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Unformatted text preview: FILE NAME HOOCH <Tournament> 2009-2010 <Your Name> 1AC Plan: The United States federal government should reduce nearly all military presence necessary to pursue counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. Advantage 1 is Hegemony The war in Afghanistan will collapse US power – 2 internal links: First – lack of a coherent policy will vacillate between engagement and isolationism – making the collapse of US credibility inevitable. Reducing presence in Afghanistan is the only way to make it sustainable Stewart, 9- Ryan Family Professor of the Practice of Human Rights and Director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, studied at Oxford and served briefly in the British army before working in the diplomatic service in Indonesia and as British representative to Montenegro (9/16/09, Rory, “The Future of Afghanistan,” http://www.hks.harvard.edu/news-events/news/testimonies/rory-stewart-on-afghanistan) The best Afghan policy would be to reduce the number of foreign troops from the current level of 90,000 to far fewer – perhaps 20,000. In that case, two distinct objectives would remain for the international community: development and counter-terrorism. Neither would amount to the building of an Afghan state or winning a counter-insurgency campaign. A reduction in troop numbers and a turn away from state-building should not mean total withdrawal: good projects could continue to be undertaken in electricity, water, irrigation, health, education, agriculture, rural development and in other areas favoured by development agencies. Even a light US presence could continue to allow for aggressive operations against Al Qaeda terrorists, in Afghanistan , who plan to attack the United States. The US has successfully prevent Al Qaeda from re-establishing itself since 2001 (though the result has only been to move bin Laden across the border.). The US military could also (with other forms of assistance) support the Afghan military to prevent the Taliban from seizing a city or taking over the country. These twin objectives will require a very long-term presence, as indeed is almost inevitable in a country which is as poor, as fragile and traumatized as Afghanistan (and which lacks the internal capacity at the moment to become independent of Foreign aid or control its territory). But a long-term presence will in turn mean a much lighter and more limited presence (if it is to retain US domestic support). We should not control and cannot predict the future of will in turn mean a much lighter and more limited presence (if it is to retain US domestic support)....
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This note was uploaded on 02/23/2012 for the course DEBATE 101 taught by Professor None during the Spring '12 term at Berkeley.
- Spring '12
- The American, FILE NAME HOOCH