South Korea 2AC Blocks - Compiled

South Korea 2AC Blocks - Compiled - FILE NAME HOOCH...

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Unformatted text preview: FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 South Korea 2AC Blocks Compiled Last printed 1 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Last printed 2 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 ***THE CASE*** Last printed 3 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Last printed 4 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Last printed 5 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Condo Bad ---Conditionality voting issue vote aff A. Strategy skew theres too many contradicting frameworks the aff is burdened with argument interaction so the negative should be held to the same standard they can contradict themselves killing fairness in round B. Ensures shallow discussion education should come from in depth discussions about issues, not reading multiple policies in the 1NC C. They get conditional counterplans but no contradictions Conflicting worlds voter even if they win conditionality is good independent voter Last printed 6 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 ***KOREA WAR Last printed 7 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Last printed 8 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 A2: No Korean War Korean war inevitable: [Generic] First succession politics power struggle causes instability concessions on nuclear testing become less likely that's Bandow Second economics Kim Jong Il is going to fall short of what his country expected makes him result to military that's Reuters [A2: No Provocations] their provocations evidence only assumes nuclear tests yes they will stop those but bioweapons still produced and even if their evidence is newer ours cites other issues like the sinking of the Chenoan [A2: Self Interest] North Korea has interest in attacking things like succession fears and the bad economy means North Korea will attack for their own stability and their evidence is from 2003 attitudes have changed Last printed 9 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 A2: Withdrawal Turn Withdrawal solves North Korean aggression presence means 1. Countries aren't exploring other defense options and North Korea knows this And 2. Countries become more belligerent in diplomatic disputes that's all Bandow [Horowitz evidence] And there's no reason why a concession to North Korea would make them more aggressive only a risk they're happier with it Last printed 10 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 A2: Bioweapons D [No Spread] Bioweapons use will spread in 6 weeks North Korea has been developing only our evidence cites analysts and they can be dispensed multiple ways like missile, aerosol, or food rising tensions mean North Korea will find a way to spread the diseases even if the weapons fail that's Levy [No Extinction] Will cause extinction new technology ensures it past nuclear tests were easier to control new diseases won't be that's Ochs and Levy Last printed 11 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 A2: China Won't Fill In China will step in their evidence doesn't assume withdrawal motives threat of South Korea after it develops weapons motivates them and even if they won't help US troops still worse they're overstretched that's Erickson Last printed 12 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 A2: Regime Stable Now Regime not stable succession politics and bad economy stopping stability sinking ship proves Last printed 13 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 A2: North Korea Military Weak Miscalculation is still possible Garnaut, 6510 (6/5/10, John, The Age, "Behind North Korea Bluster is People Fight for Survival", http://www.lexisnexis.com) cowering, depleted, shattered nation that can barely concentrate beyond the next meal. "They are exhausted," says a diplomat who left Pyongyang last week after meeting military officers there. "They are absolutely not prepared for war." But that, he adds, does not exclude the possibility of suicidal miscalculation. But behind North Korea's threats, handful of its semifunctional nuclear weapons and its cartoon dictator, there is a North Korea remains opaque, its politics impenetrable, but no longer hermetically sealed from the outside world. Traders and refugees are getting out and even arranging phone calls to relatives within range of Chinese mobile phone towers. Last printed 14 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 ***REGIONALISM Last printed 15 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 A2: South Korea Alliance k2 Multilat South Korea alliance still there without troops things like naval and air forces no reason why plan prevents multilat and withdrawing troops key China won't cooperate kills plans for security Last printed 16 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 A2: South Korea Already Balancing v. US Even if South Korea has new relationships they aren't for East Asian multilateral peace their evidence only assumes certain issue specific coalitions not our internal link: no collective strategy now that's Francis still a lot less credibility when they're the puppet of the US Last printed 17 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Last printed 18 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 A2: No Taiwan War Taiwan war likely only cause of military conflict between the US and China gives opportunity and even if diplomacy has helped in the past won't help aggression over US military forces that's Bandow Last printed 19 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 A2: ROK Already in Multilat No ROK Multilat they are unsustainable US strategy too focused on terrorism threats in the Middle East our evidence assumes multilateralism now US still hampering further agreements that's Francis Last printed 20 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 A2: Bilat K2 Multilat Not true we dominate the relationship Bandow and Carpenter 2004 *JD from Stanford, senior fellow at Cato, former special assistant to Reagan, writes for Fortune, National Interest, WSJ, Washington Times, **PhD in diplomatic history from Texas, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at Cato, contributing editor to the National Interest, editorial board of the Journal of Strategic Studies (Ted Galen and Doug, "The Korean conundrum", Google Books, page 135, WEA) So long as American forces are based in the South, Washington will seek to dominate and control the alliance. And for good reason: the United States has never and should never promise to go to war on someone else's terms. If South Korea wants America's aid, it must accept the conditions under which such assistance is offered. Real equality is simply impossible. Moreover, Seoul cannot escape being tied to U.S. policy even if it is carried out beyond the South's borders. Imagine the imposition of sanctions, enforcement of a blockade, or military strikes on the North--conducted by American forces located beyond South Korea's borders and acting outside of South Korea's borders over the objections of the ROK. North Korea is unlikely to distinguish the positions of the two members of the "mutual" defense pact and is likely to view the South as an appropriate target of retaliation. Last printed 21 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 ***SOLVENCY/OFFENSE Last printed 22 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 A2: Bandow Not Qualled [NO EVIDENCE READ] Bandow is qualified a teenager saying he got paid to write about South Korea: 1. Can't be proven And 2. Doesn't matter he's the senior fellow at CATO, worked for Reagan, and writes for all major news publications - no reason why he would have incentive to bash US troops [IF EVIDENCE READ] And he's more qualified than their authors Cato no date checked 6/22/2010 ("Doug Bandow", http://www.cato.org/people/bandow.html, WEA) Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at Cato the Institute, specializing in foreign policy and civil liberties. He worked as special assistant President to Reagan and editor of the political magazine Inquiry. He writes regularly for leading publications such as Fortune magazine, National Interest, Wall Street Journal, and Washington Times. Bandow speaks frequently at academic conferences, on college campuses, and to business groups. Bandow has been a regular commentator on ABC, CBS, NBC, CNN, Fox News Channel, and MSNBC. He holds a J.D. from Stanford University. Last printed 23 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 A2: Presence Good War Presence worse for regional wars new North Korean aggression against South Korea proves troops make it worse plus plan prevents the escalation of the war their ev talks about we won't get pulled in that's Bandow [SWANSTROM EV] Plus a couple problems with Swanstrom 1. From 2005 doesn't assume North Korean aggression against the US 2. Outlines no impact just says nuclear powers will get pulled in not that they will use their weapons Last printed 24 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 A2: Unification Turn [MITCHELL EV] And their Mitchell evidence doesn't say that there will be unification just that the US needs to remain strong trade partners South Korea and the US will still trade after the plan we just withdraw ground troops Plus they read this card and a free trade and economic collapse impact even IF the plan does prevent trade no reason A. that stops ALL free trade there will still be things like the WTO and B. it collapses the entire economy we'll still have other trading partners and domestic industries Last printed 25 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 A2 Unification Bad It's inevitable their Watson card indicates countless species are already going extinct Robust peer reviewed evidence indicates ecosystems are resilient McDermott, 09 [ Tree Hugger.Com," Good news: most ecosystems can recover in one lifetime from human induced or natural disturbance", http://www.treehugger.com/files/2009/05/mostecosystemscanrecoverfromdisturbanceinonelifetime.php] There's a reason the phrase "let nature take its course" exists: New research done at the Yale University School of Forestry & Environmental Science reinforces the idea that ecosystems are quiet resilient and can rebound from pollution and environmental degradation. Published in the journal PLoS ONE, the study shows that most damaged ecosystems worldwide can recover within a single lifetime, if the source of pollution is removed and restoration work done: Forests Take Longest of Ecosystems Studied The analysis found that on average forest ecosystems can recover general, most ecosystems take longer to recover from humaninduced disturbances than from natural events, such as hurricanes. To reach these recovery averages, the researchers looked at data from peerreviewed studies over the past 100 years on the rate of ecosystem recovery once the source of pollution was removed. Interestingly, the researchers found that it appears that the rate at which an ecosystem recovers may be independent of its degraded condition: Aquatic systems may recover more quickly than, say, a forest, because the species and organisms that live in that ecosystem turn over more rapidly than in the forest. in 42 years, while in takes only about 10 years for the ocean bottom to recover. If an area has seen multiple, interactive disturbances, it can take on average 56 years for recovery. In Not reverse causal their evidence says China will only intervene if North Korea collapses, they have no evidence on that question. Even if withdrawal is necessary it's not a sufficient condition for unification. Reunification impossible LIM 2010 (John, writer for the Georgetown Federalist, "Breaking Open the Berlin Wall of the Korean Peninsula," Feb 25, http://www.thegeorgetownfederalist.com/content/breakingopenberlinwallkoreanpeninsula ) The political stability of the Korean Peninsula is of particular importance to me. As my family is from Korea, the last thing I would want is for the North Korean communists to run over my grandparents' orchard in South Korea. Since President Harry Truman forbade General Douglas McArthur from reunifying the Korean people, the conflict has been locked in a stalemate, with no end in sight. Now that North Korea presents itself as a viable threat through its acquisition of nuclear weapons, a resolution to this problem does seem closer than ever before. The prospect of a continuation of the Korean War has never been as real as it is now , and it appears that a new war on the peninsula would be far deadlier than the first. Additionally, the possibility of a peaceful reunification of the two Koreas , a long time vision of the Korean people and the official stance of every South Korean government since the 1990s, seems further and further away. Their evidence proves scientists are aware the species are endangered unification would prompt campaigns to prevent construction or raise species in captivity Unification stabilizes the peninsula Campbell et. al, 08 *Senior Vice President at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and Director of the Aspen Strategy Group, **Research Associate at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) specializing in Asian affairs, ***Fellow at Center for a New American Security (*Kurt M., **Nirav, ***Vikram J., "The Power of Balance: America in iAsia", Center for a New American Security, June 2008, June 25th 2010, p. 33, KONTOPOULOS) PDF Given these challenges of instability and economic dislocation, one participant at a highlevel seminar on the future of the U.S.ROK alliance in Washington in February noted that the United States is probably the only one of the six parties that actually sees unification as in its interests (and even this point is highly debatable -- some in the United States might have reasons for wanting a divided Peninsula to persist). 56 With unification, Russia would lose influence; China would face instability and suddenly border a U.S. ally ; Japan would worry about a united and possibly still nuclear Peninsula; and South Korea would risk sinking under the weight of its poor brother. Assuming unification could be achieved peacefully, of course, would bring a welcome final conclusion to hostilities on the Korean peninsula it and help stabilize the entire AsiaPacific region by ending what is an inherently dangerous standoff One of the more tricky . issues associated with unification would be if South Korea inherited North Korea's nuclear arsenal. According to Mitchell Reiss and Jonathan Pollack, "A future Korean leader might view nuclear weapons development, or retention of the DPRK's nuclear legacy, as the surest means to achieve equivalence with surrounding major powers -- and perhaps especially with the United States." 57 However, both authors conclude that this would require a major shift in Korea's regional threat Last printed 26 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 perceptions and a major loss in confidence of America's nuclear umbrella and of the alliance. 58 A nuclear South Korea that would retain the North's nuclear arsenal would most assuredly catalyze instability in Northeast Asia. Japan would potentially reconsider its nuclear options as perceptions of a nucleararmed and potentially aggressive Korea would quickly translate into real threats. Solves nuclear war The Nation, 6/17/10 ("North Korea warns UN of risk of nuclear war", The Nation (Thailand), June 17th 2010, June 27th 2010, Lexis Nexis, KONTOPOULOS) North Korea yesterday urged the UN Security Council to impartially handle the deadly sinking of a South Korean warship blamed on the secretive state, warning that ongoing tension over the incident could trigger nuclear war on the peninsula The threat came hours after the country's UN ambassador told reporters at a rare news conference in New York that its military will respond if . main Rodong Sinmun newspaper said in a commentary yesterday. The paper said tension is running so high on the peninsula that any the world body questions or condemns North Korea over the sinking. Sin Sonho repeated his regime's position that it had nothing to do with the sinking that killed 46 South Korean sailors. "The UN Security Council must fulfil its responsibilities by bringing to light the truth of the incident impartially and objectively," the North's accidental incident could trigger an allout conflict, even a nuclear war . "Indeed, a very dangerous situation " in which a minor accidental incident could trigger an allout war and develop into a nuclear war " is fostered on the Korean peninsula now," said the commentary, carried by the official Korean Central News Agency. Biodiversity loss is empirically denied and there is a litany of alternate casualties Bruno, associate professor UNC Chapel Hill, 10 [John F., May 3, "Biodiversity Loss Continues Unabated Despite International Efforts", http://www.huffingtonpost.com/johnfbruno/biodiversitylosscontinu_b_561699.html] including habitat loss, climate change, pollution and overharvesting Despite a few success stories and steps in the right direction, we . are falling short far of stemming these losses. Biodiversity is the entire range of biological variety in the world, including the diversity of genotypes, species and ecosystems. It can be measured on levels from DNA molecules all the way up to broad taxonomic categories such as families and phyla. Monitoring the fate of any of these aspects of biodiversity at a global scale is a daunting task. Thus, we know little about the rates and patterns of biodiversity loss or the effectiveness of global mitigation plans such as the 2002 Convention on Biological Diversity. Dr. Stuart Butchart of the UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre and BirdLife International tackled the problem by assembling an international team of conservation scientists (that I was part of) Betting on biodiversity loss is a pretty sure thing. The earth's plant and animal species are disappearing at a sobering rate due to pressures to calculate trends in global biodiversity. The idea was to assemble several dozen indices that we had sound, long term data for including population trends for birds and other vertebrates and the loss of habitats such as forests, seagrass beds and coral reefs. As we recently reported in Science magazine, our analysis indicates that biodiversity has continued to decline over the past four decades with no detectable abatement for most indices. This is largely due to increased pressures resulting from human population growth, economic development and globalization but it also seems clear that our international response to the biodiversity crisis has been inadequate. Every aspect of biodiversity on earth is unique. The species that we have already driven extinct, from the Dodo to the Tasmanian Tiger, can never be resurrected or replaced. As a field ecologist, I have been lucky to experience and work on some truly wondrous examples of the earth's biodiversity from the tide pools of the Pacific Northwest to rainforests in Costa Rica to alpine habitats in the Rocky Mountains. The downside of my otherwise fantastic job is that I witness the degradation of nature firsthand. The coral reefs of the Florida Keys of today bear little resemblance to the underwater jungles patrolled by large sharks that I snorkeled over as a kid 35 years ago . Over the last two decades I have observed and documented striking biodiversity losses even on isolated and seemingly untouched reefs. Unification solves the South Korean economy Noland, 01 Deputy Director of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, formerly served as Senior Economist at the Council of Economic Advisers in the Executive Office of the President of the United States, Expert on the Economy of North Korea, held research or teaching positions at Yale University, the Johns Hopkins University, the University of Southern California, Tokyo University, Saitama University and the University of Ghana, and the Korea Development Institute (Marcus, "Planning for a Peaceful Korea", February 2001, June 27th 2010, p. 281282, KONTOPOULOS) PDF T his would not be pure "cost," however. Some in South Korea could arguably benefit in this scenario. Investment in the North would earn remitted profits to owners of capital in the South , and the process could be expected to shift the distribution of income away from labor and toward capital. At the same time, there would be shifts in the income distribution among different classes of labor, with the distribution of income shifting toward higher skilled classes of Last printed 27 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 labor. Another cleavage would be between sectors producing internationally traded goods such as manufactures, and nontraded goods such as construction, with the nontraded goods sector ing do relatively better. The bottom line is that if you are a South Korean construction magnate with savings to invest in unification bonds, Korean unification could be very good for you. If you are a lowskilled manufacturing worker, it could be a very different story. Environmental alarmism isn't a justification for taking action they polarize debates and prevent sound policy formation based on truth Kaleita, PHD, Assistant Professor Agricultural and Biosystems Engineering 07 [Amy, "Hysteria's History" Environmental Alarmism in Context", http://www.pacificresearch.org/docLib/20070920_Hysteria_History.pdf] Apocalyptic stories about irreparable, the catastrophic damage that humans are doing to the natural environment have been around for a long time. These hysterics often have some basis in reality, but are blown up to illogical and ridiculous proportions. Part of the reason they're so appealing is that they have the ring of plausibility along with the intrigue of a horror flick. In many cases, the alarmists identify a legitimate issue, take the possible consequences to an extreme, and advocate action on the basis of these extreme projections. In 1972, the editor of the journal Nature pointed out the problem with the typical alarmist approach: "[ Alarmists'] most common error is to suppose that the worst will always happen 82 But of course, if the worst always ." happened, the human race would have died out long ago. When alarmism has a basis in reality, the challenge becomes to take appropriate action based on that reality, not on the hysteria. The aftermath of Silent Spring offers examples of both sorts of policy reactions: a reasoned response to a legitimate problem and a kneejerk response to the hysteria. On the positive side, Silent Spring brought an end to the general belief that all synthetic chemicals in use for purposes ranging from insect control to household cleaning were uniformly wonderful, and it ushered in an age of increased caution on their appropriate use. In the second chapter of her famous book, Carson wrote, "It is not my contention that chemical insecticides must never be used. I do contend that... we have allowed these chemicals to be used with little or no advance investigation of their effect on soil, water, wildlife, and man himself." Indeed, Carson seemed to advocate reasoned response to rigorous scientific investigation, and in fact this did become the modern approach to environmental chemical licensure and monitoring. An hourlong CBS documentary on pesticides was aired during the height of the furor over Silent Spring. In the documentary, Dr. Page Nicholson, a waterpollution expert with the Public Health Service, wasn't able to answer how long pesticides persist in water once they enter it, or the extent to which pesticides contaminate groundwater supplies. Today, this sort of information is gathered through routine testing of chemicals for use in the environment. 20 V: Lessons from the Apocalypse Ironically, rigorous investigation was not used in the decision to ban DDT, primarily due to the hysteria Silent Spring generated. In this example, the hysteria took on a life of its own, even trumping the author's original intent. There was, as we have seen, a more sinister and tragic response to the hysteria generated by Silent Spring. Certain developing countries, under significant pressure from the United States, abandoned the use of DDT. This decision resulted in millions of deaths from malaria and other insectborne diseases. In the absence of pressure to abandon the use of DDT, these lives would have been spared. It would certainly have been possible to design policies requiring caution and safe practices in the use of supplemental chemicals in the environment, without pronouncing a death sentence on millions of people. A major challenge in developing appropriate responses to legitimate problems is that alarmism catches people's attention and draws them in. Alarmism is given more weight than it deserves, as policy makers attempt to appease their constituency and the media. polarizes debaters into It the groups of "believers" and "skeptics ," so that reasoned, factbased compromise is difficult to achieve . Neither of these aspects of alarmism is healthy for the development of appropriate policy. Further, alarmist responses to valid problems risk foreclosing potentially useful responses based on ingenuity and progress. There are many examples from the energy sector where, in the presence of economic, efficiency, or societal demands, the marketplace has responded by developing better alternatives. That is not to say that we should blissfully squander our energy resources; on the contrary, we should be careful to utilize them wisely. But energyresource hysteria should not lead us to circumvent scientific advancement by cherry picking and favoring one particular replacement technology at the expense of other promising technologies. Environmental alarmism should be taken for what it is--a natural tendency of some portion of the public to latch onto the worst, and most unlikely, potential outcome. Alarmism should not be used as the basis for policy . Where a real problem exists, solutions should be based on reality, not hysteria. We don't need animals to keep us alive--human evolution guarantees that we will never wipe ourselves out by destroying the environment SIMON 96 (Julian, Robert H. Smith School of Business, University of Maryland, The Ultimate Resource II: People, Materials, and Environment, http://www.rhsmith.umd.edu/faculty/jsimon/Ultimate_Resource/) Let us begin by going beyond the trends in particular resources. The greatest and most important trend , of which these particular trends are a part, is trend of this the earth becom ever more livable for human beings. We see signs ing the of this our longer in life expectancy, improved knowledge of nature, and greater ability to protect ourselves from the elements, living with ever Last printed 28 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 more safety and comfort. But though this larger trend buttresses the particular resource trends, it still provides no causal explanation of the phenomenon we seek to understand. Evolutionary thinking, however, and (more specifically in economics) the sort of analysis suggested by Friedrich Hayek, offers an explanation of the observed longterm trend. Hayek (following upon Hume) urges upon us that humankind has evolved sets of rules and patterns of living which are consistent with survival and growth rather than with decline and extinction, an aspect the of evolutionary selection for survival among past societies. He assumes that the particular rules and living patterns have had something to do with chances for survivalfor example, he reasons that patterns leading to higher fertility and more healthful and productive living have led to groups' natural increase and hence survival and therefore the patterns we have inherited constitute a machinery for continued survival and growth where conditions are not too different from the past. ( This is consistent with a biological view of humankind as having evolved genes that point toward survival. But no such genetic evolution is presupposed by Hayek, in part because its time span is too great for us to understand it as well as we can understand the evolution of cultural rules. It may be illuminating, however, to view mankind's biological nature as part of the long evolutionary chain dating from the simplest plants and animals, a history of increasing complexity of construction and greater capacity to deal actively with the environment .) Let us apply Hayek's general analysis to natural resources. Such resources of all sorts have been a part of human history ever since the beginning. If humankind had not evolved patterns of behavior that increased rather than decreased the amounts of resources available to us, we would not still be here. If, as our numbers increased (or even as our numbers remained nearly stationary), our patterns had led to diminished supplies of plants and animals, less flint for tools, and disappearing wood for fires and construction, I would not be here to be writing these pages, and you would not be here to be reading them. A withdrawal of troops will not lead to a Korean unification DPRK leaders will use fears of Japan to stabilize the regime Harrison 03 (Selig, Director of the Asia Program at the Center for International Policy, is a senior scholar of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and director of the Century Foundation's Project on the United States and the Future of Korea. He has specialized in South Asia and East Asia for fifty years as a journalist and scholar and is the author of six books on Asian affairs and U.S. relations with Asia, Baluch expert and left wing theorist at the Carnegie Institute. Former managing editor of The New Republic, Former senior fellow in charge of Asian studies at the Brookings Institution, Senior fellow at the EastWest Center and Lecturer in Asian studies at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, Adjunct professor of Asian studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University, "Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and U.S. Disengagement", p. 20) The absence of U.S forces would not fully erase memories of the Korean War, especially on the part of the older generation. Moreover, fears of a more nationalistic Japan are likely to grow in both North and South Korea in the face increasingly formidable of Japanese armed forces that are likely to include nuclear capabilities for reasons spelled out in part 4. North Korean leaders will continue to use nationalism to hold their country together for some years to come by placing a new emphasis on the danger of a revived Japanese expansionism, while steadily moving closer to South Korea as the gap between their economic systems narrows. Last printed 29 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 A2 Unification Good Attempting to unify alongside U.S. presence ensures North Korean collapse STAFFORD 2008 (Captain Jonathan Stafford, US Army, "Finding America's Role in a Collapsed North Korean State," Military Review, 88:1, Questia) Calum Even as the United States fights an information war to shape a postKim Jongil North Korea, the U.S. military must prepare urgently for the inevitable regime collapse. Military leaders who will be called upon to help stabilize North Korea do not have the option to forego planning for things they hope will not happen. However, there are few signs that U nited tates orces Korea S F has been planning or training for Kim's fall. This is not due to a lack of vision. In 2006, U.S. military planners wanted to start preparing a detailed operational plan (OPLAN) with the South Korean military to prepare jointly for the possibility of a North Korean collapse. However, the ROK Government was afraid such planning might offend North Korea, so the two nations reached a compromise: they would develop a contingency plan (CONPLAN) instead of a fullfledged OPLAN.37 CONPLAN 502905, to be completed by the end of 2007, focuses on controlling the spread of weapons of mass destruction and handling refugees fleeing the country in the event of a collapse. CONPLAN 502905 might be the beginning of planning for the possibility of a North Korean collapse, but it is still woefully inadequate. Stopping nuclear weapons dissemination and the exodus of refugees is extremely important, but as the U.S. military's experience in Iraq has taught us, providing for security, the rule of law, and government services immediately after a conflict is also essential. Who will stop the inevitable looting that will begin after a regime collapse? Who will prevent North Koreans from taking revenge against regime security forces and others who had oppressed them? The North Koreans rely on government food rations. If the regime collapses, who will provide food for the country's 23 million citizens ? Several infectious diseasesscarlet fever, measles, typhoid, paratyphoid, and typhusare reportedly spreading inside North Korea now. Who will enforce quarantines and treat the sick? Who will establish law and order in a country filled with small arms and explosives? Who will stand up a government that the citizens of North Korea will accept after a collapse? These are just a few questions that need answers. The virulent antiAmerican indoctrination of the North Korean people complicates matters enormously. This is why it might be better for South Korea to reestablish basic services and order in postKim Jongil North Korea, not the United States. The Republic of Korea, not the United States, is best prepared to occupy North Korea. South Korean soldiers can cross the DMZ with the advantages of having a shared language and culture, as representatives of a legitimate, prosperous Korean nation. American Soldiers should not enter North Korea except under the most limited of circumstances. Everything the United States does after a North Korean collapse should be in the context of building up the South Korean Government's legitimacy in the eyes of North Koreans. Moving large U.S. troop formations into North Korea with the ROK military would create the perception that the South Koreans are American puppets, which is what DPRK propaganda has taught North Koreans since their birth. The United States must avoid taking any actions that could validate such a belief. Keeping U.S. forces out of North Korea would also strengthen the U.S. diplomatic case for preventing Chinese forces from moving into the country. Putting a South Korean face on the occupation may come with some costs, but it is essential for building the ROK Government's legitimacy. The ROK military must prepare a detailed, citybycity plan to provide the same essential services the North Korean regime (sometimes) provides today, beginning with security and food supplies. The ROK military has roughly 600,000 activeduty troops available and can activate hundreds of thousands of reserve soldiers and members of the Korean Service Corps. With a population nearly twice that of North Korea, South Korea has plenty of manpower to execute an occupation. Only its logistical infrastructure needs some improvement. The ROK military must stockpile rations, medicine, blankets, clothing, and other humanitarian relief supplies and be ready to deliver them instantly in the event of regime collapse. Japan may be able to assist South Korea in this humanitarian crisis. It too should be involved in postcollapse planning, but its role must be even more carefully limited than that of the United States. With its great resources and ideal location near Korea, Japan could support the occupation and reconstruction of North Korea with funding, airlift capacity, and additional stockpiles of humanitarian aid. Koreans, however, have long been hostile toward Japan because of its occupation of the Korean peninsula before and during World War II. For this reason, Japanese nationalsand above all, Japanese military personnelshould stay out of North Korea during the initial reconstruction phase. Japan can reduce historical animosities toward Korea and make an important goodwill gesture to the Korean people by spearheading a major humanitarian relief operation in The U.S., for its part, could also provide some of the logistical assistance needed to ensure a quick, effective response to the Kim regime's fall. The U.S. military has a logistical network in South Korea to conduct the reception, staging, and onward movement of troops and equipment into South Korea in anticipation of any potential conflict. It should adapt this network to transport humanitarian aid to designated ROK military logistical locations near the DMZ. The United States could also reduce the cost and pain of North Korean reconstruction by preparing Koreans to rebuild their own nation. The U.S. should begin training the north's future doctors, teachers, journalists, and political and business leaders now. North Korean which Koreans deliver the aid. Japan's ensuing influence in a unified Korea could help offset any Chinese effort to achieve hegemony over the peninsula . defectors accepted into the United States can be taught essential nationbuilding skills. The United States allowed the first such defectors asylum in 2006, but the numbers so far have been small.38 Accepting and training , South Korea must bear most of the burden of reconstruction. A failure to prepare for this monumental task risks losing the Korean dream of reunification to Chinese hegemony. If South Korea cannot occupy the DPRK immediately and effectively, China will. Paving the way for South Korea's successful occupation and reconstruction of North Korea requires urgent planning and action now. The United States can begin more North Korean defectors will help create an educated class of citizens that will be critical in shaping the former North Korea's future. In the final analysis, however by* Escalating the information war. * Developing a detailed citybycity OPLAN. * Persuading South Korea (with Japanese and U.S. logistical support), to take a Last printed 30 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 leading role in a postcollapse North Korea. South Korea's readiness to occupy and stabilize North Korea will determine whether the Korean North Korean collapse risks refugee flows leaving nuclear and bio weapons unsecured Chung 9 0 (Michael H., Department of Army Civilian, " U.S Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula Unification: A Cross cultural Perspective", http://www.dtic.mil/cgi bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA498023&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf) ZParks people will ever achieve their dream of a unified, democratic Korean peninsula. If not, the world may see the creation of yet another Chinese autonomous area. South Koreans fear that selfidentifying cousins, nephews, and inlaws, whom they have never met, from the North may suddenly knock on doors at South Korean homes, and ask for shelter after the DMZ walls have collapsed. Consider this Wall Street Journal (7 Nov 2008) editorial: U.S. officials worry that a messy power shift in North Korea could send hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing over its borders and leave Pyongyang's nuclear and biological weapons unsecured. In the worstcase scenario, the Chinese and American militaries might be on opposing sides of efforts to stabilize North Korea. More than 86 percent of South Koreans today were born after the peninsula was divided. 6 Will these South Koreans be willing to help nephews and cousins from the North? Most of the first generation refugees from the North are already dead. Will the second and third generations in the South be willing to make necessary sacrifices to provide political, social and economic shelter for an influx of refugees from the North? The South Korean stance on the refugee influx is complex: it is a mixture of family values and fears of nevermet communists. This plausible situation leads to serious concerns about doing nothing (status quo) while there is a question of how long the Kim Jong Il regime can survive. North Korean collapse causes prolif, disease, and economic collapse STAFFORD 2008 (Captain Jonathan Stafford, US Army, "Finding America's Role in a Collapsed North Korean State," Military Review, 88:1, Questia) Calum North Korea has been a U.S. adversary responsible for the deaths of thousands of American service members over the past 55 years, and it is the only country in the world that holds a commissioned U.S. naval vessel hostage.1 It also possesses stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons, has an advanced ballistic missile program, and recently detonated a nuclear weapon. The nations within range of its mediumrange missiles include 3 of the world's top 11 economies; combined, the 3 nations contain onefourth of the world's population and are responsible for nearly onefifth of the world's trade volume.3 Today, 2 North Korea faces the very real threats of internal collapse or forced regime change. Either event would create one of the greatest humanitarian crises of modern times overnight. Infectious diseases, severe economic burdens, and even weapons of mass destruction could spread across the borders North Korea shares with some of the world's greatest economic and military powers. That destroys biodiversity in the DMZ--it's a key ecosystem CNN 2003 ("Korea's DMZ: The thin green line," August 25, http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/east/08/22/korea.bio.dmz/) (CNN) From the fields of Normandy to the forests of Ardennes, battlefields around the globe have healed their wounds and nature has fought back. Nowhere is this more evident than in the heavilyfortified border zone between North and South Korea. The Demilitarized Zone, or DMZ as it is more popularly known is now one of the few untouched havens for Northeast Asia's wildlife. Some say the only threat to its survival is peace. "Scientists have done a pretty good job of studying biodiversity in South Korea since the 1950's and I am confident that there is no place like the DMZ on the peninsula," Ke Chung Kim of the DMZ Forum told CNN. The zone was established at the end of the threeyear Korean War in 1953 and while intensive agriculture and industrialization has ravaged both the North and South since, tight security measures have left the environment in the DMZ largely undisturbed for the last 50 years. As a result, the ribbon of untouched land along the 38th parallel has now become an important refuge for two of the world's most endangered birds: the whitenaped and the redcrowned crane. Last printed 31 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Other rare species include Asiatic black bears, Chinese gorhals and egrets. According to some accounts there may even be Korean tigers in the DMZ a subspecies of the Siberian tiger, one of the rarest tigers on the planet. In total more than 20,000 migratory fowl utilize the border area. They manage to avoid setting off land mines although nowadays some may be too old to be active. The 4kilometerwide by 250kilometer long (2.5 miles by 155 miles) DMZ stretches across the entire width of the Korean Peninsula, encompassing a cross section of ecosystems and landscapes . The corridor follows the Military Demarcation Line established by the 1953 Armistice Agreement between the two Koreas which are still technically at war. After the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 the DMZ is the last remaining Cold Warstyle frontier on the planet, bristling with sensors, tank traps and automatic artillery. Up to two million soldiers guard the world's most heavily fortified border, whilst listening to the sound of crested shell ducks and swan geese. "The DMZ and its adjacent Civilian Control Zone are unique containing wetlands, forests, estuaries, mountains, coastal islands, riparian valleys and agricultural fields," says Hall Healy of Facilitated Solutions International, an organization that aids conservation groups working in the border area. Biodiversity and barbed wire In the event of a formalized peace breaking out between the two Koreas any biological reserve would compete with other proposals for the land, even though the South Korean government has said the DMZ is a priority ecosystem. While poverty alleviation would likely prevent North Korea from putting much weight on nature conservation in the DMZ, for its southern neighbor it would be the prospect of further economic development and integration with the North that would be a driving force for development. Yet pressure from the DMZ Forum, DMZ Vets and the Korean Federation for Environmental Movement (KFEM) to declare the area a "biodiversity zone," has been growing. Since much of the natural Korean natural habitat has been degraded by industrialization, urbanization and agriculture, conservationists hope that the DMZ will be preserved for its beauty and significance. "South Korea's habitats have been exploited many times over and North Korea's environmental conditions are dismal at best," says Kim. "North Korean environmental demise is the result of persistent mismanagement of forests, military destruction, and poverty," he says. In the South, the picture is not much better. A 1994 biodiversity study revealed that almost 30 percent of the country's mammals, 48 percent of reptiles and 60 percent of amphibians are either extinct or endangered. The peninsula, which covers a combined area the size of Pennsylvania and New York State, already has a combined population of about 70 million, which could rise to 100 million by 2025. This is putting more pressure on the area to the north of Seoul and to the south of Pyongyang, the North Korean capital. The distance between the two cities is only 194 kilometers and every month, development creeps nearer to the demilitarized zone. "Similar flora and fauna may have existed in other locations before, but due to development, these locations are now highly fragmented and do not possess the diversity of species they once did," says Healy. Many conservationists see the DMZ as a ready made nature reserve. It is already well defined and controlled by a body separate to both countries the Military Armistice Commission. Only the future will tell. At present the conservationists best bet is for the barbed wire to stay in place to keep the developers out and the wildlife intact. Extinction WATSON 2006 (Captain Paul, Founder and President of Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, dude on Whale Wars, Last Mod 917, http://www.eco action.org/dt/beerswil.html) The facts are clear. More plant and animal species will go through extinction within our generation than have been lost thorough natural causes over the past two hundred million years. Our single human generation, that is, all people born between 1930 and 2010 will witness the complete obliteration of one third to one half of all the Earth's life forms, each and every one of them the product of more than two billion years of evolution. This is biological meltdown, and what this really means is the end to vertebrate evolution on planet Earth. Nature is under siege on a global scale. Biotopes, i.e., environmentally distinct regions, from tropical and temperate rainforests to coral reefs and coastal estuaries, are disintegrating in the wake of human onslaught. The destruction of forests and the proliferation of human activity will remove more than 20 percent of all terrestrial plant species over the next fifty years. Because plants form the foundation for entire biotic communities, their demise will carry with it the extinction of an exponentially greater number of animal species perhaps ten times as many faunal species for each type of plant eliminated. Sixtyfive million years ago, a natural cataclysmic event resulted in extinction of the dinosaurs. Even with a plant foundation intact, it took more than 100,000 years for faunal biological diversity to reestablish itself. More importantly, the resurrection of biological diversity assumes an intact zone of tropical forests to provide for new speciation after extinction. Today, the tropical rain forests are disappearing more rapidly than any other bioregion, ensuring that after the age of humans, the Earth will remain a biological, if not a literal desert for eons to come. The present course of civilization points to ecocide the death of nature. Like a runaway train, civilization is speeding along tracks of our own manufacture towards the stone wall of extinction. The human passengers sitting comfortably in their seats, laughing, partying, and choosing to not look out the window. Environmentalists are those perceptive few who have their faces pressed against the glass, watching the hurling bodies of plants and animals go screaming by. Environmental activists are those even fewer people who are trying desperately to break into the fortified engine of greed that propels this destructive specicidal juggernaut. Others are desperately throwing out anchors in an attempt to slow the monster down while all the while, the authorities, blind to their own impending destruction, are clubbing, shooting and jailing those who would save us all. SHORT MEMORIES Civilized humans have for ten thousand years been marching across the face of the Earth leaving deserts in their footprints. Because we have such short memories, we forgot the wonder and splendor of a virgin nature. We revise history and make it fit into our present perceptions. For instance, are you aware that only two thousand years ago, the coast of North Africa was a mighty forest? The Phoenicians and the Carthaginians built powerful ships from the strong timbers of the region. Rome was a major exporter of timber to Europe. The temple of Jerusalem was built with titanic cedar logs, one image of which adorns the flag of Lebanon today. Jesus Christ did not live in a desert, he was a man of the forest. The Sumerians were renowned for clearing the forests of Mesopotamia for agriculture. But the destruction of the coastal swath of the North African forest stopped the rain from advancing into the interior. Without the rain, the trees died and thus was born the mighty Sahara, sired by man and continued to grow southward at a rate of ten Last printed 32 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 miles per year, advancing down the length of the continent of Africa. And so will go Brazil. The precipitation off the Atlantic strikes the coastal rain forest and is absorbed and sent skyward again by the trees, falling further into the interior. Twelve times the moisture falls and twelve times it is returned to the sky all the way to the Andes mountains. Destroy the coastal swath and desertify Amazonia it is as simple as that. Create a swath anywhere between the coast and the mountains and the rains will be stopped. We did it before while relatively primitive. We learned nothing. We forgot. So too, have we forgotten that walrus once mated and bred along the coast of Nova Scotia, that sixty million bison once roamed the North American plains. One hundred years ago, the white bear once roamed the forests of New England and the Canadian Maritime provinces. Now it is called the polar bear because that is where it now makes its last stand. EXTINCTION IS DIFFICULT TO APPRECIATE Gone forever are the European elephant, lion and tiger. The Labrador duck, gint auk, Carolina parakeet will never again grace this planet of ours. Lost for all time are the Atlantic grey whales, the Biscayan right whales and the Stellar sea cow. Our children will never look upon the California condor in the wild or watch the Palos Verde blue butterfly dart from flower to flower. Extinction is a difficult concept to fully appreciate. What has been is no more and never shall be again. It would take another creation and billions of years to recreate the passenger pigeon. It is the loss of billions of years of evolutionary programming. It is the destruction of beauty, the obliteration of truth, the removal of uniqueness, the scarring of the sacred web of life To be responsible for an extinction is to commit blasphemy against the divine. It is the greatest of all possible crimes, more evil than murder, more appalling than genocide, more monstrous than even the apparent unlimited perversities of the human mind. To be responsible for the complete and utter destruction of a unique and sacred life form is arrogance that seethes with evil, for the very opposite of evil is live. It is no accident that these two words spell out each other in reverse. And yet, a reporter in California recently told me that "all the redwoods in California are not worth the life on one human being." What incredible arrogance. The rights a species, any species, must take precedence over the life of an individual or another species. This is a basic ecological law. It is not to be tampered with by primates who have molded themselves into divine legends in their own mind. For each and every one of the thirty million plus species that grace this beautiful planet are essential for the continued wellbeing of which we are all a part, the planet Earth the divine entity which brought us forth from the fertility of her sacred womb. As a sea captain I like to compare the structural integrity of the biosphere to that of a ship's hull. Each species is a rivet that keeps the hull intact. If I were to go into my engine room and find my engineers busily popping rivets from the hull, I would be upset and naturally I would ask them what they were doing. If they told me that they discovered that they could make a dollar each from the rivets, I could do one of three things. I could ignore them. I could ask them to cut me in for a share of the profits, or I could kick their asses out of the engine room and off my ship. If I was a responsible captain, I would do the latter. If I did not, I would soon find the ocean pouring through the holes left by the stolen rivets and very shortly after, my ship, my crew and myself would disappear beneath the waves. And that is the state of the world today. The political leaders, i.e., the captains at the helms of their nation states, are ignoring the rivet poppers or they are cutting themselves in for the profits. There are very few asses being kicked out of the engine room of spaceship Earth. With the rivet poppers in command, it will not be long until the biospheric integrity of the Earth collapses under the weight of ecological strain and tides of death come pouring in . And that will be the price of progress ecological collapse, the death of nature, and with it the horrendous and mind numbing specter of massive human destruction. Last printed 33 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 A2 War solves power projection 1. No link their evidence assumes that the US would be fighting an offensive war not a defensive one on Korean soil 2. Displays of military power won't deter potential aggressors Schneider 99 director of the US Air Force Counterproliferation Center and Professor of International Relations at the Air War College (Dr. Barry R., Future War and Counterproliferation: U.S. Military Responses to NBC Proliferation Threats, 164) In some cases, it may be possible to preserve security, prevent proliferation, and deal with dangerous radical regimes short of military action. Logically, if the personal political power, regional security needs, economic goals, and political goals of such leaders could be achieved by less radical and risky means, it might be possible that they might slow or abandon the quest for their own weapons of mass destruction. Or, if radical regimes are not deterred from acquisition of such weapons, they may be deterred from use of them by countervailing military power, and, in time, the leadership of such regimes will change and relations may improve as a result. Longterm enemies have from time to time decided to make peace after many wars and much bloodshed. Note the EgyptianIsraeli peace treaty engineered by Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin in 1980, and the more recent accord reached between Yassir Arafat's Palestine Liberation Organization and Israel in 1993. Even more dramatic has been the end of the Cold War and subsequent warmer relations that exist between the republics of the former Soviet Union and the United States. Hayes 09 Peter, Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute, "Extended Nuclear Deterrence: Global Abolition and Korea" 12/17 http://www.nautilus.org/publications/essays/napsnet/policyforumsonline/security20092010/09096Hayes.html) 3. Nonunique and turn North Korean prolif undermines our credibility Henceforth, the credibility of US END with allies in this region was tied up directly with the United States' ability to stop and reverse (not merely contain by deterrence) the DPRK's acquisition of nuclear weapons and use of nuclear threat to compel the United States and others to negotiate with itwhat I term the DPRK's "stalker strategy." [5] As a result of nearly two decades of slow motion nuclear wrestling with the DPRK culminating in 2009 in the latter's second, this time successful, nuclear test, the credibility of US END has fallen to an alltime low. Since 2008, US nuclear hegemony based on END in East Asia has begun to unravel due to the havoc wrought by the North Korean nuclear breakout on the NPTIAEA system as a whole, by its rejection of the authority of the UNSC as enforcer of the NPTIAEA system, as a spoiler state for cooperative security institution building in the region, and by its direct challenge to US hegemony in its alliance relationships . Of course, all the nuclear weapons states are responsible for the parlous state of the NPTIAEA system. But in the case of the DPRK, the United States as a direct antagonist and primary player in the Peninsula is by far the state held most accountable for these dismal outcomes. 4. Case outweighs extend Hayes & HamelGreen war would escalate, kill the economy, destroy the environment, and cause extinction means its try or die Last printed 34 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 A2 China War Good (Russian Arms Impact) 1. War not inevitable-- A. Shifting to alternative energy now that solves resource disputes B. What one theorist says about China's ontology doesn't mean it'll attack the US changing geopolitical structures encourage more economic cooperation rather than imperialist strategies C. Predictions flawed the further out our predictions are, the less likely they are to be accurate the world will be very different by 2017. 2. US firststrike bad decimates the environment ensures extinction Takai `9, Retired Colonel and Former Researcher in the military science faculty of the Staff College for Japan's Ground Self Defense Force ("U.S.China nuclear strikes would spell doomsday", October 7, http://www.upiasia.com/Security/2009/10/07/uschina_nuclear_strikes_would_spell_doomsday/7213/) What would happen if China launched its 20 Dongfeng5 intercontinental ballistic missiles, each with a 5megaton warhead, at 20 major U.S. cities? Prevailing opinion in Washington D.C. until not so long ago was that the raids would cause over 40 million casualties, annihilating much of the United States. In order to avoid such a doomsday scenario, consensus was that the United States would have to eliminate this potential threat at its source with preemptive strikes on China. But cool heads at institutions such as the Federation of American Scientists and the National Resource Defense Council examined the facts and produced their own analyses in 2006, which differed from the hardline views of their contemporaries. The FAS and NRDC developed several scenarios involving nuclear strikes over ICBM sites deep in the Luoning Mountains in China's western province of Henan, and analyzed their implications. One of the scenarios involved direct strikes on 60 locations including 20 main missile silos and decoy silos hitting each with one W76-class, 100kiloton multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle carried on a submarinelaunched ballistic missile. In order to destroy the hardened silos, the strikes would aim for maximum impact by causing ground bursts near the silos' entrances. Using air bursts similar to the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki would not be as effective, as the blasts and the heat would dissipate extensively. In this scenario, the 6 megatons of ground burst caused by the 60 attacks would create enormous mushroom clouds over 12 kilometers high, composed of radioactive dirt and debris. Within 24 hours following the explosions, deadly fallout would spread from the mushroom clouds, driven by westerly winds toward Nanjing and Shanghai. They would contaminate the cities' residents, water, foodstuff and crops, causing irreversible damage. The impact of a 6megaton nuclear explosion would be 360 times more powerful than the Hiroshima bomb, killing not less than 4 million people. Such massive casualties among noncombatants would far exceed the military purpose of destroying the enemy's military power. This would cause political harm and damage the United States' ability to achieve its war aims, as it would lose international support. On the other hand, China could retaliate against U.S. troops in East Asia, employing intermediaterange ballistic missiles including its DF3, DF4 and DF21 missiles, based in Liaoning and Shandong provinces, which would still be intact. If the United States wanted to destroy China's entire nuclear retaliatory capability, U.S. forces would have to employ almost all their nuclear weapons, causing catastrophic environmental hazards that could lead to the annihilation of mankind. Accordingly, the FAS and NRDC conclusively advised U.S. leaders to get out of the vicious cycle of nuclear competition, which costs staggering sums, and to promote nuclear disarmament talks with China. Such advice is worth heeding by nuclear hardliners. 3. First strike impossible we don't know where China's weapons are. Lieber and Press's study is flawed. Bin, Professor of the Institute of International Studies, Tsinghua Universit, 06 [Li, "Paper Tiger with Whitened Teeth", http://www.wsichina.org/cs4_5.pdf] Rather than exploring why China chooses to do so, Lieber and Press use this fact as evidence to support their point on U.S. nuclear primacy.3 If the authors paid more heed to China's choice of a small and lowalert nuclear arsenal they would find their deductions faulty , including technical problems in their calculations. the All calculations in their paper, including the sensitivity analyses, focus on the hardness of the targets as well as strike capabilities, which are determined by the lethal distance, accuracy, and reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons. However, the calculations in the paper are based on a fundamentally unrealistic assumption: is, that the United States can detect and locate all Russian and Chinese longrange nuclear weapons The authors never state this assumption in their paper perhaps unknowingly so, as most former . calculations do not discuss the issue of target detection. In other previous studies, where the numbers of surviving nuclear weapons in a calculation are much larger than zero, it may be alright to ignore the factor of intelligence. But, if such a calculation gives a result of almost zero surviving targets in a nuclear exchange, the intelligence factor becomes highly salient and therefore cannot be ignored. The authors understand that "... one surviving mobile ICBM might destroy a U.S. city ..." So their sensitivity analysis tries to prove that no single Russian longrange nuclear weapon can survive even if the U.S. nuclear weapons are not as effective as assumed. However, the real problem is that if the United States does not know where some nuclear weapons are in Russia or China the United With near zero surviving targets in a nuclear exchange, the intelligence factor becomes highly salient. States cannot destroy them even with , superior numbers and performance of nuclear weapons. It is instructive to know that once the Soviet Union (and later, Russia) felt that it had a sufficient number of nuclear weapons to survive a first U.S. nuclear strike, it chose to sign the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START) I and II that entail onsite inspections to verify the numbers and locations of the Russian longrange nuclear weapons. If Russia feels that not a single one of its nuclear weapons can survive a first strike by the United States, it may consider not revealing all its nuclear weapons to the United States. In fact, unlike the START treaties, the new Moscow Treaty does not require Last printed 35 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 similar onsite inspections. It is evident, even more so in China's case, that it has never declared the number or location of its nuclear weapons. Naturally, the United States relies on its intelligence to identify and locate China's nuclear weapons and then uses this information to decipher which objects and how many objects appear to be nuclear weapons and where they are located. The calculations in their paper do prove that the United States can destroy all the objects that have been identified by U.S. intelligence as nuclear weapons . However, the paper misses the central point of whether the entirety of Chinese longrange nuclear weapons have been identified and located by U.S. intelligence or whether all the objects that are identified in China are real nuclear weapons. The paper simply omits possible deficiencies of intelligence. Furthermore, the performance of U.S. intelligence in the first Iraq war and the Kosovo war suggests that the United States may miss more than just a few large military targets. Technically speaking, it is a relatively simple countermeasure for China to conceal a few actual ICBMs and to deploy decoy missiles given the large size of the Chinese territory. No matter how the United States increases the number, accuracy, and reliability of its nuclear weapons, even if used in a surprise attack, it has no means of destroying those Chinese ICBMs that its intelligence has not found. Thus, there is no method or model by which Lieber and Press can determine with any certainty that the number surviving of Chinese ICBMs after a surprise U.S. strike (equal to the number of undetected Chinese ICBMs) will be zero, and it seems far more likely survivability would be greater than zero. The definitive conclusion that the surviving Chinese ICBMs must be zero is technically wrong as it omits the intelligence deficiency. The uncertainties of the calculations in the paper are much greater and much more serious than indicated by the authors, and certainly goes beyond their single scenario of an enemy target surviving because a U.S. submarine commander does not believe his launch order. However, the greatest concern is that U.S. leaders actually believe that zero retaliation from China is possible, as predicted by Lieber and Press, and behave incautiously. Zero retaliation is an illusion, and if taken seriously it would bring dire risks to the U nited States. 4. If China launches even a single nuclear weapon it would activate the Russian Early Warning System Kristensen director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists, 06 ["Report: Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War", http://www.nukestrat.com/china/chinareport.htm] In Chapter 2 we quoted a range for China's DF5A ICBM of at least 8,000 miles (13,000 km). Assuming a circumpolar trajectory for the missile, Figure 92 illustrates which areas of the United States are within range assuming the DF5A is launched from silos near the city of Luoning in China's Henan Province. A range of at least 6.835 miles (11,000 km) is required to put cities at 186 | Federation of American Scientists/Natural Resources Defense Council risk on the West Coast and in the northcentral region of the United States. A range of 7,456 miles (12,000 km) puts cities on the East Coast at risk, including New York City and Washington, D.C. If the range of the DF5A exceeds 8,000 miles (13,000 km) then all of the continental United States could be targeted. Note that a nearpolar intercontinental ballistic missile trajectory toward the United States from Luoning is the shortest distance but would necessitate an overflight of Russia and possibly activate Russia's early warning system. Missile trajectories from China to the continental United States which do not overfly Russia would require a range exceeding 10,560 miles (17,000 km). Accidental launch Rosenberg, San Francisco Gate, 06 [Eric, "Experts warn of an accidental atomic war / Nuclear missile modified for conventional attack on Iran could set off alarm in Russia", http://articles.sfgate.com/200610 06/news/17316809_1_nuclearmissilesnorwegianscientificrocketballistic] Russian military officers might misconstrue submarinelaunched conventional D5 intercontinental ballistic missile and conclude a that Russia is under nuclear attack , said Ted Postol, a physicist and professor of science, technology and national security policy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Pavel Podvig, a physicist and weapons specialist at Stanford. "Any launch of a longrange nonnuclear armed sea or land ballistic missile will cause an automated alert of the Russian early warning system," Postol told reporters. The triggering of an alert wouldn't necessarily precipitate a retaliatory hail of Russian nuclear missiles, Postol said. Nevertheless, he said, "there can be no doubt that such an alert will greatly increase chances of a nuclear accident involving strategic nuclear forces." Podvig said launching conventional versions of a missile from a the submarine that normally carries nuclear ICBMs "expands the possibility for a misunderstanding so widely that it is hard to contemplate." Mixing conventional and nuclear D5s on a U.S. Trident submarine "would be very dangerous," Podvig said, because the Russians have no way of discriminating between the two types of missiles once they are launched. Russian President Vladimir Putin warned that the project would increase the danger of accidental nuclear war. "The media and expert circles are already discussing plans to use intercontinental ballistic missiles to carry nonnuclear warheads," he said in May. "The launch of such a missile could ... provoke a fullscale counterattack using strategic nuclear forces." Accidental nuclear war is not so far fetched. In 1995, Russia initially interpreted the launch of a Norwegian scientific rocket as the onset of a U.S. nuclear attack. ThenPresident Boris Yeltsin activated his "nuclear briefcase" in the first stages of preparation to launch a retaliatory strike before the mistake was Last printed 36 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 discovered. The United States and Russia have acknowledged the possibility that Russia's equipment might mistakenly conclude the United States was attacking with nuclear missiles. In 1998, the two countries agreed to set up a joint radar center in Moscow operated by U.S. and Russian forces to supplement Russia's aging equipment and reduce the threat of accidental war. But the center has yet to open. A major technical problem exacerbates the risk of using the D5 as a conventional weapon: the decaying state of Russia's nuclear forces. Russia's nuclear missiles are tethered to early warning radars that have been in decline since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. And Russia unlike the United States, lacks , sufficient satellites to supplement the radars and confirm whether missile launches are truly under way or are false alarms. Only scenario for extinction Bostrom, gannon award winner, prof at oxford, 02 [Nick Bostrom, Professor of philosophy at Oxford University, 2002, (http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html)] A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization .[4] Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankind's potential permanently. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st century. 5. First Strike destroys the nuclear taboo and causes the Cold War's nightmare scenarios to become reality Bin, Professor of the Institute of International Studies, Tsinghua Universit, 6 [Li, "Paper Tiger with Whitened Teeth", http://www.wsichina.org/cs4_5.pdf] The power pattern in the world has significantly changed since the end of the cold war. The United States is indeed in a new period of power expansion. However, nuclear weapons of the United States provide little contribution to its fast growing power. Lieber and Press are therefore wrong to predict that the United States would gain new coercive power. First, the United States cannot develop a fully disarming nuclear strike capability against Russia and China given its intelligence deficiency; second, a disarming capability of surprise attack in peacetime cannot generate coercive power in crisis given the difficulty of signaling; third, the U nited tates S cannot new nuclear gain coercive power as its new methods of using nuclear weapons are constrained by the nuclear taboo In . this new era, nuclear weapons essentially remain a paper tiger. U.S. nuclear modernization toward greater strike capability is just a whitening of the paper tiger's teeth. If more people in the world today understood that this fundamental nature of nuclear weapons will remain unchanged, even with the rise of American nuclear strike capabilities, we might still avoid the reemergence of the Cold War's worst nightmare scenarios . 6. Case outweighs escalation of the Taiwanese conflict immediately draws in other great powers and regional actors ensures a widespread thermonuclear war irrespective of the Chinese arsenals that's Huncovik Last printed 37 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 A2 China War Good (Nanotech Impact) 1. War not inevitable-- A. Shifting to alternative energy now that solves resource disputes B. What one theorist says about China's ontology doesn't mean it'll attack the US changing geopolitical structures encourage more economic cooperation rather than imperialist strategies C. Predictions flawed the further out our predictions are, the less likely they are to be accurate the world will be very different by 2017. 2. US firststrike bad decimates the environment ensures extinction Takai `9, Retired Colonel and Former Researcher in the military science faculty of the Staff College for Japan's Ground Self Defense Force ("U.S.China nuclear strikes would spell doomsday", October 7, http://www.upiasia.com/Security/2009/10/07/uschina_nuclear_strikes_would_spell_doomsday/7213/) What would happen if China launched its 20 Dongfeng5 intercontinental ballistic missiles, each with a 5megaton warhead, at 20 major U.S. cities? Prevailing opinion in Washington D.C. until not so long ago was that the raids would cause over 40 million casualties, annihilating much of the United States. In order to avoid such a doomsday scenario, consensus was that the United States would have to eliminate this potential threat at its source with preemptive strikes on China. But cool heads at institutions such as the Federation of American Scientists and the National Resource Defense Council examined the facts and produced their own analyses in 2006, which differed from the hardline views of their contemporaries. The FAS and NRDC developed several scenarios involving nuclear strikes over ICBM sites deep in the Luoning Mountains in China's western province of Henan, and analyzed their implications. One of the scenarios involved direct strikes on 60 locations including 20 main missile silos and decoy silos hitting each with one W76-class, 100kiloton multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle carried on a submarinelaunched ballistic missile. In order to destroy the hardened silos, the strikes would aim for maximum impact by causing ground bursts near the silos' entrances. Using air bursts similar to the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki would not be as effective, as the blasts and the heat would dissipate extensively. In this scenario, the 6 megatons of ground burst caused by the 60 attacks would create enormous mushroom clouds over 12 kilometers high, composed of radioactive dirt and debris. Within 24 hours following the explosions, deadly fallout would spread from the mushroom clouds, driven by westerly winds toward Nanjing and Shanghai. They would contaminate the cities' residents, water, foodstuff and crops, causing irreversible damage. The impact of a 6megaton nuclear explosion would be 360 times more powerful than the Hiroshima bomb, killing not less than 4 million people. Such massive casualties among noncombatants would far exceed the military purpose of destroying the enemy's military power. This would cause political harm and damage the United States' ability to achieve its war aims, as it would lose international support. On the other hand, China could retaliate against U.S. troops in East Asia, employing intermediaterange ballistic missiles including its DF3, DF4 and DF21 missiles, based in Liaoning and Shandong provinces, which would still be intact. If the United States wanted to destroy China's entire nuclear retaliatory capability, U.S. forces would have to employ almost all their nuclear weapons, causing catastrophic environmental hazards that could lead to the annihilation of mankind. Accordingly, the FAS and NRDC conclusively advised U.S. leaders to get out of the vicious cycle of nuclear competition, which costs staggering sums, and to promote nuclear disarmament talks with China. Such advice is worth heeding by nuclear hardliners. 3. First strike impossible we don't know where China's weapons are. Lieber and Press's study is flawed. Bin, Professor of the Institute of International Studies, Tsinghua Universit, 06 [Li, "Paper Tiger with Whitened Teeth", http://www.wsichina.org/cs4_5.pdf] Rather than exploring why China chooses to do so, Lieber and Press use this fact as evidence to support their point on U.S. nuclear primacy.3 If the authors paid more heed to China's choice of a small and lowalert nuclear arsenal they would find their deductions faulty , including technical problems in their calculations. the All calculations in their paper, including the sensitivity analyses, focus on the hardness of the targets as well as strike capabilities, which are determined by the lethal distance, accuracy, and reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons. However, the calculations in the paper are based on a fundamentally unrealistic assumption: is, that the United States can detect and locate all Russian and Chinese longrange nuclear weapons The authors never state this assumption in their paper perhaps unknowingly so, as most former . calculations do not discuss the issue of target detection. In other previous studies, where the numbers of surviving nuclear weapons in a calculation are much larger than zero, it may be alright to ignore the factor of intelligence. But, if such a calculation gives a result of almost zero surviving targets in a nuclear exchange, the intelligence factor becomes highly salient and therefore cannot be ignored. The authors understand that "... one surviving mobile ICBM might destroy a U.S. city ..." So their sensitivity analysis tries to prove that no single Russian longrange nuclear weapon can survive even if the U.S. nuclear weapons are not as effective as assumed. However, the real problem is that if the United States does not know where some nuclear weapons are in Russia or China the United With near zero surviving targets in a nuclear exchange, the intelligence factor becomes highly salient. States cannot destroy them even with , superior numbers and performance of nuclear weapons. It is instructive to know that once the Soviet Union (and later, Russia) felt that it had a sufficient number of nuclear weapons to survive a first U.S. nuclear strike, it chose to sign the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START) I and II that entail onsite inspections to verify the numbers and locations of the Russian longrange nuclear weapons. If Russia feels that not a single one of its nuclear weapons can survive a first strike by the United States, it may consider not revealing all its nuclear weapons to the United States. In fact, unlike the START treaties, the new Moscow Treaty does not require Last printed 38 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 similar onsite inspections. It is evident, even more so in China's case, that it has never declared the number or location of its nuclear weapons. Naturally, the United States relies on its intelligence to identify and locate China's nuclear weapons and then uses this information to decipher which objects and how many objects appear to be nuclear weapons and where they are located. The calculations in their paper do prove that the United States can destroy all the objects that have been identified by U.S. intelligence as nuclear weapons . However, the paper misses the central point of whether the entirety of Chinese longrange nuclear weapons have been identified and located by U.S. intelligence or whether all the objects that are identified in China are real nuclear weapons. The paper simply omits possible deficiencies of intelligence. Furthermore, the performance of U.S. intelligence in the first Iraq war and the Kosovo war suggests that the United States may miss more than just a few large military targets. Technically speaking, it is a relatively simple countermeasure for China to conceal a few actual ICBMs and to deploy decoy missiles given the large size of the Chinese territory. No matter how the United States increases the number, accuracy, and reliability of its nuclear weapons, even if used in a surprise attack, it has no means of destroying those Chinese ICBMs that its intelligence has not found. Thus, there is no method or model by which Lieber and Press can determine with any certainty that the number surviving of Chinese ICBMs after a surprise U.S. strike (equal to the number of undetected Chinese ICBMs) will be zero, and it seems far more likely survivability would be greater than zero. The definitive conclusion that the surviving Chinese ICBMs must be zero is technically wrong as it omits the intelligence deficiency. The uncertainties of the calculations in the paper are much greater and much more serious than indicated by the authors, and certainly goes beyond their single scenario of an enemy target surviving because a U.S. submarine commander does not believe his launch order. However, the greatest concern is that U.S. leaders actually believe that zero retaliation from China is possible, as predicted by Lieber and Press, and behave incautiously. Zero retaliation is an illusion, and if taken seriously it would bring dire risks to the U nited States. 4. Qualifications should be the lens for evaluating the comparative risk of nanotech causing extinction. Their authors are random science hacks who can't speak to the scientific possibility of their impact scenario. These qualifications are a pre requisite to judging the veracity of warrants. 5. Nanotech is inevitable UNECSO, United Nations Education, Cultural, and Scientific Organization, 2006, "The Ethics and Politics of Nanotechnology" http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001459/145951e.pdf earnest. Japan's Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology has contributed some $250 million to research in various areas of nano technology. The UK Royal Society reports that the current level of EU research is about 1 billion, and that the United Kingdom is currently spending roughly 45 million annually. In addition, China, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Brazil and Israel have all made clear that national research priorities in science and technology include research into nanotechnology. Following this initial surge of research money in the US, severa other l nations have begun ing fund nanotechnology related research in 6. Nanotech depresses the motivations for arms races and arms racing is born out of psychology and not technology Jim Logajan Codirector of the MOD Business Newsgroup, 762004 http://venusia.golgothe.net/pipermail/sci.nanotech/2004July/001210.html Since nanotechnology will make irrelevant many of the motivations that drive national antagonisms, the more fundamental question is "Are nanotech arms races ever likely to arise?" not "Are they unstable?" Furthermore, an objective list would have included those aspects of nanotechnology that lent stability to any ensuing arms race as well as those that caused instability. As a result, the list appears subjective, making it an inaccurate assessment of probable futures, and therefore of little value in determining policy. It needs to be redone with more objectivity, IMHO. 1) Cheaper to develop and test That is an odd claim to make since history has already invalidated it: An understanding of the physical laws needed to develop nuclear technology, microtechnology, and nanotechnology were all in place at the end of the 1930s. Nuclear reactors and bombs now exist, as do microelectronic devices, yet no MNT device yet exists. And Feynman spoke of MNTlike capabilities and their great promise back in 1959 and yet they still don't exist. Therefore I simply can't reconcile your claim with reality. Furthermore, even when the first MNT assembler or nanofactory arrives on the scene, the design and development problems do not go away. The technology will be in virgin territory and there will be teething problems in the design of products and in each generation of device. Each of these problems will takes months and possibly even years to work out. And of course, it isn't clear why this makes a nanotech arms race "unstable". The "stability" of said race eventually rests on the psychology and motivations of the Last printed 39 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 participants. If the intent of one side is to use the arms once they believe they have superiority, then a subsequent arms race is potentially unstable but the technology involved is irrelevant. 7. If our first strike capability is truly so comprehensive we could take out nano arms factories too. 8. Status quo democratization, globalization, deterrence and international arms control will solve nanotech arms races and wars Bryan Burns, Ph.D. from Cornell and nanotech scholar, February 13, 2005 http://nanodot.org/comments.pl?sid=01/02/14/0132244&cid=1 In terms of achieving safety in peaceful uses of nanotechnology the prospects seem good. The safety section of my paper on Open , Sourcing Nanotechnology reviews some of those issues and how openness could help. The bigger problem, as analyzed in Mark Gubrud's paper on Nanotechnology recommends, may well be part of the solution, but it may be useful to put such a strategy into the context of a broader set of conditions and and International Security cited above, concerns avoiding arms races and warfare using nanoweapons. An international arms control regime, as Mark actions which can help avoid avoid arms races and nanowar : Democracy, and more broadly building a "hightrust civil society" as mentioned in the Foresight Guidelines on MNT, as in the argument that "democracies don't make wars on each other." Interdependence, increasing interlinkages , economic and otherwise, weaving peoples together to the point where their common interests outweigh the gains from violent conflict. Thomas Friedman's phrasing on capitalist globalization is that "countries with McDonalds don't make far war on each other." International arms control regimes, which might play a role, especially in setting norms enforced by reputation in international civil society, but which face formidable practical and ethical questions in terms of the level of surveillance and other control which would be needed for thorough enforcement. Deterrence, based on credible threats of retaliation. This includes not just the extremes of mutual assured destructio (MAD) institutionalized terrorism, n but also the stability that might be promoted by modest levels of deterrence. 9. First Strike destroys the nuclear taboo and causes the Cold War's nightmare scenarios to become reality Bin, Professor of the Institute of International Studies, Tsinghua Universit, 6 [Li, "Paper Tiger with Whitened Teeth", http://www.wsichina.org/cs4_5.pdf] The power pattern in the world has significantly changed since the end of the cold war. The United States is indeed in a new period of power expansion. However, nuclear weapons of the United States provide little contribution to its fast growing power. Lieber and Press are therefore wrong to predict that the United States would gain new coercive power. First, the United States cannot develop a fully disarming nuclear strike capability against Russia and China given its intelligence deficiency; second, a disarming capability of surprise attack in peacetime cannot generate coercive power in crisis given the difficulty of signaling; third, the U nited tates S cannot new nuclear gain coercive power as its new methods of using nuclear weapons are constrained by the nuclear taboo In . this new era, nuclear weapons essentially remain a paper tiger. U.S. nuclear modernization toward greater strike capability is just a whitening of the paper tiger's teeth. If more people in the world today understood that this fundamental nature of nuclear weapons will remain unchanged, even with the rise of American nuclear strike capabilities, we might still avoid the reemergence of the Cold War's worst nightmare scenarios . 10. Case outweighs escalation of the Taiwanese conflict immediately draws in other great powers and regional actors ensures a widespread thermonuclear war irrespective of the Chinese arsenals that's Huncovik Last printed 40 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 A2: Troops Key to Deter Terrorism Withdrawal stops North Korean terror attacks Meyer, 09 former U.S. Marine Corps officer who participated in military exercises in Korea (6/18/09, Carlton, "The Pentagon's Favorite Demon," http://www.fff.org/comment/com0906h.asp, JMP) If South Koreans do not want to defend their nation, why should Americans? The United States should not play a major role in Korea, lest America becomes involved in a military conflict. The American people have as much at stake in Korea as the people of Brazil. The best way to defend America from potential North Korean terror attacks is to stop provoking their leaders with demands and threats. If Asian nations can't resolve their differences and armed conflict erupts, the United States can buy manufactured goods elsewhere. Promptly withdrawing American troops from Korea is the best option for peace, and may lead to Korean unification. This would save the United States billions of dollars a year and remove American troops and their families from a potential war zone. Americans should recall the logic of President Lyndon Johnson who said in 1964: "We are not about to send American boys nine or ten thousand miles from home to do what Asian boys ought to be doing themselves." Troops in South Korea aren't key to the war on terror or to prevent hostile rivals Bandow, 10 senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Reagan (1/25/10, Doug, American Spectator, "Letting Go," http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=11166, JMP) America's security priorities are broader -- fighting terrorism and confronting potential hostile global hegemonic powers. But the first doesn't require large military forces and the second doesn't currently exist. Nor will bilateral military cooperation over such issues be easy. South Korea is not threatened by Islamic terrorism and Seoul has little interest in the difficult task of creating a friendly government in Kabul. The South plans to dispatch 350 soldiers to Afghanistan, but for the purpose of buttressing U.S. support for continuing the alliance. The plan is controversial in South Korea and of little practical value to America. In fact, it would be better if the ROK devoted its full resources to raising, equipping, and training adequate forces for action on the Korean peninsula. Seoul can do far more to defend itself than remake Afghanistan. The latter mission is a diversion. Although willing to make a gesture regarding Afghanistan, the South is unlikely to cooperate with the U.S. against China, a Washington priority. South Korea doesn't want to become a permanent enemy of the colossus next door in service of America's broader geopolitical interests. It is one thing for Seoul to seek U.S. aid in the unlikely event of attempted Chinese coercion of the South; it is quite another for South Korea to join Washington in a war to defend, say, Taiwan. Conventional troops don't solve Bandow, 05 Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Reagan (Fall 2005, Doug, National Interest, "Seoul Searching," vol. 81, EBSCO, JMP) Advocates also fall back on a familiar litany of transnational threats such as terrorism, piracy, drug trafficking and infectious diseases to justify the continued existence of the alliance. One wonders, however, how stationing troops in Korea helps to combat the spread of AIDS, or whether the Air Force is preparing to bomb opium fields in Burma. Piracy is a major problem, but not only is there no reason that the regional powersincluding South Korea, Singapore, Australia, Japan and Indonesiacannot deploy more ships and other assets to cope with this threat, U.S. ground forces based in Korea cannot patrol the Malacca Strait. Terrorism, meanwhile, is best combated by accurate intelligence and special forces, not thousands of conventional forces configured to repel a land assault. Last printed 41 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 A2: Troops Key to Deter China / Taiwan South Korea won't permit troops to be used for other regional contingencies including China Bandow, 10 senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former special assistant to Reagan (4/18/10, Doug, "Let the Koreans Take Care of the Koreas," http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dougbandow/letthekoreanstakecare_b_542141.html, JMP) At the same time, with the threat of a North Korean invasion dramatically diminishedwhether or not Pyongyang was responsible for the ship sinkingWashington looks increasingly at other "dual uses" of American forces stationed in the peninsula. However, Seoul is unlikely to assent if the U.S. tries to turn the ROK into an advanced base in a regional conflict, particularly against China. Indeed, South Korean government the would be foolish beyond measure if it allowed Washington to turn the South into a military adversary of the ROK's increasingly powerful neighbor, a nation with a long memory. South Korea won't let troops be used to deter China especially on Taiwan Bandow, 05 Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Reagan (Fall 2005, Doug, National Interest, "Seoul Searching," vol. 81, EBSCO, JMP) The Chinese Conundrum THE ONE important case where the American presence more credibly could retain relevance is the People's Republic of China. But it is not obvious that the United States should implement a plan to "contain" Beijing, or that the ROK should join such a system. China may soon marry the world's largest population with its biggest economy, assuming it continues to enjoy strong economic growth. It is a potential superpower, the most obvious peer competitor to America in the not too distant future. Nothing is certain, of course ; China remains relatively poor, faces ethnic and separatist issues, and suffers an uncertain political future. Nevertheless, its economic influence is already surpassing that of America in East Asia. In 2003, China overtook the United States as the biggest trading partner of South Korea; in 2004, China became Japan's biggest trading partner. By the close of 2005, China is poised to become the dominant trader with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. China's rising "soft power" is having an impact on Korean attitudes. A recent poll by the Program on International Policy Attitudes found that 49 percent of South Koreans viewed China favorably, compared to 47 percent negatively. Significantly, those in their forties and younger chose friendship with China over America. The future course of ChineseU.S. relations is uncertain, as disputes over human rights, nonproliferation and Taiwan remain far from resolution. It is by no means inevitable that Beijing will emerge as an antagonist and we should be very careful to avoid creating a selffulfilling prophecy. Nonetheless, Taiwan poses the most worrisome flashpoint. Despite the assumptions of some analysts that a pragmatic leadership in Beijing would not risk its economic gains by taking military action against Taipei, nationalist sentiments are powerful throughout the Chinese population and even the Chinese diaspora. It would be foolish to underestimate China's determination to reclaim its "breakaway province", evidenced by the very public initiation of antisecession legislation aimed at Taiwan. Given that, as CIA Director Porter Goss recently testified, "Beijing's military modernization and military buildup could tilt the balance of power in the Taiwan Strait", the United States is interested in credible deterrence. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice suggested what amounted to a strategy of containment before setting out on her March trip to Asia. She observed: "There are several ways to deal with [China's buildup]. Perhaps the most important is to recognize the United States has very strong alliances in the region that bring stability to the region at a time when the Chinese role is changing." For this contingency, a reformed U.S.Korean alliance might benefit Washington. And the Bush Administration almost certainly is going to raise the issue. After all, Washington has been pressing America's other friends to carefully consider what they would do if war comes to the Taiwan Strait. But the response has been mixed. Singapore Prime Minster Lee Hsein Loong returned from a visit to Taiwan in August 2004 warning Taiwan against any move toward independence and raising serious doubts that his nation would actively back Washington in a confrontation with China. Australia, along with Great Britain America's strongest backer in Iraq, also has stepped back from U.S. support for Taiwan. Last fall, Foreign Minister Alexander Downer warned Washington not to take Australian support for granted. And Canberra was no more willing to back America in the aftermath of Beijing's approval of its antisecession law. China pointedly suggested that Australia ensure that its military relationship with the United States not encompass the Taiwan question. Downer responded that while Canberra would have to consult with America in the event of a conflict, "that is a very different thing from saying that we would make a decision to go to war." Only Japan, in the midst of worsening relations with China and an obvious rethink of its relatively pacifist military stance in the face of North Korean saber rattling, seems inclined to back the U nited tates S in the event of a crisis in the Taiwan Strait. In recent security guidelines, Tokyo Japan's stance has raised expectations regarding South Korea. What would the ROK do? No official decision has been taken, but news reports took the unprecedented step of calling Taiwan a mutual security concern. Tokyo might well flinch if war approached, but so far the Koizumi government has proved to be increasingly tough with both China and North Korea. suggest substantial opposition within the government to expanding the alliance's reach, especially involving a conflict between China and Taiwan. The Korea Herald editorialized on March 11 that unlike Japan, "Korea will certainly wish to avoid being drawn into" a Sino American conflict over Taiwan. To join the United States against China would turn Seoul into an implacable enemy of its permanent neighbor, one that Last printed 42 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 possesses a long memory and almost certainly will eventually become the region's dominant power, irrespective of Washington's policies. This is why Korean analysts Woosang Kim and Taeho Kim have argued, "China's growing influence over and interdependence with South Korea amid the continuing rivalry between the U.S. and China could well make untenable the proposition that both countries can jointly cooperate to resolve a plateful of concrete policy issues and longerterm questions on the peninsula." Thus, Seoul faces a difficult decision. Several years ago, participants in a conference on U.S.South Korean relations observed that "South Korea's balancing act between its alliance with the United States and its cooperation with China could well turn out to be the most prominent security challenge in the 21st century." More recently, some analysts suggest that the ROK's choice is a more fundamental one, essentially between China and the United States. Reporting on a recent conference in Honolulu, Hawaii, Richard Halloran of the Washington Times wrote: "South Korea is fast approaching a critical decision whether to try to revive its troubled alliance with the United States or dissolve their joint security treaty, expel American forces from the peninsula and seek an alliance with China." This may be an overstatement, but Seoul need not expel American troops to have them leave. In early March, President Roh declared, "I clearly state that the U.S. forces in Korea should not be involved in disputes in Northeast Asia without consent." He added, "Our our people will not get entangled in regional disputes against our will in the future." However reasonable that might be for South Korea, if America's troops in the South are not needed to defend the ROK and Seoul is unwilling to allow America to use those forces for any other security purposes, why should the United States keep any military units there? Last printed 43 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 ***CHINA*** Last printed 44 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 A2: Multilat Bad South Korea is already playing a greater role in regionalism Lee, 09 Seoul National University (December 2009, Geun, "The Nexus between Korea's Regional Security Options and Domestic Politics," www.cfr.org, JMP) Korea's Choices: Past and Present Interestingly, Korea's diplomatic history shows a somewhat consistent pattern of loyalty relations with superpowers. In the premodern era, China exchanged protection, economic benefits, and legitimization for Korea's loyalty. As Asia opened to modernity, Japan colonized Korea, forcing Korean loyalty to the empire. With the end of the Korean War in 1953, Korea invested its full loyalty in the United States, which yielded military and economic gains. But as the international context changed, the exclusive U.S.Korea relationship became more flexible. When the bipolar system collapsed at the end of the Cold War, former enemies began transforming their own identities, which allowed Korea to consider new diplomatic relationships. This new pattern of engagement resulted in "issueoriented balancing," or issuespecific coalitions among different groups of countries.4 For example, South Korea joined North Korea and China in criticizing Japan on the textbook issue Korea seems increasingly inclined to explore exit options in the U.S.Korea alliance because its voice has been repeatedly ignored in the United States. When the Clinton administration discussed preemptive strikes against North Korea, it failed to consult with the Korean government in advance. During and the Yasukuni Shrine, pitting Korea with two Cold War enemies against its Cold War friend. At the Six Party Talks, the views of the Roh Moohyun administration were more similar to those of China and Russia than those of the United States and Japan. After the Cold War, Korea was able to spread risks through a more symmetrical loyalty portfolio. the 1997 financial crisis, the Clinton administration was reluctant in arranging quick rescue funds to Korea.5 In June 2002, the United States hurriedly released its soldiers who were involved in a vehicle accident that killed two middleschool girls in Korea. In 2008, the U.S. ambassador made a careless comment that "Koreans should learn the science" about mad cow disease. And the United States has been reluctant to pay for the environmental pollution and damage committed by the U.S. army in the Yongsan military base. Based on these experiences, many South Koreans believe there is an asymmetry between their loyalty and voice in the U.S. Korea relationship, and they are turning their eyes toward possible exit options. Last printed 45 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 ***ADDONs*** Last printed 46 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 [Overstretch] Iran Proliferation AddOn ---We're overstretched now emboldens Iran CST 06 (The Chicago Sun Times. 1/15/6. Lexis) Ahmadinejad is surely motivated by ideology and the desire to solidify the position of the security faction within Iran's ruling elite. But he also appears to be acting on the perception that the United States is in a position of considerable, indeed unprecedented, weakness. America's military is overstretched in Iraq and Afghanistan, and Washington has focused on monitoring North Korea's nuclear program rather than Iran's. If threatened, Iran could wreak havoc in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon and Israel. These observations may lead Ahmadinejad to an incorrect assessment of Iran's strength relative to any American threat. In fact, Iran has serious domestic frailties, including a shaky economy and its attendant unemployment and popular resentment, not to mention soaring levels of drug abuse and a brain drain. But Ahmadinejad no doubt takes comfort not only in his belief in divine protection but also in the knowledge that Shiite religious parties aligned with Iran are now the dominant political forces in Iraq, while the American public hardly seems amenable to waging another war in the region. Extinction Kurtz 06 (Stan, Senior Fellow at Ethics and Public Policy Center, "Our Fallout Shelter Future" The National Review, 28 Aug 2006, Lexis) Proliferation optimists, on the other hand, see reasons for hope in the record of nuclear peace during the Cold War. While granting the risks, proliferation optimists point out that the very horror of the nuclear option tends, in practice, to keep the peace. Without choosing between hawkish proliferation pessimists and dovish proliferation optimists, Rosen simply asks how we ought to act in a post-proliferation world. Rosen assumes (rightly I believe) that proliferation is unlikely to stop with Iran. Once Iran gets the bomb, Turkey and Saudi Arabia are likely to develop their own nuclear weapons, for self-protection, and so as not to allow Iran to take de facto cultural-political control of the Muslim world. (I think you've got to at least add Egypt to this list.) With three, four, or more nuclear states in the Muslim Middle East, what becomes of deterrence? A key to deterrence during the Cold War was our ability to know who had hit whom. With a small number of geographically separated nuclear states, and with the big opponents training satellites and specialized advance-guard radar emplacements on each other, it was relatively easy to know where a missile had come from. But what if a nuclear missile is launched at the U nited States from somewhere in a fully nuclearized Middle East, in the middle of a war in which, say, Saudi Arabia and Iran are already lobbing conventional missiles at one another? Would we know who had attacked us? Could we actually drop a retaliatory nuclear bomb on someone without being absolutely certain? And as Rosen asks, What if the nuclear blow was delivered against us by an airplane or a cruise missile? It might be almost impossible to trace the attack back to its source with certainty, especially in the midst of an ongoing conventional conflict. We're familiar with the horror scenario of a Muslim state passing a nuclear bomb to terrorists for use against an American city. But imagine the same scenario in a multi-polar Muslim nuclear world. With several Muslim countries in possession of the bomb, it would be extremely difficult to trace the state source of a nuclear terror strike. In fact, this very difficulty would encourage states (or ill-controlled elements within nuclear states -- like Pakistan's intelligence services or Iran's Revolutionary Guards) to pass nukes to terrorists. The tougher it is to trace the source of a weapon, the easier it is to give the weapon away. In short, nuclear proliferation to multiple Muslim states greatly increases the chances of a nuclear terror strike . Right now, the Indians and Pakistanis "enjoy" an apparently stable nuclear stand-off. Both countries have established basic deterrence, channels of communication, and have also eschewed a potentially destabilizing nuclear arms race. Attacks by Kashmiri militants in 2001 may have pushed India and Pakistan close to the nuclear brink. Yet since then, precisely because of the danger, the two countries seem to have established a clear, deterrence-based understanding. The 2001 crisis gives fuel to proliferation pessimists, while the current stability encourages proliferation optimists. Rosen points out, however, that a multi-polar nuclear Middle East is unlikely to follow the South Asian model. Deep mutual suspicion between an expansionist, apocalyptic, Shiite Iran, secular Turkey, and the Sunni Saudis and Egyptians (not to mention Israel) is likely to fuel a dangerous multi-pronged nuclear arms race. Larger arsenals mean more chance of a weapon being slipped to terrorists. The collapse of the world's non-proliferation regime also raises the chances that nuclearization will spread to Asian powers like Taiwan and Japan. And of course, possession of nuclear weapons is likely to embolden Iran, especially in the transitional period before the Saudis develop weapons of their own. Like Saddam, Iran may be Last printed 47 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 tempted to take control of Kuwait's oil wealth, on the assumption that the U nited States will not dare risk a nuclear confrontation by escalating the conflict. If the proliferation optimists are right, then once the Saudis get nukes, Iran would be far less likely to make a move on nearby Kuwait. On the other hand, to the extent that we do see conventional war in a nuclearized Middle East, the losers will be sorely tempted to cancel out their defeat with a nuclear strike. There may have been nuclear peace during the Cold War, but there were also many "hot" proxy wars. Last printed 48 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 [U.S.Sino Relations] Warming AddOn ---Plan solves US-Sino relations reduces pressure on China to build up forces against us that's Bandow Relations key to solve warming Zhou, 8, Assistant Professor in the Department of Asian Languages and Cultures at Hobart and William Smith Colleges NY Dr. Jinghao, Does China's Rise Threaten the United States? Asian Perspective, Vol. 32, No. 3, 2008, pp. 171182 Third, there are many common interests between China and the nited tates.26On the one hand, ChinaU.S. relations are U S critical not only to both countries but also to the entire international community. David M. Lampton notes that "there is no global issue that can be effectively tackled without SinoAmerican cooperation."27On the other hand, it is one of the greatest challenges for the United States to coexist with China in the new century.28To be sure, they share many opportunities for mutual benefit. Economically, the Chinese economy heavily relies on Western expertise, Chinese foreign trade largely depends on foreigninvested companies, and about 60 percent of China's total exports are produced by foreignfunded enterprises. All of this makes China sensitive to the ups and downs of the international economy, and in particular that of the U.S. economy. If the U.S. economy has troubles, it hurts China's economic growth. In turn, China is the largest market of the United States. Sara Bongiorni has recounted the story of how her family wanted to spend a year without buying anything made in China. In fact, Bongiorni discovered it was not only difficult but also not worthwhile to do so, because she found that there are vast consumer areas that are nearly all Chinesedominated. Thus, it is really difficult to exclude China from economic globalization.29 Politically, China and Western societies need to work closely together in order to maintain the global peace In fact, China . has successfully worked with Western governments on several key international issues. China hosted the Six Party Talks. As a result, North Korea agreed to disable its nuclear programs by the end of 2007.30 China took tough actions on Iran's nuclear program, showing the seriousness of China's commitment to nonproliferation. The United States and China also share common interests in energy, global warming, human rights, anticorruption, social welfare, the role of nongovernmental organizations, AIDS and other disease prevention United Nations , reform, and counterterrorism . China and the United States recently signed an agreement to open a military hot line between their defense departments. because China might easily become a very powerful military nation in 50 years. Likewise, John Ikenberry advised that the United States cannot stop China's rise.31 If the United States tries to keep China weak, it would increase China's domestic instability, which would negatively affect global peace and development. The most important thing for the United States to do is not to block China from Fourth, a hostile U.S. relationship with China would damage both countries' interests and make it impossible for them to work jointly on global issues. As early as 60 years ago, an Australian ambassador warned the United States that it was very dangerous to be hostile to China and suggested that it keep China as a friend, becoming a powerful country, but to understand China and learn to live with a rising China. In the meantime, the United States should urge the Chinese government to become a responsible, accountable, and democratic stakeholder.32 If China moves in that direction, the United States can focus on shared interests such as fighting terrorism and promoting world peace. Extinction Tickell, 08 [Oliver, Climate Researcher, The Guardian, 811, "On a planet 4C hotter, all we can prepare for is extinction", http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/aug/11/climatechange] We need to get prepared for four degrees of global warming, Bob Watson told the Guardian last week. At first sight this looks like wise counsel from the climate science adviser to Defra. But the idea that we could adapt to a 4C rise is absurd and dangerous. Global warming on this scale would be a catastrophe that would mean, in the immortal words that Chief Seattle probably never spoke, "the end of living and the beginning of survival" for humankind. Or perhaps the beginning of our extinction. The collapse of polar ice caps would the become inevitable, bring ing longterm sea level of 7080 metres. All the world's coastal rises plains would be lost, complete with ports, cities, transport and industrial infrastructure, and much of the world's most productive farmland . The world's geography would be transformed much as it was at the end of the last ice age, when sea levels rose by about 120 metres to create the Channel, the North Sea and Cardigan Bay out of dry land. Weather would become extreme and unpredictable, with more frequent and severe droughts, floods and hurricanes. The Earth's carrying capacity would be hugely reduced. Billions would undoubtedly . Watson's call was supported by the government's former chief scientific adviser, Sir David King, who die warned that "if we get to a fourdegree rise it is quite possible that we would begin to see a runaway increase". This is a remarkable understatement. The climate system is already experiencing significant feedbacks, notably the summer melting of the Arctic sea ice. more ice The the melts, more sunshine is absorbed by the sea, the and the more the Arctic warms. And as the Arctic warms, the release of billions of tonnes of methane a greenhouse gas 70 times stronger than carbon dioxide over 20 years captured under melting permafrost is already under way. To see how far this process could go, look 55.5m years to the PalaeoceneEocene Thermal Maximum, when a global Last printed 49 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 temperature increase of 6C coincided with the release of about 5,000 gigatonnes of carbon into the atmosphere, both as CO2 and as methane from bogs and seabed sediments. Lush subtropical forests grew in polar regions, and sea levels rose to 100m higher than today. It appears that an initial warming pulse triggered other warming processes. Many scientists warn that this historical event may be analogous to the present : the warming caused by human emissions could propel us towards a similar hothouse Earth. Last printed 50 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 [Bioweapons] Nuclear Taboo AddOn CBW use would result in US nuclear retaliation SCHNEIDER 1997 (Barry, Director of the USAF Counterproliferation Center at Air University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, and an Associate Professor of International Relations in the Department of Future Conflict Studies at the U.S. Air War College., Future War and Counterproliferation, 7273) Calum As a result, today, in the minds of many, the only legitimate use of U.S. nuclear weapons would be in response to a direct nuclear attack on the United States, its forces, its allies, or its vital interests.13 A U.S. nuclear response to much less severe attacks likely would be seen as severely disproportionate to the provocation, even if chemical or biological attacks were launched. However, if enemy CBW attacks were directed against important target~ in the American homeland, or if they caused horrific numbers of U.S. and allied casualties in the field, it might well be that U.S. public opinion then woul.d sanction a U.S. nuclear retaliatory response. In that case, an aroused American public might demand harsh nuclear retribution. Last printed 51 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Retaliation destroys the nuclear taboo--makes worldwide nuclear wars inevitable GIZEWSKI 1996 (Peter, Senior Associate, Peace and Conflict Studies Programme, University of Toronto, International Journal, Summer, p. 400) Calum Absolute and allencompassing, the prohibition sets all nuclear weapons apart as unique, regardless of size or power. Nuclear explosives both large and small are equally illegitimate, and the latter remain so despite the existence of seemingly `legitimate' conventional explosives of greater destructive power. The distinction stems in part from widely held but rarely questioned perceptions of nuclear arms as `different.' Nuclear weapons are distinct simply because they are perceived to be distinct . The distinction also has roots in legal reasoning and diplomacy. Traditions and conventions are crucial to the conduct of social relations. Once established, they render behaviour predictable, help coordinate to actor expectations, and offer a gauge of intentions. If they are not held to be inviolate, these functions become more difficult. Transgression at any level threatens to erode shared understandings and expectations increasing uncertainty and the inevitable costs and requirements of coping with it. One violation makes subsequent, perhaps more serious, actions of the same type easier to contemplate and thus more likely. Thus, any breach of the nuclear threshold threatens more than one isolated act of destruction: it sets precedent signalling a potential chaos, which may well include the prospect of more destruction to come . Last printed 52 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Last printed 53 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 [Korean Conflict] Democracy AddOn ---Conflict kills US-Japan relations- they feel like they will be a preemptive target Choe, 03 deputy director of international affairs for the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan ("10 Reasons why the United States Can't Attack North Korea" http://www1.korea np.co.jp/pk/189th_issue/2003030111.htm) Reason 3U.S. alliance in Northeast Asia strains During the days of the first nuclear crisis in Korea, the then president of South Korea, Kim Young Sam, opposed a U.S. bombing on North Korea, and Japan was totally unprepared to help the U.S. in such a military action because of the warrenouncing constitution of Japan and of the lack of a relevant law enabling the economic giant to mobilize and procure public and private facilities and resources for the U.S. armed forces in a "contingency." Still now, neither Seoul nor Tokyo wants war on the Korean Peninsula because they know that they will be the direct victims of such a not the U.S. Though war, Japan, the major ally of the U.S., expresses support for the U.S. going to war against Iraq if only an additional UN resolution authorizing it has been adopted. However, it stresses a peaceful and negotiated solution to the current nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula rather than an imposition of UN "sanctions" on North Korea. Key to effective democracy promotion Auslin, 10 (Michael, resident scholar at AEI.US Japan Relations. http://www.aei.org/speech/100137) Despite this litany of problems both real and perceived, the U.S.Japan alliance, and the broader relationship it embodies, remains the keystone of U.S. policy in the AsiaPacific region . There is little doubt that America and Japan share certain core values that tie us together, including a belief in democracy, the rule of law, and civil and individual rights, among others, which should properly inform and inspire our policies abroad. Our commitment to these values translated into policies to support other nations in Asia has and around the world that are trying to democratize and liberalize their societies. Today, Asia remains in the midst of a struggle over liberalization, as witnessed by the current tragic unrest in Thailand, and the willingness of both Tokyo and Washington to support democratic movements will remain important in the coming decades. Indeed, I believe a political goal of our alliance with Japan must be a further promotion of "fundamental values such as basic human rights, democracy, and the rule of law in the international community," as expressed in the 2005 U.S.Japan Security Consultative Committee Joint Statement. To that end, Japan and the U nited tates should take the S lead in hosting democracy summits in Asia, designed to bring together liberal politicians, grass roots activists, and other civil society leaders, to discuss democratic experiment and provide the support for those nations bravely moving along the path of greater freedom and openness. Extinction Diamond, 95 (Larry, Hoover Institution, Stanford University December, PROMOTING DEMOCRACY IN THE 1990S, 1p. http://www.carnegie.org//sub/pubs/deadly/diam_rpt.html ) This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and wellbeing in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread . The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones Nuclear, chemical, and . biological weapons continue to proliferate . The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered . Most of these new and unconventional threats to security associated with aggravated by the are or weakness or absence of democracy , with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. Last printed 54 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Last printed 55 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Last printed 56 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 [Regionalism] Asian Stability AddOn ---Removing troops increases South Korean regional influence Lee, 09 Seoul National University (December 2009, Geun, "The Nexus between Korea's Regional Security Options and Domestic Politics," www.cfr.org, JMP) Korea's Option of Multilateral Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia The idea of multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia is not a recent one. Since 1988, Korea has advocated regional security cooperation, and in 1994, Korea officially proposed the Northeast Asia Security Dialogue (NEASED) at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Serious discussion of multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia started in 2005 during the Six Party Talks to resolve the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula. In fact, the Six Party Talks have been an important generator of innovative ideas, and participants in the Six Party Talks have gradually realized the importance of a multilateral security mechanism in Northeast Asia, even if they do not share identical interests in such a mechanism.6 From Korea's perspective, a semiregional arrangement like the Six Party Talks produces five main benefits.7 First, a multilateral security arrangement in Northeast Asia composed of the United States, China, Japan, Russia, North Korea, and South Korea will provide insurance to the concerned parties that the agreements struck at the Six Party Talks will not be violated by the participants. Cheating and lack of trust are among the fundamental problems in solving the Korean nuclear crisis, and a multilateral binding of agreements can help solve the problems by increasing transparency and the transaction costs of violating the agreements. Second, a multilateral security arrangement in Northeast Asia is fundamentally a global security arrangement, as it includes all the global powers except the European Union. The United States and China unofficially form the Group of Two (G2), Japan is an economic superpower, and Russia used to be the leader of the Eastern bloc. The high concentration of superpowers Northeast in Asia poses a threat to Korea because an outbreak of greatpower conflict in the region will definitely devastate Korea, if not the world . Therefore, Korea has reason to promote a multilateral security mechanism that increases transparency among global powers and functions as a confidencebuilding measure. Third, voluntary or involuntary betrayal by the United States has preoccupied many Koreans and security experts. Some Koreans felt betrayed when the United States agreed to the division of the Korean peninsula. The Park Chunghee government felt abandoned when the United States withdrew a significant portion of U.S. soldiers from Korea, and was taken aback by rapprochement between the United States and China. Many Koreans got upset when the United States supported the authoritarian Korean government and kept silent during the Kwangju massacre in 1980. They again felt betrayed when it was rumored that the Clinton administration planned air strikes against North Korea without informing South Korea. And they were upset with the unilateral foreign policy stance of the George W. Bush administration, including its decision to pull the second infantry division out of Korea. A multilateral security arrangement in Northeast Asia will mitigate the security concern of Korea when the United States either voluntarily or involuntarily defects from its commitment to Korea Fourth, . multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia is necessary to establish a peace system on the Korean peninsula and ultimately unify Korea. Many Korean people doubt that the major powers, including the United States, want the unification of the Korean peninsula. Korea wants to deal with these powers transparently through a multilateral security cooperation mechanism. Fifth, seeing the latest global financial crisis and the rise of China, many Koreans recognize the need to adjust Korea's external strategy to the changing geoeconomic world. Making exclusive ties with the United States may be highrisk a investment in a past hegemon, while exclusive ties with China would be a highrisk investment in an uncertain future. In this transitional period for geoeconomics, multilateral security cooperation is an attractive partial exit option for Korea. A multilateral security mechanism in Northeast Asia appeals to Korea, so if voice and loyalty in the U.S.Korea relationship do not reveal positive correlations, then Korea will pay more attention to multilateral regional options. Moreover, if the U.S. capability and credibility in delivering its security promises to alliance partners are questioned, there will be fewer veto powers in Korean politics against a multilateral security mechanism in Northeast Asia , particularly when such an option still maintains a loose form of the U.S.Korea alliance. Solves Asian stability Francis, 06 former Australian Ambassador to Croatia and fellow at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University from 0506 (Fall 2006, Neil, Harvard International Review, "For an East Asian Union: Rethinking Asia's Cold War Alliances," http://hir.harvard.edu/index.php? page=article&id=1586, JMP) US security strategy now focuses largely on combating terrorism and denying weapons of mass destruction to socalled rogue states. It is a strategy that cannot be implemented with geographic mutual defense treaties formed to address conventional military threats. Furthermore, the United States has demonstrated in Afghanistan and Iraq that it is prepared to pursue its global security interests unilaterally, even at the risk of its At the conclusion of the Second World War, the United States established bilateral military alliances in the AsiaPacific intended to contain Soviet and Chinese communist expansion in the region. Last printed 57 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 political relations with traditional alliance partners. What happened over Iraq between the United States its European and allies ould c equally happen between the United States its and Asian allies over Taiwan or North Korea with serious consequences for the interests of countries in that region. East Asian powers need to develop collective a security strategy for the region that does not on the United States' participation. Prudence suggests that East Asian countries need to take the opportunity offered by the recently inaugurated East Asian Summit (EAS) to begin the process rely of developing an East Asian community as the first step toward the realization of an East Asian Union. This will occur only if led by a strong, proactive Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). China is now the world's secondlargest economy, almost twothirds as large as the United States in terms of domestic purchasing power. In 2005 China overtook Japan to become the world's thirdlargest exporter of goods and services. In 2004 it was the thirdlargest trading partner with ASEAN; the second largest with Japan, Australia, and India; and the largest with the Republic of Korea. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) has estimated that in 2004, in purchasing power parity dollar terms, China's military expenditure was US$161.1 billion, the second highest in the world. The Pentagon has estimated that in 2005 China's military expenditure was two to three times larger than its official figure of US$29.9 billion. China's growing economic and military strength along with the United States' preoccupation with its new security agenda has made some East Asian countries increasingly apprehensive. Particularly since September 11, bilateral military alliances have become less relevant to US security interests, and United States likely the will reduce its military presence in East Asia the n region. Parts of Asia believe that Chinese An East Asian community composed of the 16 EAS participants would represent more than 60 percent of the world's population and possess a combined GDP greater than the European It could provide significantly increased trade benefits to its members, help dampen SinoJapanese rivalry ease , the present tensions in the region over Japan's Pacific War, encourage more cooperative attitudes toward the issue of natural resource exploitation in East Asia, promote engagement over containment, prevent domination and of the region by any major power The determining factor will be ASEAN's ability to provide the leadership necessary to create a strong, independent East Asian Union. . Union. Union. hegemonic aspirations for East Asia could emerge if the United States were to disengage from the region. Fear of China and the possibility that it harbors hegemonic aspirations were among the factors that led to the creation of ASEAN in 1967 and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1993. Engaging China in an East Asian union in the future would ensure it will pay a high price in loss of trade and investment if it acts against the interests of the union's other members. Prospects for an East Asian Community In December 2005 ASEAN hosted an inaugural East Asian Summit in Kuala Lumpur. The summit involved the 10 ASEAN countries; the ASEAN+3 countries of China, Japan, and South Korea; as well as Australia, New Zealand, and India. The summit declaration of December 14, 2005, described the meeting as a forum for "dialogue on broad strategic, political and economic issues of common interest and concern with the aim of promoting peace, stability and economic prosperity in East Asia." The declaration also noted that the summit could "play a significant role in community building in this region." ASEAN would work "in partnership with the other participants of the East Asian Summit," but ASEAN was to retain leadership, preventing control of East Asian community building by either the ASEAN+3 countries, which China could dominate, or the 16 EAS countries, which some felt could steer the EAS toward what would be an unwelcome "Western" agenda. It remains to be seen whether an East Asian community can emerge under ASEAN leadership. ASEAN is an association: it is not a strong regional institution with common interests and objectives. It reflects the diversity of its membership, which has traditionally preferred an unstructured organization, a consensus approach to decision making, and avoidance of controversial issues or intervention in the affairs of its members. The ASEAN Way under Challenge ASEAN's ways, however, may be changing. Since the late 1990s ASEAN's nonintervention principle has come under challenge. In 1997 ASEAN was faced with an Asian economic crisis triggered by currency speculators and in 1997 to 1998 with a regional pollution haze problemcaused by illegal landclearance fires in Indonesia. ASEAN's ineffectiveness in these crises brought internal scrutiny to bear on ASEAN's policy of non intervention in domestic affairs. As a result, since 1999 ASEAN foreign ministers have discussed these and other transnational problems--illegal migration, terrorism, and the drug trade--that call for collective responses. They have also considered allowing ASEAN to oversee electoral and governance processes within member states. In 1999 a number of ASEAN countries defied the longstanding ASEAN position that East Timor was an internal matter for Indonesia and sent peacekeeping forces to the island to help quell the violence instigated there by antiindependence militia backed by Indonesian armed forces. In 2005 ASEAN placed public pressure on the government of Myanmar to allow an ASEAN delegation to visit Myanmar and assess what progress had been made in human rights and democratization. With the aid of the United States and European Union, ASEAN also persuaded Myanmar to relinquish its role as ASEAN chair. ASEAN's actions in the 1990s suggest increased sensitivity to the negative effects of individual member nations on the organization's international standing as well as the beginning of openness toward intervention in the domestic affairs of its members. Toward Realization At its December 2005 summit, ASEAN agreed to institute an ASEAN Charter by 2020 to provide what Malaysian Prime Minister Badawi has called a "miniconstitution," a document that will establish an institutional framework for ASEAN as well as a legal identity recognized by the United Nations. The older members--Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand--want ASEAN to become something more than an association. Institutionally strong and mostly democratic, they might more readily welcome a rulesgoverned organization similar to the European Union. Others with institutionally weak, authoritarian governments, such as Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam, are wary of placing their domestic policies under greater international scrutiny and favor the status quo. If the former nations prevail it will augur well for the realization of an East Asian community with the potential to evolve into an East Asian Last printed 58 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 [Presence] Competitiveness AddOn ---Presence kills competitiveness Bandow and Carpenter 4 JD from Stanford, senior fellow at Cato, former special assistant to Reagan, writes for Fortune, 200 * National Interest, WSJ, Washington Times, **PhD in diplomatic history from Texas, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at Cato, contributing editor to the National Interest, editorial board of the Journal of Strategic Studies (Ted Galen and Doug, "The Korean conundrum", Google Books, page 120, WEA) Billions in defense subsidies to allied nations (South Korea is merely one beneficiary, of course) have a dual impact. One is on domestic economic policy, since such outlays further inflate tax collections and government borrowing, diverting resources away from more productive private investment. Perhaps even more serious is the international impact. American defense subsidies not only impoverish U.S. taxpayers; they simultaneously enrich foreign nations that are major trade competitors. Allowing South Korea (as well as Japan and a host of European nations) to concentrate domestic resources on economic rather than military development puts American enterprises at a disadvantage. That cost was modest and probably worth enduring during the early days of the Cold War; there is no longer any reason to indirectly underwrite large Korean, Japanese, and European businesses as they compete with U.S. firms. That's key to heg Segal 04 (Adam, Senior Fellow in China Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, November/December 2004, "Is America Losing Its Edge?," Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20041101facomment83601/adamsegal/isamericalosingits edge.html?mode=print) SLV Today, however, this technological edge-so long taken for granted-may be slipping, and the most serious challenge is coming from Asia. Through competitive tax policies, increased investment in research and development (R&D), and preferential policies for science and technology (S&T) personnel, Asian governments are improving the quality of their science and ensuring the exploitation of future innovations. The percentage of patents issued to and science journal articles published by scientists in China, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan is rising. Indian companies are quickly becoming the second-largest producers of application services in the world, developing, supplying, and managing database and other types of software for clients around the world. South Korea has rapidly eaten away at the U.S. advantage in the manufacture of computer chips and telecommunications software. And even China has made impressive gains in advanced technologies such as lasers, biotechnology, and advanced materials used in semiconductors, aerospace, and many other types of manufacturing. Although the United States' technical dominance remains solid, the globalization of research and development is exerting considerable pressures on the American system. Indeed, as the United States is learning, globalization cuts both ways: it is both a potent catalyst of U.S. technological innovation and a significant threat to it. The United States will never be able to prevent rivals from developing new technologies; it can remain dominant only by continuing to innovate faster than everyone else. But this won't be easy; to keep its privileged position in the world, the United States must get better at fostering technological entrepreneurship at home. Nuclear War Khalilzad 95 (Zalmay, ambassador to Iraq, former ambassador to Afghanistan, Former counselor to Rumsfeld, Former Director of the Strategy, Doctrine and Force Structure program for RAND's Project Air Force, Former assistant prof of pol sci, Columbia, BA and MA from the American University, Lebanon, PhD, U Chicago, "Losing the Moment?" The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 2, pg. 84, Spring, Lexis) Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would Last printed 59 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system. Last printed 60 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 [Presence] Russia Relations AddOn Military concessions to North Korea key to Russian relations Toloraya, 08 diplomat with the rank of Minister and Director of Korean Programs at IMEMO, the top Russian Foreign Ministry official in charge of the Korean peninsula, Doctor of Economy and a Full Professor degree in Oriental Studies (Georgy, Asian Perspective, "THE SIX PARTY TALKS: A RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVE", ProQuest) The real root of the controversy, as Russian experts interpret it, is the fact that no "strategic decision" has yet been taken in either capital about the future. U The nited tates still S has not demonstrated its longterm commitment to toleration of Pyongyang the regime and coexistence with it without overt or covert attempts to bring it down. Consequently, North Korea has nothing left but to depend on its "military deterrent" and try to keep the country isolated in order to conserve the system and prevent its collapse. Russian experts try to see the reality as it is and not set misleading goals and deadlines. A serious policy cannot be based on wishful thinking and misapprehension. It is hard to imagine how North Korea could discard its only trump cardthe nuclear weapons it now hasin return for mere promises, although it is prepared to move forward cautiously with terminating and dismantling its military nuclear production program. That should be encouraged. At the same time it is necessary to be fully aware that North Korea's renouncing of nuclear weapons will take a much longer time, and even then may only happen if it is satisfied with comprehensive security guarantees that have yet to be provided.45 How do Russian experts see the possible future of the Six Party Talks? There is still no agreed concept of what should be their outcome. This should be worked out collectively. The change of U.S. administrations provides a chance for setting a goal, which should be realistic and then would enjoy Russian support. Some possibilities follow. * chief strategic The goal of the diplomatic process should definitely not be just denuclearization, but peace, development, and friendly cooperation in Northeast Asia. The issue of North Korea's security is sometimes omitted and that blocks any progress. Therefore it is necessary to solve the WMD and other related issues in a manner that would not jeopardize the main prioritiespeacefully and stepbystep. In fact, solving the main task is the key to solving the WMDrelated concerns. * A peaceful scenario would presume turning the DPRK into a peaceful, nonaggressive, developing state, open to international cooperationin short, the "conventionalization" of the country. That might seem utopian with the current regime, but it is under going an evolution that could be successful provided the regime has sufficient guarantee of its security, including guarantees for the safety of the current elite. Therefore, the transformation should be gradual and not endanger political stability. An eventual power succession in the DPRK would present an ideal chance for starting such a process. * International assistance is a must for overcoming the backwardness and isolation of the DPRK, which is necessary for comprehensive security. The long history of aid to developing countries suggests that aid can be futile, even counterproductive, in the absence of complementary reforms.46 Therefore, economic assistance to the DPRK as part of the package for the solution of the nuclear problem should be aimed at assisting system transformation, not at preservation of its outdated model. * The sixparty format can be an ideal venue for coordination of such assistance. Its longterm aim should be the DPRK's economic and social transformation, by drawing it into the international division of labor and introducing international managerial experience, including a gradual transformation of the current political elite to become a more liberal government system. (Many members of the elite are relatives or comrades in a framework of clan politics.) * For coordination of economic and development assistance, the interested countries (not limited to the Six Party Talk members) could choose to create a special body entrusted with the task of planning and providing such assistance. The experience of KEDO (the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization) proves that this task is feasible. * In the longer run the solution to Korean security and development issues could provide momentum for forming a regional structure by institutionalizing the Six Party Talks. The Desirability of a Multilateral Security System Russia would like to see a multiparty security and cooperation system emerge in Northeast Asia. The Six Party Talks have provided a unique opportunity to try a multilateral approach to solving the thorny issues that plague the region. In a bestpossible future, we might paradoxically be thankful for the appearance of the North Korean nuclear problem simply because it actually triggered the emergence of regional security and cooperation dialogue. It took years to recognize the fact that a solution to the North Korean nuclear problem cannot be found without assuring the security of North Korea itself. The latter goal in turn cannot be achieved without the adoption of broader principles of interaction between the countries involved. That in turn leads to the conclusion that many "narrow" regional problems cannot be solved without first solving general issues of security and cooperation in Northeast Asia. This is especially critical in light of a nascent standoff between China, on the one hand, and the United States and Japan, on the other, a confrontation both sides would like to avoid in principle. Russia, having been drawn to in a tense relationship with the U nited tates globally S in the wake of the war in Georgia, would also like to see Northeast Asia become a region of cooperation. There is no obvious geopolitical reason for confrontation there. Russia has always been a proponent of a multilateral security mechanism in Asia and the Pacific. 47 Initiatives on multilateral Asian security organizations date back at least to the Gorbachev era.48 Russian positions in Asia have considerably weakened since the demise of the USSR, while the centrifugal tendencies of the Far Eastern regions have been on the rise. Therefore, Moscow has become even more interested in Last printed 61 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 promoting its interests through a multilateral structure, which would provide access to the decisionmaking processes of other governments and prevent unilateralism. Theoretically speaking, institutionalization of the Northeast Asian security and cooperation mechanism might play an important role in a changeover from contentions based on mutual deterrence to a system of cooperation and competition grounded in the balance of interests, i.e., in a "concert of powers." The Six Party Talks may play an important role in working out a "code of conduct" in Northeast Asia and setting up a multilateral mechanism to promote it. As chair of the Working Group on the peace and security mechanism in Northeast Asia (under the February 2007 agreements), Russia has suggested guiding principles for peace and security that the parties should find agreeable.49 The official position is that these principles should be adopted at the level of foreign ministers and thus set the framework for future work. This opinion is shared by the United States, which hopes to move forward on developing a Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism that "would help transform the cooperative relationships built through the SixParty Process into an enduring security framework for Northeast Asia."50 Russia also enjoys Chinese and ROK support in this activity.51 However, controversies among the Asian members Korea sees the multilateral format mostly as a nuisancemerely decoration for its bilateral dealings with the United States. North Korean diplomats consider the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) model irrelevant to Northeast Asia, pointing to this organization's failure to resolve the crisis in of the club could prevent them from setting up a charter of Northeast Asian security and cooperation. At the same time North Yugoslavia.52 The stalemate in U.S.North Korea dialogue as well as the pause in NorthSouth Korea relations makes the DPRK's cooperation with the ROK on security issues unlikely and the degree of eagerness and initiative of the two Koreas in promoting multilateralism questionable at best. There is thus a niche for a relatively neutral Russian mediator role. Active diplomacy in this direction is especially important for Russia the context of its in global relations with the "centers of power." As Russia is increasingly seen as an opponent if not a foe of the West (e.g., the expression "the new cold war" has already been coined), it would be natural to think its cooperation with the United States on global issues would be limited at best. However, this logic should not necessarily apply in the Korean case, which might well be considered a special one in RussiaU.S. international dealings. U.S.Russia cooperation in the framework of the 6PT might have much wider global implications.53 At the same time, Moscow conservatives still fear that a fullfledged OSCEtype structure might only increase the U.S. hold on the region without producing tangible benefits for Russia or for other regional actors. They argue that Washington only pursues its own interests and is trying to strengthen its foothold in the area. Under this logic a new security architecture might harness not only its allies but also China and Russia in a framework where the United States, not being a geographical part of the region, would have rights but not obligations. The concept of what the agenda of the multilateral forum could be and the sequence of stages for establishing such a structure is being discussed in the Russian expert community. Some argue that Northeast Asia is not yet ready for a security mechanism and the road to it should start with a multilateral cooperation structure. "In a multilateral process," writes one Russian researcher, "structural and procedural issues are often no less important for the effectiveness of the process than substantive issues."54 The multiparty diplomatic process should therefore become a multitrack one, where progress in one direction should not necessarily depend on the situation in other tracks. A Japanese expert's approach--to link the bilateral, minilateral, and multilateral issues and institutions under the sixparty umbrella framework--also seems sound.55 Such an approach can be used to address regionspecific proliferation issues, security guarantees, economic assistance, and diplomatic relations, including changing the Korean armistice regime to a new peace regime and achieving coordination of institutions. Some suggestions for promoting the Northeast Asian cooperation organization building follow. The security architecture should be discussed at an early stage, although the implementation of an agreed concept might take time. The general principles discussed between the parties are wellestablished in international practice and include obeying the UN Charter principles, forging mutual trust, noninterference in internal affairs, a decline in military danger, and diplomatic conflict resolution. Nevertheless, these principles will still not be formally agreed upon pending resolution of the nuclear issue. Discussion (including at Track II level) aimed at working out common approaches to forming a collective comprehensive security system should therefore be encouraged. The Chinese idea of integrative security presented at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1996--combining comprehensive, cooperative, and common security concepts56--could become a basis for these discussions. On a more practical level the sides should begin designing trustbuilding measures for the prevention of maritime and air incidents, notifications of military exercises and their monitoring by observers, and annual reviews of defense doctrines. Ensuring the security of maritime communication lines in Northeast Asia and to the south may also be relevant. Countermeasures to nonconventional threats and challenges should be elaborated, including assistance during natural calamities, as well as fighting epidemics, environmental problems, crossborder crime, drug trafficking, and illegal migration. These issues are discussed at various fora, including ARF, but sometimes the area covered seems to be too broad for any concrete decisions and measures.57 Multilateral economic projects and coordination of regional economic policies should be discussed, particularly laying out common approaches to the setting up of new zones for free trade and reforming existing ones. Russia is especially interested in establishing regional integration in energy and transport infrastructure, in which it would be a core key participant.58 The setting up of an infrastructure for intercivilizational and interethnic contacts and rapprochement in the region where longstanding ethnic strife exists might become a historic mission of the new regional organization. It is important to develop joint projects in culture, science, and education, and stimulate multilateral humanitarian exchanges with due account of experience gained at bilateral negotiations. Regardless of the twists and turns on the thorny road of Korean settlement, promoting multilateral security cooperation will remain Russia's priority. The reasons are not only military and security in nature but also economic. In this era of uncertainty of world finance, the development of the real estate sector is fast becoming a priority, and this means an increased need for Russia's greater involvement in Northeast Asian regional energy and industrial projects. Last printed 62 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Solves accidental nuclear war Cohen 10--prof, Russian Studies and History, NYU. Prof emeritus, Princeton (Stephen, USRussian Relations in an Age of American Triumphalism: An Interview with Stephen F. Cohen, 25 May 2010, http://www.thenation.com/article/usrussianrelationsageamericantriumphalisminterviewstephenfcohen, AMiles) Cohen: The real concern I have with this "we won the Cold War" triumphalism is the mythology that we are safer today than we were when the Soviet Union existed. Though it is blasphemous to say so, we are not safer for several reasons, one being that the Soviet state kept the lid on very dangerous things. The Soviet Union was in control of its nuclear and related arsenals. PostSoviet Russia is "sorta" in control, but "sorta" is not enough. There is no margin for error. Reagan's goal in the 1980s was not to end the Soviet Union, but to turn it into a permanent partner of the United States. He came very close to achieving that and deserves enormous credit. He did what had to be done by meeting Gorbachev halfway. But since 1991, the arrogance of American policymaking toward Russia has either kept the Cold War from being fully ended or started a new one. The greatest threats to our national security still reside in Russia. This is not because it's communist, but because it is laden with all these nuclear, chemical, and biological devices--that's the threat The reaction of the second Bush administration was to junk decades of safe . guarding agreements with Moscow. It was the first time in modern times that we have had no nuclear control reduction agreement with the Russians. What should worry us every day and night is the triumphalist notion that nuclear is no longer possible. It war is now possible in even more ways than before, especially accidental ones Meanwhile, the former Soviet territories remain a WalMart of dirty material and knowhow. If terrorists ever explode a . Russia's leaders, thereby limiting their cooperation and undermining his own legacy. In other words, to have a nuclear relationship with Russia that will secure our national security, we must have a fully cooperative, trusting political relationship with Moscow. That's why all the talk about a replacement for the expired START agreement, which Obama has been having trouble reaching with the Kremlin, is halfwitted. Even if the two sides agree, and even if the Senate and Russian Duma ratify a new treaty, the agreement will be unstable because the political relationship is bad and growing worse. Evidently, no one in the Administration, Congress, or the mainstream media, or, I should add in the think tanks, can connect these dots. dirty device in the United States, even a small one, the material is likely to come from the former Soviet Union. The NunnLugar Act (1992) was the best program Congress ever enacted to help Russia secure its nuclear material and knowhow, a major contribution to American national security. But no one in Washington connects the dots. Take Senator Lugar himself. He seems not to understand that we need Russia's complete cooperation to make his own legislation fully successful, but he repeatedly speaks undiplomatically, even in ugly ways, about Last printed 63 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 [Presence] Regionalism AddOn Accelerating U.S. withdrawal is key to catalyze a multipolar balance of power in the region Espiritu, 06 Commander, U.S. Navy (3/15/06, Commander Emilson M. Espiritu, "The Eagle Heads Home: Rethinking National Security Policy for The Asia Pacific Region," http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA448817&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf, JMP) Can the U.S. live with the risk of an unstable Korean Peninsula? The obvious answer is "no." It is clear that a stable Korean peninsula is more beneficial to the United States. Clearly North Korea is a major player to determining whether the Korean Peninsula remains stable. One would argue as long as the current regime of Kim Jung Il remains in power and continue to pursue WMD (i.e. Nuclear weapons) there will be a permanent unstable scenario in the region.62 On the other hand, as long as the United States remains in the region and continues to be forward deployed in South Korea, that the U.S. is contributing to such instability in the region. According to Revere, if there is an unstable region (Korean Peninsula), the U.S. goals become harder to achieve.63 Should an unstable Korean Peninsula exist, this could possibly lead to conflicts in the region, most obvious between the Koreas; promote unhealthy economic competition in the region, whereas more developed nations (Japan, China) do not provide any form of economic assistance to the Koreas; more and dangerously a weapons/ arms race (maybe to include more nuclear weapons in the region) to maintain power a balance. In order to strengthen regional stability, the U.S. would need to succeed in countering terrorism, enhancing economic prosperity, eliminating weapons of mass destruction, promoting democracy, and addressing transnational issues.64 At what cost and risks is the U.S. willing to accept in order to achieve stability in the region? Conclusion The United States cannot live with the risks involved in an unstable region. The Korean Peninsula and the EastAsia Pacific region are home to many of the economic giants worldwide. Additionally, with the rising cost of economic commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. must rethink alternatives to bring stability in the EastAsia Pacific region more specifically, the Korean Peninsula. The U.S. must continue to pursue peace and stability using all elements of national power certainly using less emphasis on military a solution Additionally, . the U.S. must selectively engage the Koreas to bring stability to the Korean Peninsula by pursuing a combined strategy of isolationism and offshore balancing. Diplomatic, Informational, and Economic solutions take time. Perhaps by using other countries particularly in the region would be beneficial to the United States but also to the other countries as well. Strategic positioning of U.S. troops not only around the Korean Peninsula but throughout the world is the key to pursuing the National Objectives. By pursuing a stable Korean Peninsula without heavy U.S. involvement is beneficial both internationally and economically. Accelerating the withdrawal of U.S. troops, could lead to a multipolar balance of power in the region.65 Obviously, this would require a significant change in foreign policy and power position in the region; it would certainly cause other nations to reconsider their national security strategy. All in all, in a speech given by James A. Kelley, stated that "Regional stability remains our overarching strategic goal and provides the underpinnings for achievement of other key goals and objectives."66 Finally, as stated in the 2006 QDR, "Victory can only be achieved through the patient accumulation of quiet successes and the orchestration of all elements of national and international power." 67 Perhaps by completely withdrawing all U.S. troops from South Korea could potentially lead to one of these successes and bring stabilization to the region without heavy U.S. involvement. It is possible by taking the "let them work it out" (the Koreas) approach would certainly be advantageous to the U.S. The time is now for the Eagle to head home. Solves every impact Nanto, 08 Specialist in Industry and Trade Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division for Congressional Research Services (1/4, "East Asian Regional Architecture: New Economic and Security Arrangements and U.S. Policy," www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33653.pdf) stronger A regional security organization in East Asia could play a role in quelling terrorism by violent extremists. Since terrorism is a transnational problem, the United States relies on international cooperation to counter it. Without close multilateral cooperation, there are simply too many nooks and crannies for violent extremists to exploit.101 Currently, most of that cooperation is bilateral or between the United States and its traditional allies. While the ASEAN Regional Forum and ASEAN + 3, for example, have addressed the issue of terrorism, neither has conducted joint counterterrorism exercises as has the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Neither organization as a group, moreover, has joined U.S. initiatives aimed at North Korean nuclear weapons (e.g., the Proliferation Security Initiative). Meanwhile, tensions continue across the Taiwan Strait, and disputes over territory and drilling rights have flared up Last printed 64 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 between China and Japan and between Japan and South Korea. (For the United States, there is a growing possibility of nationalist territorial conflicts between two or more U.S. allies. 102) The North Korean nuclear issue remains unresolved; North Korea has conducted tests of ballistic missiles and a nuclear weapon; and the oppressive military rule in Burma/Myanmar continues. Added to these concerns are several regional issues: diseases (such as avian flu, SARS, and AIDS), environmental degradation, disaster mitigation and prevention, high seas piracy, and weapons proliferation. Memories of the 199799 Asian financial crisis still haunt policy makers in Asian countries. These are some of the major U.S. interests and issues as the United States proceeds with its policy toward a regional architecture in East Asia. Since this policy is aimed at the longterm structure of East Asian nations, it can be separated, somewhat, from current pressing problems. A metric by which any architecture can be evaluated, however, is how well it contributes to a resolution of problems as they now exist or will exist in the future. And World War 3 Waldron, 97 professor of strategy and policy at the U.S. Naval War College and an associate of the Fairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard (March 1997, Arthur, Commentary, "How Not to Deal with China," EBSCO) MAKING THESE flashpoints all the more volatile has been a dramatic increase in quantity and quality of China's the weapons acquisitions. An Asian arms race of sorts was already gathering steam in the postcoldwar era, driven by national rivalries and the understandable desire of newly rich nationstates to upgrade their capacities; but the Chinese buildup has intensified it. In part a payoff to the military for its role at Tiananmen Square in 1989, China's current buildup is part and parcel of the regime's major shift since that time away from domestic liberalization and international openness toward repression and irredentism. Today China buys weapons from European states and Israel, but most importantly from Russia. The latest multibilliondollar deal includes two Sovremennyclass destroyers equipped with the muchfeared SSN22 cruise missile, capable of defeating the Aegis antimissile defenses of the U.S. Navy and thus sinking American aircraft carriers. This is in addition to the Su27 fighter aircraft, quiet Kiloclass submarines, and other forceprojection and deterrent technologies. In turn, the Asian states are buying or developing their own advanced aircraft, missiles, and submarinesand considering nuclear options. The sort of unintended escalation which started two world wars could arise from any of the conflicts around China' s periphery. It nearly did in March 1996, when China, in a blatant act of intimidation, fired ballistic missiles so in the Taiwan Straits. It could arise from a ChineseVietnamese confrontation, particularly if the Vietnamese should score some unexpected military successes against the Chinese, as they did in 1979, and if the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which they are now a member, should tip in the direction of Hanoi. It could flare up from the smoldering insurgencies among Tibetans, Muslims, or Mongolians living inside China. Chains of alliance or interest, perhaps not clearly understood until the moment of crisis itself could easily draw in neighboring states , Russia, or India, or Japanor the United States. Last printed 65 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Strikes AddOn Nuclear deterrence prevents North Korean aggression but pressure for US preventive strikes will grow--this would cause massive casualties and destroy US credibility. Troop withdrawal solves by encouraging regional solutions. BANDOW 2009 (Doug Bandow is a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute. He is a former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan and the author of several books, including Foreign Follies: America's New Global Empire (Xulon) and Tripwire: Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World, "Starting the Second Korean War? Restraint is almost certainly the better part of valor," Reason.com, Feb 26, http://reason.com/archives/2009/02/26/startingthesecondkoreanwar) Calum The government in Seoul responded with a yawn and Secretary Clinton indicated her desire for continued negotiations. But the latest emanations from Pyongyang have caused some policymakers to advocate confrontation. Philip Zelikow, late of the Bush State Department, suggests war. This isn't the first time that U.S. officials have proposed sending in the bombers . The Clinton administration apparently came close to ordering military strikes before former President Jimmy Carter's dramatic flight to Pyongyang. And Sen. John McCain (RAriz.) has spent years pondering the possibility of preventive war against the socalled Democratic People's Republic of Korea. It was never a good idea, but the pressure for military action may grow. Selig Harrison of the Center for International Policy recently traveled to the DPRK, where he was told that existing supplies of plutonium had been "weaponized." He argues that the U.S. "can tolerate a nucleararmed North Korea that may or may not actually have the weapons arsenal it claims," but others would put the military option back on the table. Zelikow goes even further. He says: "whatever the merits of Harrison's suggestion when it comes to North Korea's nuclear weapons, the U nited tates S should not accept Pyongyang's development of longrange missiles systems, which can be paired with an admitted nuclear weapons arsenal, as still another fait accompli." In his view, Washington should warn the North to stand down; if the DPRK failed to comply, the U.S. should take out the missile on its launch pad. Why? Zelikow contends that "the North Korean perfection of a longrange missile capability against the United States, Japan, or the Republic of Korea would pose imminent threat to an the vital interests of our country." To rely on deterrence, he adds, would be a "gamble." Obviously no one wants the North to possess nuclear weapons or missiles of any kind. However, North Korean threats against the ROK and Japan are not threats against America's vital interests . Japan is the world's second ranking economic power and the South has roughly 40 times the GDP and twice the population of the North. Sooner rather than later they should be expected to defend themselves. Washington is busy enough dealing with its own geopolitical problems in the midst of an economic crisis. Moreover, nothing in the North Korean regime's behavior suggests that Dear Leader Kim Jong Il is any less amenable to deterrence than were Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong. Kim may be many things, but there is no indication that he is suicidal. Rather, he likes his virgins in the here and now. Of course , it would be better not to have to rely on deterrence. But a preventive strike would be no cakewalk. If there is insanity at work on the Korean peninsula, it is the assumption that would do nothing if his nation was attacked by the U.S. He might choose inaction, but more Kim likely would see such a strike as the prelude to regime change. In that case the results of the Iraq war would impel him to act first rather than await invasion. America and South Korea would win any war, but the costs would be horrendous. Moreover, the DPRK could easily initiate a more limited titfortat retaliation . The South's capital of Seoul lies within easy range of Scud missiles and massed artillery. Even the "optimists" who believe that Seoul could be protected by massive military strikes along the Demilitarized Zone talk about holding casualties to under 100,000. Imagine Pyongyang announcing a limited bombardment in response to the U.S. action, combined with the promise of a ceasefire if the ROK blocked any further American response. Washington's Asian policy would be wrecked along with Seoul. D espite the vagaries of dealing with the North, is not the first it bizarrely brutal and secretive regime with which the U.S. has dealt. Fortysome years ago there was China. The unstable Mao regime, atop a country convulsed by the bloody Cultural Revolution, was developing nuclear weapons. National Review editor William F. Buckley and New York Sen. James Buckley both pressed for a preventive attack on Beijing's nascent nuclear program. The Johnson administration considered proposals for such an assault. The arguments were similar as those made today regarding North Korea: An unpredictable regime, uncertainty of deterrence, and the the relative ease of attack. It's impossible to know what the world would have looked like had Washington struck, but China likely would have moved closer to the Soviet Union and become more resolutely hostile to the U.S. Restraint almost certainly was the better part of valor. So, too, with North Korea today. Of course, Washington still should work with the DPRK's neighbors in an attempt to persuade Pyongyang to abandon both its missile and nuclear ambitions. Even more important, though, would be to turn the problem of North Korea over to the surrounding states. To the extent that the North threatens anyone, it is South Korea and Japan. China and Russia are unlikely direct targets, but still have good reason to prefer a stable and peaceful Korean peninsula. Thus, the U.S. should Last printed 66 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 withdraw its 29,000 troops from the ROK, where they are vulnerable to military action by Pyongyang . Then North Korea would be primarily a problem for the ROK, China, Japan, and Russia. And the U.S. need not worry about the latest North Korean gambit. American attack on North Korea causes extinction CHOL 2002 (Director Center for Korean American Peace, 1024, http://nautilus.org/fora/security/0212A_Chol.html) Calum Any military strike initiated against North Korea will promptly explode into thermonuclear exchange between a a tiny nuclear armed North Korea and the world's superpower, America. The most densely populated Metropolitan U.S.A., Japan and South Korea will certainly evaporate in The Day After scenariotype nightmare. The New York Times warned in its August 27, 2002 comment: "North Korea runs a more advanced biological, chemical and nuclear weapons program, targets American military bases and is developing missiles that could reach the lower 48 states . Yet there's good reason President Bush is not talking about taking out Dear Leader Kim Jong Il. If we tried, the Dear Leader would bombard South Korea and Japan with never gas or even nuclear warheads, and (according to one Pentagon study) kill up to a million people." U.S. Perception Counts Most What counts most is not so much North nuclear and North Korea and let the regime of Kim Jong Il emerge a nuclear power with atomic and thermonuclear weapons in their arsenal with a fleet of ICBMs locked on to American targets. This option most likely is to set into motion the domino phenomenon, inducing Japan and South Korea to acquire nuclear arms, making unnecessary the American military presence on their soil with antiAmericanism rising to new heights. The second choice is for the Americans to initiate military action to knock out the nuclear facilities in North Korea. Without precise knowledge of the location of those target facilities, the American policy planners face the real risk of North Korea launching a fullscale war against South Korea, Japan and the U.S. The North Korean retaliation will most likely leave South Korea and Japan totally devastated with the Metropolitan U.S. being consumed in nuclear conflagration. Looking missile capability as the American perception that North Korea may have such capability. No matter how true North Korean nuclear capability may, such capability does not serve the political purposes of Kim Jong Il and his policy planners in dealing with the U.S., unless Washington policy planners perceive North Korean nuclear threat as real. Their view is of the Americans being hoaxed into suspecting that the North Koreans have already nuclear capability. The Americans are the most skeptical people in the world. Due to the historic al background of their nation building, they are least ready to trust what others say. What they trust most is guns and money. This is the reason why the Americans show a strong preference for lie detectors, which are ubiquitous in the U.S. If the North Koreans say that they have nuclear capability, the immediate American response is to doubt the statement. If the North Koreans deny, the Americans have a typical propensity to suspect that they have. Most interestingly, Americans readily accept as true acknowledgement after repeated denial. It is easy to imagine how stunned James Kelly and American officials were at the reported postdenial acknowledgement by First Deputy Foreign Minister Kang Sok Ju that the North Koreans have a uranium enrichment centrifuge. As expected, American officials have been ordered into globehopping tours, rallying international support for their campaign to apply pressure to bear upon the North Koreans to dissuade them from their alleged nuclear weapons program. Bush, Rice, Rumsfeld and other tough guys took special care to paint North Korea as different from Iraq, offering the North Koreans the stripedpants treatment. It is too obvious that indirect diplomacy is not effective now matter how hard the Americans may consult their allies and the allies of North Korea. The past consultation with Russia and China failed to produce any positive results, because they have little leverage with North Korea. The fourway talks are a case in point, where the Americans ended up talking with the North Koreans. Three Options Available Then the question arises of how to interpret the reported North Korean admission of the possession of a uranium enrichment device. One most likely explanation is that it is more of an invitation to diplomatic negotiations than refusal to talk. There are a few months to go before the target year of 2003 strikes. In other words, the Kang Sok Ju statement means that the North Koreans still keep the nuclear trump card, namely, that the Bush Administration has no choice but to pick up where the Clinton Administration left off. The Bush Administration is left with three choices: The first is just to ignore to fight a fullscale nuclear exchange with the Americans in the last war of [hu]mankind. A nucleararmed North Korea would be most destabilizing in the region and the rest of the world in the eyes of the Americans. They would end up finding themselves reduced to a second class nuclear power. down on the demolished American homeland, American policy planners aboard a special Boeing jets will have good cause to claim, "We are winners, although our homeland is in ashes. We are safely alive on this jet." The third and last option is to agree to a shotgun wedding with the North Koreans. It means entering into package solution negotiations with the North Koreans, offering to sign a peace treaty to terminate the relations of hostility, establish full diplomatic relations between the two enemy states, withdraw the American forces from South Korea, remove North Korea from the list of axis of evil states and terroristsponsoring states, and give North Korea most favored nation treatment. The first two options should be sobering nightmare scenarios for a wise Bush and his policy planners. If they should opt for either of the scenarios, that would be their decision, which the North Koreans are in no position to take issue with. The Americans would realize too late that the North Korean mean what they say . The North Koreans will use all their resources in their arsenal Last printed 67 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 ***TOPICALITY*** Last printed 68 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 T: Must Be All Military 2AC ---We meet plan withdraws ground forces resolution doesn't specify removing all military forces just presence ---Their interpretation is bad: Overlimits topic would consist of 3 good affs that have literature removing parts of the military key to strategic affs and research Ground prevents core generics based off of shifting strategy or troops "Military" means land forces AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 2009 ("Military," http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/military) 4. Of or relating to land forces. And presence refers to soldiers The Oxford Essential Dictionary of the U.S. Military, 2 (by Oxford University Press, Inc. All rights reserved, republished and cited as "US Military Dictionary" at: http://www.answers.com/topic/presence) US Military Dictionary: presence n.a group of people, especially soldiers or police, stationed in a particular place : maintain a presence in the region. ---Prefer it: Limits limits the topic to only removing ground troops prevents things like small TNW affs but still allows for predictability Most real world military historians refer to military as only ground forces Mahan 1911 (Alfred Thayer Mahan, Naval strategy compared and contrasted with the principles and practice of military operations on land: lectures delivered at U.S. Naval War College, Newport, R.I., between the years 18871911, pp. 121122) The definitions of strategy, as usually given, continue the application of the word to military combinations , which embrace one or more fields of operations, either wholly distinct or mutually dependent, but always regarded as actual or immediate scenes of war. However this may be on shore, a French writer is unquestionably right in pointing out that such a definition is too narrow for naval strategy. "This," he says, "differs from military strategy, in that it is as necessary in peace as in war. Indeed, in peace it may gain its most decisive victories by occupying in a country, either by purchase or treaty, excellent positions which would perhaps hardly be got in war. It learns to profit by all opportunities of settling on some chosen point of a coast, and to render definitive an occupation which at first was only transient." This particular differentiation of naval strategy is due to the unsettled or politically weak conditions of the regions to which navies give access, which armies can reach only by means of navies, and in which the operations of an army, if attempted, depend upon control of the sea. If a nation wishes to exert political influence in such unsettled regions it mush possess bases suitably situated; and the needs of commerce in peace times often dictate the necessity of such possessions, which are acquired, as the French writer says, when opportunity offers. ---They don't define presence in the 1NC as long as we reduce part of the military we are reducing the overall Last printed 69 FILE NAME HOOCH presence <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 ---Prefer reasonability competing interpretations are arbitrary and always find a way to exclude the aff Last printed 70 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 T: ASPEC 2AC ---Specifying increases agent counterplans vote aff Kills ground steals all aff ground and debate becomes impossible we can't generate offense Anti-educational kills topic specific education we have the same debate on every topic that we do on this topic Destroys aff flexibility makes the topic neg bias for the reasons above ---We should defend normal means fiat if there's evidence read in the round on what the normal means agent for the plan would be we'll defend it prefer it: Limits specifying explodes the topic there are hundreds of executive agencies, members of congress, and judicial courts Academic Decision making choosing the agent without evidence on normal means kills incentive to research and education on how the policy would be implemented in the real world ---Cross Ex checks its binding and people don't lie they get their ground if they'd ask solves their offense ---No resolutional justification the resolution says the USFG doesn't require agent specification nonresolutional theory justifications are infinitely regressive and worse for predictability Last printed 71 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Last printed 72 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Last printed 73 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 T: Military Presence Spec 2AC 1. W/M we'll concede their definition we withdraw the navy, ground troops, and air force their definition doesn't dispute what constitutes presence, just different ways of reducing it. Reduce means eliminate US Code, 09 (26 CFR 54.4980F1, lexis) 54.4980F-1 Notice requirements for certain pension plan amendments significantly reducing the rate of future benefit accrual. (c) Elimination or cessation of benefits. For purposes of this section, the terms reduce or reduction include eliminate or cease or elimination or cessation. 2. C/I we shouldn't have to specify military presence 3. Prefer A. Specifying is worse for them they'd lose ground based on specific types of presence they can read evidence to establish their links B. Can't spike out they define with military presence is we use it in the plan text, gives them their links. If we spiked we'd always lose on aff condo. C. PICs solve their education and fairness concerns 4. Don't vote this is arbitrary, we specified a phased withdrawal, there's no resolutional basis and it's infinitely regressive, prefer aff predictability. Last printed 74 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 T: Presence = Political End 2AC 1. We meet: presence in South Korea is tied to explicit political ends like sustaining the alliance 2. CI: Presence requires regular, noncombat activities, solves your limits claims best and establishes a predictable caselist Thomason, 2 Project Leader, Institute for Defense Analysis (James, "Transforming US Overseas Military Presence: Evidence and Options for DoD," July, http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download? doi=10.1.1.122.1144&rep=rep1&type=pdf WHAT IS OVERSEAS MILITARY PRESENCE? Our working definition of US overseas military presence is that it consists of all the US military assets in overseas areas that are engaged in relatively routine, regular, noncombat activities or functions. By this definition, forces that are located overseas may or may not be engaging in presence activities. If they are engaging in combat (such as Operation Enduring Freedom), or are involved in a onetime noncombat action (such as an unscheduled carrier battle group deployment from the United States aimed at calming or stabilizing an emerging crisis situation), then they are not engaging in presence activities. Thus, an asset that is located (or present) overseas may or may not be "engaged in presence activities," may or may not be "doing presence." We have thus far defined presence activities chiefly in "negative" terms--what they are not. In more positive terms, what exactly are presence activities, i.e., what do presence activities actually entail doing? Overseas military presence activities are generally viewed as a subset of the overall class of activities that the US government uses in its efforts to promote important military/security objectives [Dismukes, 1994]. A variety of recurrent, overseas military activities are normally placed under " the umbrella " concept of military presence . These include but are not limited to military US efforts overseas to train foreign militaries improve ; to inter operability US of and friendly forces to ; peacefully and visibly demonstrate US commitment and/or ability to defend US interests; gain to intelligence and familiarity with a locale; to conduct peacekeeping activities; and to position relevant , capable US military assets such that they are likely to be available sooner rather than later in case an evolving security operation or contingency should call for them. 3. A substantial reduction in presence requires at least a 50% decrease Comprehensive Base Closure Reform and Recovery Act, 92 (1992 H.R. 4421 ; 102 H.R. 4421, text of the Comprehensive Base Closure Reform and Recovery Act of 1992, introduced by Olympia Snowe, lexis) TITLE IENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION AT MILITARY INSTALLATIONS TO BE CLOSED SEC. 101. CLEANUP SCHEDULE FOR CERTAIN BASES ON SUPERFUND NATIONAL PRIORITIES LIST. (a) CLEANUP SCHEDULE FOR CERTAIN BASES ON NATIONAL PRIORITIES LIST.(1) With respect to each military installation described in subsection (b) (A) before the installation is closed or substantial reductions in its operations have occurred, at least 75 percent of the remedial action required on the installation pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C. 9601 et seq.) shall be completed; and (B) not later than two years after the installation is closed or substantial reductions in its operations have occurred, all of the remedial action required on the installation pursuant to such Act shall be completed. (2) For purposes of paragraph (1), substantial reductions in the operations of a military installation shall be considered to have occurred if more than 50 percent of the personnel assigned to the installation, including employees Last printed 75 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 and members of the Armed Forces, have been reassigned and moved to another installation. 4. Prefer A. No Brightline: their evidence doesn't define what an "explicit political end is" and it doesn't limit out our aff, prefer an interpretation actually grounded in the literature, that's the only way to create a predictable topic B. Limits: Other words in the resolution and the wiki check back limits explosion, plus our interpretation means its predictable you just have to do the work C. Aff Ground: their interpretation would limit the topic to fewer than three good affs, that's impossible for the aff especially when deterrence can outweigh all of them anyway, aff ground outweighs neg ground; they get the block and abusive PICs 5. Competing interpretations is bad and forces a race to the bottom to create the smallest limit possible, if our interpretation is reasonably predictable and has fair ground don't vote on T.*** Last printed 76 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 T: Should = Now 2AC 1. W/M for the purposes of your disads we'll defend an immediate reduction, they conflate the mandate of reduction with the result of withdrawal that mixes burdens because topicality becomes a question of solvency, makes a predictable case list impossible which is a prerequisite to limits. 2. C/I Should is "Used to express obligation or duty" American Heritage Dictionary 92 of the English Language, 1992 (4ed); Pg. 1612 Should--1. Used to express obligation or duty: You should send her a note. 3. Prefer A. Ground plan passage guarantees their DA links, aff spikeouts in 2AC are reasons to reject aff conditionality not our interp B. Delay CPs they steal the entire aff and rely on artificial net benefits makes generating offense impossible, destroys topic education, and creates a rigged game that's a voter. C. No case meets all affs require a delay between the mandate to withdraw and the actual withdrawal 4. Competing interpretations are bad and forces a race to the bottom to create miniscule limits, if our interpretation is reasonably predictable and has fair ground don't vote on T. Last printed 77 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 T: Substantial = Material 2AC C/I Substantially means including the main part WORDS AND PHRASES, 1964, p. 818. "Substantially" means in substance; in the main; essentially; by including the material or essential part. 1. Our interpretation most predictable black law is a law journal about a yellow taxi cab case proves there is no context for their definition 2. This would lead to whole resolution debates, which would kill indepth policymaking from creating a plan texts evolved from the literature 3. Overlimits the aff to the resolution we would always lose because of PICs Reasonability arbitrary words like "substantially" means the judge should default to reasonability instead of competing interps Last printed 78 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 B. Predictability their interp justifies affs that leave one specific soldier behind neg can never prepare C. Fairness their interp means ppl would use our aff as a PIC against reduction affs Competing interps are bad create a race to the most limiting interpretation creates shallow debates and devalue cost benefit analysis T not a voter A. Potential abuse is not a voter doesn't set precedent B. No inround abuse we will defend any links or cp competition predicated off a decrease Last printed 79 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 T: Reduce = Eliminate 2AC ---We meet we reduce troops through phased withdrawal not immediate cancellation they are eliminated over time ---Their interpretation is bad: Their limits claim is based off of debating 6 more affs not a bad thing forces them to research more about the topic and their interpretation still kills limits just lowering justifies any small decrease --- Reduce means decrease Friedman, 99 Senior Circuit Judge, US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CUNA MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Defendant-Appellee. 98-5033 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 169 F.3d 737; 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 1832; 99-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) P50,245; 83 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 799 February 9, 1999, Decided, lexis) B. CUNA's position has another fatal flaw. Section 808 is captioned "Policy Dividends Deduction," and 808(c) states: (1) In general Except as limited by paragraph (2), the deduction for policyholder dividends for any taxable year shall be an amount equal to the policyholder dividends [**15] paid or accrued during the taxable year. (2) Reduction in case of mutual companies In the case of a mutual life insurance company, the deduction for policyholder dividends for any taxable year shall be reduced by the amount determined under section 809. "The amount determined" under 809, by which the policyholder dividend deduction is to be "reduced," is the "excess" specified in 809(c)(1). Like the word "excess," the word "reduced" is a common, unambiguous, nontechnical term that is given its ordinary meaning. See San Joaquin Fruit & Inv. Co., 297 U.S. at 499. "Reduce" means "to diminish in size, amount, extent, or number." Webster's Third International Dictionary 1905. Under CUNA's interpretation of "excess" in 809(c), however, the result of the "amount determination" under 809 would be not to reduce the policyholder dividends deduction, but to increase it. This would directly contradict the explicit instruction in 808(c) (2) that the deduction "be reduced." The word "reduce" cannot be interpreted, as CUNA would treat it, to mean "increase." Prefer it: Limits out affs that result in future increases or don't substantially reduce Ground fair links to DAs and counterplans interpretation mandates a decrease in troops ---Prefer reasonability competing interpretations are arbitrary and always find a way to exclude the aff Last printed 80 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Last printed 81 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 T: Must Reduce Bases 2AC ---We meet plan removes all ground troops plan text assumes that those bases are removed ---Their interpretation is bad: Limits plans could remove any one base in the countries justifies smaller affs Neg ground removing bases means the neg doesn't get links to larger perception based DAs Aff ground no literature on removing all bases in a country won't have good solvency advocates against counterplans Military presence means ground troops The Oxford Essential Dictionary of the U.S. Military, 2 (by Oxford University Press, Inc. All rights reserved, republished and cited as "US Military Dictionary" at: http://www.answers.com/topic/presence) US Military Dictionary: presence n.a group of people, especially soldiers or police, stationed in a particular place : maintain a presence in the region. ---Prefer it: Limits the topic down to affs that reduce land forces and excludes edge of the topic affs like weapons and navy Academic decision making military historians refer to military as only ground forces Mahan 1911 (Alfred Thayer Mahan, Naval strategy compared and contrasted with the principles and practice of military operations on land: lectures delivered at U.S. Naval War College, Newport, R.I., between the years 18871911, pp. 121122) The definitions of strategy, as usually given, continue the application of the word to military combinations , which embrace one or more fields of operations, either wholly distinct or mutually dependent, but always regarded as actual or immediate scenes of war. However this may be on shore, a French writer is unquestionably right in pointing out that such a definition is too narrow for naval strategy. "This," he says, "differs country, either by purchase or treaty, excellent positions which would perhaps hardly be got in war. It learns to profit by all opportunities of settling on some from military strategy, in that it is as necessary in peace as in war. Indeed, in peace it may gain its most decisive victories by occupying in a chosen point of a coast, and to render definitive an occupation which at first was only transient." This particular differentiation of naval strategy is due to the unsettled or politically weak conditions of the regions to which navies give access, which armies can reach only by means of navies, and in which the operations of an army, if attempted, depend upon control of the sea. If a nation wishes to exert political influence in such unsettled regions it mush possess bases suitably situated; and the needs of commerce in peace times often dictate the necessity of such possessions, which are acquired, as the French writer says, when opportunity offers. ---Reasonability competing interpretations are arbitrary and always find a way to exclude the aff and debate has to be predictable for both sides only our interpretation is Last printed 82 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 ***DISADVANTAGES*** Last printed 83 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Last printed 84 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Victory DA 2AC [Heg Impact] ---We control uniqueness war is only inevitable because of U.S. presence First brinkmanship is the North strategy makes it more likely that the South seeks retaliation Second the ROK has to rely on unstable bilateral measures over aid prevents negotiations between the North and South that's Espiritu And we control the only scenario for escalation of conflict South Korea will cut their defense spending and stop modernizing removing troops means South Korean military and weapons can deter North Korea that's Stanton More ev withdrawal prevents the war BANDOW 2003 (Doug, senior fellow at the Cato Institute. A former special assistant to President Ronald Reagan, he is the author of Tripwire: Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World and coauthor of The Korean Conundrum: America's Troubled Relations with North and South Korea, "Cutting the Tripwire: It's time to get out of Korea," Reason Magazine, July 2003, http://reason.com/archives/2003/07/01/cuttingthetripwire/1) Calum Why is America still in Korea? The security commitment is the only reason the North breathes fire against Washington. If the U.S. withdrew, Pyongyang would pose no serious threat to us. Today it wields only an untested missile with the theoretical possibility of hitting Alaska or the West Coast, and it knows that attacking America would ensure obliteration. In contrast, leaving forces on the peninsula creates 37,000 nearby nuclear hostages if Pyongyang develops a nuclear arsenal. The troop presence also further strains a military that intends to garrison a defeated Iraq along with the Balkans, while searching for Al Qaeda all worldwide. Alliances are created at particular times to meet particular threats. They are not ends in themselves, to be preserved no matter how much the world changes. Instead of augmenting its forces in the Pacific and threatening Pyongyang with war, the U.S. should bring home its troops and turn the problem of Pyongyang over to its neighbors, where it belongs. ---Letting the war go on means North Korea will use nuclear weapons Layne, 06 professor of government at Texas A & M University (Christopher, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present, p. 169) Rather than being instruments of regional pacification, today America's alliances are transmission belts for war that ensure that the U.S. would be embroiled in Eurasian wars. In deciding whether to go war in Eurasia, the United States should not allow its hands to be tied in advance. For example, a non great power war on the Korean Peninsula even if nuclear weapons were not involved would be very costly. The dangers of being entangled in a great power war in Eurasia, of course, are even greater, and could expose the American homeland to nuclear attack. An offshore balancing grand strategy would extricate the United States from the danger of being entrapped in Eurasian conflicts by its alliance commitments. Goes global Bandow, 05 Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Reagan (Fall 2005, Doug, National Interest, "Seoul Searching," vol. 81, EBSCO, JMP) continent on earth, it cannot realistically expect its influence to persist forever. There no longer is a global hegemonic struggle turning local disputes into a cause for global war. the United States So should be able to devolve upon its populous and prosperous allies the responsibility of developing adequate deterrent forces necessary to guarantee their own security. Alliance advocates are searching for a new raison d'tre for a Cold War relic. As much as the United States might prefer to maintain its current dominance of every Last printed 85 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 ---[MANASAN evidence] No evidence that the US will win the war in the 1NC their Manasan evidence says that North Korea would "lose it" just an indication that they would go insane not that they would lose the war itself ---Troops not key to a win air and navy solev Mount 10 Mike, Senior Pentagon Producer @ CNN (May 21, " No alert for U.S. troops in Korea, Pentagon says", http://www.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/05/20/korea.sunken.ship.us/index.html) Though Gates and Mullen would not speculate on what the next step would be for South Korea, the U nited tates S is bound by treaty to assist that nation if it goes to war. The U.S. Army is stretched thin in two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, but Gates said there are other options in the case of armed conflict on the Korean peninsula. "We have for a long time said that if there were a problem in Korea our main arms would be the Navy and Air Force, the and those are not stretched in the same way that the ground forces are," he said. Troops are useless FEFFER 2004 (John, contributor to Foreign Policy in Focus and author of a book on Korea, "Bring Our Troops Home (from Korea)," June 23, http://www.lewrockwell.com/orig5/feffer1.html) Calum The deeper issue, however, is the declining utility of American troops on the Korean peninsula. North Korea's conventional forces have deteriorated in strength over the last twenty years, even as Pyongyang has directed large portions of its stagnant government budget toward the military. South Korea's armed forces, which include 690,000 troops, meanwhile steadily have improved its capability. Because of the high cost of fuel and lack of the critical spare parts, North Korean military pilots train 13 hours a year, which is what an American pilot easily clocks in a month . Or to give another example of the growing disparity of forces, South Korea has the luxury to spend between ten and one hundred times more per soldier for their equipment and other needs. Given the dramatic reversal of comparative strength between North and South, tiny U.S. the contingent around 5 percent of South Korean troop strength does not bring much to the table . The U.S. decision in 2003 to redeploy U.S. forces away from the DMZ has eliminated their function as a tripwire, the first line of defense against a North Korean invasion. Presence kills readiness draw in is worse Bandow 96 (Doug, Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, specializing in foreign policy and civil liberties, worked as special assistant to President Reagan and editor of the political magazine Inquiry, writes regularly for leading publications such as Fortune magazine, National Interest, Wall Street Journal, and Washington Times, Tripwire: Korea and US foreign policy in a changed world, p39) SLV Although dependence on America may have been at least the in ROK's shortterm interest , especially in the republic's early days of poverty, the longterm impact is likely to be less positive. is, after all, hard to be simultaneously a fully independent participant in It the world system and a de facto protectorate. More important, creating an international security dole on which allied nations wish to stay is surely not in Washington's interest, either short or long term. is bad enough to risk being drawn into war. It It is ridiculous to simultaneously risk being drawn into war and discourage the nation being defended from protecting itself. Last printed 86 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 ---We solve credibility: First overstretch CUMMINGS 2004 (Colonel John Cummings, US Army War College, "Should the U.S. Continue to Maintain Forces in South Korea?" May 3, http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA423298&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf) Calum In the foreseeable future the United States will continue to view the stability and security of the Korean Peninsula as a vital national security interest and integral to sustaining global commerce. Withdrawal of United States ground forces from South Korea will not degrade the military readiness of the alliance defense. On the contrary, it will eliminate one of the major sources of growing antiAmericanism among the South Korean population. Moreover, U nited tates S can utilize ground forces that are re deployed from the peninsula in the Global War on terrorism, and save the associated costs of forward based troops. For South Korea, with strong United States support, to take the lead in the defense of their nation is an idea whose time has come. In conclusion, withdrawal of U.S. ground forces from South Korea would be a winwin alternative. We gain economic and military resources while maintaining our objectives in northeast Asia and garnering positive public opinion, and South Koreans step out of our shadow and join the first rank of nations as a fully functioning democratic nation in charge of its own national defense. That's key to heg and overstretch makes it impossible to win the war Spencer 2K (Jack, policy analyst for Defense and National security, Heritage foundation, "The facts about military readiness," Readiness, "Backgrounder #1394, 9/15/00, http://heritage.org/research/missiledefense/bg1394.cfm) SLV America's national security requirements dictate that the armed forces must be prepared to defeat groups of adversaries a given in America, as the sole remaining superpower, has many enemies. Because attacking America or its interests alone would surely war. end in defeat for a single nation, these enemies are likely to form alliances. herefore, basing readiness on American military superiority over any T The evidence indicates that U.S. the armed forces are not ready to support America's national security requirements. Moreover, regarding the broader capability to defeat groups of enemies, military readiness has been declining. The National Security Strategy, the U.S. official statement of national security objectives, 3 concludes that the U nited States "must have the capability to deter and, if deterrence fails, defeat largescale, crossborder aggression in two distant theaters in overlapping time frames." 4 According to some of the military's highestranking officials, however, the U nited States cannot achieve this goal. Commandant of the Marine Corps General James Jones, former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jay Johnson, and Air Force Chief of Staff General Michael Ryan have all expressed serious concerns about their respective services' ability to carry out a two major theater war strategy. 5 Recently retired Generals Anthony Zinni of the U.S. Marine Corps and George Joulwan of the U.S. Army have even questioned America's ability to conduct one major theater war the size of the 1991 Gulf War.6 single nation has little saliency. Military readiness is vital because declines in America's military readiness signal to the rest of the world that the U nited tates S is not prepared to defend its interests. Therefore, potentially hostile nations will be more likely to lash out against American allies and interests, inevitably leading to U.S. involvement in combat. A high state of military readiness is more likely to deter potentially hostile nations from acting aggressively in regions of vital national interest, thereby preserving peace. Bandow and Carpenter 4 JD from Stanford, senior fellow at Cato, former special assistant to Reagan, writes for Fortune, 200 * National Interest, WSJ, Washington Times, **PhD in diplomatic history from Texas, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at Cato, contributing editor to the National Interest, editorial board of the Journal of Strategic Studies (Ted Galen and Doug, "The Korean conundrum", Google Books, page 120, WEA) Second presence kills competitiveness Billions in defense subsidies to allied nations (South Korea is merely one beneficiary, of course) have a dual impact. One is on domestic economic policy, since such outlays further inflate tax collections and government borrowing, diverting resources away from more productive private investment. Perhaps even more serious is the international impact. American defense subsidies not only impoverish U.S. taxpayers; they simultaneously enrich foreign nations that Last printed 87 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 are major trade competitors. Allowing South Korea (as well as Japan and a host of European nations) to concentrate domestic resources on economic rather than military development puts American enterprises at a disadvantage. That cost was modest and probably worth enduring during the early days of the Cold War; there is no longer any reason to indirectly underwrite large Korean, Japanese, and European businesses as they compete with U.S. firms. Key to heg Segal 04 (Adam, Senior Fellow in China Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, November/December 2004, "Is America Losing Its Edge?," Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20041101facomment83601/adamsegal/isamericalosingits edge.html?mode=print) SLV Today, however, this technological edgeso long taken for grantedmay be slipping, and the most serious challenge is coming from Asia. Through competitive tax policies, increased investment in research and development (R&D), and preferential policies for science and technology (S&T) personnel, Asian governments are improving the quality of their science and ensuring the exploitation of future innovations. The percentage of patents issued to and science journal articles published by scientists in China, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan is rising. Indian companies are quickly becoming the secondlargest producers of application services in the world, developing, supplying, and managing database and other types of software for clients around the world. South Korea has rapidly eaten away at the U.S. advantage in the manufacture of computer chips and telecommunications software. And even China has made impressive gains in advanced technologies such as lasers, biotechnology, and advanced materials used in semiconductors, aerospace, and many other types of manufacturing. Although the United States' technical dominance remains solid, the globalization of research and development is exerting considerable pressures on the American system. Indeed, as the United States is learning, globalization cuts both ways: it is both a potent catalyst of U.S. technological innovation and a significant threat to it. The United States will never be able to prevent rivals from developing new technologies; it can remain dominant only by continuing to innovate faster than everyone else. But this won't be easy; to keep its privileged position in the world, the United States must get better at fostering technological entrepreneurship at home. Last printed 88 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Deterrence DA 2AC Tournament Last printed 89 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 ---Troops already reduced and they're at greater risk for attack Bandow, 05 Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Reagan (Fall 2005, Doug, National Interest, "Seoul Searching," vol. 81, EBSCO, JMP) The Bush Administration also seems to think that South Korea is better prepared to stand on its own. Moving U.S. forces southessentially dismantling the fabled tripwire of fifty years cutting the American garrison by onethird and suggest that Washington no longer believes its military presence to be central to the ROK's security. As Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld explained after meeting with South Korean Defense Minister Yoon Kwangung, "the South Koreans are appropriately increasingly taking the lead in their own defense" and will be "assuming some missions and some responsibilities as we adjust our relationship going forward." Dealing with a nuclear North Korea would be more complicated but would not be aided by conventional troop deployments. To the contrary, America's force presence exacerbates the problem by creating thousands of American nuclear hostages within range of Pyongyang's weapons. Whether Washington ended up holding a nuclear umbrella over the ROK or encouraging South Korea to create its own nuclear deterrent, the United States would gain nothing by maintaining an Army division and other units in the South. ---Case solves the impact: status quo troops prevent future allies and leadership perceived as too much intervention that's Bandow Francis East Asia is becoming less important to our leadership credibility will inevitably decline ----Troops not key to deterrence: First countries still upgrading military Bandow, 06 senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former special assistant to Reagan (9/8/06, Doug, "The Korean Imbroglio: Disengage and Ignore," http://original.antiwar.com/dougbandow/2006/09/08/thekoreanimbrogliodisengageandignore/, JMP) More broadly, U.S. Troops are said to cement U.S. influence or prevent a regional arms race. However, there's no evidence that the garrison in the South adds anything the to influence that comes naturally from being the globe's sole superpower. Nor has America's force presence stopped the People's Republic of China from upgrading military; better that its frontline allied states take responsibility for their region's security rather than rely on Washington. Second strike capabilities Espiritu, 06 Commander, U.S. Navy (3/15/06, Commander Emilson M. Espiritu, "The Eagle Heads Home: Rethinking National Security Policy for The Asia Pacific Region," http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA448817&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf, JMP) Even though we are already reducing the number of U.S. troops in the region, one alternative to the current policy is to accelerate the withdrawal of all U.S. troops in the region. resident Bush announced a major restructuring of U.S. military forces overseas since the end of the Korean War.27 This restructuring essentially decreases the U.S. military footprint on foreign soil to allow better flexibility for the military of the challenges of the 21st century. A plan to withdraw as well as to reduce troops over the next 10 years will give "our service members more time on the home front and fewer moves over a career." 28 A more aggressive alternative to the current policy would be to completely withdraw all U.S. troops in the region. There are certain risks involved if U.S. troops completely withdraw in the Korean Peninsula. One risk of complete withdrawal would result in an immediate power struggle in the region. Nations such as China, Japan, and even South Korea will certainly have to rethink their own National Security policy therefore contributing to regional fallout. Any rapidly changing relationship between North and South Korea more than likely will lead to a regional power struggle among the United States, China, Japan, and even Russia. 29 This strategy seems feasible because the U.S. will "improve our ability to deter, dissuade, and defeat challenges in Asia through strengthened longrange strike Last printed 90 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 capabilities , streamlined and consolidated headquarters, and a network of access arrangements. 30 ---Korean crisis is crushing credibility Bandow, 03 Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Reagan (Summer 2003, Doug, Parameters, "Ending the Anachronistic Korea Commitment," http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/parameters/03summer/bandow.htm, JMP) Given the risks of war and problems with sanctions, negotiations are the obvious place to start. The United States could offer security guarantees, political recognition, and economic aid in exchange for the verifiable termination of the North's nuclear and missile programs. Some analysts would add demobilization and withdrawal of conventional units from their advanced positions to the agenda. A few even want to include human rights guarantees. Given the stakes, South Korea and the other neighboring states are likely to insist on being involved in shaping policy. Involving them is in America's interest. Argues Shi Yinhong, a professor at China's People's University, it "is highly doubtful" that Washington alone can end the North's nuclear ambitions--peacefully, anyway.29 But the United States cannot take the support of regional states for granted. For instance, China could play the most important role in dissuading the North from its nuclear course. Yet so far Beijing has been disinclined to solve what is seen as primarily America's problem. China lacks the North's full trust and is suspicious of Washington's willingness to assert its power globally. Concludes analyst Stephen Richter: "The North Korean crisis is helping to chip away at US credibility in the world and it is , even leading to tensions between the United States and its allies in Asia, such as South Korea and Japan. All that suits China just fine."30 The key to enlisting China (and Russia) is to convince them that doing so would help them. One tactic would be to tell them "that by failing to support us they put their relations with us at risk," writes Stephen Sestanovich of the Council on Foreign Relations.31 That might or might not work, but only at great cost, given the many other issues also at stake in those relationships. It would be better to point out the adverse consequences to them, as well as to America, if Pyongyang does not desist. ---Withdrawal key to deterrence: U.S. forces are overstretched now can't deter countries with troops that's Erickson Plus multilateralism solves regional peace U.S. withdrawal causes nations to pursue security arrangements that's Espiritu Future troop reductions will occur because of the QDRmakes collapse of deterrence inevitable ---Obama cut weapons in Asia Blumenthal, 09 resident fellow at AEI (5/1/2009, Dan, Far Eastern Economic Review, "The Erosion of U.S. Power in Asia," http://www.aei.org/article/100445, JMP) When George W. Bush was president, critics of his Asia policy liked to say that America was "getting its derriere kicked" by China. By this the critics meant that the war in Iraq was a big distraction and that the United States was not attending enough Asian multilateral conferences, where it could demonstrate its "soft power." While this case against the Bush administration was never wholly convincing, it did contain a kernel of truth. Beijing did gain regional influence at Washington's expense under Mr. Bush's watch. But Beijing did so not through kinder and gentler diplomacy alone; rather, China grew its military at a rapid clip and the region took note. If President Bush somewhat neglected this troubling turn in Asia's balance of power, President Barack Obama is doing his predecessor one better. His administration's recent announcement to cut defense programs puts America's longstanding military superiority in the Pacific at risk. If left standing, these cuts heavily targeted on hightech nology weapons systems and "powerprojection" Last printed 91 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 platforms essential to preserving that superioritymight mean that America doesn't have much of a derriere left in Asia at all. Last printed 92 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Last printed 93 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Deterrence DA 2AC [Heg Impact] ---Troops already reduced and they're at greater risk for attack Bandow, 05 Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Reagan (Fall 2005, Doug, National Interest, "Seoul Searching," vol. 81, EBSCO, JMP) The Bush Administration also seems to think that South Korea is better prepared to stand on its own. Moving U.S. forces south --essentially dismantling the fabled tripwire of fifty years-- and cutting the American garrison by one-third suggest that Washington no longer believes its military presence to be central to the ROK's security. As Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld explained after meeting with South Korean Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-ung, "the South Koreans are appropriately increasingly taking the lead in their own defense" and will be "assuming some missions and some responsibilities as we adjust our relationship going forward." Dealing with a nuclear North Korea would be more complicated but would not be aided by conventional troop deployments. To the contrary, America's force presence exacerbates the problem by creating thousands of American nuclear hostages within range of Pyongyang's weapons. Whether Washington ended up holding a nuclear umbrella over the ROK or encouraging South Korea to create its own nuclear deterrent, the United States would gain nothing by maintaining an Army division and other units in the South. ---Case solves the impact: status quo troops prevent future allies and leadership perceived as too much intervention that's Bandow Francis East Asia is becoming less important to our leadership credibility will inevitably decline ----Troops not key to deterrence: First countries still upgrading military Bandow, 06 senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former special assistant to Reagan (9/8/06, Doug, "The Korean Imbroglio: Disengage and Ignore," http://original.antiwar.com/dougbandow/2006/09/08/thekoreanimbrogliodisengageandignore/, JMP) More broadly, U.S. Troops are said to cement U.S. influence or prevent a regional arms race. However, there's no evidence that the garrison in the South adds anything to the influence that comes naturally from being the globe's sole superpower. Nor has America's force presence stopped the People's Republic of China from upgrading its military; better that front-line allied states take responsibility for their region's security rather than rely on Washington. Second strike capabilities Espiritu, 06 Commander, U.S. Navy (3/15/06, Commander Emilson M. Espiritu, "The Eagle Heads Home: Rethinking National Security Policy for The Asia Pacific Region," http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA448817&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf, JMP) Even though we are already reducing the number of U.S. troops in the region, one alternative to the current policy is to accelerate the withdrawal of all U.S. troops in the region. resident Bush announced a major restructuring of U.S. military forces overseas since the end of the Korean War.27 This restructuring essentially decreases the U.S. military footprint on foreign soil to allow better flexibility for the military of the challenges of the 21st century. A plan to withdraw as well as to reduce troops over the next 10 years will give "our service members more time on the home front and fewer moves over a career." 28 A more aggressive alternative to the current policy would be to completely withdraw all U.S. troops in the region. There are certain risks involved if U.S. troops completely withdraw in the Korean Peninsula. One risk of complete withdrawal would result in an immediate power struggle in the region. Nations such as China, Japan, and even South Korea will certainly have to rethink their own National Security policy therefore contributing to regional fallout. Any rapidly changing relationship between North and South Korea will more than likely lead to a regional power struggle among the United States, China, Japan, and even Russia. 29 This strategy seems feasible because the U.S. will "improve our ability to deter, dissuade, and defeat challenges in Asia through strengthened long-range strike capabilities, streamlined and consolidated headquarters, and a network of access arrangements. 30 ---Korean crisis is crushing credibility Last printed 94 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Bandow, 03 Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Reagan (Summer 2003, Doug, Parameters, "Ending the Anachronistic Korea Commitment," http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/parameters/03summer/bandow.htm, JMP) Given the risks of war and problems with sanctions, negotiations are the obvious place to start. The United States could offer security guarantees, political recognition, and economic aid in exchange for the verifiable termination of the North's nuclear and missile programs. Some analysts would add demobilization and withdrawal of conventional units from their advanced positions to the agenda. A few even want to include human rights guarantees. Given the stakes, South Korea and the other neighboring states are likely to insist on being involved in shaping policy. Involving them is in America's interest. Argues Shi Yinhong, a professor at China's People's University, it "is highly doubtful" that Washington alone can end the North's nuclear ambitions--peacefully, anyway.29 But the United States cannot take the support of regional states for granted. For instance, China could play the most important role in dissuading the North from its nuclear course. Yet so far Beijing has been disinclined to solve what is seen as primarily America's problem. China lacks the North's full trust and is suspicious of Washington's willingness to assert its power globally. Concludes analyst Stephen Richter: "The North Korean crisis is helping to chip away at US credibility in the world, and it is even leading to tensions between the United States and its allies in Asia, such as South Korea and Japan. All that suits China just fine."30 The key to enlisting China (and Russia) is to convince them that doing so would help them. One tactic would be to tell them "that by failing to support us they put their relations with us at risk," writes Stephen Sestanovich of the Council on Foreign Relations.31 That might or might not work, but only at great cost, given the many other issues also at stake in those relationships. It would be better to point out the adverse consequences to them, as well as to America, if Pyongyang does not desist. ---Withdrawal key to deterrence: U.S. forces are overstretched now can't deter countries with troops that's Erickson Plus multilateralism solves regional peace U.S. withdrawal causes nations to pursue security arrangements that's Espiritu More evidence Cummings, 04 (3/19/04, Colonel John P. Cummings, "SHOULD THE U.S. CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN FORCES IN SOUTH KOREA?" http://www.dtic.mil/cgi bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA423298&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf, JMP) THE REAL THREAT FROM NORTH KOREA What is the real threat from North Korea? During congressional testimony in March 2001, General Thomas Schwartz, then U.S. Commander-in-Chief in Korea, reported that the North Korean military threat was growing. He based his report on the size of North Korea's forces, weaponry, and large number of exercises conducted in 2000. However, experts in both South Korea and the United States disputed General Schwartz's testimony on several points. The critics argued that North Korean conventional military capabilities had eroded since the early 1990s due to the obsolescence of offensive weaponry like tanks and strike aircraft, as well as to deficiencies in logistics/supplies and food shortages among even North Korean front-line troops on the DMZ. Also specified was the decline in the physical and mental capabilities of North Korean draftees after a decade of malnutrition. Finally, the absence of major field exercises from 1994 to 2000 was cited.11 Since then, the military leadership in Korea has reassessed the threat from North Korea. General Leon LaPorte, current Commander of all United States forces in Republic of Korea, addressed the threat posed by North Korea in a recent interview on ABC-TV. During the interview he talked about the capability of the South Korea/ United States military in comparison to the capability of the North Korea military. LaPorte stated that "The Republic of Korea and the United States have tremendous military capabilities, far exceeding those of North Korea. The Republic of Korea (ROK) military is a very well-trained, well-led and disciplined force. They have a significant number of ground forces." LaPorte told the interviewer that North Korea's navy and air force are "minuscule compared to the ROK and U.S. Navy and Air Force." In discussing North Korea's capability he said the North Korean military is "an aging military, with older Soviet equipment and they have not been able to make the investment." 12 When considering North Korean conventional threat versus ROK military capabilities that include a large ground force, one must ask, what is the military purpose of American ground forces forward deployed to South Korea? What more could the 37,000 United States forces contribute to a ground campaign conducted by 650,000-strong ROK force? Pundits reiterate that the United States' major military contribution to South Korea in the event of hostilities will be in the form of naval and air forces, not ground forces. Andrew Krepenevich, noted scholar and expert in foreign relations, approaches the issue in a more strategic context. In an article he Last printed 95 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 wrote concerning America as a global power, he makes several predictions. He states that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile technology will likely demand an increasing share of United States defense resources for homeland defense. He maintains that this will leave less military capability available for forward presence. He argues that our policy should encourage allies to assume a larger role in providing ground forces for peacekeeping, urban control operations and regional conflicts. In the case of South Korea, this would not entail an increase of resources on the part of U.S. allies. "South Korea should be capable of effectively defending itself without major United States ground reinforcements."13 ---Defense cuts decreasing heg now Blumenthal, 09 resident fellow at AEI (5/1/2009, Dan, Far Eastern Economic Review, "The Erosion of U.S. Power in Asia," http://www.aei.org/article/100445, JMP) The point is not that Washington is poised to go to war with North Korea or China. Rather, only by maintaining its role as Asia's security guarantor can the U.S. hope to secure an enduring peace in this dynamic region. It has a strong interest in avoiding even the perception of American retrenchment. That would be a recipe for a spiraling arms race among the region's great powers. It is no accident that Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Australia, all capable of acquiring nuclear weapons, have not yet taken that road. They have been confident in the American security umbrella. If current trends continue, are we sure those states would not reconsider the wisdom of that policy? That is why the Obama administration's defense cuts are so detrimental to American strategy. The day after North Korea's longrange missile test, the U.S. announced deep cuts to missile defense and satellite programs. The Airborne Laser program that Mr. Obama axed is not only the most promising and immediate method for intercepting ballistic missiles in the "boost" phase--that is, shortly after launch--but also the first significant use of directed energy as a weapon, a technology that may prove to be yet another revolutionary change in warfare sparked by American ingenuity. There is a broad consensus among missile defense experts that to effectively defend ourselves and allies against the lethality of Chinese and North Korean missiles we need a multilayered defensive capability. A missile defense system must attempt to shoot down missiles at all points on its trajectory. The Obama administration has just undermined that capability. Last printed 96 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Deterrence DA 1AR [Heg Impact] Heg Low Ext. ---Obama is gutting U.S. hegemony in Asia Blumenthal, 09 resident fellow at AEI (5/1/2009, Dan, Far Eastern Economic Review, "The Erosion of U.S. Power in Asia," http://www.aei.org/article/100445, JMP) When George W. Bush was president, critics of his Asia policy liked to say that America was "getting its derriere kicked" by China. By this the critics meant that the war in Iraq was a big distraction and that the United States was not attending enough Asian multilateral conferences, where it could demonstrate its "soft power." While this case against the Bush administration was never wholly convincing, it did contain a kernel of truth. Beijing did gain regional influence at Washington's expense under Mr. Bush's watch. But Beijing did so not through kinder and gentler diplomacy alone; rather, China grew its military at a rapid clip and the region took note. If President Bush somewhat neglected this troubling turn in Asia's balance of power, President Barack Obama is doing his predecessor one better. His administration's recent announcement to cut defense programs puts America's longstanding military superiority in the Pacific at risk. If left standing, these cutsheavily targeted on hightechnology weapons systems and "powerprojection" platforms essential to preserving that superioritymight mean that America doesn't have much of a derriere left in Asia at all. Last printed 97 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Last printed 98 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Deterrence DA 2AC [Generic] ---Troops already reduced and they're at greater risk for attack Bandow, 05 Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Reagan (Fall 2005, Doug, National Interest, "Seoul Searching," vol. 81, EBSCO, JMP) The Bush Administration also seems to think that South Korea is better prepared to stand on its own. Moving U.S. forces south --essentially dismantling the fabled tripwire of fifty years-- and cutting the American garrison by one-third suggest that Washington no longer believes its military presence to be central to the ROK's security. As Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld explained after meeting with South Korean Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-ung, "the South Koreans are appropriately increasingly taking the lead in their own defense" and will be "assuming some missions and some responsibilities as we adjust our relationship going forward." Dealing with a nuclear North Korea would be more complicated but would not be aided by conventional troop deployments. To the contrary, America's force presence exacerbates the problem by creating thousands of American nuclear hostages within range of Pyongyang's weapons. Whether Washington ended up holding a nuclear umbrella over the ROK or encouraging South Korea to create its own nuclear deterrent, the United States would gain nothing by maintaining an Army division and other units in the South. ---Case solves the impact: ----Troops not key to deterrence: First countries still upgrading military Bandow, 06 senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former special assistant to Reagan (9/8/06, Doug, "The Korean Imbroglio: Disengage and Ignore," http://original.antiwar.com/dougbandow/2006/09/08/thekoreanimbrogliodisengageandignore/, JMP) More broadly, U.S. Troops are said to cement U.S. influence or prevent a regional arms race. However, there's no evidence that the garrison in the South adds anything to the influence that comes naturally from being the globe's sole superpower. Nor has America's force presence stopped the People's Republic of China from upgrading its military; better that front-line allied states take responsibility for their region's security rather than rely on Washington. Second strike capabilities Espiritu, 06 Commander, U.S. Navy (3/15/06, Commander Emilson M. Espiritu, "The Eagle Heads Home: Rethinking National Security Policy for The Asia Pacific Region," http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA448817&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf, JMP) Even though we are already reducing the number of U.S. troops in the region, one alternative to the current policy is to accelerate the withdrawal of all U.S. troops in the region. resident Bush announced a major restructuring of U.S. military forces overseas since the end of the Korean War.27 This restructuring essentially decreases the U.S. military footprint on foreign soil to allow better flexibility for the military of the challenges of the 21st century. A plan to withdraw as well as to reduce troops over the next 10 years will give "our service members more time on the home front and fewer moves over a career." 28 A more aggressive alternative to the current policy would be to completely withdraw all U.S. troops in the region. There are certain risks involved if U.S. troops completely withdraw in the Korean Peninsula. One risk of complete withdrawal would result in an immediate power struggle in the region. Nations such as China, Japan, and even South Korea will certainly have to rethink their own National Security policy therefore contributing to regional fallout. Any rapidly changing relationship between North and South Korea will more than likely lead to a regional power struggle among the United States, China, Japan, and even Russia. 29 This strategy seems feasible because the U.S. will "improve our ability to deter, dissuade, and defeat challenges in Asia through strengthened long-range strike capabilities, streamlined and consolidated headquarters, and a network of access arrangements. 30 ---Budget cuts will prevent the U.S. from defending Asian allies Blumenthal, 09 resident fellow at AEI (5/1/2009, Dan, Far Eastern Economic Review, "The Erosion of U.S. Power in Asia," http://www.aei.org/article/100445, JMP) Last printed 99 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Make no mistake, starved of resources regional commanders will be forced to give up important missions, from humanitarian relief and security cooperation in Southeast Asia to deterring aggression and defending allies in North Asia. The consequences of eroding military capability are easy to understand. Less fighter aircraft means more risk of adversary aggression, a smaller navy means an eroding capability to keep the seas safe for trade, fewer cargo planes means less humanitarian missions that buy us goodwill. It is fashionable these days to divide power into the "hard" and "soft" categories. In reality, the successful exercise of power is and always has been a careful calibration of diplomacy with the force to back it up. An erosion of the latter will render the former hollow. ---Withdrawal key to deterrence: U.S. forces are overstretched now can't deter countries with troops that's Erickson Plus multilateralism solves regional peace U.S. withdrawal causes nations to pursue security arrangements that's Espiritu More evidence Cummings, 04 (3/19/04, Colonel John P. Cummings, "SHOULD THE U.S. CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN FORCES IN SOUTH KOREA?" http://www.dtic.mil/cgi bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA423298&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf, JMP) THE REAL THREAT FROM NORTH KOREA What is the real threat from North Korea? During congressional testimony in March 2001, General Thomas Schwartz, then U.S. Commander-in-Chief in Korea, reported that the North Korean military threat was growing. He based his report on the size of North Korea's forces, weaponry, and large number of exercises conducted in 2000. However, experts in both South Korea and the United States disputed General Schwartz's testimony on several points. The critics argued that North Korean conventional military capabilities had eroded since the early 1990s due to the obsolescence of offensive weaponry like tanks and strike aircraft, as well as to deficiencies in logistics/supplies and food shortages among even North Korean front-line troops on the DMZ. Also specified was the decline in the physical and mental capabilities of North Korean draftees after a decade of malnutrition. Finally, the absence of major field exercises from 1994 to 2000 was cited.11 Since then, the military leadership in Korea has reassessed the threat from North Korea. General Leon LaPorte, current Commander of all United States forces in Republic of Korea, addressed the threat posed by North Korea in a recent interview on ABC-TV. During the interview he talked about the capability of the South Korea/ United States military in comparison to the capability of the North Korea military. LaPorte stated that "The Republic of Korea and the United States have tremendous military capabilities, far exceeding those of North Korea. The Republic of Korea (ROK) military is a very well-trained, well-led and disciplined force. They have a significant number of ground forces." LaPorte told the interviewer that North Korea's navy and air force are "minuscule compared to the ROK and U.S. Navy and Air Force." In discussing North Korea's capability he said the North Korean military is "an aging military, with older Soviet equipment and they have not been able to make the investment." 12 When considering North Korean conventional threat versus ROK military capabilities that include a large ground force, one must ask, what is the military purpose of American ground forces forward deployed to South Korea? What more could the 37,000 United States forces contribute to a ground campaign conducted by 650,000-strong ROK force? Pundits reiterate that the United States' major military contribution to South Korea in the event of hostilities will be in the form of naval and air forces, not ground forces. Andrew Krepenevich, noted scholar and expert in foreign relations, approaches the issue in a more strategic context. In an article he wrote concerning America as a global power, he makes several predictions. He states that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile technology will likely demand an increasing share of United States defense resources for homeland defense. He maintains that this will leave less military capability available for forward presence. He argues that our policy should encourage allies to assume a larger role in providing ground forces for peacekeeping, urban control operations and regional conflicts. In the case of South Korea, this would not entail an increase of resources on the part of U.S. allies. "South Korea should be capable of effectively defending itself without major United States ground reinforcements."13 Last printed 100 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Last printed 101 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Deterrence DA 2AC [Japan Prolif Impact] ---Troops already reduced and they're at greater risk for attack Bandow, 05 Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Reagan (Fall 2005, Doug, National Interest, "Seoul Searching," vol. 81, EBSCO, JMP) The Bush Administration also seems to think that South Korea is better prepared to stand on its own. Moving U.S. forces south --essentially dismantling the fabled tripwire of fifty years-- and cutting the American garrison by one-third suggest that Washington no longer believes its military presence to be central to the ROK's security. As Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld explained after meeting with South Korean Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-ung, "the South Koreans are appropriately increasingly taking the lead in their own defense" and will be "assuming some missions and some responsibilities as we adjust our relationship going forward." Dealing with a nuclear North Korea would be more complicated but would not be aided by conventional troop deployments. To the contrary, America's force presence exacerbates the problem by creating thousands of American nuclear hostages within range of Pyongyang's weapons. Whether Washington ended up holding a nuclear umbrella over the ROK or encouraging South Korea to create its own nuclear deterrent, the United States would gain nothing by maintaining an Army division and other units in the South. ---No link we don't withdrawal troops from Japan only a chance more troops would be available for Japan ---Case solves the impact: East Asian multilateralism solves aggression even if Japan does proliferate that's Francis And China steps in and stabilizes North Korea rest of Asia feels more comfortable ----Troops not key to deterrence: First countries still upgrading military Bandow, 06 senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former special assistant to Reagan (9/8/06, Doug, "The Korean Imbroglio: Disengage and Ignore," http://original.antiwar.com/dougbandow/2006/09/08/thekoreanimbrogliodisengageandignore/, JMP) More broadly, U.S. Troops are said to cement U.S. influence or prevent a regional arms race. However, there's no evidence that the garrison in the South adds anything to the influence that comes naturally from being the globe's sole superpower. Nor has America's force presence stopped the People's Republic of China from upgrading its military; better that front-line allied states take responsibility for their region's security rather than rely on Washington. Second strike capabilities Espiritu, 06 Commander, U.S. Navy (3/15/06, Commander Emilson M. Espiritu, "The Eagle Heads Home: Rethinking National Security Policy for The Asia Pacific Region," http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA448817&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf, JMP) Even though we are already reducing the number of U.S. troops in the region, one alternative to the current policy is to accelerate the withdrawal of all U.S. troops in the region. resident Bush announced a major restructuring of U.S. military forces overseas since the end of the Korean War.27 This restructuring essentially decreases the U.S. military footprint on foreign soil to allow better flexibility for the military of the challenges of the 21st century. A plan to withdraw as well as to reduce troops over the next 10 years will give "our service members more time on the home front and fewer moves over a career." 28 A more aggressive alternative to the current policy would be to completely withdraw all U.S. troops in the region. There are certain risks involved if U.S. troops completely withdraw in the Korean Peninsula. One risk of complete withdrawal would result in an immediate power struggle in the region. Nations such as China, Japan, and even South Korea will certainly have to rethink their own National Security policy therefore contributing to regional fallout. Any rapidly changing relationship between North and South Korea will more than likely lead to a regional power struggle among the United States, China, Japan, and even Russia. 29 This strategy seems feasible because the U.S. will "improve our ability to deter, dissuade, and defeat challenges in Asia through strengthened long-range strike capabilities, streamlined and consolidated headquarters, and a network of access arrangements. 30 Last printed 102 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 ---Budget cuts will prevent the U.S. from defending Asian allies Blumenthal, 09 resident fellow at AEI (5/1/2009, Dan, Far Eastern Economic Review, "The Erosion of U.S. Power in Asia," http://www.aei.org/article/100445, JMP) Make no mistake, starved of resources regional commanders will be forced to give up important missions, from humanitarian relief and security cooperation in Southeast Asia to deterring aggression and defending allies in North Asia. The consequences of eroding military capability are easy to understand. Less fighter aircraft means more risk of adversary aggression, a smaller navy means an eroding capability to keep the seas safe for trade, fewer cargo planes means less humanitarian missions that buy us goodwill. It is fashionable these days to divide power into the "hard" and "soft" categories. In reality, the successful exercise of power is and always has been a careful calibration of diplomacy with the force to back it up. An erosion of the latter will render the former hollow. ---Withdrawal key to deterrence: U.S. forces are overstretched now can't deter countries with troops that's Erickson Plus multilateralism solves regional peace U.S. withdrawal causes nations to pursue security arrangements that's Espiritu More evidence Cummings, 04 (3/19/04, Colonel John P. Cummings, "SHOULD THE U.S. CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN FORCES IN SOUTH KOREA?" http://www.dtic.mil/cgi bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA423298&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf, JMP) THE REAL THREAT FROM NORTH KOREA What is the real threat from North Korea? During congressional testimony in March 2001, General Thomas Schwartz, then U.S. Commander-in-Chief in Korea, reported that the North Korean military threat was growing. He based his report on the size of North Korea's forces, weaponry, and large number of exercises conducted in 2000. However, experts in both South Korea and the United States disputed General Schwartz's testimony on several points. The critics argued that North Korean conventional military capabilities had eroded since the early 1990s due to the obsolescence of offensive weaponry like tanks and strike aircraft, as well as to deficiencies in logistics/supplies and food shortages among even North Korean front-line troops on the DMZ. Also specified was the decline in the physical and mental capabilities of North Korean draftees after a decade of malnutrition. Finally, the absence of major field exercises from 1994 to 2000 was cited.11 Since then, the military leadership in Korea has reassessed the threat from North Korea. General Leon LaPorte, current Commander of all United States forces in Republic of Korea, addressed the threat posed by North Korea in a recent interview on ABC-TV. During the interview he talked about the capability of the South Korea/ United States military in comparison to the capability of the North Korea military. LaPorte stated that "The Republic of Korea and the United States have tremendous military capabilities, far exceeding those of North Korea. The Republic of Korea (ROK) military is a very well-trained, well-led and disciplined force. They have a significant number of ground forces." LaPorte told the interviewer that North Korea's navy and air force are "minuscule compared to the ROK and U.S. Navy and Air Force." In discussing North Korea's capability he said the North Korean military is "an aging military, with older Soviet equipment and they have not been able to make the investment." 12 When considering North Korean conventional threat versus ROK military capabilities that include a large ground force, one must ask, what is the military purpose of American ground forces forward deployed to South Korea? What more could the 37,000 United States forces contribute to a ground campaign conducted by 650,000-strong ROK force? Pundits reiterate that the United States' major military contribution to South Korea in the event of hostilities will be in the form of naval and air forces, not ground forces. Andrew Krepenevich, noted scholar and expert in foreign relations, approaches the issue in a more strategic context. In an article he wrote concerning America as a global power, he makes several predictions. He states that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile technology will likely demand an increasing share of United States defense resources for homeland defense. He maintains that this will leave less military capability available for forward presence. He argues that our policy should encourage allies to assume a larger role in providing ground forces for peacekeeping, urban control operations and regional conflicts. In the case of South Korea, this would not entail an increase of resources on the part of U.S. allies. "South Korea should be capable of effectively defending itself without major United States ground reinforcements."13 ---No impact Last printed 103 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Firs t: won't cause Japan prolif and even if preferable to presence Bandow, 03 senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Reagan (5/7/03, Doug, CATO Policy Analysis, "Bring the Troops Home: Ending the Obsolete Korean Commitment," http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa474es.html, JMP) The suggestion that U.S. troops in Korea could help contain a resurgent Tokyo is even more fanciful. Tokyo should be doing more militarily, despite disquiet among its neighbors, but to argue that Japan is about to embark on another imperialist rampage is to engage in scaremongering. Cohen's worry that a conventional pullout from South Korea would spark Japan to develop nuclear weapons is equally implausible because it is predicated on a long daisy chain of events with all of the intermediate steps removed.110 Moreover, the hypothetical end result of a nuclear-armed Japan is still likely to be better than the alternative of American involvement in a regional confrontation involving the PRC. Second: they'll announce it Yoshihara & Holmes, 09 associate professors of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College (Summer 09, Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, Naval War College Review, "Thinking About the Unthinkable: Tokyo's Nuclear Option," http://www.nwc.navy.mil/PRESS/review/PressReviewPDF.aspx?q=383, JMP) STRATEGY, DOCTRINE, AND FORCE STRUCTURE Beyond technical and tactical decisions associated with breaking out, Japan would need to develop comprehensive policies and processes to harness its nuclear arsenal. As noted above, strategic ambiguity over Japanese intentions and capabilities is probably impossible. As a nation that has long cherished its democratic institutions and unquestioned civilian control of the military, Tokyo would need to issue formal public statements and official documents regarding Japanese nuclear doctrine. Intended for public and international consumption, such declarations would presumably predate the SDF's deployment of a deterrent force, helping reassure Japan's neighbors, friends, and allies, especially the United States. Third: too many barriers to development ChanlettAvery & Nikitin, 09 *Specialist in Asian Affairs AND **Analyst in Nonproliferation at the Congressional Research Service (2/19/09, Emma and Mary Beth, "Japan's Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects and U.S. Interests," http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/09024CRS.pdf, JMP) This paper examines the prospects for Japan pursuing a nuclear weapons capability by assessing the existing technical infrastructure of its extensive civilian nuclear energy program. It explores the range of challenges that Japan would have to overcome to transform its current program into a military program. Presently, Japan appears to lack several of the prerequisites for a full-scale nuclear weapons deterrent: expertise on bomb design, reliable delivery vehicles, an intelligence program to protect and conceal assets, and sites for nuclear testing. In addition, a range of legal and political restraints on Japan's development of nuclear weapons, including averse public and elite opinion, restrictive domestic laws and practices , and the negative diplomatic consequences of abandoning its traditional approach is analyzed. Their impact article concedes non unique Japan has talked of proliferating Bakanic, 08 (6/9/08, Elizabeth D., BAS, "The end of Japan's nuclear taboo," http://www.thebulletin.org/webedition/features/theendofjapansnuclear taboo, JMP) Ever since the August 1945 atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Japanese people have possessed a strong aversion to the idea of nuclear weapons. Public discussion of developing nuclear weapons has been practically nonexistent, and politicians have been chastised for mentioning the topic: As recently as 1999, Japan's vice defense minister resigned after receiving overwhelming criticism for suggesting that Japan should arm itself with nuclear weapons. And despite mastering the complete nuclear fuel cycle-thus, possessing the necessary nuclear technology and expertise to develop nuclear weapons--and maintaining complicated relationships with growing and unstable neighbors such as China, Tokyo has rejected even considering nuclear weapons. More largely, this "nuclear allergy" has existed alongside a rather pacifist society that has highly constrained itself militarily and politically following World War II. Yet, in recent years, Japan has sought to become a more "normal" country --especially involving matters of defense and diplomacy, where Tokyo is transitioning from pacifism to assertiveness. In many ways, the nation is attempting to come out from the shadow of World War II. Growing nationalism has led Japan to take less apologetic stances in regards to its history and neighbors--evidenced by former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's visits to the Yasukuni shrine honoring the country's war dead, Japanese strikes on North Korean spy vessels, and continued controversies over distorted portrayals of World War II in Japanese history textbooks. Last printed 104 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Further, Japan has shown more interest in becoming a regional leader and global player--even expanding its military capability, often with encouragement from the United States. And most surprisingly, the attitude toward nuclear weapons has begun to change. The attitude shift is evident in the growing prevalence and acceptance of the subject in public discourse. High-level Japanese officials such as current Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda and his predecessor Shinzo Abe have made several open statements in recent years regarding the possibility of developing nuclear weapons, the need for deterrence in the region, and the nuclear threat presented by Japan's neighbors. As cabinet secretary for the Koizumi administration, Fukuda stated, "In the face of calls to amend the Constitution, amendment of the [three non-nuclear] principles is also possible." During his administration, Abe commented that it wouldn't violate Japan's pacifist constitution to acquire nuclear weapons for defensive purposes. In addition, the policy chief of the Liberal Democratic party has called for "active discussions" of possible nuclear weapons development. Just a few years ago, breaching these subjects openly would have been unpopular and near political suicide, but the Japanese public is now less condemning. Not surprisingly then, nationalist parties that advocate for a nuclear weapons capability are gaining popularity and traction in Japanese politics. While these developments mostly encompass asserting the rights to debate nuclear options rather than debating the options themselves, they represent a major shift. Actual consideration of nuclear weapons is still a remote and unpopular idea, but mentioning nuclear options is no longer off limits. In addition to increased public and political references, a generational attitude shift seems to be occurring. In interviews I conducted last fall in Tokyo, several Japanese officials, academics, and nuclear experts thought that younger generations have less of a nuclear allergy than previous generations--especially as memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki become more distant. While many still felt that strong opposition remains, they believe that younger cohorts cannot remember or directly see the effects of the bombings since they gather that history secondhand, which makes it less personal and emotive. Because of this, they're less afraid of the topic and potential consequences. Overall, the population continues to exhibit strong negative attitudes toward nuclear weapons, and younger generations are still much more adverse to nuclear weapons than populations in most other countries. But the degree of negativity seems to be waning. This isn't unreasonable or unexpected, but it's a gradual shift that's affecting the country's overall nuclear stance. There is some historical precedent. In both the mid-1960s--when China acquired nuclear weapons--and again in the mid-1990s-following the 1994 North Korean nuclear crisis--the Japanese expressed less aversion to nuclear weapons. The current shift in attitude could simply be a reaction to China's burgeoning role in the region and North Korea's continued reluctance to surrender its nuclear weapons, and public opinion could eventually swing back to a more anti-nuclear stance. But given the generational divide, firsthand aversion is likely to fade for good. Plus, the current change has been building for years and seems more widespread in the population than past reassessments. In addition, just as Japan wants to put its early twentieth-century transgressions behind it, Tokyo may also begin to move beyond its own victimization in the coming years. And it's possible that the regional security situation might become untenable enough that Japan will permanently move away from its pacifist nature. Already, the shift in defensive and diplomatic attitudes is changing in a parallel fashion, making a swing back to full pacifism unlikely. Last printed 105 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Deterrence DA 1AR Deterrence Low Ext. Obama's defense budget will gut credible military presence in Asia Blumenthal, 09 resident fellow at AEI (5/1/2009, Dan, Far Eastern Economic Review, "The Erosion of U.S. Power in Asia," http://www.aei.org/article/100445, JMP) In announcing his defense cuts, Mr. Gates stated that he was making "a virtue of necessity," conceding that the Obama plan was an exercise in budget cutting to pay for favored domestic programs. Mr. Gates promises that he will explain his judgments about "balancing risks" sometime soon, but a risk assessment is no substitute for a strategy. American strategy in Asia has been remarkably successful since World War II. Through a set of alliances and partnerships and a strong military presence we have provided security the cocoon within which nations could prosper rather than compete. If Mr. Obama wants to continue along this path his defense plan will , not give him the means. Last printed 106 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Last printed 107 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 North Korea Invasion DA 2AC Troops aren't key to deter North Korea previous withdrawals didn't cause conflict Cucullu, 05 former Special Forces Lieutenant Colonel and Vietnam vet (10/27/05, Gordon, "Korean Troop Withdrawal," http://www.military.com/opinion/0,15202,79439,00.html, JMP) Removal of American GIs from South Korea has been a hotbutton issue for years. When Jimmy Carter won the presidency in 1976 one of his campaign promises was to remove all ground troops from Korea. In reaction Korean leader Park Chung Hee published an oped piece postulating that arbitrary removal of the American tripwire would likely precipitate a renewed Korean War with unacceptably high costs in casualties and resources. But that was then, this is now. North Korea is an acknowledged dangerous foe. It has massed artillery poised to rain steel down on Seoul and forwarddeployed American units. It fields a 1.2 million man army with massive reserves. Aircraft, logistical support, armor units, and special operations infantry units have been deployed into protected attack positions for years. We know about the missiles, the nucsbugsandgas WMD that Kim Jong Il possesses and seems willing to use on military and civilian targets. But we also know that the hedonistic Kim regime has one foot in the economic grave and the other on a banana peel. Without massive infusion of foreign assistance and revenue gained from illegal operations such as counterfeiting, narcotics, slave labor, and sale of weapons systems to other rogue states, it is likely that an economic implosion would have flushed his regime away. Thirty years ago analysts calculated that North Korea had upwards of 90 days supplies for a fullscale war. Given the economic disintegration of North Korea since 1994, it would be surprising if the North could mount an allout war for more than 1421 days. Nevertheless, in any conflict the North Korean wild card is the horrific damage it could inflict on the civilian population of Seoul even without using WMD. That said, it is critical to recognize that the power balance has shifted on the peninsula, dramatically enough to require a reevaluation of America's roles and responsibilities. Furthermore, South Korean military is as strong as it has the ever been in manpower, equipment, and training. With its booming economy South Korean outspends the North in actual dollars while committing a significantly smaller percentage of its GNP to defense. It has approximately 600,000 regulars backed by large reserves and modern equipment. In a fight the South Korean military ought to be able to defend the country with air and naval augmentation from America and allies. At some point ground forces might need to be committed to the fight too, but the decadeslong tripwire rationale for continued forward deployed American units seems to have faded. In fact, without undue provocative response from North Korean dictator Jong Il, Kim America has already extricated a brigade from the 2nd Infantry Division, relocating it in Fort Carson, CO after a combat tour in Iraq. Other units are slated to follow over time, bringing the level of US troops to fewer than 30,000, the lowest since wartime. Concomitantly a major redeployment in theater is underway as facilities and units move southward, out of range of the most immediate North Korean artillery and missile threat. If American military deterrence is less vital now than it was several decades previously, the issue becomes primarily political. Is continue presence of American ground forces vital to the interests of the US? Of South Korea? The short answers are yes, and yes again, but not necessary at present levels or configurations. The methodology can be worked out to suit both nations, but there are still issues some rational, others quite emotional that will influence decision makers. Troops in Japan can be used to respond to a Korean crisis Espiritu, 06 Commander, U.S. Navy (3/15/06, Commander Emilson M. Espiritu, "The Eagle Heads Home: Rethinking National Security Policy for The Asia Pacific Region," http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA448817&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf, JMP) The current administration has suggested a troop reduction as well as a troop reassignment in the region. In this day and age of new technology, why subject U.S. troops in the Demilitarization Zone (DMZ) when there are U.S. troops present in Japan as well as Okinawa that can respond to any Korean crisis? The military strategy whether to reduce the number of troops or reassign their location (in Korea) has been an issue amongst the strategists and theorists. In fact, there is only a marginal difference if troops were present in South Korea or in other areas such as Japan (if North Korea attacked)... the U.S. would still prevail.17 To date, the National Security Strategy still calls for troop presence overseas to promote, deter, and defend allies Withdrawal won't signal appeasement to the North Bandow, 03 senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Reagan (5/7/03, Doug, CATO Policy Analysis, "Bring the Troops Home: Ending the Obsolete Korean Commitment," http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa474es.html, JMP) However, even the hawkish Robyn Lim, a professor of international politics at Nanzan University in Nagoya, Japan, dismisses the argument that a U.S. withdrawal would be interpreted as a strategic reversal. Lim argues: "Some might think that such a Last printed 108 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 policy would play into the hands of Pyongyang's Dear Leader, Jong Il. Kim But keeping U.S. forces in South Korea against the wishes of the government in Seoul would also further Pyongyang's agenda."105 Richard V. Allen, national security adviser to President Ronald Reagan, argues that the South "can plan to assume eventual responsibility for its own frontline defense" that and doing so would "be neither destabilizing nor provocative."106 South Korea can defend itself troops not key to deterrence Bandow, 05 Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Reagan (Fall 2005, Doug, National Interest, "Seoul Searching," vol. 81, EBSCO, JMP) Ending the U.S.Korean Alliance WHY SHOULD the United States maintain troops in the Republic of Korea (ROK)? What American interests are being served by the alliance? Officials in both capitals maintain that the alliance remains as relevant as ever. The two governments insist that the "fundamental goal is to enhance deterrence and security on the Korean Peninsula." Statesand it does not America's treaty and troops aren't necessary to achieve that end. The South has dramatically outstripped North Korea on virtually every measure of national power and can stand on its own. South Korean President Roh Moohyun told graduates of the Korean Air Force Academy in March: "We have sufficient power to defend ourselves. We have nurtured mighty national armed forces that absolutely no one can challenge." Within a decade, he added, "we should be able to develop our military into one with full command of operations." The ROK spent $16.4 billion last year on defense roughly nine times North Korea's outlayand ranks eleventh in the world in total defense expenditures. His government is increasing military spending, up about 8.6 percent this year over 2003, to create a "selfreliant defense that could help bring peace and unification to the Korean peninsula." But Washington's Cold War security concern for the ROK has disappeared. Even if the security of South Korea remained vital to the United Last printed 109 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 U.S.ROK Relations DA 2AC [Relations] ---No impact to South Korea proliferation in a world of the plan they would only modernize conventional forces that's good because it deters Chinese aggression against Taiwan China would attack the US prevents extinction Withdrawal boosts relations Bandow, 08 fellow at the American Conservative Defense Alliance and former special assistant to Reagan (9/25/08, Doug, Asia Times, "A reason to bring US troops home," http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/JI25Dg01.html, JMP) Real change Finally, downplaying America's military role would improve overall US relations with other countries. The continuing presence of bases and troops creates endless local grievances. Part of that reflects nationalist frustrations with the foreign control that inevitably accompanies foreign garrisons. There are also the inevitable problems that come from putting a large number of young American males in middle of a foreign the country and culture . The US government has a particular image problem with young South Koreans, who tend for instance to view America as a greater threat than North Korea. But anger towards Washington extends well beyond universities; the recent protests against US beef imports were directed at far more than the fear of consuming unsafe food. As a result, President George W Bush received a lessthanfriendly reception when he visited in early August, and in Japan, the heavy concentration of US bases in Okinawa has spawned strong opposition to America's presence in that province. Without presence the of US military forces, which emphasize Washington's dominance, the bilateral relationships would be closer to one of equals, with greater emphasis on private economic and cultural ties rather than on governmenttogovernment geopolitical relations. ---Overstretch non uniques the DA South Korea would already perceive our forces as being weak plus solving overstreth prevents conflict in the future we can actually fight to deter other powers that's Erickson ---Still relations: cultural and economic ties Bandow, 03 senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Reagan (5/7/03, Doug, CATO Policy Analysis, "Bring the Troops Home: Ending the Obsolete Korean Commitment," http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa474es.html, JMP) Cutting the U.S. security commitment to South Korea does not mean ending close cooperation and friendship between the two countries. Intelligence sharing and port access rights would be beneficial for both nations. Depending on the direction interKorean relations take, the ROK might become interested in cooperating with Washington in developing a missile defense and possibly nuclear weapons. Cultural ties between the two states would remain strong. Family and friends span the Pacific, as a result of the millions of Americans who have served in South Korea and the hundreds of thousands of Koreans who have immigrated to America. More than 1.2 million Americans identified themselves as Korean in the 2000 census.117 Indeed, Americans are likely to receive a warmer welcome if our fractious military relationship is replaced by one based on commerce. An equal, cooperative relationship between the governments is more likely once the ROK is no longer dependent on America for its defense. Finally, economic ties will remain strong after an American troop withdrawal. Korea is America's seventh largest trading partner, with twoway trade totaling $57.4 billion in 2001.118 An obvious step forward would be a free trade agreement. In May 2001, even before congressional approval of President Bush's Trade Promotion Authority, Sen. Max Baucus (DMont.), then chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, introduced legislation authorizing the U.S. Trade Representative to negotiate such an agreement.119 The ROK has already inked a trade accord with Chile and is discussing the possibility of doing so with Japan.120 North Korean prolif makes the disad inevitable Choi, 06 visiting professor at the College of International Relations, Ritsumeikan University and senior research fellow at Korea Institute for National Last printed 110 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Unification (Jinwook, Ritsumeikan Annual Review of International Studies, "The North Korean Domestic Situation and Its Impact on the Nuclear Crisis," Vol. 15, pp.118, http://www.ritsumei.ac.jp/acd/cg/ir/college/bulletin/evol.5/CHOI.pdf, JMP) As the North Korean nuclear crisis is pending, it affects changes in relations among nations in the region and their policies. It creates policy frictions between two long-time allies--the United States and South Korea. While the United States wants to financially squeeze North Korea, South Korea insists on inter- Korean economic cooperation regardless of the nuclear issue. As the tension between the United States and North Korea continues, China has increased its influence over North Korea by providing food and crude oil. Russia and Japan are also trying to expand their influence over the Korean peninsula in the midst of the North Korean nuclear crisis. ---No link: First security commitment not key Bandow, 10 senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Reagan (1/25/10, Doug, American Spectator, "Letting Go," http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=11166, JMP) There are lots of other suggested areas of cooperation, such as international development and UN peacekeeping, but none of these grow out of today's bilateral relationship -- and especially America's essentially unilateral security guarantee. Whatever the future of ROK-U.S. relations, there is no need for America to defend the South. That doesn't mean the two governments should not cooperate: both have an interest in a stable and prosperous East Asia. But their cooperation should be issue-by-issue, whether informal and bilateral or formal and multilateral. Second troops not key Alliance", http://www.nautilus.org/publications/essays/napsnet/policyforumsonline/security/0649Hamm.html/?searchterm=%22withdrawal%22) ZParks In the long run, Korea will be compelled to carry out cool headed costbenefit analyses of the ROKU.S. alliance, centering on the China factor as well as issues in Hamm 06 (Taik young, Professor of Political Science at Kyungnam University, "The SelfReliant National Defense of South Korea and the Future of the U.S.ROK economic cooperation, such as the FTA talks, and defense burden sharing. The alliance with the U.S. does not constitute an end in itself but a means for establishing peace and reunification on the Korean peninsula. A regional ROKU.S. alliance in the future could be an "alliance without U.S. troops" or a "political" (that is, nonmilitary) alliance Owing to the transfer of the . wartime OPCON and defense reform, Seoul would be able to replace U.S. components of the military cooperation , alleviating the need for U.S. ground troops on Korean soil. The regional alliance should be a strictly defensive alliance that rejects a war of preemption. As it would be difficult for the ROK to say no to the call to join the U.S. in an armed conflict in the region, a provision for the veto power of the ROK to reject any unwanted armed conflict is in order in a future mutual defense treaty. ---No impact Kang, 08 Professor in the Government department and Adjunct Professor at the Tuck School of Business, Dartmouth College (David C., "InterKorean Relations in the Absence of a U.S.ROK Alliance." in" in "What If? A World without the U.S.ROK Alliance" ed. by Nicholas Eberstadt, Aaron L. Friedberg & Geun Lee. Asia policy, number 5 (january 2008), 2541) Given this possibility, how might relations between the two Koreas evolve in the absence of a U.S.ROK military alliance? Fairly clear is that while South Korean threat perceptions of North Korea would increase North Korean threat perceptions would decrease; this would occur simply because direction of change the key question should be about the extent of change: would the increased threat perception be enough to override both ROK engagement of North Korea and Seoul's interdependence strategy in general? That is, would a cold war return to the peninsula or would South Korea continue its engagement of North Korea? Evidence suggests that even without the U.S.ROK military allianceinstability and change on the Korean peninsula would be less dramatic than some observers have predicted. The absence of an alliance might under certain circumstances, such as continued progress in the sixparty talks, have relatively little impact. Under other circumstances, such as increased tension between the United States and China over regional issues, the absence of the alliance might be more consequential. U.S. military support for South Korea would be less readily available in event of a crisis or military confrontation. Indeed, rather than focusing on the Last printed 111 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Last printed 112 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 ROKUS Alliance DA 2AC [ROK Prolif] ---Plan doesn't cause proliferation South Korea will negotiate with North Korea before action that's Erickson plus plan solves better internal link to East Asia proliferation multilateral agreements No ROK proliferation Bakanic et al 2k8 (Elizabeth, Princenton University Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, "Preventing Nuclear Proliferation Chain Reactions: Japan, South Korea, and Egypt", January 2008, http://wws.princeton.edu/research/pwreports_f07/wws591f.pdf) Not unlike Japan, South Korea would a number of face barriers were it to pursue nuclear weapons, including its relationship with the United States its dependence on uranium imports, and commitment to nonproliferation, especially on the Korean peninsula. Any , its move by South Korea to acquire nuclear weapons would damage the country's relationship with the U nited tates. Such a S decision would jeopardize the U.S. security assurances, including extended deterrence, that form the bedrock of South Korea's security calculations. South Korea maintains bilateral agreements with uranium suppliers that prevent it from using imported uranium for non peaceful purposes. Given that South Korea relies on imported uranium fuel, and that nuclear energy accounts for about 40 percent of its electricity, the suspension of uranium imports would deal a heavy blow to the South Korean 18 economy. South Korea is a party to the NPT and the Additional Protocol, and has ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Furthermore, although North Korea has violated both the spirit and letter of the 1992 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, South Korea remains committed to it, including its prohibition of enrichment and reprocessing activities. ---Phased withdrawal solves the link South Korea won't have a knee jerk reaction to proliferate ---Nuclear guarantee still there post plan Payne, et. al, 10 Professor in Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University (March 2010, Dr. Keith Payne, Study Director Thomas Scheber Kurt Guthe, "U.S. Extended Deterrence and Assurance for Allies in Northeast Asia," http://www.nipp.org/National%20Institute%20Press/Current%20Publications/PDF/US%20ExtendDeterfor%20print.pdf, JMP) South Korea has been the beneficiary of a U.S. nuclear guarantee for more than a half century. Throughout that time, the guarantee has helped deter nonnuclear aggression by North Korea. In more recent years, the prevention of North Korean nuclear coercion or use has been added to the deterrence task. The nuclear guarantee is grounded in, not apart from, the basic structure of the U.S. alliance with the ROK. U.S. reaffirmations of the guarantee are essential for assuring Seoul, but they much of gain their credibility from the broader relationship between the two countries, their longstanding military pact, the forward deployment of U.S. forces, the combined exercises of the two militaries, and the U.S. track record in different points, however, South Korean confidence in the American security commitment has been diminished by U.S. troop withdrawals and redeployments, increases in the North Korean threat, seemingly weak U.S. responses to North Korean provocations, change in alliance command arrangements, and perceived U.S. abandonment of other Asian allies. In the end, though, the U.S. nuclear guarantee has retained its assurance value. coming to the aid of South Korea. The United States thus assures South Korea of its military commitment and nuclear guarantee by the security interests it shares, the mutual defense treaty it signed, the words it says, the troops it stations, and the force it shows. This approach to assurance, by and large, has been successful. At ---Alliance collapse inevitable now we solve Bandow and Carpenter 2004 *JD from Stanford, senior fellow at Cato, former special assistant to Reagan, writes for Fortune, National Interest, WSJ, Washington Times, **PhD in diplomatic history from Texas, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at Cato, contributing editor to the National Interest, editorial board of the Journal of Strategic Studies (Ted Galen and Doug, "The Korean conundrum", Google Books, page 122, WEA) The United States and Korea have achieved much together. But links between the two countries are growing increasingly fragile, since the raison d'tre for Seoul's military free ride has disappeared Although officials on neither side of the Pacific are ready to concede the . obsolescence of the security structure that they have so laboriously constructed, it is bound to collapse. As the ROK grows richer, Pyongyang reforms or dies, America tires of underwriting a onesided defense treaty, and South Korea no longer wishes to be treated as a protectorate, there likely will be a nasty divorce . Instead, the two governments should agree to an amicable Last printed 113 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 separation. That means beginning, now, to plan a positive transition emphasizing a relationship of mutuality and equality rather than of dependency and inferiority. We solve ROK and allied prolif Bandow, 10 senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former special assistant to Reagan (4/18/10, Doug, "Let the Koreans Take Care of the Koreas,"http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dougbandow/letthekoreanstakecare_b_542141.html, JMP) What value, then, is the alliance? Some proponents view it as a useful tool of nonproliferation, discouraging South Korea from developing a nuclear weapon. However, that possibility remains remote. Although nuclear negotiations with the North hardly look promising, China might yet forcefully weigh in to halt the North Korean program. Moreover, the U.S. could maintain a nuclear umbrella over the ROK without keeping conventional forces on the ground in South Korea, which only act as nuclear hostages vulnerable to DPRK intimidation. Moreover, the most powerful incentive for Beijing to apply significant pressure on the North to denuclearize (and not just return to the SixParty talks) is the threat of further proliferation The People's Republic of China does not fear a North Korean atomic bomb. The PRC . might not worry unduly about a South Korean weapon . But Japan and even Taiwan might consider joining a growing nuclear parade. That possibility should raise more than eyebrows in Beijing, encouraging a vigorous response to halt the process at the start. The best way to keep the ROK and neighboring states nonnuclear is to make the North nonnuclear. The best way to make North Korea nonnuclear is for the PRC to use its full array of diplomatic and economic tools on Pyongyang . Nuke war Millot 94, Defense Analyst at RAND [Marc Dean, Washington Quarterly, Summer, Lexis] The outcome of this refusal to face the emerging reality of regional nuclear adversaries is that the United States is not preparing seriously for the possibility of it cannot assure the security of its allies against this threat, the result is likely to be further proliferation among these allies , highly unstable regional military situations, a severe reduction nited States' of the U international influence, and a growing probability of regional nuclear wars involving U.S. forces. having to fight in a regional nuclear war. If it continues down this path, it will be unable to cope with the potential threat of nuclear aggression against its allies. If ---No ROK prolif Payne, et. al, 10 Professor in Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University (March 2010, Dr. Keith Payne, Study Director Thomas Scheber Kurt Guthe, "U.S. Extended Deterrence and Assurance for Allies in Northeast Asia," http://www.nipp.org/National%20Institute%20Press/Current%20Publications/PDF/US%20ExtendDeterfor%20print.pdf, JMP) During the 1970s, South Korea began a clandestine nuclear weapons program because of serious doubts about the reliability of the United States. This lack of confidence was due to U.S. troop withdrawals from the peninsula, insufficient U.S. responses to aggressive acts by the North, the Vietnam pullout, the perceived U.S. abandonment of Taiwan for rapprochement with China, and other indications of diminished U.S. commitment to allies in Asia. When the program was discovered, United States the acted to prevent certain nuclear nology tech transfers to South Korea, threatened to block financial assistance for South Korean civilian nuclear power, and warned that the U.S.ROK security relationship itself was in danger . After Seoul backed off from the weapons project and ratified the NPT in 1975, theUnited States restated its security commitment to assure the ROK.44 Relations resilient we strengthen them Bandow, 03 senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Reagan (5/7/03, Doug, CATO Policy Analysis, "Bring the Troops Home: Ending the Obsolete Korean Commitment," http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa474es.html, JMP) Cutting the U.S. security commitment to South Korea does not mean ending close cooperation and friendship between the two countries. Intelligence sharing and port access rights would be beneficial for both nations. Depending on the direction interKorean relations Last printed 114 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 nuclear weapons. Cultural ties between the two states would remain strong Family and friends span the Pacific, as a result of the millions of Americans who . take, the ROK might become interested in cooperating with Washington in developing a missile defense and possibly have served in South Korea and the hundreds of thousands of Koreans who have immigrated to America. More than 1.2 million Americans identified themselves as Korean in the 2000 census.117 Indeed, Americans are likely to receive a warmer welcome if our fractious military relationship is replaced by one based on commerce. An equal, cooperative relationshipbetween the governments is more likely once the ROK is no longer dependent on America for its defense. Finally, economic ties will remain strong after an American troop withdrawal Korea is America's seventh largest trading partner, with . twoway trade totaling $57.4 billion in 2001.118 An obvious step forward would be a free trade agreement. In May 2001, even before congressional approval of President Bush's Trade Promotion Authority, Sen. Max Baucus (DMont.), then chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, introduced legislation authorizing the U.S. Trade Representative to negotiate such an agreement.119 The ROK has already inked a trade accord with Chile and is discussing the possibility of doing so with Japan.120 Presence causes backlash Snyder, 08 Director, Center for U.S.Korea Policy Senior Associate, International Relations. (5/1/08, Scott, "Future of ROKU.S. Relations: U.S. Approach" Presentation 2, Peace in the Korean Peninsula and the Security Environment in Northeast Asia) Periodic outbursts of anti American sentiment in South Korea accompanied a rise in Korean national feeling surrounding the 2002 World Cup hosted in Seoul and Tokyo. The upswing in national pride from the World Cup provided kindling for a nationwide series of protests following the deaths in June of 2002 of two schoolgirls in a traffic accident involving a U.S. armored transport vehicle on a road north of Seoul. The acquittal of two American privates in a USFK trial held in November of 2002 only one month before South Korea's presidential electionscatalyzed peaceful nationwide open air candlelight demonstrations against the verdict, which was widely seen in South Korea as a betrayal of justice and as a symbol of American military impunity and arrogance. The demonstrations became a focal point of the South Korean presidential election , which was won by the "anti American " progressive candidate Roh Moohyun. , The relationship with the United States became contested in South Korean society as a result of the emergence of new political forces that oppose the alliance relationship with the United States and feel that it is time to reduce South Korean over dependence on the U nited tates for its security South Korean political terms of debate have cast the alliance with the United States in S . opposition to improved interKorean relations. The opposition party has criticized the Roh administration for weakening relations with the United States by unduly favoring progress in interKorean relations, while the ruling party has criticized conservatives for being too beholden to the United States at the expense of reconciliation with North Korea. That kills deterrence and causes North Korea attack Lim 7--Fellow at the Korea Development Institute (Wonhyuk, Economic Consequences of ROKU.S. Separation, 27 November 2007,http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/07086Lim.html, AMiles) Suppose the two allies have an amicable separation under mutual agreement. For instance, the two allies agree that the ROK can now defend itself without the USFK and that the U.S. national interest is better served if its troops are relocated from the ROK to, say, the Middle East. Under this scenario, the two allies are likely to agree on a phased withdrawal schedule for the USFK so as to minimize the risk of miscalculation on the part of the DPRK. Even after the ROK and U.S. terminate the Mutual Defense Treaty,they may well continue security consultation and cooperation through bilateral and multilateral channels. Alternatively, the U.S. may decide to bring its troops back home as part of its neoisolationist program to reduce its overseas commitments. Under this scenario, a phased withdrawal of the USFK may be a more difficult proposition, and the ROK may have to assume a greater part of the USFK expenses to extend its stay and arrange for its orderly exit. By contrast, an acrimonious separation between the two allies may make "transition planning" much more difficult and produce considerable spillover effects. Suppose, for instance, that a series of unfortunate incidents involving U.S. military personnel trigger a nationalist backlash in the ROK, which in turn leads to American anger at Korean "ingratitude." The ensuing war of words between the two allies escalates to the point that they both decide to go their separate ways as soon as possible. Under this scenario , for which "transition planning" is minimal, what matters is the current preparedness of ROK forces. Nuclear war Last printed 115 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Carroll 10--Lt. Col, Airforce (Jay, North Korea, South Korea: The Military Balance on the Peninsula, 26 May 2010, STRATFOR, AMiles) So the real issue is the potential for escalation -- or an accident that could precipitate escalation -- that would be beyond the control of Pyongyang or Seoul. With both sides on high alert, both adhering to their own national (and contradictory) definitions of where disputed boundaries lie and with rules of engagement loosened, the potential for sudden and rapid escalation is quitereal. Indeed, North Korea's navy, though sizable on paper, is largely a hollow shell of old, laidup vessels. What remains are small fast attack craft and submarines -- mostly SangO "Shark" class boats and midget submersibles. These vessels are best employed in the cluttered littoral environment to bring asymmetric tactics to bear -- not unlike those Iran has prepared for use in the Strait of Hormuz. These kinds of vessels and tactics -- including, especially, the deployment of naval mines -- are poorly controlled when dispersed in a crisis and are often impossible to recall. For nearly 40 years, tensions on the Korean Peninsula were managed within the context of the wider Cold War. During that time it was feared that a second Korean Warcould all too easily escalate into and a thermonuclear World War III, so both Pyongyang and Seoul were being heavily managed from their respective corners. In fact, USFK was long designed to ensure that South Korea could not independently provoke that war and drag the Americans into it, which for much of the Cold War period was of far greater concern to Washington than North Korea attacking southward. Today, those constraints no longer exist. There are certainly still constraints -- neither the United States nor China wants war on the peninsula. But current tensions are quickly escalating to a level unprecedented in the post Cold War period, and the constraints that do exist have never been tested in the way they might be if the situation escalates much further. No impact to prolif Waltz, 3 Adjunct professor, Columbia University (2003, Kenneth N, "The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed, With Scott D. Sagan," p. 4345, CJC) What will a world populated by a few more nuclear states look like? I have drawn a picture of such a world that accords with experience throughout the nuclear age. Those who dread a world with more nuclear states do little more than assert that more is worse and claim without substantiation that new nuclear states will be less responsible and less capable of self control than the old ones have been. They feel fears that many felt when they imagined how a nuclear China would behave. Such fears have proved unfounded as nuclear weapons have slowly spread. I have found many reasons for believing that with more nuclear states the world will have a promising future I have reached this unusual conclusion for . three main reasons. First, international politics is a selfhelp system, and in such systems the principal parties determine their own fate, the fate of other parties, and the fate of the system This will continue to be so. Second, nuclear weaponry . makes miscalculation difficult because it is hard not to be aware of how much damage a small number of warheads can Early in this century Norman Angell argued that war would not occur because it could not pay. But conventional wars have brought political gains to some do. countries at the expense of others. Among nuclear countries, possible losses in war overwhelm possible gains. In the nuclear age Angell's dictum becomes persuasive. When the active use of force threatens to bring great losses, war becomes less likely. This proposition is widely accepted but insufficiently emphasized. Nuclear weapons reduced the chances of war between the United States and the Soviet Union and between the Soviet Union and China. One must expect them to have similar effects elsewhere. Where nuclear weapons threaten to make the cost of wars immense, who will dare to start them? Third, new nuclear states will feel the constraints that present nuclear states have experienced nuclear states will be more concerned for their safety and more mindful of dangers than .New some of the old ones have been. Until recently, only the great and some of the major powers have had nuclear weapons. While nuclear weapons have spread slowly, con [*45] ventional weapons have proliferated. Under these circumstances, wars have been fought not at the center but at the periphery of international politics. The likelihood of war decreases as deterrent and defensive capabilities increase. Nuclear weapons make wars hard to start. These statements hold for small as for big nuclear powers. Because they do, the gradual spread of nuclear weapons is more to be welcomed than feared. Last printed 116 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 ROKUS Relations 1AR Still Commitment Ext. Withdrawal won't end U.S. commitment to Korea we can be responsive with troops stationed outside of the peninsula Gilbert, 04 Lieutenant Colonel in U.S. Army (5/3/04, David, "Korea 50 Years Later: Why Are We Still There?" http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc? AD=ADA424189&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf, JMP) The United States commitment to Korea has not changed. We are committed to peace in Northeast Asia and our allies understand our commitment goes beyond the forward deployment of troops or repositioning of military forces within the region.22 The United States will remain committed to peace in the region both today and tomorrow, whether or not our footprint decreases in the future. The future in this region should involve even fewer troops. Given the proven capabilities of the United States military and those capabilities that will be obtained in the next 1020 years, the footprint on the Korean Peninsula and within the immediate area of operations (Japan) could be reduced. We have the ability and operational reach today to station our troops further from the shores of Korea and still be responsive. Many would argue this would not be feasible given the current nuclear situation, but I believe otherwise. Perhaps conventional troop strengths, both of the United States and North Korea, should be part of the current discussion concerning the nuclear disarmament of North Korea. The United States and South Korean governments have already agreed to pull U.S. forces south of Seoul. However, moving troops back from the DMZ should only be seen as the first step towards reducing the overall footprint on the Korean Peninsula. Once the troops are removed from the DMZ, a build down program should be developed to reduce the endstrength of each military while providing assurances of protection. Perhaps it would even be possible to agree to the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea in the future. engaging in arms races, both conventional and nuclear. Given the prospects of an arms race in Northeast Asia, the United States must The United States cannot withdraw from the region completely. The vital interests of the United States preclude it from such a drawdown. I agree that complete withdrawal is not feasible nor is it in our nation's best interest. Many analysts have argued that to withdraw U.S. forces from Asia would heighten the risk of nations remain engaged in the region. U.S. forces must remain forward deployed in Asia, but I am not convinced they need to be on the Korean Peninsula. Positioning the military and reducing conventional forces are two methods to underwrite peace and stability in the region. The road map to a sustained peace in the region should begin by denuclearizing the Korean peninsula. Last printed 117 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Last printed 118 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Japan Prolif DA 2AC ---No impact First: won't cause Japan prolif and even if preferable to presence Bandow, 03 senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Reagan (5/7/03, Doug, CATO Policy Analysis, "Bring the Troops Home: Ending the Obsolete Korean Commitment," http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa474es.html, JMP) The suggestion that U.S. troops in Korea could help contain a resurgent Tokyo is even more fanciful. Tokyo should be doing more militarily, despite disquiet among its neighbors, but to argue that Japan is about to embark on another imperialist rampage is to engage in scaremongering. Cohen's worry that a conventional pullout from South Korea would spark Japan to develop nuclear weapons is equally implausible because it is predicated on a long daisy chain of events with all of the intermediate steps removed.110 Moreover, the hypothetical end result of a nuclear-armed Japan is still likely to be better than the alternative of American involvement in a regional confrontation involving the PRC. Second: they'll announce it Yoshihara & Holmes, 09 associate professors of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College (Summer 09, Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, Naval War College Review, "Thinking About the Unthinkable: Tokyo's Nuclear Option," http://www.nwc.navy.mil/PRESS/review/PressReviewPDF.aspx?q=383, JMP) STRATEGY, DOCTRINE, AND FORCE STRUCTURE Beyond technical and tactical decisions associated with breaking out, Japan would need to develop comprehensive policies and processes to harness its nuclear arsenal. As noted above, strategic ambiguity over Japanese intentions and capabilities is probably impossible. As a nation that has long cherished its democratic institutions and unquestioned civilian control of the military, Tokyo would need to issue formal public statements and official documents regarding Japanese nuclear doctrine. Intended for public and international consumption, such declarations would presumably predate the SDF's deployment of a deterrent force, helping reassure Japan's neighbors, friends, and allies, especially the United States. Third: too many barriers to development ChanlettAvery & Nikitin, 09 *Specialist in Asian Affairs AND **Analyst in Nonproliferation at the Congressional Research Service (2/19/09, Emma and Mary Beth, "Japan's Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects and U.S. Interests," http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/09024CRS.pdf, JMP) This paper examines the prospects for Japan pursuing a nuclear weapons capability by assessing the existing technical infrastructure of its extensive civilian nuclear energy program. It explores the range of challenges that Japan would have to overcome to transform its current program into a military program. Presently, Japan appears to lack several of the prerequisites for a full-scale nuclear weapons deterrent: expertise on bomb design, reliable delivery vehicles, an intelligence program to protect and conceal assets, and sites for nuclear testing. In addition, a range of legal and political restraints on Japan's development of nuclear weapons, including averse public and elite opinion, restrictive domestic laws and practices , and the negative diplomatic consequences of abandoning its traditional approach is analyzed. ---Their impact article concedes non unique Japan has talked of proliferating Bakanic, 08 (6/9/08, Elizabeth D., BAS, "The end of Japan's nuclear taboo," http://www.thebulletin.org/webedition/features/theendofjapansnuclear taboo, JMP) Ever since the August 1945 atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Japanese people have possessed a strong aversion to the idea of nuclear weapons. Public discussion of developing nuclear weapons has been practically nonexistent, and politicians have been chastised for mentioning the topic: As recently as 1999, Japan's vice defense minister resigned after receiving overwhelming criticism for suggesting that Japan should arm itself with nuclear weapons. And despite mastering the complete nuclear fuel cycle-thus, possessing the necessary nuclear technology and expertise to develop nuclear weapons--and maintaining complicated relationships with growing and unstable neighbors such as China, Tokyo has rejected even considering nuclear weapons. More largely, this "nuclear allergy" has existed alongside a rather pacifist society that has highly constrained itself militarily and politically following World War II. Last printed 119 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Yet, in recent years, Japan has sought to become a more "normal" country --especially involving matters of defense and diplomacy, where Tokyo is transitioning from pacifism to assertiveness. In many ways, the nation is attempting to come out from the shadow of World War II. Growing nationalism has led Japan to take less apologetic stances in regards to its history and neighbors--evidenced by former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's visits to the Yasukuni shrine honoring the country's war dead, Japanese strikes on North Korean spy vessels, and continued controversies over distorted portrayals of World War II in Japanese history textbooks. Further, Japan has shown more interest in becoming a regional leader and global player--even expanding its military capability, often with encouragement from the United States. And most surprisingly, the attitude toward nuclear weapons has begun to change. The attitude shift is evident in the growing prevalence and acceptance of the subject in public discourse. High-level Japanese officials such as current Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda and his predecessor Shinzo Abe have made several open statements in recent years regarding the possibility of developing nuclear weapons, the need for deterrence in the region, and the nuclear threat presented by Japan's neighbors. As cabinet secretary for the Koizumi administration, Fukuda stated, "In the face of calls to amend the Constitution, amendment of the [three non-nuclear] principles is also possible." During his administration, Abe commented that it wouldn't violate Japan's pacifist constitution to acquire nuclear weapons for defensive purposes. In addition, the policy chief of the Liberal Democratic party has called for "active discussions" of possible nuclear weapons development. Just a few years ago, breaching these subjects openly would have been unpopular and near political suicide, but the Japanese public is now less condemning. Not surprisingly then, nationalist parties that advocate for a nuclear weapons capability are gaining popularity and traction in Japanese politics. While these developments mostly encompass asserting the rights to debate nuclear options rather than debating the options themselves, they represent a major shift. Actual consideration of nuclear weapons is still a remote and unpopular idea, but mentioning nuclear options is no longer off limits. In addition to increased public and political references, a generational attitude shift seems to be occurring. In interviews I conducted last fall in Tokyo, several Japanese officials, academics, and nuclear experts thought that younger generations have less of a nuclear allergy than previous generations--especially as memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki become more distant. While many still felt that strong opposition remains, they believe that younger cohorts cannot remember or directly see the effects of the bombings since they gather that history secondhand, which makes it less personal and emotive. Because of this, they're less afraid of the topic and potential consequences. Overall, the population continues to exhibit strong negative attitudes toward nuclear weapons, and younger generations are still much more adverse to nuclear weapons than populations in most other countries. But the degree of negativity seems to be waning. This isn't unreasonable or unexpected, but it's a gradual shift that's affecting the country's overall nuclear stance. There is some historical precedent. In both the mid-1960s--when China acquired nuclear weapons--and again in the mid-1990s-following the 1994 North Korean nuclear crisis--the Japanese expressed less aversion to nuclear weapons. The current shift in attitude could simply be a reaction to China's burgeoning role in the region and North Korea's continued reluctance to surrender its nuclear weapons, and public opinion could eventually swing back to a more anti-nuclear stance. But given the generational divide, firsthand aversion is likely to fade for good. Plus, the current change has been building for years and seems more widespread in the population than past reassessments. In addition, just as Japan wants to put its early twentieth-century transgressions behind it, Tokyo may also begin to move beyond its own victimization in the coming years. And it's possible that the regional security situation might become untenable enough that Japan will permanently move away from its pacifist nature. Already, the shift in defensive and diplomatic attitudes is changing in a parallel fashion, making a swing back to full pacifism unlikely. Last printed 120 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Japan Prolif DA 1AR No Nukes Ext. Several technical barriers to nuclearization no delivery system for bombs Yoshihara & Holmes, 09 associate professors of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College (Summer 09, Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, Naval War College Review, "Thinking About the Unthinkable: Tokyo's Nuclear Option," http://www.nwc.navy.mil/PRESS/review/PressReviewPDF.aspx?q=383, JMP) Even assuming that Japan can procure enough fissile materials to build an arsenal, its engineers would still have to leap over several technical barriers. First, Japan must devise an effective, efficient delivery system. The most direct route would be to arm Japan's existing fleet of fighter aircraft with nuclear bombs or missiles. The fighters in the Air Self Defense Force (SDF) inventory, however, are constrained by four factors: vulnerability to preemptive strikes while still on the ground at their bases; limited range, as Japan possesses no strategic bombers; susceptibility to interception by enemy fighters while en route to their targets; and vulnerability to increasingly sophisticated integrated airdefense systems. Compounding these shortcomings, Japan is surrounded by water, substantially increasing flight times to targets on the Asian mainland. In light of this, ballistic or cruise missiles would likely rank as Japan's weapon of choice. 45 The challenges would be two. First, if Tokyo chose to rely on a missile delivery system, it would have to produce a workable, miniaturized nuclear warhead that could be mounted atop an accurate cruise or ballistic missile. Such a feat is not beyond Japanese engineering prowess, but it would involve significant lead time. Second, the nation must develop the delivery vehicle itself. Even the U.S. defenseindustrial sector, with its halfcentury of experience in this field, takes years to design and build new missiles. Japan could conceivably convert some of its civilian spacelaunch vehicles into ballistic missiles, but it would have to perfect key components, like inertial guidance systems. If it opted for longrange cruise missiles, Tokyo would in effect find itself--unless it could purchase Tomahawk cruise missiles off the shelf from the United States, a doubtful prospect, given the highly offensive nature of Tomahawks and thus the political sensitivity of such a sale--compelled to start from scratch. Procuring and integrating satellite guidance, terraincontour matching, and other specialized techniques and hardware would demand long, hard labor from Japanese weapon scientists. Japan can't effectively deploy nuclear weapons no place to test them Endo, 07 former vice chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission of Japan (8/23/07, Tetsuya, Nautilus Policy Forum Online 07063A, "How Realistic Is a NuclearArmed Japan?" http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/07063Endo.html, JMP) Feasibility Technologically, Japan is capable of developing nuclear weapons if it invests considerable time and money. A major nuclear energy user possessing 55 nuclear reactors and committed to its nuclear fuel cycle program, Japan possesses highlevel nuclear technologies, a substantial amount of plutonium and the capability to enrich uranium. Although nearly all this plutonium is reactorgrade plutonium unsuitable for nuclear explosion, Japan does possess a small amount of highgrade plutonium. A majority of its uranium is lowenriched, but Japan is capable of producing highlyenriched uranium if it wishes. Japan indeed retains highlyenriched uranium for use in research and experiments, albeit in an extremely small amount. Nevertheless , it is virtually unthinkable for this country to divert nuclear fuel to make bombs in secret. Its plutonium and uranium are kept under strict IAEA verification, and Japan is a highly transparent society. Even if Japan succeeds in manufacturing nuclear warheads, where is it going to test them? Some people say simulation technology can substitute for an onsite test, but the first nuclear warhead at least would require an onsite test. However, there is no geographically suitable place for such a test in Japan. Given time, it is not technologically impossible for Japan to develop nuclear weapons as well as their delivery systems. However, developing more than one or two nuclear bombs would require enormous money. There is a huge gap between possessing the technology to produce one or two nuclear bombs and arming oneself with nuclear weapons "effectively". Japan can't test weapons prevents their effective deployment Yoshihara & Holmes, 09 associate professors of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College (Summer 09, Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, Naval War College Review, "Thinking About the Unthinkable: Tokyo's Nuclear Option," http://www.nwc.navy.mil/PRESS/review/PressReviewPDF.aspx?q=383, JMP) There is also the question of testing. Japan would need to ensure the safety and reliability of its nuclear arsenal. There would be no substitute for an actual nuclear test that proved this new (for Japan) technology while bolstering the credibility of Japanese deterrence. The Japanese Archipelago is simply too small and too densely populated for a test to Last printed 121 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 be conducted there safely--even leaving aside the potential for a political backlash, given the memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki it would conjure up. Tokyo could detonate a device near some Japaneseheld island in the Pacific, such as Okinotorishima. But again, the diplomatic furor from flouting the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) would be intense, while the Japanese populace would think back to the Lucky Dragon incident during the Bikini tests of the 1950s.46 One need only recall the uproar over French and Chinese tests on the eve of the CTBT's entry into force. Computer simulations of weapon performance may be less optimal but would certainly be more palatable from a political standpoint for Japan. The Israeli experience may be instructive here for any Japanese bombmaking efforts. Last printed 122 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Biodiversity DA 2AC ---Case outweighs war on the Korean peninsula would ensure collapse of the DMZ ecosystem and bioweapons would kill the species their evidence talks about quicker timeframe for this and strikes collapse of the whole ecosystem would take years U.S. strikes and Korean conflict wouldn't ---No reason why DMZ biodiversity is key to global biodiversity even if they read evidence that says it's a "global hotspot" that doesn't mean extinction of a few small species there triggers global collapse Last printed 123 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Last printed 124 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Last printed 125 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Israel Relations DA 2AC U.S.Israeli relations are at an alltime low BBC News 31510 ("Ties between Israel and US 'worst in 35 years", http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8567706.stm) Israel's ambassador to the US has said relations between the two are at their lowest for 35 years, Israeli media say. Last week, Israeli officials angered visiting US VicePresident Joe Biden by announcing the building of 1,600 new homes in occupied East Jerusalem. The US said it was waiting for a formal Israeli response to its concerns. Palestinian leaders say indirect talks with Israel are now "doubtful". Israel's PM said Jewish settlements did "not hurt" Arabs in East Jerusalem. Addressing Israel's parliament, the Knesset, Benjamin Netanyahu said he wanted peace negotiations, and hoped the Palestinians would not present "new preconditions" for talks. It is widely seen as a political impossibility for any Israeli prime minister publicly to announce a suspension of building in East Jerusalem "No government in the past 40 years has limited construction in neighbourhoods of Jerusalem," he said. "Building these Jewish neighbourhoods in Jerusalem does not hurt the Arabs of East Jerusalem or come at their expense." US state department spokesman Philip Crowley said Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had asked Mr Netanyahu for a "formal" response to concerns she had raised with him. But he stressed continuing US support for the country, saying: "Israel is a strategic ally of the US and will continue to be so." Meanwhile, EU foreign policy head Baroness Ashton, who is on a Middle East tour, said Israel's decision had put the prospect of indirect talks with the Palestinians in jeopardy. 'Difficult period' Previously the Israeli government had played down the strain in relations with the US. But Israel's ambassador to the US, Michael Oren, told a conference call with Israeli consuls general in the US that "the crisis was very serious and we are facing a very difficult period in relations", the Israeli media reported on Monday. Israel's ambassador to Washington, Michael Oren, is a noted historian, but his critics and indeed, his bosses back home may think he rather exaggerated when he reportedly described this as the worst crisis in USIsraeli relations for 35 years. But the fact remains that having been snubbed by the Netanyahu government twice in six months, the White House has decided that enough is enough. USIsrael relations are resilient recent problems will be quickly overcome Pipes, 10 director of the Middle East Forum, editor of Middle East Quarterly and Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institution (Daniel, "The Solace of Poor U.S.Israel Relations," 4/13/10, http://www.danielpipes.org/8244/poorusisrael relations) Things are not always as simple as they seem; the current crisis in U.S.Israel relations has a silver lining. Four observations, all derived from historical patterns, prompt this conclusion: First, the "peace process" is in actuality a "war process." Diplomatic negotiations through the 1990s led to a parade of Israeli retreats that had the perverse effect of turning the middlingbad situation of 1993 into the awful one of 2000. Painful Israeli concessions, we now know, stimulate not reciprocal Palestinian goodwill but rather irredentism, ambition, fury, and violence. Second, Israeli concessions to the Arabs are effectively forever while relations with Washington fluctuate. Once the Israelis left south Lebanon and Gaza, they did so for good, as would be the case with the Golan Heights or eastern Jerusalem. Undoing these steps would be prohibitively costly. In contrast, U.S.Israel tensions depend on personalities and circumstances, so they go up and down and the stakes are relatively lower. Each president or prime minister can refute his predecessor's views and tone. Problems can be repaired quickly. More broadly, the U.S.Israel bond has strengths that go beyond politicians far and issues of the moment. Nothing on earth resembles this bilateral, "the most special" of special relationships and "the family relationship of international politics." Like any family tie, it has high points (Israel ranks second, behind only the United States, in number of companies listed on NASDAQ) and low ones (the Jonathan Pollard espionage affair continues to rankle a quarter century after it broke). The tie has a unique intensity when it comes to strategic cooperation, economic connections, intellectual ties, shared values, U nited ations N voting records, religious commonalities, and even mutual interference in each other's internal affairs. From Israel's perspective , then, political relations with the Arabs are freighted but those with Washington have a lightness and flexibility. Relations are the root cause of terrorist resentment and decreasing American influence in the Middle East Last printed 126 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Gaouette, 5 (Nicole, CQ Press, "Middle East Peace: IS Palestinian statehood finally a real possiblity", Jan 21, Vol 15, Issue 3, CQ Researcher) Yet some analysts have begun calling for a reassessment of U.S. policy toward Israel. In several recent books -- such as Imperial Hubris by Michael Sheuer, a former senior U.S. intelligence official, and America: Right or Wrong by British scholar Anatol Lieven, the authors and other critics argue that the administration's seemingly unconditional support for Israel harms U.S. interests in the Middle East and makes it impossible for the United States to act as an honest broker between Israelis and Palestinians. "There has been a historical shift in the first four years of this administration away from a position that has existed in one way or another in U.S. government since Truman: to tread a fine line [that allows the United States] to simultaneously have a very special relationship with the Israeli state, combined with an acceptance of a need to play that honest broker role," says The Carter Center's Hodes. For Israel, U.S. friendship has produced unparalleled U.S. financial aid -- some $80 billion since 1974 -- and rocksolid U.S. support in the U.N. In fact, say some analysts, Israel could not take the risks needed for peace, such as leaving West Bank areas it considers militarily important, without strong U.S. backing. However, America's loyalty to Israel has produced bitter anti American resentment in the Arab world. Since the latest IsraeliPalestinian conflict reignited in September 2000 and the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, Arab views of the United States have soured. When Western and Arab leaders met in Morocco in December 2004 to discuss regional political change, the conference ran aground when the Arab attendees began protesting "the Western bias toward Israel." "Our favorable ratings as a country -- which were in the midteen or 20s range in 2002 -- have sunk to single digits," says Zogby of the Arab American Institute. "Israel is certainly a factor in this. We ask, 'What should the U.S. do?' Invariably, it comes up: 'Be fair to the Palestinians.' " Convicted terrorist Ramzi Yousef, claiming responsibility for the 1993 W T orld rade enter C bombing, demanded that the U nited States halt all aid and ties to Israel. "The terrorism that Israel practices (which is supported by America) must be faced with a similar one," he wrote. Since 1998 terrorist leader Osama bin Laden repeatedly has decried U.S.Israeli alliance, and, indeed, justifies the Sept. 11, 2001, al Qaeda attack on the United States in part as the punishment for America's support for Israel. Lieven, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, says the IsraeliPalestinian conflict "is certainly not the only motive, but is a very, very important contemporary motive for Arab anger at the United States and sympathy for al Qaeda." Zbigniew Brzezinski, national security adviser during the Carter administration, believes the ArabIsraeli conflict could severely disrupt America's ties with Europe, and that a solution is "essential" to solving other U.S. security challenges. "To the extent that the Arabs perceive America as sponsoring Israeli repression of the Palestinians, America's ability to pacify antiAmerican passions in the region is constrained," he wrote. Palestinians themselves see bias in Bush's April 14, 2004, letter to Sharon backing Israel's claim to parts of the West Bank. A month later, 53 former U.S. diplomats charged that Bush sacrificed U.S. credibility in the Arab world by tilting toward Israel. "By closing the door to negotiations with Palestinians and had the possibility of a Palestinian state, you have proved that the U.S. is not an evenhanded peace partner," said the letter writers, who included former ambassadors to India, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Qatar and Egypt. The impact is extinction SidAhmed, 4 (Mohamed, Managing Editor for AlAhali, "Extinction!" August 26September 1, Issue no. 705, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm) A nuclear attack by terrorists will be much more critical than Hiroshima and Nagazaki, even if and this is far from certain the weapons used are less harmful than those used then, Japan, at the time, with no knowledge of nuclear technology, had no choice but to capitulate. Today, the technology is a secret for nobody. So far, except for the two bombs dropped on Japan, nuclear weapons have been used only to threaten. Now we are at a stage where they can be detonated. This completely changes the rules of the game. We have reached a point where anticipatory measures can determine the course of events. Allegations of a terrorist connection can be used to justify anticipatory measures, including the invasion of a sovereign state like Iraq. As it turned out, these allegations, as well as the allegation that Saddam was harbouring WMD, proved to be unfounded. What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists ? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate negative features the of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. Last printed 127 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This could lead to a third world war , from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without winners and losers. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers. ---Military doesn't spill over Jones, 10 Obama's national security advisor, former special envoy for Middle East regional security, Supreme Allied Commander Europe and commander of USEUCOM (Gen. (Ret.) James L. USMC, Michael Stein Address on U.S. Middle East Policy at The Washington Institute's 2010 Soref Symposium, 4/21/10, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC07.php?CID=525) And since there has been a lot of distortion and misrepresentation of our policy recently, let me take this opportunity to address our relationship with our ally Israel. Like any two nations, we will have of disagreements, but we will always resolve them as allies. And we will never forget that since the first minutes of Israeli independence, the United States has had a special relationship with Israel. And that will not change. Why? Because this is not a commitment of Democrats or Republicans; it is a national commitment based on shared values, deep and interwoven connections, and mutual interests. As President Obama declared in Cairo, "America's strong bonds with Israel are well known. This bond is unbreakable." They are the bonds of history two nations that earned our independence through the sacrifice of patriots. They are the bonds of two people, bound together by shared values of freedom and individual opportunity. They are the bonds of two democracies, where power resides in the people. They are the bonds of pioneers in science, technology and so many fields where we cooperate every day. They are the bonds of friendship, including the ties of so many families and friends. This week marked the 62nd anniversary of Israeli independence a nation and a people who have survived in the face of overwhelming odds. But even now, six decades since its founding, Israel continues to reside in a hostile neighborhood with adversaries who cling to the false hope that denying Israel's legitimacy will ultimately make it disappear. But those adversaries are wrong. As the President said in Cairo, for the entire world to hear, the State of Israel "will not go away." As he said at the United Nations, nations "do the Palestinians no favors when they choose vitriolic attacks against Israel over constructive willingness to recognize Israel's legitimacy and its right to exist in peace and security." So America's commitment to Israel will endure. And everyone must know that there is no space no space between the U nited tates S and Israel when it comes to Israel's security. Our commitment to Israel's security is unshakable. It is as strong as ever. This President and this Administration understands very well the environment regionally and internationally in which Israel and the United States must operate. We understand very well that for peace and stability in the Middle East, Israel must be secure. The United States will never waiver in defense of Israel's security. That is why we provide billions of dollars annually in security assistance to Israel, why we have reinvigorated our consultations to ensure Israel's Qualitative Military Edge, and why we undertake joint military exercises , such as the Juniper Cobra ballistic missile defense exercise that involved more than 1,000 United States servicemen and women. We view these efforts as essential elements of our regional security approach, because many of the same forces that threaten Israel also threaten the United States. I can also say from long experience that our security relationship with Israel is important for America. Our military benefits from Israeli innovations in technology, from shared intelligence, from exercises that help our readiness and joint training that enhances our capabilities and from lessons learned in Israel's own battles against terrorism and asymmetric threats. Over the years, and like so many Americans like so many of you here tonight I've spent a great deal of time with my Israeli partners, including my friends in the IDF. These partnerships are deep and abiding. They are personal relationships and friendships based on mutual trust and respect. Every day, across the whole range of our bilateral relationship, we are working together for our shared security and prosperity. And our partnership will only be strengthened in the months and years to come. Last printed 128 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 North Korea Deterrence DA 2AC ---Modernization solves U.S. presence not key China will cooperate and help stop North Korean aggression that's Bandow More evidence Bandow and Carpenter 4 JD from Stanford, senior fellow at Cato, former special assistant to Reagan, writes for Fortune, 200 * National Interest, WSJ, Washington Times, **PhD in diplomatic history from Texas, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at Cato, contributing editor to the National Interest, editorial board of the Journal of Strategic Studies (Ted Galen and Doug, "The Korean conundrum", Google Books, page 127, WEA) Moreover, even if the security of the South was vital to the United States, Washington's treaty and troops are not necessary to achieve that end. Nearly a decade ago the Department of Defense declared that "our security relationship with the Republic of Korea continues to be central to the stability of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia, as it has been for over forty years."29 Although America's presence probably was central to the maintenance of peace 50 years ago, it is not today. so After all, the raison d'tre for Washington's defense of the ROK, a weak South Korea vulnerable to communist aggression orchestrated by Beijing or Moscow, has disappeared. That America's presence undoubtedly still helps deter DPRK the from military adventurism does not mean that it is necessary to do so .30 As noted earlier, the South can stand on its own. A recent report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies conceded: "Without U.S. help, South Korea is capable today of defending itself against an invasion from the North."31 An invasion that would be supported by no other nation, and certainly not by the DPRK's old allies, China and Russia. North Korea aggression only inevitable with our presence because we give political cover to hardliners Harrison 2001 professor of Asian Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs, at the George Washington University, director of the Asia Program at the Center for International Policy, senior scholar of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, lectures at the National Defense University, the National War College, and the State Department's Foreign Service Institute (1/31, Selig, Center for Defense Information, ADM interview, "United States Military Strategy in Asia After the Cold War", http://www.cdi.org/ADM/1039/Harrison.html, WEA) And therefore, the picture of an aggressive North Korea bent on invad invading South Korea, provoking trouble with South Korea I think is completely out of date, reflects obsolete Cold War thinking that bears no relationship to the present situation in which North Korea wants to improve its relations with the US, needs to do so for economic reasons now that it has lost the Soviet Union and China as its patrons, which they they had in the course during the Cold War, getting all kinds of food and fuel from them at subsidized prices. But now North Korea really wants to be friends with the United States and gradually as it establishes more normal relations with the United States, I think it will become more friendly with South Korea. But there is a danger of an accidental conflict of a series of events leading to escalation. There is a hardline group in North Korea in the military there. We've got to be very careful to not to strengthen that group by maintaining obsolete Cold War policies in Korea. But I think the danger of a war in Korea is much less than the danger of a war over Taiwan. Those are the two places where a serious conflict could break out. And of the two, I would say Taiwan is, by far, the most menacing. Withdrawal doesn't affect deterrence on North Korea not perceived Roehrig, 08 Associate Professor in the National Security Decision Making Department at the U.S. Naval War College (Terence, "On Korea", Academic Paper Series, 2008, June 27th 2010, p. 145, KONTOPOULOS) PDF Although the U.S. withdrawals and relocations might have been used as leverage to obtain concessions from North Korea, it is not certain this would have been successful. Indeed, according to one line of argument, the relocation of U.S. forces to positions south of Seoul would free Washington to conduct a military strike on the North with less fear of retaliation on its forces close to the DMZ. Statements from North Korea indicate the North may believe this possibility as well.61 Given the current climate Last printed 129 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 of U.S.DPRK relations, it is unlikely Pyongyang would perceive U.S. policy to be softening and interpret these changes as such. Thus, the overall impact of U.S. force changes on deterrence is negligible. Port calls and troops in Japan solve perception of commitment Printz and Doran 06 (Scott A., Lieutenant Colonel, and George Doran, Project Adviser, USAWC Strategy Research Project, "A U.S Military Presence in a Post Unified Korea: Is it Required?", http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA448748&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf ) ZParks Finally, it is entirely possible to withdraw the permanent U.S. military forces from Korea without withdrawing from the region. U.S. presence in Japan and Okinawa, in addition to the presence of U.S. carriers in the East and Yellow Seas, will demonstrate a sustained U.S. military commitment to the region. U.S. ship visits to ports throughout Korea will show the flag and U.S. resolve in regional security. Christopher Yung of the Korean Institute for Defense Analyses recently observed, "Korea ranked in seventh in the region for Seventh Fleet port visits."49 Increased port calls and combined training exercises is an effective means to advance U.S. interests in the region without the baggage of a permanent presence or intrusion upon the sovereign territory of another nation. Of the 75,000 troops stationed in the region, 30,000 are in Korea. The bulk of ground combat power in South Korea comes from the 680,000 man ROK Army. U.S. ground forces consists of two (to be reduced to one) brigade of mechanized infantry, and an Army headquarters with its supporting units.50 The relative combat power of U.S. ground forces in Korea visvis DPRK forces is minimal. Their presence largely represents a commitment to the bilateral treaty with the ROK and the UN Armistice. From a defense perspective, the need for continued U.S. forces presence after reunification is questionable. If Congress doesn't dissolve them due to increased budgetary pressures and emphasis on burden sharing, they can be relocated to Hawaii, Guam, or Alaska. Prepositioned sets of brigade size equipment can ensure ready response to the peninsula in the event of crisis. Credible military deterrent still exists post withdrawal *card conflicts with regionalism advantage* Printz and Doran 06 (Scott A., Lieutenant Colonel, and George Doran, Project Adviser, USAWC Strategy Research Project, "A U.S Military Presence in a Post Unified Korea: Is it Required?", http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA448748&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf ) ZParks The U.S. will continue to maintain vital interests in the region and retain a credible military presence to protect them. U.S. vital interests in the Asia Pacific region include increased foreign trade, a key component to continued U.S. prosperity. Currently, U.S. trade with Asia far exceeds trade with Europe representing thirty percent of all U.S. exports and millions of domestic jobs.48 The U.S. will continue to honor treaty obligations with Korea and Japan and seek to maintain open navigation and security of the strategic sea lanes in the region. Maintaining alliances and remaining engaged in the region is important to a successful nonproliferation strategy. Failure to successfully mediate the current North Korean nuclear crisis and maintain a balance of power in the region may result in South Korea and Japan pursuing WMD. However, the U.S. can continue to prepare and shape the Asian strategic environment without a permanent military presence in Korea. First, the U.S. has a range of strategic options and can employ other instruments of power to effectively engage the region. The U.S. can pursue diplomatic initiatives to normalize relations with China, and strengthen bilateral and multilateral relations among the regional actors. The challenge for U.S. foreign policy is to maintain a critical balance between competing interests among the regional powers in East Asia. The U.S. already provides stability to the region and is well positioned for this role. Strong ties to both Japan and South Korea and improved relations with China and Russia logically casts the U.S. in a mediating role. As the world leader in information, technology, and 14 advanced medical procedures, the U.S. has the most leverage with China and other countries in the region. The U.S. can employ its economic strength to increase trade and mutual prosperity which will eventually lead to economic interdependence and greater cooperation in the region. US withdrawal would result in South KoreanJapanese cooperation both share similar interests and Japanese military development is inevitable Bandow 96 (Doug, Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, specializing in foreign policy and civil liberties, worked as special assistant to President Reagan and editor of the political magazine Inquiry, writes regularly for leading publications such as Fortune magazine, National Interest, Wall Street Journal, and Washington Times, Tripwire: Korea and US foreign policy in a changed world, P 94) SLV Last printed 130 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 In particular, Washington should encourage the expansion of ties between South Korea and Japan, which remain tainted by the latter's half century of colonial rule.45 Tokyo supports America's military presence in the ROKit vigorously opposed the Carter withdrawal plan, for instance. Observes historian Frank Baldwin, once Jimmy Carter was elected, "members of Japan's foreign affairs and defense establishment put down their cups of green tea and moved swiftly to block Carter's plans." 46 However, there is no reason why the world's secondranking economic power, which surpasses both China and Russia, could not help fill any security vacuum left by a U.S. pullout, especially since Japan and the ROK have significant interests, including the maintenance of regional peace, in common. Col. Mark Bean would go further and encourage a formal Northeast Asian security coalition including R. China. 47 Not that many Koreans would like to see a larger Japanese role, although some, at least, are willing to countenance increased cooperation so long as it revolves around America. Argues Ahn Byungjoon, a political science professor at Yonsei University, "South Korea, Japan and the US must deepen their partnership for common interests as well as common values beyond the Cold War alliances."48 But fear and loathing of Tokyo are one issue that unites many Koreans in both North and South. 49 So strong have those sentiments been that serious defense consultations between the ROK and Japan began only in November 1994, and only recently has Seoul spoken favorably of potential military cooperation with Tokyo.50 Some South Koreans bridle at the thought of Japanese support even in war. One official at the Ministry of National Defense stated that Seoul would accept such assistance only II at the last moment," if then. The people are just "not sentimentally inclined to accept" aid from Japan. 51 However, sentimentality is no excuse for irresponsibility. The ROK can avoid exorcising the ghosts of World War II only because it believes Washington would rescue it in case of war. Washington needs to drop its defense promise and assist Seoul to refashion its relationship with Tokyo. There are, after all, many steps short of the sort of physical presence of Japanese soldiers in Korea that would reawaken far too many memories. Possibilities include shared intelligence gathering, joint naval exercises, cooperative weapons development, and even financial contributions, though the latter seem the least appropriate as Seoul's economy continues to grow so swiftly.52 Japan's Role Of course, other nations in East Asia and the Pacific share the South's disquiet over the prospect of Japan's playing a larger security role in the region. But everexpanding global economic interests and growing nationalistic feelings make it inevitable that Tokyo will someday enlarge its military. Observes former secretary of state Henry Kissinger, "With Korea and China gaining in military strength, and with the least impaired portion of Soviet military power located in Siberia, Japanese longrange planners will not indefinitely take the absolute identity of American and Japanese interests for granted. /f53 Washington's military presence in the region may slow that process; it is not likely to halt it. any case, as discussed in more detail in chapter 7, it is unreasonable to expect the United States to forever garrison the region to In avert nervousness caused by Japanese aggression more than five decades ago. The best policy for Washington would be to encourage a responsible expansion of Tokyo's armed forcesadding defense oriented weapons, such as frigates and interceptors, for instance and to channel Japanese efforts into nonthreatening activities, such as aiding the military programs of neighboring democratic states, including the ROK. No domino effect Carpenter and Bandow 04 (Ted Galen, the vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, Doug Bandow, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, specializing in foreign policy and civil liberties, "The Korean Conundrum", pg. 128) ZParks How about larger issues of regional stability? Withdrawal might unsettle neighboring nations, but none needs to rely on the United States to meet its security needs. Indeed, even war on the Korean peninsula would set off no chain of falling dominoes. The DPRK represents the remnant of last century's communist threat, not the advance guard of the future. Last printed 131 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Net no effect on deterrence because presence weakens the South Bandow and Carpenter 2004 JD from Stanford, senior fellow at Cato, former special assistant to Reagan, writes for Fortune, * National Interest, WSJ, Washington Times, **PhD in diplomatic history from Texas, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at Cato, contributing editor to the National Interest, editorial board of the Journal of Strategic Studies (Ted Galen and Doug, "The Korean conundrum", Google Books, pages 120121, WEA) More important is the military risk of U.S. security ties. Although the American commitment helps deter North Korean aggression, it ensures that the United States will be involved if hostilities should occur again. Indeed, the presence of 37,000 American soldiers is to make intervention automatic. Moreover, protecting the South discourages it from enhancing its own military, which reduces deterrence. Turn--presence facilitates risk taking and preemption from both sides Bandow and Carpenter 4 JD from Stanford, senior fellow at Cato, former special assistant to Reagan, writes for Fortune, 200 * National Interest, WSJ, Washington Times, **PhD in diplomatic history from Texas, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at Cato, contributing editor to the National Interest, editorial board of the Journal of Strategic Studies (Ted Galen and Doug, "The Korean conundrum", Google Books, page 121, WEA) Although the risks of war are modest, the consequences would be horrific. The concentration of military power in Korea was unparalleled elsewhere in the world even during the Cold War; roughly 1.5 million troops face each other across a 155mile border, in contrast to only 2 million soldiers along the entire 4,600mile SinoSoviet border when those two nations were involved in serious border skirmishes. Presumably the toll would not match that of the first Korean War, in which America's technological lead was not so great, the South was far less prepared to defend itself, and China intervened on the DPRK's side. However, credible estimates of casualties run 1 to 2 million.108 And the possible acquisition by North Korea of atomic weapons increases the potential costs exponentially; should a conflict come, the American troops would become nuclear hostages . The U.S. troop presence also may encourage risktaking by both Koreas . Pyongyang could see a need to preempt an attempt by the United States at preventive war; a more hawkish South Korea n government, feeling secure in America's protection, might challenge the North.109 (However, Seoul's proximity to the border, and thus increased vulnerability to attack, seemingly counteracts the impact of the latter possibility, at least on the governments of Kim Daejung and Roh Moohyun.) Last printed 132 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Last printed 133 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 ROK Economy DA 2AC ---Recent economic downturn proves why South Korea economy is already low they rely on U.S. trade and goods exports are what their uniqueness assumes US will strike North Korea removing troops solves BANDOW 2009 (Doug Bandow is a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute. He is a former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan and the author of several books, including Foreign Follies: America's New Global Empire (Xulon) and Tripwire: Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World, "Starting the Second Korean War? Restraint is almost certainly the better part of valor," Reason.com, Feb 26, http://reason.com/archives/2009/02/26/startingthesecondkoreanwar) Calum The government in Seoul responded with a yawn and Secretary Clinton indicated her desire for continued negotiations. But the latest emanations from Pyongyang have caused some policymakers to advocate confrontation. Philip Zelikow, late of the Bush State Department, suggests war. This isn't the first time that U.S. officials have proposed sending in the bombers . The Clinton administration apparently came close to ordering military strikes before former President Jimmy Carter's dramatic flight to Pyongyang. And Sen. John McCain (RAriz.) has spent years pondering the possibility of preventive war against the socalled Democratic People's Republic of Korea. It was never a good idea, but the pressure for military action may grow. Selig Harrison of the Center for International Policy recently traveled to the DPRK, where he was told that existing supplies of plutonium had been "weaponized." He argues that the U.S. "can tolerate a nucleararmed North Korea that may or may not actually have the weapons arsenal it claims," but others would put the military option back on the table. Zelikow goes even further. He says: "whatever the merits of Harrison's suggestion when it comes to North Korea's nuclear weapons, the U nited tates S should not accept Pyongyang's development of longrange missiles systems, which can be paired with an admitted nuclear weapons arsenal, as still another fait accompli." In his view, Washington should warn the North to stand down; if the DPRK failed to comply, the U.S. should take out the missile on its launch pad. Why? Zelikow contends that "the North Korean perfection of a longrange missile capability against the United States, Japan, or the Republic of Korea would pose an imminent threat to the vital interests of our country." To rely on deterrence, he adds, would be a "gamble." Obviously no one wants the North to possess nuclear weapons or missiles of any kind. However, North Korean threats against the ROK and Japan are not threats against America's vital interests . Japan is the world's second ranking economic power and the South has roughly 40 times the GDP and twice the population of the North. Sooner rather than later they should be expected to defend themselves. Washington is busy enough dealing with its own geopolitical problems in the midst of an economic crisis. Moreover, nothing in the North Korean regime's behavior suggests that Dear Leader Kim Jong Il is any less amenable to deterrence than were Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong. Kim may be many things, but there is no indication that he is suicidal. Rather, he likes his virgins in the here and now. Of course , it would be better not to have to rely on deterrence. But a preventive strike would be no cakewalk. If there is insanity at work on the Korean peninsula, it is the assumption that Kim would do nothing if his nation was attacked by the U.S. He might choose inaction, but more likely would see such a strike as the prelude to regime change. In that case the results of the Iraq war would impel him to act first rather than await invasion. America and South Korea would win any war, but the costs would be horrendous. Moreover, the DPRK could easily initiate a more limited titfortat retaliation . The South's capital of Seoul lies within easy range of Scud missiles and massed artillery. Even the "optimists" who believe that Seoul could be protected by massive military strikes along the Demilitarized Zone talk about holding casualties to under 100,000. Imagine Pyongyang announcing a limited bombardment in response to the U.S. action, combined with the promise of a ceasefire if the ROK blocked any further American response. Washington's Asian policy would be wrecked along with Seoul. Despite the vagaries of dealing with the North, it is not the first bizarrely brutal and secretive regime with which the U.S. has dealt. Fortysome years ago there was China. The unstable Mao regime, atop a country convulsed by the bloody Cultural Revolution, was developing nuclear weapons. National Review editor William F. Buckley and New York Sen. James Buckley both pressed for a preventive attack on Beijing's nascent nuclear program. The Johnson administration considered proposals for such an assault. The arguments were similar as those made today regarding North Korea: An unpredictable regime, the uncertainty of deterrence, and the relative ease of attack. It's impossible to know what the world would have looked like had Washington struck, but China likely would have moved closer to the Soviet Union and become more resolutely hostile to the U.S. Restraint almost certainly was the better part of valor. So, too, with North Korea today. Of course, Washington still should work with the DPRK's neighbors in an attempt to persuade Pyongyang to abandon both its missile and nuclear ambitions. Even more important, though, would be to turn the problem of North Korea over to the Last printed 134 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 surrounding states. To the extent that the North threatens anyone, it is South Korea and Japan. China and Russia are unlikely direct targets, but still have good reason to prefer a stable and peaceful Korean peninsula. Thus, the U.S. should withdraw its 29,000 troops from the ROK, where they are vulnerable to military action by Pyongyang. Then North Korea would be primarily a problem for the ROK, China, Japan, and Russia. And the U.S. need not worry about the latest North Korean gambit. Fear of strikes kills investor confidence Lim 7--Fellow at the Korea Development Institute (Wonhyuk, Economic Consequences of ROKU.S. Separation, 27 November 2007, http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/07086Lim.html, AMiles) Although the prevailing assumption is that foreign investment is unsustainable in the ROK without a U.S.guaranteed peace, it should be asked how essential security is in determining investment inflows and how crucial the U.S. guarantee is in maintaining the peace on the Korean peninsula. As for the first question, although security may be regarded as the most fundamental variable, what actually played a larger role is the ROK's policy on investment liberalization and commercial attractiveness of its assets. Figure 3 on FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) inflows and Table 1 on the foreign investors' share of ROK stockmarket capitalization show that the dramatic increase in investment flows took place in the postcrisis period. Moreover, the investor reaction to nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula for more than a decade suggests that the the critical variable is possibility of war the , not the quality of the military alliance per se. In fact, if the ROKU.S. alliance is strong but is about to launch a preemptive strike on the DPRK, investors are likely to take flight from the Korean peninsula and its neighboring countries. When the nuclear crisis broke for the first time in FebruaryMarch 1993, the market capitalization of the Korean Stock Exchange declined by 6.5 percent. At this time, there was hardly any strain in the ROKU.S. alliance, but investors were seriously concerned about a military conflict on the Korean peninsula over the DPRK's nuclear program. By contrast, when investors apparently interpreted the DPRK's brinkmanship in 2005 as an attempt to draw attention from the U.S. and break a diplomatic deadlock, the Korean stock market achieved solid gains. ---No link it assumes break up of the U.S.- South Korea alliance plan doesn't do that we'll still have relations with them through other means ---No impact: First: Past proves Lim 7--Fellow at the Korea Development Institute (Wonhyuk, Economic Consequences of ROKU.S. Separation, 27 November 2007, http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/07086Lim.html, AMiles) USFK = US forces in Korea With regard to the increase in defense burden caused by the termination of the alliance, it would be useful to recall that the ROK managed to build its deterrent capability in the 1970s in conjunction with its HCI drive when it was faced with a reduced security commitment from the U.S.and when it had far less economic and security resources than now, especially relative to the DPRK. With the world's thirteenth largest economy, the ROK should be able to handle its security challenges much more effectively. In such defense related industries as shipbuilding, electronics, steel, and automobiles, the ROK is one of the top five producers in the world. It also holds the world's fourth largest foreign reserves, after China, Japan, and Taiwan. The ROK has indeed come a long way since the early 1960s when it was one of the poorest countries in the world. According to an estimate provided by the Ministry of National Defense to the National Assembly in September 2002, the value of USFK equipment and materiel ranges from 14.0 to 25.9 billion dollars depending on assumptions. With the ROK's current GDP close to $1 trillion, the cost of replacing USFK equipment and materiel amounts to 1.4 to 2.6 percent of GDP. Although this is not a small sum of money, it is by no means unaffordable for the ROK. In fact, as a percentage of GDP, additional defense expenditure this is much smaller than the burden the ROK had to bear in the 1970s to build up its military. As Figure 1 in the previous section showed, the ROK's defense spending as a percentage of GDP increased from 3.47 percent in 1973 to 5.95 percent in 1980. Although an increase in defense expenditure is likely to raise fiscal deficit or reduce government spending in economic and social areas, adverse its impact on overall economic growth likely is to be manageable . According to a simulation study released in 2003, the ROK's annual GDP is expected to decline by 1.20 to 1.25 percent each year when the ROK's defense expenditure as a percentage of GDP is increased (by debt financing) from 2.9 percent to 3.5 percent for each of next seven years to replace USFK equipment and materiel.(12) Also, the ROK's experience with a rapid defense buildup in the 1970s suggests that an increased defense burden of this magnitude would not have Last printed 135 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 a large adverse effect on the economy. Last printed 136 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Second: other ties Lim 7--Fellow at the Korea Development Institute (Wonhyuk, Economic Consequences of ROKU.S. Separation, 27 November 2007, http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/07086Lim.html, AMiles) As for the spillover effect on bilateral economic relations, it is important to recall that even the acrimonious exchange of words in the security area from 2002 to 2005 did not have a significant economic impact on investment and trade between the U.S. and ties ROK. For the United States, the ROK is now the seventh largest trading partner, ahead of such Western European countries as France and Italy; whereas, for South Korea, the United States is the third largest trading partner, after China and Japan. Although ROKU.S. interaction has had a positive influence on the ROK's institutionbuilding efforts in the economic area, this effect should not be overstated. On balance, the ROK's accession to the GATT/ WTO, OECD, and other international normsetting institutions has had a greater impact on economic liberalization has the ROK's alliance relationship with the U.S. It should also be noted that than many nonU.S. allies, including China, have adopted global economic norms as part of their requirements for joining international organizations. Moreover, the ROK's economic development since the 1960s has reduced dependence on the U.S its . In particular, as Figure 2 shows, China's increasing relative importance to the ROK in economic terms has become unmistakable in recent years. In 1991, the year before the ROK and China normalized relations, China bought only 1.4 percent of the ROK's exports while the U.S. accounted for 25.8 percent. By 2003, however, China's share of the ROK's exports had increased to 18.1 percent while U.S the . share had declined to 17.7 percent. Of course, as the controversy over the ancient kingdom of Koguryo in 2004 suggests, the increasing economic importance of China does not mean that the ROK would lean toward China at the expense of the U.S. The ROK's more diversified economic portfolio just means that it has more independence.(13) More fundamentally, the extent to which trade tends to "follow the flag" seems to have been reduced in the postCold War era. In fact, some have argued that while U.S. allies were "too important to fail" during the Cold War, security considerations no longer play a prominent role in determining a response to a major economic crisis like the Asian crisis in 199798. The integration of former (and some current) socialist countries into the global economy seems to have accentuated the tendency to decouple security considerations from economic issues. Last printed 137 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Obama Good DA 2AC ---[Won't Pass] Last printed 138 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 ---DAs not intrinsic policy maker control both not an opportunity cost we advocate passing the plan and START ---Winner's Win Singer 2009 (an editor of MyDD, a position he has held since November 2005. Singer is a Juris Doctorate candidate at Berkeley Law, 3/3/09 (Johnathan, My direct Democracy, By expending capital, Obama Grows His Capital, http://www.mydd.com/story/2009/3/3/191825/0428) Peter Hart gets at a key point. Some believe that political capital is finite, that it can be used up. To an extent that's true. But it's important to note, too, that political capital can be regenerated and, specifically, that when a President expends a great deal of capital on a measure that was difficult to enact and then succeeds, he can build up more capital . Indeed, that appears to be what is happening with Barack Obama, who went to the mat to pass the stimulus package out of the gate, got it passed despite nearunanimous opposition of the Republicans on Capitol Hill, and is being rewarded by the American public as a result. Take a look at the numbers. President Obama now has a 68 percent favorable rating in the NBCWSJ poll, his highest ever showing in the survey. Nearly half of those surveyed (47 percent) view him very positively. Obama's Democratic Party earns a respectable 49 percent favorable rating. The Republican Party, however, is in the toilet, with its worst ever showing in the history of the NBCWSJ poll, 26 percent favorable. On the question of blame for the partisanship in Washington, 56 percent place the onus on the Bush administration and another 41 percent place it on Congressional Republicans. Yet just 24 percent blame Congressional Democrats, and a mere 11 percent blame the Obama administration. So at this point, with President Obama seemingly benefiting from his ambitious actions and the Republicans sinking further and further s a result a of their kneejerked opposition to that agenda, there appears to be no reason not to push forward on anything from universal healthcare to energy reform to ending the war in Iraq. ---Congress perceives South Korea as anti-American plan's popular Shepard 2009 (October 18, Kevin, AsiaPacific Analyst for BizTechReport, "Changing Tides of the USAKorea Alliance", http://www.biztechreport.com/story/254changingtidesusakoreaalliance , IW) The U.S.ROK reliance arguably hit its lowest point during the George W. Bush and Roh Moohyunera. With President Roh running a presidential campaign steeped in nationalism and leaning toward antiAmericanism, and President Bush taking a hardline policy of shunning North Korea and refusing to negotiate the denuclearization of the peninsula, Roh's election in 2002 foreshadowed a shift in relations. The nationalism stoked by President Roh ran high through the South's hosting of the 2002 military forces on the peninsula grew. When Roh called on Washington to hand over wartime military control by the year 2012, the Pentagon responded by saying it would be ready by 2009. This was an indication of Washington's confidence in the professionalism of South Korean troops, but also reflected a growing dissatisfaction in Congress ional circles over the appearance of an ungracious South Korea. World Cup, and then quickly turned dark as the pumped up public sought avenues for release once the soccer games were over. The accidental death of two South Korean schoolgirls crushed by an American armored vehicle provided that avenue, and calls for the withdrawal of the USFK and the selfdeterminant right to control --- No internal link issues are compartmentalized the plan has no effect on how politicians vote they always have self interest in mind GOP loves withdraw Bandow 96 (Doug, Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, specializing in foreign policy and civil liberties, worked as special assistant to President Reagan and editor of the political magazine Inquiry, writes regularly for leading publications such as Fortune magazine, National Interest, Wall Street Journal, and Washington Times, Tripwire: Korea and US foreign policy in a changed world, p13) SLV Last printed 139 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Such a harvest requires Washington to adapt its foreign policy to a changing world. A good place to begin that shift would be Korea. The prospect of a majorpower confrontation in the region has virtually disappeared; the bilateral balance has shifted irrevocably toward America's ally; and a successful disengagement would provide a model for eliminating other, similarly outmoded, commitments in the region. Such a policy shift should particular hold attraction for conservatives, who most loudly proclaim their commitment to smaller government, fiscal responsibility, and individual liberty. should also appeal to South It Koreans. Although entrepreneurial, resilient, prosperous, and rightly proud, they will continue to be treated as children by Washington so long as they rely on their American "big brother" for protection. As the Ministry of National Defense of the ROK has rightly observed, A sovereign /I state should be able to defend itself independently, without relying on foreign assistance." 33 That is especially true when a significant number of Koreans doubt the foreign nation's willingness to fulfill its commitments. The key to South Koreans' military security and international growth will ultimately be Seoul, not Washington. Today there is no Soviet Union to contain, and regional quarrels are no longer of vital concern because they are part of the overall Cold War. Moreover, those who were once possible victims of aggressionnot only underdeveloped Korea but also defeated Germany and Japan and wartom Britain and Franceare all now stronger than their potential foes. The United States needs to develop a new military strategy of strategic independence, or benign detachment. ---Foreign issues don't effect domestic Edwards 9 Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M University, holds the George and Julia Blucher Jordan Chair in Presidential Studies and has served as the Olin Professor of American Government at Oxford (George, "The Strategic President", Printed by the Princeton University Press, pg. 179180)MGM Did George W. Bush's extraordinarily high approval ratings following the terrorist attacks provide him a significant political resource in his attempts to obtain congressional support for his policies ? Did the patriotic response to the attacks help him to mobilize the public on behalf of his programs? The president certainly viewed public support as a potential advantage and was aware of its ephemeral nature, declaring, " is important to move as quickly as you can in order to spend whatever capital you have as It quickly as possible."40 Where the public supported his policieson fighting the war on terrorism abroad, on investigating and prosecuting terrorism at home, and in reorganizing the government to enhance domestic securitythe president ultimately won most of what he sought. Passing legislation was more difficult on the divisive domestic issues that remained on Congress's agenda, including health care, environmental protection, energy, the economy, government support for faithbased social programs, corporate malfeasance, judicial nominees, and taxes. The politics of the war on terrorism did not fundamentally alter the consideration of these issues, which continued to divide the public and their representatives in Congress as they had before. The inevitable differences between the parties emerged, exacerbated by the narrow majorities in each chamber and the jockeying for advantage in the midterm elections. The president was not able to turn public support for the war on terrorism into leverage for obtaining the passage of his domestic initiatives. Popular OPCON Bruce Klinger 9 (senior research fellow Heritage Foundation) "It's Not Right Time To Discuss OPCON Transfer"http://www.heritage.org/Research/Commentary/2009/06/ItsnotrighttimetodiscussOPCONtransfer U.S. officials in the Bush administrations were strongly opposed to reversing the decision and it appears that the Obama administration will maintain U.S. resistance. U.S. officials have expressed exasperation if not hostility to South Korea's repeated attempts to undo OPCON the decision. Transferring operational command requires Seoul to implement a series of improvements to South Korean military forces. Although not totally synonymous with South Korea's defense Reform 2020 initiative, that program provides a metric for assessing progress in implementing necessary defense programs. The ambitious military modernization plan is to develop a smaller, technologically oriented defense force by upgrading technology, improving command and control systems, and procuring more capable weapons. Funding shortfalls have already delayed the program by five years. South Korean inability or unwillingness to fund its military requirements raises U.S. concerns over Seoul's resolve to fulfill its alliance obligations. Deferring the OPCON transfer decision at this time would be seen by the United States as removing a necessary catalyst for South Korea to maintain its commitment to deploying the forces necessary to assume wartime command. South Korean advocacy for reversing the decision also risks calling into question the U.S. pledge to defend its ally. U.S. officials have repeatedly affirmed Washington's unwavering commitment to defend the Republic of Korea. Washington has emphasized that U.S. troop levels will remain at 28,500 in Korea. The introduction of extended accompanied tours, in which Last printed 140 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 families will move to South Korea with service members, is also highlighted as another sign of a longterm U.S. presence. Because the OPCON transfer won't occur for three more years, there is no need to fight a battle over it now. To do so unnecessarily risks introducing tension into the bilateral relationship, particularly at a time when the two allies should be focused on close policy coordination on a number of more urgent issues. The U.S. message to South Korea would be to choose your battles wisely and don't fall on your sword before it is necessary . In 2011, both countries may very well be in agreement to either delay or not delay the transfer. Allaying South Korean security concerns The negative impressions of OPCON transfer can be mitigated to some degree careful by bilateral planning in coming years . Washington and Seoul should seek common ground in transforming the bilateral alliance to incorporate enhanced South Korean military capabilities while maintaining an integrated U.S. role . A key facet of this is for the two countries to engage in a more proactive and transparent public diplomacy effort. Last printed 141 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Last printed 142 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 START Good 2AC ---Won't pass: First GOP Alexander 729 [72910. David, "Republican concerns could stall START treaty" http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE66S5KM20100729? type=politicsNews, SM] WASHINGTON (Reuters) Senate Republicans voiced objections on Thursday the new to START nuclear arms treaty with Russia raising concerns that could delay efforts to hand President Barack Obama a foreign policy victory ahead of the November elections. At a , Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, Republicans said the accord could impede U.S. plans for an antimissile defense system and pressed the Obama administration to release the full treaty negotiating record to answer their questions . "We originally were told that there would be no references to missile defense in the treaty and no linkage drawn between offensive and defensive weapons," Senator John McCain said, adding that one section included a "clear, legally binding limitation on our missile defense options." "Why did the administration agree to this language after saying they would do no such thing ?" he asked. " We're insisting on an opportunity to review the negotiating record for ourselves, specifically those parts dealing with the ambiguous references to missile defense." With U.S. midterm congressional campaigns heating up ahead of the November 2 vote, some Republicans groups have moved to put the START treaty on the broader national agenda, hoping to use the issue along with healthcare to fire up voters against Obama's Democrats. Mitt Romney, a potential 2012 Republican presidential contender, called the treaty Obama's "worst foreign policy mistake yet" in a Washington Post opinion piece. Heritage Action for America, a conservative group, is rallying opposition to the treaty with an online petition. Second midterms LaFranchi 7/23 Staff Writer [July 23, 2010. Howard,"Republican skepticism challenges USRussia treaty on nuclear weapons", http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/ForeignPolicy/2010/0723/RepublicanskepticismchallengesUSRussia treatyonnuclearweapons, SM] senators to aspects of a new arms control treaty with Russia. President Obama would like to see the treaty ratified by the end of the year. But with the November midterm elections fast approaching, and with some Republican voices calling for no significant legislation to be considered in a postelection lameduck session, prospects for what is widely considered to be President Obama's most significant foreignpolicy achievement to date may be wilting with every passing hot Washington summer Democrats, many day. nonproliferation advocates, and some of Washington's NATO allies are pushing for the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or START. They warn that allowing it to languish jeopardizes the vaunted "reset" of USRussia relations. Beyond that, they see President Obama's vision for arms reduction hanging in the balance. But The White House will be scrambling in the coming weeks to answer the objections and questions of key Republican several influential Republican senators, including Jon Kyl of Arizona and John Thune of South Dakota, are pressing for reassurances on the treaty's provisions. They are also using the debate over ratification to elicit administration commitments on related arms issues, such as the modernization of the nation's nuclear weapons complex and missile defense. Skeptical Republicans would also like some guarantees that subsequent arms negotiations with Russia will address tactical nuclear weapons, where Russia maintains a significant advantage. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is expected to vote on the treaty before the August recess. Passage there is not in doubt, however, especially since the ranking member, Richard Lugar (R) of Indiana, has already announced his support. But full Senate ratification requires a twothirds vote, or 67 senators which explains the White House clamber to address Republican concerns. ---No impact: First they'll cheat Brookes 9 (8/31/09, Peter, Heritage Foundation, is a former deputy assistant secretary of defense, "DON'T GET SCAMMED BY RUSSIA AGAIN", http://www.nypost.com/p/news/opinion/opedcolumnists/item_bMq6vAe17UkGwNosvttQoM) Last printed 143 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 AMERICAN and Russian teams will start another round of talks in Vienna as early as today on a new nucleararmsreduction pact to replace the expiring Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. Problem is Russia isn't meeting its obligations on some old armscontrol agreements. It's no small matter but the question is: Will the Obama administration make an issue of it? Some analysts fear that, with President Obama keen for a nukefree world, negotiators US might be willing to look the other way to reach an accord with Russia, despite a record of noncompliance with existing armscontrol agreements. So what are the Russkies scamming on? Tactical nuclear weapons: President George Bush (41) and his Soviet/Russian counterparts, Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin, adopted the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNI) to dramatically reduce tactical nuke arsenals. Earlier this year, a congressional panel, the Strategic Posture Commission, reported that Russia is "no longer in compliance with its PNI commitments " leaving Moscow with what some say could be a 10:1 advantage in "battlefield" nukes. Nuke testing: America, Russia and others have undertaken an informal moratorium on nuclearweapons tests based on the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which President Bill Clinton signed but the Senate never ratified. But an SPC member warned recently that Russian "nuclear labs have been growing, their budgets have been increasing and they continue an active underground test program at Novaya Zemlya, which includes the release of low levels of nuclear energy." This conflicts with America's nobang, "zeroyield" standard and suggests Moscow is doing some lowyield testing that could lead to new weapons' development. (Russian doctrine puts a premium on fighting battlefield nuclear war.) Strategic arms: Even as it negotiates a new START treaty, the Kremlin is fudging on the existing one. A 2005 State Department report points to multiple Russian violations, including restrictions on inspections of its intercontinental ballistic missiles and warheads. There's more: One expert recently noted Russia is testing its SS27 ICBM with multiple warheads. But START identifies the SS27 as a singlewarhead missile and permits testing/deployment only in that configuration. Proliferation : Others say Russia has been cutting corners on accepted nonproliferation standards notably, by helping Iran and North Korea develop ballistic missiles and nuclear knowhow. This is no small matter, considering the threat to America. Indeed, the director of national intelligence sent a letter to the State Department in March 2007, stating: "We assess that individual Russian entities continue to provide assistance to Iran's ballisticmissile programs" which implies either Kremlin involvement in, knowledge of, or failure to intervene into these activities. Some analysts also think North Korea got Russian help in the form of key components for its April longrangemissile test. Others see Moscow's aid to the Iranian nuclear program going beyond the reactor it's building at Bushehr . Adding to fears Obama's negotiators won't bring up these issues in the Vienna talks is the tentative deal he struck with Russian president Dmitry Medvedev on dualuse strategicdelivery systems this summer, drastically cutting US subs and bombers that have conventional military roles, too. They may also throw Iranfocused, Europebased US missile defense, which the Russkies hate, under the bus in order close a deal. Successful arms control depends on actually controlling weapons in ways that serve US nationalsecurity interests, not by merely inking new pacts for the sake of concluding a deal that sounds good Before we rush into signing onto any more armscontrol treaties, we need to get to the . bottom of Russia's noncompliance with existing armscontrol and nonproliferation promises. If we don't, the Russians will have little if any incentive to correctly implement any new treaty and every reason to find clever ways to cheat, as it looks like they're doing now, further jeopardizing our national security. Second two other START treaties solve the impact their impact evidence isn't specific ---Only plan solves proliferation from other countries START only effects the US and Russia overstretch means other countries will take advantage of our weakness they know we won't be willing to start another war that's CST Last printed 144 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Tax Cuts Bad 2AC Ending tax cuts won't revitalize the economy only a risk it destabilizes Whitehouse 7/24 deputy bureau chief for The Wall Street Journal in London (7/24/2010, Mark, "Number of the Week: Tax Cuts and Debt", http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2010/07/24/numberoftheweekendingtaxcutsmakes onlysmalldentindebt/) MGM 0.26%: Added revenue, as a percentage of annual economic output, generated by raising tax rates on top earners The Obama administration has set the stage for a political battle by signaling that it plans to allow Bushera tax cuts for top earners to expire at the end of this year. In the context of the U.S.'s longterm fiscal problems, the politicians will be squabbling over chump change. By allowing marginal tax rates on the top couple percent of earners to revert to their precut levels of 36% and 39.6%, the government will gain an added $479 billion in revenue over the next ten years, according to calculations done by Alan Auerbach of the University of California, Berkeley and William Gale of the Brookings Institution. That may sound like a lot, but as a share of the country's projected economic output it's very small -- only 0.26%. By contrast, Messrs. Auerbach and Gale estimate that the government needs to increase tax revenues or cut spending by as much as 9% of economic output to put its finances on a sustainable trajectory. Even if tax cuts for all earners were allowed to expire, the result wouldn't come close to what is needed. Over the next ten years, the government would gain an added $1.65 trillion, or 0.88% of economic output. If spending on defense and discretionary items other than Social Security and Medicare were also held at their current level, the U.S. government's net debt would still exceed 100% of economic output by 2031, 200% by 2049, and 500% by 2080. Japan, currently the world's most indebted major industrialized nation, has a net government debt load of 122% of economic output, the IMF estimates. Fixing the government's finances will take a much more radical rethink of the way it taxes and spends. Economists have offered various options, including increasing the retirement age and implementing a valueadded tax like those common in other countries around the world. Much also depends on how well the economy recovers, and the rate at which it can grow over the coming decades. In the meantime, the meager revenue potential of incometax hikes is worth keeping in mind as the government seeks to strike a delicate balance between supporting the recovery and allaying concerns about its longterm finances. By raising taxes now to show its resolve, the government could risk undermining the growth it needs to help solve its longterm problems. Tax Cuts key to the economy First: jobs Heritage Foundation 7/13 (7/13/2010, Factsheet "Obama's Tax Plan: Bad for Economic Growth", http://www.heritage.org/Research/Factsheets/ObamasTaxPlanBadforEconomicGrowth) MGM Major Tax Hikes on the Horizon * The End Is Near: The 2001 and 2003 tax relief packages expire at the end of 2010. All taxpayers will see a steep tax hike in 2011 unless Congress acts soon * Tax Cuts That Create Jobs: The 2001 and 2003 tax cuts that help small . businesses create jobs include lower top marginal income tax rates and lower rates on tax capital gains and dividends . Each of these growthpromoting policies will expire * Small Businesses Hit Hard: Small businesses that employ the most . workers would be particularly hardhit if the top income tax rates go up. * Now Is Not the Time: There is never a good time to raise taxes, because higher taxes always slow job creation . But raising taxes now, as economic recovery remains the weak and job creation is nonexistent, would be an economic disaster. Obama's Plan to Keep Tax Cuts for Some, Raise Taxes for Others * Obama's Plan: President Obama's plan, if passed this year, would extend the 2001 and 2003 tax relief for taxpayers making less than $250,000 a year and hike taxes on small businesses and families earning more than $250,000. * Extended Tax Cuts for Some: Policies that the President wants kept include the 10% tax bracket for low levels of income, the doubling of the Child Tax Credit from $500 to $1,000, marriage penalty reductions, and the 25% and 28% marginal income tax rates. * No Job Creation with Select Extensions: While each of these policies lowers taxes, none will encourage job creation, because they do not increase the incentives for individuals and businesses to work, save, invest, or take on new risk. * Tax Hikes Won't Create Jobs Either: Tax hikes on highincome earners will cause the most productive small businesses that provide jobs for the vast majority of workers to cut back on hiring Higher taxes on highincome earners will also . slow investment , which will further inhibit job creation. Redistributive Policies Hurt the Economy * Backwards Plan to Stimulate Growth: The Last printed 145 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 tax relief Obama wants to keep doesn't create jobs, while the ones he intends to get rid of do. * Plan Fails CostBenefit Analysis: The tax revenue from pro growth policies that would help small businesses and create jobs pales in comparison to the revenue from the tax relief policies that spread the wealth around. * What to Do: The economy continues to struggle and private businesses are still hesitant to add new workers. The best way Congress can help reverse these ominous trends right now is to make permanent the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for all taxpayers. Second: empirics Riedl 7/13 Grover Hermann Fellow in Federal Budgetary Affairs (7/13/2010, Brian, "The Bush Tax Cuts and the Deficit Myth", http://www.heritage.org/Research/Commentary/2010/07/TheBushTaxCutsandtheDeficitMyth) MGM President Obama and congressional Democrats are blaming their trilliondollar budget deficits on the Bush tax cuts of 2001 and 2003. Letting these tax cuts expire is their answer. Yet the data flatly contradict this "tax cuts caused the deficits" narrative . Consider the three most persistent myths: The Bush tax cuts wiped out last decade's budget surpluses. Sen. John Kerry (D., Mass.), for example, has long blamed tax the cuts for having "taken a $5.6 trillion surplus and turned it into deficits as far as the eye can see." That $5.6 trillion surplus never existed. It was a projection by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) in January 2001 to cover the next decade. It assumed that late1990s economic growth and the stockmarket bubble (which had already peaked) would continue forever and generate recordhigh tax revenues. It assumed no recessions terrorist attacks, wars, natural disasters, and , no no no that all discretionary spending would fall to 1930s levels. The projected $5.6 trillion surplus between 2002 and 2011 will more likely be a $6.1 trillion deficit through September 2011. So what was the cause of this dizzying, $11.7 trillion swing? I've analyzed CBO's 28 subsequent budget baseline updates since January 2001. These updates reveal that the muchmaligned Bush tax cuts, at $1.7 trillion, caused just 14% of the swing from projected surpluses to actual deficits (and that is according to a "static" analysis, excluding any revenues recovered from faster economic growth induced by the cuts). The bulk of the swing resulted from economic and technical revisions (33%), other new spending (32%), net interest on the debt (12%), the 2009 stimulus (6%) and other tax cuts (3%). Specifically, the tax cuts for those earning more than $250,000 are responsible for just 4% of the swing. If there were no Bush tax cuts, runaway spending and economic factors would have guaranteed more than $4 trillion in deficits over the decade and kept the budget in deficit every year except 2007. The next decade's deficits are the result of the previous administration's profligacy . Mr. Obama asserted in his January State of the Union Address that by the time he took office, "we had a oneyear deficit of over $1 trillion and projected deficits of $8 trillion over the next decade. Most of this was the result of not three grounds. First, the wars, tax cuts and the prescription drug program were implemented in the early 2000s, yet by 2007 the deficit stood at only $161 billion. How could these stable policies have suddenly caused trilliondollar deficits beginning in 2009? (Obviously what happened was collapsing revenues from the recession along with stimulus spending .) Second, the president's $8 trillion figure minimizes the problem. Recent CBO data indicate a 10year baseline deficit closer to $13 trillion if Washington maintains today's taxandspend policies--whereby discretionary spending grows with the economy, war spending winds down, ObamaCare is implemented, and Congress extends all the Bush tax cuts, the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) patch, and the Medicare "doc fix" (i.e., no reimbursement cuts). Under this realistic baseline, the 10year cost of extending the Bush tax cuts ($3.2 trillion), the paying for two wars, two tax cuts, and an expensive prescription drug program." In short, it's all President Bush's fault. But Mr. Obama's assertion fails on Medicare drug entitlement ($1 trillion), and Iraq and Afghanistan spending ($515 billion) add up to $4.7 trillion. That's approximately onethird of the $13 trillion in baseline deficits--far from the majority the president claims. Third and most importantly, the White House methodology is arbitrary. With Washington set to tax $33 trillion and spend $46 trillion over the next decade, how does one determine which policies "caused" the $13 trillion deficit ? Mr. Obama could have just as easily singled out Social Security ($9.2 trillion over 10 years), antipoverty programs ($7 trillion), other Medicare spending ($5.4 trillion), net interest on the debt ($6.1 trillion), or nondefense discretionary spending ($7.5 trillion). There's no legitimate reason to single out the $4.7 trillion in tax cuts, war funding and the Medicare drug entitlement. A better methodology would focus on which programs are expanding and pushing the next decade's deficit up. Third: doubledip recession and collapse by 2011 Toronto Sun 6/18 (PETER WORTHINGTON, TORONTO SUN, 6/18/10, "Obama's tax increases will ruin economic recovery", lexis) The other day, Arthur Laffer (originator of the principle that lowering taxes increases tax revenues) had a disquieting article in the Wall Street Journal that should give pause about the future. He noted that tax cuts introduced in the U.S. when George Bush was president on Jan. 1, 2011. end The maximum income tax rate will then go from 35% to 39.6%, the dividend tax from 15% to a whopping 49.6%, capital gains tax from 15% to 20% and a death tax on estates from 0% to 55%. What that means is that people who can do it, are shifting production and income out of next year into this year, to take advantage Last printed 146 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 of lower taxes. This helps explain why the economic recovery in 2010 looks better than predicted. It also means next year income will be less than it should be , according to Laffer, "my best guess is that the train goes off the tracks and and we get our worst nightmare of a severe 'double dip' recession To support his prediction, Laffer points to 19 when ." 81 Ronald Reagan began a series of tax cuts that didn't take effect until 1983. So much economic activity was deferred until tax cuts the came into effect , that there was virtually no growth in America and unemployment reached 10%. Then 19 the in 83 " economy took off like a rocket with an average economic growth rate of 7.5%, and 5.5% in 1984. That was then, this is now. ", ECONOMY WILL COLLAPSE With recordsetting deficits and debt running deep into the trillions, President Barack Obama's deferred tax rate increases will likely be the reverse of President Reagan's tax rate decreases economy seem to the will collapse in 2011 . If corporate profits are considered as a share of the GDP, they are too high this year, considering the state of the U.S. economy as it struggles to emerge from recession These high profits represent a shift of income anticipated in 2011 into 2010 to avoid next year's high tax rate. If profits the . appear to tumble next year the stock market will react accordingly and plummet. At least that's the view of Arthur Laffer, a guy who has a record of accuracy and who doesn't sugarcoat his concerns. Politicians in both Canada and the U.S. (and elsewhere) have difficulty seeing how lowering taxes can increase tax revenues. The public doesn't have the same problem. If we of the unwashed multitudes are allowed to keep more of the money we earn, we are more likely to spend it. If the government takes it, we can't spend it. That seems obvious to wage earners, if not to those who feed at the public trough. Look at the capital gains tax. In the U.S., whenever this tax was lowered, investors tended to sell and buy more shares, thus the overall revenue from the gains tax increased , investors kept more of their own money, businesses benefited, more money was in constant circulation. Isn't that what the economy wants? There is virtually no downside to cutting taxes except it means government has to be more careful about how it spends money and , politicians and bureaucrats less prone to give themselves pay raises and benefits that exceed the confines of decency. There are few indications that the Obama administration appreciates the potential benefits of lowering taxes. Instead, it seems to believe that printing money and going into debt at least postpones the day of reckoning. Tough times loom ahead. ---No impact: First: other actors check, the economy won't decline enough, past recessions prove we'll recover, and world war two wasn't caused by the depression Second: doesn't cause war Ferguson, 06 (Niall, MA, D.Phil., is the Laurence A. Tisch Professor of History at Harvard University. He is a resident faculty member of the Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies. He is also a Senior Reseach Fellow of Jesus College, Oxford University, and a Senior Fellow of the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Foreign Affairs, Sept/Oct) Nor can economic crises explain the bloodshed. What may be most familiar causal chain in modern historiography links the the Great Depression to the rise of fascism and the outbreak of orld ar . But that simple story leaves too much out. Nazi Germany W W II started the war in Europe only after its economy had recovered. Not all the countries affected by the Great Depression were taken over by fascist regimes , nor did all such regimes start wars of aggression. In fact, no general relationship between economics and conflict is discernible for the century as a whole. Some wars came after periods of growth, others were the causes rather than the consequences of economic catastrophe, and some severe economic crises were not followed by wars. Third: it's resilient Washington Times, 08 chief political correspondent of The Washington Times (7/28/08, Donald Lambro, The Washington Times, "Always darkest before dawn", lexis, WEA) Last printed 147 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 The doomandgloomers are still with us, of course, and they will go to their graves forecasting that life as we know it is coming to an end and that we are in for years of economic depression and recession . Last week, the New York Times ran a Page One story maintaining that Americans were saving less than ever, and that their debt burden had risen by an average of $117,951 per household. And the London Telegraph says there are even harder times ahead, comparing today's economy to the Great Depression of the 1930s. Wall Street economist David Malpass thinks that kind of fearmongering is filled with manipulated statistics that ignore longterm wealth creation in our country, as well as globally. Increasingly, people are investing "for the long run for capital gains (not counted in savings) rather than current income in preparation for retirement," he told his clients last week. Instead of a coming recession, "we think the U.S. is in gradual recovery after a sharp twoquarter slowdown, with consumer resilience more likely than the decadesold expectation of a consumer slump," Mr. Malpass said. " Fed data shows clearly that household savings of all types liquid, financial and tangible still close to the are record levels set in September. IMF data shows U.S. households holding more net financial savings than the rest of the world combined. Consumption has repeatedly outperformed expectations in recent quarters and year," he said. The American economy has been pounded by a lot of factors, including the housing collapse (a needed correction to bring home prices down to earth), the mortgage scandal and the meteoric rise in oil and gas prices. But this $14 trillion economy, though slowing down, continues to grow by about 1 percent on an annualized basis, confounding the pessimists who said we were plunging into a recession, defined by negative growth over two quarters. That has not happened yet. Call me a cockeyed optimist, but I do not think we are heading into a recession. On the contrary, I'm more bullish than ever on our economy's longterm prospects. Last printed 148 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 APA Climate Good DA 2AC ---Won't pass: First no support and not on the top of the agenda SEO 623rd 2010 [http://www.seolawfirm.com/2010/06/senatedemocratswrestleoverclimatechangecapand trade/, "Senate Democrats wrestle over climate change and cap and trade" by Kristen Friend, SEO is a law firm sponsored news source] President Obama hopes to reinvigorate the push for comprehensive climate change legislation in a meeting with Senate lawmakers today. Climate change legislation has succumbed to the familiar fate of many recent Democratic measures: a perceived failure to be able to hit the 60vote threshold needed to overcome Republican filibuster a in the Senate. While the House answered Obama's call for climate chance legislation in 2009 with the passage of the House American Clean Energy and Security Act the , conventional wisdom moving into the summer of 2010 is that climate change legislation in the Senate now is dead on arrival. Several bills are competing for primacy, none of which seem to have the support they need to pass anytime soon. In an apparent attempt to prove clich that (recent) history is destined to repeat itself, Senate Democrats are causing as many headaches for themselves in the debate climate change over legislation as is their Republican opposition. Two Democratic bills, the KerryLieberman American Power Act and the CantwellCollins CLEAR Act offer competing views how on emissions should be regulated. Liberalleaning Senators, having already been snubbed on the issues of the public option in Health Insurance Reform and tougher regulation of banks and financial institutions during the financial reform debate are threatening to , walk and pull support for any bill that does not include strong incentives to limit carbon emissions. [1] And, Senator Jay Rockefeller (DW.Va.), has gone so far as to call for the Senate to abandon efforts to enact comprehensive climate change legislation altogether, urging lawmakers instead to focus on preventing the EPA from regulating greenhouse gases. [2] Second midterm pressure ew ork imes N Y T 6/28 (2010, by Mike Soraghan, "LameDuck Session Emerges as Possibility for Climate Bill Conference", http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2010/06/28/28climatewirelameducksessionemergesaspossibilityfor72268.html) What Sen. Harry Reid (DNev.) puts in the Senate climate and energy bill, and what gets added on the floor, may not matter as much as simply whether some bill passes. In the end, a joint HouseSenate conference committee will likely hammer out the final version of the That might bill. not take place until a "lame duck" session after the November election, when much of the political pressure on lawmakers has dissipated. Which means that despite the oftrepeated assertion by Sen. Lindsay Graham (RS.C.) that "cap and trade is dead," the House's bill based on cap and trade could be back in play someday, given the right conditions. Even if they do not enact cap and trade, Democratic leaders could use a conference to ratchet up the climate regulations past what the Senate agreed to and beyond what Democratic House centrists want. Last printed 149 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Obama Bad DA 2AC ---[WILL PASS] ---Unpopular powerful lobbies and Korean war legacy Harrison 3 (Selig, Director of the Asia Program at the Center for International Policy, is a senior scholar of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and director of the Century Foundation's Project on the United States and the Future of Korea. He has specialized in South Asia and East Asia for fifty years as a journalist and scholar and is the author of six books on Asian affairs and U.S. relations with Asia, Baluch expert and left wing theorist at the Carnegie Institute. Former managing editor of The New Republic, Former senior fellow in charge of Asian studies at the Brookings Institution, Senior fellow at the EastWest Center and Lecturer in Asian studies at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, Adjunct professor of Asian studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University, "Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and U.S. Disengagement", p. 1812) Why has the presence of U.S. ground forces in South Korea remained politically inviolate in Washington for nearly five decades? Part of the answer lies in the searing psychological legacy of the Korean War and the resulting imagery of North Korea as irrational and threatening, a new "Yellow Peril," an imagery inflated by fears that it will develop longrange missiles. This imagery has persisted despite the NorthSouth summit meeting of June 2000 and the subsequent visits of North Korea's secondranking leader, ViceMarshal Jo Myong Rok, to Washington, and of Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to Pyongyang. Indeed, Albright was widely criticized for legitimizing a brutal dictatorship. Some of the answer lies in the superficial appeal of the strategic arguments examined in part 5: the U.S. that presence helps stabilize a volatile part of the world and that any change in the U.S. posture would be seen as a "retreat" from Asia. But the key reason why the United States is stuck to South Korea "like Brer Rabbit was to the Tar Baby" is that Seoul has shown remarkable skill and determination in resisting any change. The impact of the negative images and the positive strategic arguments has been maximized over the years sustained and by effective South Korean lobbying efforts, aided by sympathizers in the Pentagon in and defense industries with a stake in Korea. The payoffs to members of Congress exposed in the 1976 "Koreagate" scandal were not isolated cases. A former Washington station chief of the South Korean CIA, Gen. Kim Yoon Ho, has told of how he arranged support for legislation relating to U.S. military aid and the U.S. force presence by channeling big export contracts to states with cooperative representatives in Congress, especially exports subsidized under a variety of U.S. economic and military aid programs. The manipulation of pricing in such contracts offered easy opportunities for rakeoffs to middlemen. In South Korean eyes, anything that will keep the United States in South Korea is morally justified because Washington was largely to blame for the division of the peninsula and remains obligated to stay until reunification is achieved. "The South Korean Embassy swings a lot of weight in Washington," observed David E. Brown, former director of Korean affairs in the State Department, in 1997. "Longtended friendships between conservatives in both capitals give extra potency to the political clout they wield. 17 South Korean influence in Washington has been reinforced by the support " of legions of U.S. military officers with fond memories of their years in Korea. The semiimperial trappings of U.S. military life there are epitomized by three eighteenhole golf courses, one of which occupied some of the most valuable real estate in Seoul until former Ambassador James Lilky persuaded the U.S. Army to relocate it. "The pain it took to do this," Lilley recalled, "is symptomatic of the military's resistance to giving up its perks. They told me about how they have to keep up morale to retain personnel, but you can't do this at the expense of your relations with the host countly."18 For officers with their families, the nine U.S. military installations in the South are selfsufficient enclaves equipped with most of the comforts of home and largely insulated from the local society. For the footloose, there are kiesang hostesses, the Korean equivalent of Japanese geisha. Most important, for the top brass of the U.S. Army, Korea is the last and only place left in the world where a fourstar general can be a "commander in chief' presiding over an operational command in a foreign country. All of the nine other "CinCs" with regional and functional commands have their headquarters in the United States. --- Vote no debate is congress, the plan is already proposed means the political capital is already used ---Plan costs political capital ROK Drop 8 (GI Korea, 7/4/08, "Why Immediate Withdrawal of USFK Will Not Happen Anytime Soon" http://rokdrop.com/2008/07/04/whyimmediate withdrawalofusfkwillnothappenanytimesoon/) Power of the Status Quo For anyone to tackle all the issues I have listed above it would take extraordinary dedication and effort to do so that would need to be maintained over a number of years until the pull out of forces from Korea is complete. For many political leaders, putting forth the multiyear effort necessary to withdraw USFK is simply too Last printed 150 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 much work with little political payoff, so why bother trying? --- No internal link issues are compartmentalized the plan has no effect on how politicians vote they always have self interest in mind ---Winners Lose Harris and VandeHei 7/15 (John F., editor in chief for Politico, Jim, executive editor and cofounder of Politico, "Why Obama loses by winning," POLITICO, July 15, http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=D58D428A18FE70B2A80D4E80D221BD8A) Thursday's passage of financial reform, just a couple months after the passage of a comprehensive health care overhaul, should decisively end the narrative that President Barack Obama represents a Jimmy Carter style case of naive hope crushed by the inability to master Washington. the mystery remains: Having moved swiftly toward achieving the very policy objectives he Yet promised voters as a candidate, Obama is still widely perceived as flirting with a failed presidency. Eric Alterman, in a column that drew wide notice, wrote in The Nation that most liberals think the president is a "big disappointment." House Democrats are in nearinsurrection after White House press secretary Robert Gibbs stated the obvious -- that the party has a chance of losing the House under Obama's watch. And independent voters have turned decisively against the man they helped elect 21 months ago -- a trend unlikely to be reversed before November. This is an odd reversal of expectations. When Obama came into office, the assumption even among some Democrats was that he was a dazzling politician and communicator who might prove too unseasoned at governance to win substantive achievements. The reality is the opposite. You can argue over whether Obama's achievements are good or bad on the merits. But, especially after Thursday's vote, you can't argue that Obama is not getting things done. To the contrary, he has, as promised, covered the uninsured, tightened regulations, started to wind down the war in Iraq and shifted focus and resources to Afghanistan, injected more competition into the education system and edged closer to a big energy bill. The problem is that he and his West Wing turn out to be not especially good at politics or communications -- in other words, largely ineffective at the very things on which their campaign reputation was built. And the promises he made in two years of campaigning turn out to be much less appealing as actual policies. "I tell you, it's very frustrating that it's not breaking through, when you look at these things and their scale," said a top Obama adviser, who spoke on background to offer a candid take on the state of play. "Can you imagine if Bill Clinton had achieved even one of these? Part of it is because we are divided, even on the left. ... And part of it is the culture of immediate gratification." But there are many other reasons for Obama's woes. Based on interviews with officials in the administration and on Capitol Hill, and with Democratic operatives around town, here are a halfdozen reasons why Obama is perceived as failing to win over the public, even though by most conventional measures he is clearly succeeding: ---Unpopular with GOP Feffer 4 contributor to Foreign Policy In Focus and the author of North Korea, South Korea: U.S. Policy at a Time of Crisis (6/23/04, John, "Bring Our Troops Home (from Korea)," http://www.lewrockwell.com/orig5/feffer1.html, JMP) North Korea has argued that it is under threat of U.S. attack and considers U.S. troops in South Korea a longstanding provocation. So let's try something new by putting U.S. troop presence on the negotiating table. With the advice and consent of our South Korean allies, the Bush administration should offer a timetable for the removal of all U.S. troops from the peninsula. Democrat would be hard pressed to offer such a deal. A When Jimmy Carter tried to withdraw U.S. troops from the peninsula, he hit major resistance from Washington insiders. Only the hawks in Washington the have political capital to push through complete withdrawal. a ---Foreign issues don't effect domestic Edwards 9 Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M University, holds the George and Julia Blucher Jordan Chair in Presidential Studies and has served as the Olin Professor of American Government at Oxford (George, "The Strategic President", Printed by the Princeton University Press, pg. 179180)MGM Did George W. Bush's extraordinarily high approval ratings following the terrorist attacks provide him a significant political resource in his attempts to obtain congressional support for his policies ? Did the patriotic response to the attacks help him to mobilize the public on behalf of his programs? The president certainly viewed public support as a potential advantage and was aware of its ephemeral nature, declaring, " is important to move as quickly as you can in order to spend whatever capital you have as It quickly as possible."40 Where the public supported his policieson fighting the war on terrorism abroad, on investigating and prosecuting terrorism Last printed 151 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 legislation was more difficult on the divisive domestic issues that remained on Congress's agenda, including health care, environmental protection, energy, the economy, government support for faithbased social programs, corporate malfeasance, judicial nominees, and taxes. The politics of the war on terrorism did not fundamentally alter the consideration of these issues, which continued to divide the public and their representatives in Congress as they had before. The inevitable differences between the parties emerged, exacerbated by the narrow majorities in each chamber and the jockeying for advantage in the midterm elections. The president was not able to turn public support for the war on terrorism into leverage for obtaining the passage of his domestic initiatives. at home, and in reorganizing the government to enhance domestic securitythe president ultimately won most of what he sought. Passing Last printed 152 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 China Containment DA 2AC Troops already reduced this postdates their link ev Bandow, 05 Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Reagan (Fall 2005, Doug, National Interest, "Seoul Searching," vol. 81, EBSCO, JMP) The Bush Administration also seems to think that South Korea is better prepared to stand on its own. Moving U.S. forces south essentially dismantling the fabled tripwire of fifty years and cutting the American garrison by onethird suggest that Washington no longer believes its military presence to be central to the ROK's security. As Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld explained after meeting with South Korean Defense Minister Yoon Kwangung, "the South Koreans are appropriately increasingly taking the lead in their own defense" and will be "assuming some missions and some responsibilities as we adjust our relationship going forward." Dealing with a nuclear North Korea would be more complicated but would not be aided by conventional troop deployments. To the contrary, America's force presence exacerbates the problem by creating thousands of American nuclear hostages within range of Pyongyang's weapons. Whether Washington ended up holding a nuclear umbrella over the ROK or encouraging South Korea to create its own nuclear deterrent, the United States would gain nothing by maintaining an Army division and other units in the South. No link navy fills in Ross, 05 Professor of Political Science at Boston College, an Associate at the John King Fairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University, and Senior advisor in the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Fall 2005, Robert S, "Assessing the China Threat," http://www.allbusiness.com/government/3584280 1.html) On the other hand, the U nited tates has long S defined U.S. dominance in maritime Southeast Asia as vital to U.S. security. So far, the rise of China does not threaten this interest. Moreover, despite the growth of Chinese economic influence, U.S. strategic partnerships in maritime East Asia are stronger than ever. So far, the U nited tates has S responded well to the rise of China. It has maintained its deterrent and stabilized the regional order. The entire thesis of our advantage is that after withdrawal China would not be aggressive and its increased influence in the region would prevent violent collapse, military response by South Korea, North Korean nuclearization, and allied proliferation that's 1AC Erickson and Bandow Withdrawal solves Chinese adventurism US troop presence guarantees conflict escalation Bandow, 04 senior fellow at the Cato Institute (Doug, "Withdrawal of U.S. forces a good start," Japan Times, August 22, Lexis) Japan understandably looks at China with unease, but Tokyo should construct a defensive force capable of deterring Chinese adventurism. Taiwan is an obvious potential flash point, but no sane American president would inaugurate a ground war with China. Still, critics contend, having troops nearby would better enable the U.S. to intervene in some future crisis. But most potential conflicts, like past ones in the Balkans, would not warrant American involvement. Moreover, allies often limit Washington's options. France would not even grant overflight rights to Washington to retaliate against Libya for the Berlin disco bombing. Seoul and Tokyo would be unlikely to let Washington use their bases in a war with China over Taiwan. Changing technology has reduced the value of propinquity. As Bush observed, our forces are "more agile and more lethal, they're better able to strike anywhere in the world over great distances on short notice." A major conflict like that in Iraq would require an extended buildup, irrespective of where the forces were located. In contrast, the benefits of withdrawing are obvious. As the president observed: "Our service members will have more time on the home front, and more predictability and fewer moves over a career... The taxpayers will save money as we configure our military to meet the threats of the 21st century." Drawing down unnecessary overseas garrisons would reduce pressure on personnel resulting from the unexpectedly difficult Iraqi occupation. Roughly 40 percent of the 140,000 troops now stationed in Iraq are Reserve or National Guard. Bush also contended that his proposal would "strengthen our alliances around the world." Actually, pulling out troops would not improve existing relationships. Indeed, former U.N. Ambassador Richard Holbrooke complained that "the Germans are very unhappy about these withdrawals. The Koreans are going to be equally unhappy." A few officials in Asia might fear for their security. Some Europeans complain that the administration is retaliating for their opposition to the U.S. invasion of Iraq. However, most critics most worry about the economic impact on local communities surrounding American bases. Last printed 153 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Washington's response should be, so what? Proposals for drawing down U.S. forces were made long before the Iraq war and are justified by changing strategic realities, whatever the Bush administration's private intentions. Moreover, Americans aren't responsible for making Germans and Koreans happy. The economic health of small German villages is a problem for Berlin, not Washington. Still, some U.S. devotees of the status quo worry about the impact of Bush's initiative. Charged Wesley Clark, who commanded President Bill Clinton's misbegotten war on Serbia: the move would "significantly undermine U.S. national security." Even if transAtlantic ties loosened, the U.S. would be better off. America's alliances are mostly security black holes, with Washington doing the defending and allies doing the carping. Withdrawal would force friendly states to take on full responsibility for their own defense, which would enhance U.S. security. Why do Americans patrol Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia, which are of only peripheral interest to Europe and of no concern to the U.S.? Japan should take on a frontline role in deterring potential Chinese adventurism. Why does Washington treat populous and prosperous South Korea as a perpetual defense dependent? Plan solves the impact it prompts South Korean conventional force modernization which allows it to deter Chinese aggression that's Bandow South Korea views China as a threat it will modernize in response to withdrawal Richardson, 06 Washingtonbased analyst who covered East Asian security issues as a presidential management fellow with the US Department of Defense, cofounder of The Korea Liberator weblog focused on North Korea (Coreyu, "South Korea Must Choose Sides", Asia Times, September 9th 2006, June 27th 2010, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/HI09Dg02.html, KONTOPOULOS) South Korea wants to be the "hub" of something in East Asia, and it may finally have its chance, thanks to the Roh administration. The current USSouth Korea situation is a case of "be careful of what you ask for because you might get it". Even so, the psychological impact on South Korea of a significant USFK departure likely would not be immediate but should not be underestimated. A massive reduction of US troop levels and capabilities could have the same effect as a complete withdrawal on Seoul's planning processes. It might begin with regretful concern, but could quickly become panic. At this point it should be noted that even if the USFK withdraws from Korea, some sort of collaborative security agreement will remain in place. However, South Korea's perception of America's commitment to security on the peninsula is the decisive factor in how it will react to real and perceived threats. What are now relatively minor disagreements with Japan and China would take on a more serious dimension. Without USFK, South Korea would need vastly to increase its defense budget to make up for functions long taken for granted. With American forces on its soil as a safety net, South Korea didn't have to be overly concerned with being attacked or invaded. Many Koreans would perceive that era over. They do not have a single piece of link evidence that is specific to South Korea means only a risk that the plan solves back Chinese aggression Troops make conflict with China inevitable Bandow, 09 Fellow at the American Conservative Defense Alliance and Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Reagan (1/12/09, Doug, "First Among Equals," http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=20570 , JMP) It's the job of military planners to plot future contingencies, which is why the U.S. Joint Forces Command looked ahead in its newly published Joint Operating Environment 2008. Despite obvious foreign threats, America's destiny continues to remain largely in its own hands. No other country could draft such a report with such a perspective. The Europeans, constrained by the European Union and their memories of World War II, must cast a wary eye towards Russia and have little military means to influence events much beyond Africa. For all of its pretensions of power, Moscow is economically dependent on Europe and fearful of an expanding China; Russia's military revival consists of the ability to beat up small neighbors on its border. Countries like Australia, South Korea and Japan are not without resources, but they are able to influence their regions, no more. Brazil is likely to become the dominant player in South America, but global clout is far away. India and China are emerging powers, but remain well behind Russia and especially the United States. Every other nation would have to start its operational analysis with America, which alone possesses the ability to intervene decisively in every region. The main challenge facing the United States will be becoming more like other nations. That is, over time other states will grow economically relative to America. That will allow them to improve and expand their militaries. Washington will long remain first among equals, the most powerful single global player. But eventually it will no longer be able to impose its will on any nation in any circumstance. Last printed 154 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 That doesn't mean the United States will be threatened. Other countries won't be able to defeat America or force it to terms. But the outcomes of ever more international controversies will become less certain. Other governments will be more willing in more instances to say no to Washington. Especially China. Much will change in the coming years, but as the JOE 2008 observes, The SinoAmerican relationship represents one of the great strategic question marks of the next twentyfive years. Regardless of the outcome--cooperative or coercive, or both--China will become increasingly important in the considerations and strategic perceptions of joint force commanders. What kind of a power is Beijing likely to become? Chinese policymakers emphasize that they plan a "peaceful rise," but their ambitions loom large. Argues JOE 2008, while the People's Republic of China doesn't "emphasize the future strictly in military terms," the Chinese do calculate "that eventually their growing strength will allow them to dominate Asia and the Western Pacific." More ominously, argues the Joint Forces Command, "The Chinese are working hard to ensure that if there is a military confrontation with the United States sometime in the future, they will be ready." Washington almost certainly will be unable to thwart Beijing, at least at acceptable cost. China needs spend only a fraction of America's military outlays to develop a deterrent capability--nuclear sufficiency to forestall nuclear coercion, submarine and missile forces to sink U.S. carriers, and antisatellite and cyberwarfare weapons to blind and disrupt American forces. Washington could ill afford to intervene in East Asia against the PRC so equipped. Such a military is well within China's reach. Notes JOE 2008: "by conservative calculations it is easily possible that by the 2030s China could modernize its military to reach a level of Yet this assessment is far less threatening than it sounds. The PRC is not capable (nor close to being capable) of threatening vital U.S. interests--conquering American territory, threatening our liberties and constitutional system, cutting off U.S. trade with the rest of the world, dominating Eurasia and turning that rich resource base against America. After all, the United States has the world's most sophisticated and powerful nuclear arsenal; China's intercontinental delivery capabilities are quite limited. America has eleven carrier groups while Beijing has none. Washington is allied with most every other industrialized state and a gaggle of the PRC's neighbors. China is surrounded by nations with which it has been at war in recent decades: Russia, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam and India. Indeed, today Beijing must concentrate on defending itself. In pointing to the PRC's investment in submarines, the JOE 2008 acknowledges: "The emphasis on nuclear submarines and an increasingly global Navy in particular, underlines worries that the U.S. Navy possesses the ability to shut down China's energy imports of oil--80% of which go through the straits of Malacca." The Chinese government is focused on preventing American intervention against it in its own neighborhood, not on contesting U.S. dominance elsewhere in the world, let alone in North America. approximately one quarter of current U.S. capabilities without any significant impact on its economy." Thus, absent the unlikely economic and social collapse of China, in not too many years Beijing will able to enforce its "no" to America. Washington must reconsider its response. U.S. taxpayers already spend as much as everyone else on earth on the military. It's a needless burden, since promiscuous intervention overseas Russia, India and other states would require disproportionately larger military outlays in the United States. It's a game Washington cannot win. A better alternative would be to more carefully delineate vital interests, while treating lesser issues as matters for diplomacy rather than military action. Equally important, the American government should inform its allies that their security is in the first instance their responsibility. Washington should act as an offshore balancer to prevent domination of Eurasia by a hostile hegemon. But the United States should not attempt to coercively micromanage regional relations. Stepping back today would reduce pressure on Beijing to engage in a sustained arms buildup to limit U.S. intervention in the future. If the PRC nevertheless moved forward, its neighbors could take note and respond accordingly. Encouraging China to keep its rise peaceful is in everyone's interest. Despite the many challenges facing U.S. policy, America retains an extraordinarily advantageous position in today's global order. Eventually, the United States is likely to fall to merely first among many--the globe's leading state, but no longer the hyper or unipower, as America has been called. The sooner Washington begins preparing for this new role, the smoother will be the transition. does not make Americans safer. To maintain today's overwhelming edge over progressively more powerful militaries in China, Last printed 155 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 ROK Investment DA 2AC ---Recent economic downturn proves why South Korea economy is already low they rely on U.S. trade and goods exports are what their uniqueness assumes And democratic economy low Kim 7 Policy Analyst in Heritage's Center for International Trade and Economics (2/3/07, "South Korea's Economy at the Crossroads," http://www.heritage.org/Research/Commentary/2007/02/SouthKoreasEconomyattheCrossroads) This year marks the 10th anniversary of the Asian financial crisis, better known as the "IMF crisis" in South Korea. It forced South Korea to renounce its government controlled economic strategies and to embrace firm market principles. Surely, this transformation was a loud wakeup call for South Korea , as it was, though, the aftermath of the crisis helped South Korea's leaders realize what is lacking in South Korea: economic which had enjoyed spectacular economic growth over the previous two decades under government's heavy hands . As painful freedom. Economic freedom is essential for an economy to prosper, as the Heritage Foundation/Wall Street Journal Index of Economic Freedom documents annually. Economic freedom encompasses all liberties and rights associated with the production, distribution or consumption of goods and services. It includes the protection of basic rights, such as property ownership, and commercial freedoms, such as unfettered movement of labor, capital and goods. By eliminating obstacles, economic freedom creates a framework in which innovation is welcomed and economic prosperity is enhanced and sustained. One critical Index finding replicated year after year is the stunningly high correlation between economic freedom and prosperity. The general rule, simply put, is this: The higher the degree of economic freedom a people enjoy, the greater their economic opportunity and therefore prosperity. In the aftermath of the financial meltdown, South Korea's willingness to undertake tough reforms to adopt more economic freedom has indeed allowed the economy to swiftly bounce back from the economic turmoil. Many reform measures have been employed to revamp the weakness that led to the crisis. Nonperforming loans have been effectively dealt with through extensive financial reforms, and the banking sector has been strengthened. South Korea has slashed its regulations by more than half (from 17,000 in 1998) and cut corporate tax rates to be a more competitive economy. Today, according to the 2007 Index, South Korea's economy is 68.6 percent free, making it the world's 36th freest economy. Unfortunately, however, a closer look reveals that South Korea's level of economic freedom is neither as comprehensive nor concrete as it should be. For example, although its as regulatory process has improved, bureaucracy and lack of transparency still hinders entrepreneurial activities. Interventionist government policies still linger. South Korea's labor freedom is also shackled by restrictive employment regulations that hamper employment and productivity growth. Militant labor unions make the situation worse, disrupting the rule of law and undermining productivity. As a result, opportunities have eluded entrepreneurs and consumers have been harmed. Uncertainty and lack of opportunity frustrates people, particularly the young, and small and mediumsized companies. Antibusiness sentiment and populist attacks on free market and globalization become more frequent. These developments, in turn, make it harder for South Korea to expand economic freedom. How should South Korea respond? Rather than just talking, seriousness about enhancing South Korea's economic freedom should mean matching rhetoric with more concrete actions in modernizing and upgrading economic system. The role of government is not to create and distribute wealth. It's to clear the way for people to create their own wealth. More importantly, South Korea must start with a bigger change a change in mindset. Globalization is a fact of life in Korea. It is happening in the economy, but it should also happen in the way of thinking so that South Korea looks outward, not inward. Indeed, many of the positive changes South Korea has achieved since the crisis can be attributed to discarding the old way of thinking. A truly dynamic Korea should embrace more economic freedom in order to adapt its social model to global realities. Protectionist and extreme nationalistic sentiment recently shown in the violent protests against ongoing FTA negotiations with the United States is shameful and shouldn't be tolerated. A failure to carry through on necessary economic reform with strong leadership may add to growing international concerns over Seoul's receptivity to foreign business investment. The danger isn't that the South Korean economy will collapse but that it will become less attractive to investors who will increasingly bypass South Korea to invest elsewhere, including competitive rival China. This 10th anniversary of the "IMF crisis" is also a year in which South Korea will hold a presidential election an election that will shape its economic direction. It should be the year for a frank national discussion on how to continue and enhance South Korea's prosperity. South Korea must not shy away from the challenge of pursuing more economic freedom. Last printed 156 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 ---Plan solves the economy: First: investments would be shared between the North and South South Korea could build up infrastructure in North Korea solves back for their economy Second: modernization solves the US got out of the biggest economic downturn in history by building up their military empirics prove this plan key to solve economy Third: Fear of strikes kills investor confidence Lim 7--Fellow at the Korea Development Institute (Wonhyuk, Economic Consequences of ROKU.S. Separation, 27 November 2007, http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/07086Lim.html, AMiles) Although the prevailing assumption is that foreign investment is unsustainable in the ROK without a U.S.guaranteed peace, it should be asked how essential security is in determining investment inflows and how crucial the U.S. guarantee is in maintaining the peace on the Korean peninsula. As for the first question, although security may be regarded as the most fundamental variable, what actually played a larger role is the ROK's policy on investment liberalization and commercial attractiveness of its assets. Figure 3 on FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) inflows and Table 1 on the foreign investors' share of ROK stockmarket capitalization show that the dramatic increase in investment flows took place in the postcrisis period. Moreover, the investor reaction to nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula for more than a decade suggests that the the critical variable is possibility of war the , not the quality of the military alliance per se. In fact, if the ROKU.S. alliance is strong but is about to launch a preemptive strike on the DPRK, investors are likely to take flight from the Korean peninsula and its neighboring countries. When the nuclear crisis broke for the first time in FebruaryMarch 1993, the market capitalization of the Korean Stock Exchange declined by 6.5 percent. At this time, there was hardly any strain in the ROKU.S. alliance, but investors were seriously concerned about a military conflict on the Korean peninsula over the DPRK's nuclear program. By contrast, when investors apparently interpreted the DPRK's brinkmanship in 2005 as an attempt to draw attention from the U.S. and break a diplomatic deadlock, the Korean stock market achieved solid gains. ---No link it assumes break up of the U.S.- South Korea alliance plan doesn't do that we'll still have relations with them through other means ---No impact: First: Past proves Lim 7--Fellow at the Korea Development Institute (Wonhyuk, Economic Consequences of ROKU.S. Separation, 27 November 2007, http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/07086Lim.html, AMiles) USFK = US forces in Korea With regard to the increase in defense burden caused by the termination of the alliance, it would be useful to recall that the ROK managed to build its deterrent capability in the 1970s in conjunction with its HCI drive when it was faced with a reduced security commitment from the U.S.and when it had far less economic and security resources than now, especially relative to the DPRK. With the world's thirteenth largest economy, the ROK should be able to handle its security challenges much more effectively. In such defense related industries as shipbuilding, electronics, steel, and automobiles, the ROK is one of the top five producers in the world. It also holds the world's fourth largest foreign reserves, after China, Japan, and Taiwan. The ROK has indeed come a long way since the early 1960s when it was one of the poorest countries in the world. According to an estimate provided by the Ministry of National Defense to the National Assembly in September 2002, the value of USFK equipment and materiel ranges from 14.0 to 25.9 billion dollars depending on assumptions. With the ROK's current GDP close to $1 trillion, the cost of replacing USFK equipment and materiel amounts to 1.4 to 2.6 percent of GDP. Although this is not a small sum of money, it is by no means unaffordable for the ROK. In fact, as a percentage of GDP, additional defense expenditure this is much smaller than the burden the ROK had to bear in the 1970s to build up its military. As Figure 1 in the previous section showed, the ROK's defense spending as a percentage of GDP increased from 3.47 percent in 1973 to 5.95 percent in 1980. Although an increase in defense expenditure is likely to raise fiscal deficit or reduce government spending in economic and social areas, adverse its impact on overall economic growth likely is to be manageable . According to a simulation study released in 2003, the ROK's annual GDP is expected to decline Last printed 157 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 by 1.20 to 1.25 percent each year when the ROK's defense expenditure as a percentage of GDP is increased (by debt financing) from 2.9 percent to 3.5 percent for each of next seven years to replace USFK equipment and materiel.(12) Also, the ROK's experience with a rapid defense buildup in the 1970s suggests that an increased defense burden of this magnitude would not have a large adverse effect on the economy. Second: other ties Lim 7--Fellow at the Korea Development Institute (Wonhyuk, Economic Consequences of ROKU.S. Separation, 27 November 2007, http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/07086Lim.html, AMiles) As for the spillover effect on bilateral economic relations, it is important to recall that even the acrimonious exchange of words in the security area from 2002 to 2005 did not have a significant economic impact on investment and trade between the U.S. and ties ROK. For the United States, the ROK is now the seventh largest trading partner, ahead of such Western European countries as France and Italy; whereas, for South Korea, the United States is the third largest trading partner, after China and Japan. Although ROKU.S. interaction has had a positive influence on the ROK's institutionbuilding efforts in the economic area, this effect should not be overstated. On balance, the ROK's accession to the GATT/ WTO, OECD, and other international normsetting institutions has had a greater impact on economic liberalization has the ROK's alliance relationship with the U.S. It should also be noted that than many nonU.S. allies, including China, have adopted global economic norms as part of their requirements for joining international organizations. Moreover, the ROK's economic development since the 1960s has reduced dependence on the U.S its . In particular, as Figure 2 shows, China's increasing relative importance to the ROK in economic terms has become unmistakable in recent years. In 1991, the year before the ROK and China normalized relations, China bought only 1.4 percent of the ROK's exports while the U.S. accounted for 25.8 percent. By 2003, however, China's share of the ROK's exports had increased to 18.1 percent while U.S the . share had declined to 17.7 percent. Of course, as the controversy over the ancient kingdom of Koguryo in 2004 suggests, the increasing economic importance of China does not mean that the ROK would lean toward China at the expense of the U.S. The ROK's more diversified economic portfolio just means that it has more independence.(13) More fundamentally, the extent to which trade tends to "follow the flag" seems to have been reduced in the postCold War era. In fact, some have argued that while U.S. allies were "too important to fail" during the Cold War, security considerations no longer play a prominent role in determining a response to a major economic crisis like the Asian crisis in 199798. The integration of former (and some current) socialist countries into the global economy seems to have accentuated the tendency to decouple security considerations from economic issues. ---Military doesn't affect investment Snyder, 08 Senior Associate in the International Relations program of The Asia Foundation and Pacific Forum CSIS (Scott, Asia Policy, "U.S.ROK Civil Society Ties: Dynamics and Prospects in a PostAlliance World." In "What If? A World without the U.S.ROK Alliance." Ed. by Nicholas Eberstadt, Aaron L. Friedberg & Geun Lee Number 5, (January 2008), 4359) How does the private sector interact with the security alliance? There is a widespread assumption that the two are closely connected and that foreign investment is unsustainable on the peninsula without U.S.guaranteed deterrence of North Korean aggression. At an AmCham breakfast meeting held in Seoul with then U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in November 2003, a participant asked whether U.S. security guarantees as "a critical issue for guaranteeing that [foreign investor] confidence" were being weakened by reductions in the level of United States Forces Korea (USFK). Rumsfeld responded that he was sensitive to issues of business confidence and that USFK reconfiguration would enhance U.S. capabilities and strengthen the U.S. commitment to the defense of South Korea. It is no longer clear that 2 the business confidence of investors in South Korea is directly correlated with security the alliance . One measure of the diminished influence of rising security tensions on private sector confidence is the reaction of the South Korean stock market (the KOSPI) both to the North Korean nuclear crisis and the reconfiguration of the USFK in South Korea. On October 17, 2002, the KOSPI rose to 644.66, despite news that North Korea had admitted develop nuclear weapons ing and a sameday downturn on Wall Street. On January 10, 2003, when North Korea announced the country's 3 Last printed 158 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the market showed volatility within an hour of the announcement but ended up only slightly lower at 628.36.4 Moody's Investors Service's downgrade of South Korea's ratings outlook from "positive" to "negative" on February 13, 2003, jolted the market, which closed at 575.98 on concerns over geopolitical risks, but local analysts assessed that the influence of the downgrade would be "temporary" and "marginal" in light of solid economic fundamentals. Following the establishment of a dialogue channel with North Korea in April of 2003, however, the Korean stock market appears to have decoupled from lingering concerns over the North Korean nuclear issue, as the KOSPI has barely registered any reaction to North Korea's attempts to escalate the crisis. The Financial Times seemed prescient in the assessment that "investors in Northeast Asia have tended to ignore the threat posed by North Korea to the stability of the region and their money" but proved to be less surefooted in the prediction that "fund managers can no longer ignore the geopolitical risks attached to their investments in South Korea and Japan."5 The KOSPI reached the 1,000 level on February 25, 2005, and topped 1,500 on April 8, 2007, almost tripling the index's capitalization value despite the protracted nuclear crisis, including North Korea's February 2005 announcement that the country possessed nuclear weapons capability, the July 2006 missile tests, and the October 2006 nuclear test. Tellingly, foreign investors bought heavily to arrest the KOSPI's fall during trading even before the end of the day of the nuclear test.6 The KOSPI's rise has stimulated recent analysis that the "Korean discount," the relatively lower capitalization of Korean assets compared to assessments of their real worth owing to concerns about tensions on the peninsula, is gradually fading away despite the North Korean nuclear imbroglio remaining unresolved.7 Based on an analysis of market responses following ten events related to the North Korean nuclear crisis, the Korea Times reported that foreign investors took net buying positions in half of the cases and net selling positions in half of the cases. The market sustained a loss during the week following new nuclearrelated events in only one case: the week following North Korea's decision to remove IAEA seals from the Yongbyon nuclear facilities in December 2002.8 A separate but related question is whether the withdrawal of U.S. troops--or a sharp spike in tensions with North Korea --might have a dramatically negative effect on foreign investment in South Korea in the future. Future of the Alliance (FOTA) and Security Policy Initiative (SPI) negotiations over the reconfiguration of the U.S. presence, including a reduced level of U.S. forces on the Korean peninsula, occurred regularly during 200307. At no point was there public suggestion that a these negotiations had an influence on the behavior of Korean equity markets. The data presented above clearly suggest that reconfiguring the USFK in South Korea and the delinking of the level of U.S. troop presence from the North Korean nuclear crisis, as well as North Korean crisis escalation tactics, have had a minimal influence on investor confidence in South Korea's equity markets. South Korean analyses of factors affecting levels of inward direct foreign investment during this period do not even take into account Korea's division as a factor.9 Unless the end of the U.S.ROK security alliance is tied to a significant downturn in the overall U.S.ROK political relationship, there is no evidence that significant events related to the North Korean nuclear crisis are directly influencing private sector relations between the two countries. Last printed 159 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Russia SOI DA 2AC No risk of expansion rollback strategies check J.R. Dunn, consulting editor of American Thinker and editor of the forthcoming Military Thinker, August 26, 2008. "Rollback Russian Expansionism" American Thinker. http://www.americanthinker.com/2008/08/how_to_rollback_russia.html How can it be adapted to the present situation? By taking the Reagan effort as a blueprint. Reagan applied relentless pressure military, financial, and political on Soviet weak points. No attempt was made to challenge the Soviets directly. At the same time, accepted means of support for the Soviet regime agricultural credits, industrial exchanges, technological and scientific collaboration were curtailed. There was no easing of pressure in the short term, nor were any negotiations offered. At the same time the Soviets were allowed a clear path of retreat. Rollback was a rational strategy, punishing bad behavior and rewarding rational decisions but only after these had been demonstrated in concrete. Consideration must be made of Russian fears, and each of those fears made a reality. If Russia fears encirclement, she should be encircled. If Russia fears military inferiority, that inferiority should be clearly established. If Russia fears American technology, that technology should be unleashed. A serious defensive league of former Soviet states, including Central Europe, the Baltics, Ukraine, and the Caucasian and Central Asian states, should be formed under the quiet sponsorship of the U.S. The mutually defensive purpose of this pact should be emphasized, with the threat remaining unnamed. Lowkey exercises and consultations between militaries should be carried out, with select officers sent to the U.S. for further training. The fact that many of these countries are political and territorial rivals is scarcely relevant at this point. Such questions must be set aside in light of national survival. American diplomats should take the lead here. Revocation of easements and allowances given the Russians such as the use of the Sebastopol navy base should be brought to the table. The Ukraine has already placed limitations on the use of the base (and been answered with Russian threats). This is a good start that needs to be taken further. Sebastopol is not a Guantanamo or Gibraltar situation, a base in a remote area easily isolated from contact with the host nation. Sebastopol is a major Ukrainian city. Methods of making life unpleasant for the Russians are myriad, and include strikes, shutting down utilities for "repair" or "maintenance", and other forms of harassment. Sebastopol is a Russian weak point, and they need to be made aware of th this quickly and repeatedly. (A friendly visit by U.S. 6 Fleet units to our Ukrainian friends should also be put on the calendar, perhaps combined with Black Sea exercises with Ukrainian naval forces. Such a visit has already occurred in Georgia.) Russian "peacekeepers" are illegal occupiers in South Ossetia and Abkhazia and life ought to be made hot for them. There is technically no difference between the invasion and occupation of portions of Georgia and the invasion and occupation of Afghanistan. Particular attention should be paid to the Ossetian and Abkhazian "irregulars" who followed Russian troops into Georgia. It was they who carried out the majority of executions, rapes, and looting. Georgia was treated with almost the same level of brutality as Nazi Germany during the Soviet advance of 1945. The Russian "irregulars" are war criminals, and ought to be dealt with as such. The final factor in Reagan's winning strategy, the S trategic efense D Initiative, has its equivalent in the National Missile Defense system now being extended to cover Europe. This system, which is a lineal descendant of SDI, drives the Russians to distraction for the simple reason that they can't duplicate it. The proposed placement of missiles in Poland is a evidently major source of Russian belligerence. (The Poles, who had been dawdling over negotiations, signed an agreement immediately upon the invasion of a Georgia. So much for Putin's strategic "brilliance".) Much can be done with this system. The Ukrainians have offered use of two radar sites They . should be taken up on it, and discussions concerning the potential support roles of other postSoviet states should be opened. The Russians truly believe that American technology is a magic box that when tapped, pours forth all sorts of miracles. Playing on this fear paid dividends during the 80s. There is no reason why it won't work again. (One element that should not be overlooked is the fact that the Navy's Aegis system has been upgraded to fill the antiballistic missile role. Perhaps those ships visiting Sebastopol could be Aegis destroyers?) That's what rollback would look like in the 21 st century. No aggression, no revanchism, simply unending and consistent pressure intended to modify Russian behavior to match international norms. The more Russia misbehaves, the more trouble she will see. Russia is nowhere near as powerful as the Soviet Union. It's reported that Putin had to transfer an entire army from Central Russia to do the job in Georgia the forces in the Caucasus simply weren't up to it. Similarly, postinvasion bluster about the Russian navy acquiring a halfdozen aircraft carriers is completely empty. Such a naval program would challenge even the U.S., with all its resources. And it happens that the sole shipyard capable of such a project is located... in the Ukraine. This is the reason and the only reason why the Russians are rattling nuclear weapons (and at Poland, no less). Their hand is weak, and they know it. The current Russian elite is comprised not of ideologues but hustlers, who very much want to live to enjoy power and riches. Actual use of nuclear weapons is the last thing on their minds. Nor is Russia is anywhere near as economically robust as it seems. Recent reports indicate that the country's oil wealth is based on redrilling already exploited sites. Little in the way of new exploration has been carried out and is not likely to happen without outside investment. Russia's oil bubble may be ready to burst. (This brings up a related aspect of the rollback strategy: yet another reason for the U.S. to begin offshore drilling and building nuclear plants. Russia is flexing its muscles thanks in large part to funding gained from recent oil hikes. Cut the income, and we'll at the same time cut the impulse to shake up the international system.) Russian sphere of influence inevitable Zhukov 8 (Yuri, PhD in government from Harvard, Masters with Honors from Georgetown, and AB with honors in International Relations, "A Russian Sphere of Last printed 160 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Influence is Geopolitical Reality" http://www.nextamerica.org/node/460) Even so, U.S. participation in such a competition would be unsustainable. Though currently in a muchdiminished state, a Russian sphere of influence is not simply the ambition of Moscow's current leadership, it is geopolitical reality. Through its position on the Eurasian landmass, Russia controls many of these countries' links to the outside world, including critical pipelines, railroads and ports. Russia also remains the destination for most of the region's labor migrants and is the origin of large volumes of remittances, amounting to as much as 2530% of some receiving countries' GDP. The U.S. will struggle to find a sufficiently compelling national interest to justify an allocation of resources and political capital sufficient to roll back Russian this influence. U.S. interests in Eurasia tend to be driven by the extent to which regional trends can support or hinder success in other areas -- strategic access to Afghanistan, containment of Iran, diversification of energy routes. These interests are significant, but --by force of geography alone -- they will never be as proximate or enduring as those of Russia. Violence in the separatist regions of Georgia has clear implications for security in the North Caucasus. Likewise, a security vacuum in Central Asia has direct implications for the smuggling of Afghan narcotics into Russia. It should come as no surprise that throughout the last 20 years, no other major power has taken an equally active interest in the resolution of regional conflicts. Turn Russian sphere of influence good A weak Russia means proliferation in numerous countries Zhukov 8 (Yuri, PhD in government from Harvard, Masters with Honors from Georgetown, and AB with honors in International Relations, "A Russian Sphere of Influence is Geopolitical Reality" http://www.nextamerica.org/node/460) Finally, a policy of neocontainment would be counterproductive. The alternative to a Russian sphere of influence may be a political and security vacuum, not necessarily a stronger U.S. position. As a global power, the U.S. will always face multiple demands on its foreign policy, of which Eurasia will rarely be the most pressing. Neither it nor any other regional power -- whether China, India, Turkey or Iran -- is likely to garner the resources and will to fill the void left by Russia. Meanwhile, when isolated and pushed into a corner, even a weak Moscow could create significant problems in areas of great importance to the U.S. -- in weapons proliferation, Iran, the Eastern Mediterranean, Venezuela, the Korean Peninsula and the former Soviet in Union itself. Absent a credible commitment to the defense of its allies in Eurasia, the U.S. will need to consider whether neocontainment is an effective means to support the independence of Russia's neighbors, or whether it will only bolster Russia's desire to re assert its authority in the region. Accepting a Russian sphere of influence in Eurasia need not be a strategic retreat . The U.S. should continue to expand its relationships with Russia's neighbors and support their continued independence. At the same time, the U.S. should be keenly aware of the limits of what it can achieve. Proliferation causes global nuclear war Cimbala, 2008 [Stephen, Distinguished Prof. Pol. Sci. Penn. State Brandywine, Comparative Strategy, "Anticipatory Attacks: Nuclear Crisis Stability in Future Asia", 27, InformaWorld] If the possibility existed of a mistaken preemption during and immediately after the Cold War, between the experienced nuclear forces and command systems of America and Russia, then it may be a matter of even more concern with regard to states with newer and more opaque forces and command systems. In addition, the Americans and Soviets (and then Russians) had a great deal of experience getting to know one another's military operational proclivities and doctrinal idiosyncrasies, including those that might influence the decision for or against war. Another consideration, relative to nuclear stability in the present century, is that the Americans and their NATO allies shared with the Soviets and Russians a commonality of culture and historical experience. Future threats to American or Russian security from weapons of mass destruction may be presented by states or nonstate actors motivated by cultural and social predispositions not easily understood by those in the West nor subject to favorable manipulation during a crisis. The spread of nuclear weapons in Asia presents a complicated mosaic of possibilities in this regard. States with nuclear forces of variable force structure, operational experience, and commandcontrol systems will be thrown into a matrix of complex political, social, and cultural crosscurrents contributory the possibility of . In addition to the existing nuclear powers in Asia, others may to war seek nuclear weapons if they feel threatened by regional rivals or hostile alliances. Containment of nuclear proliferation in Asia is a desirable political objective for all of the obvious reasons. Nevertheless, the present century is unlikely to see the nuclear hesitancy or risk aversion that marked the Cold War, in part, because the military and political discipline imposed by the Cold War superpowers no longer exists, but also because states in Asia have new aspirations for regional or global respect.12 spread of ballistic missiles and The other nuclearcapable delivery systems in Asia, or in the Middle East with reach into Asia, especially is dangerous because plausible adversaries Last printed 161 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 live close together and are already engaged in ongoing disputes about territory or other issues.13 The Cold War Americans and Soviets required missiles and airborne delivery systems of intercontinental range to strike at one another's vitals. But shortrange ballistic missiles or fighterbombers suffice for India and Pakistan to launch attacks at one another with potentially "strategic" effects . China shares borders with Russia, North Korea, India, and Pakistan; Russia, with China and NorthKorea; India, with Pakistan and China; Pakistan, with India and China; and so on. The short flight times of ballistic missiles between the cities or military forces of contiguous states means that very little time will be available for warning and attack assessment by the defender. Conventionally armed missiles could easily be mistaken for a tactical nuclear first use. Fighterbombers appearing over the horizon could just as easily be carrying nuclear weapons as conventional ordnance. In addition to the challenges posed by shorter flight times and uncertain weapons loads, potential victims of nuclear attack in Asia may also have first strikevulnerable forces and commandcontrol systems that increase decision pressures for rapid, and possibly mistaken, retaliation. This potpourri possibilities challenges conventional wisdom about nuclear deterrence and proliferation on the part of policymakers of and academic theorists. For policymakers in the United States and NATO, spreading nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in Asia could profoundly shift the geopolitics of mass destruction from a European center of gravity (in the twentieth century) to an Asian and/or Middle Eastern center of gravity (in the present century).14 This would profoundly shake up prognostications to the effect that wars of mass destruction are now passe, on account of the emergence of the "Revolution in Military Affairs" and its encouragement of informationbased warfare.15 Together with this, there has emerged the argument that largescale war between states or coalitions of states, as opposed to varieties of unconventional warfare and failed states, are exceptional and potentially obsolete.16 The spread of WMD and ballistic missiles in Asia could overturn these expectations for the obsolescence or marginalization of major interstate warfare. Efforts to block Russian sphere of influence dooms USRussia relations and risks war Eland, 2008 [Ivan, Nov, Sr. Fellow, Independent Inst., former Defense Analyst for Congressional Budget Office, The Independent Institute, http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=2363] But the bear is now coming out of a long hibernation a bit rejuvenated. Using increased petroleum revenues from the oil price spike, the Russians will hike defense spending 26 percent next year to about $50 billion--the highest level since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Yet as the oil price declines from this historic high, Russia will have fewer revenues to increase defense spending and rebuild its military. Even the $50 billion a year has to be put in perspective. The United States is spending about $700 billion per year on defense and starting from a much higher plain of capability. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian military fell apart and was equivalent to that of a developing country. Even the traditionally hawkish U.S. military and defense leaders and analysts are not worried about Russia's plans to buy modern arms, improve military living standards to attract better senior enlisted personnel, enhance training, and cut back the size of the bloated forces and officer corps. For example, Eugene B. Rumer of the U.S. National Defense University was quoted in the Washington Post as saying that Russian actions are "not a sign, really, of the Russian military being reborn, but more a of Russia being able to flex what relatively little muscle it has on the global scale, and to show that it actually matters."[1]In addition, the Russian military is very corrupt--with an estimated 40 percent of the money for some weapons and pay for personnel being stolen or wasted. This makes the amount of real defense spending far below the nominal $50 billion per year. U.S. analysts say, however, that increased military spending would allow Russia to have more influence over nations in its near abroad and Eastern Europe. Of course, throughout history, small countries living in the shadow of larger powers have had to make political, diplomatic, and economic adjustments to suit the larger power. Increased Russian influence in this sphere, however, should not necessarily threaten the security of the faraway nited tates. It does only because the United States has U S defined its security as requiring intrusions into Russia's traditional sphere of influence. By expanding NATO into Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the United States has guaranteed the security of these allied countries against a nucleararmed power, in the worst case, by sacrificing its cities in a nuclear war. Providing this kind of guarantee for these nonstrategic countries is not in the U.S. vital interest. Denying Russia the sphere of influence in nearby areas traditionally enjoyed by great powers (for example, the U.S. uses the Monroe Doctrine to police the Western Hemisphere) only will lead to unnecessary U.S.Russian tension and possibly even cataclysmic war. Last printed 162 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Russia SOI DA 2AC A2: Terrorism No impact A Empirically denied If their terrorism arguments were correct, attacks would already be happening dangerous terrorist networks have been destroyed Mueller 6 (John, Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, Foreign Affairs, Sep/Oct) For the past five years, Americans have been regularly regaled with dire predictions of another major al Qaeda attack in the United States. In 2003, a group of 200 senior government officials and business executives, many of them specialists in security and terrorism, pronounced it likely that a terrorist strike more devastating than 9/11 possibly involving weapons of mass destruction would occur before the end of 2004. In May 2004, Attorney General John Ashcroft warned that al Qaeda could "hit hard" in the next few months and said that 90 percent of the arrangements for an attack on U.S. soil were complete. That fall, Newsweek reported that it was "practically an article of faith among counterterrorism officials" that al Qaeda would strike in the runup to the November 2004 election. When that "October surprise" failed to materialize, the focus shifted: a taped encyclical from Osama bin Laden, it was said, demonstrated that he was too weak to attack before the election but was marshalling his resources to do so months after it. On the first page of its founding manifesto, the massively funded Department of Homeland Security intones, "Today's terrorists can strike at any place, at any time, and with virtually it? Why have they not been sniping at people in shopping centers, collapsing tunnels, poisoning the food supply, cutting electrical lines, derailing trains, blowing up oil pipelines, causing massive traffic jams, or exploiting the countless other vulnerabilities that, according to security experts, could so easily be exploited? One reasonable explanation is that almost no terrorists exist in the United States and few have the means or the inclination to strike from abroad. But this explanation is rarely offered. B even if terrorists attack, Obama won't retaliate he knows the costs Crowley 10, Senior Editor the New Republic, 10 [Michael, January, "Obama and Nuclear Deterrence", http://www.tnr.com/node/72263] Los Angeles Times The ran an important story yesterday about the Obama administration's Nuclear Posture Review, which evaluates U.S. policy towards the use of nuclear weapons. Apparently there's a debate inside the administrationone that is splitting the civilians from the generals any weapon." But if it is so easy to pull off an attack and terrorists are so if demonically competent, why have they not done said, is whether the United States should shed its longstanding ambiguity about whether it would use nuclear weapons in certain circumstances, in hopes that greater specificity would give foreign governments more confidence to make their own decisions on nuclear arms. Some in the U.S. argue that the administration should assure foreign governments that it won't use nuclear weapons in reaction to a biological, chemical or conventional attack, but only in a nuclear exchange. Others argue that the United States should promise that it would never use nuclear weapons first, but only in response to a nuclear attack. As the story notes, some experts don't place much weight on how our publiclystated doctrine emerges because they don't expect foreign nations to take it literally. And the reality is that any decisions about using nukes will certainly be casebycase. But I'd still like to see some wider discussion of the underlying questions, which are among the most consequential that policymakers can consider. The questions are particularly vexing when it comes to terrorist groups and rogue states. Would we, for instance, actually nuke Pyongyang if it sold a weapon to terrorists who used it in America? That implied threat seems to exist, but I actually doubt that a President Obamaor any president, for that matterwould go through with it. not just about the size of our nuclear stockpile but also how we conceive of possible firststrike and retaliatory policies. A core issue under debate, officials Last printed 163 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Russia SOI DA 2AC A2: Piracy 1. South Korea not key Piro 10 author of the African Jihad: Bin Laden's Quest for the Horn of Africa (Gregory Alonso, "Stopping Piracy and Terrorism in Somalia." April 16, 2010. Ocnus News. http://www.ocnus.net/artman2/publish/Dark_Side_4/Stopping PiracyandTerrorisminSomalia.shtml) Until a landbased solution can be found to end the piracy, an international naval flotilla is curbing piracy in the Indian Ocean and the strategic Gulf of Aden , which is one of the world's busiest shipping routes through which 20 per cent of global trade passes. Off the coast of Somalia, 27 ships from 16 different nations conducting counterpiracy operations are on watch. They are part of European Union NAVFOR, NATO, the U. S. Navy' s antipiracy Combined Task Force 151, and other nationally deployed ships from Japan, China, India and Saudi Arabia. A Pan Arab Task Force is in the making with Saudi Arabia the first to command it. 2. Peacekeeping forces can't deter Somali piracy too much money, peacekeeping forces are opposed by locals, pirates will just move around, and punishment fails Wadhams 9 staff writer, Time magazine (Nick, Time Magazine, "Why the Pirates Are Winning the Battle of the Seas." http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1890350,00.html ransom payouts in recent months have proved that the piracy trade is perhaps their best route out of despair and hopelessness. It now appears that the earlier drop in attacks had more to do with the weather than with the international show of force. "There are new pirates all the time," Abdi TimoJile, a pirate himself, told TIME from his home in the central city of Garowe. "We people are not afraid. There is death every day." Pirates, expirates and pirate recruiters tell TIME that even with all the international attention, the tough talk from leaders around the world and the presence of warships from 20 or so of the most powerful navies, the lure of the piracy trade remains as strong as ever. It only takes a few pirates to hijack a massive vessel, and shipping companies continue to pay out ransoms -- in some cases more than $3 million -- to secure the release of those precious cargo carriers. Given Somalia's miserable state, the temptation is irresistible. (See the top 10 audacious acts of piracy.) It doesn't help that Somalis have a marked aversion to foreign forces. Fiercely conservative and suspicious of outsiders, the country bristled under the failed U.N. peacekeeping mission in the early 1990s and the Ethiopia occupation over the past few years. "The sea and the There are several reasons for the spike in attacks. For impoverished Somalis, who appear to be behind most of the attacks, massive land are the same," says Abdinaser Biyokulule, a pirate recruiter in the pirate haven of Bossaso. "Foreign troops did not succeed on land, so they will not succeed in the sea either." Steppedup patrols around the Gulf of Aden were designed to intimidate the pirates. But the recent attacks, including hijackings and attempted hijackings hundreds of miles farther down the East African coastline, show that the Somalis are just changing tactics and moving away from the heavily patrolled gulf. "It's not that the navies have been unsuccessful," says Tony Mason, secretarygeneral of the Londonbased International Chamber of Shipping. "You can almost argue that they've been too successful, so the pirates have decided it's easier to go after targets in the Indian Ocean because the navies are not there and it's a much, much more difficult area to patrol because there's an awful lot more sea." (See pictures of Somalia's modern piracy.) The international community was hopeful in March when Kenya agreed to try suspected pirates in its courts. That, experts said, would provide a deterrent and at least impose some sense of rule of law off Somalia's coasts. Yet the threat of arrest has done nothing to dissuade the pirates. " Not even 0.2% of the total pirates are arrested, so anybody who is at all intelligent can understand that arrest does not bring fear," says Maryam Jama, a pirate recruiter in Bossaso. "If you get arrested, in prison the others will say, 'Do not worry, you will be out and then hijack another ship with good luck.'" 3. Piracy doesn't cause econ collapse Last printed 164 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Nesbitt 9 Foreign Policy In Focus contributor and teaches African politics and conflict resolution at San Diego State University. He is the author of Race for Sanctions (Indiana University Press, 2004) and is completing a book on peacemaking in the Horn of Africa (Francis Njubi, FPIF, "Strategic Dialogue: Somalia." http://www.fpif.org/articles/strategic_dialogue_somalia) It's important not to hype the threat pirates pose to the United States and international security. Vice Admiral Gortney, commander of the naval forces in the Middle East, estimated that only onetenth of 1% of the thousands of ships that use the Gulf of Aden are in danger of being hijacked. Analysts estimate that piracy costs $1 billion a year in a global maritime industry worth trillions of dollars. Last printed 165 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 RRW DA 2AC 1. RRW is cancelled Fleck 9 (John, Albuquerque Journal, "Labs' Nuclear work in danger: Memo: Obama wants major weapons programs ended," February 14, http://www.allbusiness.com/government/governmentbodiesoffices/120137401.html) Defense Secretary Robert Gates, a holdover from the Bush administration, spoke out last fall in favor of the Reliable Replacement Warhead. During the campaign, Barack Obama had raised objections to the project, but in a way that left the door open to some modest research efforts. The memo suggests an effort under way now to close that door, going out of its way to ensure that both direct funding for the RRW program, as well as indirect funding in other research programs that would support RRW work, is zeroed out in the soontobe delivered Fiscal Year 2010 budget now being prepared. "The RRW program, both explicitly and implicitly, is canceled," the memo says. 2. Even if there are discussions about RRW, case outweighs timeframe RRW has to wait until the next federal budget cycle 3. Gates does not want RRW zero risk of a link Gerstein 10 (Josh, 3/6/10, "ObamaGates nuke war brewing?" POLITICO, Lexis) Some say Gates, a veteran government official who served as CIA director under Bush's father, also knows when he has to get on the team. "My guess is that Gates's bureaucratic instincts are on autopilot," said John Bolton, former U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. under the Bush administration. He said the Defense Secretary may be trying to adjust to the "overwhelmingly proarms control" Obama team. No matter how the Obama administration irons out its differences, Bolton contends that the U.S needs new nuclear weapons, like bunkerbusters and lowyield nuclear weapons. "It would be better, cleaner, safer and more reliable simply to design what are clean, new designs intended for that purpose, which is very necessary given countries like Iran and North Korea are doing to bury hardened targets," he said. If Gates were to publicly renounce his call for new warheads, he would be able to cite a new study released last fall in which scientists concluded the current arsenal could last for decades without allnew warheads. In his public comments, Gates consistently has said his sole concern was reliability and safety, not trying to seek a military advantage. "We have no desire for new capabilities. That's a red herring," Gates said last September. "This is about modernizing and keeping safe a capability that everyone acknowledges we will have to have for some considerable period into the future." While the arms control community has generally been ecstatic about the repeated public calls from Obama and his administration to move towards a nuclearfree world, they are nervous that the large budget hike the White House proposed for nuclear programs pulls in the opposite direction, all but ensuring that the U.S. will have a large and growing nuclear weapons complex for the indefinite future. Obama is proposing spending $7.3 billion in nuclear weaponsrelated activities in fiscal 2011, up 14 percent from this year, according to Civiak. The total 2011 request is the largest ever, and 40 percent higher, adjusted for inflation, than during the Cold War. "Future administrations could use this new capacity to produce new nuclear weapons," warned said Nickolas Roth of the Alliance for Nuclear Accountability. Administration officials are scrambling to wrap up the delayed nuclear posture review in advance of Obama's nuclear safety summit in Washington and a Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty review conference set to take place in May at the United Nations. Given Gates's earlier statements in favor of new warheads, arms control advocates will be reading the U.S. strategy paper closely to see whether programs purportedly aimed at refurbishing the current nuclear arsenal could amount to new weapons programs in disguise. "That's a very fair concern," Cirincione said. "People will be taking a very close look at what the posture review says about the Life Extension Program for exactly this reason.....I think this is mostly on the up and up." Speaking to reporters earlier this year, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control Ellen Tauscher said she was keenly aware of suspicions that ramping up funding for the nuclear labs could be seen as undercutting disarmament efforts. She said the scientists have been given explicit instructions to avoid that. "You're not going to do things that are going to cause people to think that we're saying one thing and doing another. Because we don't have enough time in the day to unwind that monster," she said. Tauscher also insisted that Gates was fully on board with the administration's approach --notwithstanding his past statements. "A lot of people have morphed to where we are right now," she said. 4. Case solves proliferation <insert advantage/explanation> Last printed 166 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 5. Turn RRW key to stop a global arms race allows us to build covertly and eliminates need to test Tauscher 7 Ellen, November 2007, the Nonproliferation Review, The Monterey Institute of International Studies, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/143tauscher.pdf The overall goal of our nuclear program must be to strike this critical balance between deterrence and nonproliferation. The goal of the RRW program can be similarly characterized and aimed at providing U.S. armed forces with a weapons design that is highly reliable while providing our nuclear weapons laboratories and facilities with a stockpile that is safer and easier to manufacture and monitor than our oldest Cold War weapons.3 While it is far from assured, if the RRW program can deliver on this promise, then it should bring the added benefit of allowing the labs to make these safety and security improvements to the weapons stockpile without the dangerous consequences of nuclear testing, which could include resumption of a global nuclear arms race. If it proves feasible, RRW should also allow the weapons production complex to begin using more environmentally friendly materials and processes and allow the labs to adopt a common set of core design components and safety requirements that could be adapted to different sizes of weapons, streamlining the production process. Further, RRW the would provide an opportunity to further improve the safety and security features of U.S. nuclear weapons, including devices rendering them even more unusable should they fall into the hands of terrorists or rogue nations. 6. Turn RRW allows the US to maintain a strong deterrent Grossman 9 (Elaine M., "Inside Obama Administration, A Tug of War over Nuclear Warheads," NTI, August 18, http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20090818_1478.php) Link to Arms Control In Gates' view, as the stockpile ages, the risk grows that a defect might be discovered that could render a whole class of warheads unusable. Once arms control reductions are taken and the arsenal shrinks, the relative effect of such a discovery could magnify. If a sizable portion of a smaller arsenal becomes unusable, the U.S. deterrent posture could be significantly weakened, according to this perspective. The antidote, from Gates' standpoint, would be to ensure that after taking arms control reductions newer and more reliable warheads populate the remaining stockpile. The Reliable Replacement Warhead's new design was envisioned as replacing outdated materials with modern technologies, and lowering the risk of theft or accidental detonation. The Pentagon leader a Bush administration holdover who has largely embraced the new president's policies on Iraq, Afghanistan and defense acquisition reform last year publicly laid down the gauntlet on nuclear modernization. He said an ambitious effort must be undertaken to assure that the arsenal remains safe, secure and reliable. The RRW program, Gates told a Washington audience in October, "could potentially allow us to reduce aging stockpiles by balancing the risk between smaller number a of warheads and an industrial complex that could produce new weapons if the need arose." Warhead replacement, the defense secretary said, "is about the future credibility of our strategic deterrent. And it deserves urgent attention" (see GSN, Oct. 29, 2008). "His view of the necessity of a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear arsenal has not changed since that speech," Geoff Morrell, Gates' spokesman, told GSN on Friday. With the change in administration, the urgency Gates saw last fall was overtaken by more pressing issues, including the global economic meltdown and increasing violence in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 7. RRW would not violate the NPT only a risk of proliferation is in countries that are already breaking the NPT like North Korea and Iran Grossman 9 (Elaine M., "Inside Obama Administration, A Tug of War over Nuclear Warheads," NTI, August 18, http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20090818_1478.php) In June, a senior administration official endorsed the commission's approach to nuclear modernization. "We can best manage risk if given the opportunity to apply a spectrum of options: warhead refurbishment, warhead component reuse and warhead replacement to our life extension strategy," Harvey, the former NNSA policy official, said at a Capitol Hill gathering. Now a Pentagon senior civilian working on nuclear, chemical and biological defense programs, Harvey said a modernization effort that includes warheadreplacement would be consistent with the testban treaty, because upgraded weapons would increase confidence in the stockpile in the absence of test explosions. He also Last printed 167 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 said such an effort would bolster the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty because a "credible" U.S. deterrent would reduce incentives for allies to acquire their own atomic arms. "If you're living in a world with other nuclear powers, are you going to play in the ballgame?" said a former senior Bush administration official, who asked not to be identified. "There's nothing in history to suggest that leading by example works in the nuclear world." Last printed 168 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Dip Cap DA 2AC 1. Aff outweighs 2. TurnClinton is useless and US Dip Cap hardens Russia and makes them actively hinder peace Today.AZ 7/26 (interview with Alexei Mukhin, Director General of Russiabased Political Information Center, "It is impossible to resolve NagornoKarabakh conflict peacefully today", http://today.az/news/politics/71410.html) Q: How would you assess the efforts of mediators to move NagornoKarabakh conflict from the deadend? A: I have to admit that the question of maintaining status quo will dominate in the process of NagornoKarabakh conflict settlement. The fact is that the U.S. today really is making serious attempts to influence the situation. The U.S. officials recently visited the region. However, they are very cautious about the settlement process, particularly given Russia's position. Apparently, softening of Russia's position towards nuclear sanctions against Iran prompted the U.S. to listen more attentively to what Moscow says on the postSoviet area. During her recent visit to the region Hillary Clinton said what hosts wanted to hear from her while framing the position of United States on old track level of democracy, strengthening of bilateral relations, etc., and did not give anyone any concrete promises. In fact, her task was to strengthen the antiRussian trend among CIS countries. Hillary Clinton saw talks on NagornoKarabakh conflict as a ritual process. She left full of uncertainty. Q: In your opinion, does Russia have a real willingness to resolve the NagornoKarabakh conflict? A: Russia is not ready to resolve the conflict quickly, although it claims it can. Moscow seems to fail to understand how serious Turkey's reorientation is. Russia intends to strengthen ties with Turkey. In turn, Ankara is concerned over the U.S. support for Baku. In such a confused situation status quo in the conflict is, of course, preferable to all the major players. Q: Are hostilities likely to be resumed? A: It is clear that the Armenian army is too weak to resist Azerbaijani army. Therefore, Russia will have to take the side of Yerevan in the framework of the CSTO agreement. And it is clear that if there is military conflict, it will turn into a disaster in the region. Therefore, the Russian leadership hopes no war will take place. It must be admitted that the United States should also give its approval to outbreak of hostilities. Q: How do you see the scenario of the next developments around the NagornoKarabakh conflict settlement? A: I think significant no changes will happen in near future. Of course, it would be better if the issue resolved peacefully, is but this is impossible today. Q: What, except Armenia's stance, does hinder it? A: Unfortunately, world powers are playing their games. As soon as the United States steps up efforts in this matter, Moscow will do everything to maintain the status quo because it is not satisfied with Washington's desire to replace it in the former Soviet Union as a regulator of various problems. 3. DipCap already being dispelled A. Taiwan AP 7/27 TAIPEI, Taiwan -- U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's thinly veiled criticism of Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea angered has Beijing's leadership and quietly pleased Asian countries concerned about China's expanding military power. Clinton spoke less than 48 hours before American and South Korean warships started highprofile military exercises in the Sea of Japan and the Yellow Sea, and the criticism is raising fears that longdormant tensions between China and the U.S could spike. That would have worrying consequences for global stability, . which benefits greatly from coordination between Beijing and Washington on issues like nuclear proliferation and financial stability. Speaking Friday at an Asian security forum in Hanoi, Clinton called on China to resolve its offshore territorial disputes with Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and other regional parties through international consultations. China favors a bilateral approach because feels that it would give it more control of the outcome. Lowkey attempts to resolve the disputes have gone on for years but achieved little. The Foreign Ministry in Beijing angrily characterized the Clinton comment as "an attack" and quoted Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi as saying that it would only make "things worse and more difficult to resolve." B. North Korea VOA News 7/23 ("Secretary Clinton announced new sanctions against North Korea.", http://www1.voanews.com/policy/editorials/ClintonInSouthKorea99133454.html ) "By contrast," said Secretary Clinton, "the North has not only stagnated in isolation, but the people of the North have suffered for so many years." It is the men and women in the Republic of Korea, the United States of America, and a multinational force who today stand Last printed 169 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 watch for freedom and who helped protect South Korea. U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates said, "Our commitment to South Korean security is steadfast. In fact, our military alliance has never been stronger and should deter any potential aggression." In a move that makes clear to North Korea that its provocative behavior towards South Korea is unacceptable, Secretary Clinton announced new sanctions against DPRK proliferation and illicit activities. These measures will target the sale or purchase of arms and related materiel, the acquisition of luxury items, which are banned under UN Security Council Resolution 1718, and other illicit activities conducted by the DPRK that could be used to help fund its weapons programs, such as counterfeiting of U.S. currency, cigarette counterfeiting, and money laundering. The United States also act under existing authorities to will freeze additional assets of DPRK proliferationsrelated entities, work to prevent more DPRK proliferators from traveling abroad, and urge banks to prevent financial transactions of designated North Korea entities as required under UN Security Council Resolution 1874. These measures are not directed at the people of North Korea, who have suffered too long. They are directed at the DPRK's destabilizing, illicit, and provocative actions. " At the same time," said Secretary of State Clinton, "we continue to send a message to the North. There is another way. There is a way that can benefit the people of the North." If and when North Korea abides by its international obligations, the need for sanctions will be eliminated. 4.US not Key Reuters, 6262010 ["US, Russia, France back NagornoKarabakh peace moves," http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKN26177539._CH_.2420] HUNTSVILLE, Ontario, June 26 (Reuters) The United States, France and Russia on Saturday pledged to support Armenia and Azerbaijan as they try to agree basic principles for settling a dispute over Azerbaijan's breakaway NagornoKarabakh region . U.S. President Barack Obama, joined by French President Nicolas Sarkozy and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, said both sides had made a significant step in accepting the overall framework of a deal and now needed to work on details. Now the presidents of Armenia and " Azerbaijan need to take the next step and complete the work on the basic principles to enable the drafting of a peace agreement to begin," the three leaders said in a joint statement issued during a Group of Eight meeting in Canada. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton plans to visit both Armenia and Azerbaijan early next month during a trip to the South Caucasus. The dispute between mostly Muslim Azerbaijan and mostly Christian Armenia remains a threat to stability in the South Caucasus, an important route for oil and gas supplies from the Caspian region to Europe. Skirmishes, sometimes fatal, erupt frequently along front lines near NagornoKarabakh, a small mountainous region under the control of ethnic Armenians who fought a six year separatist war with support from neighboring Armenia. An estimated 30,000 people were killed and one million displaced before a ceasefire in 1994 but a peace accord has never been agreed and the ethnic Armenian leadership's independence claim has not been recognized by any country. The three powers' joint statement on Saturday said the socalled "Helsinki principles" now recognized by both sides relate to the return of the occupied territories surrounding NagornoKarabakh, interim status for NagornoKarabakh guaranteeing security and selfgovernance and a corridor linking Armenia to NagornoKarabakh. The framework also calls for the final status of NagornoKarabakh to be determined by a legallybinding vote and the right of all internallydisplaced persons and refugees to return. More than a decade of mediation led by Russia, France and the United States has failed to produce a final peace deal and Azerbaijan has said it may use force to try to regain control of NagornoKarabakh. Tension has increased since Armenia and its traditional foe Turkey, which has close ties to Azerbaijan, reached a rapprochement last year. The accord crumbled this year when Armenia suspended ratification after Turkish demands that it first reach terms over NagornoKarabakh, a condition set by Turkey to appease Azerbaijan, an oil and gas producer. (reporting by Alister Bull, writing by Andrew Quinn; editing by David Storey) 5. The link is nonsensicalClinton can handle multiple things at onceshe can use a cell phone 6. Azerbaijan Blocks News.am, 792010 ["Aliyev impudent hypocrite, Armenian MP says," http://news.am/eng/news/24611.html] Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliev has used the EU Resolution on the South Caucasus for issuing threats of war, stated Naira Zohrabyan, CoChairperson of the ArmeniaEU parliamentary commission. The Azeri leader is trying to deceive the public by presenting the European Parliament's Resolution "EU Strategy for the South Caucasus" as a resolution on NagornoKarabakh. " A few days ago the Azeri President made one more provocative statement, referring to the EU Strategy for the South Caucasus by the European Parliament. The Armenian legislative and executive bodies pointed out the inconsistency of the resolution . Unfortunately, our forecasts that the resolution would be used against the peaceful process are coming true," Zohrabyan said. "He keeps on threatening to resolve the NagornoKarabakh conflict in a military way," she said. With barefaced lie, rephrasing certain points of the resolution, Aliyev claimed it contained proposals for a settlement of the NagornoKarabakh conflict. She pointed out that the Azeri leader's statement runs counter to a number of most important points of the resolution . First, they condemn the idea of a military resolution of the conflict. The resolution also contains an appeal for observing the ceasefire, and underlines the importance of security guarantees as one of the most important components of each solution. "As regards the settlement of the NagornoKarabakh conflict, the resolution welcomes the intensification Last printed 170 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 of negotiations as a result of the six ArmenianAzerbaijani presidential meetings on the basis of the Moscow statement of 2008," Zohrabyan said. The Council of Europe is consistently supporting the OSCE Minsk Group's activities, as well as the l'Aquila statement, whereas Aliyev's statements run counter to the letter and spirit of the resolution, Zohrabyan said. Surprising is the fact that President Aliyev is ignoring the point dealing with human rights in Azerbaijan, particularly an appeal for releasing the bloggers, and is using the resolution for military propaganda. The Armenian parliamentarian called on her colleagues in the council of Europe to condemn Aliyev's manner of misusing the name of the Council of Europe and make a political assessment of the Azeri leaders' threats and provocations. 7. No Linkif their focus args are true that Clinton is putting it at the top of her agenda then she leave to help with the Withdraw announcementthe DoD would do that 8. No Escalation Stepanian, 6282010 [Ruzanna, "Another Karabakh War Unlikely, Says UK Envoy," http://www.azatutyun.am/content/article/2085150.html] ArmenianAzerbaijani war unlikely to resume The is any time soon despite the latest upsurge in ceasefire violations around NagornoKarabakh, Britain's ambassador to Armenia said on Monday. "I wouldn't want to speculate about the possibility of war in Karabakh," Charles Lonsdale told a news conference in Yerevan Recent incidents raise concern, but . " I think we are a long way from a resumption of real hostilities." Lonsdale said at the same time that the status quo in the Karabakh conflict may not be sustainable in the long term and that both sides should pursue a peaceful settlement based on mutual compromise. 9. Clinton Fails News.am, 732010 ["Clinton comes to South Caucasus for Karabakh's sake?" http://news.am/eng/news/24057.html] Clinton's visit is a regional one, even it can happen for no reason, the former RA Foreign Minister and oppositional Armenian National Congress member Vahan Papazyan told seems to U.S. have serious challenges in the region. According to him, the Karabakh pace process will be discussed in Armenia and Azerbaijan. " Armenian and Azerbaijani statesmen have separately expressed content with the recent statement made by the co chairing states in Canada. They have just to meet, discuss it and sign a joint agreement on adoption of certain principles. I think this is the reason for Clinton's visit," he said. Vahan Papazyan also noted that no breakthrough should be expected in the ArmenianTurkish reconciliation process. " Clinton will say that the U.S. is considering the issues separately and in different contexts, simultaneously realizing that one cannot be tackled without another," ANC member stated. The former RA Foreign Minister found it difficult to say whether any document on NagornoKarabakh will be signed and singled out an "absurd point": "One of the conflicting parties Nagorno Karabakh Republic is not involved in the peace process, therefore the mediators do not care about it at all ," he concluded. Though Hillary NEWS.am. He added that the Last printed 171 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 CMR DA 2AC Civilmilitary relations are at an unprecented low Obama has increased tensions by putting political considerations over strategy. The American 6/25 [The American, The Journal of the American Enterprise Institute, The Editors, "The Unprecedented Acrimony in Civilmilitary Affairs," June 25, 2010, http://blog.american.com/?p=15970] When President Obama announced General Stanley McChrystal's resignation as commander of U.S. and allied forces in Afghanistan, he said, "I welcome debate among my team, but I won't tolerate division." But division is nothing new, according to Naval War College Professor Mackubin Thomas Owens, and is not likely to disappear anytime soon . In Lessons for a Long War: How America Can Win on New Battlefields (AEI Press, 2010), Owens observes an "unprecedented level of public acrimony in civilmilitary affairs since the beginning of the Iraq war ." He identifies a pattern of "shirking" by top military officials beginning in the Clinton administration and culminating in the fraught relationship between President Obama and General McChrystal : Obama , perhaps inadvertently, sowed the seeds of the current civilmilitary discord with his campaign rhetoric, which used Afghanistan as a club to beat the Republicans in general and the party's presidential candidate, John McCain , in particular over the head about Iraq ... The perception that the president's actions regarding Afghanistan were motivated by political factors rather than strategic ones --a perception undermined healthy civilmilitary relations that --was reinforced by several clumsy missteps by the administration . These included the naked attempt by retired Marine General James Jones, the national security adviser, to intimidate military commanders in Afghanistan into reducing their troop requests to a politically acceptable level, and a White House directive to the Pentagon not to forward a request for more troops . The most serious mistake , reported in the Wall Street Journal, was that the White House ordered General McChrystal not to testify before Congress This move . furthered the perception that the administration was trying to muzzle the military ...It is easy to see ... that a clumsy step by the administration would sow distrust on the part of the soldiers, thereby increasing civilmilitary tensions , but the steps taken by some in the military have made the situation worse . First someone leaked General McChrystal's strategic assessment to Bob Woodward of the Washington Post. Then an article published by McClatchy quoted anonymous officers to the effect that McChrystal would resign if the president did not give him what he needed to implement the announced strategy. Such actions on the part of the uniformed military are symptoms of a continuing civilmilitary relations problem : they reflect the widespread belief among military officers that they should be advocates of particular policies rather than simply serving in their traditional advisory role. No link the theory of CMR is flawed the military doesn't know the politics of war Owens 8 [Mackubin Thomas, December 29, editor of Orbis and professor of nationalsecurity affairs at the Naval War College in Newport, R.I. He is writing a history of U.S. civilmilitary relations, and his study of Lincoln's wartime leadership will be published in early 2009 by the Foreign Policy Research Institute, "Scholar & Gentleman : Sam Huntington, R.I.P." http://article.nationalreview.com/381736/scholargentleman/mackubinthomasowens] There are a number of flaws in Huntington's theory , though. First, as Feaver points out, elegant as it may be, it doesn't always fit the evidence of the Cold War. Second, my own research for a forthcoming history U.S. of civilmilitary relations has led me to question some of Huntington's historical generalizations concerning the alleged isolation of the military during the late 19th century. Finally, the line of demarcation mandated by Huntington's theory is not as clear as some would have it. Sam's student Eliot Cohen has shown in Supreme Command, storied As democratic war leaders such as Winston Churchill and Abraham Lincoln impinged upon the military's turf as a matter of course, influencing not only operations but also tactics. The reason that civilian leaders cannot simply leave the military to its own devices during war is that wars are fought to achieve policy goals set by the political leadership of the state. As the war continues, situations tend to change, modifying the relationship between these political goals and military means. No link Obama's replacement of McChrystal due to the slightest hint of disrespect for civil control means the problem is fixed before it escalates Last printed 172 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Policy disagreements don't undermine overall CMR and don't spill over Hansen 9 Victor Hansen, Associate Professor of Law, New England Law School, Summer 2009, "Symposium: Law, Ethics, And The War On Terror: Article: Understanding The Role Of Military Lawyers In The War On Terror: A Response To The Perceived Crisis In CivilMilitary Relations," South Texas Law Review, 50 S. Tex. L. Rev. 617, p. lexis According to Sulmasy and Yoo, these conflicts between the military and Bush the Administration are the latest examples of [*624] a crisis in civilianmilitary relations. n32 The authors suggest the principle of civilian control of the military must be measured and is potentially violated whenever the military is able to impose its preferred policy outcomes against the wishes of the civilian leaders. n33 They further assert that it is the attitude of at least some members of the military that civilian leaders are temporary office holders to be outlasted and outmaneuvered. n34 If the examples cited by the authors do in fact suggest efforts by members of the military to undermine civilian control over the military, then civilian military relations may have indeed reached a crisis. Before such a conclusion can be reached, however, a more careful analysis is warranted. We cannot accept at face value the authors' broad assertions that any time a member of the military , whether on active duty or retired, disagrees with the views of a civilian member of the Department of Defense or other member of the executive branch, including the President, that such disagreement or difference of opinion equates to either a tension or a crisis in civilmilitary relations. Sulmasy and Yoo claim there is heightened tension or perhaps even a crisis in civilmilitary relations, yet they fail to define what is meant by the principle of civilian control over the military. Instead, the authors make general and rather vague statements suggesting any policy disagreements between members of the military and officials in the executive branch must equate to a challenge by the military against civilian control. n35 However, until we have a clear understanding of the principle of civilian control of the military, we cannot accurately determine whether a crisis in civilmilitary relations exists. It is to this question that we now turn. No readiness impact explicit tension over goals and missions just causes the military to give in to civilian commands. Yoo 9 [John Yoo, Fletcher Jones Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law; Professor of Law, School of Law, University of California, Berkeley; Visiting Scholar, American Enterprise Institute, May 2009, "ThirtyNinth Annual Administrative Law Issue: Administrative Law Under The George W. Bush Administration: Looking Back And Looking Forward: Article: Administration Of War," Duke Law Journal, 58 Duke L.J. 2277, p. lexis ] Applied to the military context, it is worth identifying how the Bush and Clinton administration and civilian preferences may have diverged from those of the armed forces. Unlike the Clinton administration, both the civilian and military leadership were on the same page in the area of budget and personnel. Under the Bush administration, military spending rose sharply, both in absolute terms and as a share of the federal budget. As a percentage of the federal budget, Defense Department spending rose from 15.6 percent in 2001 ($ 290 billion) to 21 percent in 2008 ($ 651 billion). n104 Civilian and military leaders may very well have disagreed, however, over how that money should be spent. As noted earlier, President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld favored a restructuring of the Army to emphasize smaller, lighter, and more lethal units that could deploy more quickly [*2296] to fight in smaller conflicts. n105 Army officers may well have favored keeping the focus on the large armored units designed for a broad conflict against a major power such as Russia or China n106 hence the conflict over the Crusader artillery system and the Comanche attack helicopter. n107 This tension signaled a larger difference over the nation's strategic goals in the wake of the Cold War's end. Civilians wanted a force shaped for the smaller conflicts, civil wars, nation building, and humanitarian missions that characterized the 1990s. Military leaders preferred the conflicts envisioned by the "Powell doctrine," n108 which emphasized defeating an enemy quickly with overwhelming force, defined goals, and a clear exit strategy. n109 The pressure of external events may have exacerbated these differences. The actual combat phases of both the Afghanistan and Iraq wars were relatively short and involved few casualties for American forces. Whereas the latter was a regular international conflict between two conventionally armed forces, the former involved special forces, covert units, air power, and irregular allies fighting a mixture of loosely organized militia units and terrorist groups. Afghanistan required the United States to pivot quickly from defeating the Taliban and al Qaeda units to rebuilding a national government in cooperation with the Northern Alliance victors a task still unfinished. Nation building is at odds with the Powell doctrine, because it requires military units to perform a police function over the civilian population, with goals that are hard to measure and difficult to achieve, and with no preset exit date. Iraq called for yet a different kind of strategy, that of counterinsurgency, which also deviated from the preferred focus on hightechnology weapons systems, armored units and air ground troops who patrolled in urban environments, cooperated with local leadership structures, and relied on intelligence to defeat al Qaeda operatives and Sunni resistance fighters. The Army had engaged in counterinsurgency operations in South Vietnam, sometimes to great effect, but had since lost its expertise in favor of the tactics and strategies needed for a conventional conflict. n110 superiority fighters, and [*2297] largescale conventional warfare. Instead, the armed forces eventually had to surge in large numbers of Last printed 173 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Last printed 174 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 ***COUNTERPLANS*** Last printed 175 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Last printed 176 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 TNWs CP 2AC ---Doesn't solve the case: Conflict removing troops key presence means China won't fill in to stop conflict and the CP triggers the bioweapons impact faster conventional weaknesses motivate them to use them at risk of threat China troop reduction key to China cooperation over the North Korea leadership transition and allows South Korea to modernize Regionalism counterplan promotes unstable bilateral agreements troops make this inevitable that's Espiritu regional security key to cooperation over every threat that's Nanto ---Permutation do both solves the link to the net benefit solves overstretch and deters best there are still weapons but less anti-Americanism ---South Korea will reject the counterplan AFP 4212010 ("Seoul rejects redeployment of US nuclear weapons," http://www.asiaone.com/News/Latest+News/Asia/Story/A1Story20100421211649.html) South Korea on Wednesday ruled out redeploying atomic weapons US on its territory in response to North Korea's nuclear arsenal. "It can never be our option," Foreign Minister Yu MyungHwan said at a lecture. "Redeployment of nuclear deterrence must be dealt with within the framework of a global security and in that regard, a policy coordination with the United States as part of its global nuclear strategy is crucial ," he said. Means even if they fiat we put weapons in South Korea there is no deterrent against North Korea their leaders have publically rejected them and North Korea perceives that ---[REMOVING TROOPS KEY ADD-ON] ---Military concessions to North Korea key to Russian relations Toloraya, 08 diplomat with the rank of Minister and Director of Korean Programs at IMEMO, the top Russian Foreign Ministry official in charge of the Korean peninsula, Doctor of Economy and a Full Professor degree in Oriental Studies (Georgy, Asian Perspective, "THE SIX PARTY TALKS: A RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVE", ProQuest) The real root of the controversy, as Russian experts interpret it, is the fact that no "strategic decision" has yet been taken in either capital about the future. U The nited tates still S has not demonstrated its longterm commitment to toleration of Pyongyang the regime and coexistence with it without overt or covert attempts to bring it down. Consequently, North Korea has nothing left but to depend on its "military deterrent" and try to keep the country isolated in order to conserve the system and prevent its collapse. Russian experts try to see the reality as it is and not set misleading goals and deadlines. A serious policy cannot be based on wishful thinking and misapprehension. It is hard to imagine how North Korea could discard its only trump cardthe nuclear weapons it now hasin return for mere promises, although it is prepared to move forward cautiously with terminating and dismantling its military nuclear production program. That should be encouraged. At the same time it is necessary to be fully aware that North Korea's renouncing of nuclear weapons will take a Last printed 177 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 much longer time, and even then may only happen if it is satisfied with comprehensive security guarantees that have yet to be provided.45 How do Russian experts see the possible future of the Six Party Talks? There is still no agreed concept of what should be their outcome. This should be worked out collectively. The change of U.S. administrations provides a chance for setting a goal, which should be realistic and then would enjoy Russian support. Some possibilities follow. * chief strategic The goal of the diplomatic process should definitely not be just denuclearization, but peace, development, and friendly cooperation in Northeast Asia. The issue of North Korea's security is sometimes omitted and that blocks any progress. Therefore it is necessary to solve the WMD and other related issues in a manner that would not jeopardize the main prioritiespeacefully and stepbystep. In fact, solving the main task is the key to solving the WMDrelated concerns. * A peaceful scenario would presume turning the DPRK into a peaceful, nonaggressive, developing state, open to international cooperationin short, the "conventionalization" of the country. That might seem utopian with the current regime, but it is under going an evolution that could be successful provided the regime has sufficient guarantee of its security, including guarantees for the safety of the current elite. Therefore, the transformation should be gradual and not endanger political stability. An eventual power succession in the DPRK would present an ideal chance for starting such a process. * International assistance is a must for overcoming the backwardness and isolation of the DPRK, which is necessary for comprehensive security. The long history of aid to developing countries suggests that aid can be futile, even counterproductive, in the absence of complementary reforms.46 Therefore, economic assistance to the DPRK as part of the package for the solution of the nuclear problem should be aimed at assisting system transformation, not at preservation of its outdated model. * The sixparty format can be an ideal venue for coordination of such assistance. Its longterm aim should be the DPRK's economic and social transformation, by drawing it into the international division of labor and introducing international managerial experience, including a gradual transformation of the current political elite to become a more liberal government system. (Many members of the elite are relatives or comrades in a framework of clan politics.) * For coordination of economic and development assistance, the interested countries (not limited to the Six Party Talk members) could choose to create a special body entrusted with the task of planning and providing such assistance. The experience of KEDO (the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization) proves that this task is feasible. * In the longer run the solution to Korean security and development issues could provide momentum for forming a regional structure by institutionalizing the Six Party Talks. The Desirability of a Multilateral Security System Russia would like to see a multiparty security and cooperation system emerge in Northeast Asia. The Six Party Talks have provided a unique opportunity to try a multilateral approach to solving the thorny issues that plague the region. In a bestpossible future, we might paradoxically be thankful for the appearance of the North Korean nuclear problem simply because it actually triggered the emergence of regional security and cooperation dialogue. It took years to recognize the fact that a solution to the North Korean nuclear problem cannot be found without assuring the security of North Korea itself. The latter goal in turn cannot be achieved without the adoption of broader principles of interaction between the countries involved. That in turn leads to the conclusion that many "narrow" regional problems cannot be solved without first solving general issues of security and cooperation in Northeast Asia. This is especially critical in light of a nascent standoff between China, on the one hand, and the United States and Japan, on the other, a confrontation both sides would like to avoid in principle. Russia, having been drawn to in a tense relationship with the U nited tates globally S in the wake of the war in Georgia, would also like to see Northeast Asia become a region of cooperation. There is no obvious geopolitical reason for confrontation there. Russia has always been a proponent of a multilateral security mechanism in Asia and the Pacific. 47 Initiatives on multilateral Asian security organizations date back at least to the Gorbachev era.48 Russian positions in Asia have considerably weakened since the demise of the USSR, while the centrifugal tendencies of the Far Eastern regions have been on the rise. Therefore, Moscow has become even more interested in promoting its interests through a multilateral structure, which would provide access to the decisionmaking processes of other governments and prevent unilateralism. Theoretically speaking, institutionalization of the Northeast Asian security and cooperation mechanism might play an important role in a changeover from contentions based on mutual deterrence to a system of cooperation and competition grounded in the balance of interests, i.e., in a "concert of powers." The Six Party Talks may play an important role in working out a "code of conduct" in Northeast Asia and setting up a multilateral mechanism to promote it. As chair of the Working Group on the peace and security mechanism in Northeast Asia (under the February 2007 agreements), Russia has suggested guiding principles for peace and security that the parties should find agreeable.49 The official position is that these principles should be adopted at the level of foreign ministers and thus set the framework for future work. This opinion is shared by the United States, which hopes to move forward on developing a Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism that "would help transform the cooperative relationships built through the SixParty Process into an enduring security framework for Northeast Asia."50 Russia also enjoys Chinese and ROK support in this activity.51 However, controversies among the Asian members of the club could prevent them from setting up a charter of Northeast Asian security and cooperation. At the same time North Korea sees the multilateral format mostly as a nuisancemerely decoration for its bilateral dealings with the United States. North Korean diplomats consider the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) model irrelevant to Northeast Asia, pointing to this organization's failure to resolve the crisis in Yugoslavia.52 The stalemate in U.S.North Korea dialogue as well as the pause in NorthSouth Korea relations makes the DPRK's cooperation with the ROK on security issues unlikely and the degree of eagerness and initiative of the two Koreas in promoting multilateralism questionable at best. There is thus a niche for a relatively neutral Russian mediator Last printed 178 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 role. Active diplomacy in this direction is especially important for Russia the context of its in global relations with the "centers of power." As Russia is increasingly seen as an opponent if not a foe of the West (e.g., the expression "the new cold war" has already been coined), it would be natural to think its cooperation with the United States on global issues would be limited at best. However, this logic should not necessarily apply in the Korean case, which might well be considered a special one in RussiaU.S. international dealings. U.S.Russia cooperation in the framework of the 6PT might have much wider global implications.53 At the same time, Moscow conservatives still fear that a fullfledged OSCEtype structure might only increase the U.S. hold on the region without producing tangible benefits for Russia or for other regional actors. They argue that Washington only pursues its own interests and is trying to strengthen its foothold in the area. Under this logic a new security architecture might harness not only its allies but also China and Russia in a framework where the United States, not being a geographical part of the region, would have rights but not obligations. The concept of what the agenda of the multilateral forum could be and the sequence of stages for establishing such a structure is being discussed in the Russian expert community. Some argue that Northeast Asia is not yet ready for a security mechanism and the road to it should start with a multilateral cooperation structure. "In a multilateral process," writes one Russian researcher, "structural and procedural issues are often no less important for the effectiveness of the process than substantive issues."54 The multiparty diplomatic process should therefore become a multitrack one, where progress in one direction should not necessarily depend on the situation in other tracks. A Japanese expert's approach--to link the bilateral, minilateral, and multilateral issues and institutions under the sixparty umbrella framework--also seems sound.55 Such an approach can be used to address regionspecific proliferation issues, security guarantees, economic assistance, and diplomatic relations, including changing the Korean armistice regime to a new peace regime and achieving coordination of institutions. Some suggestions for promoting the Northeast Asian cooperation organization building follow. The security architecture should be discussed at an early stage, although the implementation of an agreed concept might take time. The general principles discussed between the parties are wellestablished in international practice and include obeying the UN Charter principles, forging mutual trust, noninterference in internal affairs, a decline in military danger, and diplomatic conflict resolution. Nevertheless, these principles will still not be formally agreed upon pending resolution of the nuclear issue. Discussion (including at Track II level) aimed at working out common approaches to forming a collective comprehensive security system should therefore be encouraged. The Chinese idea of integrative security presented at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1996--combining comprehensive, cooperative, and common security concepts56--could become a basis for these discussions. On a more practical level the sides should begin designing trustbuilding measures for the prevention of maritime and air incidents, notifications of military exercises and their monitoring by observers, and annual reviews of defense doctrines. Ensuring the security of maritime communication lines in Northeast Asia and to the south may also be relevant. Countermeasures to nonconventional threats and challenges should be elaborated, including assistance during natural calamities, as well as fighting epidemics, environmental problems, crossborder crime, drug trafficking, and illegal migration. These issues are discussed at various fora, including ARF, but sometimes the area covered seems to be too broad for any concrete decisions and measures.57 Multilateral economic projects and coordination of regional economic policies should be discussed, particularly laying out common approaches to the setting up of new zones for free trade and reforming existing ones. Russia is especially interested in establishing regional integration in energy and transport infrastructure, in which it would be a core key participant.58 The setting up of an infrastructure for intercivilizational and interethnic contacts and rapprochement in the region where longstanding ethnic strife exists might become a historic mission of the new regional organization. It is important to develop joint projects in culture, science, and education, and stimulate multilateral humanitarian exchanges with due account of experience gained at bilateral negotiations. Regardless of the twists and turns on the thorny road of Korean settlement, promoting multilateral security cooperation will remain Russia's priority. The reasons are not only military and security in nature but also economic. In this era of uncertainty of world finance, the development of the real estate sector is fast becoming a priority, and this means an increased need for Russia's greater involvement in Northeast Asian regional energy and industrial projects. Solves accidental nuclear war Cohen 10--prof, Russian Studies and History, NYU. Prof emeritus, Princeton (Stephen, USRussian Relations in an Age of American Triumphalism: An Interview with Stephen F. Cohen, 25 May 2010, http://www.thenation.com/article/usrussianrelationsageamericantriumphalisminterviewstephenfcohen, AMiles) Cohen: The real concern I have with this "we won the Cold War" triumphalism is the mythology that we are safer today than we were when the Soviet Union existed. Though it is control of its nuclear and related arsenals. PostSoviet Russia is "sorta" in control, but "sorta" is not enough. There is no margin for error. Reagan's goal in the 1980s was not to end the Soviet Union, but to turn it into a permanent partner of the United States. He came very close to achieving that and deserves enormous credit. He did what had to be done by meeting Gorbachev halfway. But since 1991, the arrogance of American policymaking toward Russia has either kept the Cold War from being fully ended or started a new one. The greatest threats to our national security still reside in Russia. This is not because it's communist, but because it is laden with all these nuclear, chemical, and biological devices--that's the threat The reaction of the second Bush administration was to junk decades of safe . guarding agreements with Moscow. It was the first time in modern times that we have had no nuclear control reduction agreement with the Russians. What should worry us every day and night is the triumphalist notion that nuclear is no longer possible. It war is now possible in even more ways blasphemous to say so, we are not safer for several reasons, one being that the Soviet state kept the lid on very dangerous things. The Soviet Union was in Last printed 179 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 than before, especially accidental ones Meanwhile, the former Soviet territories remain a WalMart of dirty material and knowhow. If terrorists ever explode a . Russia's leaders, thereby limiting their cooperation and undermining his own legacy. In other words, to have a nuclear relationship with Russia that will secure our national security, we must have a fully cooperative, trusting political relationship with Moscow. That's why all the talk about a replacement for the expired START agreement, which Obama has been having trouble reaching with the Kremlin, is halfwitted. Even if the two sides agree, and even if the Senate and Russian Duma ratify a new treaty, the agreement will be unstable because the political relationship is bad and growing worse. Evidently, no one in the Administration, Congress, or the mainstream media, or, I should add in the think tanks, can connect these dots. dirty device in the United States, even a small one, the material is likely to come from the former Soviet Union. The NunnLugar Act (1992) was the best program Congress ever enacted to help Russia secure its nuclear material and knowhow, a major contribution to American national security. But no one in Washington connects the dots. Take Senator Lugar himself. He seems not to understand that we need Russia's complete cooperation to make his own legislation fully successful, but he repeatedly speaks undiplomatically, even in ugly ways, about Last printed 180 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 TNWs CP A2: Results in Plan [Parker Ev] ---Justifies perm do the counterplan we'll defend it it's a way to implement the plan ---Isn't specific to the counterplan just a war happening no threshold for what would cause Chinese resolve sinking of the ship should have removed troops already ---Parker says it would be a concession to China to remove our troops not that the US or South Korea would actually follow through with it Last printed 181 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 ---Prefer qualifications Parker is a freelance writer based in Thailand for Asia Times Online can't accurately predict US or South Korean policy decisions ---Doesn't solve Russia relations it's based on North Korea being a part of the Six Party Talks their argument is based on reunification Last printed 182 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Condition on Denuclearization CP 2AC ---Doesn't solve the case the counterplan delays the plan theres no evidence in the 1NC that ____________could be implemented quickly the case outweighs in the short term ---The counterplan is a voting issue vote aff A. Unpredictable infinite number of things that the negative could condition the burden for an advocate off conditioning means its infinite and the aff will never have offense against it B. Steals the entire aff it does the entirety of the plan and assumes the plan text passes with 100% certainty C. Kills topic specific education you can read generic conditions CPs on every topic reading this as a DA solves their offense They'll say no IISS, 09 (June 2009, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Comments, "North Korea's Dangerous Game," Vol. 5, Issue 5, http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategiccomments/pastissues/volume152009/volume15issue5/northkoreasdangerousgame/, JMP) Nuclear test and missile launches go beyond usual brinkmanship In May, the United States Secretary of Defense called it `a harbinger of a dark future'. North Korea's apparent progress on nuclear weapons and longrange missiles did not pose a direct military threat to the US, Robert Gates said at the eighth IISS ShangriLa Dialogue in Singapore. However, the rogue state's recent actions in testing its second nuclear bomb and firing off a volley of missiles did `give urgency' to efforts to persuade it to change its direction. Since April, the international community's alarm and condemnation of North Korea's actions have grown. Having fired a missile 3,200km over the Sea of Japan and into the Pacific Ocean, conducted a second nuclear test explosion, quit the SixParty Talks on its nuclear programme, restarted its plutonium production programme, expelled UN nuclear inspectors and repudiated the 56yearold truce that ended the Korean War (see timeline, overleaf), the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) was talking menacingly in early June of its `nuclear deterrent' being available for a `merciless offensive'. Such actions herald a dangerous new phase in tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Past provocations have been viewed as attempts to gain attention and concessions is no longer suggesting it would trade its nuclear programme for the right economic and political sweeteners. Show of power from the outside world. Now, as it demands to be recognised as a nucleararmed state and simultaneously concentrates on leadership succession, North Korea Giving little warning of nuclear test and ignoring the Obama Administration's offers of engagement, North Korea did not the appear to be bargain ing for security and economic advantages. While testing the new US president or seeking his attention may have figured in the equation, it may also be that Pyongyang preemptively decided it had little to gain from Obama. While it is impossible to know North Korea's true intentions, assertion of power seems to be a key motivator of recent actions. an its American scholars visiting North Korea this spring heard a consistent message that North Korea was no longer interested in normalising relations unless on the basis of recognition as nucleararmed US a state. The North Koreans may have believed that the best way to gain this was demonstrating that their nuclear devices and longrange missiles really work (see boxes above and below). The great fear is that they could miniaturise nuclear warheads to mount on missiles and then deliver such a weapon, but it is unlikely that they can currently achieve this (see box, next page). need to show strength is driven by external A and internal vulnerabilities. Since 2008, North Korea has faced a firmer foe in conservative South Korean President Lee Myung Bak. Lee ended the `sunshine policies' of his two predecessors and reduced the aid pledged in their summits with the North. His insistence on reciprocity has apparently prompted Pyongyang to do the opposite, lest it appear weak. North Korea broke off most communications and trade with the South, and threatened to close the Kaesong joint industrial complex, just north of the DMZ (demilitarised zone) between the Koreas, unless wage payments were quadrupled. On 30 March, North Korea arrested a South Korean manager at the plant, shortly after seizing two American journalists near the Chinese border. Succession politics are also surely in play. After the stroke suffered by Kim Jong Il in August 2008, regime the needed to Last printed 183 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 demonstrate externally and internally that it remained strong. Photos and video footage since showed Kim to be gaunt and limping. In early June, South Korean media outlets reported that North Korea has asked the country's institutions and overseas missions to pledge loyalty to Kim's third and youngest son, 25yearold Kim Jong Woon. These were later given some credence when eldest son and former heir apparent Kim Jong Nam told Japanese TV that he thought his younger brother would succeed to the position. It is also widely assessed that Chang Sung Taek, Kim Jong Il's brotherinlaw and a National Defence Commission member, will wield power as a regent if formal authority passes to the youngest son. Given the key role generals would play in any succession scenario, Kim Jong Il had good reason to accede to military demands for a second nuclear test. ---Permutation do the counterplan its not severance A. Certainty and immediacy aren't in the plan text the counterplan isn't separate from the mandate of the plan B. Severance is justified when counterplans only compete off certainty it allows counterplans that do the plan illegally which the aff is never prepared for severance is justified ---Counterplan worse for stability Choi, 06 visiting professor at the College of International Relations, Ritsumeikan University and senior research fellow at Korea Institute for National Unification (Jinwook, Ritsumeikan Annual Review of International Studies, "The North Korean Domestic Situation and Its Impact on the Nuclear Crisis," Vol. 15, pp.118, http://www.ritsumei.ac.jp/acd/cg/ir/college/bulletin/evol.5/CHOI.pdf, JMP) MilitaryFirst Policy One of major reasons for North Korea's reluctance to adopt reform policies consistently seems to be its lack of confidence in domestic political stability. The economic reforms in China in the late 1970s and in Vietnam in the mid1980s were based on government confidence in domestic political loyalty. In fact, China and Vietnam were faced with more hostile environments, when they started their reform policies, than North Korea is facing now. China faced tensions with Russia and Taiwan, while Vietnam had troubles with the U.S., China, and Cambodia. Instead of consistently implementing fullfledged reform policies to maintain political stability, Kim Jongil relies on MilitaryFirst the Policy , under which he has given military the unprecedented privileges, frequently visiting events and places associated with it and promoting military officials within the official power hierarchy. Despite the almighty status and power of KWP, it has not functioned normally since Kim Il Sung's death. No party congress has been held since the sixth party congress in 1980. According to the Party Act, the party congress is supposed to be held every five years. The plenum of the Central Committee has not been held since the 21st plenum in December 1993. The plenum, which has the right to elect the secretarygeneral, was not held even when Kim Jongil became the party's secretarygeneral in October of 1997. Instead, Kim Jongil was endorsed by both the Central Committee and the Central Military Committee. It is no longer considered strange that the plenum is not held before the Supreme People's Assembly. It is suspected that Secretariat and Politburo meetings have not been held since Kim Il Sung's death. It is likely that not a single organization within the party is fulfilling its decisionmaking functions, and thus the party is not working properly as a system. There are a number of vacant positions in the party. Under the MilitaryFirst Policy, the KWP does not function as an institutionalized decisionmaking body. In fact, Kim Jongil has said, "My business style is one without a conference."15 Decisionmaking is highly centralized around Kim Jongil, particularly in the areas of military affairs, foreign policy, and high level appointments, and he does not depend on any institutionalized body in his decisionmaking process. When a single paramount leader dominates the decision making process, decisionmaking bodies do not operate properly, even when they are convened. When Mao ruled China, for example, he limited the degree of top leadership participation in key policy debates, and decisionmaking bodies were relegated to rubberstamp organizations.16 In North Korea, where the input of formal and informal institutions in the decisionmaking process is extremely limited, the results can be unpredictable, irrational, and sometimes even dangerous. There are several reasons why the Kim Jongil regime has adopted the MilitaryFirst Policy. First, the enhanced status of the military is designed to guarantee its loyalty. In fact, military contributes to the stability the of the regime and may be its last resort. Second, this policy appears to be related to Kim Jongil's intention to bypass the party and control the military directly. If, as in the past, the military is controlled by the party in every aspect, it is possible that someone in the party could rise to become a strong second man on the North Korean political scene. This situation would weaken the personal power of Kim Jongil. In fact, Kim Jongil himself consolidated his power through the party organization, beginning in the early 1970s. As secretary of KWP's Department of Organization and Guidance, Kim Jongil could monopolize the personnel policy of the party, military, and government; thus he knows the power of party connections better than anybody. Therefore, he does not want to control the military through the central party organization. Third, the enhanced status of the military may be partly aimed at the outside world. A strong military seems to be the only political leverage that North Korea has. It believes that military blackmail is its most effective bargaining chip in relations with United the States and South Korea, and that the outside world will not dare to dismiss it if it shows off its military muscle. North Korean negotiators often avoid sensitive issues and turn down the agenda raised by the United States and South Korea under the pretext of Last printed 184 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 "military dissatisfaction" or "military veto." nuclear program The can be interpreted in the same context. Pyongyang seems to consider nuclear program its the as most reliable form of leverage in negotiating for economic aid, diplomatic normalization, and security guarantees. The nuclear program also helps promote regime stability by giving the North Korean people a sense of pride in their "Strong and Prosperous Nation." It is noteworthy that this time, unlike the first nuclear crisis of 1993,17 North Korea actually said "We are entitled to possess nuclear weapons" and declared itself to be a nuclear power on February 10, 2005.18 Conflict Bandow, 10 senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former special assistant to Reagan (5/24/10, Doug, "Avoiding Pyongyang," http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=23432, JMP) The socalled Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has been a malign international actor since its formation six decades ago. Kim Ilsung initiated full scale war in 1950; over the years the regime has engaged in a variety of military and terrorist attacks on both South Korean and American targets. However, since the downing of a ROK airliner in 1987, Pyongyang has been on better behavior. Brinkmanship has remained the North's chief negotiating tactic, but the DPRK has avoided committing any blatant acts of war. Why sink a South Korean ship It could be an unauthorized military action intended to prevent resumption of negotiations over Pyongyang's nuclear ? program. It could be an attempt by Kim Jongil to demonstrate that North Korea can strike with impunity. could be a It concession by him to the military as Kim attempts to install his young as his successor. In any case, the attack poses a significant challenge to South Korea. But son not to America. ---Permutation do the plan and the counterplan in a world where North Korea says yes its not severance because we're only permuting the world where they say yes US isn't a threat Horowitz, 05 doctoral candidate in the Department of Government at Harvard and a predoctoral fellow in national security at the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies (Winter 200405, The Washington Quarterly, "Who's Behind That Curtain? Unveiling Potential Leverage over Pyongyang," http://www.twq.com/05winter/docs/05winter_horowitz.pdf, JMP) Militarily leveraging the North Korean regime will be difficult. Although the United States possesses overwhelming military superiority, it is not clear if it can credibly threaten an attack at the present. Military power may be more positively utilized in the form of a negative security assurance to induce North Korean cooperation, but such incentives would also incur risks. China's military leverage over North Korea is similarly unclear. North Korea would certainly count on Chinese support in the event of a military contingency on the peninsula, but China's actual actions are difficult to predict. Last printed 185 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Conditions 1AR Theory Theres no solvency advocate for the counterplan in context of food stamps this has a few problems There are infinite things the CP could be conditioned on multiple things are conditioned on government spending Also kills aff ground the 1AC becomes irrelevant and we have to rely on net benefit offense which will never be good offense because we can't research all conditions Prefer topic specific education we'll never learn about social services when teams rely on conditioning it shifts the debate to our mechanism they could read this as a DA At worst this is just a reason to reject the solvency of the counterplan Last printed 186 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Conditions 1AR Perm Do the CP Perm do the counterplan solves all of the plan and the counterplan net benefit this doesn't sever The counterplan isn't separate from the mandate of the plan it does the entire plan plus conditions ________ the certainty and immediacy of the plan weren't specified in the text At worst severance is justified it competes off certainty theres no other way to answer a counterplan that justifies things like doing the plan on any infinite process The perm also shields the net benefit we're still allowing for the plan to be conditioned on __________________ A2: Moving Target It isn't a moving target this argument assumes we're changing the plan text as long as we still defend that the plan passes its not a moving target A2: Infinitely Regressive We're defending all of the plan as a mechanism for solvency and we're not severing out of it because we're defining the meaning of fiat its not infinitely regressive in this instance A2: Strategy Skew There's no negative skew because we're defending the mandate after the 1NC theres no evidence saying how the plan could be implemented just that it will be A2: Education Their education arguments swing our way introducing this generic of a strategy into the debate forces debates about implementation and not mandates A2: Not Real World Policy makers always discuss the implementation of plans after they are passed we control the internal link to real world education no one can predict what the actual bill of the plan would look like it would be hundreds of pages long Last printed 187 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Conditions 1AR Multiple Worlds Perm Multiple worlds perm we're permuting to do the plan only if the states will allow for conditional spending the impact A. the states say yes and we get our permutation which solves 100% of both the aff and the net benefit OR B. they say no and we get to weigh the case against the counterplan as a solvency deficit This perm isn't severance it just permutes the one world where the states say yes its not our burden to determine whether the states will accept the plan the aff ALWAYS advocates plan passage we just permute part of the counterplan Plus the conditional nature of fiat with the counterplan means it is reciprocal we unconditionally do the plan even if the perm is conditional Last printed 188 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Last printed 189 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Conditions 1AR regime turn Last printed 190 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Giving up the nuclear weapons program will wreck Kim Jongil's regime military won't tolerate it Bandow, 09 senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former special assistant to Reagan (8/4/09, Doug, "Grumpy Old Men," http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=21936, JMP) Pyongyang subsequently relaxed internal controls and slightly opened the economy to the outside. Under South Korean Presidents Kim Daejung and Roh Moohyun the Republic of Korea engaged in the socalled Sunshine Policy, aiding and investing in the DPRK. Since the 1994 Agreed Framework, the North also has engaged in an onandoff negotiation with North Korea's neighbors and the United States over ending its nuclear program. This process has significantly increased Pyongyang's contact with the West. Even so, a negotiated settlement remained out of reach. Despite the common assumption that the North was willing to deal, Pyongyang had reason to reject even a seemingly generous offer. Observes analyst Balbina Hwang: "For the regime itself, isolation of course serves to preserve its own power and legitimacy which would immediately be undermined by openness." Lankov points out that the Kim regime is particularly vulnerable given the proximity of South Korea, with a prosperous and free people who share the same culture and speak the same language. Still, hope of a solution rose in the aftermath the October 2007 denuclearization agreement. Alas, the accord crashed and burned last year. North Korea has subsequently denounced the arrangement, expelled international inspectors, announced that it will not return to the sixparty talks, begun to rebuild its nuclear program and restarted reprocessing activities, renounced the 1953 Armistice, nullified boundarydemarcation accords, terminated bilateral political cooperation and reconciliation agreements, and voided economic arrangements with the South. Earlier this year, Pyongyang conducted a nuclear test and several missile tests. As international criticism increased, the DPRK ratcheted up its rhetoric, threatening military retaliation in response to varied South Korean, U.S. and UN actions. None of this means that North Korea could not come back to the table. However, today there is far less expectation that the DPRK will ever be willing to abandon its nuclear program, let alone yield up its existing nuclear materials. Nuclear weapons offer the North security assurance, international status and extortion opportunities. If Pyongyang can still be bought off, the price has likely risen sharply. North Korea's current internal instability will make reaching a deal even more difficult. Despite common claims that Kim is "crazy," the evidence indicates that he is evil, not insane. His strategy is consistent with regime preservation. The military is central to Kim's rule. He long has pushed a "military first" policy. Even as the regime lost authority, it continued to funnel resources to the armed forces. Nevertheless, in their prime both Kims may have had sufficient authority to sacrifice the military's most powerful weapon as part of a political deal. A seriously ill and perhaps dying Kim Jong Il may not. A transitional collective leadership likely would not. Last printed 191 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Remove Troops From Elsewhere CP 2AC ---Doesn't solve... anything... First Korean conflict troops there prevents Korea from building up their own deterrence forces resentment from North Korea means they are more likely to attack when troops are there that's Bandow Second overstretch Korea is key biggest infrastructure costs and anti-American resentment that's Cummings ---Permutation do both ---No solvency advocate is a voter plan based off of what the US can plan to do removing troops from all other places is unpredictable aff loses to bad advantage counterplans every time Korean presence kills competitiveness Bandow and Carpenter 4 JD from Stanford, senior fellow at Cato, former special assistant to Reagan, writes for Fortune, 200 * National Interest, WSJ, Washington Times, **PhD in diplomatic history from Texas, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at Cato, contributing editor to the National Interest, editorial board of the Journal of Strategic Studies (Ted Galen and Doug, "The Korean conundrum", Google Books, page 120, WEA) Billions in defense subsidies to allied nations (South Korea is merely one beneficiary, of course) have a dual impact . One is on domestic economic policy, since such outlays further inflate tax collections and government borrowing, diverting resources away from more productive private investment. Perhaps even more serious is the international impact. American defense subsidies not only impoverish U.S. taxpayers; they simultaneously enrich foreign nations that are major trade competitors . Allowing South Korea (as well as Japan and a host of European nations) to concentrate domestic resources on economic rather than military development puts American enterprises at disadvantage. a That cost was modest and probably worth enduring during the early days of the Cold War; there is no longer any reason to indirectly underwrite large Korean, Japanese, and European businesses as they compete with U.S. firms. That's key to heg Segal 04 (Adam, Senior Fellow in China Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, November/December 2004, "Is America Losing Its Edge?," Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20041101facomment83601/adamsegal/isamericalosingits edge.html?mode=print) SLV Today, however, this technological edgeso long taken for grantedmay be slipping, and the most serious challenge is coming from Asia. Through competitive tax policies, increased investment in research and development (R&D), and preferential policies for science and technology (S&T) personnel, Asian governments are improving the quality of their science and ensuring the exploitation of future innovations. The percentage of patents issued to and science journal articles published scientists in by China, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan is rising. Indian companies are quickly becoming the secondlargest producers of application services in the world, developing, supplying, and managing database and other types of software for clients around the world. South Korea has rapidly eaten away at the U.S. advantage in the manufacture of computer chips and telecommunications software. And even China has made impressive gains in advanced technologies such as lasers, biotechnology, and advanced materials used in semiconductors, aerospace, and many other types of manufacturing. Although the United States' technical dominance remains solid, the globalization of research and development is exerting considerable pressures on the American system. Indeed, as the U nited States is learning, globalization cuts both ways: it is both a potent catalyst of U.S. technological innovation and a significant threat to it. The U nited tates will never be able to prevent rivals S from developing new technologies; it can remain dominant only by continuing to innovate faster than everyone else. But this won't be easy; to keep its privileged position in the world, the United States must get better at fostering technological entrepreneurship at Last printed 192 FILE NAME HOOCH home. <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 ---And doesn't remove troops from Iraq and Afghanistan doesn't solve overstretch wars are taking up most of our resources that's Wood ---Multiple conditionality voting issue vote aff A. Strategy skew theres too many contradicting frameworks the aff is burdened with argument interaction so the negative should be held to the same standard they can contradict themselves killing fairness in round B. Ensures shallow discussion education should come from in depth discussions about issues, not reading multiple policies in the 1NC C. They get one conditional counterplan prevents future contradictions Conflicting worlds voter even if they win conditionality is good independent voter Last printed 193 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 USFG Doesn't Strike North Korea CP 2AC ---Object fiat is a voter: the advantage is based off of predictive strikes we have uniqueness on it it justifies them fiating out of every impact we read without a solvency advocate encourages lazy research and prevents learning about the topic plus kills fairness aff can't permute to solve their impacts puts us behind cause we have to read defense answering it ---Doesn't solve Korean conflict only removing troops solves China and South Korea deter North Korean aggression that outweighs bioweapons have a faster timeframe spread 6 weeks after they are deployed kills us before the net benefit ---We're overstretched now emboldens Iran CST 06 (The Chicago Sun Times. 1/15/6. Lexis) Ahmadinejad is surely motivated by ideology and the desire to solidify the position of the security faction within Iran's ruling elite. But he also appears to be acting on the perception that the United States is in a position of considerable, indeed unprecedented, weakness. America's military is overstretched in Iraq and Afghanistan, and Washington has focused on monitoring North Korea's nuclear program rather than Iran's. If threatened, Iran could wreak havoc in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon and Israel. These observations may lead Ahmadinejad to an incorrect assessment of Iran's strength relative to any American threat. In fact, Iran has serious domestic frailties, including a shaky economy and its attendant unemployment and popular resentment, not to mention soaring levels of drug abuse and a brain drain. But Ahmadinejad no doubt takes comfort not only in his belief in divine protection but also in the knowledge that Shiite religious parties aligned with Iran are now the dominant political forces in Iraq, while the American public hardly seems amenable to waging another war in the region. Extinction Kurtz 06 (Stan, Senior Fellow at Ethics and Public Policy Center, "Our Fallout Shelter Future" The National Review, 28 Aug 2006, Lexis) Proliferation optimists, on the other hand, see reasons for hope in the record of nuclear peace during the Cold War. While granting the risks, proliferation optimists point out that the very horror of the nuclear option tends, in practice, to keep the peace. Without choosing between hawkish proliferation pessimists and dovish proliferation optimists, Rosen simply asks how we ought to act in a post-proliferation world. Rosen assumes (rightly I believe) that proliferation is unlikely to stop with Iran. Once Iran gets the bomb, Turkey and Saudi Arabia are likely to develop their own nuclear weapons, for self-protection, and so as not to allow Iran to take de facto cultural-political control of the Muslim world. (I think you've got to at least add Egypt to this list.) With three, four, or more nuclear states in the Muslim Middle East, what becomes of deterrence? A key to deterrence during the Cold War was our ability to know who had hit whom. With a small number of geographically separated nuclear states, and with the big opponents training satellites and specialized advance-guard radar emplacements on each other, it was relatively easy to know where a missile had come from. But what if a nuclear missile is launched at the U nited States from somewhere in a fully nuclearized Middle East, in the middle of a war in which, say, Saudi Arabia and Iran are already lobbing conventional missiles at one another? Would we know who had attacked us? Could we actually drop a retaliatory nuclear bomb on someone without being absolutely certain? And as Rosen asks, What if the nuclear blow was delivered against us by an airplane or a cruise missile? It might be almost impossible to trace the attack back to its source with certainty, especially in the midst of an ongoing conventional conflict. We're familiar with the horror scenario of a Muslim state passing a nuclear bomb to terrorists for use against an American city. But imagine the same scenario in a multi-polar Muslim nuclear world. With several Muslim countries in possession of the bomb, it would be extremely difficult to trace the state source of a nuclear terror strike. In fact, this very difficulty would encourage states (or ill-controlled elements within nuclear states -- like Pakistan's intelligence services or Iran's Revolutionary Guards) to pass nukes to terrorists. The tougher it is to trace the source of a weapon, the easier it is to give the weapon away. In short, nuclear proliferation to multiple Muslim states greatly increases the chances of a nuclear terror strike . Right now, the Indians and Pakistanis "enjoy" an Last printed 194 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 apparently stable nuclear stand-off. Both countries have established basic deterrence, channels of communication, and have also eschewed a potentially destabilizing nuclear arms race. Attacks by Kashmiri militants in 2001 may have pushed India and Pakistan close to the nuclear brink. Yet since then, precisely because of the danger, the two countries seem to have established a clear, deterrence-based understanding. The 2001 crisis gives fuel to proliferation pessimists, while the current stability encourages proliferation optimists. Rosen points out, however, that a multi-polar nuclear Middle East is unlikely to follow the South Asian model. Deep mutual suspicion between an expansionist, apocalyptic, Shiite Iran, secular Turkey, and the Sunni Saudis and Egyptians (not to mention Israel) is likely to fuel a dangerous multi-pronged nuclear arms race. Larger arsenals mean more chance of a weapon being slipped to terrorists. The collapse of the world's non-proliferation regime also raises the chances that nuclearization will spread to Asian powers like Taiwan and Japan. And of course, possession of nuclear weapons is likely to embolden Iran, especially in the transitional period before the Saudis develop weapons of their own. Like Saddam, Iran may be tempted to take control of Kuwait's oil wealth, on the assumption that the U nited States will not dare risk a nuclear confrontation by escalating the conflict. If the proliferation optimists are right, then once the Saudis get nukes, Iran would be far less likely to make a move on nearby Kuwait. On the other hand, to the extent that we do see conventional war in a nuclearized Middle East, the losers will be sorely tempted to cancel out their defeat with a nuclear strike. There may have been nuclear peace during the Cold War, but there were also many "hot" proxy wars. ---Permutation do both solves the impact best --- No solvency advocate is a voter plan based off of what the US can plan to do they have no evidence that the U.S. would never strike North Korea under stress Last printed 195 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Last printed 196 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Last printed 197 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Last printed 198 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 [Generic] Consult CP 2AC ---The counterplan is a voting issue vote aff: A. Unpredictable theres an infinite number of places that the negative could consult the burden for an advocate off consulting means the aff will never have offense against it B. Steals the entire aff it does the entirety of the plan and assumes the plan text passes with 100% certainty only a counterplan that has a solvency advocate in context of the aff is legitimate C. Kills topic specific education you can read generic consult CPs on every topic reading this as a DA solves their offense D. Neg topic bias the neg gets things like conditionality and agent fiat allowing the Consult CP makes it impossible to be aff ---Doesn't solve the case the counterplan delays the plan theres no evidence in the 1NC that consultation with ________ could be implemented quickly the case outweighs in the short term ---Permutation do the plan and consult with Russia it's not intrinsic doesn't specify what consultation is done ---Permutation do the counterplan its not severance A. Certainty and immediacy aren't in the plan text the counterplan isn't separate from the mandate of the plan B. Fiat doesn't mean the plan is implemented the resolution is a question of what the federal government should do that means desirable or recommended, not mandatory C. Severance is justified when counterplans only compete off certainty it allows counterplans that do the plan illegally which the aff is never prepared for severance is justified Should expresses desirability Cambridge Dictionary of American English, 7 (http://dictionary.cambridge.org/define.asp? key=should*1+0&dict=A) should (DUTY) auxiliary verb Last printed 199 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 used to express that necessary, desirable, advisable, or important to perform the action it is of the following verb And prefer textual competition - A. Most objective text comparison is the most clear and predictable allows in-depth clash cuz we can accurately predict the range of CPs B. functional competition leads to arbitrary judge intervention about functions of plan C. Key to force internally competitive counterplans the only predictable CPs that allow aff to generate offense ---Permutation do the plan and the counterplan in a world where Russia accepts the plan its not severance because we're only permuting the world where they say yes Last printed 200 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 [Full] Consult NATO CP 2AC Last printed 201 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 ---NATO will say no - it perceives US forces on the peninsula as a deterrent to Russian aggression ---The counterplan is a voting issue vote aff: A. Unpredictable theres an infinite number of places that the negative could consult the burden for an advocate off consulting means the aff will never have offense against it B. Steals the entire aff it does the entirety of the plan and assumes the plan text passes with 100% certainty only a counterplan that has a solvency advocate in context of the aff is legitimate C. Kills topic specific education you can read generic consult CPs on every topic reading this as a DA solves their offense D. Neg topic bias the neg gets things like conditionality and agent fiat allowing the Consult CP makes it impossible to be aff ---Doesn't solve the case the counterplan delays the plan theres no evidence in the 1NC that consultation with NATO could be implemented quickly the case outweighs in the short term Gordon `86 NATO Indecisiveness Delays Arms Projects http://www.aviationnow.com The inability of N orth tlantic reaty rganization countries A T O to make firm budget commitments delayed has implementation of cooperative weapons development projects with the U.S., according to William H. Taft, 4th deputy Defense secretary. The Defense Dept. already has legislative and budget authority to start the programs, and officials are disappointed by European governments' failure to move more rapidly, Taft said here. Taft recently returned from a visit to urge European and Middle Eastern allies to complete action on joint projects. Defense officials hope that allied officials will sign several agreements when the independent European planning group (IEPG) holds its next meeting in Madrid in January. The deputy secretary visited government officials and industrial failities in France, the Netherlands, Spain, Greece, Turkey, Israel and Egypt. Despite U.S. efforts to negotiate satisfactory agreements to implement programs identified earlier this year by NATO armaments directors, only one memorandum of understanding, on the standoff airborne radar demonstration system, has been signed, Taft said (AW&ST June 23, p. 26). Three other memoranda have been signed on programs proposed under U.S. cooperative projects legislation originally sponsored by Sen. Sam Nunn (D.Ga.). NATO officials have been receptive to the idea of cooperative projects, even in Spain and the Netherlands where the balance of defense procurement is very much in favor of the U.S. "They've seen over five or six years that the U.S. has made a real effort, even if it is not paying off for them," Taft said. The U.S. has an approximate balance with the United Kingdom and a deficit with France. Modernization Burden The Defense Dept. has been concerned about the role the Southern European allies Portugal, Spain, Greece and Turkey might play in the initiative, because of their relative lack of development, industrial advancement and available research and development funds. These nations now depend on U.S. security assistance for defense modernization, but Defense Dept. officials hope to shift that burden partly onto the countries' local industry through the mechanism of arms cooperation, he said. Reduction of an ally's dependence on U.S. security assistance can benefit both countries. Last printed 202 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 ---Permutation do the counterplan its not severance A. Certainty and immediacy aren't in the plan text the counterplan isn't separate from the mandate of the plan B. Fiat doesn't mean the plan is implemented the resolution is a question of what the federal government should do that means desirable or recommended, not mandatory C. Severance is justified when counterplans only compete off certainty it allows counterplans that do the plan illegally which the aff is never prepared for severance is justified Should expresses desirability Cambridge Dictionary of American English, 7 (http://dictionary.cambridge.org/define.asp? key=should*1+0&dict=A) should (DUTY) auxiliary verb used to express that necessary, desirable, advisable, or important to perform the action it is of the following verb And prefer textual competition - A. Most objective text comparison is the most clear and predictable allows in-depth clash cuz we can accurately predict the range of CPs B. functional competition leads to arbitrary judge intervention about functions of plan C. Key to force internally competitive counterplans the only predictable CPs that allow aff to generate offense CP makes war with Russia inevitable Carpenter 9 (Ted Galen Carpenter, Ph.D., is the vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, "NATO at 60: A Hollow Alliance," http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa635.pdf) Taking on the obligation to defend the Baltic countries was especially unwise, because NATO now poses a direct geopolitical challenge to Russia right on Moscow's doorstep. Relations between Russia and its small Baltic neighbors are testy, to put it mildly. At the moment, Russiamay be tooweak to challenge the U.S./NATO security commitment to those countries, but we cannot be certain that will always be true. The endorsement of NATO membership for Croatia and Albania confirms that the alliance has nowentered the realmof farce.Themilitary capabilities of those two countries are minuscule. According to the 2009 edition of The Military Balance, published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies,Croatia'smilitary budget is a mere $962 million, and its military force consists of 18,600 activeduty personnel. Albania's budget is $233million, and its force is 14,295. They will augment Estonia's $425 million and 5,300 troops, Latvia's $513million and 5,187 troops, Lithuania's $500 million and 8,850 troops, and Slovenia's $756 million Last printed 203 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 and 7,200 troops. By not offering membership to Macedonia, though,NATO will have todowithout Skopje's $163 million and 10,890 troops.5 Collectively, those countries spend less on their militaries inayear thantheUnitedStates spends in Iraq in twoweeks. The NewMembers Are Dangerous as Well as Useless Such new allies are not merely useless; they are potentially an embarrassment to the alliance, and possibly a serious danger. When Vice President Dick Cheney asserted during a visit to the Balkans in 2006 that the proposed members would help "rejuvenate" NATO and rededicate the alliance "to the basic and fundamental values of freedom and democracy," he showed how out of touch with reality U.S and NATO policy had become.6 Croatia is just a few years removed from the fascistic regime of Franjo Tudjman and continues to have frosty relations with neighboring Serbia. Albania is a close ally of the new, predominantlyAlbanian state of Kosovo, an entity whose independence both Serbia and Russia (as well as most other countries) do not recognize and vehemently oppose. Albania also is notorious for being under the influence of organized crime. Indeed, the Albanian mafia is legendary throughout Europe, controlling much of the gambling, prostitution, and drug trafficking.7 Efforts to add Ukraine and Georgia to the alliance, a policy that the Bush administration pushed and the Obama administration endorses, would be even worse than the previous rounds of expansion. Ukraine's relationship with Russia is quite contentious. Georgia's relationship, of course, is even worse than that, as last summer's warfare confirmed. Rational Americans should have breathed a sigh of relief thatGeorgiawas not aNATO member at the time the conflict erupted. Proponents of NATO's enlargement eastward sometimes act as though the alliance is now merely a political honor society. Their underlying logic is that, because the nations of Eastern Europe have become capitalist democracies, they deserve to be members of the West's most prominent club. But nearly all the newer members ofNATO, which are themost concerned about possible adverse security developments emanating from Russia, consider the alliance to bemore than a political body. They are counting on tangible protection from depredations by their large eastern neighbor. And, equally important, Moscow does not view the current incarnation of NATO as merely political in nature. The Georgian conflict should remind us That NATO is still officiallymuchmore than a political club. It remains a military alliance with extensive obligations--especially for the United States. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty proclaims that an attack on one member is an attack on all. That means the nited States is U obligated to assist in the defense of every member--no matter how small,how militarily or economically insignificant, or how strategically exposed thatmembermight be.8 Nuclear war Yesin 7 (Colonel General Vladimir Senior Vice President of the Russian Academy of the Problems of Security, Defense, and Law. "Will America Fight Russia?;". Defense and Security, No 78. LN July 2007) Yesin: Should the RussianAmerican war begin, it will inevitably deteriorate into the Third World War. The United States is a NATO member and this bloc believes in collective security. In fact, collective security is what it is about. Vladimirov: This war will inevitably deteriorate into a nuclear conflict. Regardless of what weapons will be used in the first phase. ---Permutation do the plan and consult with Russia it's not intrinsic doesn't specify what consultation is done ---Permutation do the plan and the counterplan in a world where Russia accepts the plan its not severance because we're only permuting the world where they say yes Last printed 204 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 NATO decline inevitable Carpenter `9. USA Today. Farmingdale. Vol. 138, Iss. 2774; pg. 26, A HOLLOW ALLIANCE 3 pgs [Headnote] NATO once was a serious and capable military association with an important purpose. That no longer is the case, and there is little prospect that the process of decay can be reversed. NATO CELEBRATED its 60th birthday this past April. The prevailing view that the alliance is healthy and an essential political and security player in the 2 lsl century is reinforced by the apparent attitude of the new government of die North Atlantic Treaty Organization's leading power, the U.S. The Administration of George W. Bush often seemed to prefer a unilateral approach to foreign affairs. Pres. Barack Obama's foreign policy team repeatedly has emphasized its commitment to multilateralism in general and NATO in particular which helped Obama win the Nobel Peace Prize (albeit in dubious fashion) less than a year into his presidency. Moreover, during her confirmation hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stressed that Washington's policy should be one of "smart power," the meaning of which includes "strengthening die alliances that have stood the test of time, especially wilh our NATO partners and our allies in East Asia" However, the professed optimism on both sides of the Atlantic cannot conceal growing doubts about NATO's relevance to policy challenges die of the 21st century, and its ability to be an effective security mechanism. There are unmistakable signs of trouble in several areas: weakness die and vulnerability of new members and prospective new members: clumsy alliance policies that have created serious tensions with Russia: growing divisions within the burgeoning alliance policy toward over Russia: NATO's anemic performance in Afghanistan: and the alarming decline in the military capabilities of the alliance's core European members. ---Permutation do both phased withdrawal means we can consult NATO after implementation ---No collapse Powell 3 (Colin Powell, "Powell Stresses Durability of TransAtlantic Alliance," 572003) Time and again for more than a decade, with great drama, pundits and analysts have predicted the demise of NATO, growing tensions between the Alliance and the European Union, and crises in the transatlantic relationships. Time and again, I've had to listen to charges of wither NATO. I have had to listen to people say, Well, the Warsaw Pact is over, it is gone. Why isn't NATO over and gone? I don t know how many former Soviet generals I have spoken to who kept saying to me, Well, Colin, since we no longer need an alliance, why do you need an alliance called NATO? And time and time again, they have not understood the reality at all. Time and time again, pundits have been wrong. What we have seen instead of the demise of NATO and other halfcentury old institutions, we are seeing them rapidly and successfully evolving and expanding and changing to meet profound geostrategic challenges. They have changed as the changes have come to them. We have gone through it all the collapse of Soviet communism, consolidation of the new democracies, and the chilling dawn of a postSeptember 11 world. Despite the dire prognostications, NATO shows absolutely no signs of shutting down. Why would it? Why should it? You don t close a club that people keep lining up to get in to. A few weeks ago, I warmly congratulated the European Union, when in Athens ten more countries signed their accession treaty for membership in the Union. And I know that tomorrow Javier will heartily greet the expected vote in the U.S. Senate for NATO's further enlargement seven more countries and Minister Geoana will be with us in Washington tomorrow and I hope can deliver that to you tomorrow, my friend. Last printed 205 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Last printed 206 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Last printed 207 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 [Full] Consult ROK CP 2AC ---The counterplan is a voting issue vote aff: A. Unpredictable theres an infinite number of places that the negative could consult the burden for an advocate off consulting means the aff will never have offense against it B. Steals the entire aff it does the entirety of the plan and assumes the plan text passes with 100% certainty only a counterplan that has a solvency advocate in context of the aff is legitimate C. Kills topic specific education you can read generic consult CPs on every topic reading this as a DA solves their offense D. Neg topic bias the neg gets things like conditionality and agent fiat allowing the Consult CP makes it impossible to be aff ---Say no: First wrong signal NEW YORK TIMES 2003 ("South Korea, in Surprise, Demands U.S. Forces Stay in Place," March 7, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/07/international/asia/08CNDKORE.html) Calum "Anything that would leave the impression the U nited tates S was backing out would send the wrong signal," said Ralph Cossa , president of the Pacific Forum of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. "At this point it doesn't make sense either to do it or talk about it." South Koreans have not altered their pleas for a "more mature, equal partnership," as demanded by President Roh, but are turning that demand into another reason for the U nited tates S to keep all 37,000 troops in Korea, the majority between here and the North Korean frontier. "We agree it's a critical issue," said Song Young Gil, a National Assembly member from Mr. Roh's Millennium Democratic Party. "After the nuclear crisis is solved, at that time we will consult on this problem." Second perceived as prelude to attack NEW YORK TIMES 2003 ("South Korea, in Surprise, Demands U.S. Forces Stay in Place," March 7, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/07/international/asia/08CNDKORE.html) Calum Mr. Song shared a view, increasingly heard here, that any American proposal to move troops from near the line with North Korea may mean that the U nited tates S intends to attack North Korean nuclear facilities against the wishes of the South Korean government. The logic behind this thinking is that the United States would want its troops out of harm's way in case North Korean ground forces retaliated by striking across the demilitarized zone. "American troops are something like hostages to attack by North Korea," said Mr. Song. "Maybe this kind of action means some kind signal for a preemptive strike against North Korea of ." For much the same reason, Mr. Song also opposed proposals to withdraw American forces from the large headquarters area that they have occupied in Seoul since the Korean War. "When North Koreans attack Seoul, automatically American troops will be involved just in time to react," he said. "So they can prevent North Korean attack." In any case, "We ask Secretary Rumsfeld, do not withdraw American troops at this time," said Mr. Song. "If the alliance is equal, Americans should heed the voice of the Korean government." Last printed 208 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 ---Permutation do the counterplan its not severance A. Certainty and immediacy aren't in the plan text the counterplan isn't separate from the mandate of the plan B. Fiat doesn't mean the plan is implemented the resolution is a question of what the federal government should do that means desirable or recommended, not mandatory C. Severance is justified when counterplans only compete off certainty it allows counterplans that do the plan illegally which the aff is never prepared for severance is justified And should expresses desirability Cambridge Dictionary of American English, 7 (http://dictionary.cambridge.org/define.asp? key=should*1+0&dict=A) should (DUTY) auxiliary verb used to express that necessary, desirable, advisable, or important to perform the action it is of the following verb And prefer textual competition - A. Most objective text comparison is the most clear and predictable allows in-depth clash cuz we can accurately predict the range of CPs B. functional competition leads to arbitrary judge intervention about functions of plan C. Key to force internally competitive counterplans the only predictable CPs that allow aff to generate offense Past US troop withdraw beats their counterplan--prior consultation is empirically false, South Korea would say no, relations didn't collapse, and consultation after the plan solves NEW YORK TIMES 2003 ("South Korea, in Surprise, Demands U.S. Forces Stay in Place," March 7, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/07/international/asia/08CNDKORE.html) Calum Officials here said today that Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld had ignored them in suggesting realignment of American forces in Korea and demanded that they stay where they are at least until resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue. South Korea's newly installed defense minister, Cho Young Kil, said Washington "has never officially informed us of the movement U.S. of troops" and "the withdrawal issue was never raised by the U.S. government." Indeed, said Mr. Cho, talking to members of South Korea's fractious National Assembly, American and South Korean officials "will not discuss any possibility of movement of U.S. troops before the nuclear issue is resolved." The demand for American troops to stay comes as a shock to United States officials, who had assumed they were responding to commonly held Korean thinking by pushing ahead with plans for shifting the American military posture. South Korean response The indicated the sensitivities here regarding the role of U nited tates S troops as the new government of President Roh Moo Hyun settles into power amid a nuclear crisis that shows no sign of ending any time soon. Last printed 209 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Assuming that antiAmerican demonstrations in recent months verified the desire of many Koreans for American troops either to go home or to assume a much less visible presence, United States military strategists have been drafting elaborate plans for pulling them back or withdrawing many of them entirely. Against this background, Mr. Rumsfeld said on Thursday that he envisioned a plan under which American forces would provide mainly air and naval support while South Korean troops guarded against North Korean forces massed above the line between the two Koreas. Rumsfeld, Mr. at the Pentagon, suggested that the alternatives were between pulling American troops to positions south of Seoul, reducing the number of United States troops in Korea, or both. Those choices, he said, were "the kinds of things that are being sorted out." South Korean officials, however, viewed Mr. Rumsfeld's remarks as an unsettling revelation that was entirely news to them. All they know about, they said, was a plan announced last year for American troops to leave some minor bases in the interests of tactical efficiency. "Rumsfeld made some wording that was not discussed fully," said a foreign ministry spokesman, in understated politeness. "We should understand each other. There will be more intense discussions." Last printed 210 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 ---Doesn't solve the case the counterplan delays the plan theres no evidence in the 1NC that consultation with Japan could be implemented quickly the case outweighs in the short term ---Permutation do the plan and consult with Japan it's not intrinsic doesn't specify what consultation is done Last printed 211 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 [Full] Consult Japan CP 2AC ---Japan would say no: First perception that US is giving up on protecting Asia all together Second perceived as a concession to China and North Korea over things like nuclear issues The counterplan is a voting issue vote aff: A. Unpredictable theres an infinite number of places that the negative could consult the burden for an advocate off consulting means the aff will never have offense against it B. Steals the entire aff it does the entirety of the plan and assumes the plan text passes with 100% certainty only a counterplan that has a solvency advocate in context of the aff is legitimate C. Kills topic specific education you can read generic consult CPs on every topic reading this as a DA solves their offense D. Neg topic bias the neg gets things like conditionality and agent fiat allowing the Consult CP makes it impossible to be aff ---Doesn't solve the case the counterplan delays the plan theres no evidence in the 1NC that consultation with Japan could be implemented quickly the case outweighs in the short term ---Permutation do the plan and consult with Japan it's not intrinsic doesn't specify what consultation is done ---Permutation do the counterplan its not severance A. Certainty and immediacy aren't in the plan text the counterplan isn't separate from the mandate of the plan B. Fiat doesn't mean the plan is implemented the resolution is a question of what the federal government should do that means desirable or recommended, not mandatory C. Severance is justified when counterplans only compete off certainty it allows counterplans that do the plan illegally which the aff is never prepared for severance is justified And should expresses desirability Cambridge Dictionary of American English, 7 (http://dictionary.cambridge.org/define.asp? key=should*1+0&dict=A) Last printed 212 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 should (DUTY) auxiliary verb used to express that necessary, desirable, advisable, or important to perform the action it is of the following verb And prefer textual competition - A. Most objective text comparison is the most clear and predictable allows in-depth clash cuz we can accurately predict the range of CPs B. functional competition leads to arbitrary judge intervention about functions of plan C. Key to force internally competitive counterplans the only predictable CPs that allow aff to generate offense Last printed 213 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Last printed 214 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Last printed 215 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 [Full] Consult Russia CP 2AC ---The counterplan is a voting issue vote aff: A. Unpredictable theres an infinite number of places that the negative could consult the burden for an advocate off consulting means the aff will never have offense against it B. Steals the entire aff it does the entirety of the plan and assumes the plan text passes with 100% certainty only a counterplan that has a solvency advocate in context of the aff is legitimate C. Kills topic specific education you can read generic consult CPs on every topic reading this as a DA solves their offense D. Neg topic bias the neg gets things like conditionality and agent fiat allowing the Consult CP makes it impossible to be aff ---We never consult proves no impact Gabbitas `2 (Andrea Gabbitas 02. Ph.D. candidate in the Security Studies Program at MIT ("Prospects for U.S. Russian Nonproliferation Cooperation Under Bush and Putin." BCSIA Discussion Paper 200216, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, December 2002. ) Bush has expended significant energy on the creation of a cooperative personal relationship with President Putin. Although Bush has focused on the the United States has still pressed forward with several unilateral moves at Russia's expense and without Russian consultation, belying his rhetoric about the importance of bilateral cooperation. However, Bush has realized that Russian cooperation is necessary to combat both state proliferation and the diversion of President need to work cooperatively with Russia, nuclear materials, two areas in which Bush has pressed for U.S.-Russian cooperation. Bush's commitment to nonproliferation regimes has been less conscientious, and he has used them selectively to back U.S. policy where the regimes accord with U.S. interests while looking the other way when U.S. policy might violate them. ---Doesn't solve the case the counterplan delays the plan theres no evidence in the 1NC that consultation with Russia could be implemented quickly the case outweighs in the short term that's 1AC CNN Money any risk that the counterplan wouldn't be implemented in a short time means you vote aff to stop another recession ---Permutation do the plan and consult with Russia it's not intrinsic doesn't specify what consultation is done ---Economic cooperation checks relations Lavrov 6/11 Sergey; Russian Foreign Minister when asked about the keys to improved USRussian relations "We can't say that NATO presents a threat to us" Kommersant, June 11th 2010; Lexis we are bound not only by disarmament problems . I have already mentioned the need to substantially increase the economic component. This is the main foundation of our relation s, and the plans here are great. At the end of May a large group of representatives of US But I will emphasize that innovative companies came to Russia. And they left inspired. They are preparing concrete ideas towards the visit of President Medvedev to the US. Our companies are also preparing serious proposals that could become the subject of joint projects. I hope this work will proceed apace and the theme of innovation will be one of the determinants of our relationship. I will mention one of the projects the creation of a new large cargo aircraft. Only Russia and the US produce these aircraft, and now the Americans' planes are at the end of their useful life time and we have the need to modernize the same AN-124. Last printed 216 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 ---Permutation do the counterplan its not severance A. Certainty and immediacy aren't in the plan text the counterplan isn't separate from the mandate of the plan B. Fiat doesn't mean the plan is implemented the resolution is a question of what the federal government should do that means desirable or recommended, not mandatory C. Severance is justified when counterplans only compete off certainty it allows counterplans that do the plan illegally which the aff is never prepared for severance is justified Should expresses desirability Cambridge Dictionary of American English, 7 (http://dictionary.cambridge.org/define.asp? key=should*1+0&dict=A) should (DUTY) auxiliary verb used to express that necessary, desirable, advisable, or important to perform the action it is of the following verb And prefer textual competition - A. Most objective text comparison is the most clear and predictable allows in-depth clash cuz we can accurately predict the range of CPs B. functional competition leads to arbitrary judge intervention about functions of plan C. Key to force internally competitive counterplans the only predictable CPs that allow aff to generate offense Relations impossible without U.S. surprises RT 10 RT is the first Russian 24/7 Englishlanguage news channel which brings the Russian view on global news. "Reset button in USRussian relations doesn't work Russia's NATO envoy" February 16, 2010; http://www.allvoices.com/s/event 5238254/aHR0cDovL3J0LmNvbS9Qb2xpdGljcy8yMDEwLTAyLTE2L3RyYW5zZG5pZXN0ZXItaXNrYW5kZXItbWlzc2lsZ S1hYm0uaHRtbA== Commenting on the Transdniester offer, Dmitry Rogozin also added that there could be no talk yet of bilateral efforts to "reset" RussianUS relations if Moscow continues to find out about the U nited tates' S plans to locate missiles in Eastern Europe from mass media: "How can we talk of a true partnership with Washington if we read unpleasant news in the newspapers?" Earlier in February, NATO member Romania approved a US plan to deploy American SM3 interceptor missiles on its territory. The US State Department said that such systems will be in operational readiness in Romania by 2015. Besides this, plans to host American ABMs in Bulgaria are also being discussed . The Russian Foreign Ministry has asked Bulgaria for clarification of its plans by asking a rather rhetorical question: "Why is it that, after the Romanian surprise, a Bulgarian one follows?" ---Permutation do the plan and the counterplan in a world where Russia accepts the plan its not severance Last printed 217 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 because we're only permuting the world where they say yes Last printed 218 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Condition on Chinese Cooperation CP 2AC ---Doesn't solve the case the counterplan delays the plan theres no evidence in the 1NC that North Korea could denuclearize quickly the case outweighs in the short term ---The counterplan is a voting issue vote aff A. Unpredictable infinite number of things that the negative could condition the burden for an advocate off conditioning means its infinite and the aff will never have offense against it B. Steals the entire aff it does the entirety of the plan and assumes the plan text passes with 100% certainty C. Kills topic specific education you can read generic conditions CPs on every topic reading this as a DA solves their offense ---Either China says no or it pursues measures that North Korea won't accept and that collapse the regime Scobell 4 Associate Research Professor at the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, and Adjunct Professor of Political Science at Dickinson College (March 2004, Andrew, Strategic Studies Institute, "China and North Korea: from comradesinarms to allies at arm's length", pg. 2223, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/00364.pdf) MGM What pressure can China exert on North Korea? China could publicly criticize North Korea in the United Nations, but this would only make North Korea more militant and paranoid, and destroy any influence Beijing has over Pyongyang. The same would be true if China were formally to revoke the 1961 treaty of alliance. Beijing also appears unwilling to cooperate vigorously in the Proliferation Security Initiative launched by the United States, fearing that measures such as blockading and interdicting North Korean exports to check proliferation of WMD would only exacerbate the problem . The Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said in midAugust that these steps "could make a bad situation worse."79 China could also impose sanctions : withhold food and fuel, for example. However, China adamantly opposes the implementation of sanctions. In Beijing's view, this would make Pyongyang more desperate and probably lead to regime collapse. 80 China could throw open its border to North Korean refugees, but this act might very well hasten the collapse of regime. Beijing is highly unlikely to do this, fearing consequences both in terms of the scale of the humanitarian crisis China would face, not to mention being at odds with Beijing's consuming priority: Pyongyang's survival. Since the early 1990s, Beijing has faced an unwanted humanitarian problem, with the individuals, insisting they are economic, rather than political, refugees. Beijing is extremely reluctant and/or averse to taking any of these steps because it perceives only negative consequences for China.82 hundreds of thousands of North Korean refugees seeking safe haven in China. And China was embarrassed by a high profile wave of at least 130 North Korean asylum seekers, during spring and summer 2002, trying to break into diplomatic missions in Beijing and Shenyang.81 A larger infl ow of refugees from North Korea would not only threaten to swamp Northeast China but also increase international pressure on Beijing to permit access to the UN High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) and NonGovernmental Organizations (NGOs) eager to provide humanitarian assistance. China has resisted efforts by the UNHCR or NGOs to gain access to ---Plan solves the net benefit encourages China to cooperate over North Korea troops are preventing China from cooperating in the status quo that's Garfinkle and Bandow More evidence they'll say no without the plan Scobell 4 Associate Research Professor at the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, and Adjunct Professor of Political Science at Dickinson College (March 2004, Andrew, Strategic Studies Institute, "China and North Korea: from comradesinarms to allies at arm's length", pg. 1113, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/00364.pdf) MGM Last printed 219 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 A Unique Confluence of Conditions. The outcome of Chinese pressure in this instance is due to what is very likely a unique set of conditions. It is important to put China's diplomatic efforts in 2003 in full perspectiveBeijing's sustained efforts to bring Washington and Pyongyang to the same table are unprecedented. China has never before undertaken such an activist diplomatic initiative solely on its own initiative. Beijing literally stuck its neck out: by Chinese standards of excessive caution, it took an enormously bold and risky step well outside of its normal comfort zone. It could be argued that China had little to lose because even if this attempt to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis had failed miserably, Beijing only would have been widely applauded for its efforts. Nevertheless, China's efforts are nothing short of highly unusual. The closest Beijing has come to this kind of selfinitiated diplomatic activism is in its leading role in the formation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in June 2001. But in this earlier case, Chinese efforts entailed bringing together neighboring countries that enjoyed good relations without a legacy of hostility and with a recent track record of confidence and trustbuilding measures including landmark steps at demilitarization. By contrast, the case of in North Korea, the primary actors had a long history of hostilities and antagonisms, substantial mutual and mistrust and suspicion. Certainly, some analysts stress that in recent years China has become a more confident international actor, more willing to participate in both multilateral and bilateral settings.35 Nevertheless, prior to January 2003, China had displayed no interest in taking an activist and leading role on the Korean crisis. What brought on this sudden burst of high energy activity? The answer seems to lie in the unique confluence of three conditions. The first was the impending and then actual Iraq war. This had a significant and sobering impact on both China and North Korea. Both regimes were extremely concerned about what the U nited States would do next. The result was a sudden sense of urgency on the part of Beijing and Pyongyang to remove any excuse for the United States to use military power on the Korean Peninsula. China's perceived sense of crisis can be gauged by Beijing's reported decision in early 2003 to establish a leading small group on North Korea.36 Second, China had thought more seriously about the strategic consequences of a nuclearized North Korea and began to recognize the disturbing ramifications of this.37 Some Chinese security analysts grasped that Bejing's hierarchy of priorities visvis Pyongyang might be illusory. That is, China's number one priority of keeping the regime afloat might be in doubt if North Korea went nuclear. A nuclearized Pyongyang could mean the end of the regime because this development could cause the United States to respond militarily and oust the regime. Moreover, if not, Pyongyang might even at some point engage in nuclear blackmail against China. Indeed, one Chinese analyst has raised this as a possibility.38 At the very least North Korea's acquisition of nuclear weapons might trigger a "chain reaction " or "domino effect"[duominnuo gupai xiaogai] in Northeast Asia: Japan and perhaps South Korea might also go nuclear (rarely mentioned but certainly a concern to China is the possibility that Taiwan might reconsider its nonnuclear stance).39 Moreover, unmentioned by Chinese analysts but a logical second order effect would be heightened U.S. enthusiasm for ballistic missile defense .40 Third, China was also beginning to realize the extent of the economic cost of continued tensions on the peninsula. This is not only measured in terms of China's significant largesse to prop up North Korea's collapsed economy, but also in terms of the potential damage to China's economy of prolonged instability on the peninsula and the fallout on South Korea's economic performance.41 The impact of the protracted Pyongyang nuclear crisis was being felt in Seoul, and Beijing feared this might impinge on South Korea's burgeoning economic relationship with China. The Iraq war was almost certainly the most important condition, and the one that motivated both China and North Korea to act . But the further away from the end of major combat operations we get, declared by President Bush on May 1, 2003, the more the "shock and awe" value of the highly successful military victory in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM recedes. By the autumn of 2003, the sense of urgency in addressing the North Korean nuclear crisis that China exhibited in the spring and summer seemed to have evaporated. Chinese analysts in civilian and military research institutes in Beijing with whom the author held discussions in September 2003 seemedwith one notable exceptiongenerally comfortable with a very gradual approach to resolving the crises. The consensus was that there was no reason to rush matters: the North Korean nuclear problem would take a long time to resolve, and patience was essential.42 Negative economic impact and nuclear fallout from the creeping crisis, by themselves, are probably not sufficient to prompt a degree of alarm necessary for Beijing to rouse itself to exert direct influence on Pyongyang. ---Permutation do the counterplan its not severance A. Certainty and immediacy aren't in the plan text the counterplan isn't separate from the mandate of the plan B. Severance is justified when counterplans only compete off certainty it allows counterplans that do the plan illegally which the aff is never prepared for severance is justified Last printed 220 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Should expresses desirability Cambridge Dictionary of American English, 7 (http://dictionary.cambridge.org/define.asp? key=should*1+0&dict=A) should (DUTY) auxiliary verb used to express that necessary, desirable, advisable, or important to perform the action it is of the following verb ---Permutation do the plan and the counterplan in a world where North Korea says yes its not severance because we're only permuting the world where they say yes Last printed 221 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Condition on Chinese Cooperation 2AC States NB Multiple states are failing now Rotberg 3 Adjunct Professor of Public Policy, is Director of the Belfer Center's Program on Intrastate Conflict and Conflict Resolution at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, as well as President of the World Peace Foundation and a member of the Belfer Center's board of directors (Robert, "Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators", Pg. 1011, http://www.brookings.edu/press/books/chapter_1/statefailureandstateweaknessinatimeofterror.pdf) MGM This decade's failed states are Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Sudan These the the .5 seven states exemplify the criteria of failure sketched out above. Somalia is a collapsed state. Together they are the contemporary classical failed and collapsed states, but others were once collapsed or failed and many other modern nationstates now approach brink of failure, some much the more ominously than others. Another group of states drifts disastrously downward from weak to failing to failed. What is of particular interest is why and how states slip from weakness toward failure, or not. The list of weak states is long, but only a few of those weak and poorly governed states need necessarily edge into failure. Why? Even the categorization of a state as failing--Colombia and Indonesia, among others--need not doom it irretrievably to full failure. What does it take to drive a failing state over the edge into failure or collapse? Why did Somalia not stop at failure rather than collapsing? Last printed 222 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Restructuring CP 2AC [ASCC Headquarters] Doesn't solve case impacts just makes the army more efficient advantages are perception based First Korean conflict troops discourage states from building their own defense prevents deterring North Korea Second China troop reduction key to China cooperation over the North Korea leadership transition and allows South Korea to modernize Counterplan doesn't build trust and increases North Korean aggression Chu, `06(213, John S., MAJ, US Army, " Military Exercises in Korea: A Provocation or a Deterrent to War?", http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA463339&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf ) While these activities sound reasonable and achievable, employing CBMs to increase transparency, verification, and communication has been incorporated partially and selectively in the past, but has not been successful. The reason is trust. "Under current conditions, there is no trust."69 North Korea will continue to see America as an impediment to Korean reunification regardless of the minor changes it makes to build confidence. Furthermore, DPRK may see the use of FAPI as preparation for preemptive war. The North Koreans argue that the realignment and reduction in U.S. forces is a first step by the United States to move American troops out of danger as she prepares for a preemptive attack. The new position would give America a better second strike capacity as the troops in the DMZ or in Seoul would face substantial losses in the first strike. Similarly, FAPI measures may be seen as a weakness in the U.S ROK resolve and could have negative effects on the ongoing negotiations with DPRK over nuclear proliferation and stability in the region. Their evidence says that removing the ASCC headquarters will "reduce our footprint" no reason why this is strong enough to solve the magnitude of our impacts and their solvency evidence is from 2004 no reason it would have the same effect today Permutation do both solves best and avoids the net benefit perceived as the US removing troops from multiple places [REMOVING TROOPS KEY ADDONs] Last printed 223 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Regime Change CP 2AC ---Permutation do both ---Doesn't solve: First- draw in attack on North Korea ensures escalation and superpowers like China and Russia are drawn in. Second- succession politics- Also, when North Korea feels threatened they will lashout with bioweapons because they feel the need to use asymmetric capabilities. Plan still accesses the counterplan because China steps in to handle regime change Third- strikes- the 1ac strikes advantage indicates how we will attempt to take down the regime, strikes on conventional weapons causes immediate lashout. Fourth- China- Only withdrawing troops from South Korea allows modernization to occur which is critical to deter Chinese aggression. Additionally troop presence ensures accidental conflict arises risking a conflict between great power wars. Takeout is impossible and causes nuclear and CBW lashout leading to escalation over Asia Ayson & Taylor, 04 Professor of Strategic Studies and directs the Centre for Strategic Studies, AND * lecturer in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University (Robert Ayson and Brendan Taylor, Comparative Strategy, "Attacking North Korea: Why War Might Be Preferred," 23:263279) The Conflict May Get Catastrophic The costs and risks of conflict on the Korean peninsula look daunting on the basis of the conventional military arsenals available to the protagonists. But they would be even more severe should this become the first conflict of the 21 century to see the use weapons of mass st of destruction. North Korea is widely expected to consider using the chemical weapons it has at its disposal, and to do so early in any conflict. Moreover, if the worst case estimates are correct, and North Korea does have nuclear weapons and the ability to deliver them, the war could become especially destructive, raising the challenge for Washington of whether to use its own nuclear arsenal. The possible use of nuclear weapons at any stage and by any party makes it much harder to argue that the costs of going to war are outweighed by the benefits. Any use of WMDs, especially by North Korea, increases the chances of catastrophic damage on the peninsula. It may increase the chances of other parties being drawn into the conflict also . Even if Japan managed to stay on the sidelines of a conventional war, acting only as a transit point for US forces heading for the peninsula, it could be drawn into the conflict if it felt vulnerable itself to an unconventional weapons attack. Indeed one possible strategy for a threatened North Korea would be to deliberately attempt to bring other countries into the conflict, raising the costs in the region and thus compelling the US to desist. (Iraq attempted to do this with its Scud attacks on Israel in the first Gulf War of the early 1990s). The most compelling disincentive for a USled attack against the DPRK is the enormous damage that could potentially be inflicted upon South Korea, and perhaps also parts of Japan, by North Korean anticipatory or retaliatory strikes. Seoul, the capital city of South Korea, is most vulnerable to such action . It is located only 25 miles from the demilitarized zone separating the two Koreas, rendering its 10 millionstrong population well within range of the North's thousands of artillery pieces and hundreds of shortrange missiles. Indeed, since the North Korean nuclear crisis of 19931994, the DPRK has reportedly been expanding these capabilities, with approximately 70% of its active duty ground forces and 80% of its total firepower now concentrated in and around this area.10 As a result of this forward deployment, Joseph Bermudez estimates in his seminal study of North Korea's armed forces that South Korea and the US would only have 24 hours warning of an imminent DPRK strike, and possibly less if North Korean forces were already at high alert status.11 Last printed 224 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 The fact that much of the North's arsenal is still widely dispersed and ensconced in hardened positions could render its complete elimination extremely difficult . Yet, were it to be successfully unleashed upon Seoul, civilian casualties would reach tens or hundreds of thousands, and perhaps more if the strike involved the use of chemical, biological, or even nuclear weapons. ---Links to the net benefit: Alliance Ayson & Taylor, 04 Professor of Strategic Studies and directs the Centre for Strategic Studies, AND * lecturer in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University (Robert Ayson and Brendan Taylor, Comparative Strategy, "Attacking North Korea: Why War Might Be Preferred," 23:263279) expose America's network of Asian alliances to similar pressures. A high level of discomfort currently exists in the alliance relationship between American and South Korea, some of which is almost certainly the product of differing opinions over how to deal with the DPRK. Unlike the Bush administration, Seoul favors a policy of "Constructive Engagement"--often referred to as the "Sunshine Policy"--towards the North.15 Added to this, any American moves towards war would also likely exacerbate currents of antiAmericanism which, according to recent polls, are evident in a clear majority of South Korean public opinion.16 The Bush Administration may therefore be reluctant to lead an attack on the North that could risk the further deterioration, if not the complete collapse, of this 50yearold alliance. Moreover, just as the Atlantic alliance has come under severe strain as a result of the USled campaign against Iraq, the advent of a second Korean war could Permutation do the counterplan it's a way to implement the aff ---Conditionality voting issue vote aff A. Strategy skew theres too many contradicting frameworks the aff is burdened with argument interaction so the negative should be held to the same standard they can contradict themselves killing fairness in round. Additionally the 2ac is impossible to viably construct because they kick whatever is covered. B. Ensures shallow discussion education should come from in depth discussions about issues, not reading multiple policies in the 1NC and not defending them C. Pre round conditionality solves all their offense they can research all the ideas they want but be ready to defend it during the debate in the form of dispo. Regime change causes prolif, disease, and economic collapse STAFFORD 2008 (Captain Jonathan Stafford, US Army, "Finding America's Role in a Collapsed North Korean State," Military Review, 88:1, Questia) Calum North Korea has been a U.S. adversary responsible for the deaths of thousands of American service members over the past 55 years, and it is the only country in the world that holds a commissioned U.S. naval vessel hostage.1 It also possesses stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons, has an advanced ballistic missile program, and recently detonated a nuclear weapon. The nations within range of its mediumrange missiles include 3 of the world's top 11 economies; combined, the 3 nations contain onefourth of the world's population and are responsible for nearly onefifth of the world's trade volume.3 Today, 2 North Korea faces the very real Last printed 225 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 threats of internal collapse or forced regime change. Either event would create one of the greatest humanitarian crises of modern times overnight. Infectious diseases, severe economic burdens, and even weapons of mass destruction could spread across the borders North Korea shares with some of the world's greatest economic and military powers. Last printed 226 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Last printed 227 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Bomb Korea CP 2AC ---Doesn't solve: Korean conflict there's no part of the CP text that mandates that the US bombs all of Korea means that what is left will rise tensions more North Korea begins to have incentive to attack the South China China won't fill in to prevent North Korean aggression against other states ---CP kills US-ROK relations Choe, 03 deputy director of international affairs for the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan ("10 Reasons why the United States Can't Attack North Korea" http://www1.korea np.co.jp/pk/189th_issue/2003030111.htm) Reason 4SeoulWashington ties worsen President Roh Moo Hyon, former human rights lawyer representing the post war generations of South Korea, has pledged to succeed, and develop, his predecessor's "sunshine policy" or reconciliation policy toward fraternal North Korea. He is an explicit advocate of revising the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and of more matured South KoreaU.S. relations based on an equal footing. He also declares that Seoul should be a main player in addressing the aggravated situation on the Korean peninsula including the nuclear issue by acting as arbitrator between Pyongyang and Washington. Roh's election pledges won the ardent support of voters. In his inaugural speech on February 25, new South Korean the leader stressed peace, stability, dialogue, reconciliation and common prosperity of Northeast Asia. His emergence as a new type leader came true against the background of unprecedentedly strong antiAmerican sentiments in South Korea in the wake of the USFK military court's acquittal of two GIs who killed two Korean teenage school girls by an armored vehicle in June last year, in particular. The South Korean public was angered by Bush's calling North Korea a member of an "axis of evil." Such unfavorable developments in South Korea have aroused serious concerns in Washington over its relations with Seoul, baffling George W. Bush's unilateralist hardline policy on North Korea. Last printed 228 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 ---Links to politics causes backlash among Republicans Obama is perceived as ultra-liberal when he bombs a country without consulting Congressional leaders and the public loses all trust in the government instead of bringing troops home the president is causing more international conflict ---Causes proliferation impacts to occur faster perception of US bombing another state causes others to proliferate to protect themselves [IF NOT READ YET] Escalates to global nuclear war Cirincione, 2000 Director of the NonProliferation Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Spring 2000, Joseph, Foreign Policy, "The Asian Nuclear Reaction Chain", JStor) The blocks would fall quickest and hardest in Asia, where proliferation pressures are already building more quickly than anywhere else in the world. If a nuclear breakout takes place in Asia, then the international arms control agreements that have been painstakingly negotiated over the past 40 years will crumble Moreover the United States could . , find itself embroiled its fourth war on the Asian continent in in six decadesa costly rebuke to those who seek the safety of Fortress America by hiding behind national missile defenses. Consider what is already happening: North Korea continues to play guessing games with its nuclear and missile programs; South Korea wants its own missiles to match Pyongyang's; India and Pakistan shoot across borders while running a slowmotion nuclear arms race; China modernizes its nuclear arsenal amid tensions with Taiwan and the United States; Japan's vice defense minister is forced to resign after extolling the benefits of nuclear weapons; and Russiawhose Far East nuclear deployments alone make it the largest Asian nuclear powerstruggles to maintain territorial coherence. Five of these states have nuclear weapons; the others are capable of constructing them. Like neutrons firing from a split atom, one nation's actions can trigger reactions throughout the region, which in turn, stimulate additional actions. These nations form an interlocking Asian nuclear reaction chain that vibrates dangerously with each new development. If the frequency and intensity of this reaction cycle increase, critical decisions taken by any one of these governments could cascade into the second great wave of nuclearweapon proliferation, bringing regional and global economic and political instability and, perhaps, first combat the use of a nuclear weapon since 1945. ---We have offense against striking North Korea it would lead to nuclear exchange between the countries North Korea would be desperate and the US would use their most powerful weapons encourages other powers to proliferate to avoid warfare that's CHOL the CP doesn't prevent them using nuclear weapons we don't know enough about North Korean facilities to find them accurately plus they will use their biological weapons that's Levy ---Plan solves US-Sino relations reduces pressure on China to build up forces against us that's Bandow Relations key to solve warming Zhou, 8, Assistant Professor in the Department of Asian Languages and Cultures at Hobart and William Smith Colleges NY Dr. Jinghao, Does China's Rise Threaten the United States? Asian Perspective, Vol. 32, No. 3, 2008, pp. 171182 Third, there are many common interests between China and the nited tates.26On the one hand, ChinaU.S. relations are U S critical not only to both countries but also to the entire international community. David M. Lampton notes that "there is no global issue that can be effectively tackled without SinoAmerican cooperation."27On the other hand, it is one of the greatest challenges for the United States to coexist with China in the new century.28To be sure, they share many opportunities for mutual benefit. Economically, the Chinese economy heavily relies on Western expertise, Chinese foreign trade largely depends on foreigninvested companies, and about 60 percent of China's total exports are produced by foreignfunded enterprises. All of this makes China sensitive to the ups and downs of the international economy, and in particular that of the U.S. economy. If the U.S. economy has troubles, it hurts China's economic growth. In turn, China is the largest market of the United States. Sara Bongiorni has recounted the story of how her family wanted to spend a year without buying anything made in China. In fact, Bongiorni discovered it was not only difficult but also not worthwhile to do so, because she found that there are vast consumer areas that are nearly all Chinesedominated. Thus, it is really difficult to exclude China from economic globalization.29 Politically, China and Western societies need to work closely together in order to maintain the global peace In fact, China . Last printed 229 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 has successfully worked with Western governments on several key international issues. China hosted the Six Party Talks. As a result, North Korea agreed to disable its nuclear programs by the end of 2007.30 China took tough actions on Iran's nuclear program, showing the seriousness of China's commitment to nonproliferation. The United States and China also share common interests in energy, global warming, human rights, anticorruption, social welfare, the role of nongovernmental organizations, AIDS and other disease prevention United Nations , reform, and counterterrorism . China and the United States recently signed an agreement to open a military hot line between their defense departments. because China might easily become a very powerful military nation in 50 years. Likewise, John Ikenberry advised that the United States cannot stop Fourth, a hostile U.S. relationship with China would damage both countries' interests and make it impossible for them to work jointly on global issues. As early as 60 years ago, an Australian ambassador warned the United States that it was very dangerous to be hostile to China and suggested that it keep China as a friend, China's rise.31 If the United States tries to keep China weak, it would increase China's domestic instability, which would negatively affect global peace and development. The most important thing for the United States to do is not to block China from becoming a powerful country, but to understand China and learn to live with a rising China. In the meantime, the United States should urge the Chinese government to become a responsible, accountable, and democratic stakeholder.32 If China moves in that direction, the United States can focus on shared interests such as fighting terrorism and promoting world peace. Extinction Tickell, 08 [Oliver, Climate Researcher, The Guardian, 811, "On a planet 4C hotter, all we can prepare for is extinction", http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/aug/11/climatechange] We need to get prepared for four degrees of global warming, Bob Watson told the Guardian last week. At first sight this looks like wise counsel from the climate science adviser to Defra. But the idea that we could adapt to a 4C rise is absurd and dangerous. Global warming on this scale would be a catastrophe that would mean, in the immortal words that Chief Seattle probably never spoke, "the end of living and the beginning of survival" for humankind. Or perhaps the beginning of our extinction. The collapse of polar ice caps would the become inevitable, bring ing longterm sea level of 7080 metres. All the world's coastal rises plains would be lost, complete with ports, cities, transport and industrial infrastructure, and much of the world's most productive farmland . The world's geography would be transformed much as it was at the end of the last ice age, when sea levels rose by about 120 metres to create the Channel, the North Sea and Cardigan Bay out of dry land. Weather would become extreme and unpredictable, with more frequent and severe droughts, floods and hurricanes. The Earth's carrying capacity would be hugely reduced. Billions would undoubtedly . Watson's call was supported by the government's former chief scientific adviser, Sir David King, who die warned that "if we get to a fourdegree rise it is quite possible that we would begin to see a runaway increase". This is a remarkable understatement. The climate system is already experiencing significant feedbacks, notably the summer melting of the Arctic sea ice. more ice The the melts, more sunshine is absorbed by the sea, the and the more the Arctic warms. And as the Arctic warms, the release of billions of tonnes of methane a greenhouse gas 70 times stronger than carbon dioxide over 20 years captured under melting permafrost is already under way. To see how far this process could go, look 55.5m years to the PalaeoceneEocene Thermal Maximum, when a global warming processes. Many scientists warn that this historical event may be analogous to the present : the warming caused by human temperature increase of 6C coincided with the release of about 5,000 gigatonnes of carbon into the atmosphere, both as CO2 and as methane from bogs and seabed sediments. Lush subtropical forests grew in polar regions, and sea levels rose to 100m higher than today. It appears that an initial warming pulse triggered other emissions could propel us towards a similar hothouse Earth. ---Kills US-Japan relations- they feel like they will be a preemptive target Choe, 03 deputy director of international affairs for the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan ("10 Reasons why the United States Can't Attack North Korea" http://www1.korea np.co.jp/pk/189th_issue/2003030111.htm) Reason 3U.S. alliance in Northeast Asia strains During the days of the first nuclear crisis in Korea, the then president of South Korea, Kim Young Sam, opposed a U.S. bombing on North Korea, and Japan was totally unprepared to help the U.S. in such a military action because of the warrenouncing constitution of Japan and of the lack of a relevant law enabling the economic giant to mobilize and procure public and private facilities and resources for the U.S. armed forces in a "contingency." Still now, neither Seoul nor Tokyo wants war on the Korean Peninsula because they know that they will be the direct victims of such a not the U.S. Though war, Japan, the major ally of the U.S., expresses Last printed 230 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 support for the U.S. going to war against Iraq if only an additional UN resolution authorizing it has been adopted. However, it stresses a peaceful and negotiated solution to the current nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula rather than an imposition of UN "sanctions" on North Korea. Key to effective democracy promotion Auslin, 10 (Michael, resident scholar at AEI.US Japan Relations. http://www.aei.org/speech/100137) Despite this litany of problems both real and perceived, the U.S.Japan alliance, and the broader relationship it embodies, remains the keystone of U.S. policy in the AsiaPacific region . There is little doubt that America and Japan share certain core values that tie us together, including a belief in democracy, the rule of law, and civil and individual rights, among others, which should properly inform and inspire our policies abroad. Our commitment to these values translated into policies to support other nations in Asia has and around the world that are trying to democratize and liberalize their societies. Today, Asia remains in the midst of a struggle over liberalization, as witnessed by the current tragic unrest in Thailand, and the willingness of both Tokyo and Washington to support democratic movements will remain important in the coming decades. Indeed, I believe a political goal of our alliance with Japan must be a further promotion of "fundamental values such as basic human rights, democracy, and the rule of law in the international community," as expressed in the 2005 U.S.Japan Security Consultative Committee Joint Statement. To that end, Japan and the U nited tates should take the S lead in hosting democracy summits in Asia, designed to bring together liberal politicians, grass roots activists, and other civil society leaders, to discuss democratic experiment and provide the support for those nations bravely moving along the path of greater freedom and openness. Extinction Diamond, 95 (Larry, Hoover Institution, Stanford University December, PROMOTING DEMOCRACY IN THE 1990S, 1p. http://www.carnegie.org//sub/pubs/deadly/diam_rpt.html ) This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and wellbeing in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread . The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones Nuclear, chemical, and . biological weapons continue to proliferate . The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered . Most of these new and unconventional threats to security associated with aggravated by the are or weakness or absence of democracy , with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. Last printed 231 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Courts CP 2AC Permutation do the counterplan it's not severance the counterplan is an example of the plan passage and it's not textually competitive because it includes the same mandate as the plan we don't have to defend all parts there is one USFG American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, 2k (dictionary.com) the Used before singular or plural nouns and noun phrases that denote particular, specified persons or things : the baby; the dress I wore. Used before a noun, and generally stressed, to emphasize one of a group or type as the most outstanding or prominent: considered Lake Shore Drive to be the neighborhood to live in these days. Used to indicate uniqueness: the Prince of Wales; the moon. Used before nouns that designate natural phenomena or points of the compass: the weather; a wind from the south. Used as the equivalent of a possessive adjective before names of some parts of the body: grab him by the neck; an infection of the hand. Used before a noun specifying a field of endeavor: the law; the film industry; the stage. Used before a proper name, as of a monument or ship: the Alamo; the Titanic. Used before the plural form of a numeral denoting a specific decade of a century or of a life span: rural life in the Thirties. Doesn't solve: court decisions don't cause any societal change Gerald N. Rosenberg (University of Chicago political science and law professor, law degree from University of Michigan, PH. D. from Yale), 2001. The Hollow Hope. Published by the University of Chicago Press. Page 9. When and under what conditions will U.S. courts be effective producers of significant social reform? When does it make sense for individuals and groups pressing for such charge to litigate? What kinds of effects from court victories can they expect? Which view best captures the reality of American politics? Given the alleged success of the social reform litigation of the last four decades, and the Americans' attachment to the Dynamic Court view, it is tempting to suggest that it always makes sense for groups to litigate. On the other hand, our attachment to the vision of the Constrained Court, as well as knowledge of legal history, can suggest that courts can never be effective producers of significant social reform. But "always" and "never" are claims about frequency, not conditions. To fully understand the role of the courts in producing significant social reform, we must focus on the latter. Many Scholars have turned their attention to the questions that this litigation activity raises. However, their findings remain unconnected and not squarely centered on whether, and under what conditions, courts produce significant social reform. Some writing has focused on the determinants of winning court cases rather than on the effects of court decisions. Permutation do both cooperation over the plan solves the net benefit it's not intrinsic because it limits the action of both the USFG and courts to the plan mandate Agent counterplans are a voting issue: Unpredictable infinite number of agents no solvency advocate specific to the plan means we can't research answers Trivializes the topic it's about reduction in troops not about the actor makes debate the same every year And only a counterplan that uses the same actor is legitimate Last printed 232 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Courts CP 2AC A2: Politics Net Benefit Courts are not insulated from politics congressional and presidential appointments have turned courts into politicized bodies Harrison 05; (Lindsay Harrison, Lecturer in Law at the University of Miami School of Law "Does the Court Act As "Political Cover" for the Other Branches?"; 11/18/05; http://legaldebate.blogspot.com/2005/11/doescourtactas politicalcoverfor.html) Does the Court Act as "Political Cover" for the Other Branches? While the Supreme Court may have historically been able to act as political cover for the President and/or Congress, that is not true in a world postBush v. Gore The Court is seen . today as a politicized body, and especially now that we are in the era of the Roberts Court, with a Chief Justice hand picked by the President and approved by the Congress it is highly unlikely that Court action will not, at least to some extent, be blamed on and/or , credited to the President and Congress The Court can still get away with a lot more than the elected branches since people don't understand . the technicalities of legal doctrine like they understand the actions of the elected branches; this is, in part, because the media does such a poor job of covering legal news. Nevertheless , it is preposterous to argue that the Court is entirely insulated from politics, and equally preposterous to argue that Bush and the Congress would not receive at least a large portion of the blame for a Court ruling that, for whatever reason, received the attention of the public. We control the uniqueness the courts are making decisions that link to politics now Joondeph 04; (Brad Joondeph, Assistant Professor, Law, Santa Clara University); April 2004; "Politics, the Supreme Court, and Affirmative Action"; http://www.scu.edu/ethics/publications/ethicalperspectives/affirmative_action.html the recent decision of In Grutter v. Bollinger, the Supreme Court held that it was constitutionally permissible for public colleges and universities to consider race in student admissions. Raceconscious admissions programs must be "narrowly tailored" to the goal of achieving diversity in their student bodies. Specifically, such programs must be "flexible enough to consider all pertinent elements of diversity in light of the particular qualifications of each applicant, and to place them on the same footing for consideration, although not necessarily according them the same weight." Under this rather exacting scrutiny, the University of Michigan's undergraduate admissions program, which assigned a specific number of points to certain applicants on the basis of race, was unconstitutional. But the Court held that Michigan's law school program was permissible, thus upholding the continuing validity of affirmative action in higher education. To me, the decision in Grutter transparently was political, in the sense that the outcome was grounded more in the political choices of the justices and the surrounding political context than in any objective legal principles. Of course, the Court's previous decisions concerning the use of race in government programs defined what was at issue, constraining the Court's discretion in important ways. For instance, the Court hardly could have held that universities were constitutionally obligated to pursue raceconscious admissions programs; prior decisions made that argument untenable. But the ultimate decision that racial diversity in higher education is a compelling state interest--and thus a valid justification for affirmative action--was a political choice . It could not be deduced logically from the relevant sources of law, such as the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the Court's prior decisions. These were too indeterminate to supply something we could call a "correct" answer. The courts link to politics, assumes your arguments legal evidence exists for both sides but personal political value determines decision Joondeph 04; (Brad Joondeph, Assistant Professor, Law, Santa Clara University); April 2004; "Politics, the Supreme Court, and Affirmative Action"; http://www.scu.edu/ethics/publications/ethicalperspectives/affirmative_action.html Accusing the Court of engaging in politics might seem like a stinging accusation. After all, the common understanding is that, in our constitutional system of separated powers, the Supreme Court is supposed to operate outside the realm of politics. Its principal function in our system of "checks and balances," or so the argument goes, is to check the excesses of the political branches. Cases are to be decided according to objective and neutral principles of law, not the ideological values of the justices or prevailing public opinion. The very legitimacy of the Court, many argue, depends on this separation of law from politics . But this conception of the Supreme Court is more myth than reality. First, in cases like Grutter, the sources of supposedly neutral, objective legal principles are usually malleable enough for the Court to provide legitimate justifications for resolving the issue either way. There are sound legal arguments on both sides. Something must ultimately push the Last printed 233 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Court to accept one outcome over the other, and that something will usually be the political values of the justices even , when the justices themselves do not realize it. By political values, I do not mean the simple desire for a "conservative" or "liberal" outcome in the particular case before them (though this may be part of it). Rather, I mean the justices' views of a just society in the broadest sense. This includes such things as the values of consistency in legal interpretation, the rule of law, and the importance of justifying outcomes with persuasive legal arguments. Last printed 234 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Last printed 235 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 XO CP 2AC Permutation do the counterplan it's not severance the counterplan is an example of the plan passage and it's not textually competitive because it includes the same mandate as the plan we don't have to defend all parts there is one USFG American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, 2k (dictionary.com) the Used before singular or plural nouns and noun phrases that denote particular, specified persons or things : the baby; the dress I wore. Used before a noun, and generally stressed, to emphasize one of a group or type as the most outstanding or prominent: considered Lake Shore Drive to be the neighborhood to live in these days. Used to indicate uniqueness: the Prince of Wales; the moon. Used before nouns that designate natural phenomena or points of the compass: the weather; a wind from the south. Used as the equivalent of a possessive adjective before names of some parts of the body: grab him by the neck; an infection of the hand. Used before a noun specifying a field of endeavor: the law; the film industry; the stage. Used before a proper name, as of a monument or ship: the Alamo; the Titanic. Used before the plural form of a numeral denoting a specific decade of a century or of a life span: rural life in the Thirties. Counterplan gets rolled back: A. The Courts Cooper 2 [Phillip, Professor of Public Administration @ Portland State University, By Order of the President: The Use and Abuse of Executive Direct Action" pg..77] Despite the apparent deference by the judiciary to the president's orders, this chapter has plainly demonstrated any number of instances in which the White House has lost in court. Executive orders, both legal and illegal, can expose officials to liability. It is an old argument, developed long before the battle over the socalled Nuremberg defense, that illegal orders do not insulate a public official from liability for his or her actions. The classic example harks back to Little v. Barreme 13 1 during the Washington administration. Even legal orders can expose the government to liability. Though the federal courts have often upheld dramatic actions taken by the president during difficult periods, they have not been hesitant to support claims against the government later. The many cases that were brought involving the U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation after World War I provide examples of just how long such postorder legal cleanup can take and how much it can Cost. 112 Later, in a 1951 case, the Supreme Court subjected government to claims by business for the damages done to their interests during the government's operation of the coal mines during World War II after FDR seized the mines in 1943.133 Thus, the legal issues that may arise are concerned with both the validity of orders and with addressing the consequences of admittedly legitimate decrees. B. Future Presidents Cooper 97 [Phillip, Professor of Poli Sci @ University of Vermont, Administration and Society, Lexis] Even if they serve temporary goals, executive orders can produce a significant amount of complexity and conflict and not yield a long-term benefit because the next president may dispose of predecessors' orders at a whim. It may be easier than moving a statute through Congress and faster than waiting for agencies to use their rulemaking processes to accomplish policy ends, but executive orders may ultimately be a much weaker foundation on which to build a policy than the alternatives. C. Congress controls the funds Elsea Et al 8 (Legislative Attorneys, American Law Divison, Congressional Research Service, "Congressional Authority Last printed 236 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 to limit U.S. Military Operations in Iraq" PDF, updated February 27th, 2008, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33837.pdf) These examples reveal the approaches that Congress employed to prohibit has or restrict using military force. They have ranged from the least comprehensive "none of the funds appropriated in this act may be used" to the most comprehensive "notwithstanding any other provision of law, no funds may be used." The phrase "none of the funds appropriated in this act" limits only funds appropriated and made available in the act that carries the restriction, but not funds, if any, that may be available pursuant to other appropriations acts or authorizing statutes. To restrict funds appropriated and made available not only in the act that carries the restriction, but also pursuant to other appropriations acts, Congress has used the phrase "none of the funds appropriated in this act or any other act may be used." The most comprehensive restriction is "notwithstanding any other provision of law, no funds may be used." This language precludes using funds that have been appropriated in any appropriations acts as well as any funds that may be made available pursuant to any authorizing statutes including laws that authorize transfers of appropriated or nonappropriated funds. Permutation do both cooperation over the plan solves the net benefit it's not intrinsic because it limits the action of both the USFG and the executive branch to the plan mandate Agent counterplans are a voting issue: Unpredictable infinite number of agents no solvency advocate specific to the plan means we can't research answers Trivializes the topic it's about reduction in troops not about the actor makes debate the same every year And only a counterplan that uses the same actor is legitimate Last printed 237 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Last printed 238 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 XO CP 2AC A2: Politics Net Benefit Unpopular XOs have political consequences and spark massive congressional backlash Risen 4 [Clay, Managing editor of Democracy: A Journal of Ideas, M.A. from the University of Chicago "The Power of the Pen: The NotSoSecret Weapon of Congresswary Presidents" The American Prospect, July 16, http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=the_power_of_the_pen] The most effective check on executive orders has proven to be political. When it comes to executive orders, "The president is much more clearly responsible ," says Dellinger, who was heavily involved in crafting orders under Clinton. "Not only is there no involvement from Congress, but the president has to personally sign the order." Clinton's Grand StaircaseEscalante National Monument executive order may have helped him win votes, but it also set off a massive congressional and public backlash. Rightwing Internet sites bristled with comments about "dictatorial powers," and Republicans warned of an end to civil liberties as we know them. "President Clinton is running roughshod over our Constitution," said thenHouse Majority Leader Dick Armey. Indeed, an unpopular executive order can have immediate and lasting political consequences . In 2001, for example, Bush proposed raising the acceptable number of parts per billion of arsenic in drinking water . It was a bone he was trying to toss to the mining industry, and it would have overturned Clinton's order lowering the levels. But the overwhelmingly negative public reaction forced Bush to quickly withdraw his proposal and it painted him indelibly as an antienvironmental president . Executive orders turn the President into a lightning rod Cooper 97 [Phillip, Professor of Poli Sci @ University of Vermont, Administration and Society, Lexis] Interestingly enough, the effort to avoid opposition from Congress or agencies can have the effect of turning the White House itself into a lightning rod . When an administrative agency takes action under its statutory authority and responsibility, its opponents generally focus their conflicts as limited disputes aimed at the agency involved. Where the White House employs an executive order, for example, to shift critical elements of decision making from the agencies to the executive office of the president, the nature of conflict changes and the focus shifts to 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue or at least to the executive office buildings The saga of the OTRA battle with Congress under regulatory review orders and the murky status of the Quayle Commission working in concert with OIRA provides a dramatic case in point. The nature and focus of conflict is in some measure affected by the fact that executive orders take administrative action outside the normal rules of administrative law. And although there are tensions in that field of law, the fact is that it has been carefully developed over time with the intention of accommodating the needs of administration and the demands for accountability by agencies filled with unelected administrators who make important decisions having the force of law in the form of rules and administrative adjudications. On one hand, administrative law requires open, orderly, and participative decision processes, but it also creates significant presumptions in favor of administrative agencies. The courts provide legal support in the form of favorable decisions as well as assisting agencies in enforcement through orders enforcing subpoena and other investigative authority while also ordering compliance with agency decisions once the investigations and decision processes are complete. Administrative law also provides a vehicle for integrating administrative decisions having the force of law with the larger body of law and policy. The use of executive orders to confound or circumvent normal administrative law is counterproductive and ultimately dysfunctional. Independent use of executive power saps political capital Simendinger `02 (Alexis, Staff Writer National Journal, The Power of One, National Journal, 126, Lexis) Bush's White House aides insist that the President knows how valuable his political capital is and that he has to spend that capital wisely. , To presidency scholars such as Richard E. Neustadt, who wrote a seminal 1960 book on the subject, real presidential power is the strength and standing to persuade, in order to bring about government action. It is not just the authority to effect change by edict. "From the veto to appointments, from publicity to budgeting, and so down a long list, the White House now controls the most encompassing array of vantage points in the American political system," Neustadt wrote . Bush's first year suggests he understood how to bargain when the policies at issue were most important to him personally tax cuts and school accountability, for instance. Before September 11, however, the President seemed to get into the most trouble when he exercised power alone. The cumulative uproar over arsenic in water, his early regulatory actions that had an antigreen tinge, and Last printed 239 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 the energy policies that favored the oil and gas industries were sour notes for Bush with the public and with many in Congress . The White House is still feeling the effects of those missteps as Bush heads into his second year. Last printed 240 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 XO CP 2AC A2: Pres Powers Defense Presidential power high even without XOs economic crisis Walsh 9 [Kenneth, Chief White House Correspondent, "Obama, Like Bush, Uses Crisis to Expand Presidential Power" US News and World Report, March 16, http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/obama/2009/03/16/obamalikebush usescrisistoexpandpresidentialpower.html?PageNr=2] It's clear that Obama is intent on changing America's course in a dramatic way, as Ronald Reagan did in 1981. But Obama, while he admires Reagan's "transformational" approach, seeks to reverse much of what Reagan accomplished. "This is a guy who is defining a new way forward," says Will Marshall, president of the centrist Progressive Policy Institute. "This is terra incognita. People aren't used to seeing changes in government that are this dramatic." In a way, Obama is doing what George W. Bush did in the national security sphere, using a crisis to expand presidential authority. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Bush moved to increase and exert his warmaking powers. Now, amid the recession and financial meltdown, Obama is moving to increase and exert his peacetime powers. The result in both cases has been a more muscular presidency. Obama will inevitable assert unilateral powers if other branches impede his agenda Greenwald 9 [Glenn, JD, NYU Law School, columnist @ Salon News "Obama contemplates Executive Order for detention without charges" Salon, June 27 http://www.salon.com/opinion/greenwald/2009/06/27/preventive_detention/] There has now emerged a very clear and very disturbing pattern whereby Obama is willing to use legal mechanisms and recognize the authority of other branches only if he's assured that he'll get the outcome he wants. If he can't get what he wants from those processes, he'll just assert Bushlike unilateral powers to bypass those processes and do what he wants anyway. In other words, what distinguishes Obama from the firstterm Bush is that Obama is willing to indulge the charade that Congress, the courts and the rule of law have some role to play in political outcomes as long as they give him the power he wants. But where those processes impede Obama's will, he'll just bypass them and assert the unilateral power to do what he wants anyway (by contrast, the firstterm Bush was unwilling to go to Congress to get expanded powers even where Congress was eager to give them to him; the secondterm Bush, like Obama, was willing to allow Congress to endorse his radical proposals: hence, the Military Commissions Act, the Protect America Act, the FISA Amendments Act, etc.). That, for instance, is the precise pattern that's driving his suppression of torture photos. Two federal courts ordered the President to release the photos under the 40yearold Freedom of Information Act. Not wanting to abide by that decision, the White House (using Lindsey Graham and Joe Lieberman) tried to pressure Congress to enact new legislation vesting the administration with the power to override FOIA. When House progressives blocked that bill, the White House assured Lieberman and Graham that Obama would simply use an Executive Order to decree the photos "classified" (when they are plainly nothing of the sort) and thus block their release anyway. In other words: We'll go to court and work with Congress so we can pretend that we're not like those bad people in the last administration, but if we don't get what we want by doing that, just anyway we'll do it through unilateral Presidential action, using the theories that the last administration so helpfully left behind and which we've been aggressively defending in court. This was also the mentality that shaped Obama's "civil liberties" speech generally and his "prolonged detention" policy specifically. In that speech, Obama movingly assured us that some of the Guantanamo detainees will be tried in a real court i.e., only those the DOJ is certain ahead of time they can convict. For those about whom there's uncertainty, he's going to create new military commissions to make it easier to obtain convictions, and then try some of the detainees there i.e., only those they are certain ahead of time they can convict there. For the rest meaning those about whom Obama can't be certain he'll get the outcome he wants in a judicial proceeding or military commission he'll just keep them locked up anyway. In Last printed 241 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 other words, he'll indulge the charade that people he wants to keep in a cage are entitled to some process (a real court or military commissions) only where he knows in advance he will get what he wants; where he doesn't know that, he'll bypass those pretty processes and assert the unilateral right to keep them imprisoned anyway. A government that will give you a trial before imprisoning you only where it knows ahead of time it will win and, where it doesn't know that, will just imprison you without a trial isn't a government that believes in due process. It's one that believes in show trials. And here again, with this Executive Order proposal, we see this same mentality at play . According to the Post article, one motive behind the Executive Order is that "White House officials are increasingly worried that reaching quick agreement with Congress on a new detention system may be impossible." In other words: we'll be happy to work with Congress as long as they give us what we want; if they don't, we'll just do it anyway using unilateral presidential powers. It's certainly possible in fact, I'd say it's likely that if Congress passes a preventive detention law, it will be even more Draconian than the one Obama wants. But a President who recognizes Congressional authority only when he likes the outcome and ignores it when he doesn't isn't a President who actually recognizes Congressional authority at all. CP Doesn't Solve single executive orders don't spillover Kreider 6 [Dr. Kyle L. Kreider, Assistant Professor of Political Sciences at the Political Science Department, Wilkes University June 2006 [http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/lpbr/subpages/reviews/warber0606.htm]//DoeS A part of the strategic environment surrounding executive orders is what Congress is likely to do in response. As Warber sees it, Congress has two options: apply verbal pressure or pass legislation "to nullify or reform existing executive orders" (p.108). While Congress has these two options, the data show that "Congress devotes a small portion of its time debating executive orders" (p.114) and "has been relatively inactive in reforming and eliminating specific executive orders issued by presidents who served between the Kennedy and George H. W. Bush administrations" (p.120). Warber concludes with a cursory examination of President George W. Bush's use of executive orders and some thoughts on where future research should go. While his political opponents and some members of the media criticize President Bush for his penchant for acting unilaterally (in both domestic and foreign affairs), expanding the powers of the presidency, and sometimes bypassing the expertise found in Congress, "the results demonstrate that Bush has not significantly departed from previous presidents regarding the types and quantity of executive orders that he issued during his first term" (p.124). However, what has been different under President Bush is his willingness to change existing public policy by revoking, superseding, or amending executive orders made by previous presidents. Yearly averages show President Bush to be second only to President Carter in revising inherited executive orders. A key finding of this book is that "presidents have not dramatically expanded their power with [executive orders] across the modern presidency" (p.128). Though Warber does not have the specific answers as to why presidents have not increased their use of executive orders over time, he speculates the stasis in presidential directives to a number of [*437] factors, one being the continued existence of separation of powers specifically Congress's ability to pass legislation to revoke or revise executive orders and the -- federal courts' authority to decide upon their constitutionality Last printed 242 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 XO CP 2AC A2: Pres Powers (Offense) Generic Sole presidential authority makes nuclear war inevitable Forrester 89 [Ray, Professor, @ Hastings College of the Law, University of California, Former dean of the law schools at Vanderbilt, Tulane, and Cornell, "Presidential Wars in the Nuclear Age: An Unresolved Problem" George Washington Law Review, August, 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1636, Lexis] A basic theoryif not the basic theory of our Constitutionis that concentration of power in any one person, or one group, is dangerous to mankind. The Constitution, therefore, contains a strong system of checks and balances, starting with the separation of powers between the President, Congress, and the Supreme Court. The message is that no one of them is safe with unchecked power. Yet, in what is probably the most dangerous governmental power ever possessed, we find the potential for world destruction lodged the in discretion of one person. As a result of public indignation aroused by the Vietnam disaster, in which tens of thousands lost their lives in military actions initiated by a succession of Presidents, Congress in 1973 adopted, despite presidential veto, the War Powers Resolution. Congress finally asserted its checking and balancing duties in relation to the making of presidential wars. Congress declared in section 2(a) that its purpose was to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United States and insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations. The law also stated in section 3 that [t]he President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated. . . . Other limitations not essential to this discussion are also provided. The intent of the law is clear. Congress undertook to check the President, at least by prior consultation, in any executive action that might lead to hostilities and war . [*1638] President Nixon, who initially vetoed the resolution, claimed that it was an unconstitutional restriction on his powers as Executive and Commander in Chief of the military. His successors have taken a similar view. Even so, some of them have at times complied with the law by prior consultation with representatives of Congress, but obedience to the law has been uncertain and a subject of continuing controversy between Congress and the President . Ordinarily, the issue of the constitutionality of a law would be decided by the Supreme Court. But, despite a series of cases in which such a decision has been sought, the Supreme Court has refused to settle the controversy. The usual ground for such a refusal is that a "political question" is involved. The rule is well established that the federal judiciary will decide only "justiciable" controversies. "Political questions" are not "justiciable." However, the standards established by the Supreme Court in 1962 in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, to determine the distinction between "justiciable controversies" and "political questions" are far from clear. One writer observed that the term "political question" [a]pplies to all those matters of which the court, at a given time, will be of the opinion that it is impolitic or inexpedient to take jurisdiction. Sometimes this idea of inexpediency will result from the fear of the vastness of the consequences that a decision on the merits might entail. Finkelstein, Judicial SelfLimitation, 37 HARV. L. REV. 338, 344 (1924)(footnote omitted). It is difficult to defend the Court's refusal to assume the responsibility of decisionmaking on this most critical issue. The Court has been fearless in deciding other issues of "vast consequences" in many historic disputes, some involving executive war power. It is to be hoped that the Justices will finally do their duty here. But in the meantime the spectre of singleminded power persists, fraught with all of the frailties of human nature that each human possesses, including the President. World history is filled with tragic examples. Even if the Court assumed its responsibility to tell us whether the Constitution gives Congress the necessary power to check the President, the War Powers Resolution itself is unclear. Does the Resolution require the President to consult with Congress before launching a nuclear attack? It has been asserted that "introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities" refers only to military personnel and does not include the launching of nuclear missiles alone. In support of this interpretation, it has been argued that Congress was concerned about the human losses in Vietnam and in other presidential wars, rather than about the weaponry. Congress, of course, can amend the Resolution to state explicitly that "the introduction of Armed Forces" includes missiles as well as personnel. However, the President could continue to act without prior consultation by renewing the claim first made by President [*1639] Nixon that the Resolution is an unconstitutional invasion of the executive power. Therefore, the real solution, in the absence of a Supreme Court decision, would appear to be a constitutional amendment. All must obey a clear rule in the Constitution. The adoption of an amendment is very difficult. Wisely, Article V requires that an amendment may be proposed only by the vote of twothirds of both houses of Congress or by the application of the legislatures of twothirds of the states, and the proposal must be ratified by the legislatures or conventions of threefourths of the states. Despite the difficulty, the Constitution has been amended twentysix times. Amendment can be done when a problem is so important that it arouses the attention and concern of a preponderant majority of the American people. But the people must be made aware of the problem. It is hardly necessary to belabor the relative importance of the control of nuclear warfare A constitutional . amendment may be, indeed, the appropriate method. But the most difficult issue remains. What should the amendment provide? How can the problem be solved specifically? The Constitution in section 8 of Article I stipulates that "[t]he Congress shall have power . . . To declare War. . . ." The idea seems to be that only these many representatives of the people, reflecting the public will, should possess the power to commit the lives and the fortunes of the nation to warfare. This approach makes much more sense in a democratic republic than entrusting the decision to one person, even though he may be designated the "Commander in Chief" of the military forces. His power is to command the war after the people, through their representatives, have made the basic choice to submit themselves and their children to war. There is recurring a relevation of a paranoia of power throughout human history that has impelled one leader after another to draw their people into wars which in hindsight, were foolish, unnecessary, and, in some instances, downright , insane. Whatever may be the psychological influences that drive the single decisionmaker to these irrational commitments of the lives and fortunes of others, the fact remains that the behavior is a predictable one in any government that does not provide an effective check and balance against uncontrolled power in the hands of one human. We, naturally, like to think that our leaders are above such irrational behavior. Eventually, however, human Last printed 243 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 nature, with all its weakness, asserts itself whatever the setting. At least that is the evidence that experience and history give us, even in our own relatively benign society, where the Executive is subject to the rule of law. [*1640] Vietnam and other more recent engagements show that it can happen and has happened here. But the "nuclear football"the ominous "black bag" remains in the sole possession of the President. Last printed 244 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 XO CP 2AC A2: Pres Powers (Offense) Heg Presidential power ends all Congressional restraint on warmaking conflicts become inevitable Eland 7 [Ivan, Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent Institute and Assistant Editor of The Independent Review and former Director of Defense Policy Studies @ CATO, "Bush Out of Link in Scolding Pelosi" Consortium News, April 3, http://www.consortiumnews.com/2007/040307a.html] Curiously, although the expansion of executive power in foreign policy has not served the nation well, it often has the counterintuitive effect of serving the interests of Congress. If the President is always in charge of U.S. foreign policy, members of Congress can duck responsibility for tough issues that might pose risks to their paramount goal-- getting reelected. For example, by allowing presidents to fight even major conflicts without constitutionally required declarations of war --a phenomenon that began when Harry Truman neglected, with a congressional wink and nod, to get approval for the Korean War-- the Congress conveniently throws responsibility for the war into the President's lap. The founders would be horrified at the erosion of a major pillar of their system of checks and balances. To fulfill their constitutional responsibility as a check on the President, members of Congress do have a responsibility to be heavily involved in U.S. foreign policy . Instead of publicly condemning Speaker Pelosi for carrying out the bipartisan Iraq Study Group's heretoforelanguishing recommendation of actually talking to Syria to resolve bilateral issues, the President should be happy that someone in the U.S. government is willing to take risks with one of America's major adversaries in the region. Congressional checks of the president key to prevent crippling military entanglements like Iraq Holt 7 [Pat, former chief of staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee "Between Congress and the president, a power seesaw" Christian Science Monitor, Feb 1, Lexis] American involvement in Iraq appears to be an unresolvable dilemma: the United States can neither stay in nor get out. It cannot stay in because the public will not support it. It cannot get out because, after four years there, the US has wrecked the country. It would be unconscionable now simply to walk away and leave a nation of impoverished Iraqis among the ruins . America cannot start writing a new policy on a clean slate. But what it can do is adjust the imbalance of power between the executive and legislative branches Too much deference to the White House . got the US into this predicament. A moreassertive Congress might help bring about a solution, and more important, avoid a similar situation in the future. The Iraq war represents a constitutional failure of American government, but it was not the institutions of government that failed; it was the people who were supposed to make those institutions work. The Constitution provides for a separation of powers among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. It is the separation of powers that creates the crucial checks and balancesthat enable one branch to keep another in line. A good deal of the thinking that went into this structure was based on skepticism and distrust. From long experience, the framers of the Constitution were skeptical and distrustful of power, and they wanted to build this into the new government. Perhaps the biggest failure with respect to Iraq was in Congress. Members were far too deferential to the White House; they failed to question President Bush's reactions to 9/11 as they were dutybound to do. Among Republicans on Capitol Hill, there was an exaggerated sense of party loyalty to the president. Among both parties, there was an exaggerated sense of partisanship. The party system and the separation of powers are incompatible. Parties do not work well without cohesion and discipline. The separation of powers does not work well without independence. This conflict was foreseen by the framers. In one of the Federalist papers, James Madison warns against "the pestilential influence of party animosities." The Constitution has been called "an invitation to struggle" between the president and Congress for the control of foreign policy. On Iraq, Congress did not accept the invitation. Republicans reveled in Mr. Bush's popularity. Democrats were afraid of it. Only after the public began to turn against the war did Congress began to follow. Meanwhile, the president was left unchecked. The history of the constitutional struggle between president and Congress is a seesaw with first one branch up and then the other. Congress probably reached its postWorld War II high at the end of the Vietnam War when it used its control of money to force the US to end its support of South Vietnam. When President Johnson left office in 1969, a congressional observer remarked that it would take to the end of the 20th century to restore presidential powers to where Johnson found them. Bush became president in 2001 determined to hasten that restoration. He showed his hand early when he supported Vice President Dick Cheney's refusal to name the participants in a committee studying energy policy. The war on terror provided further opportunities. By 2006, the president's end of the seesaw was at a postWorld War II high. Now there is an opposite movement propelled, as before, by an unpopular war. With respect to both Vietnam and Iraq, Congress did not assert itself until corrective action became prohibitively difficult . The principal lesson we can learn from the Iraq dilemma is Last printed 245 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 that Congress should join the struggle with the president earlier in the development of a problem. It should combat the natural tendency to let the president take the lead in foreign crises. Presidential powers crush public support for the military Paul 98 [Paul R, Professor @ University of Connecticut School of Law "The Geopolitical Constitution: Executive Expediency and Executive Agreements" California Law Review, 86 Calif. L. Rev. 671, Lexis] Second, the growth of executive power has created a bias in favor of internationalism that has often led to failure. Possessing a virtual monopoly power over foreign relations has tempted presidents to send troops abroad or to make foreign commitments. Time and again the executive has stumbled into foreign conflicts, like Bosnia, Lebanon, Iran and Somalia, with tragic results. n32 At a minimum, congressional [*680] participation might have slowed decision making, leaving time for public deliberation. n33 Third, the absence of congressional debate has often accounted for the lack of public support for foreign commitments. When U.S. forces have suffered casualties, such as in Somalia or Beirut, public opinion turned against the executive. Without the popular will to stay the course, presidents have withdrawn U.S. forces in some cases. As a result, U.S. policy has often lacked coherence. Though Congress was blamed for this inconsistency in many cases, one reason members of Congress so readily changed their minds was that they were not politically invested in the policy. Public support is key to sustained leadership Gray 4 [Colin, Professor of International Politics and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, England, The Sheriff: America's Defense of the New World Order, pp. 945] Seventh, the American sheriff cannot police world order if domestic opinion is not permissive. The longevity of U.S. guardianship depends vitally upon the skill, determination, and luck with which the country protects and burnishes its reputation for taking strategically effective action. But it also depends upon the willingness of American society to accept the costs that comprise the multifaceted price of this particular form of glory. The American public is probably nowhere near as casualtyshy as popular mythology insists, though the same cannot be said with equal confidence of the professional American military. Such, at least, are the conclusions of the major recent study on this much debated subject." It is the opinion of this author that popular American attitudes toward casualties stem fairly directly from the sense of involvement, or lack of the same, in the matters at issue. If valid, this judgment is good news for the feasibility of U.S. performance in the sheriff's role, but a dire systemic problem may still remain. Specifically, as principal global guardian, the United States risks being thwarted on the domestic front by the central and inalienable weakness that mars attempts to practice the theory of collective security. Bacevich and others advance powerful arguments connecting American strategic behavior to the promotion of what they see, not wholly implausibly, as an informal American empire. But many, if not most, American voters will be hard to convince that U.S. military action is warranted save in those mercifully rare instances when it is directed to thwart some clear and present danger. A doctrine of military preemption, typically meaning prevention, no matter how strategically prudent, will be as difficult to justify domestically as abroad. There is an obvious way to diminish the amount, intensity, and duration of domestic political opposition to military operations conducted for purposes that do not resonate loudly on Main Street. That solution is to adopt a style of warfare that imposes few costs on American society, especially in the most human of dimensions casualties. But since war is a duel, the United States' ability to perform all but painlessly as sheriff can never lie totally within its own control. Nonetheless, the potential problem of a reluctant domestic public should be eased if care is taken in selecting policing duties and if the troops who must execute the strategy are tactically competent. All of this would be more reassuring were we not respectful students of Clausewitz's teaching that "War is the realm of chance," an aphorism that we have had occasion to quote before Last printed 246 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 XO CP 2AC A2: Pres Powers (Offense) Democracy An increase in presidential powers hurt democracy Schmike 8 Presidential Power to the People Author Dana D. Nelson on why democracy demands that the next president be taken down a notch SeptemberOctober 2008 interview by David Schimke editor in chief [http://www.utne.com/20080901/Politics/PresidentialPowertothePeople.aspx]//DoeS The title of Dana D. Nelson's latest book captures both its radical rhetorical edge and its populist center. In Bad for Democracy: How the Presidency Undermines the Power of the People (University of Minnesota Press, 2008), the Vanderbilt University professor combines political philosophy, historical anecdote, and a sprinkling of pop arcana to deliver a compelling case against both the cult of Obama and the centrist pull of McCain's "straight talk express." "Presidentialism works against people's civic cultivation of democratic skills," she argues in the introduction. "It trains us to want the president to take care of democracy for us instead of remembering that democracy, properly defined, is our job." While the book is both substantive and theoretical, Nelson is not coldly observing the American experiment's mean streets from the cozy confines of an ivy tower. After demonstrating how the executive branch has morphed into a Machiavellian chamber of corporate interest, the grassroots activist focuses the latter half of her polemic on how to "reimagine and retake democracy as a project we lead together, amid and out of the savagery of our many differences." With Decision 2008 looming, Utne Reader turned down the talking heads to chat with Nelson about the world's most expensive popularity contest and why it doesn't have to be a choice between liberty and death. Extinction Diamond, 95 Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, founding coeditor of the Journal of Democracy, Professor of Political Science and Sociology and Coordinator of the Democracy Program at the the Center on Democracy at Stanford University (Larry, "Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors and instruments, issues and imperatives : a report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict", December 1995, June 26th 2010 , http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/di.htm, KONTOPOULOS) This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and wellbeing in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread . The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones Nuclear, chemical, and . biological weapons continue to proliferate . The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered . Most of these new and unconventional threats to security associated with aggravated by the are or weakness or absence of democracy , with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. Last printed 247 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 ***CRITIQUES*** Last printed 248 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Security K 2AC [Reps] ---Framework: role of the ballot is to weigh the plan against a competitive policy option Net benefits: Fairness there are an infinite number of frameworks we have to be ready for only one of USFG policy is predictable and they moot the 1AC 8 minutes are ignored our 1AC was action based Education policy education is good teaches future decision making It's a reason why discourse doesn't come first debate is yes or no to plan not about interrogating the assumptions of the 1AC but we don't exclude discussion of security logic they could read links based off of plan action ---Realism is a reason to prefer empirics only our evidence has empirical backing and explanation North Korea is a real threat sinking of the Chenoan proves also proves there is no internal link it is based off the unintended outcomes of security logic but our evidence assumes that we get our advantages because they're rooted in certainty but they don't get a utopian alternative that's Mearshiemer And empirical validity is a sufficient justification for action. Meta-physical discussions kill problem/solution Owen `2 (David Owen, Reader of Political Theory at the Univ. of Southampton, Millennium Vol 31 No 3 2002 p. 655 7) Commenting on the `philosophical turn' in IR , Wver remarks that `[a] frenzy for words like "epistemology" and "ontology" often signals this philosophical turn', although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness-- but this does not undermine the point that , for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theorydriven rather than problemdriven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, `theorydriven work is part of a reductionist program' in that it `dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory'.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since `whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for socialscientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry'. 6 Moreover, this Last printed 249 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity The third danger is that . the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR--what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) `the Highlander view'--namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises. ---Alt fails no acceptable solution or empirical evaluation Walt 99 (Stephen, Professor of International Affairs at Harvard University, "Rigor or Rigor Mortis? Rational Choice and Security Studies," International Security, 23(4),) Taken together, these characteristics help explain why recent formal work has had relatively little to say about important real-world security issues. Although formal techniques produce precise, logically consistent arguments, they often rest on unrealistic assumptions and the results are rarely translated into clear and accessible conclusions. And because many formal conjectures are often untested, policymakers and concerned citizens have no way of knowing if the arguments are valid . In this sense, much of the recent formal work in security studies reflects the "cult of irrelevance" that pervades much of contemporary social science. Instead of using their expertise to address important real-world problems, academics often focus on narrow and trivial problems that may impress their colleagues but are of little practical value. If formal theory were to dominate security studies as it has other areas of political science, much of the scholarship in the field would likely be produced by people with impressive technical skills but little or no substantive knowledge of history, politics, or strategy .[111] Such fields are prone to become "method-driven" rather than "problem-driven ," as research topics are chosen not because they are important but because they are amenable to analysis by the reigning methode du jour.[112] Instead of being a source of independent criticism and creative, socially useful ideas, the academic world becomes an isolated community engaged solely in dialogue with itself.[113] Throughout most of the postwar period, the field of security studies managed to avoid this danger. It has been theoretically and methodologically diverse , but its agenda has been shaped more by real-world problems than by methodological fads. New theoretical or methodological innovations have been brought to bear on particular research puzzles, but the field as a whole has retained considerable real-world relevance. By contrast, recent formal work in security studies has little to say about contemporary security issues. Formal rational choice theorists have been largely absent from the major international security debates of the past decade (such as the nature of the post-Cold War world; the character, causes, and strength of the democratic peace; the potential contribution of security institutions; the causes of ethnic conflict; the future role of nuclear weapons; or the impact of ideas and culture on strategy and conflict). These debates have been launched and driven primarily by scholars using nonformal methods, and formal theorists have joined in only after the central parameters were established by others. [114] Thus one of the main strengths of the subfield of security studies--namely, its close connection to real-world issues-- could be lost if the narrow tendencies of the modeling community took control of its research agenda . ---Permutation: do the entire 1AC and question the assumptions of threats being real throughout the 1AC it's not intrinsic test of the link and reciprocal the negative can advocate more than the alternative text plus the permutation is the first step in a larger movement against securitization of threats it removes troops ---Case is a DA to the alt rejecting securitization means they don't take steps for peace the alt ignores problems in the status quo North Korea has empirically been aggressive sinking of the Chenoan ensures extinction and: Threats are real RealistTheory of Underbalancing," International Security 29.2 (2004) 159201, Muse] Schweller 4 [Randall L. Schweller, Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at The Ohio State University, "Unanswered Threats A Neoclassical Despite the historical frequency of underbalancing, little has been written on the subject. Indeed, Geoffrey Blainey's memorable observation that for "every thousand pages published on the causes of wars there is less than one page directly on the causes of peace" could have been made with equal veracity about overreactions to threats as opposed to underreactions to them.92 Library shelves are filled with books on the causes and dangers of exaggerating threats, ranging from studies of domestic politics to bureaucratic politics, to political psychology, to organization theory. By comparison, there have been few studies at any level of analysis or from any theoretical perspective that directly explain why states have with some, if not equal, regularity underestimated dangers to their survival . There may be some cognitive or normative bias at work here. Consider, for instance, that there is a commonly used word, paranoia, for the unwarranted fear that people are, in some way, "out to get you" or are planning to do oneharm. I suspect that just as many people are afflicted with the opposite Last printed 250 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 psychosis: the delusion that everyone loves you when, in fact, they do not even like you. Yet, we do not have a familiar word for this phenomenon. Indeed, I am unaware of any word that describes this pathology (hubris and overconfidence come close, but they plainly define something other than what I have described). That noted, international relations theory does have a frequently used phrase for the pathology of states' underestimation of threats to their that may help resolve or manage urgent security problems. Thus, born in the atomic age with its new balance of terror and an ongoing Cold War, the field of security studies has naturally produced theories of and prescriptions for national security that have had little to say about--and , in fact, heavily biased against are warnings of--the dangers of underreacting to or underestimating threats . After all, the nuclear revolution was not about overkill but, as Thomas Schelling pointed out, speed of kill and mutual kill.93 Given the apocalyptic consequences of miscalculation , accidents, or inadvertent nuclear war, small wonder that theorists were more concerned about overreacting to threats than underresponding to them. At a time when all of humankind could be wiped out in less than twentyfive minutes, theorists may be excused for stressing the benefits of caution under conditions of uncertainty and erring on the side of inferring from ambiguous actions overly benign assessments of the opponent's intentions. The overwhelming fear was that a crisis "might unleash forces of an essentially military nature that overwhelm the political process and bring on a war thatnobody wants. Many important conclusions about the risk of nuclear war, and thus about the political meaning of nuclear forces, rest on this fundamental idea."94 Now that the Cold War is over, we can begin to redress these biases in the literature. In that spirit, I have offered a domestic politics model to explain why threatened states often fail to adjust in a prudent and coherent way to dangerous changes in their strategic environment. The model fits nicely with recent realist studies on imperial under and overstretch. Specifically, it is consistent with Fareed Zakaria's analysis of U.S. foreign policy from 1865 to 1889, when, he claims, the United States had the national power and opportunity to expand but failed to do so because it lacked sufficient state power (i.e., the state was weak relative to society).95 Zakaria claims that the United States did [End Page 199] not take advantage of opportunities in its environment to expand because it lacked the institutional state strength to harness resources from society that were needed to do so. I am making a similar argument with respect to balancing rather than expansion: incoherent, fragmented states are unwilling and unable to balance against potentially dangerous threats because elites view the domestic risks as too high, and they are unable to mobilize the required resources from a divided society. The arguments presented here also suggest that elite fragmentation and disagreement within a competitive political process, which Jack Snyder cites as an explanation for overexpansionist policies, are more likely to produce underbalancing than overbalancing behavior among threatened incoherent states.96 This is because a balancing strategy carries certain political costs and risks with few, if any, compensating short-term political gains, and because the strategic environment is always somewhat uncertain. Consequently, logrolling among fragmented elites within threatened states is more likely to generate overly cautious responses to threats than overreactions to them. This dynamic captures the underreaction of democratic states to the rise of Nazi Germany during the interwar period.97 In addition to elite fragmentation, I have suggested some basic domesticlevel variables that regularly intervene to thwart balance of power predictions. survival, socalled Munich analogy. The term is used, however, in a disparaging way by theorists to ridicule those who employ it. The central the claim is that the navet associated with Munich and the outbreak of World War II has become an overused and inappropriate analogy because few leaders are as evil and unappeasable as Adolf Hitler. Thus, the analogy either mistakenly causes leaders [End Page 198] to adopt hawkish and overly competitive policies or is deliberately used by leaders to justify such policies and mislead the public. A more compelling explanation for the paucity of studies on underreactions to threats, however, is the tendency of theories to reflect contemporary issues as well as the desire of theorists and journals to provide society with policy- relevant theories ---Conditionality voting issue vote aff A. Strategy skew theres too many contradicting frameworks the aff is burdened with argument interaction so the negative should be held to the same standard they can contradict themselves killing fairness in round B. Ensures shallow discussion education should come from in depth discussions about issues, not reading multiple policies in the 1NC C. They get conditional counterplans but no contradictions Conflicting worlds voter even if they win conditionality is good independent voter ---We're past the tipping point. Enemies are inevitable- the alternative risk extinction Harris `4 Essayist for Policy Review (Lee, Policy Review is one of America's leading conservative journals. It was founded by the Heritage Foundation and was for many years the foundation's flagship publication. In 2001, the publication was acquired by the Stanford, Californiabased Hoover Institution, though it maintains its office on Washington, D.C.'s Dupont Circle. "Civilization and its Enemies", http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f news/1260214/posts, MT) Last printed 251 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 This is why all utopian projects are set either on a distant island or in a hidden valley: they must exist in isolation from the rest of the world, to keep even the thought of the enemy at bay. Otherwise, they would have to deal with the problem of how to survive without abandoning their lofty ideals. This is the problem that confronts us today. The ideals that our intellectuals have been instilling in us are utopian ideals, designed for men and women who know no enemy and who do not need to take precautions against him. They are the values appropriate for a world in which everyone plays by the same rules, and accepts the same standards, of rational cooperation ; they are fatally unrealistic in a world in which the enemy acknowledges no rule except that of ruthlessness. To insist on maintaining utopian values when your society is facing an enemy who wishes only to annihilate you is to invite annihilation. And that is unacceptable. The only solution is for us to go back and unforget some of what we have forgotten, for our very forgetfulness is an obstacle to understanding the lessons of the past, so long as we insist on interpreting the past in ways which give comfort to our pet illusions. We want to believe that civilization came about because men decided one fine morning to begin living sensible, peaceful, rational lives; we refuse to acknowledge what its not to achieve even the first step in this direction. Unless we can understand this first step, none of the rest will make any sense to us, and we will fail to see what is looming right in front of us. The Greek way of expressing past and future differed from ours. We say that the past is behind us and the future is in front of us. To the Greeks, however, the past was before them, because they could plainly see its finished form standing in front of them: it was territory they had passed through and whose terrain they had charted. It was the future that was behind them, sneaking up like a thief in the night, full of dim imaginings and vast uncertainties. Nothing could penetrate the blackness of this unknown future except the rare flash of foresight that the Greeks called sophos, or wisdom. Yet even these flashes of wisdom depended entirely upon the capacity to remember that which is eternal and unchangingwhich is precisely what we have almost forgotten. The past tells that there can be no end of history, no realm of perpetual peace, and that those who are convinced by this illusion are risking all that they hold dear. The past tells us that there will always be an enemy as long as men care enough about anything to stake a claim to it, and thus enmity is built into the very nature of things. The past tells us that the next stage of history will be a tragic conflict between two different ways of life, which both have much that is worthy of admiration in them but which cannot coexist in the same world. But the past does not, and cannot, tell us how it will end this time. That is why it is impossible simply to stand by and not take sides . No outcome is assured by any deep logic of history or by any iron law of human development. Individual civilizations rise and fall; in each case the fall was not inevitable, but due to the decisions or lack of decision of the human beings whose ancestors had created the civilization for them, but who had forgotten the secret of how to preserve it for their own children. We ourselves are dangerously near this point, which is all the more remarkable considering how close we are still to 9/11. It is as if 9/11 has become simply an event in the past and not the opening up of a new epoch in human history, one that will be ruled by the possibility of catastrophic terror, just a previous historical epochs were ruled by other possible forms of historical catastrophe, from attack by migratory hordes to totalitarian takeover, from warrior gangs to the threat of nuclear annihilation. ---Alternative is vague voting issue neg can shift to get around our offense also justifies perm do the alternative we'll defend it ---Permutation do the plan and question the realist tradition: their K incorrectly essentializes realism-it's not a static entity, it can incorporate critical insights MURIELLE COZETTE* BA (Hons) (Sciences Po Paris), MA (King's College London), MA (Sciences Po Paris), PhD (LSE) is a John Vincent Postdoctoral fellow in the Department of International Relations. Review of International Studies (2008), 34, 527 This article concentrates on Morgenthau's views on the ethics of scholarship and argues that all his works must be read in the light of his central goal: speaking truth to power. Morgenthau wrote at length, and held very specific views about, the role and function of scholars in society. It is therefore legitimate to claim that, as a scholar himself, Morgenthau attempted to live up to his very demanding definition of scholarly activity, and his assertion that scholars have the moral responsibility to speak truth to power informed all his major works. While Morgenthau's conception of the ethics of scholarship is generally ignored or neglected, it is, however, indispensable to take it into account when approaching his writings. Indeed, it demonstrates that for Morgenthau, a realist theory of international politics always includes two dimensions, which are intrinsically linked: it is supposed to explain international relations, but it is also, fundamentally, a normative and critical project which questions the existing status quo. While the explanatory dimension of realism is usually discussed at great length, its critical side is consistently and conveniently forgotten or underestimated by the more recent, self-named `critical' approaches. However diverse these recent approaches may be in their arguments, what unites them all is what they are supposedly critical of: the realist tradition. The interpretation they provide of realism is well known, and rarely questioned. Although it is beyond the scope of this article to review it at length, it is worth stressing some of the main features which are constantly emphasised. First then, realism is a state- Last printed 252 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 centric approach, by which is meant that it stresses the importance of anarchy and the struggle for power among states. From this, most critical approaches jump to the conclusion that realism is therefore strikingly ill-equipped to deal with the contemporary era where the state is increasingly regarded as outdated and/or dangerous, because it stands in the path of different, more emancipatory modes of political organisation. Realism, it is also argued, pretends to be objective and to depict `things as they are': but this cannot obscure the fact that theories are never value-neutral and constitute the very `reality' they pretend to `describe'. This leads to the idea that realism is in fact nothing but conservatism : it is portrayed as the voice of (great) powers, with the effect of reifying (and therefore legitimising) the existing international order. This explains why Rothstein can confidently argue that realism `is . . . implicitly a conservative doctrine attractive to men concerned with protecting the status quo', and that it is a `deceptive and dangerous' theory, not least because it `has provided the necessary psychological and intellectual support to resist criticism, to persevere in the face of doubt, and to use any means to outwit or to dupe domestic dissenters'.2 Such views represent a fundamental misunderstanding of the realist project, but are nonetheless widely accepted as commonsense in the discipline. A typical example of this is the success of Cox's famous distinction between `problem solving' and `critical' theory. Unsurprisingly, realism is the archetypal example of a problem-solving theory for Cox. His account of the realist tradition sweepingly equates Morgenthau and Waltz, who are described as `American scholars who transformed realism into a form of problem-solving theory'.3 Thereafter in his famous article `Social Forces, States and World Orders', Cox refers to the works of both scholars by using the term `neo-realism'. Problem solving theory (and therefore realism) `takes the world as it finds it . . . as the given framework for action', while by contrast, the distinctive trait of `critical theory' is to `stand apart from the prevailing order of the world and asks how that order came about'.4 Problem-solving theory, says Cox, `serves particular national sectional or class interests, which are comfortable within the given order', which therefore means that its purpose is `conservative'.5 Problem-solving theory also pretends to be `value free', while Cox is keen to remind his reader that it contains some `latent normative elements', and that its `non normative quality is however, only superficial'.6 By contrast to what Cox presents as a problem-solving theory, being `critical' in IR means being openly normative, challenging the status quo, and seeking to advance human emancipation( s), however this concept is to be defined.7 The picture Cox proposes is therefore simple: critical theory is named as such because of its commitment to `bringing about an alternative order' and because of its openly normative stance, while realism, by contrast, is presented as a theory which in effect reproduces and `sustain[s] the existing order'.8 To be fair, not all critical theorists promote such a simplistic vision of what realism stands for Cox himself, in some of his later works, recognised that classical realism possesses an undeniable critical dimension. In 1992, providing a more nuanced analysis of the school, he thus accepted that `classical realism is to be seen as a means of empowerment of the less powerful, a means of demystification of the manipulative instruments of power'.9 He did not, however, investigate the critical dimension of realism in much depth, and failed to identify its emancipatory dimension. Other critical theorists demonstrate an awareness of the richness and subtlety of Morgenthau's ideas. The best example remains Ashley's famous piece on the poverty of neorealism, where he justly argues that the triumph of the latter has obscured the insights provided by classical realism. Ashley's analysis remains, however, problematic as his interpretation of Morgenthau does not identify all the critical dimensions of his writings, and ultimately continues to present classical realism as the `ideological apparatus' of one particular ruling group, that of statesmen, which remains essentially incapable of realising its own limitations. As he writes: It is a tradition whose silences and omissions, and failures of self critical nerve join it in secret complicity with an order of domination that reproduces the expectation of inequality as a motivating force, and insecurity as an integrating principle. As the `organic intellectuality of the world wide public sphere of bourgeois society, classical realism honors the silences of the tradition it interprets and participates in exempting the `private sphere' from public responsibility.10 (emphasis added) The `picture' of classical realism which is provided by Ashley therefore does not adequately capture its inherent critical dimension, as it ultimately presents it as reproducing the existing order and silencing dissent. Cox's distinction clearly echoes the now classic one between `orthodox' and `critical' approaches (a label broad enough to include the self-named Critical Theory, Feminism, Normative theory, Constructivism and Post-Structuralism). The diversity of critical approaches should not obscure the fact that crucially, what allows them to think of themselves as critical is not simply a set of epistemological (usually `post-positivist') or ontological assumptions they may share. It is also, fundamentally, the image they think lies in the mirror when they turn it to realism . In most cases then, it seems to be enough to oppose a simplistic picture of realism like that provided by Cox to deserve the much coveted label `critical'. This leads to the idea that it is impossible to be at the same time a realist scholar and critical, as the two adjectives are implicitly presented as antithetical. This clearly amounts to an insidious highjacking of the very adjective `critical' , which more often than not merely signals that one does not adopt a realist approach. The meaning of the adjective is therefore presented as self-evident, and realism is denied any critical dimension. This is highly problematic as this reinforces a typical `self-righteousness' from these `critical' approaches, Last printed 253 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 which tend to rely on a truncated and misleading picture of what realism stands for and conveniently never properly engage with realists' arguments. The fact that Waltz is always the primary target of these approaches is no coincidence: this article demonstrates that realism as expressed by Morgenthau is at its very core a critical project. In order to challenge the use of the adjective `critical' by some who tend to think of themselves as such simply by virtue of opposing what they mistakenly present as a conservative theoretical project, the article highlights the central normative and critical dimensions underlying Morgenthau's works. It does so by assessing his views about the ethics of scholarship. The article is divided into two parts. First, it investigates Morgenthau's ideal of the scholarly activity, which rests upon a specific understanding of the relationship between truth and power. Second, it focuses on some features which, for Morgenthau, constitute a `betrayal' of this ideal (a term he borrowed from Julien Benda). The article demonstrates that contrary to the common interpretation of realism as a theoretical outlook that holds an implicit and hidden normative commitment to the preservation of the existing order, Morgenthau's formulation of realism is rooted in his claim that political science is a subversive force, which should `stir up the conscience of society', and in doing so, challenge the status quo. For Morgenthau, IR scholars have the responsibility to seek truth, against power if needed, and then to speak this truth to power even though power may try to silence or distort the scholar's voice.11 Giving up this responsibility leads to ideology and blind support for power, which is something that Morgenthau always saw as dangerous, and consistently opposed. His commitment to truth in turn explains why, according to him, political science is always, by definition, a revolutionary force whose main purpose is to bring about `change through action'. In complete contrast to what `critical approaches' consistently claim, the realist project is therefore best understood as a critique of the powers-thatbe. Alternative cedes the political Lord William Wallace, Baron of Saltaire, AND PhD Cornell, Former IR Prof London School of Economics, Total Badass, Review of international Studies 19 96 (22) The failure the Weimar Republic of to establish its legitimacy owed something to irresponsibility of intellectuals of the right the of democratic politics. The Frankfurt School of Adorno and Marcuse were Salonbolschewisten, 'relentless in their hostility towards the capitalist system' while 'they never abandoned the lifestyle of the haute bourgeoisie'?x The followers of Nietzsche on the right those of and Marx on the left both worked to denigrate the limited achievements and the political compromises of Weimar, encouraging their students to adopt their own radically critical positions and so contribute to undermining the republic. Karl Mannheim, who had attempted in Ideology and Utopia to build on Weber's conditional and contingent sociology of knowledge, was among the first professors dismissed when the Nazis came to power. Intellectuals who live within relatively open civil societies a have responsibility to the society within which they live: to act themselves as constructive critics, and to encourage their students to contribute to the strengthening of civil society rather than to undermine it.32 (3089) That makes their impacts inevitable Boggs 97 professor of social sciences, Los Angeles (Carl, The Great Retreat, Theory and Society 26.6, jstor) and left, preferring private certainties of their the ideological schools to critical engagement with the difficult compromises false sense of empowerment that comes with The such mesmerizing impulses is accompanied by loss of public a engagement, an erosion of citizenship and a depleted capacity of individuals in large groups to work for social change. As this ideological quagmire worsens, urgent problems that are destroying the fabric of American society will go unsolved perhaps even unrecognized only to fester more ominously into the future. And such problems (ecological crisis, poverty, urban decay, spread of infectious diseases, technological displacement of workers) cannot be understood outside the larger social and global context of internationalized markets, finance, and communications. Paradoxically, the widespread retreat from politics, often inspired by localist sentiment, comes at a time when agendas that ignore or sidestep these global realities will, more than ever, be reduced to impotence. In his commentary on the state of citizenship today, Wolin refers to the increasing sublimation and dilution of politics, as larger numbers of people turn away from public concerns toward private ones. By diluting the life of common involvements, we negate the very idea of politics as a source of public ideals and visions.74 In the meantime, the fate of the world hangs in the balance. The unyielding truth is that, even as the ethos of antipolitics becomes more compelling and even fashionable in the United States, it is the vagaries of political power that will continue to decide the fate of human societies. This last point demands further elaboration. The shrinkage of politics hardly means that corporate colonization will be less of a reality, that social hierarchies will Last printed 254 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 somehow disappear, or that gigantic state and military structures will lose their hold over people's lives. Far from it: the space abdicated by a broad citizenry, wellinformed and ready to participate at many levels, can in fact be filled by authoritarian and reactionary elites an already familiar dynamic in many lesserdeveloped countries. The fragmentation and chaos of a Hobbesian world, not very far removed from the rampant individualism, social Darwinism, and civic violence that have been so much a part of the American landscape, could be the prelude to a powerful Leviathan designed to impose order in the face of disunity and atomized retreat. In this way the eclipse of politics might set the stage for a reassertion of politics in more virulent guise or it might help further rationalize the existing power structure. In either case, the state would likely become what Hobbes anticipated: the embodiment of those universal, collective interests that had vanished from civil society.75 ---Prefer falsifiability Lett, 91 Professor of Anthropology, Department of Social Sciences ("A field Guide to Critical Thinking" p.32) It may sound paradoxical, but in order for any claim to be true, it must be falsifiable . The rule of falsifiabiity is a guarantee thai if the claim is false, the evidence will prove it false; and if the claim is true, the evidence will not disprove it (in which case the claim can be tentatively accepted as true until such time first and most important and most fundamental rule of evidential reasoning. The rule of falsifiability is essential for this reason: If nothing conceivable could ever disprove the claim, then the evidence that does exist would not matter, it would be pointless to even examine the evidence, because the conclusion is already known--the claim is invulnerable to any possible evidence. This would not mean, however, that the claim is true; instead it would mean that the claim is meaningless. This is so because it is impossible--logically impossible--for any claim to be true no matter what. For every true claim, you can always conceive of evidence that would make the claim untrue-- in other words, again, every true claim is falsifiable. as evidence is brought forth that does disprove it). The rule of falsifiability, in short, says that the evidence must matter, and as such it is the Last printed 255 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Fem IR K 2AC ---Framework: role of the ballot is to weigh the plan against a competitive policy option Net benefits: Fairness there are an infinite number of frameworks we have to be ready for only one of USFG policy is predictable and they moot the 1AC 8 minutes are ignored our 1AC was action based Education policy education is good teaches future decision making It's a reason why discourse doesn't come first debate is yes or no to plan not about interrogating the assumptions of the 1AC but we don't exclude discussion of security logic they could read links based off of plan action ---Realism is a reason to prefer empirics only our evidence has empirical backing and explanation North Korea is a real threat sinking of the Chenoan proves also proves there is no internal link it is based off the unintended outcomes of security logic but our evidence assumes that we get our advantages because they're rooted in certainty but they don't get a utopian alternative that's Mearshiemer And empirical validity is a sufficient justification for action. Meta-physical discussions kill problem/solution Owen `2 (David Owen, Reader of Political Theory at the Univ. of Southampton, Millennium Vol 31 No 3 2002 p. 655 7) Commenting on the `philosophical turn' in IR , Wver remarks that `[a] frenzy for words like "epistemology" and "ontology" often signals this philosophical turn', although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness-- but this does not undermine the point that , for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theorydriven rather than problemdriven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, `theorydriven work is part of a reductionist program' in that it `dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory'.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since `whether there are general Last printed 256 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for socialscientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry'. 6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity The third danger is that . the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR--what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) `the Highlander view'--namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises. Their authors simplify IR prefer empirics Caprioli, 4 ("Feminist IR Theory and Quantitative Methodology: A Critical Analysis" Mary Caprioli, Dept. of Political Science, University of Tennessee. 0 International Studies Review. Volume 42 Issue 1 Page 193197, March 2004. http://www.blackwellsynergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/00208833.00076, JPW) Conventional feminist IR scholars misrepresent the field of international relations in arguing that IR scholarship as popularly accepted excludes alternative explanations of state behavior, including feminist inquiry, that go beyond structural, statefocused models. Feminist IR theorists, among others, critique the IR field for its statecentric approach and argue that ``a world of states situated in an anarchical international system leaves little room for analyses of social relations, including gender relations'' (Tickner 2001:146). As a result, appear to they set up a straw man by refusing to recognize variety within the ``conventional'' IR research. Indeed, as Jack role of social relations in explaining state behavior. The normative explanation for the democratic peace thesis emphasizes the Levy (2000) has observed, a significant shift to societallevel variables has occurred, partly in response to the decline in the systemic imperatives of the bipolar era. Certainly the democratic peace literature, particularly its normative explanation (Maoz and Russett 1993; Dixon 1994), among other lines of inquiry, recognizes the societal level values of human rights, support for the rule of law, and peaceful conflict resolution in explaining the likelihood of interstate conflict. Furthermore, dyadic tests of the democratic peace thesis rely ``on an emerging theoretical framework that may prove capable of incorporating the strengths of the currently predominant realist or neorealist research program, and moving beyond it'' (Ray 2000:311). In addition, theorizing and research in the field of ethnonationalism has highlighted connections that domestic ethnic discrimination and violence have with state behavior at the international level (Gurr and Harff 1994; Van Evera 1997; Caprioli and Trumbore 2003a, 2003b). ---Alt fails no acceptable solution or empirical evaluation Walt 99 (Stephen, Professor of International Affairs at Harvard University, "Rigor or Rigor Mortis? Rational Choice and Security Studies," International Security, 23(4),) Taken together, these characteristics help explain why recent formal work has had relatively little to say about important realworld security issues. Although formal techniques produce precise , logically consistent arguments, they often rest on unrealistic assumptions and the results are rarely translated into clear and accessible conclusions. And because many formal conjectures are often untested, policymakers and concerned citizens have no way of knowing if the arguments are valid. In this sense, much of the recent formal work in security studies reflects the "cult of irrelevance" that pervades much of contemporary social science. Instead of using their expertise to address important realworld problems, academics often focus on narrow and trivial problems may impress their colleagues but are of little practical value. If formal theory were to dominate security that studies as it has other areas of political science, much of the scholarship in the field would likely be produced by people with impressive technical skills but little or no substantive knowledge of history, politics, or strategy .[111] Such fields are prone to become "methoddriven" rather than "problemdriven," as research topics are chosen not because they are important but because they are amenable to analysis by the reigning methode du jour.[112] Instead of being a source of independent criticism and creative, socially useful ideas, academic world becomes an isolated community engaged solely in dialogue with itself.[113] Throughout most of the postwar period, the the field of security studies managed to avoid this danger. It has been theoretically and methodologically diverse, but its agenda has been shaped more by realworld problems than by methodological fads. New theoretical or methodological innovations have been brought to bear on particular research puzzles, but the field as a whole has retained considerable realworld relevance. By contrast, recent formal Last printed 257 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 work in security studies little to say about has contemporary security issues. Formal rational choice theorists have been largely absent from the major international security debates of the past decade (such as the nature of the postCold War world; the character, causes, and strength of the democratic peace; the potential contribution of security institutions; the causes of ethnic conflict; the future role of nuclear weapons; or the impact of ideas and culture on strategy and conflict). These debates have been launched and driven primarily by scholars using nonformal methods, and formal theorists have joined in only after the central parameters were established by others.[114] Thus one of the main strengths of the subfield of security studiesnamely, its close connection to real world issuescould be lost if the narrow tendencies of the modeling community took control of its research agenda . ---Permutation: do the entire 1AC and reject gendered representations of security discourse in international relations it's not intrinsic test of the link and reciprocal the negative can advocate more than the alternative text plus the permutation is the first step in a larger movement against gender dichotomies in international relations it removes troops Alternative cedes the political Lord William Wallace, Baron of Saltaire, AND PhD Cornell, Former IR Prof London School of Economics, Total Badass, Review of international Studies 19 96 (22) The failure the Weimar Republic of to establish its legitimacy owed something to irresponsibility of intellectuals of the the right and left, preferring private certainties of their the ideological schools to critical engagement with the difficult compromises of democratic politics. The Frankfurt School of Adorno and Marcuse were Salonbolschewisten, 'relentless in their hostility towards the capitalist system' while 'they never abandoned the lifestyle of the haute bourgeoisie'?x The followers of Nietzsche on the right those of and Marx on the left both worked to denigrate the limited achievements and the political compromises of Weimar, encouraging their students to adopt their own radically critical positions and so contribute to undermining the republic. Karl Mannheim, who had attempted in Ideology and Utopia to build on Weber's conditional and contingent sociology of knowledge, was among the first professors dismissed when the Nazis came to power. Intellectuals who live within relatively open civil societies have responsibility a to the society within which they live: to act themselves as constructive critics, and to encourage their students to contribute to the strengthening of civil society rather than to undermine it.32 (3089) That makes their impacts inevitable Boggs 97 professor of social sciences, Los Angeles (Carl, The Great Retreat, Theory and Society 26.6, jstor) false sense of empowerment that comes with The such mesmerizing impulses is accompanied by loss of public a engagement, an erosion of citizenship and a depleted capacity of individuals in large groups to work for social change. As this ideological quagmire worsens, urgent problems that are destroying the fabric of American society will go unsolved perhaps even unrecognized only to fester more ominously into the future. And such problems (ecological crisis, poverty, urban decay, spread of infectious diseases, technological displacement of workers) cannot be understood outside the larger social and global context of internationalized markets, finance, and communications. Paradoxically, the widespread retreat from politics, often inspired by localist sentiment, comes at a time when agendas that ignore or sidestep these global realities will, more than ever, be reduced to impotence. In his commentary on the state of citizenship today, Wolin refers to the increasing sublimation and dilution of politics, as larger numbers of people turn away from public concerns toward private ones. By diluting the life of common involvements, we negate the very idea of politics as a source of public ideals and visions.74 In the meantime, the fate of the world hangs in the balance. The unyielding truth is that, even as the ethos of antipolitics becomes more compelling and even fashionable in the United States, it is the vagaries of political power that will continue to decide the fate of human societies. This last point demands further elaboration. The shrinkage of politics hardly means that corporate colonization will be less of a reality, that social hierarchies will somehow disappear, or that gigantic state and military structures will lose their hold over people's lives. Far from it: the space abdicated by a broad citizenry, wellinformed and ready to participate at many levels, can in fact be filled by authoritarian and reactionary elites an already familiar dynamic in many lesserdeveloped countries. The fragmentation and chaos of a Hobbesian world, not very far removed from the rampant individualism, social Darwinism, and civic violence that have been so much a part of the American landscape, could Last printed 258 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 be the prelude to a powerful Leviathan designed to impose order in the face of disunity and atomized retreat. In this way the eclipse of politics might set the stage for a reassertion of politics in more virulent guise or it might help further rationalize the existing power structure. In either case, the state would likely become what Hobbes anticipated: the embodiment of those universal, collective interests that had vanished from civil society.75 ---Prefer falsifiability Lett, 91 Professor of Anthropology, Department of Social Sciences ("A field Guide to Critical Thinking" p.32) It may sound paradoxical, but in order for any claim to be true, it must be falsifiable . The rule of falsifiabiity is a guarantee thai if the claim is false, the evidence will prove it false; and if the claim is true, the evidence will not disprove it (in which case the claim can be tentatively accepted as true until such time as evidence is brought forth that does disprove it). The rule of falsifiability, in short, says that the evidence must matter, and as such it is the first and most important and most fundamental rule of evidential reasoning. The rule of falsifiability is essential for this reason: If nothing conceivable could ever disprove the claim, then the evidence that does exist would not matter, it would be pointless to even examine the evidence, because the conclusion is already known--the claim is invulnerable to any possible evidence. This would not mean, however, that the claim is true; instead it would mean that the claim is meaningless. This is so because it is impossible--logically impossible--for any claim to be true no matter what. For every true claim, you can always conceive of evidence that would make the claim untrue-- in other words, again, every true claim is falsifiable. Last printed 259 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Orientalism K 2AC ---Framework: role of the ballot is to weigh the plan against a competitive policy option Net benefits: Fairness there are an infinite number of frameworks we have to be ready for only one of USFG policy is predictable and they moot the 1AC 8 minutes are ignored our 1AC was action based Education policy education is good teaches future decision making It's a reason why discourse doesn't come first debate is yes or no to plan not about interrogating the assumptions of the 1AC but we don't exclude discussion of security logic they could read links based off of plan action ---Permutation do both --- the plan isn't an explicit endorsement of negative representations of the orient. It rejects stereotypical understandings of Asia and seeks to promote broader regional based cooperation. This cooperation is an utter rejection of US preponderance and imperialism. --- proves its try or die for the aff. Prefer a positivist epistemology it is self reflexive and based on falsifiable claims Houghton 08 Associate Professor of International Relations Theory at the University of Central Florida (David Patrick, Positivism `vs' Postmodernism: Does Epistemology Make a Difference? International Politics (2008) 45 ) As long ago as 1981, Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach effectively laid the influence of the dogmatic behaviouralism of the 1960s to rest in their book The Mansbach, 1988). The popularity of the `nave' form of positivism , wed to a view of inexorable scientific progress and supposedly practiced by wideeyed scholars during the 1960s , has long been a thing of the past. Postmodernists hence do the discipline a disservice when they continue to attack the overly optimistic and dogmatic form of positivism as if it still represented a dominant orthodoxy, which must somehow be overthrown. Equally, supporters of the contemporary or `neo' version of positivism perform a similar disservice when they fail to articulate their epistemological assumptions clearly or at all. Indeed, the first error is greatly encouraged by the second, since by failing to state what they stand for, neopositivists have allowed postmodernists to fashion a series of straw men who burn Elusive Quest, signaling the profound disillusionment of mainstream IR with the idea that a cumulative science of IR would ever be possible ( Ferguson and rapidly at the slightest touch. Articulating a full list of these assumptions lies beyond the scope of this article, but contemporary neo positivists are, I would suggest, committed the following five assumptions, none of which are especially radical or hard to defend: (1) That explaining to the social and political world ought to be our central objective, (2) That -- subjective though our perceptions of the world may be -- many features of the political world are at least potentially explainable What remains is a conviction that there are at least some . empirical propositions, which can be demonstrably shown to be `true' or `false', some underlying regularities that clearly give shape to IR (such as the proposition that democracies do not fight one another), (3) That careful use of appropriate methodological techniques can establish what patterns exist in the political world, (4) That positive and normative questions, though related, are ultimately separable, although both constitute valid and interesting forms of enquiry. There is also a general conviction (5) that careful use of research design may help researchers avoid logical pitfalls in their work. Doubtless, there are some who would not wish to use the term `positivism' as an umbrella term for these five assumptions, in which case we probably require a new term to cover them . But to the extent that there exists an `orthodoxy' in the field of IR today, this is surely it. Writing in 1989 , Thomas Biersteker noted that the vast majority of scholarship in ` international relations (and the social sciences for that matter) proceeds without conscious reflection on its philosophical bases or premises. In professional meetings, lectures, seminars and the design of curricula, we do not often engage in serious reflection on the required concepts and methods courses, as we socialize students into the profession' ( Biersteker, 1989). This observation -- while accurate at the time -- would surely be deemed incorrect were it to be made today Even some scholars who profess regret at the philosophically self . philosophical bases or implications of our activity. Too often, consideration of these core issues is reserved for (and largely forgotten after) the introductory weeks of Last printed 260 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 regarding nature of contemporary of IR theory, nevertheless feel compelled to devote huge chunks of their work to epistemological issues before getting to more substantive matters (see for instanceWendt, 1999). The recent emphasis on epistemology has helped to push IR as a discipline further and further away from the concerns of those who actually practice IR. The consequent decline in the policy relevance of what we do and our retreat into philosophical selfdoubt, is ironic given , the roots of the field in very practical political concerns (most notably, how to avoid war). What I am suggesting is not that IR scholars should suppose; stated more specifically, postpositivists have much more in common than they would like to think with the positivists ignore philosophical questions, or that such `navel gazing' is always unproductive, for questions of epistemology surely undergird every vision of IR that ever existed. Rather, I would suggest that the existing debate is sterile and unproductive in the sense that the various schools of thought have much more in common than they they seek to condemn. Consequently , to the extent that there is a meaningful dialogue going on with regard to epistemological questions has no real impact on what we do as scholars , it when we look at the world `out there'. Rather than focusing on epistemology, it is inevitably going to be more fruitful to subject the substantive claims made by positivists (of all metatheoretical stripes) and postpositivists to the cold light of day. My own view, as the reader may have gathered metatheoretical or epistemological ones, ought to be what divides the international relations scene today. gathering betrayed by both, but this is a side issue here; the point is that substantive theoretical and empirical claims, rather than already, is that the empirical claims of scholars like Der Derian and Campbell will not often stand up to such harsh scrutiny given the inattention to careful evidence Reps not first a) The aff should only have to defend explicit plan mandates the alternative is infinitely regressive and is divorced from real world political education. We should be able to weigh our aff against the 1acs negative representations b) The construction of discourse as first is leftist musing and ignores the realization of policy goals TaftKaufman, 95 [Jill, professor, Department of Speech Communication And Dramatic Arts, at Central Michigan University, Southern Communication Journal, Spring, proquest] despite their adversarial posture and talk of opposition, their discourses on intertextuality and interreferentiality isolate them from and ignore the conditions that have produced leftist politicsconflict, racism, poverty, and injustice. In short, as Clarke (1991) asserts, postmodern emphasis on new subjects conceals the old subjects, those who have cultural critics, with their ostensible concern for the lack of power experienced by marginalized people, aligns them with the political left. Yet, The postmodern passwords of "polyvocality," "Otherness," and "difference," unsupported by substantial analysis of the concrete contexts of subjects, creates a solipsistic quagmire. The political sympathies of the new limited access to good jobs, food, housing, health care, and transportation, as well as to the media that depict them. Merod (1987) decries this situation as one which leaves no vision, will, or commitment to activism. He notes that academic lip service to the oppositional is underscored by the absence of focused collective or politically active intellectual communities. Provoked by the academic manifestations of this problem Di Leonardo (1990) echoes Merod and laments: Has there ever been a historical era characterized by as little radical analysis or activism and as much radicalchic writing as ours? Maundering on about Otherness: phallocentrism or Eurocentric tropes has become a lazy academic substitute for actual engagement with the detailed histories and contemporary realities of Western racial minorities, white women, or any Third World population. (p. 530) Clarke's assessment of the postmodern elevation of language to the "sine qua non" of critical discussion is an even stronger indictment against the trend. Clarke examines Lyotard's (1984) The Postmodern Condition in which Lyotard maintains that virtually all social relations are linguistic, and, therefore, it is through the coercion that threatens speech that we enter the "realm of terror" and society falls apart. To this assertion, Clarke I can think of few more striking indicators of the political and intellectual impoverishment of a view of society that can only recognize the discursive. If the worst terror we can envisage is the threat not to be allowed to speak, we are appallingly ignorant of terror in its elaborate contemporary forms. It may replies: be the intellectual's conception of terror (what else do we do but speak?), but its projection onto the rest of the world would be calamitous....(pp. 227) The realm of the discursive is derived from the requisites for human life, which are in the physical world, rather than in a world of ideas or symbols.(4) Nutrition, shelter, and protection are basic human needs that require collective activity for their fulfillment. Postmodern emphasis on the discursive without an accompanying analysis of how the discursive emerges from material circumstances hides the complex task of envisioning and working towards concrete social goals (Merod, 1987). Although the material postmodern "textual radicals" who Rabinow (1986) acknowledges are "fuzzy about power and the realities of socioeconomic constraints" (p. 255), most writers from marginalized groups are clear about how discourse interweaves with the concrete circumstances that create lived experience. People whose lives form the material for postmodern counterhegemonic discourse do not share the optimism over the new recognition of their discursive subjectivities, because such an acknowledgment does not address sufficiently their collective historical and current struggles against racism, sexism, homophobia, and economic injustice They do not appreciate being told they are living in a world in . which there are no more real subjects. Ideas have consequences. Emphasizing the discursive self when a person is hungry and homeless represents both a cultural and humane failure. The need to look beyond texts to the perception and attainment of concrete social goals keeps writers from marginalized groups evermindful of the specifics of how power works through political agendas, institutions, agencies, and the budgets that fuel them. Unlike conditions that create the situation of marginality escape the purview of the postmodernist, the situation and its consequences are not overlooked by scholars from marginalized groups. Robinson (1990) for example, argues that "the justice that working people deserve is economic, not just textual" (p. 571). Lopez (1992) states that "the starting point for organizing the program content of education or political action must be the present existential, concrete situation" (p. 299). West (1988) asserts that borrowing French poststructuralist discourses about "Otherness" blinds us to realities of American difference going on in front of us (p. 170). Last printed 261 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Even if our epistemology isn't perfect its preferable to take action the alternative is political paralysis. David Owen, Reader of Political Theory at the Univ. of Southampton, Millennium Vol 31 No 3 200 2 p. 6557 Commenting on the `philosophical turn' in IR, Wver remarks that `[a] frenzy for words like "epistemology" and "ontology" often signals this philosophical turn', although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, i f this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness--but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and epistemological sophistication /or is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily most important . The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that the kind because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theoryconstruction from philosophical first principles, cultivates a theorydriven rather than it problemdriven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, `theory driven work is part of a reductionist program' in that it `dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory'.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ` whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for socialscientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry'.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR--what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) `the Highlander view'--namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR . Alternative cedes the political Lord William Wallace, Baron of Saltaire, AND PhD Cornell, Former IR Prof London School of Economics, Total Badass, Review of international Studies 19 96 (22) The failure the Weimar Republic of to establish its legitimacy owed something to irresponsibility of intellectuals of the the right and left, preferring private certainties of their the ideological schools to critical engagement with the difficult compromises of democratic politics. The Frankfurt School of Adorno and Marcuse were Salonbolschewisten, 'relentless in their hostility towards the capitalist system' while 'they never abandoned the lifestyle of the haute bourgeoisie'?x The followers of Nietzsche on the right those of and Last printed 262 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Marx on the left both worked to denigrate the limited achievements and the political compromises of Weimar, encouraging their students to adopt their own radically critical positions and so contribute to undermining the republic. Karl Mannheim, who had attempted in Ideology and Utopia to build on Weber's conditional and contingent sociology of knowledge, was among the first professors dismissed when the Nazis came to power. Intellectuals who live within relatively open civil societies have responsibility a to the society within which they live: to act themselves as constructive critics, and to encourage their students to contribute to the strengthening of civil society rather than to undermine it.32 (3089) That makes their impacts inevitable Boggs 97 professor of social sciences, Los Angeles (Carl, The Great Retreat, Theory and Society 26.6, jstor) false sense of empowerment that comes with The such mesmerizing impulses is accompanied by loss of public a engagement, an erosion of citizenship and a depleted capacity of individuals in large groups to work for social change. As this ideological quagmire worsens, urgent problems that are destroying the fabric of American society will go unsolved perhaps even unrecognized only to fester more ominously into the future. And such problems (ecological crisis, poverty, urban decay, spread of infectious diseases, technological displacement of workers) cannot be understood outside the larger social and global context of internationalized markets, finance, and communications. Paradoxically, the widespread retreat from politics, often inspired by localist sentiment, comes at a time when agendas that ignore or sidestep these global realities will, more than ever, be reduced to impotence. In his commentary on the state of citizenship today, Wolin refers to the increasing sublimation and dilution of politics, as larger numbers of people turn away from public concerns toward of the world hangs in the balance. The unyielding truth is that, even as the ethos of antipolitics becomes more compelling and even fashionable in the United States, it is the vagaries of political power that will continue to decide the fate of human societies. This last point demands further elaboration. The shrinkage of politics hardly means that corporate colonization will be less of a reality, that social hierarchies will somehow disappear, or that gigantic state and military structures will lose their hold over people's lives. Far from it: the space abdicated by a broad citizenry, wellinformed and ready to participate at many levels, can in fact be filled by authoritarian and reactionary elites an already familiar dynamic in many lesserdeveloped countries. The fragmentation and chaos of a Hobbesian world, not very far removed from the rampant individualism, social Darwinism, and civic violence that have been so much a part of the American landscape, could be the prelude to a powerful Leviathan designed to impose order in the face of disunity and atomized retreat. In this way the eclipse of politics might set private ones. By diluting the life of common involvements, we negate the very idea of politics as a source of public ideals and visions.74 In the meantime, the fate the stage for a reassertion of politics in more virulent guise or it might help further rationalize the existing power structure. In either case, the state would likely become what Hobbes anticipated: the embodiment of those universal, collective interests that had vanished from civil society.75 ---Prefer falsifiability Lett, 91 Professor of Anthropology, Department of Social Sciences ("A field Guide to Critical Thinking" p.32) It may sound paradoxical, but in order for any claim to be true, it must be falsifiable . The rule of falsifiabiity is a guarantee thai if the claim is false, the evidence will prove it false; and if the claim is true, the evidence will not disprove it (in which case the claim can be tentatively accepted as true until such time as evidence is brought forth that does disprove it). The rule of falsifiability, in short, says that the evidence must matter, and as such it is the first and most important and most fundamental rule of evidential reasoning. The rule of falsifiability is essential for this reason: If nothing conceivable could ever disprove the claim, then the evidence that does exist would not matter, it would be pointless to even examine the evidence, because the conclusion is already known--the claim is invulnerable to any possible evidence. This would not mean, however, that the claim is true; instead it would mean that the claim is meaningless. This is so because it is impossible--logically impossible--for any claim to be true no matter what. For every true claim, you can always conceive of evidence that would make the claim untrue-- in other words, again, every true claim is falsifiable. Their k re entrenches orientalism our impact claims are true and their methodology is flawed. Teitelbaum 6 --Senior Fellow, Moshe Dayan Center for Middle East and African Studies, Tel Aviv U. Adjunct Senior Last printed 263 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Lecturer, Middle Eastern History, Bar Ilan U. PhD, Tel Aviv U--AND--Meir Litvak--Senior Research Fellow, Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies. Associate Professor, Middle Eastern and African History, Tel Aviv U. PhD, Harvard (Joshua, Students, Teachers, and Edward Said: Taking Stock of Orientalism, March 2006, http://www.campuswatch.org/article/id/2493] The critics did not deny that Western culture and scholarship in the past has included ethnocentric, racist, or antiIslamic components, but argued that these had been greatly exaggerated, to the point of being made universal. Out of more than 60,000 works on the Middle East published in Europe and the United States, he chose only those needed in order to prove his case that there was a discourse which he termed Orientalism. In order to arrive at this conclusion he ignored much evidence critical to the historical documentation of research and literature, material which would have supported the opposite position .[19] His choices, as Kramer writes, rejected "all discrimination between genres and disregarded all extant hierarchies of knowledge." This was particularly true regarding Said's deliberate conflation of Middle Eastern studies as a research discipline and the popular, artistic, or literary perspective of the Orient. It also disregarded the key question of which were the field's main texts and which were those purely on the margins.[20] This approach led Said to ignore several leading researchers who had a decisive influence on Middle Eastern studies. For example, there is his almost complete ignoring of Ignaz Goldziher's workwhich made an undeniable contribution to the study of Islamsince his persona contradicts Said's claims. Said chose to attack Goldziher's criticism of anthropomorphism in the Koran as supposed proof of his negative attitude toward Islam, while Goldziher himself felt great respect for Islam and had even attacked Ernest Renan for his racist conceptions.[21] Malcolm Kerr, for example, criticized Said's ignorance of the role and importance of ArabAmerican Middle East researchers, who played an important role in the field and could not easily be labeled antiArab or antiIslamic. Reina Said's selectivity enabled him to paint scholarship of the Middle East as an essentialist, racist, and unchangeable phenomenon, whereas the evidence he ignored would have proven that the Western understanding and representation of the Middle Eastespecially of the Arabs and Islamhad become quite rich and multifaceted over the years. Many scholars and literary figures were actually enamored with the residents of the Middle East, and the " Orientalist discourse" was not nearly as dominant as Said would have his readers believe, as few examples among many would show. British literary figures and activists, like Wilfred Scawen Blunt, actively sought to improve the lot of the Arabs. Traveler and M.P. David Urquhart promoted Ottoman Turkey as a partner for Christian Europe. Marmaduke Pickthall, a famous convert to Islam and a translator of the Koran, looked to Turkey for the formation of a modernist Islam. Finally, Cambridge Persian scholar E.G. Browne wrote in favor of the Iranian revolution of 19061911 and published articles against Curzon. These examples demonstrate the existence of discourses on the Middle East other than that Lewis and Joan Miller argued that Said ignored women's voices which, they maintained, contradicted the monolithically masculine representation which Said wished to present.[22] characterized by Said.[23] Moreover, a number of researchers have demonstrated that though Islam was perceived as Europe's enemy in the Middle Ages, even then it had already gained respect and appreciation in the fields of science and philosophy, to the point of even idealizing it as a philosopher's religion.[24] A prominent example of the complexity of the Western perspective on Islam is the attitude of the Enlightenment movement in the eighteenth century, which Said perceives as the parent of modern Orientalism. True, some attacked Islam as a part of their rational, secular perception which criticized unenlightened religiosityparallel arguments were simultaneously made by them against Christianity and Judaism. Moreover, at times it was clear that their criticism of Islam was actually a camouflaged criticism of Christianity. Yet, other contemporary writers viewed Islam as a rational religion closer to the ideas of the Enlightenment than Christianity. They saw it as a religion balanced between a commitment to morality and an acknowledgement of the basic needs of man, as opposed to Christianity's distorted attitude toward sex. There were among them, too, people who spoke admiringly of Islam and its tolerance of minorities, and juxtaposed it with Christian fanaticism. An important factor in shaping the complex perspective of Oriental studies in the nineteenth century was the entry of Jewish researchers into the field. They brought a deep knowledge of Judaism to a comparative study of Islam. Unlike some Christian researchers of Islam, they had no missionary approach or nostalgia for the Crusades or much interest in the political aspects of the contemporary "Eastern Question." For these Jewish scholars, Islam did not represent the same kind of religious challenge to Judaism that it did to Christianity, and therefore they were free of most of the prejudices that tripped up many Christian scholars. On the contrary, many Jewish researchers Middle Eastern and European, contrary to Said's portrayal of unflagging European ethnocentrism. It was thus convenient for Said to leave them out of his onedimensional portrayal of the Orientalist discourse Middle Eastern Jews present a problem for the Saidian . OrientOccident dichotomy. He deals with this by pointedly connecting "Oriental Jews" with Palestinians when writing of Israeli (i.e., Western) discrimination. That the Jewish concept of peoplehood spans the West and the East is perhaps too threatening to the dichotomy so central to his theory.[26] The argument that the Occident (or actually Europe prior to the twentieth century) primarily defined itself in opposition to the Orient may be questioned as oversimplifying and essentialist. evolved an almost romantic approach toward Islam. They emphasized its tolerant attitude toward the Jews, as opposed to Medieval Europe and the rising antiSemitism of the nineteenth century. Some of them tended to portray Jewish history in Muslim lands as a continuous golden age.[25] They stood somewhere between the two worlds, as Jews with histories both Last printed 264 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 the fluxes of medieval scholasticism, the Renaissance, the Reformation and CounterReformation, the Enlightenment, and modernism. In other words, Western identity is overwhelmingly defined by historical references to its earlier selves rather than by geographical comparisons with others. To claim otherwise is to deny the central thrust of Western education for the past one thousand years.[27] Conversely, the argument that Islam was the ultimate "other" in Western culture, may be challenged as well. Christian theology and doctrine emerged to a large degree as an antithesis to Judaism. Likewise, in popular culture the image of the Jew was much more frightening than that of the Muslim. It can be argued that the number of explicit antiJewish tractstheological or political throughout western history was probably higher than those devoted to Islam. The point here is not made to win the race of victimhood, but rather to argue that the picture of According to Keith Windschuttle, Europeans identify themselves as joint heirs of classical Greece and Christianity, each tempered by defining the "self" and the "other" in European culture was much more complex than the one Said presented; the "Orient" was not necessarily the defining "other" of the Occidental self. In the final analysis, then, contrary to what Said would have his readers believe, his idea of " Orientalism" is exaggerated and fails to encompass the entirety of how the West understood and conceived Islam; just as it cannot be said that because of anti Semitism, all of European thought was hostile toward Jews, is it not true that the West viewed the Middle East in a closed circle of interpretation disconnected from other historical developments. New ideas that surfaced in intercultural contact undermined a priori assumptions time after time. Prejudices and stereotypes were endemic but never shaped into an unchangeable united discourse on the Middle East . In reality, academics who led the discourse often took the lead in undermining prejudices. Said, concluded Bayly Winder, did to Western scholars of Islam exactly what he accused them of doing to the Middle East.[28] Said's disregard of the scope and complexity of research on Islam and the Middle East motivated Rodinson to comment that Said was not familiar enough with the main body of scholarly research on the Middle East.[29] However, Said's disregarding of this scholarship does not appear to result from a lack of familiarity, but rather from a political agenda , and the proof of this is that he continued to make his arguments regarding the monolithic character of Middle Eastern studies years after publishing this criticism. In order to demonstrate the nature of scholarship as an instrument of domination Said excoriates scholars of the Middle East for dividing into categories, classifying, indexing, and documenting "everything in sight (and out of sight)."[30] Does this, asks the Syrian philosopher Sadiq Jalal alAzm, imply something vicious or is it simply characteristic of all scientific academic work, essential for a proper understanding of human societies and cultures altogether?[31] Thus, Said's condemnation of the generalizations made by Western scholars of the Middle East and his insistence that they study the Arabs and Muslims as individuals made some of his Arab critics wonder if this meant that it was impossible or unnecessary to study collective entities . If the inclusion of Marx in Orientalism comes from his lack of attention to individual cases, added James Clifford rhetorically, perhaps it is simply impossible to form social or cultural theory, and perhaps there is no room for research fields such as sociology?[32] Said's overgeneralized and nonhistoric conception of "Orientalism" is at its most radical when he writes that "every European, in what he could say about the Orient, was a racist, and imperialist, and almost totally ethnocentric."[33] According to Nikki Keddie, who was praised by Said and who found positive points in his book, this argument generally encourages people to believe Westerners have no right to study the Middle East and insists that only Muslims and Arabs can investigate correctly Middle Eastern history.[34] Even the assertion. Moreover, disqualifying all researchers who come outside the examined group in every area of the worldwould put an end doyen of Middle Eastern scholarship of the Middle East, Albert Hourani, a Christian Arab like Said, shared the feeling that the book might lend support to a Muslim counterattack based on the idea that no one understands Islam better than Muslims.[35] While Said denied that this was his intention,[36] the actual text of the book and the conclusion of many readers belie this to all serious academic research. It also neglects the fact that outside researchers may have certain advantages, since as an outsider the scholar might be free from the myths or preconceptions which insiders share. Said also raises a doubt as to whether anyone can study (in his words, "represent") any subject in any manner other than in an entirely subjective way, which is determined by the culture of the scholarobserver . He believes that the unknown, the exotic, and the foreign have always been perceived, assimilated, and represented in these terms. This leads him to doubt that any scholarship can even come close to the truth, or in his words, "whether indeed there can be a true representation of anything, or whether any or all representations, because they are representations," are so intertwined with the institutions, language, and culture of the representer to render the truth impossible.[37] The obvious conclusion from this argument, as Winder and alAzm show, is that according to Said, "Orientalism" is inevitable since such distortions are inevitable. If one accepts this argument, however, as alAzm suggests, this only means the West was merely doing what all cultures must do: examine other cultures through the concepts and frameworks it already holds.[38] If this is true, Winder explains, that everyone who sees the "other" distorts it, then the West is no different from other cultures, including Islamic culture, which also has a distorted perspective of the "other." If indeed, Winder wonders, Said demands that Westerners should be better, does he not accept that they have a certain supremacy, a certain mission that makes them superior? Or should different criteria apply to the West simply because it was more "successful" than other societies? Thus, Said himself is promoting a clearly "Orientalist" perspective, accepting and forgiving the "weakness" of Middle Eastern society. "Westerners," claims Winder, "are not better, but Western science, including `Orientalism,' is selfbettering in that it is selfcorrective."[39] By determining that all "representations" of the other are by definition distortions, Said is saying that people can Last printed 265 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 only study themselves, that only Muslims can properly "represent" Islam. In our experience this has led to a crippling timidity amongst nonMuslim or nonArab students. While it is good scholarship to control for bias, Said's influence has made students chary of writing about Islam and the Arabs from a point of view not necessarily shared by the objects of their research. They give more weight to an Arab or Islamic viewpoint and are fearful of developing an opinion of their own. ORIENTAL STUDIES AND IMPERIALISM Said's selectivity drove him to ignore the important intellectual achievement of the German and Hungarian scholars of the Middle East. According to his argument, "the major steps in Oriental scholarship were first taken in either Britain and France [sic], then elaborated upon by Germans."[40] There is no historical basis this argument. The main reason for his ignoring research in these countries is for that an accurate assessment of it would have undermined his central argument that Orientalism was integrally linked to imperialism as an expression of the nexus between knowledge and power, and therefore that Orientalists wished to gain knowledge of the Orient in order to control it. To support his claims, Said even backdated the development of British and French imperialism in the Middle East to the seventeenth century, which is clearly a historical error. Considering German leadership in Oriental studies, it is unlikely that they took much from British and French scholars. No doubt, agrees Bernard Lewis, some of the scholars of the Middle East served imperialism or gained from it. Yet as an explanation of academic research of the Islamic world as a whole this argument is flawed. If the effort to gain power through knowledge is the main or only motive, why did the , study of Arabic and Islam in Europe begin hundred of years before Western imperialism in the Middle East had appeared even as an ambition? Why did these studies blossom in European countries that didn't take part in the European domination effort ? Why did scholars invest so much effort in trying to decipher or study the monuments of the ancient East which had no political value and were forgotten even by the local people? The importance of the German and Hungarian scholars was tremendous in terms of their contribution to Middle East scholarship, even though they were not residents of countries with any imperialist interest in the region, and therefore the connection between power and knowledge did not exist in this case, sums up Lewis. [41] Said also ignored the fact that many scholars opposed imperialism, and therefore the connection he creates between their academic works and imperialism is forced. Edmond Burke, like Said, criticizes Oriental studies scholars who at the start of the twentieth century dealt with minor issues: "studies on obscure manuscripts, folk traits, rural sufism and popular religion," instead of dealing with topics he considered to be more important, such as study of the national movements that developed in the region.[42] Yet again, if these scholars were so "impractical," then obviously their studies had to do more with a search for knowledge rather than an effort to help imperialism. Ironically, if they had been as Said and Burke would have them, they would have focused on precisely the issues Burke criticizes them for ignoring. It appears then that many of Said's "Orientalists" actually pursued knowledge for the sake of knowledge. Said cannot have it both ways, complaining that scholars of Islam and the Middle East dealt with the trivial and at the same time asserting they were agents of imperialistic domination. In addition if there were any researchers who participated in an "academic effort to embalm Islam," to use Said's words, these were the Germans, but this was not because of imperialism. This was rather due to their more comprehensive approach to the study of cultures, which they applied to their own society as well. It is very likely, writes Emmanuel Sivan, that if the Germans had been involved in the imperialist effort, they would have been more conscious of Islam being a living and dynamic tradition. Actually, the British and the French, who imitated the Germans, could not afford to be pure classicists because of their country's imperialist demands. They studied Islam as a living civilization. Sivan concludes that the reality of the situation was much more complicated and ironic than that presented by Said.[43] While Said disregarded German Middle Eastern studies scholars because they were not connected to imperialism, if he had taken the time to examine their work, he would have discovered that many saw Islam and the Middle East in all its variety, without essentializing. [44] AlAzm raises another issue, namely, the problematic cause and effect connection that Said makes between Orientalism as a culturalsocial phenomenon and imperialism. It is impossible to avoid the impression, alAzm remarks, that for Said the presence of observers, administrators, and intruders in the Middle Eastsuch as Napoleon, Cromer, and Balfourhad become inevitable and actually was caused by literary and intellectual Orientalism. Therefore, according to Said, we can understand better the political inclinations and the aspirations of European imperialists if we turn to literary figures, among them Barth?lemy d'Herbelot and Dante Alighieri, rather than if we actually explore strategic and economical interests.[45] Another difficulty in Said's approach of connecting academic research to imperialism lays, according to Halliday, in the assumption that if ideas come to the world in circumstances of domination or even directly in the service of the dominator, they are not valid. Yet according the Halliday, trying to subdue a land requires producing as accurate an image as possible of it . For example, French ethnographers serving French imperialism in North Africa did not necessarily produce worthless research, as Said would have his readers believe. On the contrary, in order for the studies of those academic researchers to serve the French, they had to be accurate. "To put it bluntly," writes Halliday, "if you want to rob a bank, you would be well advised to have a pretty accurate map if its layout....."[46] An ironic twist to the connection between political establishments and scholarship was visible after Martin Kramer's fierce attack against the American academy for identifying with Said's Orientalism critique. Kramer argued that Middle Eastern studies were so compromised by Said's world view that they should no longer receive U.S. government aid. Said's supporters, who in the past had attacked the connection between academic research and the political establishment, were quite alarmed at the notion. In effect they were arguing that the large amounts of monies their institutions took from the government did not undermine their intellectual independence, even as many of them characterized U.S. policy as imperialistic . Clearly, they do not really believe that a connection with the political establishment, even an "imperialistic" one, has any effect on their own research. Yet if that is so, then government funding does not necessarily influence academic discourse. If this is true of today, it might well be true of the past as well, despite Said's critique. Last printed 266 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Schmitt K 2AC ---Framework: role of the ballot is to weigh the plan against a competitive policy option Net benefits: Fairness there are an infinite number of frameworks we have to be ready for only one of USFG policy is predictable and they moot the 1AC 8 minutes are ignored our 1AC was action based Education policy education is good teaches future decision making It's a reason why discourse doesn't come first debate is yes or no to plan not about interrogating the assumptions of the 1AC but we don't exclude discussion of security logic they could read links based off of plan action ---Their link evidence says nothing about reducing military presence plan isn't central to liberalism ---Perm Do both this is their author Thorup 6 Ph.D. dissertation @ the Institute of Philosophy and the History of Ideas (Mikkel, January, 2006, "In Defence of Enmity Critiques of Liberal Globalism," p. 3940, TH) This text is mainly about the potential dangers of the liberal approach to politics. But this is not turning it into an unqualified defence or advocacy of the conflict perspective. As an illustration of the dangers of what we can call `manichean decisionism', I'll briefly mention an article on Schmitt's concept of the political by Bernard Willms (1991), in which he classifies two traditions of political thinking: political realism and political fictionalism (try to guess his position!). Political fictionalism "subordinates politics to `higher' principles or `truths'", whereas political realism is "the permanently repeated attempt to conceive of politics as what in fact it is" (1991: 371). It is a (unintended) caricature on the selfprofessed realist's sense of superiority because of their courage and ability to confront the really real reality: Political fictionalisms help to satisfy man's need for consolation, edification, hope and sense, tending to veil real conditions of government. The political realist seeks to identify necessities irrespective of their severity and without consideration for any need for deceit under the existing government. (1991: 3712) This is the kind of reductionism of the political that I want to avoid. Working with Schmitt's categories and critiques entails a danger of falling in the (very selfcomforting) trap of proclaiming only one true and `hard' version of the political and of dismissing all others as fictions and wishful thinking. Primacy of the political becomes primacy of foreign policy, organized violence etc. The political is effectively reduced to a few areas which is just what liberalism is criticized for doing. The friend/enemy distinction or conflictuality may often be a dominant feature of the political, but that is not to say that it is then the political. As Ankersmit (1996: 127) says, that would be the same as making the unavoidability of marital disagreements into the very foundation of marriage as such. I want instead to argue that the political contains a number of styles, sides, variants (or whatever one want to call it) that can very loosely and idealtypically be grouped in two main forms: Politics as conflict and politics as technique, where neither of them can claim exclusivity. So, I want to avoid a sterile discussion of what the political really is. My interest is far more the various styles of the political that are operative in political debate. Schmitt and many other conflict theoreticians do not see the other face of the political as anything other than a `secondary', `dependent', `corrupted' expression of politics. Liberals tend to exclude politics as conflict, confining it to other spaces in time or geography, as aberration or relapse. What the two concepts each do is to highlight a certain aspect of the political, and my claim is that they are elements of a unity. There's a certain pendulum process at work and I'll give that a number of expressions, which basically states the not very controversial thought that the political world is located between the extremes of repetition and break, stability and change, regime and revolution , or, as I prefer to call them, technique and conflict. Depoliticization, then, is a way to describe the attempts to or methods of making repetition, stability and regime universal and eternal to place areas, practices and actors beyond change and critique whereas repoliticization describes the opposite movement disruption, change, recreation of the entire social space. Case outweighs Their Celermajer evidence doesn't say extinction we only have to win a risk of our offense Liberalism solves human rights, genocide, and nuclear war IEER 2 (Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, International Peer Reviewed Journal Website, "Executive Summary An Overview of U.S. Policies Toward the International Legal System", http://www.ieer.org/reports/treaties/execsumm.pdf, May 2002, LEQ) Last printed 267 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 The evolution of international law since World War II is largely a response to the demands of states and individuals living within a global society with a deeply integrated world economy. In this global society, the repercussions of the actions of states, nonstate actors, and individuals are not confined within borders, whether we look to greenhouse gas accumulations, nuclear testing the danger of , accidental nuclear war, or the vast massacres of civilians that have taken place over the course of the last hundred years and still continue. Multilateral agreements increasingly have been a primary instrument employed by states to meet extremely serious challenges of this kind, for several reasons. They clearly and publicly embody a set of universally applicable expectations, including prohibited and required practices and policies. In other words, they articulate global norms, such as the protection of human rights and the prohibitions of genocide and use of weapons of mass destruction. They establish predictability and accountability in addressing a given issue. States are able to accumulate expertise and confidence by participating in the structured system established by a treaty. However, influential U.S. policymakers are resistant to the idea of a treatybased international legal system because they fear infringement on U.S. sovereignty and they claim to lack confidence in compliance and enforcement mechanisms. This approach has dangerous practical implications for international cooperation and compliance with norms U.S. treaty partners do not enter into treaties expecting that they . are only political commitments that can be overridden based on U.S. interests. When a powerful and influential state like the United States is seen to treat its legal obligations as a matter of convenience or of national interest alone, other states will see this as a justification to relax or withdraw from their own commitments. When the United States wants to require another state to live up to its treaty obligations, it may find that the state has followed the U.S. example and opted out of compliance. And Human rights outweigh war Shattuck 94 Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (John, "Hearing of the Foreign Ops Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee," Federal News Service, April 19, Lexis) Around the world we are witnessing ugly and violent racial, ethnic and religious conflict in Bosnia, Central Asia, Africa, most vividly, perhaps, right now in Rwanda, in the Sudan, but elsewhere, too, away from the cameras. The international community clearly has not developed an adequate response to these problems. Why, then, if they are so daunting, has this administration made protecting human rights and promoting democracy a major part of our foreign policy agenda? I think the answer lies not only in our American values but in also the strategic benefits to the United States. We know from historical experience that democracies are more likely than other forms of government to respect human rights, to settle conflict peacefully, to observe international law and honor agreements, to go to war with great reluctance, and rarely against other democracies, to respect the rights of ethnic, racial and religious minorities living within their borders, and to provide the social and political basis for free market economics. By contrast, Mr. Chairman, the costs to the world of repression and authoritarianism are painfully clear. In the 20th century, number of the people killed by their own governments under authoritarian regimes is four times the number killed in all this century's wars combined. Repression pushes refugees across borders and triggers wars; unaccountable governments are heedless of environmental destruction, and the agenda for repression goes on in a very negative way. policymaking. These, then, are the reasons why promoting democracy and human rights are at the forefront of our foreign policy agenda. What are our strategic objectives? In a word, Mr. Chairman, we aim, perhaps not yet successfully, to incorporate human rights and democracy into the mainstream of our foreign Perm Do the plan and reject liberalism this puts them in a double bind either the plan doesn't trigger the link or the perm solves Liberalism is key to heg Nash 6 (William Nash, Retired U.S. Army Major General who commanded the 1 Armored Division of the United States Army, "The ICC and the Deployment of st U.S. Armed Forces", http://www.amacad.org/publications/icc9.aspx, 2006, LEQ) Thus U.S. military power is more effectively employed when its actions are endorsed as consistent with international norms and broadly shared objectives and when U.S. forces act in coalition and in conjunction with nations and institutions that undertake political, social, and economic efforts. Securing international support, while not determining, has become increasingly important for advancing U.S. security interests. The overwhelming vote against the U.S. proposal to allow states to shelter their nationals form the ICC shows that most nations, including some of the strongest allies of the United States, recoil at what they perceive as an open display of U.S. exceptionalism. This perception is dangerous. Over the long term, it undermines the capacity of the U nited tates S to lead. The ICC unfortunately is not the only issue fueling this perception. But because it goes to the heart of accountability international norms and because it is the first new international security institution in decades, it is a particularly resonant issue by which to measure U.S. attitude toward global leadership. This places a heavy burden on opponents of the ICC to demonstrate why it is not in U.S. interests to join the Court. The United States does not conduct coalition operations because it could not achieve its military objectives without the assistance of other nations. Put bluntly, the Last printed 268 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 United States can accomplish virtually any strictly military task it is ordered to carry out. Rather, the United States works in partnership with others to accomplish a variety of objectivesand political objectives are at the forefront. Leading coalitions can be trying, timeconsuming, and resource intensive. The associated costs and uncertainties cannot be predicted. But leadership of the United States, and its ability to sustain its credibility and effectiveness as a leader in the twentyfirst century, hinges in no small part on its willingness to lead with and through other nations. In addition, the ICC is the first securityrelated international institution since the United Nations. U.S. absence from the Court would be a significant and supremely isolating act. It will underscore U.S. ambivalence about joining in collective efforts and institutions to enhance security, an attitude that, however reasonably presented, weakens the claim of the United States to international leadership. Other nations increasingly question the intentions of a leading power that appears willing to lead exclusively on its own terms. The United States loses leverage and credibility by fueling impressions that its cooperation in international politics requires an exemption from the rules. From a purely pragmatic standpoint, the United States can do more to advance national interests (and the interests of U.S. servicemembers) by signing the Treaty than it could by continuing to oppose the ICC. To no small degree, the Court's efficacy and impact will hinge on the appointment of capable, fair, and apolitical officials. The United States has everything to gain from helping to choose those individuals. The United States will be in a better position to ensure an appropriate U.N. Security Council role regarding the definition of aggression if ever the Assembly of States Parties were to entertain discussions on that contentious issue. Ignoring the Court accomplishes little. It seems, on balance, prudent to sign the Treaty. The United States has lost much of the moral high ground in the effort to shape the ICC. While much time can be spent lamenting U.S. actions and rhetoric before, during, and after the Rome Conference, the future offers the only possibility for change. The sources of military concern are understandable, but they hinge on a need to believe the absolute worst of an institution and a process instead of on a commitment to ensure that it works as intended. Moreover, by trumpeting its uniqueness and appearing to demand special treatment, the United States corrodes its own power and authority . And - Heg solves nuclear war Krauthammer 9 columnist for the Washington Post, Pulitzer Prize winner (Charles, "Decline Is a Choice," Weekly Standard, Vol. 15, No. 5, October 19, http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/017/056lfnpr.asp?page=6) So why not? Why not choose ease and bask in the adulation of the world as we serially renounce, withdraw, and concede? Because, while globalization has produced in some the illusion that human nature has changed, it has not. The international arena remains a Hobbesian state of nature in which countries naturally strive for power. If we voluntarily renounce much of ours, others will not follow suit. They will fill the vacuum. Inevitably, an inversion of power relations will occur. Do we really want to live under unknown, untested, shifting multipolarity? Or even worse, under the gauzy internationalism of the New Liberalism with its magically selfenforcing norms? This is sometimes passed off as "realism." In fact, it is the worst of utopianisms, a fiction that can lead only to chaos. Indeed, in an age on the threshold of hyperproliferation, it is a prescription for catastrophe. Heavy are the burdens of the hegemon. After the blood and treasure expended in the post9/11 wars, America is quite ready to ease its burden with a gentle descent into abdication and decline. The alt results in unlimited war Moreiras 4 Director of European Studies at Duke, (Alberto, 2004, "A God without Sovereignty. Political Jouissance. The Passive Decision", CR: The New Centennial Review 4.3, p. 8283, Project MUSE, TH) But the scandal gets worse, and this is something that Schmitt does not point out. He does quote, with high praise ("it is impossible to understand the concept of a just enemy better than did Kant" [169]), Kant's definition of the just enemy. But Kant's definition of the just enemy is itself scandalous, and potentially throws Schmitt's differentiation into disarray. For Kant, "a just enemy would be one that I would be doing wrong by resisting, but then he would also not be my enemy" (2003, 169). With this, with what we could call Schmitt's refusal to deal with the implications of the Kantian definition, although he himself provides it, Schmitt shows a double face. It stands to reason that, if the notion of the just enemy is an impossibility, unjust. If all enemies are unjust, then every single enemy stands outside the jurisdiction of the nomos. The nomic order has then effective jurisdiction only over friends, and it loses its universality. It loses, indeed, more than its universality: it loses its position as a political concept, since it cannot account for, it can only submit to, the friend/enemy division. Hence, the order of the nomos and the order (or, rather, the state) that is, if the enemy, in virtue of his very justice, is always already a friend, then all enemies, in order to be enemies, must be of any concrete politics are radically incompatible. If there is politics, then there is no binding nomos. If there is a nomos, the unjust enemy--and that means any enemy--falls outside the political order. Schmitt's position in The Nomos of the Earth seems to contradict his earlier position on the political successfully: the notion of a nomos of the earth, of an order of the political, accomplishes, perhaps against Schmitt's own will, a deconstruction of his notion of the political. Or perhaps, on the contrary, we are faced with the fact that Schmitt's own indications of the Kantian position deconstruct the notion of an order of the political beyond every concrete friendenemy grouping and send us back to the absolute primacy of the friend/enemy division in terms of a determination of the politcal. Do we prefer to uphold the notion of a nomic order, or do we prefer to abide by a savage, anomic notion of the political? Is there a choice?4 If all enemies are unjust Last printed 269 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 enemies, all enemies must be exterminated. There is no end and no limitation to war: war is total, and that is so both for the friends But a total war without a nomos is a totally unregulated, totally nondiscriminatory war, without legality. And a war under of the nomos, and for their unjust enemies. But total war cannot be a fundamental orientation and a principle of order. The notion of total war announces the end of any possible reign of nomic order. It also announces a radicalization of the political, precisely as it opens itself to its most extreme determination as war, now total. those conditions cannot abide by a concept of friendship, since it has generalized the friend/enemy division into their complete disruption. Friendship presupposes legality. Faced with total war, humanity finds itself deprived of amity, just as it finds itself deprived of enmity. At the logical end of the concept, the political division finds its own end. Total war is the end of the political. The whole notion of an order of the political has now been placed beyond the line. Total war is an absolute threat. ---Prefer falsifiability Lett, 91 Professor of Anthropology, Department of Social Sciences ("A field Guide to Critical Thinking" p.32) It may sound paradoxical, but in order for any claim to be true, it must be falsifiable . The rule of falsifiabiity is a guarantee thai if the claim is false, the evidence will prove it false; and if the claim is true, the evidence will not disprove it (in which case the claim can be tentatively accepted as true until such time as evidence is brought forth that does disprove it). The rule of falsifiability, in short, says that the evidence must matter, and as such it is the first and most important and most fundamental rule of evidential reasoning. The rule of falsifiability is essential for this reason: If nothing conceivable could ever disprove the claim, then the evidence that does exist would not matter, it would be pointless to even examine the evidence, because the conclusion is already known--the claim is invulnerable to any possible evidence. This would not mean, however, that the claim is true; instead it would mean that the claim is meaningless. This is so because it is impossible--logically impossible--for any claim to be true no matter what. For every true claim, you can always conceive of evidence that would make the claim untrue-- in other words, again, every true claim is falsifiable. 11. The alternative invites authoritarianism and nihilism Gross 2k (Oren Gross, Assistant Professor of Law at Tel Aviv University, 21 Cardozo L. Rev. 1825, Lexis Nexus, May 2000, LEQ) From a normative perspective, Schmitt's theory, simply put, is indefensible. 14 In this article, I engage in an internal evaluation of his theory of the exception. Such a critique taking Schmitt's own goals, parameters, and criteria as our reference point drives substantial holes into his theoretical corpus. For all the rhetoric of Schmitt and his disciples and defenders, his theory proves to be a crude version of nihilism . Yet, this approach is hidden behind the veneer of overt aspiration to legal determinacy 15 and to substantive, semireligious content of the legal order. 16 Among other things, Schmitt challenges liberalism for being negligent, if not outright deceitful, in disregarding the state of exception, and in pretending that the legal universe is governed by a complete, comprehensive, and exceptionless normative order. 17 Following the guidance of the natural sciences which, according to Schmitt, do not recognize the possibility of exceptions in the natural world liberalism presents us with a legal world view that is based on universalism, generalities, and utopian normativeness, without allowing for the possibility of exceptions. Against liberalism's intellectual dishonesty, Schmitt offers an alternative that is allegedly candid and transparent. However, Schmitt's project does not comply with his own yardsticks of legitimacy. His theory falls [*1829] prey to the very same basic challenge which he puts to liberalism. Schmitt's rhetoric of norm and exception does not adequately reflect the real thrust of his theory, which calls for the complete destruction of the normal by the exception . Taken to its logical extreme, Schmitt's intellectual work, especially as reflected in his Political Theology 18 and The Concept of the Political, 19 forms the basis not only for a normless exception, but also for an authoritarian exceptionless exception. Part I of this article focuses on these themes. 12. The alternative creates the preconditions for the Holocaust Rejali 3 Associate Professor of Political Science at Reed College (Darius, "Friend and Enemy, East or West: Political Realism in the work of Usama bin Ladin, Carl Schmitt, Niccolo Machiavelli and KaiKa'us ibn Iskandar" January 2003, MT) It is tempting to put Schmitt's answer like this: we know the public enemy when we know ourselves. Figure out your question, and you will know the public enemy, domestic or international. But that is not quite right. We so easily deceive ourselves about our question that it takes the enemy, thrust on us providentially by history, to confront us with "our own question" and force us to "answer in doing"._ftn14 Schmitt's answer is rather: "tell me who your enemy is and I will tell you who you are."[15] A great leader proves his merit because he helps us grasp this selfknowledge by drawing out this confrontation. Schmitt praised leaders, like Mussolini, who used myth to mobilize people against the public enemy. Mussolini used the myth of ancient Rome to motivate popular support and maintain a strong state. He would no doubt find bin Ladin's appeal to the Caliphate equally praiseworthy. In these instances, among others, "political thought and political instinct thus prove themselves theoretically and practically in the capacity of distinguishing between friend and enemy."[16] Even on Last printed 270 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Schmitt's own terms though, the use of myth to locate friend and enemy is not an easy one, and one that is easily abused. Schmitt himself seems to have drawn the distinction between myth well used and myth poorly used. While he praised Mussolini, he regarded the racially based Nazi policies as nothing but "a swindle."_ftn17 Schmitt resisted the temptation to reduce the notion of enemy to "objective" markers such as race. He held to a constitutionalism that granted the state, not nature, the right to determine the identity of the public enemy and friend. The reason the public enemy was "objective" was not that it was written in the genes, but rather the institution of the state had the keenest sense of what, at that moment in history, posed the greatest danger to the common way of life. Schmitt was a Fascist, but he was not, in this respect, a Nazi. Still that raises a question: how can one know whether myth is well or poorly used? Schmitt's response is that this is not the individual citizen's decision to make. Only the state has the rightful monopoly to determine who is a friend and who is an enemy. "In its entirety, the state as an organized political entity decides for itself the friendenemy distinction."[18] The state is the inevitable expression of politics, the institution that transcends other groups concerned with ethics, religion, ideology and kinship, and forges a genuinely political association. States emerge as means of reducing conflicts (over property, ways of life etc.). States substitute for these private conflicts, the public enemy. They deny smaller associations the power to determine their enemies independently. What one surrenders to the state in the social contract is the power to judge subjectively what is necessary for one's own survival. This, for Schmitt, is another way of saying, "We cede to the state the power to determine who is the enemy of our way of life." It decides who is "objectively" the enemy. Above all, the state emerges historically as well as philosophically, as the institution that possesses a legal monopoly on violence. Either "it exists or does not exist. If it exists, it is the supreme, that is, in the decisive case, the authoritative entity."_ftn19 Only it has "the right to demand from its own members the readiness to die and unhesitatingly to kill enemies."[20] Ironically, Schmitt's solution is inadequate even for bin Ladin. Bin Ladin was asking what is an ordinary Muslim's duty in a world in which there is no legitimate state. How does he decide who is a friend and who is an enemy? Schmitt advises that he turn to the leader of his collectivity. This advice is not unlike bin Ladin's advice to find the true ulama and ask them. But this then raises the question: How does the leader (the religious scholar or the Caliph if we could find him) decide who is a friend and who is an enemy in practice? It is all very fine and well to leave it to the institution, as long as the person in charge of the institution knows what he or she is doing. But what if the politician abused his power and named a private enemy as a public foe? Schmitt himself encountered this problem in the case of Hitler. In 1934, Hitler turned on many of his rivals, particularly leaders in the SA. Since Ernst Rohm and other SA leaders had plotted against the state, Hitler was right to name them as a public enemy. Hitler's actions were exonerated by reason of state. Other acts, however, such as Hitler's own private violence could not be exonerated.[21] In explaining his own motivations for joining the Nazi Party (aside from gross opportunism), Schmitt apparently believed that "it is a duty under circumstances to advise a tyrant ."_ftn22 Yet, Schmitt did not appear to have any account of what this advice would be. He had, particular, no adequate answer to explaining how a ruler should be trained, and what a ruler should think about in selecting friend or foe. What is interesting is how little modern political science has improved upon Schmitt's answer. Consider the dominant contemporary effort to locate friend and enemy today, Samuel Huntington's discussion of the class of civilizations. [23] Huntington begins by envisioning a clash between ways of life, conflicts at the broadest, most fundamental levels of group identity. Today, civilizations do not merely conflict; rather they have, as a result of encounter with each other, been put into question. They have yielded large social movements that identify their enemies as other ways of life. When these movements are militarized and take control of the state, conflict between enemies ensues. But Huntington's effort is an exception to the rule. Most modern political scientists do not dabble in the business of advising rulers how they shouldthink about selecting friend or foe, or what kind of training would be required to do that well. They advise as to the various means to engage the enemy (the relative effectiveness of diplomacy, sanctions or force), but not on ends. Still as in Schmitt, most political scientists view the state as the authoritative source of who is a friend and who is an enemy. Sometimes, as in Schmitt, the state is posited as a unitary rational actor, equivalent to a human being, who decides this question based on some calculation of its interests. At other times, it is viewed as a complex organization whose determinations may be explained by bureaucratic politics, limited information, historical experience, and psychological groupthink. In both cases, the state's stated preferences are taken as a given: they can be explained but not secondguessed. Last printed 271 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Last printed 272 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Pan K 2AC ---Framework: role of the ballot is to weigh the plan against a competitive policy option Net benefits: Fairness there are an infinite number of frameworks we have to be ready for only one of USFG policy is predictable and they moot the 1AC 8 minutes are ignored our 1AC was action based Education policy education is good teaches future decision making It's a reason why discourse doesn't come first debate is yes or no to plan not about interrogating the assumptions of the 1AC but we don't exclude discussion of security logic they could read links based off of plan action ---Realism is a reason to prefer empirics only our evidence has empirical backing and explanation North Korea is a real threat sinking of the Chenoan proves also proves there is no internal link it is based off the unintended outcomes of security logic but our evidence assumes that we get our advantages because they're rooted in certainty but they don't get a utopian alternative that's Mearshiemer And empirical validity is a sufficient justification for action. Meta-physical discussions kill problem/solution Owen `2 (David Owen, Reader of Political Theory at the Univ. of Southampton, Millennium Vol 31 No 3 2002 p. 655 7) Commenting on the `philosophical turn' in IR , Wver remarks that `[a] frenzy for words like "epistemology" and "ontology" often signals this philosophical turn', although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is is a philosophical weakness-- this does not undermine the point that , for a certain class of problems, but rational choice theory may that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological /or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it and is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theorydriven rather than problemdriven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, `theorydriven work is part of a reductionist program' in that it `dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory'.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since `whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for socialscientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry'. 6 Moreover, this Last printed 273 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity The third danger is that . the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR--what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) `the Highlander view'--namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises. Egotism and Domination are inevitable in the international system Thayer 2k (Bradley, political scientist and an associate professor in Missouri State University's Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, the MIT Press, International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2(Autumn 2000), pp. 124151, "Bringing in Darwin: Evolutionary Theory, Realism, and International Politics") The second ultimate cause of egoistic and dominating behavior is given by Morgenthau: Humans behave as they do because they possess an animus dominandi.24 They seek power because human nature is fundamentally egoistic and malignant. Thus conflict and war occur because human nature is bad.25 Thomas Hobbes provided the foundation for this second, secular, pillar of real ist thought: Humans are ruled by an insatiable desire for power.26 This lust for power has created a state of war in which humans live in reciprocal and per manent fear of violent death, and in which peace is always precarious. According to Morgenthau, the "desire for power ... concerns itself not with the individual's survival but his with position among his fellows once his sur vival has been secured.... His lust for power would be satisfied only if the last became an object of his domination, there being nobody above or beside him, that is, if he became like God."27 So encompassing is this desire for power that the tendency to dominate "is an element of all human associations, from the family through fraternal and professional associations and local political orga nizations, to the state."28 Two types of behavior are the proximate causes of the realist argument: ego ism and domination.29 Egoism will cause an individual to place his interests before those of others, the interests of himself and his family before those of more distant relatives, and the interests of relatives before those of his commu nity, state, and so on.30 The desire to dominate, realists believe, is inherent and often leads to physical aggression against those who oppose n of the primitive cell into ever larger components, organs, and so on to create what Dawkins calls "sur vival machines." He explainsone's objectives. State leaders are expected to mirror this ordering by ting put the interests of their state before those of others or of the world community, and by striving to dominate other states. Realists argue that only by possessing power can indi viduals attack and conquer others as well as deter and defend themselves from attack. The principal result of this process is that balances of power will form and reform cyclically, producing both periods of stability and intense security competition in international politics China is a threat Gertz 10 (Bill, geopolitics editor and a national security and investigative reporter for The Washington Times, author of six books, 3/5/10, Washington Times, "China rhetoric raises threat concerns", http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/mar/5/harshwordsfromchinesemilitaryraisethreatcon/print/, DB) Recent statements by Chinese military officials are raising concerns among U.S. analysts that the communist government in Beijing is shifting its oftstated "peaceful rise" policy toward an aggressive, antiU.S. posture. The most recent sign appeared with the publication of a governmentapproved book by Senior Col. Liu Mingfu that urges China to "sprint" toward becoming the world's most powerful state. "Although this book is one of many by a senior colonel, it certainly challenges the thesis of many U.S. Chinawatchers that the People's Liberation Army's rapid military growth is not designed to challenge the United States as a global power or the U.S. military," said Larry M. Wortzel, a China affairs specialist who until recently was cochairman of the congressional U.S.China Economic and Security Review Commission. A Reuters report on Col. Liu's book, "The China Dream," appeared Tuesday in the Communist Party newspaper People's Daily quoted the book as stating China . It and the United States are in "competition to be the leading country, a conflict over who rises and falls to dominate the world." Mr. Wortzel said the statements in the book contradict those of former President Jiang Zemin and other Chinese leaders who said China's rise to prominence in the 21st century would be peaceful. They also carry political weight because the book was published by the Chinese military. The book was released after calls by other Chinese military Last printed 274 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 officials to punish the United States for policies toward Taiwan, U.S. criticism of China's lack of Internet freedom and U.S. support for the exiled Tibetan leader Dalai Lama. One official, Maj. Gen. Luo Yuan, called for using economic warfare against the U.S. over arms sales to Taiwan and urged selling off some of China's $750 billion in holdings of U.S. debt securities. China's military also recently cut off military exchanges with the Pentagon after the announcement of a $6.4 billion sale of helicopters and missiles to Taiwan. Asked about Col. Liu's book, State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley said it would be wrong for China to view itself as a U.S. competitor. For the 21st century, U.S.China relations are the most important ties in the world and "it is a mistake to see the relationship in zerosum terms," Mr. Crowley said. Some U.S. officials in the past dismissed similar alarming statements from the Chinese military as not reflecting official views. However, Chinese leaders have not disavowed Gen. Luo's remarks or those of others, such as Maj. Gen. Zhu Chenghu, who in 2005 said China would use nuclear weapons against the U nited tates S in response to firing conventionally armed any of longrange cruise missiles against Chinese cities. The statement contradicted Beijing's declared policy of not using nuclear weapons first in a conflict . Gen. Zhu reportedly was criticized and demoted but surfaced in print Feb. 10, calling for increased defense spending and boosting military deployments in response to the Taiwan arms sale. China on Thursday announced that it would increase defense spending this year by 7.5 percent, a smaller increase than in previous years, in an apparent effort to limit criticism of its doubledigit annual spending increases for more than a decade. The recent military statements also counter insistence by many U.S. officials that China's strategic intentions toward the United States are masked by the lack of "transparency" in the communist system. U.S. intelligence analysts, in analyses and estimates, also have dismissed or played down evidence of Chinese military deception to hide its true goals. They instead have said in classified reports that the use of strategic deception to hide China's military buildup is similar to masking efforts of Western powers. Critics of those analysts' "benign China" outlook say such views resulted in missing major strategic and military developments by China for more than a decade, such as new missiles, submarines and other advanced military hardware, some that were built in complete secrecy. The recent Chinese military statements have renewed the longrunning debate in U.S. policy and intelligence circles about China's longterm military intentions and whether they pose threats to U.S. interests. ---Permutation do the entire 1AC and reject the representations of China being a threat throughout the 1AC it's not intrinsic or severance it's a test of the link and reciprocal plus the perm is the first step of a larger movement away from reliance on security logic The state is critical to determining security discourse--the perm is best. Krolikowski 8 (Alanna is a doctoral student in International Relations at the Department of Political Science of the University of Toronto. She completed an MA in International Relations at the Munk Centre for International Relations of the University of Toronto in August 2006; State Personhood in Ontological Security Theories of International Relations and Chinese Nationalism: A Sceptical View: http://www.utoronto.ca/ethnicstudies/Krolikowski_2008.pdf, DB) Jennifer Mitzen and others13 have explored the relevance of Giddens' concept of ontological security for the study of world politics. In particular, Mitzen has used this idea to develop a theory of routinized relationships between states that can shed light on enduring international rivalries .14 For Mitzen, ontological security is not only sought by individuals, as in Giddens's original articulation but also by states.15 For both individuals and , states, ontological security is necessary "in order to realize a sense of agency.16" In short, states, like individuals, need to feel secure in who they are, as identities or selves. Some, deep forms of uncertainty threaten this identity security. The reason is that agency requires a stable cognitive environment. Where an actor has no idea what to expect, she cannot systematically relate ends to means, and it becomes unclear how to pursue her ends. Since ends are constitutive of identity, in turn, deep uncertainty renders the actor's identity insecure. Individuals are therefore motivated to create cognitive and behavioural certainty, which they do by establishing routines.17 While all actors satisfy the need for ontological security by routinizing their social interactions, they vary in their mode of attachment to these habituated behaviours: "some actors rigidly repeat routines, while others participate more reflexively."18 Actors who are very attached to their routines will reproduce these ontological securityproviding behaviours even if they compromise their physical security. Thus, in Mitzen's application, this approach offers a new explanation for very persistent conflicts between securityseeking states.19 ---Alternative is vague voting issue neg can shift to get around our offense also justifies perm do the alternative we'll defend it Last printed 275 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 ---Alternative cedes the political Lord William Wallace, Baron of Saltaire, AND PhD Cornell, Former IR Prof London School of Economics, Total Badass, Review of international Studies 19 96 (22) The failure the Weimar Republic of to establish its legitimacy owed something to irresponsibility of intellectuals of the right the and left, preferring private certainties of their the ideological schools to critical engagement with the difficult compromises of democratic politics. The Frankfurt School of Adorno and Marcuse were Salonbolschewisten, 'relentless in their hostility towards the capitalist system' while 'they never abandoned the lifestyle of the haute bourgeoisie'?x The followers of Nietzsche on the right those of and Marx on the left both worked to denigrate the limited achievements and the political compromises of Weimar, encouraging their students to adopt their own radically critical positions and so contribute to undermining the republic. Karl Mannheim, who had attempted in Ideology and Utopia to build on Weber's conditional and contingent sociology of knowledge, was among the first professors dismissed when the Nazis came to power. Intellectuals who live within relatively open civil societies a have responsibility to the society within which they live: to act themselves as constructive critics, and to encourage their students to contribute to the strengthening of civil society rather than to undermine it.32 (3089) ---Alt fails no acceptable solution or empirical evaluation Walt 99 (Stephen, Professor of International Affairs at Harvard University, "Rigor or Rigor Mortis? Rational Choice and Security Studies," International Security, 23(4),) Taken together, these characteristics help explain why recent formal work has had relatively little to say about important real-world security issues. Although formal techniques produce precise, logically consistent arguments, they often rest on unrealistic assumptions and the results are rarely translated into clear and accessible conclusions. And because many formal conjectures are often untested, policymakers and concerned citizens have no way of knowing if the arguments are valid . In this sense, much of the recent formal work in security studies reflects the "cult of irrelevance" that pervades much of contemporary social science. Instead of using their expertise to address important real-world problems, academics often focus on narrow and trivial problems that may impress their colleagues but are of little practical value. If formal theory were to dominate security studies as it has other areas of political science, much of the scholarship in the field would likely be produced by people with impressive technical skills but little or no substantive knowledge of history, politics, or strategy .[111] Such fields are prone to become "method-driven" rather than "problem-driven ," as research topics are chosen not because they are important but because they are amenable to analysis by the reigning methode du jour.[112] Instead of being a source of independent criticism and creative, socially useful ideas, the academic world becomes an isolated community engaged solely in dialogue with itself.[113] Throughout most of the postwar period, the field of security studies managed to avoid this danger. It has been theoretically and methodologically diverse , but its agenda has been shaped more by real-world problems than by methodological fads. New theoretical or methodological innovations have been brought to bear on particular research puzzles, but the field as a whole has retained considerable real-world relevance. By contrast, recent formal work in security studies has little to say about contemporary security issues. Formal rational choice theorists have been largely absent from the major international security debates of the past decade (such as the nature of the post-Cold War world; the character, causes, and strength of the democratic peace; the potential contribution of security institutions; the causes of ethnic conflict; the future role of nuclear weapons; or the impact of ideas and culture on strategy and conflict). These debates have been launched and driven primarily by scholars using nonformal methods, and formal theorists have joined in only after the central parameters were established by others. [114] Thus one of the main strengths of the subfield of security studies--namely, its close connection to real-world issues-- could be lost if the narrow tendencies of the modeling community took control of its research agenda . ---We're past the tipping point. Enemies are inevitable- the alternative risk extinction Harris `4 Essayist for Policy Review (Lee, Policy Review is one of America's leading conservative journals. It was founded by the Heritage Foundation and was for many years the foundation's flagship publication. In 2001, the publication was acquired by the Stanford, Californiabased Hoover Institution, though it maintains its office on Washington, D.C.'s Dupont Circle. "Civilization and its Enemies", http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f news/1260214/posts, MT) This is why all utopian projects are set either on a distant island or in a hidden valley: they must exist in isolation from the rest of the Last printed 276 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 world, to keep even the thought of the enemy at bay. Otherwise, they would have to deal with the problem of how to survive without abandoning their lofty ideals. This is the problem that confronts us today. The ideals that our intellectuals have been instilling in us are utopian ideals, designed for men and women who know no enemy and who do not need to take precautions against him. They are the values appropriate for a world in which everyone plays by the same rules, and accepts the same standards, of rational cooperation ; they are fatally unrealistic in a world in which the enemy acknowledges no rule except that of ruthlessness. To insist on maintaining utopian values when your society is facing an enemy who wishes only to annihilate you is to invite annihilation. And that is unacceptable. The only solution is for us to go back and unforget some of what we have forgotten, for our very forgetfulness is an obstacle to understanding the lessons of the past, so long as we insist on interpreting the past in ways which give comfort to our pet illusions. We want to believe that civilization came about because men decided one fine morning to begin living sensible, peaceful, rational lives; we refuse to acknowledge what its not to achieve even the first step in this direction. Unless we can understand this first step, none of the rest will make any sense to us, and we will fail to see what is looming right in front of us. The Greek way of expressing past and future differed from ours. We say that the past is behind us and the future is in front of us. To the Greeks, however, the past was before them, because they could plainly see its finished form standing in front of them: it was territory they had passed through and whose terrain they had charted. It was the future that was behind them, sneaking up like a thief in the night, full of dim imaginings and vast uncertainties. Nothing could penetrate the blackness of this unknown future except the rare flash of foresight that the Greeks called sophos, or wisdom. Yet even these flashes of wisdom depended entirely upon the capacity to remember that which is eternal and unchangingwhich is precisely what we have almost forgotten. The past tells that there can be no end of history, no realm of perpetual peace, and that those who are convinced by this illusion are risking all that they hold dear. The past tells us that there will always be an enemy as long as men care enough about anything to stake a claim to it, and thus enmity is built into the very nature of things. The past tells us that the next stage of history will be a tragic conflict between two different ways of life, which both have much that is worthy of admiration in them but which cannot coexist in the same world. But the past does not, and cannot, tell us how it will end this time. That is why it is impossible simply to stand by and not take sides . No outcome is assured by any deep logic of history or by any iron law of human development. Individual civilizations rise and fall; in each case the fall was not inevitable, but due to the decisions or lack of decision of the human beings whose ancestors had created the civilization for them, but who had forgotten the secret of how to preserve it for their own children. We ourselves are dangerously near this point, which is all the more remarkable considering how close we are still to 9/11. It is as if 9/11 has become simply an event in the past and not the opening up of a new epoch in human history, one that will be ruled by the possibility of catastrophic terror, just a previous historical epochs were ruled by other possible forms of historical catastrophe, from attack by migratory hordes to totalitarian takeover, from warrior gangs to the threat of nuclear annihilation. ---Prefer falsifiability Lett, 91 Professor of Anthropology, Department of Social Sciences ("A field Guide to Critical Thinking" p.32) It may sound paradoxical, but in order for any claim to be true, it must be falsifiable . The rule of falsifiabiity is a guarantee thai if the claim is false, the evidence will prove it false; and if the claim is true, the evidence will not disprove it (in which case the claim can be tentatively accepted as true until such time as evidence is brought forth that does disprove it). The rule of falsifiability, in short, says that the evidence must matter, and as such it is the first and most important and most fundamental rule of evidential reasoning. The rule of falsifiability is essential for this reason: If nothing conceivable could ever disprove the claim, then the evidence that does exist would not matter, it would be pointless to even examine the evidence, because the conclusion is already known--the claim is invulnerable to any possible evidence. This would not mean, however, that the claim is true; instead it would mean that the claim is meaningless. This is so because it is impossible--logically impossible--for any claim to be true no matter what. For every true claim, you can always conceive of evidence that would make the claim untrue-- in other words, again, every true claim is falsifiable. Last printed 277 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Prolif Reps K 2AC Framework: role of the ballot is to weigh the plan against a competitive policy option Net benefits: Fairness there are an infinite number of frameworks we have to be ready for only one of USFG policy is predictable and they moot the 1AC 8 minutes are ignored our 1AC was action based Education policy education is good teaches future decision making It's a reason why discourse doesn't come first debate is yes or no to plan not about interrogating the assumptions of the 1AC but we don't exclude discussion of security logic they could read links based off of plan action Aff outweighs <insert> Perm do the entire 1AC and reject the representations of Orientalist discourse throughout the 1ac impact is inevitable and the alt cannot overcome it a. domination is human nature Thayer 2k (Bradley, political scientist and an associate professor in Missouri State University's Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, the MIT Press, International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2(Autumn 2000), pp. 124151, "Bringing in Darwin: Evolutionary Theory, Realism, and International Politics") The second ultimate cause of egoistic and dominating behavior is given by Morgenthau: Humans behave as they do because they possess an animus dominandi.24 They seek power because human nature is fundamentally egoistic and malignant. Thus conflict and war occur because human nature is bad.25 Thomas Hobbes provided the foundation for this second, secular, pillar of real ist thought: Humans are ruled by an insatiable desire for power.26 This lust for power has created a state of war in which humans live in reciprocal and per manent fear of violent death, and in which peace is always precarious. According to Morgenthau, the "desire for power ... concerns itself not with the individual's survival but his with position among his fellows once his sur vival has been secured.... His lust for power would be satisfied only if the last became an object of his domination, there being nobody above or beside him, that is, if he became like God."27 So encompassing is this desire for power that the tendency to dominate "is an element of all human associations, from the family through fraternal and professional associations and local political orga nizations, to the state."28 Two types of behavior are the proximate causes of the realist argument: ego ism and domination.29 Egoism will cause an individual to place his interests before those of others, the interests of himself and his family before those of more distant relatives, and the interests of relatives before those of his commu nity, state, and so on.30 The desire to dominate, realists believe, is inherent and often leads to physical aggression against those who oppose n of the primitive cell into ever larger components, organs, and so on to create what Dawkins calls "sur vival machines." He explains one's objectives . State leaders are expected to mirror this ordering by ting put the interests of their state before those of others or of the world community, and by striving to dominate other states. Realists argue that only by possessing power can indi viduals attack and conquer others as well as deter and defend themselves from attack. The principal result of this process is that balances of power will form and reform cyclically, producing both periods of stability and intense security competition in international politics b. prolif rhetoric will always be used Last printed 278 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Mutimer , David. 2k "The Weapons State" Mutimer has a PhD in political science from York University and is now an associate professor of political science there. p. 105 LH Here, then, is both the greatest potential and the greatest problem posed by a "disarmament" frame. With such a different object and set of identities, a "disarmament" image would enable a rather different series of practices. But on the other hand, the politics of instituting those practices would become somewhat more difficult because of the entailments of the "disarmament" image. Although considerable rhetorical support has been expressed for the goal of disarmament from the earliest days of the nuclear age, and before, concrete disarmament practices have been difficult to achieve. Part of the problem has been a series of discursive and practical links enabled by the "disarmament" image. The first and perhaps most damaging has been the connection between the language of disarmament and the program of general and complete disarmament. Although many analysts and even policymakers might be willing to concede the value of eliminating some weapons--notice the ability to generate support for bans on land mines and both chemical and biological weapons-- and possibly even all nuclear weapons, few are willing to express support for a goal they characterize as hopelessly utopian. The utopian features of general and complete disarmament gesture toward another politically difficult entailment of "disarmament"--the link between disarmament and weakness. Several unfortunate links are created by the language of "disarmament" that inculcate an entailment of weakness. The first is characterization of those pressing for general and complete disarmament as pacifist, lefty, or even wimp by those entrusted the with arsenals of, certainly, the United States. The second problematic link is with the practices of the enforced disarmament that follows wars: losers are disarmed, so to disarm is to be a loser. This is not a promising way to generate political support. Finally, arms , in both senses of the word, intimately tied to are concepts of power and masculinity . To be disarmed is to be rendered powerless, to be emasculated. Even if the process of eliminating weapons produces enhanced security, the entailments of powerlessness and emasculation are difficult obstacles to overcome . If the alternative claims to overcome this it is utopian and justifies perm do the alternative turn The alts universal characterization of third world countries causes their impact Shapiro, 98, Professor of Political Science University of Hawaii, "Representational Violence," Peace Review v. 10 i. 4, Michael J.) BBL Of late, critical and polemical commentaries aimed at politicizing language have been focused on the damaging effects of what Judith Butler has called "excitable speech," utterances intended to incite violence toward persons with recognizable social identities: religious groups, ethnic groups, and gays and lesbians, among others Apart from the problem of . neglecting the meaning slippage involved in assigning an unmediated causal effect to speech acts, the position of those who are arguing, for example, in favor of juridical responses to censor hate speech confronts a paradox . In order to militate against one kind of linguistic violencethe damaging effects of utterances on personsthey have to commit another kind of violence. By assigning a unitary identity to the targets of hate speech , the protectors of vulnerable bodies engage in a violence of representation. They must attribute to speechact victims a unitary and unambiguously coherent identity; they must dissolve hybridities, turning pluralistic and contingent historical affiliations into essential characteristics. As a result, their arguments in favor of protecting the vulnerable reinforce the identity perspectives presupposed in the discourses they oppose. The paradox evident in juridically oriented attempts to sanction hate speech is part of a more pervasive historical phenomenon toward which Jacques Derrida has pointed in his warning about attempts at definitively expunging violence. As he has famously put it, a commitment to total nonviolence risks the "worst violence it perpetuates the illusion that an absolute peace is possible. Strategies for attaining such ;" a peace have varied from the structural approach, e.g. the Hobbesian idea of concentrating violence at one point above the social formation, to the conceptual approach e.g. the Kantian commitment to a universalizing cognitive enlargement at the levels of both the individual and global society. , Threats are real Schweller 4 [Randall L. Schweller, Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at The Ohio State University, "Unanswered Threats A Neoclassical RealistTheory of Underbalancing," International Security 29.2 (2004) 159201, Muse] Despite the historical frequency of underbalancing, little has been written on the subject. Indeed, Geoffrey Blainey's memorable observation that for "every thousand pages published on the causes of wars there is less than one page directly on the causes of peace" could have been made with equal veracity about overreactions to threats as opposed to underreactions to them.92 Library shelves are filled with books on the causes and dangers of exaggerating threats, ranging from studies of domestic politics to bureaucratic politics, to political psychology, to organization theory. By comparison, there have been few studies at any level of analysis or from any theoretical perspective that directly explain why states have with some, if not equal, regularity underestimated dangers to their survival . There may be some cognitive or normative bias at work here. Consider, for instance, that there is a commonly used word, paranoia, for the unwarranted fear that people are, in some way, "out to get you" or are planning to do oneharm. I suspect that just as many people are afflicted with the opposite Last printed 279 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 psychosis: the delusion that everyone loves you when, in fact, they do not even like you. Yet, we do not have a familiar word for this phenomenon. Indeed, I am unaware of any word that describes this pathology (hubris and overconfidence come close, but they plainly define something other than what I have described). That noted, international relations theory does have a frequently used phrase for the pathology of states' underestimation of threats to their that may help resolve or manage urgent security problems. Thus, born in the atomic age with its new balance of terror and an ongoing Cold War, the field of security studies has naturally produced theories of and prescriptions for national security that have had little to say about--and , in fact, heavily biased against are warnings of--the dangers of underreacting to or underestimating threats . After all, the nuclear revolution was not about overkill but, as Thomas Schelling pointed out, speed of kill and mutual kill.93 Given the apocalyptic consequences of miscalculation , accidents, or inadvertent nuclear war, small wonder that theorists were more concerned about overreacting to threats than underresponding to them. At a time when all of humankind could be wiped out in less than twentyfive minutes, theorists may be excused for stressing the benefits of caution under conditions of uncertainty and erring on the side of inferring from ambiguous actions overly benign assessments of the opponent's intentions. The overwhelming fear was that a crisis "might unleash forces of an essentially military nature that overwhelm the political process and bring on a war thatnobody wants. Many important conclusions about the risk of nuclear war, and thus about the political meaning of nuclear forces, rest on this fundamental idea."94 Now that the Cold War is over, we can begin to redress these biases in the literature. In that spirit, I have offered a domestic politics model to explain why threatened states often fail to adjust in a prudent and coherent way to dangerous changes in their strategic environment. The model fits nicely with recent realist studies on imperial under and overstretch. Specifically, it is consistent with Fareed Zakaria's analysis of U.S. foreign policy from 1865 to 1889, when, he claims, the United States had the national power and opportunity to expand but failed to do so because it lacked sufficient state power (i.e., the state was weak relative to society).95 Zakaria claims that the United States did [End Page 199] not take advantage of opportunities in its environment to expand because it lacked the institutional state strength to harness resources from society that were needed to do so. I am making a similar argument with respect to balancing rather than expansion: incoherent, fragmented states are unwilling and unable to balance against potentially dangerous threats because elites view the domestic risks as too high, and they are unable to mobilize the required resources from a divided society. The arguments presented here also suggest that elite fragmentation and disagreement within a competitive political process, which Jack Snyder cites as an explanation for overexpansionist policies, are more likely to produce underbalancing than overbalancing behavior among threatened incoherent states.96 This is because a balancing strategy carries certain political costs and risks with few, if any, compensating short-term political gains, and because the strategic environment is always somewhat uncertain. Consequently, logrolling among fragmented elites within threatened states is more likely to generate overly cautious responses to threats than overreactions to them. This dynamic captures the underreaction of democratic states to the rise of Nazi Germany during the interwar period.97 In addition to elite fragmentation, I have suggested some basic domesticlevel variables that regularly intervene to thwart balance of power predictions. survival, socalled Munich analogy. The term is used, however, in a disparaging way by theorists to ridicule those who employ it. The central the claim is that the navet associated with Munich and the outbreak of World War II has become an overused and inappropriate analogy because few leaders are as evil and unappeasable as Adolf Hitler. Thus, the analogy either mistakenly causes leaders [End Page 198] to adopt hawkish and overly competitive policies or is deliberately used by leaders to justify such policies and mislead the public. A more compelling explanation for the paucity of studies on underreactions to threats, however, is the tendency of theories to reflect contemporary issues as well as the desire of theorists and journals to provide society with policy- relevant theories Last printed 280 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 ---Prefer falsifiability Lett, 91 Professor of Anthropology, Department of Social Sciences ("A field Guide to Critical Thinking" p.32) It may sound paradoxical, but in order for any claim to be true, it must be falsifiable . The rule of falsifiabiity is a guarantee thai if the claim is false, the evidence will prove it false; and if the claim is true, the evidence will not disprove it (in which case the claim can be tentatively accepted as true until such time as evidence is brought forth that does disprove it). The rule of falsifiability, in short, says that the evidence must matter, and as such it is the first and most important and most fundamental rule of evidential reasoning. The rule of falsifiability is essential for this reason: If nothing conceivable could ever disprove the claim, then the evidence that does exist would not matter, it would be pointless to even examine the evidence, because the conclusion is already known--the claim is invulnerable to any possible evidence. This would not mean, however, that the claim is true; instead it would mean that the claim is meaningless. This is so because it is impossible--logically impossible--for any claim to be true no matter what. For every true claim, you can always conceive of evidence that would make the claim untrue-- in other words, again, every true claim is falsifiable. Last printed 281 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Chernus K 2AC ---Framework: role of the ballot is to weigh the plan against a competitive policy option Net benefits: Fairness there are an infinite number of frameworks we have to be ready for only one of USFG policy is predictable and they moot the 1AC 8 minutes are ignored our 1AC was action based Education policy education is good teaches future decision making It's a reason why discourse doesn't come first debate is yes or no to plan not about interrogating the assumptions of the 1AC but we don't exclude discussion of security logic they could read links based off of plan action ---Prefer falsifiability Lett, 91 Professor of Anthropology, Department of Social Sciences ("A field Guide to Critical Thinking" p.32) It may sound paradoxical, but in order for any claim to be true, it must be falsifiable . The rule of falsifiabiity is a guarantee thai if the claim is false, the evidence will prove it false; and if the claim is true, the evidence will not disprove it (in which case the claim can be tentatively accepted as true until such time first and most important and most fundamental rule of evidential reasoning. The rule of falsifiability is essential for this reason: If nothing conceivable could ever disprove the claim, then the evidence that does exist would not matter, it would be pointless to even examine the evidence, because the conclusion is already known--the claim is invulnerable to any possible evidence. This would not mean, however, that the claim is true; instead it would mean that the claim is meaningless. This is so because it is impossible--logically impossible--for any claim to be true no matter what. For every true claim, you can always conceive of evidence that would make the claim untrue-- in other words, again, every true claim is falsifiable. as evidence is brought forth that does disprove it). The rule of falsifiability, in short, says that the evidence must matter, and as such it is the Perm do the plan and synthesize the literalism of the 1AC speech act with the symbolism of the alternative Political action and literalism will always be necessary Chernus 1986 (Ira, Professor of Religious studies at UC Boulder, Dr. Strangegod, pp. 168) A mythic journey of the imagination cannot replace awareness of the literal empirical facts. Nor can it replace political activity based on those facts. Empirical education, in which we learn to distinguish between true and false, and political action, in which we choose between right and wrong and find practical ways to implement our choices, will always be necessary. But as long as our awareness is merely literal and our activity merely political, we are confined to the realm of limited meanings and goals. Literalism and politics cannot lead us to the unity underlying the fragments of our experience. Symbolism and myth are the key to unification. They teach us to see better and worse as two sides of a single reality, even as they help us to struggle implacably against the worse in the name of the better. They transform our political struggle itself into an experience of wholeness. The means must suit the end. Perhaps the means are ultimately the same as the end. Only a synthesis of dark and light, unconscious and conscious, symbolic and literal, mythic and political, can offer the power of true wholeness. This initiatory journey of mythicized politics and politicized myth is a sacred journey, as frightening as it is fascinating . But we need not make it alone. If we are to discover the power of transcendence within us, we can and must make our journey together, as did the religious Last printed 282 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 communities of old. As Joanna Macy writes: "When we face the darkness of our time, openly and together, we tap deep reserves of strength within us. . . . In the synergy of sharing comes power." No matter how many share it, however, the journey is sure to be long and arduous. It leads through vast unmapped territory, and we have no leaders or heroes to look to except ourselves. It may go on for 10,000 miles. But it starts with a single step. And every one of us, we may be surprised to learn, knows how to walk. Imagining future nuclear wars prevents them Martin 82 (Brian, *Professor of Social Sciences in the School of Social Sciences, Media and Communication at the University of Wollongong, "How the Peace Movement Should be Preparing for Nuclear War," Bulletin of Peace Proposals, Vol. 13, No. 2, 1982, pp. 149159) But these possibilities provide relatively little consolation for the human disaster of nuclear war, and certainly would not justify any policy which significantly increased the risk of nuclear war. It is in their implications for the present that peace movement activities relating to nuclear war must be assessed.It is my belief that preparation for nuclear war by the peace movement would reduce the chance of nuclear war by providing a visible threat to otherwise unchallenged continuance of the existing political institutions.National decisionmakers may wish to avoid nuclear war to save their own lives, but they have demonstrated a continued willingness to risk nuclear war, both in crises and confrontations and through the very existence of nuclear arsenals, through the policies they have promoted and the institutions they have constructed and supported. This institutionalised risk of nuclear war will seem less acceptable if one consequence of continued preparations for war were a major challenge to the complete system of political and economic power and privilege. Nuclear weapons states have refrained from nuclear war thus far not primarily because of their perception of the human disaster of nuclear war but because of the possible political consequences. A prepared peace movement would ensure that such political consequences are as serious as possible. 4 Chernus misunderstands the causes of inaction it may be rationalization or self interest, not numbing. Fails to incorporate any empirical data SUMMERS, 1991 [Nuclear Texts and Contexts, Spring 1991, Review of Nuclear Madness, http://www.wsu.edu/~brians/ntc/NTC6.pdf] This is a book that relies heavily on lofty language and philosophical jargon (e.g., "radical finitude", p. 53). Relating mythological terms like "the underworld" (p. 254) to nuclear deterrence is about as useful to a real understanding of the nuclear threat as former U.S. President Reagan's references to "the evil empire." These grandiose descriptions fail to recognize simple economic realities. The scientific-military-industrial complex and the nuclear industry are often supported simply because they provide companies and shareholders with profits, and employees with jobs. Therefore, it may not be that numbing occurs because of the magnitude of the threat, but that rationalization occurs because of vested interests in the threat. It would therefore be worth considering whether there is any difference between numbing in the hibakusha that survived Hiroshima, and rationalization (or numbing) for questionable work that pays well. This distinction may perhaps be studied empirically. As with imagery, there are also empirical studies that could have been considered in any book dealing with these types of psychological mechanisms (e.g., Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959 and all of the subsequent studies validating cognitive dissonance). The only evidence for numbing in the book is Lifton's observations of victims in Hiroshima, which are then linked to potential victims of the contemporary nuclear threat. Lifton himself recently associated the thought processes in perpetrating Nazi mass killing, and in contemporary "perpetrators" of the nuclear threat, which would have been very relevant to reference here (Lifton and Markusen, 1990). The tendency throughout Nuclear Madness is to increasingly leave the initial evidence and begin describing events as schizophrenic, neurotic or mad. Chernus wrote his works 19 years ago and there's been no impact, only proves no threshold for the k No impact to "schizophrenia" its based on discredited psychology SUMMERS, 1991 [Nuclear Texts and Contexts, Spring 1991, Review of Nuclear Madness, http://www.wsu.edu/~brians/ntc/NTC6.pdf] The mental health metaphors in Nuclear Madness are rooted in pre-1950s psychoanalysis. (Even continual reference to "The bomb" rather Last printed 283 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 than "smart missiles," for example, is outdated.) Chernus states Psychologists may identify nuclear weapons with interper- sonal hostility, dominance needs, repressed rage, or magical defenses against insecurity. Freudians will find a mapping of infantile omnipotence desires. Jungians will find arche- typal patterns of all sorts. Theologians will consider the bomb a mapped replication of our traditional image of God. But all will attest the existence of social fantasy. (p. 32. Infantile omnipotence desires? All will attest to the existence of social fantasy? Nuclear Madness does, but it is surely a step backwards for any reader attempting to learn something of explanations in contemporary political psychology. In relying on clinical metaphors from over forty years ago, Chernus has tied his philosophy to a clinical approach with little actual evidence, and which is generally no longer accepted. Psychic numbing and mental illness could be used successfully if not treated as just a metaphorical explanation for nuclear irrationality. This is a difference between Lifton's (1967) actual psychiatric observations and Chernus's numbing metaphor. But Nuclear Madness dwells on descriptive images and similes, not actually pursuing responses to the nuclear threat using either side of psychology: ( a) the experimental and observational bases, which have been extensively documented, or (b) clinical psychopathology, which would be worth seriously pursuing. One could propose very real psychiatric grounds for the suicidal nature of being a passive bystander or having vested interests in the nuclear arms race (see Charny, 1986). Masking, numbing, rationalizing, or however ignoring the potential for nuclear omnicide is a psychological process that poses a very real threat to human life, and may thus fit the criteria for inclusion as a pathological disorder in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders III (American Psychiatric Association, 1987). Psychoanalysis fails Chernus work is nonfalsifiable SUMMERS, 1991 [Nuclear Texts and Contexts, Spring 1991, Review of Nuclear Madness, http://www.wsu.edu/~brians/ntc/NTC6.pdf] As a central theme, Nuclear Madness: Religion and the Psychology of the Nuclear Age states that: "The question to be asked about nuclear weapons . . . is: What fantasy images are embedded in our attitudes and behaviors?" (p. 83). But Psychology as a discipline and profession is based on empirical research, not fantasy images. Author Ira Chernus does acknowledge that his approach is not easily interwoven with formal psychological research (discussing theologian Paul Tillich, p. 48; also pp. 105 106). But he nevertheless uses arguments, such as those from Mircea Eliade, that "can be neither verified nor falsified by empirical research" (p. 193), an ominous note for social scientists reading the book. Chernus overlooks vast areas of empirical research in political science, economics, political psychology, and even the scientific evidence on nuclear winter, stating that "the empirical reality of a large-scale use of nuclear weapons eludes scientific understanding" (p. 64). As one example to the contrary, in psychology there have been innumerable experimental studies of imagery, both in terms of imaginal thinking, and a narrower literature specifically focusing on nuclear imagery (e.g., Journal of Social Issues, v. 39[1]). Skirting these seems to be a gross omission in a book purporting to use imagery as a basis for a psychological understanding of the nuclear age. Last printed 284 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 8 No Impact Chernus is just wrong about psychic numbing disproven by acts of resistance SUMMERS, 1991 [Nuclear Texts and Contexts, Spring 1991, Review of Nuclear Madness, http://www.wsu.edu/~brians/ntc/NTC6.pdf] Chernus, Ira. Nuclear Madness: Religion and the Psy chology of the Nuclear Age. Albany, NY: State Univer sity of New York Press, 1991. 336 pp. $17.95 softcover. This book attempts to explain political psychology in the nuclear age through nuclear imagery and psychiatrist R. J. Lifton's (1967) construct of psychic numbing. To start with an image of my own, the nuclear threat could be characterized by two men (gender intended), each holding a gun to the other's head as a means of security . The inherent danger and illogic in this is of course mad; a madness defined by Mutual Assured Destruction (M.A.D.). The book draws heavily on metaphors of madness in attempting to explain this situation, and in attempting to "point to new political possibilities that will lead beyond the nuclear trap and void" (p. 70). The logic followed in the book is that psychic numbing causes us to shut off any thoughts about a fundamental threat to our existence. We therefore develop no images of nuclear doomsday, and this is essentially why we do not act to prevent it. It is not completely clear, however, why numbing makes us inactive regarding the nuclear threat, but not about other threats. Certainly death is a more immediate threat to blacks in South Africa or to those in bread lines in Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. Yet rather than being numbed into paralysis, thesevictims defy government threats of bloodshed to hold public rallies. Numbing may not be the cause of general inactivity regarding the nuclear threat; unlike demonstrations against foodlines and racism, we may just find it too long- term, large and improbable to deal with in our day-to-day lives. 9 Apocalypticism occurs only because we abdicate our control over the bomb plan solves Chernus 1986 (Ira, Professor of Religious studies at UC Boulder, Dr. Strangegod, pp. 99100) There is, however, one important way in which the apocalyptic view cannot be applied to the nuclear age. Apocalyptic stresses that human beings must choose sides, for or against God, but it is God himself who decides when the final battle will be fought; and ultimately it is God, the divine warrior, who fights and controls the outcome of the battle. God's human allies are necessarily subordinate, although participating fully, in this process. The omnipotent Bomb, on the other hand, is itself powerless until human beings use it. This situation is complicated by the human sense of powerless-ness and the very real ways in which humans have abdicated their control and put the Bomb in control. But among our perceptions of nuclear weapons there is always at least some component of awareness that the Bomb is a human invention that is deployed and implemented by human decision. This dimension of human control in the nuclear situation puts us, quite simply, in the place that had formerly been reserved for God. Last printed 285 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 10 [EXCLUSIVIELY FOR DEMAND/K Affs YOU ARE FUCKED IF YOU READ THIS AND ROLEPLAY, SO DON'T] We control uniqueness and link direction psychic numbing only occurs when we ignore our capacity to act CHERNUS 1991 (Ira, Associate Professor of Religious Studies at the University of Colorado Boulder, Nuclear Madness, pp. 567) Tillich's understanding of neurosis, coupled with his critique of modernity, shows how the psychodynamics of nuclear images and nuclear numbing in the Cold War world are rooted in the neurotic fears characteristic of modernity . Neurosis tries to avoid unreality by refusing to face the fearful side of reality. The tremendous achievements of science and technology make us virtually fearless in the face of nature. The evil spirits that once populated waterways and wilderness and darkness are banished. So we learn to fear other people: the ethnic and racial minorities, the Communists, or whatever others are most convenient at the time . We cling to these fears so persistently just because our potential range of fears has become so narrow. Fixation on a small number of intensely held fears is a prime characteristic of neurosis. Neurotic fears assume a special quality of unreality in two senses: they express the threat of unreality in especially vivid symbolic terms, and they are often unrealistic. The pervasive fears of our own day display both these qualities. Among all the others, we especially fear the shadowy, impalpable, unknowable other: the terrorist, the thief in the night, the infiltrating spy, the stranger on the other side of the streetor the tracks, or the worldwhom we will never meet. All these people are unreal to us, yet we guard ourselves against them with special caution, spending huge portions of our wealth to buy security, because we never know what They will do next. Our publicly shared fears do little to concretize our anxiety. For the most part, they simply reinforce our sense of helplessness in the face of intangible dangers. So we feel compelled to limit our anxiety by neurotically limiting our world and our own possibilities. Many of these fears may be unfounded and others exaggerated, but we simply have no way to find out the facts. Neurotics cherish their unrealistic fears as a buffer against reality. They strip genuine dangers of their reality for the same reason. Whenever possible, they ignore real dangers and refuse to feel fear at all. If fear cannot be avoided, the second-best line of defense is to talk about the danger (sometimes incessantly) without internalizing it or intending to respond to it. In our societal neurosis, this verbal defense is quite common. We cannot totally ignore our fears about environmental destruction, urban decay, or the threat of nuclear annihilation. "It's a terrible problem," we say. "Someone really ought to do something." With that we confirm our own impotence. We diminish our reality in the face of the problem so that we can diminish the reality of the fear and danger. In a life of radical finitude this maneuver is especially easy. Subject and object, person and world, life and death are permanently separated in any event. Thus the danger, even if it represents death itself, becomes just one more object "out there,'' too far away to touchor to touch our lives. So we deaden ourselves to very real dangers and sink back into psychic numbing. The more dangers there are, the easier it is to feel totally detached and numb. Yet as we take refuge in our pure subjectivity, we also take refuge in our sense that we are just objects, cogs in the machine, inert and incapable of response. Ignoring our capacity to act, we settle into a convenient fatalism. "It's all too overwhelming," we say. And in fact we are quite easily overwhelmed. In the narrow shelter of our finitized world, we systematically train ourselves to be incapable of contemplating threats to the whole. Embedded in temporality, we can only deal with concerns of the short run. Our minds boggle in trying to think of global centuries-long consequences. And a nuclear threat that conjures up eternity with its image of "the end of all life" is impossible to take in which is just the way neurotics want it. Last printed 286 FILE NAME HOOCH <Your Name> <Tournament> 20092010 Last printed 287 ...
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