NEG SOUTH KOREA JIMI 27 - Whitman National Debate Institute...

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Whitman National Debate Institute 1 South Korea Neg South Korea Negative
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Position Explanation This is the case negative to the South Korea aff. It contains answers to the aff’s advantages, links to politics, and a South Korean nuclear proliferation disad. The general theme that runs through this file is that the U.S. ground forces in the ROK are a stabilizing force in the region, and that withdrawal risks instability. The appeasement turns argue that the plan basically rewards North Korea’s belligerent behavior, which only encourages more risk taking and aggression by the North. It’s a turn that complicates both the Korean War and Proliferation Advantage. The ROK Prolif Disad is pretty solid and straight forward. In response to U.S. withdrawal, South Korea would no longer be able to trust that the US will provide for their security, and thus would develop a program to build a nuclear weapons arsenal. This type of reaction would have a cascading effect in East Asia, and spark an arms race that would be highly destabilizing, increasing the prospect for nuclear war in the region.
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Whitman National Debate Institute 3 South Korea Neg ROK Prolif Shell Withdrawal causes South Korea to acquire nuclear weapons Kang Choi , Director-General and Professor of American Studies @ Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, and Joon-Sung Park , Distinguished Researcher @ Department of National Security and Reunification @ the Institute for Foreign Affairs and National Security, 2008 , The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia, P. 392-393 The possibility of either a decision by South Korea to go nuclear or a regional nuclear arms race still seems remote, but neither can be ruled out completely. Unless timely and appropriate measures are taken , nonnuclear states in the region, including South Korea and Japan, may be compelled to consider their own nuclear options . At this time, the United States is believed to hold the key to preventing this worrisome development. The key is the continued provision of the U.S. nuclear umbrella.41 The latest reaffirmation of the U.S. extended deterrence commitment to South Korea was made at the thirty-eighth SCM in 2006. What is notable about the SCM was that the term extended nuclear deterrence was inserted in the Joint Communique upon South Korea's insistence.42 Due to this, the excessive fear of nuclear threat in South Korea has been largely mitigated. The insertion of the term altered nothing significant in the ROK-U.S. security relationship. Why then did South Korea so persistently request this wording in the Joint Communique? To answer this question, it is important to revisit the evolution of the ROK's defense strategy. As discussed earlier, it is now clear that "ground-based" nuclear deterrence has been replaced by "offshore" deterrence. The former was viewed as particularly strong since it consisted of a "trip-wire" strategy with forward deployment of the USFK and the presence of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons on South Korean soil.
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This note was uploaded on 02/23/2012 for the course DEBATE 101 taught by Professor None during the Spring '12 term at University of California, Berkeley.

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NEG SOUTH KOREA JIMI 27 - Whitman National Debate Institute...

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