--Comparative U.S. presence in Afghanistan is on balance bad for primacy and global influence Cordesman, CSIS strategic analyst in the area of Afghanistan, 6/16/10 p. http://csis.org/publication/realism-afghanistan-rethinking-uncertain-case-war DA 7/15/10 Two critical questions dominate any realistic discussion of the conflict. The first is whether the war is worth fighting. The second is whether it can be won. The answers to both questions are uncertain. The US has no enduring reason to maintain a strategic presence in Afghanistan or Central Asia. It has far more important strategic priorities in virtually every other part of the world, and inserting itself into Russia's "near abroad," China's sphere of influence, and India's ambitions makes no real sense. Geography, demographics, logistics, and economics all favor other nations, and no amount of academic hubris can realistically model American reform of the "Stans" in ways that are costeffective relative to other uses of US resources. 61 Overstretch--Afghanistan I/L Because the US is overstretched in Afghanistan it lacks a standing reserve, leaving it vulnerable Friedman 10 [George, Political Scientist and Author, Founger and CEO of the private intelligence corporation Stratrof, "Afghanistan: Obama continues America's longest war," http://www.speroforum.com /a/36034/Afghanistan-Obama-continues-Americas-longest-war, SperoNews 7/5/2010, DA 7/15/10 From the grand strategic point of view, the United States needs to withdraw from Afghanistan, a landlocked country where U.S. forces are dependent on tortuous supply lines. Whatever Afghanistan's vast mineral riches, mining them in the midst of war is not going to happen. More important, the United States is overcommitted in the region and lacks a strategic reserve of ground forces. Afghanistan ultimately is not strategically essential, and this is why the United States has not historically used its own forces there. Obama's attempt to return to that track after first increasing U.S. forces to set the stage for the political settlement that will allow a U.S. withdrawal is hampered by the need to begin terminating the operation by 2011 (although there is no fixed termination date). It will be difficult to draw coalition partners into local structures when the foundation -- U.S. protection -- is withdrawing. Strengthening local forces by 2011 will be difficult. Moreover, the Taliban's motivation to enter into talks is limited by the early withdrawal. At the same time, with no ground combat strategic reserve, the United States is vulnerable elsewhere in the world, and the longer the Afghan drawdown takes, the more vulnerable it becomes (hence the 2011 deadline in Obama's war plan). In sum, this is the quandary inherent in the strategy: It is necessary to withdraw as early as possible, but early withdrawal undermines both coalition building and negotiations. The recruitment and use of indigenous Afghan forces must move extremely rapidly to hit the deadline (though officially on track quantitatively, there are serious questions about qualitative measures) -- hence, the aggressive operations that have been mounted over recent months. But the correlation of forces is such that the United States probably will not be able to impose an acceptable political reality in the time frame available. Thus, Afghan President Hamid Karzai is said to be opening channels directly to the Taliban, while the Pakistanis are increasing their presence. Where a vacuum is created, regardless of how much activity there is, someone will fill it. Afghanistan quagmire eroding our war winning capabilities Engelhardt 10 [Tom, co-founder of the American Empire Project, runs the Nation Institute's TomDispatch.com. Fellow at The Nation Institute. "Call the Politburo, We're in Trouble: Entering the Soviet Era in America" Foreign Policy In Focus, ProQuest, 6/22/2010, DA 7/14/2010. The first year and a half of the Obama administration has seen a continuation of what could be considered the monumental socialist-realist era of American war-making (including a decision to construct another huge, Baghdad-style "embassy" in Islamabad, Pakistan). This sort of creeping gigantism, with all its assorted cost overruns and private perks, would undoubtedly have seemed familiar to the Soviets. Certainly no less familiar will be the near decade the U.S. military has spent, increasingly disastrously, in the Afghan graveyard. Drunk on war as Washington may be, the U.S. is still not the Soviet Union in 1991 - not yet. But it's not the triumphant "sole superpower" anymore either. Its global power is visibly waning, its ability to win wars distinctly in question, its economic viability open to doubt. It has been transformed from a can-do into a can't-do nation, a fact only highlighted by the ongoing BP catastrophe and "rescue" in the Gulf of Mexico. Its airports are less shiny and more Third World-like every year. Unlike France or China, it has not a mile of high-speed rail. And when it comes to the future, especially the creation and support of innovative industries in alternative energy, it's chasing the pack. It is increasingly a low-end service economy, losing good jobs that will never return. And if its armies come home in defeat... watch out. In 1991, the Soviet Union suddenly evaporated. The Cold War was over. Like many wars, it seemed to have an obvious winner and an obvious loser. Nearly 20 years later, as the U.S. heads down the Soviet road to disaster - even if the world can't imagine what a bankrupt America might mean - it's far clearer that, in the titanic struggle of the two superpowers that we came to call the Cold War, there were actually two losers, and that, when the "second superpower" left the scene, the first was already heading for the exits, just ever so slowly and in a state of self-intoxicated self-congratulation. Nearly every decision in Washington since then, including Barack Obama's to expand both the Afghan War and the war on terror, has only made what, in 1991, was one possible path seem like fate itself. Call up the Politburo in Washington. We're in trouble. 62 Overstretch--Afghanistan I/L Afghanistan has empirically been a "Graveyard of Empires." It drove the stake through the heart of the USSR in a war not unlike the one the U.S. is involved in now Engelhardt 10 [Tom, co-founder of the American Empire Project, runs the Nation Institute's TomDispatch.com. Fellow at The Nation Institute. "Call the Politburo, We're in Trouble: Entering the Soviet Era in America" Foreign Policy In Focus, ProQuest, 6/22/2010, DA 7/14/2010. The USSR had been heading for the exits for quite a while, not that official Washington had a clue. At the moment it happened, Soviet "experts" like Secretary of Defense Robert Gates (then director of the CIA) still expected the Cold War to go on and on. In Washington, eyes were trained on the might of the Soviet military, which the Soviet leadership had never stopped feeding, even as its sclerotic bureaucracy was rotting, its economy (which had ceased to grow in the late 1970s) was tanking, budget deficits were soaring, indebtedness to other countries was growing, and social welfare payments were eating into what funds remained. Not even a vigorous, reformist leader like Mikhail Gorbachev could staunch the rot, especially when, in the late 1980s, the price of Russian oil fell drastically. Looking back, the most distinctive feature of the last years of the Soviet Union may have been the way it continued to pour money into its military - and its military adventure in Afghanistan - when it was already going bankrupt and the society it had built was beginning to collapse around it. In the end, its aging leaders made a devastating miscalculation. They mistook military power for power on this planet. Armed to the teeth and possessing a nuclear force capable of destroying the Earth many times over, the Soviets nonetheless remained the vastly poorer, weaker, and (except when it came to the arms race) far less technologically innovative of the two superpowers. In December 1979, perhaps taking the bait of the Carter administration whose national security advisor was eager to see the Soviets bloodied by a "Vietnam" of their own, the Red Army invaded Afghanistan to support a weak communist government in Kabul. When resistance in the countryside, led by Islamic fundamentalist guerrillas and backed by the other superpower, only grew, the Soviets sent in more troops, launched major offensives, called in air power, and fought on brutally and futilely for a decade until, in 1989, long after they had been whipped, they withdrew in defeat. Gorbachev had dubbed Afghanistan "the bleeding wound," and when the wounded Red Army finally limped home, it was to a country that would soon cease to exist. For the Soviet Union, Afghanistan had literally proven "the graveyard of empires." If, at the end, its military remained standing, the empire didn't. (And if you don't already find this description just a tad eerie, given the present moment in the U.S., you should.) 63 No Middle East Heg US has no power perception and only limited power over the Middle East Bubalo '10. (Anthony, Program Director at the Lowy Institute for International Policy, "Ambivalence on the Middle East does not work", The Australian, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/ambivalence-on-the-middle-east-does-not-work/storye6frg6ux-1225861248469, 5-3, Accessed 7-19-10) Such an attitude will be challenged by two major changes under way in the region. The first is the end of American hegemony. It is often forgotten that American hegemony in the Middle East -- in the sense of an overwhelmingly dominant position -- dates only to 1991. During the Cold War, the competing power of the Soviet Union and the US limited what each could do. The American defeat of Iraq in 1991, and the Soviet Union's meek acquiescence in the war, signaled a change. After 1991, Washington could contemplate ways to transform the Middle East, something that was unthinkable in the Cold War era. Under Bill Clinton, it sought transformation via Israeli-Arab peace; under George W. Bush it sought change via democratic revolution. Yet the next two decades only demonstrated the limits of US power. Israeli-Arab peace proved elusive, despite the microscopic attention of Clinton. Bush's democratic revolution never escaped the tar pit of its birth, Iraq. Iran, meanwhile, moved steadily towards a nuclear capability. The end of America's hegemony does not mean the end of US power in the Middle East, but it does mean a change in perceptions of that power. As former French foreign minister Herbert Vedrine once observed of US hegemony globally, it was not oppressive, but existed ``in people's heads'' -- and so it has been in the Middle East. Had the US been more successful, or less ambitious, in its designs for regional transformation over the past two decades, it might still be in people's heads. Instead, diplomatic and military failures have confirmed in the minds of foes and friends that American hegemony has proven to be something less than was initially promised or feared. 64 A2: Afghan Minerals Solve Heg Mineral access in Afghanistan uncertain and very long term--positives are all media spin Cordesman, CSIS strategic analyst in the area of Afghanistan, 6/16/10 p. http://csis.org/publication/realism-afghanistan-rethinking-uncertain-case-war DA 7/15/10 The carefully spun good news story about Afghan minerals may or may not prove to be economically realistic. It is all too typical of a long series of "breadbasket" arguments that take problem countries and argue that their natural resources can make them wealthy or that they can become major exporters of agricultural products. In practice, it will be at least half a decade before Afghanistan's mineral resources will pay off, and the key outside investors are likely to be Chinese, Russian, and local. It is very unlikely that firms can compete without bribes and incentives as the cost of doing business, and even if US registered companies do invest, they are likely to operate as nonUS entities in ways than minimize any economic benefits to the US. 65 ***Regional Stability/Pakistan/Terror*** 66 Presence Destabilizing--Region India and other nations freaked out by U.S. presence--threat of regional destablization may create a self-fulfilling prophecy Goodenough, international editor for CNS News, 6/23/10 p. http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/68268 (Patrick, "Obama's Troop Withdrawal" DA 7/15/10) Karzai's outreach, coupled with Obama's Afghanistan timeline, has set off alarm bells in India, boosting concerns arising from Afghanistan's long history of conflict, the spillover of instability and terrorism into the wider region, and deep suspicions of rival Pakistan. Times of India foreign editor Chidanand Rajghatta opined Wednesday that many allies "have begun to express doubts about the U.S. purpose and resolve in Afghanistan." "There is talk once again of `good Taliban' and bad Taliban and efforts to draw the former into the power structure in Kabul, a move engendered by the growing belief that the U.S is not going to win the war in Afghanistan," he said. U.S. Presence in Afghanistan Feeds Pakistan's Insurgency Making Pakistan Question US Tactics Innocent, 2009 (Malou, U.S. Presence in Afghanistan Feeds Pakistan's Insurgency, CATO Institute, http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/2009/06/10/us-presence-in-afghanistan-feeds-pakistans-insurgency/, June 21, July 14 2010) Yesterday's attack on Peshawar's Pearl Continental Hotel was the latest signal of Pakistan's growing Islamist insurgency. Since the raid by the Pakistani government on the Red Mosque (Lal Masjid) in Islamabad in July 2007, a wave of revenge attacks against the army and the government has been launched by loose networks of suicide bombers. It's possible, depending on the culprit, that the recent attack in Peshawar might have been retribution for the Pakistan army's month-long offensive against extremists in the country's northwest districts. While the United States hopes to eliminate the threat from extremists in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the knock-on effects from U.S.-NATO efforts to stabilize Afghanistan destabilize Pakistan. America's presence in the region feeds Pakistan's insurgency. If America's interests lie in stabilizing Pakistan, and ensuring that the virus of anti-American radicalism does not infect the rest of the country, the fundamental objective should be to get out of Afghanistan in a reasonable time frame. 67 Pakistan Scenario--Destabilization Success in Afghanistan just moves the operatives into Pakistan destabilizing their government Rubin and Rashid, Dir. Of Intl Studies @ NYU and fellow @ Pacific Council 2008 p. l/n (Barnett and Ahmed, "From Great Game to Grand Bargain" Foreign Affairs DA 7/5/10) Seven years after the U.S.-led coalition and the Afghan commanders it supported pushed the leaderships of the Taliban and al Qaeda out of Afghanistan and into Pakistan, an insurgency that includes these and other groups is gaining ground on both the Afghan and the Pakistani sides of the border. Four years after Afghanistan's first-ever presidential election, the increasingly besieged government of Hamid Karzai is losing credibility at home and abroad. Al Qaeda has established a new safe haven in the tribal agencies of Pakistan, where it is defended by a new organization, the Taliban Movement of Pakistan. The government of Pakistan, beset by one political crisis after another and split between a traditionally autonomous military and assertive but fractious elected leaders, has been unable to retain control of its own territory and population. Its intelligence agency stands accused of supporting terrorism in Afghanistan, which in many ways has replaced Kashmir as the main arena of the stillunresolved struggle between Pakistan and India. 68 Pakistan Scenario--Destabilization US presence destabilizes Pakistan and turns popular and political sentiment in Pakistan against the U.S. Coll, 2009 (Steven gave this in a testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and is a Foreign Relations Specialist at the New Heritage Foundation. "Afghanistan's Impact on Pakistan", New Heritage Foundation, http://www.newamerica.net/publications/resources/2009/afghanistans_impact_on_pakistan, October 7, July 15 2010) It seems useful to begin with an assessment of where U.S. interests in Pakistan are located. The success of Pakistan - that is, its emergence as a stable, modernizing, prosperous, pluralistic country, at peace with its neighbors and within its borders, and integrated economically in South and Central Asia - is important, even vital, not only to the United States but to the broader international community. The nuclear danger in South Asia alone argues for risk-taking investments in Pakistan's success. In addition, any durable American "exit strategy" from Afghanistan will depend upon the emergence of a stable Pakistan that is moving toward normalization with India and the reduction of extremism within its borders. For nearly four decades, Pakistan's struggle to achieve its constitutional and founding ideals of democracy, pluralism, and a culture rooted in a modernizing Islam have been impeded in part by the spillover effects of continual warfare in Afghanistan. These spillover effects have influenced the militarization of Pakistanis politics, encouraged the development of a "paranoid style" in Pakistani security doctrines, and more recently, helped to radicalize sections of the country's population. The United States today is a catalyzing power in this same, continual Afghan warfare. U.S. actions in Afghanistan since 2001 have amplified the debilitating spillover effects of the Afghan war on Pakistan. To name a few examples: The lightly resourced, complacent U.S. approach to Afghanistan following the ouster of the Taliban in late 2001 effectively chased Islamist insurgents into Pakistan, contributing to its destabilization. Dormant, often directionless U.S. diplomacy in the region failed to bridge the deepening mistrust among the Kabul, Islamabad, and New Delhi governments after 2001, or to challenge successfully the Pakistani military's tolerance of Islamist extremist groups, including the Afghan Taliban. In Pakistan itself, the U.S. relied for too long and too exclusively on former President Pervez Musharraf and failed to challenge his marginalization of political opponents or his coddling of Islamist extremists. During these years, narrowly conceived, transparently self-interested U.S. policies caused many Pakistanis to conclude, to some extent correctly, that the American presence in their region was narrowly conceived, self-interested, and ultimately unreliable. A recent poll of Pakistani public opinion carried out by the Pew Global Attitudes Project found that only sixteen percent of Pakistanis have a favorable view of the United States.1 That discouraging number has been more or less consistent since 2001; the only time it spiked, to just above twenty-five percent, was in 2006, after the United States pledged $500 million in aid to Pakistan and after it played a visible and significant role in an earthquake relief effort in Pakistani-held Kashmir. The Senate's recent unanimous passage of the Kerry-Lugar bill, providing $1.5 billion in aid to Pakistan for each of the next five years, offers a foothold to begin shifting U.S. policy in a more rewarding direction. However, it would be a mistake to underestimate the depth of the resentments and sources of instability in Pakistan that now confront the United States. A poll carried out by Gallup and Al Jazeera in July asked a sample of Pakistanis what constituted the biggest threat to Pakistan's security. Fifty-nine percent answered that it was the United States, followed by eighteen percent who named India and only eleven percent who named the Taliban. 69 Pakistan Scenario--Destabilization War is not winnable the U.S. presence only exacerbates problems--without a U.S. presence the desire for a global jihad would collapse--Pakistan collapse now Fuller, former CIA station chief in Kabul, 10/2/09 p. l/n in Christian Science Monitor DA 7/15/10 Many decades ago, as a fledgling CIA officer in the field, I was naively convinced that if the facts were reported back to Washington correctly, everything else would take care of itself in policymaking. The first loss of innocence comes with the harsh recognition that "all politics are local" and that overseas realities bear only a partial relationship to foreignpolicy formulation back home. So in President Obama's new policy directions for Afghanistan, what goes down in Washington politics far outweighs analyses of local conditions. I that the war in Afghanistan is not being won, indeed is not winnable within any practicable framework. Obama possesses the intelligence and insight to grasp these realities. But had hoped that Obama would level with the American people such an admission - however accurate - would sign the political death warrant of a president to be portrayed as having snatched defeat out of the jaws of "victory." The "objective" situation in Afghanistan remains a mess. The details are well known. Senior commanders acknowledge that we are not now winning hearts and minds in Afghanistan; indeed, we never can, and certainly not at gunpoint. Most Pashtuns will never accept a US plan for Afghanistan's future. The non-Pashtuns - Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, etc. - naturally welcome any outside support in what is a virtual civil war. America has inadvertently ended up choosing sides. US forces are perceived by large numbers of Afghans as an occupying army inflicting large civilian casualties. The struggle has now leaked into Pakistan - with even higher stakes. Obama's policies would seem an unsatisfying compromise among contending arguments. Thirty thousand more troops will not turn the tide; arguably they present more American targets for attack. They will heighten traditional xenophobia against foreigners traipsing through Pashtun villages and homes. It is a fool's errand to persuade the locals in Pashtun territory that the Taliban are the enemy and the US is their friend. Whatever mixed feelings Pashtuns have toward the Taliban, they know the Taliban remain the single most important element of Pashtun political life; the Taliban will be among them long after Washington tires of this mission. The strategy of the Bush era envisioned Afghanistan as a vital imperial outpost in a post-Soviet dream world where hundreds of overseas US bases would cement US global hegemony, keeping Russia and China in check and the US on top . That world vision is gone - except to a few Washington diehards who haven't grasped the new emerging global architectures of power, economics, prestige, and influence. The Taliban will inevitably figure significantly in the governance of almost any future Afghanistan, like it or not. Future Taliban leaders, once rid of foreign occupation, will have little incentive to support global jihadi schemes - they never really have by choice. The Taliban inherited bin Laden as a poison pill from the past when they came to power in 1996 and have learned a bitter lesson about what it means to lend state support to a prominent terrorist group. The Taliban with a voice in power will have every incentive to welcome foreign money and expertise into the country, including the Pashtun regions - as long as it is not part of a Western strategic package. An austere Islamic regime is not the ideal outcome for Afghanistan, but it is by far the most realistic. To reverse ground realities and achieve a markedly different outcome is not in the cards and will pose the same dilemma to Obama next year. Meanwhile, Pakistan will never be willing or able to solve Washington's Afghanistan dilemma. Pakistan's own stability has been brought to the very brink by US demands that it solve America's self-created problem in Afghanistan. Pakistan will eventually be forced to resolve Afghanistan itself - but only after the US has gone, and only by making a pact with Taliban forces both inside Afghanistan and in Pakistan itself. Washington will not accept that for now, but it will ultimately be forced to fairly soon. Maybe the Pakistanis can root out bin Laden, but meanwhile, Al Qaeda has extended its autonomous franchises around the world, and terrorists can train and plan almost anywhere in the world; they do not need Afghanistan. By now, as in so many other elements of the Global War on Terror, the US has become more part of the problem than part of the solution. We are sending troops to defend troops that themselves constitute an affront to Afghan nationalism. Only expeditious American withdrawal from Afghanistan will prevent exacerbation of the problem. Afghans must face the complex mechanics of internal struggle and reconciliation. They have done so over long periods of their history. The ultimate outcome is of greater strategic consequence to Pakistan, Russia, China, Iran, India, and others in the region than to the US. Europe and Canada have lost all stomach for this mission that is now promoted primarily in terms of "saving NATO" for future (and obsolescent) "out of area" struggles in a world in which Western strategic preferences can no longer predominate. In a crucial counterbalance to the mini-surge, Obama wisely establishes a date for genuine withdrawal in 2011 - thereby putting Kabul on notice to start solving its own problems. The "surge" may just be worth it if it enables Obama to put the US military and Kabul on notice that time is quickly running out to demonstrate genuine political and military progress - reflecting Gorbachev's ultimatum to the Red . Obama has only kicked the can down the road to a possibly even more difficult place both at home and abroad next year. Only with immense luck will his real goal - creation of the minimally acceptable terms for an American withdrawal - come into sight, providing a tiny fig leaf to mask what will essentially constitute a strategic American failure that was inherent in this situation nearly from the beginning in Army in Afghanistan when he came to power. So the ugly struggle continues with little prospect for genuine improvement. There are no good choices America's global military response to the challenge of 9/11. 70 Pakistan Scenario--India War U.S. military presence draws in Pakistan weakening their strategic depth and prompting a collapse of their state inviting Indian aggression Akhtar, senior ME analyst at Islam.net, 1/26/10 p. http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite? c=Article_C&cid=1262372328640&pagename=Zone-English-Muslim_Affairs%2FMAELayout DA 7/15/10 If it is a war against extremists and militancy inside Pakistan, it is a civil war because its origins stem from the US, NATO occupation of neighboring Afghanistan. The conflict should be seen as an extension of the ongoing resistance of the Afghan people to alien domination. It is inaccurate to say that the US invaded Afghanistan because of the 9/11 attacks by Al-Qaeda. Former BBC correspondent George Arney reported on September 18, 2001, that Niaz Naik, the former Pakistani foreign secretary, had told him that he was informed by US officials at a UN-sponsored international contact group on Afghanistan in Berlin during July that year that unless Osama bin Laden were handed over swiftly, America would take military action to kill or capture both Bin Laden and Mullah Omar. The wider objective, however, was to topple the Taliban regime and install a transitional government under King Mohammad Zahir Shah. The invasion was to take place in mid-October 2001. Mr. Naik went on to say that he doubted that the US would have abandoned its plan to invade Afghanistan even if Osama were handed over by the Taliban. Arney's story is corroborated by the Guardian correspondent David Leigh in his report published on September 26, 2001, in which he revealed that the Taliban had received specific warning by the US through secret diplomacy in Berlin in July that the Bush Administration would topple the entire regime militarily unless Osama is extradited to the US. This was part of the larger design of US military, industrial complex to bring about regime change in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran. As the US needed bases in Pakistan to accomplish its preplanned invasion of Afghanistan, the Bush Administration sought to use Islamabad as a cat's paw to pull the chestnuts out of the fire. Fortunately for President Bush, a usurper ruled there, devoid of all legitimacy, legal and moral, and he readily and willingly succumbed to US pressure and made a U-turn by severing all links with the Taliban. He even joined the war against Afghanistan instead of using his leverage with the Taliban to exhaust all means of peaceful settlement of the dispute. The entire region, including Pakistan, was declared a war zone by the US military command, and the flights of all passenger planes were prohibited over a certain altitude, while no merchant ships could enter the harbors of Pakistan, thus bringing maritime trade (which comprises approximately 95 percent of Pakistan's import-export trade) to a standstill. It is no wonder that Pakistan suffered a loss of 34 billion dollars because of its involvement in the Afghan war. America's War The sinister motive behind such acts of terror is to incite sectarian violence in Pakistan and lay the blame at the doors of religious extremists. As one can see, it was America's war that was imposed upon Pakistan. Whether Pakistan could have avoided the war is a matter of controversy among politicians and political observers. But the war has fuelled insurgency in Pakistan's hitherto peaceful tribal territory adjacent to Afghanistan. This insurgency shows no sign of abatement, as terrorist attacks on military and civilian centers in the capital and major cities of the North-West Frontier Province and Punjab continue with a vengeance, posing threat to the security of the state. In the meantime, routine predator strikes by the US in Waziristan have taken a heavy toll of civilian lives amid accusations of Islamabad's complicity in the piratical attacks on tribespeople, which prompts them to resort to retaliatory strikes on the perpetrators. Not satisfied with Pakistan's military operations in the tribal region, the US Administration has compelled Islamabad's fragile government to pull out its troops from the tense Indo-Pak border and deploy them in the restive tribal belt along the Pak-Afghan border. Now Pakistan faces existential threat from the Taliban and not India, a perception which the country's military leadership is not prepared to share, given the unresolved disputes with New Delhi, which triggered four wars during the last 62 years. At the same time, speculation (not entirely unfounded) is rife about the involvement of the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) and the former Blackwater (now christened Xe Services) in murder, mayhem, and gunrunning as evidenced by the armed Americans who drive consulate vehicles through cities and, when intercepted, refuse to disclose their identity. It is here that one recalls with dismay the role of General Stanley McChrystal, who until last year headed the Joint Special Operations Command, which runs drone attacks and targeted assassinations with the assistance of the operatives of the former Blackwater. This was revealed by Jeremy Scahill's investigative report published in the US weekly the Nation. That may, perhaps, solve the mystery 71 surrounding a series of assassinations of ulama belonging to various Islamic movements. The sinister motive behind such acts of terror is to incite sectarian violence in Pakistan and lay the blame at the doors of religious extremists. Similar death squads were organized by the CIA in El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua to carry out political assassinations of nationalists who were opposed to US intervention. At the time, the Sandinista government of Nicaragua complained to the International Court of Justice about the mining of Nicaraguan ports, the violation of the country's airspace, the killing and kidnapping of individuals on the Nicaraguan territory, and the threat or use of force by the US. The court in its decision in June 1986 held that the US was in breach of the customary rules of international law and international humanitarian law. The above case is titled the "Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua." The precedent set by this case may be invoked by Pakistan to prevent the US drone attacks on its territory. Once the piratical attacks of the US have stopped, the irritant in the tribal insurgency would have gone, paving the way for pacification of the conflict. If this were Pakistan's war, the government would have exercised its own judgment in dealing with the militants at home, either by conciliation or by resort to force. But Islamabad's so-called operation against militants is subordinated to US military designs in the region, aimed at the encirclement of the People's Republic of China and the control of the transit of gas pipelines from Central Asia to South Asia. It is not aimless that China expressed its concern over the concentration of US, NATO troops in the region. India fits in the American scheme of things, hence the US-India nuclear deal. Pakistan's National Interest Islamabad has adopted double standards in dealing with the Baluchistan militants and the Pashtun militants. In this emerging security environment, Pakistan will have to be content with its role as a junior partner of India. Therefore, the sooner Islamabad extricates itself from the US "war on terror," the better it is for its security and independence. Doesn't Islamabad realize that its military operation against the militants would leave its border with India vulnerable to a New Delhi offensive? If Pakistan permits the US to attack the suspected training centers of militants on its territory, will it be able to prevent India from doing so? With Islamabad embroiled in internecine strife, it cannot negotiate with India from a position of strength. It may be forced to make a compromise that might be detrimental to its national interest. Pakistan's preoccupation with tribal rebellion would not permit it to deal with separatist ethnic forces in Baluchistan. Undoubtedly, this is a threat to the territorial integrity of Pakistan. After the total failure of the military operation in Baluchistan, the federal government has come round to the painful conclusion that political and not military action can bring militancy to an end. Granting general amnesty to the dissidents and engaging them in a meaningful dialogue on contentious issues is a laudable initiative. The same gesture should be made to the militants in the tribal areas. But Islamabad has adopted double standards in dealing with the Baluchistan militants and the Pashtun militants, as if there were good militants and bad ones. This discriminatory policy would intensify the Pashtun insurgency and might drive them toward even more escalation. The rulers have seen the consequences of military operations in the former East Pakistan, Baluchistan, Karachi, Sind, and FATA (federally administered tribal areas). If anything, the situation has only worsened. The surge of US troops, the expansion of war beyond the borders of Afghanistan, and the attacks on Quetta and Muridke as envisaged by Obama's new strategy would mean that US troops are at war with the people of Pakistan. 72 Pakistan Collapse Bad--War Radicalized and collapsed Pakistan war and instability Cordesman, CSIS strategic analyst in the area of Afghanistan, 6/16/10 p. http://csis.org/publication/realism-afghanistan-rethinking-uncertain-case-war DA 7/15/10 Experts disagree sharply about Pakistan's instability and vulnerability in the face of a US and ISAF defeat in Afghanistan. There is no way to predict how well Pakistan can secure its border and deal with its own Islamic extremists, and Pakistan is both a nuclear state and a far more serious potential source of support to other extremist movements than Afghanistan. A hardline dominated Pakistan would be a serious strategic threat to the US and its friends and allies, and would sharply increase the risk of another major Indo-Pakistani conflict. 73 Pakistan Scenario--Anti U.S. Sentiment Pakistani Civilians Blame the United States Presence in Afghanistan for Terrorism in Pakistan USA Today 7/2 (USA Today is a popular, national American daily newspaper published by the Gannett Company. "Pakistanis blame U.S. after shrine attack kills 42". USA Today. http://www.usatoday.com/ne ws/washington/2010-07-02-pakistan-us-strike_N.htm. 2010. July 15, 2010. Two suicide bombings that killed 42 at a popular Sufi shrine in Pakistan's east stirred outrage in this terror-scarred nation Friday. Several people blamed the U.S. presence in Afghanistan for spurring the attacks, while some faulted a minority sect that itself was viciously targeted weeks ago. The bombings of Lahore's Data Darbar shrine, the burial site of a famous Sufi saint, struck at the heart of the moderate Islam most Pakistanis practice. The assault wounded 180 people and again demonstrated the potency of militant groups that are linked to but operate far from the northwest tribal areas bordering Afghanistan. Thousands of people had gathered late Thursday at the green-domed shrine when bombs went off minutes apart in separate sections. The blasts ripped concrete from the walls, twisted metal gates and left the white marble floor awash with blood. Worshippers scattered as white plumes of smoke blanketed the area, footage showed. There was no claim of responsibility, but Islamist extremists consider Sufism to be heretical, and they have previously struck non-Sunni sects. Still, several Pakistanis interviewed Friday said the real root of the problem was the U.S. presence in Afghanistan and its missile strikes against militants in Pakistan's tribal regions. "America is killing Muslims in Afghanistan and in our tribal areas, and militants are attacking Pakistan to express anger against the government for supporting America," said Zahid Umar, 25, who frequently visits the shrine. Pakistanis are suffering because of American policies and aggression in the region, said Mohammed Asif, 34, who runs an auto workshop in Lahore. He and others said the attacks would end if the U.S. would pull out of Afghanistan. The U.S. Embassy issued a statement Friday condemning the attack, and saying it "demonstrates the terrorists' blatant disregard for the lives of the Pakistani people and the future of this country." Several other Pakistanis interviewed blamed the Ahmadis, a minority sect that has long faced discrimination in Pakistan. On May 28 in Lahore, gunmen and a suicide squad targeted two Ahmadi mosques, massacring at least 93 people. "I think the Ahmadis were behind the attack" on the Sufi shrine, said Lahore resident Mohammad Amir, accusing the sect of seeking revenge. He offered no evidence to back up his claim. Lahore, capital of Punjab province, is a key military, political and cultural hub. The city has witnessed several audacious attacks on diverse targets over the past two years, from crowded markets to Sri Lanka's cricket team. The Pakistani government has been criticized for lacking the will to crack down on militants in Punjab, the country's most populous and most powerful region. Many of the militants are part of now-banned groups launched with government support in the 1980s and '90s to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan and pressure archenemy India. Many of these groups have formed links with the Pakistani Taliban, which has recruited militants to carry out attacks in parts of Pakistan far from its sanctuary in the northwest. During Thursday's attack, the first bomber detonated his explosives in an underground room where visitors sleep and wash themselves before praying. Minutes later, a second bomber struck upstairs in a large courtyard in front of the shrine as people tried to flee. Police investigated a possible third blast, but concluded there were only two suicide bombers, whose heads were later found, said Khusro Pervez, a senior government official in Lahore. Overnight, the death toll rose to 42, he said. Police said 180 were wounded. Pakistani officials condemned the bombings, using language they have frequently used to try to convince the population that the fight against militancy is not one they can ignore. The efforts have had limited success in a country where anti-Americanism is widespread and engaging conspiracy theories is a national pastime. "Those who still pretend that we are not a nation at war are complicit in these deaths," said Farahnaz Ispahani, a spokeswoman for Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari. The attacks have fueled anger against Pakistan's weak police forces, who appear helpless to stop the killings. In the hours after Thursday's bombings, demonstrators gathered outside the shrine to protest the security lapse, only to be dispersed after police fired into the air and threw rocks at them. Pervez said recent intelligence alerts about possible attacks lacked details. "The intelligence agencies alerted us that terrorists could target prominent places, shrines and mosques in Lahore. They mentioned names of major places as a possible target, but no specific information was available to us," he said. Also Friday, militants attacked a security checkpoint on the outskirts of the northwestern city of Peshawar, killing three officers, said Safwat Ghayur, a regional commander of the Frontier Constabulary security force. He said officers also returned fire and killed some of the attackers. 74 Presence Bad--Radicalization The presence of American soldiers fuels the insurgency and national instability, pullout solves Dorronsoro 09 [Gilles, Previously, Dorronsoro was a professor of political science at the Sorbonne, Paris and the Institute of Political Studies of Rennes. He also served as the scientific coordinator at the French Institute of Anatolian Studies in Istanbul, Turkey., Focus and Exit: An Alternative Strategy for the Afghan War, Policy Brief, Carnegie Endowment, January, DA 7/16/10] After seven years of war, the international community has failed to create the conditions for a sustainable Afghan state. The reality is that the international coalition now has limited resources and a narrow political time frame to create lasting Afghan institutions. Yet building such institutions is our only realistic exit strategy. The debate in Washington and European capitals has recently centered on how many more troops will be sent to Afghanistan in 2009 as part of a military surge. Such a tactical adjustment is unlikely to make much of a difference in a country where the basic population-to-troops ratio is estimated at approximately 430 people per foreign soldier. The real question is how combat troops should be used. The two choices we face are whether to continue playing offense by going after the Taliban, especially in the south and the east, and spreading troops thin; or whether to adopt a new strategy focusing on protecting strategic sites, namely, urban centers and key roads, to allow for the development of a strong core of Afghan institutions. Key conclusions: Objectives in Afghanistan must be reconciled with the resources available to pursue them. The mere presence of foreign soldiers fighting a war in Afghanistan is probably the single most important factor in the resurgence of the Taliban. The best way to weaken, and perhaps divide, the armed opposition is to reduce military confrontations. The main policy objective should be to leave an Afghan government that is able to survive a U.S. withdrawal. Strategy should differentiate three areas and allocate resources accordingly: strategic cities and transportation routes that must be under total Afghan/alliance control; buffers around strategic areas, where NATO and the Afghan Army would focus their struggle against insurgents; and opposition territory, where NATO and Afghan forces would not expend effort or resources. Withdrawal will allow the United States to focus on the central security problem in the region: al-Qaeda and the instability in Pakistan. 75 Presence Bad--Terrorism Fighting proxy wars against terrorism is a failing strategy Babbin, former undersecretary of defense under Bush Sr., 5/4/10 (Jed, "Are We Losing in Afghanistan?" http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2010/05/04/are_we_losing_in_afghanistan_105426.html, DA 7/3/10) Which the Bush administration before, and the Obama administration now, have not been willing to face up to. And that - regardless of timetables - is the fundamental flaw in America's approach to counterinsurgency (i.e. "nation-building") in Iraq and now Afghanistan. As I wrote in the Washington Times on September 12, 2001 - and on many occasions since - the nations that sponsor terrorism are our principal enemy in this war. We need not make war against all of the nations that sponsors terrorism. But until we recognize that we cannot end state sponsorship of terrorism by fighting proxy wars, we cannot "win" anywhere at all. 76 Presence Bad--Terrorism Arab and Muslim Countries like Afghanistan and Pakistan Hate the US for their Occupation. Balles 6/23 (Paul is a writer that focuses on human injustices across the globe. "The kin of the dead can't forget why they hate America". Redress Information and Analysis. http://www.redress.cc/americas/pjballes20100623. 2010. July 15 2010.) Paul J. Balles says the reason why so many people in the Arab and Muslim worlds hate the United States is not envy of American wealth or power but injustice and greed. And the solution is simple: "Stop occupying their countries. Stop controlling others' land, populations, governments and resources." Pakistani writer Mohsin Hamid tells of a polite Oklahoman who held a copy of his latest novel, The Reluctant Fundamentalist, and examined the face on its cover, comparing it to Hamid's. The Oklahoman then said to the Muslim writer, nodding once as if to dip the brim of an imaginary hat: "So tell me, sir. Why do they hate us?" Hamid then goes on to voice the propaganda he'd been fed, attributing it to envy, adding: "The richest, most powerful country in the world attracts the jealousy of others in much the same way that the richest, most powerful man in a small town attracts the jealousy of others." "America is a tyrant to the world just as Israel is a tyrant to the Middle East; and America becomes a greater tyrant for its mindless support of Israel." Of course, the Washington Post, which published Hamid's article, devoured his explanation as if he was serving them and the country a lesson in deserved pride. Hamid does finally add more answer to: why do they hate us? "Simply because America has often for what seemed good reasons at the time intervened to shape the destinies of other countries and then, as a nation, walked away." As true as that reflection on his own experiences with both America and Pakistan might be, it turns two blind eyes toward the most egregious of America's foreign maladies. Along with the control of other's land, populations, governments and resources has come the Sword of Damocles: imminent and ever-present peril faced by those in positions of power. The excessive fear of terrorists and terrorism held by vast numbers of Americans feeds on the mythical sword hanging over their heads on the thinnest thread. "...stop the military killing sprees! Stop the murders and destruction that breed hatred. What percentage, from the millions of dead, etched on the handles of your guns, is needed to sire retribution?" "A tyrant's fear is complete fear" as it is the tyrant's place to sit daily under the sword. America is a tyrant to the world just as Israel is a tyrant to the Middle East; and America becomes a greater tyrant for its mindless support of Israel. According to the Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz, "The Jordanian national that attacked a US military base in Afghanistan, killing seven CIA agents, was furious over the Israel's Gaza offensive, the London-based Arabic daily Al-Quds Al-Arabi reported..." An MSNBC anchor asked, "What can we do to stop them from hating us?" A TV anchor for a major media asking a question as stupid as that deserved to have the answer shouted at her: "Stop occupying their countries. Stop controlling others' land, populations, governments and resources," Most of all stop the military killing sprees! Stop the murders and destruction that breed hatred. What percentage, from the millions of dead, etched on the handles of your guns, is needed to sire retribution? The bombs, the drones, the F-15s, the assault rifles, the sub-machine-guns, the rocket-propelled grenades, the bunker busters, the cruise missiles, the smart bombs, the E-bombs, the dirty-bombs, the MOABs, the Stingers the Sidewinder missiles, the Strykers, the Bradleys, the M1 tanks, the grenades all bloody murder weapons. "We Americans run around the world like Mafia gangsters, beating up and eliminating those who don't accept America as the Godfather." We Americans run around the world like Mafia gangsters, beating up and eliminating those who don't accept America as the Godfather. What have we been doing in Iraq since we invaded it on a pretext a fraud, a lie by conmen in the White House? How many of the millions dead have families who love America? Will those forced into refugee camps teach their children not to hate America? The same applies to Afghanistan and Pakistan and to the families of the slaughtered to bring "democracy" to help satisfy the fake "envy" of America. The same is true of those who have suffered in occupied Palestine, in Gaza, in Lebanon from Israel, the puppet that controls its master. The kin of the dead can't forget why they hate America. 77 Instability Impact--Nuclear Terrorism Theft and destruction of nuclear materials possible Shah 09 [Saeed, Special to The Globe and Mail, Terrorist assault shows increased threat of extremists; Day-long raid and hostage crisis expose vulnerability of military sites, raise concerns over security of nuclear arsenal, The Globe and Mail, Lexis Nexis Acadmic, 10/12/09, DA 7/15/10] The devastating terrorist assault on Pakistan's military headquarters that ended yesterday after nearly 24 hours exposed the threat of extremist groups operating in the heart of the country and the vulnerability of its most sensitive sites, raising concerns over the security of its nuclear arsenal. The raid and ensuing hostage crisis resulted in the death of a total of 11 army personnel and civilians inside the military complex in Rawalpindi, while nine terrorists were killed and their ringleader captured, injured but alive. A rescue operation early yesterday brought out 39 hostages, but three others died. It was the climax of a week that began with a suicide bombing that killed five people last Monday at a UN aid agency office in the heart of the capital, and saw 53 people killed Friday in a market bombing in Peshawar, as the army is about to begin a planned U.S.-backed offensive against the Pakistani Taliban in the country's wild Wazirstan region on the border with Afghanistan. Evidence pointed to assailants from Pakistan's core Punjab province, rather than ethnic Pashtuns from Wazirstan and elsewhere on the northwest fringe. Some experts said that Pakistan's military establishment, long accused of backing some extremist groups while cracking down on others, should now be forced to finally abandon its deadly game of good militant, bad militant, as once-loyal groups have repeatedly turned against the Pakistani state. The accused ringleader of the attackers, Aqeel alias Dr. Usman, came from Punjab province, almost certainly from a militant outfit that was once patronized by officials, who had linked up with Taliban groups from the northwest. Punjab is untouched by the military's anti-extremist operations. "The only thing that stands between al-Qaeda and nuclear weapons is the Pakistan army," said Shaun Gregory, a professor at Britain's Bradford University and an expert on Pakistan's nuclear weapons. "It is an incredible shock that terrorists can strike at the heart of GHQ [general headquarters]. ... Terrorists could mount this sort of assault against Pakistan's nuclear installations." Most of the terrorist attacks seen in Pakistan during the past two years have been suicide bomb strikes, but the GHQ attack was a commando-style or fidayeen assault by welltrained jihadists against a highly protected target. Such military-style tactics could be used against nuclear sites, Prof. Gregory said, which could result in installations being bombed or set on fire, or nuclear material could be stolen. The same sort of attack was seen in the blitz on Mumbai in late 2008 by a Pakistan-based group, and the ambush of the visiting Sri Lankan cricket team in the Pakistani city of Lahore earlier this year. Aqeel was already being hunted as the mastermind of that attack. U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton said the GHQ attack was "another reminder that the extremists in Pakistan are increasingly threatening the authority of the state." 78 Collapse Impact--Destabilization Spillover from Afghanistan collapses Pakistan and risks a massive conflagaration Pandya is a Senior Associate at the Henry L. Stimson Center, 2009 p. http://www.stimson.org/pub.cfm? id=701 DA 7/13/10 As the collective capacity of the Kabul government, NATO and the US to control events weakens, Afghanistan's neighbors including Iran, Pakistan and India will pursue competitive military and security policies through proxies, with devastating consequences for the Afghan people. In the absence of a bold new initiative of political reconciliation, the reemergence of an unstable political order inimical to US interests is only a matter of time. Defeat in Afghanistan will seriously undercut NATO's credibility and call into question at the outset its capacity to conduct the new type of mission embodied in Afghanistan. Deterioration of the security situation in Afghanistan will spill over into Pakistan, adding to the already high level of violence there. In Pakistan, further economic deterioration of a country of 150 million people will add to political instability and the growth of armed militancy, which in turn will affect its neighbors and the world. US pressure for a military and paramilitary solution to the violence on the frontier will alienate civilian opinion in Pakistan and will in fact lead to further destabilization of the security environment. 79 Instability Impact--Regional Stability Taliban takeover of Pakistan spills over into the entire region CNN 09 [Interview with P. Chidambaram, Indian federal home minister by Karan Thapar, Indian minister says Taleban's growing influence "very bad" for South Asia, by Karan Thapar, BBC, Lexis Nexis Academic, 3/24/9, DA 7/15/10] [Karan Thapar]: Do you believe the recent developments... have made Pakistan a more stable country, or do you think a precarious equilibrium that lasted for seven months has been disturbed? [P. Chidambaram]: Well, I can't make a judgment on that, but we're not happy with the turmoil... Turmoil across our border has a tendency to spill over in different ways... If they have reached a settlement and that settlement will provide greater stability to the civilian government I'll be happy. But, for the time being I'd like to reserve judgment... [Karan Thapar]: There are several components... The first is [Pakistan President] Asif Ali Zardari. He always says things that sound very reassuring to Indian ears. But do you believe he's sincere or is this just rhetoric? [ellipses as received] [P. Chidambaram]: Well, I don't have to make a judgment on his sincerity. I only need to know what he says and what he does. If there's a wide gap between what they say and what they do then I have to keep my guard high. That's all. [Karan Thapar]: And in the case of Mr. Zardari, does that gap exist...? [P. Chidambaram]: It exists in the case of every Pakistani leader who has commented on the situation post the Mumbai attack. [Karan Thapar]: A second aspect... is the role... played by [army chief] General Parvez Ashfaq Kayani. People in Pakistan say he played a sagacious role in ensuring that the confrontation was reduced and that a consensus was arrived at between the quarrelling political parties. Are you reassured by his presence and behaviour, or do you have a sense of doubt and concern? [P. Chidambaram]: Well, I don't know him. All I know is what I hear. I'm told the Army is a centre of power. I'm told the Army has brokered some kind of peace between the Prime Minister and the President. Now, who wields real authority in Pakistan I can't say, but if General Kayani is a moderating influence, if he has brokered peace between the president and the prime minister, well that's a good piece of news. But I've no information to make a judgment on these matters. [Karan Thapar]: The other element is the spreading influence of the Taleban and other fundamentalist organizations... How do you view the peace deals the Zardari government has done with the Taleban...? [P. Chidambaram]: Very bad for South Asia. It's bad for Pakistan, it's bad for the rest of South Asia. We cannot countenance a regime like the Taleban regime, that's opposed to every notion of civilized democratic government that we accept, and we're trying to build India on that foundation. But if the Taleban's influence spreads in Pakistan then I'm sorry for the people of Pakistan. But it worries me because the Taleban's influence is spreading and it could spill over into India. [Karan Thapar]: Would it have security implications for us...? [P. Chidambaram]: See, the induction of any force into Pakistan does alter the security situation. Does it alter it for the better or for the worse, I can't say. The point is India is trying to help Afghanistan find its feet. We are helping them in many ways. We've a policy on Afghanistan which is quite explicit. We've made it clear. There's a paragraph in the President's speech. I don't want to say anything beyond that. 80 Pakistan Key Flashpoint Alt cause to Pakistan instabilities internal fighting among extremists and tensions with India Khan 10 [Imran, Member of Parliament for the Mianwali province, The Politics of Pakistan - Democracy & Extremism, Henry Jackson Society, 6/3, DA 7/15/10] Pakistan is a country of enormous importance to international security and the regional stability of South East Asia, not least with regard to its relationship with neighbouring Afghanistan and international interests there. As a nuclear armed state, suffering from internal instability and located within one of the most volatile regions in the world, Pakistan is a vital concern to its international partners and a major source of concern in the international system. The country's ongoing ideological battle with extremism emanating from its Swat tribal region is a contest that must be decisively won in order to ensure internal stability and to make strides towards better governance and a strengthening of democracy. If that were not enough of a challenge alone, Pakistan's efforts to combat extremism are also affected by her uneasy relationship with India, draining resources from the fight against terror and feeding regional instability. Understanding the interplay of these political forces is vital to crafting a constructive approach to the serious challenge these problems pose to the domestic, regional and international orders at stake. 81 ***U.S. Pakistan Relations*** 82 Presence Kills U.S.-Pakistani Relations The U.S. Pakistani Relationship has Only Filled Pakistan with Terrorism, Making Pakistanis Question U.S. Relations with Pakistan Concerning COIN and Counter Terrorism Pakistan Policy Working Group 2008 (The PPWG is an organization attempting to ease tensions between Pakistan and the United States. "The Next Chapter: the United States and Pakistan". Pakistan Policy Working Group. http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/reports/2008/09_pakistan_cohen/09_pakistan_cohen.pdf. February. July 15, 2010.) As Americans learned to their great sorrow on September 11, 2001, what happens in Southwest Asia can profoundly affect their lives. Events in Pakistan directly affect Afghanistan, and the present U.S. Pakistan relationship is rooted in the events of 9/11. The United States cannot afford to see Pakistan fail, nor can it ignore the extremists hiding in Pakistan's tribal areas. The U.S.Pakistan partnership is deeply troubled. U.S. interests in Pakistan are more threatened now than at any time since the Taliban was driven from Afghanistan in 2001. Pakistan's very integrity as a nation is challenged more directly than at any time since the country broke apart following the 1971 IndoPakistani war that led to the creation of Bangladesh. Nuclear-armed Pakistan--the world's sixth most populous country--has no effective control over a large swath of territory along its border with Afghanistan. Dangerous extremist groups that are intent on attacking the United States, such as al-Qaeda, enjoy safe haven in these border areas. Ominously for Pakistanis, these terrorist groups are extending their reach into the more settled portions of Pakistan. Most Pakistanis either blame these problems on Pakistan's counterterrorism cooperation with the U.S. or tend to discount the threat. A recent poll by the International Republican Institute revealed that only 15 percent of Pakistanis think their country should cooperate with the United States to combat terrorism. 83 US Pakistan Relations--Kashmir The US Supports Indo Pak Peace Negotiations The Gaea Times 7/14. ("US supports renewed Indo-Pak talks but not `directly' behind it: Holbrooke". Targana. http://breakingnews.gaeatimes.com/2010/07/14/us-supports-renewed-indo-pak-talks-but-notdirectly-behind-it-holbrooke-39285/. 2010. July 15, 2010) Welcoming the scheduled meeting between External Affairs Minister S M Krishna with his Pakistani counterpart Shah Mehmood Qureshi on July 15, the United States has clarified that it is not `directly' behind the renewed contacts between the two South Asian neighbours. Talking to reporters before leaving for a tour of Germany and South Asian region, President Obama's Special Envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke said the White House would support any effort through which tension between India and Pakistan is reduced. "Anything that reduces tensions and increases confidence between Pakistan and India is certainly something we encourage and support, we are not directly involved (in the process)," The Daily Times quoted Holbrooke, as saying. The U.S. is Encouraging Relations between the United States and Pakistan Indian Express 2010 (Indian Express is an Indian news source that deals with controversial issues, especially those dealing with Indian Foreign Policy. "US to encourage for reduction of Indo-Pak tension: Holbrooke". Indian Express.com. http://www.indianexpress.com/news/us-to-encourage-for-reduction-ofindopak-te/575456/. February 4. July 15 2010. Ruling out any move by the Obama Administration to mediate between India and Pakistan, Special US Representative for Pakistan and Afghanistan, on Thursday said the US would encourage and applaud any effort to reduce tension between the two South Asian neighbors. "I want to be clear that anything that the two countries do to reduce tensions or improve relations will be something we would applaud and encourage," Richard Holbrooke told correspondents at a news briefing at the Washington Foreign Press Center. "But we are not going to act as intermediaries between Islamabad and New Delhi. That is not what we are here to do. I'm not just talking about myself," Holbrooke said in response to a question. The Special US Envoy who is the point man of the Obama Administration on Afghanistan and Pakistan with the mandate to help bring peace and stability in the two countries, also ruled out any attempt to try and resolve the Kashmir dispute between Indian and Pakistan. 84 Indo-Pak War Impact Nuclear war between India and Pakistan leads to massive death tolls, regional famine, and complete trade disruption Wilson 98 [Nicholas, MBChB, FAFPHM, MPH, public health physician and an independent consultant to health organizations, Regional Nuclear War in South Asia: Effects on Surrounding Countries, Medicine & Global Survival, 6/27, DA 7/16/10] The potential effects of nuclear wars involving India, Pakistan, and China on neighboring noncombatant countries and the rest of the world are estimated by applying historical data on nuclear weapons effects and models for nuclear weapons usage to a range of plausible war scenarios involving these three countries. Lethal levels of local radioactive fallout could reach neighboring countries such as Nepal and Bangladesh after nuclear attacks on India. After an India-China conflict, radiation could spread globally and the external radiation alone might be expected in the long-term to cause around 0.6 million cancer deaths in the population living in latitudes 20 to 40 degrees North. Refugee flows, the spread of epidemics, and trade disruptions could have even more severe effects on neighboring countries than the impact from fallout. Nuclear weapon attacks on Pakistan, India, and China would have major impacts on neighboring countries and could spread radioactive fallout globally. Prevention of nuclear war through disarmament measures should be both a regional and global priority. [M&GS 1999;6:24-27] During May 1998 both India and Pakistan undertook a series of nuclear weapons tests that dramatically demonstrated their nuclear weapon capabilities [1]. The current military situation between these countries is relatively unstable as there is major asymmetry in the size of their nuclear arsenals, along with asymmetry in conventional military power. The absence of sophisticated early warning systems and the very short warning times involved also raise the risk of surprise first strike attacks. In the last half of this century India has had three major wars with Pakistan and one with China [see Mian, Z., "The Politics of South Asia's Nuclear Crisis," M&GS 1998;5:78-85]; current border disputes between India and these other countries remain unresolved; and both India and Pakistan have increased military spending [2]. Given this situation, it is likely that this region poses the highest risk of a future nuclear war in the world. Indeed, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists considered the developments in India and Pakistan as a reason for moving the hands of their symbolic doomsday clock forward to nine minutes to midnight [3]. Methodology The following two nuclear war scenarios are considered here (direct and indirect physical effects are based on scaling from the 1985 and 1986 SCOPE studies [4,5]) : An India-Pakistan war in which 25 15-kiloton (kt) Hiroshima-sized warheads are exploded on Pakistani targets and nine similar warheads are exploded on Indian targets (0.27 megaton (Mt) as airbursts, 0.24 Mt as surface bursts). A China-India war involving 25 Hiroshima-sized explosions on Chinese targets and 75 explosions on Indian targets (an even mix of 100 kt and 300 kt weapons; 7.5 Mt as airbursts, 7.9 Mt as surface bursts). Arsenals and Delivery Systems These scenarios represent around half the Indian strategic arsenal (assumed to contain 50 strategic nuclear weapons) and around three-quarters of the Pakistani arsenal (assumed to contain around 12 strategic weapons [6]). There is significant uncertainty surrounding the size of the weapons in these arsenals given the seismological data from recent weapons tests suggesting much smaller yields (less than Hiroshima-size) than the official information released by the Indian and Pakistani Governments [7]. China was assumed to use 30% of its 250 strategic nuclear weapons, which range from 100 kt to 300 kt for most long-range missiles (an average of 200 kt was used) [8]. The delivery systems assumed were aircraft for Indian and Pakistani weapons and aircraft and ballistic missiles for Chinese weapons [6]. As in a number of previous nuclear war scenarios [4], this study assumed an equal mix of air and surface nuclear explosions. In addition to the scenarios developed, the effect of the destruction of all of India's 10 nuclear reactors (with a generating capacity of 1,695 MWE [9]) was considered in terms of its contribution to global fallout (based on a previous reactor attack model [4]). Fallout The levels and distribution of global fallout were based on scaling from the GLODEP [2] model used in the study by the Scientific Committee on Problems of the Environment (SCOPE) [4]. This model produced doses integrated over 50 years without assuming anything about weathering or sheltering. A 50% fission fraction was assumed (as in the scenario used by SCOPE) and the standard risk factor for cancer mortality of 5% per sievert was used for estimating the radiation-induced cancer burden [10]. Results An India-Pakistan War Nuclear explosions of 15 kt over Indian and Pakistani cities in this scenario would probably kill far more people per city than the 120,000 killed at Hiroshima [11]. This is because of the larger and denser One estimate for a 15-kt attack on Bombay suggested that 150,000 to 800,000 deaths would occur within a few weeks [12]. Therefore, it is likely that many millions of citizens in both countries would die in the short term from the 34 explosions occurring in this scenario. The destruction of many major cities in the attacked countries would also be likely to lead to social and political chaos disrupting food production and distribution. This could lead to famines, which may not be alleviated by international aid measures in a turbulent post-war international environment. Also, the destruction of water and sewage systems could increase the risk of disease epidemics among the survivors. These indirect effects could ultimately cause far more mortality than the short-term effects, as has been previously predicted for larger nuclear wars [5]. Such effects could have an impact on neighboring countries, especially if there were large migrations of refugees crossing country borders to escape famine, social chaos, or environments contaminated with radioactivity. Figure 1. A nuclear war between India and Pakistan or between India and populations of modern Asian cities and the higher level of combustible materials and fossil fuels, which increase the risk of firestorms. China would have health and environmental consequences for the entire South Asia region, including neighboring countries Bangladesh and Nepal. This nuclear war could cause immediate deaths from radiation exposure in neighboring countries--depending on meteorological conditions, which vary impacts on the neighboring countries could arise from exposure to sub-lethal local fallout (increased long-term cancer risk), the disruption in cross-border trade of critical products such as food, floods from destroyed dams, and the movements of refugees across borders. Bangladesh would be particularly vulnerable to the consequences of a nuclear attack on Calcutta, and Nepal would suffer from attacks on northern Indian coastal cities. by season. Other 85 ***Solvency*** 86 The current state of the US mirrors that of the USSR before its collapse. The economy is faultering, and it is engaged in a resource draining war in Afghanistan that appears to be unwinnable. Engelhardt 10 [Tom, co-founder of the American Empire Project, runs the Nation Institute's TomDispatch.com. Fellow at The Nation Institute. "Call the Politburo, We're in Trouble: Entering the Soviet Era in America" Foreign Policy In Focus, ProQuest, 6/22/2010, DA 7/14/2010. In the fall of 2008, the abyss opened under the U.S. economy, which the Bush administration had been blissfully ignoring, and millions of people fell into it. Giant institutions wobbled or crashed; extended unemployment wouldn't go away; foreclosures happened on a mind-boggling scale; infrastructure began to buckle; state budgets were caught in a death grip; teachers' jobs, another kind of infrastructure, went down the tubes in startling numbers; and the federal deficit soared. Of course, a new president also entered the Oval Office, someone (many voters believed) intent on winding up (or at least down) Bush's wars and the delusions of military omnipotence and technological omniscience that went with them. If George W. Bush had pushed this country to the edge of disaster, at least his military policies, as many of his critics saw it, were as extreme and anomalous as the cult of executive power his top officials fostered. But here was the strange thing. In the midst of the Great Recession, under a new president with assumedly far fewer illusions about American omnipotence and power, war policy continued to expand in just about every way. The Pentagon budget rose by Bushian increments in fiscal year 2010; and while the Iraq War reached a kind of dismal stasis, the new president doubled down in Afghanistan on entering office - and then doubled down again before the end of 2009. There, he "surged" in multiple ways. At best, the U.S. was only drawing down one war, in Iraq, to feed the flames of another. As in the Soviet Union before its collapse, the exaltation and feeding of the military at the expense of the rest of society and the economy had by now become the new normal; so much so that hardly a serious word could be said - lest you not "support our troops" - when it came to ending the American way of war or downsizing the global mission or ponying up the funds demanded of Congress to pursue war preparations and war-making. 87 Corruption Now Karzai government illegitimate--corruption ruins credibility Smith 7-12. (William, Republican member of the South Carolina House of Representatives, representing the 32nd District since 1992, and serving as the Speaker Pro Tempore since 2000. "A Flip of the COIN: the future of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan", http://iar-gwu.org/node/177, 2010, Accessed 7-15-10) That similarity aside, it is the differences between Iraq and Afghanistan that will prove the most important. Perhaps the most significant difference is host government buy-in and credibility. The COIN FM states that the "primary objective of any counterinsurgent is to foster the development of effective governance by a legitimate government." Few would, at this juncture, deem the Karzai government to be one that is imbued with an overwhelming sense of legitimacy. Rumors of corruption, a failure to deliver essential services, and a faltering licit economy coupled with the electoral farce of last August have cast a huge shadow over the Karzai government. There are many in the U.S. government who now question the viability of Karzai as a partner for building a stable Afghanistan. Massive corruption now Cordesman, CSIS strategic analyst in the area of Afghanistan, 6/16/10 p. http://csis.org/publication/realism-afghanistan-rethinking-uncertain-case-war DA 7/15/10 The US, its allies, and all aid donors need to take responsibility for much of what is called "corruption." They failed to understand that Afghans accept informal payments as part of the cost of normal life. They did not consider the real world motivations of people involved in some 30 years of war and turmoil and who had no way to know if any given job or position would last more than a few months. They failed to see the importance of preserving the Afghan civil service and instead hired many Afghans away from the government. They created a virtually uncontrolled flood of money that could be grabbed by Afghans who had not had any similar opportunities in 30 years, who had limited loyalty or no abstract concept of governance, and who had the resulting ability to take that money to become wealthy and buy power in the process. Organizations like UNAMA and AID have been massively corrupting forces in Afghanistan. So have the US and ISAF military who have given massive amounts of money to poorly supervised contractors and others, who in turn not only buy power with that money, but often pay a tax to insurgents in the process. These problems have been compounded by an emphasis on anticorruption drives that have had a predictable lack of effect. Rather than threaten the power structure, they lead to hollow investigations, finding scapegoats, shuffling officials from one post to another, and predictable resistance from any Afghan with the clout and wealth to avoid becoming a successful target. Moreover, all these problems interacted with a past emphasis on building a formal justice system whose resources and timescales were impossibly long and limited in near-term coverage, decoupled from credible policing and detention, and ignored the hopelessly low pay and poor security for judges and prosecutors. The end result bypassed the kind of less formal justice Afghans wanted and needed, left much of the country without effective justice, and empowered the Taliban to the point where it had enough presence to create its own "prompt" justice system. Anticorruption efforts cannot function at the local and regional levels under such circumstances, and creating local police becomes impossible when there is no real justice system for them to support and virtually any power broker or successful criminal can buy their way to the result they want. 88 Corruption Impact--Lose War Intense corruption will lose the U.S. the war Reuters 3/29/10 p. http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/LDE62S15U.htm DA 7/15/10 The Pentagon's top military officer followed his commander-in-chief to Kabul on Monday to keep up pressure on President Hamid Karzai to tackle corruption, which he said could ruin the war's new strategy. Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, arrived less than a day after President Barack Obama made the first trip of his presidency there, bringing a stern message that Karzai needs to do more to fight graft. Obama's strategy, backed by 30,000 more troops this year, enters its most ambitious phase with a major offensive starting in June in the Taliban's birthplace Kandahar, where the top provincial official is Karzai's half brother, Ahmad Wali Karzai. Mullen described Kandahar as Afghanistan's "centre of gravity" and the key to reversing the Taliban's momentum. But he said the whole strategy could fail if Karzai does not do more to fight corruption in his brother's southern fiefdom. "We will be unable to succeed in Kandahar if we cannot eliminate a vast majority of corruption there and set up a legitimate governance structure," he told reporters. "If we can't do that there, then we will not be able to succeed. We can succeed militarily, but it's not going to work. That's just a fact." 89 Withdrawal Solves Corruption The United States presence is inherently corrupting. Shepard 2010 (Ken Shepard, Cum laude, University of Maryland Masters in Arts in Government and Politics, "MSNBC's Maddow: U.S. Presence in Afghanistan 'Inherently Corrupting http://newsbusters.org/blogs/ken-shepherd/2010/07/08/msnbcs-maddow-u-s-presence-afghanistaninherently-corrupting 7/08/10, DA 7/15/10) During the Bush administration, the Left often argued that the president had distracted America by engaging in hostilities in Iraq, bleeding resources and attention away from the real war on terror in Afghanistan, which had harbored al Qaeda pre-9/11. Now with Iraq all but won following the success of the Bush-approved, Petraeus-executed "surge," the Left is becoming vocal in its opposition to the war in Afghanistan and finding a platform on MSNBC. Daytime network anchor Dylan Ratigan has been calling for withdrawal from Afghanistan for weeks, arguing that the war in Afghanistan has lasted longer than Vietnam and been a needless waste of money. Now Ratigan's colleague has joined in the chorus. On the Tuesday, July 6 edition of her eponymous show, Maddow made this argument: If they're still offering that (referring to Taliban) and we're trying to make an Afghan government that is not corrupt, to be a viable alternative to that, but our very presence by virtue of the fact that we've got to spend a ton of money and we're foreigners and we've got to protect ourselves and all this stuff, our influence here, our presence here, is inherently corrupting just because a lot of money flows everywhere we go. The US is buying off the warlords causing massive corruption Reuters `10("U.S. indirectly funding Afghan warlords: House report" http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE65L0SK20100622 Jun 22, 2010, DA July 19, 2010) The United States is indirectly paying tens of millions of dollars in protection money to Afghan warlords, and potentially to the Taliban, to secure convoys carrying supplies to U.S. troops in Afghanistan, congressional investigators said in a report. The Pentagon's system of outsourcing to private companies the task of moving supplies in Afghanistan, and leaving it up to them to provide their own security, frees U.S. troops to focus on counterinsurgency. But its unintended consequences undermine U.S. efforts to curtail corruption and build an effective Afghan government, according to the report to be reviewed at a congressional hearing on Tuesday. "This arrangement has fueled a vast protection racket run by a shadowy network of warlords, strongmen, commanders, corrupt Afghan officials, and perhaps others," Representative John Tierney, chairman of a House of Representatives national security subcommittee, said in a statement. Tierney, a Democrat, said the system "runs afoul" of the Defense Department's own rules and may be undermining the U.S. strategic effort in Afghanistan. The report by the subcommittee's Democratic staff called protection payments "a significant potential source of funding for the Taliban," citing numerous documents, incidents reports and emails that refer to attempts at Taliban extortion along the road. Congressional investigators began looking into the Defense Department's $2.16 billion Host Nation Trucking (HNT) contract in November 2009. The contract covers 70 percent of the food, fuel, ammunition and other supply distributions to U.S. troops in Afghanistan. "HNT contractors and trucking subcontractors in Afghanistan pay tens of millions of dollars annually to local warlords across Afghanistan in exchange for 'protection' for HNT supply convoys to support U.S. troops," the report said. "The HNT contractors frequently referred to such payments as 'extortion,' 'bribes,' 'special security,' and/or 'protection payments,'" the document said. Many contractors have told U.S. military officials that warlords were demanding protection payments in exchange for safe passage and that these payments were funding the insurgency, the report said. But the contractors concerns were never appropriately addressed, it said. It faults the Pentagon for a lack of effective oversight of its supply chain and private security contractors. "The Department of Defense has little to no visibility into what happens to the trucks carrying U.S. supplies between the time they leave the gate to the time they arrive at their destination," the report said. 90 Withdrawal Solves Corruption The US military is "Dramatically Undermining" all projects in Afghanistan by funding terrorism Washington Post 10("U.S. indirectly paying Afghan warlords as part of security contract" http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/21/AR2010062104628.html June 22, 2010, DA July 19, 2010) The U.S. military is funding a massive protection racket in Afghanistan, indirectly paying tens of millions of dollars to warlords, corrupt public officials and the Taliban to ensure safe passage of its supply convoys throughout the country, according to congressional investigators. This Story The security arrangements, part of a $2.16 billion transport contract, violate laws on the use of private contractors, as well as Defense Department regulations, and "dramatically undermine" larger U.S. objectives of curtailing corruption and strengthening effective governance in Afghanistan, a report released late Monday said. The report describes a Defense Department that is well aware that some of the money paid to contractors winds up in the hands of warlords and insurgents. Military logisticians on the ground are focused on getting supplies where they are needed and have "virtually no understanding of how security is actually provided" for the local truck convoys that transport more than 70 percent of all goods and materials used by U.S. troops. Alarms raised by prime trucking contractors were met by the military "with indifference and inaction," the report said. "The findings of this report range from sobering to shocking," Rep. John Tierney (D-Mass.) wrote in an introduction to the 79-page report, titled "Warlord, Inc., Extortion and Corruption Along the U.S. Supply Chain in Afghanistan." The report comes as the number of U.S. casualties is rising in the Afghan war, and public and congressional support is declining. The administration has been on the defensive in recent weeks, insisting that the slow progress of anti-Taliban offensives in Helmand province and the city of Kandahar does not mean that more time is needed to assess whether President Obama's strategy is working. The US presence in Afghanistan and funding of the Taliban and other terror groups causes drug trade to continue Washington Times `09("Turning the battle against drugs;Herbicide breakthrough could end poppy and coca crops" LexisNexis, April 27, 2010 July 19, 2010) While Afghan President Hamid Karzai, whose political power is waning, lashed out against Mr. Obama's criticism, the spokesman for the Afghan Ministry of Counter Narcotics, Zulmai Afzali, pointed out the folly of the U.S. strategy: "The Taliban are the ones who profit from opium, so you are letting your enemy get financed by this so he can turn around and kill you back." Afghanistan's multibillion-dollar illegal drug industry finances Taliban and al Qaeda activities, funding bribes to Afghan and Pakistani officials, sustaining the terrorists' stranglehold on farmers and foiling feeble coalition attempts to control the thriving drug trade. Led by the United States, unsuccessful control policies have earned pointed criticism by the director of the Russian Federal Drug Control Service, Viktor Ivanov, who noted that "drug production in Afghanistan has increased 40 times during the last 10 years in the presence of international troops. The previous year saw only a dramatic decline in the volume of confiscated drugs." The Russian criticism is especially telling because last summer, the United States shifted its policy from eradicating poppy fields the source of the high-grade cheap heroin flooding Russia and Europe - to interdiction. The current U.S. policy includes targeting of about 50 known Afghan drug traffickers with Taliban ties. According to Pentagon spokesman Lt. Col. Patrick Ryder, the U.S. is "targeting terrorists with links to the drug trade rather than targeting drug traffickers with links to terrorism." 91 Withdrawal Reconciliation Withdrawal allows reconciliation of Afghan society Digital Journal 11/10/09 p. As President Obama struggles over the question of additional troop commitments to the war in Afghanistan, Mikhail Gorbachev offers advice that speaks from experience. The war in Afghanistan is certainly not lacking in advisers. But with U.S. President Barack Obama wrestling over the many questions the difficult Afghan experience is delivering every day, any experienced advice should likely be welcomed. Former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev may very well offer the most experienced perspective - as the Soviet Union's troops withdrew from Afghanistan under Gorbachev's watch. With coalition casualties in Afghanistan now over 1,500, Mr. Gorbachev's experience could help steer the Obama administration in the right direction. Gorbachev believes that America should begin withdrawing troops immediately. "I believe that there is no prospect of a military solution," Gorbachev said. "What we need is the reconciliation of Afghan society -- and they should be preparing the ground for withdrawal rather than additional troops." 92 Karzai-Taliban Reconciling Karzai seeking reconciliation with Taliban in SQ Goodenough, international editor for CNS News, 6/23/10 p. http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/68268 (Patrick, "Obama's Troop Withdrawal" DA 7/15/10) Whatever the outcome of McChrystal's summons to Washington, the question of Obama's Afghanistan policy increasingly is troubling experts in the U.S. and in the war zone, ahead of next month's international conference in Kabul. Provoking further unease is some quarters, Afghan President Hamid Karzai is pressing ahead with his plan to seek reconciliation with "moderate" Taliban elements. In line with recommendations arising from the recent peace "jirga," Karzai asked a visiting delegation of U.N. Security Council delegates Tuesday to remove Taliban members from a U.N. blacklist. A statement from his office said the delegation had "agreed to do so gradually and provided the members had no links to al-Qaeda or other terrorist groups." The blacklist derives from a pre-9/11 Security Council resolution targeting the Taliban and its al-Qaeda ally by freezing assets and restricting travel. It currently names 137 individuals associated with the Taliban and another 257 linked to al-Qaeda. Karzai has suggested that even Taliban leader Mullah Muhammad Omar and veteran warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar be removed from the list. In a further step stemming from Karzai's "reconciliation and reintegration" policy and arising from "jirga" recommendations, Afghan legal officials announced the release from prison of 26 Taliban detainees. Karzai looking into reintegrating Taliban fighters Rogin, reporter at Foreign Policy, 6/29/10 p. http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/06/29/petraeus_withdrawal_timeline_does_not_mean_switchi ng_off_the_lights DA 7/12/10 He also said that a comprehensive plan to reintegrate some Taliban fighters is under final review with President Hamid Karzai and "offers the potential to reduce violence and provide realistic avenues to assimilate Pashtun insurgents back into Afghanistan society." 93 Withdrawal Solves A smaller US presence would promote Afghan democracy Washington Post 06 ("U.S. Cedes Duties in Rebuilding Afghanistan: NATO, Other Allies Take On New Roles", Washington Post Foreign Service, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/01/02/AR2006010201942.html, 1-3, DA 7-19-10) KABUL, Afghanistan -- Four years into a mammoth reconstruction effort here that has been largely led, funded and secured by Americans, the United States is showing a growing willingness to cede those jobs to others. The most dramatic example will come by this summer, when the U.S. military officially hands over control of the volatile southern region -- plagued by persistent attacks from Islamic militias -- to an international force led by the NATO alliance. The United States will cut its troop strength by 2,500, even though it is not clear how aggressively NATO troops will pursue insurgents, who have shown no sign of relenting. At the same time, the U.S. government is increasingly allowing Western allies, or Afghans themselves, to take on the tasks of rebuilding a country that has suffered more than two decades of fighting and remains beset by poverty, drugs and insurgency. The United States says that its shifting approach complements Afghanistan's evolution into a self-sustaining democracy and that Washington has no plans to pull out altogether. "The Afghans have to have enough space to make their own decisions, even to stumble sometimes," said U.S. Ambassador Ronald Neumann. "But we shouldn't leave them without critical support before they're strong enough." As the U.S. presence becomes less visible, however, Afghans are starting to question whether the U.S. support is sufficient. Some Afghan officials express concern that the Bush administration's priorities are simply shifting elsewhere and that the United States may abandon their country prematurely, much the way it did in the early 1990s following the withdrawal of Soviet troops. Funding from the U.S. Agency for International Development, which topped $1 billion for 2005 and has helped build highways, schools and clinics across the country during the last four years, will be reduced to just over $600 million in 2006, unless Congress appropriates more money. On one of the biggest threats facing the country, the illicit drug trade, the United States has largely ceded leadership to the British government and is pinning its hopes on Afghan provincial governors to eradicate poppy fields. Although U.S. officials have warned repeatedly about the need to curb the burgeoning opium business, they have so far spent only modest amounts to help and now say Kabul must take the initiative. Politically, too, the United States has been less willing to exert its influence. The previous ambassador, Zalmay Khalilzad, played a strong, high-profile role here, negotiating directly with recalcitrant regional leaders and openly advising President Hamid Karzai. Neumann, who arrived several months ago, is a quieter presence who rarely interferes in Karzai's decisions. Earlier last month, to the surprise of many Afghans, the U.S. Embassy stood by silently during a struggle for the leadership of the new parliament, in which Karzai's government was believed to have backed a radical Islamic scholar and ex-militia leader accused of past human rights abuses over a more moderate candidate who had run against Karzai for president. Some foreign allies are encouraged by the signs that the United States is willing to loosen its grip and allow others a greater role 94 Reconciliation Good Giving the existing stakeholders a role is the only realistic option--negative reconciliation bad arguments are inevitable Cordesman, CSIS strategic analyst in the area of Afghanistan, 6/16/10 p. http://csis.org/publication/realism-afghanistan-rethinking-uncertain-case-war DA 7/15/10 The war is not going to be won by treating the power structure of Afghanistan as if it did not exist or as if it could be radically changed in the course of the next few years. The central government is not going to be empowered at the expense of key regional, geographic, ethnic, and sectarian divisions; or suddenly eliminate the role of tribalism and key families. Efforts to reshape governance to create a modern Western structure of "effective governance" that somehow transform all of Afghanistan are simply not going to work. The challenge is to co-opt the power structure, and control its worst elements and behavior, in ways that the Afghan people can accept as a better option than the Taliban. As one experienced aid worker put it, "it is to find their worst grievances, deal with them, and create conditions where they can move forward if they choose to do so." This means setting far less ambitious goals for reform and government capacity. It means accepting a major role for existing power brokers, if for no other reason than that there is no credible alternative. The issue is not Western concepts of governance, but what will make GIRoA "good enough" by Afghan popular standards. Reconciliation democratizes more effectively--moderates Afghanistan Curtis and Phillips, Senior Research Fellows @ Heritage, 10/5/09 p. http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/10/shortsighted-us-policies-on-afghanistan-to-bring-longterm-problems DA 7/16/10 Although there are no signs that the senior Taliban leadership is ready to compromise on a political solution or break its ties with al-Qaeda's destructive global agenda, there is advantage in pursuing local reconciliation efforts that bring the non-ideological "foot soldiers" of the Taliban into the political process. The goal of such a strategy is to put military pressure on the top Taliban leaders and to protect the population from intimidation by the Taliban while simultaneously convincing local insurgents that they are on the losing side and would benefit by laying down their arms and joining the mainstream political process. 95 Reconiliation Good Blacklists prove reconciliation possible Bloomberg 7-15 ("Afghanistan Wants Taliban Names Removed From UN List in Reconciliation Bid", Bloomberg News, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-07-15/afghanistan-wants-taliban-names-removed-from-un-list-inreconciliation-bid.html, 2010, DA 7-19-10) Afghanistan's government, encouraging reconciliation with the Taliban, is seeking the removal of 10 militants from a United Nations blacklist and welcoming the naming of a Canadian judge to review cases. Zahir Tanin, Afghanistan's ambassador to the UN, said the 10 names were given last week to the Security Council committee that implements sanctions imposed in 1999 on the Taliban and al- Qaeda. He said Judge Kimberly Prost's appointment to the new position of committee "ombudsperson" should facilitate the unanimity needed to remove names. "Any help for all members of the Security Council to have less dispute and more unity is welcome," Tanin said in an interview. "A psychological and political obstacle to reconciliation is removed any time you delist people who are ready to join the peace process." U.S., Afghan and allied forces are trying to degrade the Taliban militia in its southern Afghanistan stronghold while building up the central government's ability to secure the country. Tanin said a "political solution" was essential to ending the conflict, which began in 2001 when the U.S. toppled the Taliban regime. A consensus was reached last month among delegates to a gathering in Kabul of more than 1,600 tribal elders and local leaders that the names of Taliban officials should be removed from the UN and U.S. blacklists. A total of 137 Taliban loyalists are barred by the UN from traveling or accessing financial assets abroad. 96 Reconciliation Good Reconciliation with the Taliban the best option, Britain will abandon U.S. soon, NATO strategies are failing, this is the only option to end the war and a 30 year civil war in Afghanistan Steele 7-12 (Jonathan. Senior writer for the UK Guardian. "Cameron must make the case for talks with the Taliban." The UK Guardian. http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/jul/12/talks-talibanpolitical-solution-us-un. 7-12-10. DA 7-19-10.) The only realistic option is to move from reconciliation to accommodation, as the British did with the IRA. Hard though it will be, not least because the Taliban have no political wing to match Sinn Fin, Karzai and the US must approach the Taliban leadership for dialogue over power-sharing. Some critics of the Afghan war deride talking to the Taliban as "desperate". However, if the aim is not just for Nato to make a speedy withdrawal but also to help Afghans end 30 years of civil war, there has to be a process of intra-Afghan dialogue backed by regional agreements on non-interference and cooperation among Afghanistan's neighbours, as well as security council guarantees. Despite his vacillation Karzai seems to support this. Last month's peace jirga in Kabul called for the lifting of sanctions on Taliban leaders and talks with the government's armed opponents. Next week's international conference in Kabul, attended by Hillary Clinton and William Hague, is meant to endorse that. The fact that Taliban spokespeople publicly reject negotiations until foreign forces have left Afghanistan is no obstacle, let alone a surprise. This is normal when secret contacts begin. Indeed, contacts have already been made between Karzai intermediaries and Mullah Omar's people. Representatives of the Hekmatyar group, powerful Taliban allies, have visited Kabul. Pakistan is pressing Karzai to talk to the Haqqani faction. The biggest problem is the US position. No progress is possible until Obama announces a new strategy of engaging the Taliban with a view to local, provincial and nationwide ceasefires plus talks for a coalition government in Kabul in parallel with a rapidly phased and full Nato withdrawal. At the moment the US line is to support engagement but to say it must be "Afghanled". This sounds democratic but it is a cop-out. It was not the Afghan national army that launched the military intervention in 2001, nor is the Afghan army leading the anti-Taliban combat. The US remains the major player and cannot sit back as a simple spectator. The Afghan government and the UN must also play a part. The UN was the convening power for talks that led to the 1988 agreement for Soviet withdrawal. It provides the best forum for getting Afghan's regional neighbours together, and its special representative in Kabul has just started to convene their ambassadors on a regular basis. Obama repeats the mantra that there has to be a political solution. He has to act on that by explaining to the US public that the Taliban are legitimate elements in the Afghan equation. Britain's last foreign secretary, David Miliband, accepted this in the bold speech he made in Massachusetts in March. For all its new mood music about three- to five-year timetables in Afghanistan, it is not yet clear whether the new UK government does too. It ought to. Cameron talks of leaving Afghanistan by 2015, but he should accelerate that by at least three years. He should come out publicly for the US to open contacts with the Taliban and make the case strongly in the White House next week. He need not say, publicly or privately, that Britain will leave Afghanistan unilaterally if Obama rejects the policy. This would sound like an ultimatum and annoy Washington needlessly. But he should be clear in his own mind that this is Britain's strategy. Give it a year, and if US strategy has not shifted towards talks with the Taliban, tell Obama: "Sorry, Barack. For a year we've been suggesting what we see as the best way to leave Afghanistan with dignity: broker a power-sharing government that includes the Taliban. You don't agree. In that case we cannot continue with an unwinnable war or go along with your refusal to consider peace talks. Best of luck. You're on your own." 97 Reconciliation Good Reconciliation offers opportunity for Taliban to be honourable members in society, this promotes an end to the violence. Lekic 7-8 (Slobodan. Writer for the Canadian Press. "NATO secretary-general points to political progress in Afghanistan." The Canadian Press. http://www.google.com/hostednews/canadianpress/article/ALeqM5hMBxfyEX3bI7IEYtoAnSQux1Boow. 7-8-10. DA 7-19-10) Fogh Rasmussen also touched on the sensitive subject of reconciliation with Taliban militants, seen by many analysts as a precondition for a political solution to the nearly 9-year-old war. "The reconciliation process in Afghanistan is one of several important tracks," he said. "I have heard reports that the Taliban is rejecting negotiations with NATO. In fact, NATO never offered any negotiations -- simply because this process must be led by the Afghan government." Karzai has been making peace overtures to the Taliban militants who ruled the country for five years before they were driven out in the U.S.led invasion at the end of 2001. Last month, Afghan delegates to a national assembly, or peace jirga, called on the government and its international partners to remove some of the 137 Taliban members from the sanctions list -- a long-standing demand of the Taliban to help promote reconciliation and a political solution to the conflict. "We do know that many insurgents are interested in finding an honourable position in society," Fogh Rasmussen said. Reconciliation with the Taliban means the end of insurgency fighting and improved relations with Pakistan The Times of India 7-9. ("Pak needs to clear international concerns on China nuke deal: Clinton." The Times of India. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/World/Pakistan/Pak-needs-to-clear-internationalconcerns-on-China-nuke-deal-Clinton/articleshow/6187121.cms. 7-19-10. DA 7-19- 10.) Asked about the Afghan government's process of reconciliation with the Taliban, Clinton said the US supports the reconciliation and reintegration efforts undertaken by Afghan President Hamid Karzai but has made it clear that "reconciliation cannot succeed unless the insurgents who have been fighting the Afghan government... recognise the importance of renouncing violence and al-Qaida". Reconciliation is only possible with militants who enter the political system and agree to abide by the Afghan constitution and laws, she said. Pakistan has been trying to position itself as a key player in the Afghan reconciliation process by facilitating contacts between Karzai's government and the Haqqani network, a powerful Afghan Taliban faction based in North Waziristan tribal region. 98 No Reconciliation Now No short term chances of a political agreement with the Taliban Reuters 3/29/10 p. http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/LDE62S15U.htm DA 7/15/10 That review will assess whether the U.S.-led campaign and the training of the Afghan army and police have gained enough ground to allow a gradual U.S. withdrawal to begin in July 2011. While U.S. and European leaders accept that a deal with the Taliban is the only way to end the war, Mullen played down the chances of a political agreement in the short term. "I think it is premature. There's no one that I've spoken to, at least on the American side, or actually, on the coalition side, that doesn't think we need to proceed from a position of strength," Mullen said. "In my judgment, we're not there yet." Karzai this week held preliminary peace talks with Hezb-i-Islami, one of the smaller insurgent factions. Karzai is also holding a major peace conference in Kabul in early May. 99 Solvency--Reduces Anti-U.S. Sentiment While anti-American sentiment remains prevalent throughout the globe, it is a result of Bush era policies, which can be easily remedied by policy changes in Afghanistan. Bowman 07 [Bradley L, major and strategic plans and policy officer in the U.S. Army, assistant professor of American Politics, Policy, and Strategy at the United States Military Academy at West Point, and an MA in international relations from Yale University (2004) and a BS in American politics from the United States Military Academy at West Point (1995), "Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy," Parameters, ProQuest, Autumn 2001, DA 7/15/2010. Surveying the now familiar international and domestic polling data, Walt finds pervasive antiAmericanism around the world. According to polls that Walt cites, with only a few exceptions, majorities in other countries view the United States unfavorably, see US influence as negative, ascribe ulterior and self-serving motives to the US war on terrorism, and believe American foreign policy does not consider the interests of others. After identifying these well-known trends in international opinion, Walt moves to a provocative and important discussion of whether US values or policies explain this widespread anti-American sentiment. The author acknowledges that both play a role, but ultimately concludes by arguing that "the chief source of contemporary opposition is global reaction to specific policies-and especially the actions of the Bush Administration- and is not simply a response to US power or American values." While the debate regarding the causes of anti-Americanism is now ubiquitous, Walt provides a valuable and insightful contribution that is central to debates regarding US grand strategy. After all, policymakers must accurately identify the causes of global anti-Americanism before designing an effective strategy to ameliorate them. In other words, a successful prescription depends largely on an accurate diagnosis. If foreign governments and populations oppose the United States because of American values, as well as American power and influence, there is little to be done. However, if much of the ire directed toward the United States is a function of American policies, it follows that policy changes would likely alter these global perceptions. In the 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, the Bush Administration minimizes the role of US policy in explaining the emergence of Islamist terrorism, instead arguing that terrorism springs primarily from maladies pervasive in the Arab world. This debate is much more than a petty, academic squabble. The success or failure of the United States in the Long War will depend largely on an accurate and nuanced diagnosis of the problem. Walt's book offers a fairly persuasive counter-argument to the Bush Administration's point of view that will provide readers of all leanings with a more nuanced framework with which to analyze US grand strategy 100 Reconciliation Good--Strategic Depth Taliban reconciliation preserves strategic depth between India and Pakistan Malhotra, retired Indian general, 6/16/10 p. http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/blockading-peace-anddevelopment-in-manipur-3154.html DA 7/14/10 It will be recalled that the Afghan Taliban, which took over 80 per cent of Afghanistan in 1996, is a `spin off' from the Mujahideen created and supported by the US and Pakistan to counter the Russians. The Taliban in Afghanistan was hosting Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda, despite the 9/11 terror that they perpetrated against the US, and this led to American orchestrated operations. These operations drove them out of Afghanistan to Pakistan tribal areas, from where they operate with impunity even today. Geographically, South Waziristan, in Federally Administered Tribal Areas has a border with the North West Frontier Province city of Dera Ismial Khan on to which abuts Punjab's Dera Gazi Khan. This makes it easy for the militants in tribal areas to network with terrorist groups in the Pakistan heartland, resulting in tacit `unification' of the Afghan Taliban, al Qaeda/LeT and the Pakistan Taliban. Hence the ISI has channels open not only with Afghan Taliban but with al Qaeda/LeT and Pakistan Taliban, which cause terror in India from time to time, as well. In his address at the West Point Military Academy on 1 December 2009, President Obama had justified the `30,000 thousand US troops surge' in the first half of 2010 on the grounds that it would allow the US to begin the transfer of troops out of Afghanistan in July 2011. It signaled that the US and its NATO allies no longer believed in the possibility of a military victory over the Taliban and were looking for a dignified exit. Military operations in Afghanistan would now have to aim at persuading the Taliban to negotiate. Hence effort had to be made to wean away non-ideological and moderate Taliban fighters, engage them in dialogue and even facilitate their eventual participation in governance; thus underlining the concept of `Good and Bad Taliban'. Taking cue from G Parthasarathy, India's former high commissioner to Pakistan, the definition of `Good Taliban' for the ISI, hitherto appeared to be, those who killed US and Afghan soldiers after crossing the Durand Line into Afghanistan or caused havoc in Kashmir and other parts of India. The `Good Taliban' was armed, trained and backed by the ISI. But if they combined such activity with attempts to create unrest in Pakistan, they were categorized as `Bad Taliban' and were acted against, by the ISI. These distinctions assume importance because right now Pakistan is facing a `double jeopardy'. While the US plans to reduce their military presence in Afghanistan, Pakistan appears determined to have a say with the new dispensation there, to marginalize India and keep the concept of `strategic depth' alive. It can achieve this only through the Taliban, but cannot when assisting the NATO offensive against them in the West. In the East, LeT and Pakistan Taliban have been used as `weapons' against India even though they have caused death and destruction in its own heartland as retribution for assisting the NATO forces in the West. A Catch 22 situation is being portrayed for Pakistan, which will make it `easier' for her to subscribe to the American concept of `Good and Bad Taliban' since it serves their cause against India on both fronts par excellence 101 ***Politics/Process*** 102 NM: Phased Phased nature of any withdrawal solves your DA links Naiman 7-16. (Robert, Robert Naiman is Policy Director at Just Foreign Policy, writer for U.S. foreign policy at Huffington Post, former policy analyst and researcher at the Center for Economic and Policy Research and Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch, Masters degrees in economics and mathematics from the University of Illinois, "Should the United States Withdraw from Afghanistan?", http://www.cato.org/pubs/policy_report/v31n6/cpr31n6-3.html, 2010, Accessed 7-16-10) Specifics should be negotiated with the Afghan government and other partners. The U.S. public does not support the war in Afghanistan. Since the majority of Americans don't support the war, the U.S. prosecution of the war should not continue. Some say such important decisions can't be made according to the vagaries of public opinion polls. But the most important decisions should be decided democratically, and U.S. public opinion is not volatile on questions of war and peace. Once the public turned against the Iraq war, it never turned back. Some say the war is making Americans safer. But the American public is the highest judge on this question. Since the American people oppose the war, they must believe it is not making them safer, or that whatever contribution the war is making to their safety is too small to justify the human and financial costs. Some argue against a "precipitous" withdrawal. In practice, this is a straw argument. The probability of a "precipitous" U.S. withdrawal is minuscule. The overwhelming likelihood is that as the U.S. moves towards withdrawing its troops, it will do so gradually, as it is doing in Iraq. 103 No Link--Politics DoD does the plan Rubin and Rashid, Dir. Of Intl Studies @ NYU and fellow @ Pacific Council 2008 p. l/n (Barnett and Ahmed, "From Great Game to Grand Bargain" Foreign Affairs DA 7/5/10) After the first phase of the war in Afghanistan ended with the overthrow of the Taliban in 2001 (and as the United States prepared to invade Iraq), Washington's limited agenda in the region was to press the Pakistani military to go after al Qaeda; meanwhile, Washington largely ignored the broader insurgency, which remained marginal until 2005. This suited the Pakistani military's strategy, which was to assist the United States against al Qaeda but to retain the Afghan Taliban as a potential source of pressure on Afghanistan. But the summer of 2006 saw a major escalation of the insurgency, as Pakistan and the Taliban interpreted the United States' decision to transfer command of coalition forces to NATO (plus U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's announcement of a troop drawdown, which in fact never took place) as a sign of its intention to withdraw. They also saw non-U.S. troop contributors as more vulnerable to political pressure generated by casualties. 104 Karzai- Cred Low Karzai's credibility is low due to the re-election fraud scandal MacKenzie 09. (Jean, Contributor to the New York Times and The Star Tribune, Institute of War and Peace Reporting, "Karzai Credibility Still in Question Despite Poll Win", http://www.iwpr.net/reportnews/karzai-credibility-still-question-despite-poll-win, 11-03, Accessed 7-14-10) But while Karzai gets to retain his seat for another five years, he does so under a cloud. His legitimacy will remain in question, since he never managed to gain the 50-percent-plus-one vote necessary for victory. His reputation has also taken a bad hit, with the very public airing of the fraud scandal. Regardless of the speed with which international leaders rushed to congratulate him, Karzai will have an uphill battle to convince them that he is a credible partner who can deliver. This could very well have a negative impact on the willingness of the international community to commit more resources to what is an increasingly unpopular war. Bottom has fallen out of Karzai's credibility Dorronsoro, Carnegie Endowment for Peace analyst, 5/11/10 p. http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=40779 DA 7/15/10 When traveling around Afghanistan, it is clear that Karzai enjoys little support and continues to lose ground politically. Karzai's legitimacy is weakening, his political base is shrinking, and Afghan institutions are eroding. This is a post-democratic Afghanistan and President Karzai is not going to be a reliable partner in the long term. 105 A2: Grab Bag CP Most measures will fail in light of the situational complexities Rubin and Rashid, Dir. Of Intl Studies @ NYU and fellow @ Pacific Council 2008 p. l/n (Barnett and Ahmed, "From Great Game to Grand Bargain" Foreign Affairs DA 7/5/10) Cross-border attacks into Pakistan may produce an "October surprise" or provide material for apologists hoping to salvage George W. Bush's legacy, but they will not provide security. Advancing reconstruction, development, good governance, and counternarcotics efforts and building effective police and justice systems in Afghanistan will require many years of relative peace and security. Neither neglecting these tasks, as the Bush administration did initially, nor rushing them on a timetable determined by political objectives, can succeed. Afghanistan requires far larger and more effective security forces, international or national, but support for U.S. and NATO deployments is plummeting in troopcontributing countries, in the wider region, and in Afghanistan itself. Afghanistan, the poorest country in the world but for a handful in Africa and with the weakest government in the world (except Somalia, which has no government), will never be able to sustain national security forces sufficient to confront current -- let alone escalating -- threats, yet permanent foreign subsidies for Afghanistan's security forces cannot be guaranteed and will have destabilizing consequences. Moreover, measures aimed at Afghanistan will not address the deteriorating situation in Pakistan or the escalation of international conflicts connected to the Afghan-Pakistani war. More aid to Pakistan -- military or civilian -- will not diminish the perception among Pakistan's national security elite that the country is surrounded by enemies determined to dismember it, especially as cross-border raids into areas long claimed by Afghanistan intensify that perception. Until that sense of siege is gone, it will be difficult to strengthen civilian institutions in Pakistan. 106 ***Counterplans*** 107 A2: ROE CP No matter what casualties will be large Dorronsoro, Carnegie Endowment for Peace analyst, 5/11/10 p. http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=40779 DA 7/15/10 There is structural tension, however, that has nothing to do with personal relationships. While Karzai wants to prevent civilian casualties, increased casualties will be inevitable with more fighting, even with a concerted effort by the United States to avoid them. 108 A2: Foreign Grants CP Foreign grants fail--international support collapses too quickly Rubin and Rashid, Dir. Of Intl Studies @ NYU and fellow @ Pacific Council 2008 p. l/n (Barnett and Ahmed, "From Great Game to Grand Bargain" Foreign Affairs DA 7/5/10) Many have therefore proposed long-term international financing of the ANSF; after all, even $5 billion a year is much less than the cost of an international force deployment. But sustaining, as opposed to training or equipping, security forces through foreign grants would pose political problems. It would be impossible to build Afghan institutions on the basis of U.S. supplemental appropriations, which is how the training and equipping of the ANSF are mostly funded. Sustaining a national army or national police force requires multiyear planning, impossible without a recurrent appropriation -which would mean integrating ANSF planning into that of the United States' and other NATO members' budgets, even if the funds were disbursed through a single trust fund. And an ANSF funded from those budgets would have to meet international or other national, rather than Afghan, legal requirements. Decisions on funding would be taken by the U.S. Congress and other foreign bodies, not the Afghan National Assembly. The ANSF would take actions that foreign taxpayers might be reluctant to fund. Such long- term international involvement is simply not tenable. 109 A2: Pressure Pakistan CP US based pressure fails because of realism and a number of geographical and geopolitical considerations Rubin and Rashid, Dir. Of Intl Studies @ NYU and fellow @ Pacific Council 2008 p. l/n (Barnett and Ahmed, "From Great Game to Grand Bargain" Foreign Affairs DA 7/5/10) The Pakistani military does not control the insurgency, but it can affect its intensity. Putting pressure on Pakistan to curb the militants will likely remain ineffective, however, without a strategic realignment by the United States. The region is rife with conspiracy theories trying to find a rational explanation for the United States' apparently irrational strategic posture of supporting a "major non-NATO ally" that is doing more to undermine the U.S. position in Afghanistan than any other state. Many Afghans believe that Washington secretly supports the Taliban as a way to keep a war going to justify a troop presence that is actually aimed at securing the energy resources of Central Asia and countering China. Many in Pakistan believe that the United States has deceived Pakistan into conniving with Washington to bring about its own destruction: India and U.S.-supported Afghanistan will form a pincer around Pakistan to dismember the world's only Muslim nuclear power. And some Iranians speculate that in preparation for the coming of the Mahdi, God has blinded the Great Satan to its own interests so that it would eliminate both of Iran's Sunni-ruled regional rivals, Afghanistan and Iraq, thus unwittingly paving the way for the long-awaited Shiite restoration. The true answer is much simpler: the Bush administration never reevaluated its strategic priorities in the region after September 11. Institutional inertia and ideology jointly assured that Pakistan would be treated as an ally, Iran as an enemy, and Iraq as the main threat, thereby granting Pakistan a monopoly on U.S. logistics and, to a significant extent, on the intelligence the United States has on Afghanistan. Eighty-four percent of the materiel for U.S. forces in Afghanistan goes through Pakistan, and the ISI remains nearly the sole source of intelligence about international terrorist acts prepared by al Qaeda and its affiliates in Pakistan. More fundamentally, the concept of "pressuring" Pakistan is flawed. No state can be successfully pressured into acts it considers suicidal. The Pakistani security establishment believes that it faces both a U.S.-Indian-Afghan alliance and a separate Iranian-Russian alliance, each aimed at undermining Pakistani influence in Afghanistan and even dismembering the Pakistani state. Some (but not all) in the establishment see armed militants within Pakistan as a threat -- but they largely consider it one that is ultimately controllable, and in any case secondary to the threat posed by their nuclear-armed enemies. Karzai has no real incentive to cave to U.S. pressure Dorronsoro, Carnegie Endowment for Peace analyst, 5/11/10 p. http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=40779 DA 7/15/10 Since the last presidential election, the ability for the United States to put pressure on the Afghan government and influence President Karzai's actions has been limited. Karzai is less dependent on the international coalition, but more dependent on his allies in Afghanistan. During the election in 2009 he needed to mobilize local support and he is now paying back favors. This means that Karzai is less and less under the influence of the United States. Despite U.S. pressure, Karzai and his allies do not want to change their ways and implement reforms in order to build strong institutions and establish credible local partners. They are making a lot of money with the military surge--there are more contracts with local companies and those controlling private security companies are earning more money. 110 A2: International Troop CP Insurgents view non-US nations as more casualty inverse--boosts the incentives for violence Rubin and Rashid, Dir. Of Intl Studies @ NYU and fellow @ Pacific Council 2008 p. l/n (Barnett and Ahmed, "From Great Game to Grand Bargain" Foreign Affairs DA 7/5/10) After the first phase of the war in Afghanistan ended with the overthrow of the Taliban in 2001 (and as the United States prepared to invade Iraq), Washington's limited agenda in the region was to press the Pakistani military to go after al Qaeda; meanwhile, Washington largely ignored the broader insurgency, which remained marginal until 2005. This suited the Pakistani military's strategy, which was to assist the United States against al Qaeda but to retain the Afghan Taliban as a potential source of pressure on Afghanistan. But the summer of 2006 saw a major escalation of the insurgency, as Pakistan and the Taliban interpreted the United States' decision to transfer command of coalition forces to NATO (plus U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's announcement of a troop drawdown, which in fact never took place) as a sign of its intention to withdraw. They also saw non-U.S. troop contributors as more vulnerable to political pressure generated by casualties. 111 A2: Pakistani Aid CP Aid to Pakistan fails--regional threat issues Rubin and Rashid, Dir. Of Intl Studies @ NYU and fellow @ Pacific Council 2008 p. l/n (Barnett and Ahmed, "From Great Game to Grand Bargain" Foreign Affairs DA 7/5/10) Subsequent events, however, have only exacerbated Pakistan's sense of insecurity. Musharraf asked for time to form a "moderate Taliban" government in Afghanistan but failed to produce one. When that failed, he asked that the United States prevent the Northern Alliance (part of the anti-Taliban resistance in Afghanistan), which had been supported by India, Iran, and Russia, from occupying Kabul; that appeal failed. Now, Pakistan claims that the Northern Alliance is working with India from inside Afghanistan's security services. Meanwhile, India has reestablished its consulates in Afghan cities, including some near the Pakistani border. India has genuine consular interests there (Hindu and Sikh populations, commercial travel, aid programs), but it may also in fact be using the consulates against Pakistan, as Islamabad claims. India has also, in cooperation with Iran, completed a highway linking Afghanistan's ring road (which connects its major cities) to Iranian ports on the Persian Gulf, potentially eliminating Afghanistan's dependence on Pakistan for access to the sea and marginalizing Pakistan's new Arabian Sea port of Gwadar, which was built with hundreds of millions of dollars of Chinese aid. And the new U.S.-Indian nuclear deal effectively recognizes New Delhi's legitimacy as a nuclear power while continuing to treat Islamabad, with its record of proliferation, as a pariah. In this context, pressuring or giving aid to Pakistan, without any effort to address the sources of its insecurity, cannot yield a sustainable positive outcome. 112 A2: Condition Pakistan Aid CP Afghanistan says no Tellis, senior associate in East affairs at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2010 p. http://carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=40347 DA 7/15/10 Based on this judgment, President Barack Obama has told Pakistan's President Asif Zardari that targeting LeT would be one of his key conditions for a renewed US strategic partnership with Pakistan. Thus far, however, the Pakistani military, which still rules Pakistan even though it does not formally govern, has been non-responsive, preferring instead to emphasize the threat India supposedly poses to Pakistan thereby implicitly justifying ISI's continued reliance on terrorism while demanding further US assistance. Such a demand is intended to inveigle the US into Pakistan's relentless competition with India. The military's dismissal of Obama's injunctions regarding LeT are driven at least partly by its belief that all US warnings are little other than special pleading on the behalf of India. 113 A2: Troop Surge CP Troop surge only enflames anti-U.S. sentiment--no amount of troops change Middle East ideology Pandya is a Senior Associate at the Henry L. Stimson Center, 2009 p. http://www.stimson.org/pub.cfm? id=701 DA 7/13/10 Recent experience suggests that it is likely that a larger and more aggressive presence would serve to increase Afghan nationalist resistance. The West and the Afghan government have failed, not because of insufficient force, but because the present political arrangement is inherently unviable and a sure source of conflict. Recent talks between the Kabul government and the Taliban are a start but insufficient. The US, as the preeminent player in Afghanistan, should take the lead in promoting a fundamentally new approach that involves all stakeholders in discussion of a mutually agreeable settlement in Afghanistan. This will have two dimensions, an intra-Afghan one and one which involves Afghanistan's proximate neighbors and other key international players. Interested parties that could play the spoiler if excluded must be party to the conversation about Afghanistan's future. Adding troops triggers Pakistani collapse Pandya is a Senior Associate at the Henry L. Stimson Center, 2009 p. http://www.stimson.org/pub.cfm? id=701 DA 7/13/10 Above all there are complex continuities of political affiliation and clan loyalty between many of those involved in armed activity and those involved in politics. These suggest both the extent of the problem and the difficulty of a military solution. Pakistanis see the US obsession with defeat of armed insurgents on the frontier as a distraction from the pressing need for political stabilization and response to the parlous economic situation of the country. The temptation to involve the US in arming and training of tribal militias to fight Taliban and Al Qaeda forces is to be avoided. There is little promise of transparency or control over such a program, and considerable risk of unintended consequences detrimental to the goal of securing and pacifying the frontier. ...
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This note was uploaded on 02/23/2012 for the course DEBATE 101 taught by Professor None during the Spring '12 term at University of California, Berkeley.

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DJ Afghanistan Aff - 1 Afghanistan Aff Afghanistan

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