South Korea Neg - Korea Neg 1/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7...

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Unformatted text preview: Korea Neg 1/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors KOREA NEG 7 WEEK Korea Neg 7 Week............................................................................................................................................. 1 1NC Korean Conflict.......................................................................................................................................... 10 1nc a2 bioweap................................................................................................................................................. 13 1nc a2 strikes.................................................................................................................................................... 14 1nc a2 retal/taboo............................................................................................................................................. 15 2nc no conflict................................................................................................................................................... 16 2NC no escalation.............................................................................................................................................. 17 2NC bioweapons................................................................................................................................................ 18 2nc turn presence solves north korea................................................................................................................ 19 A2: Korean War Low Risk............................................................................................................................... 20 A2: Korean War No Escalation........................................................................................................................ 21 A2: Korean War No North Provocations.......................................................................................................... 22 A2: Korean War No North Invasion................................................................................................................. 23 A2: Korean War No North Invasion................................................................................................................. 24 A2: Korean War No South Retaliation............................................................................................................. 25 A2: Korean War South Will Solve................................................................................................................... 26 A2: Korean War China Will Solve.................................................................................................................... 27 A2: Korean War China Will Solve.................................................................................................................... 29 A2: Korean War North Will Preserve Its Survival.............................................................................................31 A2: Regime Collapse Adv 1nc......................................................................................................................... 32 ***Succession / Regime Collapse Adv ANS.................................................................................................32 ***Succession / Regime Collapse Adv ANS........................................................................................................32 2nc no regime collapse...................................................................................................................................... 33 2nc china will not step in................................................................................................................................... 34 ext china won't step in...................................................................................................................................... 35 U.S. Presence Needed Post Unification / Collapse..............................................................................................37 Security Assurances Won't Solve........................................................................................................................ 38 External Threats Sustain the Regime ................................................................................................................ 39 1nc regionalism................................................................................................................................................. 40 ***Regionalism Adv ANS............................................................................................................................. 40 ***Regionalism Adv ANS................................................................................................................................... 40 2NC Bilat=multilat............................................................................................................................................ 41 2NC squo solves sk is multilating................................................................................................................ 42 2NC regionalism impossible............................................................................................................................... 43 A2 taiwan war................................................................................................................................................... 44 ROK Already Participating in Regionalism.........................................................................................................45 Alliance => U.S. Regional Integration.............................................................................................................. 46 Alliances Compliments Regionalism.................................................................................................................. 47 Alliances Compliments Regionalism.................................................................................................................. 48 Alliances Compliments Regionalism.................................................................................................................. 49 Economic Decline Turns Multilateralism............................................................................................................ 50 ***ROK Soft Power / Modernization Adv Ans.............................................................................................50 ***ROK Soft Power / Modernization Adv Ans...................................................................................................50 A2: ROK Modernization Deters China................................................................................................................ 51 Military Presence Key to ROK Autonomy........................................................................................................... 52 A2: ROK Modernization Deters China................................................................................................................ 53 2nc won't deter.................................................................................................................................................. 54 Korea Neg Michigan Institutes `10 2/436 7 Week Juniors 2nc the modernization is nuclear ...................................................................................................................... 55 1nc china adv.................................................................................................................................................... 56 ***U.S. China Adv....................................................................................................................................... 56 ***U.S. China Adv............................................................................................................................................. 56 2nc china rise peaceful...................................................................................................................................... 59 china rise peaceful econ.................................................................................................................................... 60 china rise peaceful institutions......................................................................................................................... 61 2nc withdraw causes chinese agresion............................................................................................................... 62 2nc no taiwan war............................................................................................................................................. 64 China Won't Balance Against U.S....................................................................................................................... 65 ***Overstretch***............................................................................................................................................. 67 1nc overstretch.................................................................................................................................................. 68 Alt cause- afghanistan.......................................................................................................................................68 Troops don't matter- naval power maintains dominance..................................................................................68 2nc afghanistan alt cause................................................................................................................................... 70 2nc heg inevitable............................................................................................................................................. 71 2nc no impact to heg......................................................................................................................................... 74 ***Prolif Advantage***..................................................................................................................................... 76 1nc prolif........................................................................................................................................................... 77 2nc no pressure................................................................................................................................................. 78 2nc no retal....................................................................................................................................................... 79 ***China Soft Power Adv ANS..................................................................................................................... 79 ***China Soft Power Adv ANS........................................................................................................................... 79 China's Influence Will Grow.............................................................................................................................. 80 Chinese Soft Power Increasing........................................................................................................................... 81 Chinese Soft Power Increasing........................................................................................................................... 82 China Becoming More Responsible in Region....................................................................................................83 China's Soft Power Exaggerated......................................................................................................................... 84 Several Factors Undermine Chinese Soft Power.................................................................................................85 Chinese Soft Power Won't Solve........................................................................................................................ 86 1NC Reunification............................................................................................................................................. 87 ***REUNIFICATION ADVANTAGE............................................................................................................... 87 ***REUNIFICATION ADVANTAGE.................................................................................................................... 87 2NC no reunification......................................................................................................................................... 89 2nc relations high.............................................................................................................................................. 90 2NC plan kills relations...................................................................................................................................... 91 2nc Presence solves reunification....................................................................................................................... 92 ***OTHER***................................................................................................................................................... 93 At: Iran prolif..................................................................................................................................................... 94 ***Case Turns***.............................................................................................................................................. 96 US Troops Solve Asia Peace............................................................................................................................... 97 Ground Forces Key............................................................................................................................................ 98 Troops Key to Multilat/ROK.............................................................................................................................. 99 US Forces Key.................................................................................................................................................. 100 Nuclear Umbrella Good................................................................................................................................... 101 War/Allied Prolif............................................................................................................................................. 102 prolif links....................................................................................................................................................... 103 allied prolif links.............................................................................................................................................. 105 Korea Neg Michigan Institutes `10 3/436 7 Week Juniors Presence Good War ...................................................................................................................................... 106 Presence Good Asia ...................................................................................................................................... 107 Presence Good Japan ................................................................................................................................... 108 Unification Turn (unification good)................................................................................................................. 110 Unification Turn (unification good)................................................................................................................. 111 A2: Unification = Withdrawal Inevitable.........................................................................................................112 Unification Bad Arms Race............................................................................................................................ 113 North Korea Threat/ A2: South Can Defend....................................................................................................114 USROK Relations Turn................................................................................................................................... 115 A2: ROK / US Relations .................................................................................................................................. 116 Must End Defense Treaty................................................................................................................................. 118 ***Solvency ARGUMENTS......................................................................................................................... 118 ***Solvency ARGUMENTS............................................................................................................................... 118 1nc/2nc Uniqueness........................................................................................................................................ 119 ***DETERRENCE DA................................................................................................................................. 119 ***DETERRENCE DA....................................................................................................................................... 119 Deterrence Now............................................................................................................................................... 120 A2: N/U Troop Reductions Now................................................................................................................... 121 A2: N/U Restructuring.................................................................................................................................. 122 1nc Links......................................................................................................................................................... 123 2nc Link Block................................................................................................................................................. 125 2nc Link Block................................................................................................................................................. 126 2nc Crushes U.S. Influence.............................................................................................................................. 127 2nc Plan Causes Withdrawal from Japan........................................................................................................128 2nc Ground Forces Key.................................................................................................................................... 129 Link Extensions................................................................................................................................................ 130 U.S. Presence Prevents Allied Prolif................................................................................................................. 131 Withdrawal => Withdrawal from Japan.........................................................................................................132 A2: Turn Withdrawal => Regionalism.........................................................................................................133 A2: Navy / Air Force Solves............................................................................................................................. 134 Terrorism Impact 2nc.................................................................................................................................... 135 North Korean Invasion Impact 1nc/2nc.........................................................................................................137 A2: ROK Can Defend Itself............................................................................................................................... 138 U.S.ROK Alliance DA 1nc............................................................................................................................. 140 ***U.S.ROK Alliance DA........................................................................................................................... 140 ***U.S.ROK Alliance DA................................................................................................................................. 140 2NC Overview................................................................................................................................................. 142 turns korean conflict........................................................................................................................................ 143 turns china...................................................................................................................................................... 144 ***UNIQUENESS....................................................................................................................................... 144 ***UNIQUENESS............................................................................................................................................. 144 2NC Relations High......................................................................................................................................... 145 military commitment strong now..................................................................................................................... 146 Relations Up Now............................................................................................................................................ 147 Relations Up Now............................................................................................................................................ 149 Relations Up Now............................................................................................................................................ 150 Brinks.............................................................................................................................................................. 151 A2: N/U Troop Reductions Now................................................................................................................... 152 Korea Neg Michigan Institutes `10 4/436 7 Week Juniors A2: N/U Troops Moved Away from DMZ......................................................................................................154 2nc Link security guarantee............................................................................................................................ 155 LINK....................................................................................................................................................... 155 LINK............................................................................................................................................................. 155 2nc link alliance............................................................................................................................................. 157 a2 public link turn........................................................................................................................................... 158 link security.................................................................................................................................................... 161 link public...................................................................................................................................................... 162 ROK Public Link Ext......................................................................................................................................... 164 2nc Ground Troops Key................................................................................................................................... 165 Troops Prevent ROK Prolif............................................................................................................................... 166 Withdrawal Links............................................................................................................................................. 167 OPCON Links................................................................................................................................................... 168 OPCON Links................................................................................................................................................... 169 Unification Links.............................................................................................................................................. 171 War Solves ROK Relations............................................................................................................................... 172 A2: Turn Opposition to Troops..................................................................................................................... 173 A2: Relations Resilient..................................................................................................................................... 174 A2: Regionalism Solves.................................................................................................................................... 175 A2: Korean AntiAmericanism.......................................................................................................................... 176 A2: Korean AntiAmericanism.......................................................................................................................... 177 A2: ROK Will Side With China......................................................................................................................... 178 2nc internal link nuclearization...................................................................................................................... 181 INTERNAL LINK/IMPACT....................................................................................................................... 181 INTERNAL LINK/IMPACT............................................................................................................................ 181 2nc prolif......................................................................................................................................................... 182 Relations...................................................................................................................................................... 183 iran prolif module............................................................................................................................................ 184 Disease module................................................................................................................................................ 186 Warming module............................................................................................................................................. 187 Solves heg....................................................................................................................................................... 189 econ module.................................................................................................................................................... 190 ext solves heg................................................................................................................................................. 192 2nc Laundry List Impacts................................................................................................................................. 193 ext laundry list............................................................................................................................................... 194 2nc Prolif Impact............................................................................................................................................. 195 2nc Middle East Prolif Impact.......................................................................................................................... 196 2nc Iran Impact............................................................................................................................................... 198 2nc Human Rights Impact............................................................................................................................... 200 Alliance Solves Energy Cooperation Ext........................................................................................................201 2nc Solves Free Trade...................................................................................................................................... 202 2nc Solves Chinese Aggression........................................................................................................................ 203 2nc Solves Deterrence & Stability ................................................................................................................... 204 2nc Solves Economy........................................................................................................................................ 205 Solves Democracy Promotion........................................................................................................................... 206 Solves North Korean Nuclearization................................................................................................................ 207 Solves Korean Stability.................................................................................................................................... 208 Solves ROK Tension With Neighbors................................................................................................................ 209 Solves War on Terrorism................................................................................................................................. 210 A2: North East Asian Prolif is Stable................................................................................................................ 211 Korea Neg Michigan Institutes `10 5/436 7 Week Juniors ROK Alliance Key to Unification....................................................................................................................... 212 ^^^deterrence....................................................................................................................................... 212 ^^^deterrence............................................................................................................................................. 212 2nc impact terrorism...................................................................................................................................... 213 Uniqueness OPCON Delay............................................................................................................................. 216 OPCON SPECIFIC................................................................................................................................... 216 OPCON SPECIFIC......................................................................................................................................... 216 Link OPCON Part of USFK............................................................................................................................. 217 OPCON Good Deterrence.............................................................................................................................. 218 OPCON Good Deterrence.............................................................................................................................. 219 OPCON Good Deterrence.............................................................................................................................. 220 OPCON Good Pressure DPRK........................................................................................................................ 221 OPCON Good ROK Military Collapse............................................................................................................. 222 OPCON Good Loose Nukes........................................................................................................................... 224 OPCON Good Loose Nukes........................................................................................................................... 225 A2: OPCON Transfer Good.............................................................................................................................. 226 A2: Planning Solves......................................................................................................................................... 227 A2: ROK Military Solves.................................................................................................................................. 228 A2: Bridging Solves......................................................................................................................................... 229 ***ROK ECON DA***................................................................................................................................. 229 ***ROK ECON DA***...................................................................................................................................... 229 investment 1nc sk econ................................................................................................................................... 230 investment 1nc u.s. econ................................................................................................................................ 231 2nc overview................................................................................................................................................... 232 solves china..................................................................................................................................................... 233 turns north korea............................................................................................................................................. 235 UNIQUENESS......................................................................................................................................... 235 UNIQUENESS............................................................................................................................................... 235 2nc econ fine................................................................................................................................................... 236 Uniqueness SK Economy Strong.................................................................................................................... 237 Uniqueness Investment Increasing................................................................................................................ 238 Uniqueness Investment Increasing................................................................................................................ 239 LINKS / Internal Links .......................................................................................................................... 239 LINKS / Internal Links ................................................................................................................................. 239 2nc Link Block............................................................................................................................................... 240 2nc Defense Spending Link.............................................................................................................................. 242 ext defense spending...................................................................................................................................... 243 2nc Defense Spending Link.............................................................................................................................. 244 links--defense spending.................................................................................................................................. 245 us key for defense spending............................................................................................................................. 246 Defense spending uniq..................................................................................................................................... 247 investor confidence.......................................................................................................................................... 248 Military Presence Key to Investor Confidence & Econ......................................................................................249 Withdrawal Causes Economic Instability..........................................................................................................250 Immediate Withdrawal Link............................................................................................................................ 251 Links................................................................................................................................................................ 252 Links................................................................................................................................................................ 253 A2: Link Turns / "X" Issue Hurting Investment Now........................................................................................254 Korea Neg Michigan Institutes `10 6/436 7 Week Juniors A2: Link Turns................................................................................................................................................. 255 a2: spending good--econ................................................................................................................................ 257 a2: spending good--influence......................................................................................................................... 259 a2: won't take the risk..................................................................................................................................... 261 ROK Economy Modeled................................................................................................................................... 262 IMPACTS................................................................................................................................................ 262 IMPACTS...................................................................................................................................................... 262 U.S. Economy Impact....................................................................................................................................... 263 Global Economy Impact .................................................................................................................................. 264 Low Oil Prices Impact...................................................................................................................................... 265 Alliance Impact................................................................................................................................................ 266 Democracy Impact........................................................................................................................................... 267 Democracy Impact........................................................................................................................................... 268 Chinese Democracy Impact.............................................................................................................................. 269 Chinese Democracy Impact.............................................................................................................................. 271 Chinese Democracy Impact.............................................................................................................................. 272 Chinese Democracy Impact.............................................................................................................................. 273 Chinese Democracy Impact.............................................................................................................................. 274 Impact Free Trade and Environment............................................................................................................. 275 Free trade solves nuclear war.........................................................................................................................276 Copley News Service, 99 (December 1) Teddy..............................................................................................276 Environmental destruction causes extinction..................................................................................................276 Coyne and Hoekstra, 07 *Professor in the Department of Ecology and Evolution at the University of Chicago AND ** Associate Professor in the Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology at Harvard University (*Jerry and *Hopi, "The Greatest Dying", The New Republic, September 24th 2007, June 26th 2010, http://www.truthout.org/article/jerry-coyne-and-hopi-e-hoekstra-the-greatestdying, KONTOPOULOS) ..........................................................................................................................................................................276 china influence impact..................................................................................................................................... 278 Layne and Thayer, 07 *Associate Professor at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and **Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota, Associate Professor in the Dept. of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University (*Christopher and **Bradley A., "American Empire: A Debate", Google Books, p. 75, 2007, June 25th 2010, KONTOPOULOS)............................................................................................................................................278 So what should the United States do about China? If the United States persists with its strategy of primacy, the odds of a Sino-American conflict are high. Current American strategy commits the United States to maintaining the geopolitical status quo in East Asia, a status quo that reflects American primacy. The United States' desire to preserve the status quo, however, clashes with the ambitions of a rising China. As a rising great power, China has its own ideas about how East Asia's political and security order should be organized. Unless U.S. and Chinese interests can be accommodated, the potential for future tension--or worse--exists. Moreover, as I already have demonstrated, the very fact of American primacy is bound to produce a geopolitical backlash--with China in the vanguard--in the form of counter-hegemonic balancing. Nevertheless, the United States cannot be completely indifferent to China's rise.........................................278 Extinction..........................................................................................................................................................278 Straits Times, 00 (Ching Cheong, Straits times, July 25 2000, l/n)................................................................278 A2: Regional Democracy High Now................................................................................................................. 279 Korea Neg Michigan Institutes `10 7/436 7 Week Juniors ***ROK PEACEKEEPING DISAD***........................................................................................................... 285 ***ROK PEACEKEEPING DISAD***................................................................................................................. 285 ROK Peacekeeping DA 1nc............................................................................................................................ 286 Peacekeeping Now........................................................................................................................................... 290 UNIQUENESS......................................................................................................................................... 290 UNIQUENESS............................................................................................................................................... 290 Peacekeeping/Modernization Now ................................................................................................................. 291 Piracy Decreasing............................................................................................................................................ 294 2nc Link Block................................................................................................................................................. 295 LINKS..................................................................................................................................................... 295 LINKS........................................................................................................................................................... 295 U.S. Key to ROK Piracy Solutions..................................................................................................................... 296 IMPACTS................................................................................................................................................ 296 IMPACTS...................................................................................................................................................... 296 African War Impact 2nc................................................................................................................................ 297 Global Economy Impact 2nc.......................................................................................................................... 298 Global Economy Impact 2nc.......................................................................................................................... 299 Middle East Stability Impact 2nc................................................................................................................... 300 ROK Forces Solve Piracy.................................................................................................................................. 302 Piracy Hurts Trade........................................................................................................................................... 303 Piracy Hurts Trade........................................................................................................................................... 304 Piracy Hurts Trade........................................................................................................................................... 305 ROK Soft Power Impact................................................................................................................................... 306 ***UNIFICATION DISAD***....................................................................................................................... 306 ***UNIFICATION DISAD***............................................................................................................................ 306 1NC biodviersity............................................................................................................................................. 308 Reunification Uniquness.................................................................................................................................. 312 Withdrawal Links............................................................................................................................................. 314 withdrawal links.............................................................................................................................................. 316 Peace Bad: Roads............................................................................................................................................ 318 Peace Bad: Empirical Examples....................................................................................................................... 320 Peace Bad: Empirical Examples....................................................................................................................... 322 Peace Bad: Empirical Examples....................................................................................................................... 324 Peace Bad/DMZ Key........................................................................................................................................ 325 Peace Bad/DMZ Key........................................................................................................................................ 327 DMZ Key Ecosystem........................................................................................................................................ 329 DMZ Key Ecosystem........................................................................................................................................ 331 DMZ Key Ecosystem........................................................................................................................................ 333 A2: Preservation Measures............................................................................................................................... 335 A2: Reunification Inevitable............................................................................................................................ 337 DMZ Key Ecosystem........................................................................................................................................ 339 ***CONDITION on DPRK Nuclear Freeze CP.............................................................................................339 ***CONDITION on DPRK Nuclear Freeze CP...................................................................................................339 CP Condition on Denuclearization 1nc.......................................................................................................340 2nc overview................................................................................................................................................... 342 2NC Perm do cp............................................................................................................................................... 343 2NC Perm do both........................................................................................................................................... 344 2NC multiple worlds perm............................................................................................................................... 346 Korea Neg Michigan Institutes `10 8/436 7 Week Juniors 2NC conditions cps good................................................................................................................................. 347 2NC at functional competition......................................................................................................................... 348 2NC at artificial competition............................................................................................................................ 349 2nc Say yes...................................................................................................................................................... 350 2nc Solvency ***............................................................................................................................................. 351 Solvency Extensions......................................................................................................................................... 353 2nc Solves Succession / Democracy................................................................................................................. 354 2nc Solves Regionalism................................................................................................................................... 355 Unconditional Guts Leverage / A2: perm ***...................................................................................................356 Withdrawal => Bargaining Chip 2nc........................................................................................................... 357 Withdrawal => Bargaining Chip 2nc........................................................................................................... 358 Withdrawal => Bargaining Chip..................................................................................................................... 359 Allies Relations NB Ext.................................................................................................................................... 360 A2: Plan Solves Net Benefit............................................................................................................................. 361 A2: NK Will Reject the Offer............................................................................................................................ 362 A2: NK Will Reject the Offer............................................................................................................................ 363 A2: NK Won't Make Concessions on Nuclear Program.....................................................................................364 A2: NK Won't Make Concessions on Nuclear Program.....................................................................................365 ***Condition on Chinese Cooperation CP.................................................................................................365 ***Condition on Chinese Cooperation CP........................................................................................................365 CP Condition on Chinese Coop 1nc............................................................................................................ 367 2nc Chinese Influence Bad NB ........................................................................................................................ 368 2nc Chinese Influence Bad NB ........................................................................................................................ 369 2nc Solvency................................................................................................................................................... 370 Withdrawal => Leverage for Coop ................................................................................................................. 372 Solvency Extensions......................................................................................................................................... 373 Solves Denuclearization................................................................................................................................... 374 solves WMD Prolif........................................................................................................................................... 376 China Will Do Soft Sanctions........................................................................................................................... 377 Chinese Coop Key to Solvency......................................................................................................................... 378 Chinese Coop Key to Solvency......................................................................................................................... 379 China Can Influence North Korea.................................................................................................................... 381 China Can Influence North Korea.................................................................................................................... 382 China Can Influence North Korea.................................................................................................................... 383 China Will Say Yes........................................................................................................................................... 384 China Will Say Yes........................................................................................................................................... 385 China Will Say Yes........................................................................................................................................... 386 China Will Say Yes........................................................................................................................................... 387 A2: Strong ChinaDPRK Relations Block Solvency............................................................................................388 Taiwan NB....................................................................................................................................................... 389 U.S.China War NB.......................................................................................................................................... 390 CP => U.S.China Cooperation....................................................................................................................... 392 CP => U.S.China Cooperation....................................................................................................................... 393 CP => U.S.China Cooperation....................................................................................................................... 394 U.S.China Relations Good Laundry List........................................................................................................395 U.S.China Cooperation solves prolif and terror...............................................................................................396 U.S.China Cooperation solves NPT, Taiwan, Chinese Economy.......................................................................397 U.S.China Cooperation solves Iran nuclearization...........................................................................................398 Consultation Solvency General...................................................................................................................... 399 ***Consultation CPS.................................................................................................................................. 399 Korea Neg Michigan Institutes `10 9/436 7 Week Juniors ***Consultation CPS........................................................................................................................................ 399 Consult ROK Solvency.................................................................................................................................. 401 Consult ROK Key to Alliance......................................................................................................................... 402 Consult ROK A2: Perm ***........................................................................................................................... 403 Consult Russia Solvency................................................................................................................................ 404 Consult Russia Solvency................................................................................................................................ 405 Consult Russia Say Yes.................................................................................................................................. 406 1nc Solvency................................................................................................................................................... 407 ***Ban Military Exercises CP..................................................................................................................... 407 ***Ban Military Exercises CP........................................................................................................................... 407 2nc Solvency................................................................................................................................................... 408 2nc Threat to Restart Exercises => Empirical Bargaining Chip.......................................................................409 2nc Solves Tension / Prolif.............................................................................................................................. 410 Military Exercises Undermine Nonprolif Efforts...............................................................................................411 Military Excercises Bad 2nc Laundry List.......................................................................................................412 Military Exercises Bad DOD Budget.............................................................................................................. 413 Military Exercises => Korea War.................................................................................................................... 414 Military Exercises => China/Korea War..........................................................................................................415 Military Exercises => SK Anti Americanism....................................................................................................416 Military Exercises Will Provoke China.............................................................................................................. 417 A2: NK Won't Lashout at Exercises.................................................................................................................. 418 A2: Exercises key to Readiness......................................................................................................................... 419 Exercises Happening Now................................................................................................................................ 420 CP Restructuring........................................................................................................................................... 421 ***Other CPS............................................................................................................................................. 421 ***Other CPS.................................................................................................................................................. 421 CP restructure army (CFC)............................................................................................................................ 423 CFC CP--Solves North Korea .......................................................................................................................... 425 CFC CP--Maintains Deterrence / North Korea DA Link...................................................................................426 CFC CP--A2 UN Controls .............................................................................................................................. 427 CFC CP--Unpopular ....................................................................................................................................... 428 Condition C/P and Politics Link....................................................................................................................... 430 CP Remove Permanent Troop Stationing......................................................................................................432 CP Gradual Withdrawal 1nc....................................................................................................................... 433 CP Condition on End to Ballistic Missile PROGRAM......................................................................................434 Withdrawal Spec Multiple Ways to Reduce U.S. Presence.............................................................................435 ***REDUCE / Withdrawal Specification....................................................................................................435 ***REDUCE / Withdrawal Specification.......................................................................................................... 435 Korea Neg 10/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors 1NC KOREAN CONFLICT No conflict a. The north is too weak Sydney Morning Herald, 10 (5/29/10, "North Korean war unlikely, say analysts", http://www.lexisnexis.com) "China refuses scheming against NK with the US," read the front page banner headline. Patrick Morgan, a leading strategic analyst at the University of California, writes that the North has succeeded in looking "like Mighty Mouse" because its nuclear deterrence has not been tested by highly motivated potential attackers. "Why not? Because a collapse of the North seems at least as dangerous, and much more likely, than its use of nuclear weapons," Morgan says. The good news, however, is that the North's estimated eight nuclear missiles, of questionable functionality, are not nearly enough to embolden the North to deliberately outright military risk confrontation . "Pyongyang has never displayed intense dedication to anything except survival; it will not initiate a war to die for its principles," Morgan says. Peter Hayes, at the Nautilus Institute, recalls being in North Korea in 1998, when the country was also on a war footing. "The whole country just went berserk. It was like throwing petrol on an ant hill," he said. "Presumably [the war ritual] is a positive for the regime, or they wouldn't do it." b. would hurt the regime Reuters, 10 (3/17/10, Jon Herskovitz, "North Korea may turn more menacing but options limited," http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE62G12T20100317, JMP) ***Note B.R. Myers is an expert on the North's ideology at Dongseo University CHINA TO THE RESCUE? While the parlous state of his economy may give Kim the incentive to rally support with some military muscle flexing, it also limits his options , if he wants to avoid even more punishing U.N. sanctions and a U.S. Treasury crackdown on his finances . "The North Korean regime cannot risk any further destruction of the economy at this point," Myers said. China, the North's only major benefactor, offers Kim one of his few ways out. Beijing fears a collapse of his government would bring chaos to its border has blocked any global economic push and that would significantly destabilize Pyongyang It has also supplied food, oil and money to keep his government afloat. . China appears to want to augment social stability along its three provinces that border North Korea by increasing investment with the state, according to John Park, an expert on the region with the United States Institute of Peace. "China is helping facilitate localized development needs to boost its broader geopolitical needs," Park said. That relationship may help to temper any provocations by Kim who does not want to put China in the position of having to fend off global criticism for propping up Pyongyang. c. Intelligence proves Hosenball 10--Newsweek investigative correspondent (Mark, U.S. Intel Official: North Korea Is Bluffing, 26 May 2010, http://www.newsweek.com/blogs/declassified/2010/05/26/usintelligenceseesscantevidencethatnorthkoreaispreparingforwar.html, AMiles) Despite all the recent huffing and puffing from Pyongyang, U.S. officials say they've physical evidence that seen little North Korea might actually be preparing to go to war. Just hours after Seoul blamed the North for the March 26 sinking of the South Korean naval vessel Cheonan, North Korean leader Kim Jongil publicly ordered his armed forces to get ready for military action, according to sources quoted in The Guardian. But two U.S. national security officials, asking for anonymity when discussing sensitive information, Declassified tell they're not aware of any intelligence reporting on significant military mobilization or redeployments inside North Korea. The North Korean military is always on the move somewhere, one of the officials said, but at the moment whatever movements being noted by Western intelligence agencies regarded as particularly threatening. A third are are not U.S. foreign policy official, who also asked for anonymity, told Declassified that U.S. agencies are picking up "nothing of extreme concern" in what North Korean forces are currently up to. Pyongyang could still launch some form of surprise military action if it really wanted to. For one thing, South Korea's capital and largest city, Seoul, is only 30 miles south of the Demilitarized Zone, within easy artillery range. The North Koreans keep their forward artillery batteries stocked with enough ammunition to do serious damage, one of the officials points out. But there are no indications that the North is preparing to embark on any such adventure , which would almost certainly risk a wider conflict. There's also the possibility that Pyongyang might try to intimidate its neighbors by setting off another missile or nuclear test. And although the North might be able for the most part to conceal preparations for an underground nuclear explosion, Korea Neg Michigan Institutes `10 11/436 7 Week Juniors the West's detection equipment would probably pick up signs that the North was planning a major new missile test , and according to one of the officials, no such preparations appear to be under way. No escalation a. empirical Strobel and Landay, 10 Foreign affairs correspondent, reporter (Warren and Jonathan, 5/25/10, Yahoo News, "Will North Korea's saber rattling lead to war?" http://news.yahoo.com/s/mcclatchy/20100525/wl_mcclatchy/3516222) " It's not inevitable that it will escalate ," said Mitchell Reiss , who negotiated with North Korea during the Clinton administration. Reiss said no war erupted after earlier North Korean acts that were more provocative than the sinking of the Cheonan was. Those included a 1983 bombing linked to North Korea that killed South Korean cabinet members who were visiting Burma and a 1968 commando raid on the South Korean presidential residence , the Blue House. Lee also "didn't shoot all of his bullets, and he left some incentives on the table for the North Koreans to behave better in the future," Reiss said, pointing to Lee's decision not to pull out of a joint industrial park in the northern border town of Kaesong. b. South doesn't want to freak out investors South Korea won't retaliate doesn't want to freak out investors Kim, 6/16 (6/16/10, Jack, Reuters, "Q+A How serious is the Korean crisis and risk of war?" http://in.reuters.com/article/idINIndia49340820100616, JMP) SEOUL (Reuters) North Korea has repeated its threat to take military action if the U.N. Security Council punishes it for what it says is a fabricated accusation by South Korea that it attacked and sank a navy ship, killing 46 sailors. The sinking of the South Korean corvette Cheonan in March was the deadliest incident between the rival Koreas in decades. Following are some questions about how serious the crisis is, whether it could escalate to an armed confrontation and how the North could react to the outcome of debate at the U.N. WILL THERE BE WAR? Many analysts doubt there will be war, as long as South Korea holds its fire. North Korea's obsolete conventional armed forces and military equipment mean quick and certain defeat if it wages fullscale war and Pyongyang is well aware of its limits. South Korea has made it clear it will not retaliate despite investigations that found a torpedo fired by a North Korean submarine sank the corvette Cheonan in March. It knows the investment community will take fright if it does attack President Lee Myungbak's government has taken the case to the Security Council, rather . than take the law into its own hands. IS EVERYTHING SAFE AND SOUND? No. As the level of rhetoric rises, there is always a risk of skirmishes which could in turn develop into wider conflict. Lee raised the stakes by saying in a national address the South would exercise its right to defend itself if the North provoked it again. North Korea has said much the same. Both have carefully avoided sounding like the aggressor, promising to fight only if the other strikes first. But South Korea said it would resume loudspeaker broadcasts against the North at their armed border. Pyongyang says it will shoot at the equipment. South Korea's defence minister has repeatedly said it would defend itself if the North begins shooting by quickly returning fire with overwhelming intensity. Another risk could be the buildup of U.S. military forces on the peninsula that will be seen by the North as a sign of imminent invasion, something that leaders in Pyongyang are said to be genuinely afraid of. The United States, which has about 28,000 troops stationed on the peninsula, threw its full support behind South Korea but said it was working hard to stop the escalation getting out of hand. WHAT WILL THE SECURITY COUNCIL DO? South Korea, not a member of the Security Council, and the United States, its key ally who is a permanent member, want the strongest action taken against the North that hits where it will hurt the destitute state's leaders. But China, another permanent member and the North's major backer, will likely veto a resolution, possibly on grounds that the ship incident, unlike Pyongyang's nuclear tests, is a localised issue that is better addressed by the two rivals and not by the international community. The alternative is a strongly worded statement by the Security Council that condemns the North's actions and calls for its pledge not to repeat provocative actions. Such a statement will be nonbinding and will not involve prescriptions for sanctions such as a trade embargo. As the North's chief U.N. representative said on Tuesday, Pyongyang is also likely to protest against such a statement. WHAT ARE THE RISKS TO INVESTORS? Market players have tended to think that confrontation between the two Koreas will not escalate into armed conflict because they believe Seoul will not risk the damage to its own economy and its powerful neighbours in North Asia, who together account for about a sixth of the world's economic output. In South Korea, even a nuclear test does little to rattle financial markets, as market players are more concerned with direct armed confrontation and have become largely inured to the North's rhetoric. But the latest report of Kim Jongil calling for war readiness has unnerved financial markets. Some analysts say historic trends suggest any market losses will remain brief, as long as the two Koreas stop short of allout war . Turn presence prevents North invasion of South Huessy, 03 Senior Defense Associate at National Defense University Foundation who specializes in nuclear weapons, missile defense, terrorism and rogue states (8/13/2003, Peter, "Realism on the Korean Peninsula: Real Threats, Real Dangers," http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=18560, JMP) However, Carpenter has long advocated a unilateral withdrawal of our U.S. forces from the Republic of Korea, under the guise of arguing that such a reduction of U.S. forces would save taxpayer dollars, as well as U.S. lives, should there be an armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula. In fact, Carpenter, in conversations I have had with him, readily agrees that a U.S. withdrawal from the Korean Peninsula might very well precipitate an invasion by the communists in the North with the aim of quickly capturing Seoul and then suing for peace in an agreement that would eventually give control over a unified country to the communists. Apart from the fact that U.S. forces withdrawn from the ROK would be redeployed elsewhere in the U.S. and thus save the U.S. taxpayers nothing and given that U.S. military forces deployed overseas and at home have declined by over 1 million soldiers since the end of the Cold War, withdrawa a l from the ROK by the United States would do nothing except cause another Korean Wa r, kill millions of Korean civilians Korea Neg Michigan Institutes `10 12/436 7 Week Juniors and soldiers and place in danger the ability of Japan to maintain its economy in the face of a Korean Peninsula in communist hands. As every Commander of U.S. forces in Korea since 1979 has told Congress in public testimony, Japan is not defensible if Korea is taken by the communists. A blockade of trade routes to and from Japan would become a realistic weapon in the hands of the PRC, not dissimilar to a blockade of Taiwan by the PRC portrayed by Patrick Robinson in Kilo Class. Korea Neg 13/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors 1NC A2 BIOWEAP Bioweapons won't cause extinction O'Neill 4 O'Neill 8/19/2004 [Brendan, "Weapons of Minimum Destruction" http://www.spikedonline.com/Articles/0000000CA694.htm] Rapoport, professor of political science at University of California, Los Angeles and editor of the Journal of Terrorism and Political Violence, has examined what he calls evidence' relating to the historic use of chemical and biological weapons. He found something surprising such weapons do not cause mass destruction. Indeed, whether used by states, terror groups or dispersed in industrial accidents, they tend to be less far destructive than conventional weapons 'If we stopped speculating . about things that might happen in the future and looked instead at what has happened in the past, we'd see that our fears about WMD are misplaced', he says. Yet David C 'easily available such fears remain widespread. Post9/11, American and British leaders have issued dire warnings about terrorists getting hold of WMD and causing mass murder and mayhem. President George W Bush has spoken of terrorists who, 'if they ever gained weapons of mass destruction', would 'kill hundreds of thousands, without hesitation and without mercy' (1). The British government has spent 28million on stockpiling millions of smallpox vaccines, even though there's no evidence that terrorists have got access to smallpox, which was eradicated as a natural disease in the 1970s and now exists only in two highsecurity labs in America and Russia (2). In 2002, British nurses became the first in the world to get training in how to deal with the victims of bioterrorism (3). The UK Home Office's 22page pamphlet on how to survive a terror attack, published last month, included tips on what to do in the event of a 'chemical, biological or radiological attack' ('Move away from the immediate source of danger', it usefully advised). Spinechilling books such as Plague Wars: A True Story of Biological Warfare, The New Face of Terrorism: Threats From Weapons of Mass Destruction and The Survival Guide: What to Do in a Biological, Chemical or Nuclear Emergency speculate over what kind of horrors WMD might wreak. TV docudramas, meanwhile, explore how Britain might cope with a smallpox assault and what would happen if London were 'dirty nuked' (4). The term 'weapons of mass destruction' refers to three types of weapons: nuclear, chemical and biological. A chemical weapon is any weapon that uses a manufactured chemical, such as sarin, mustard gas or hydrogen cyanide, to kill or injure. A biological weapon uses bacteria or viruses, such as smallpox or anthrax, to cause destruction inducing sickness and disease as a means of undermining enemy forces or inflicting civilian casualties. We find such weapons repulsive, because of the horrible way in which the victims convulse and die but they appear to be less 'destructive' than conventional weapons. 'We know that nukes are massively destructive, there is a lot of evidence for that', says Rapoport. But when it comes to chemical and biological weapons, 'the evidence suggests that we should call them "weapons of minimum destruction not mass destruction', he says. Chemical weapons have most commonly been used by states, in military warfare. Rapoport explored various state uses of chemicals over the past hundred years: both ", sides used them in the First World War; Italy deployed chemicals against the Ethiopians in the 1930s; the Japanese used chemicals against the Chinese in the 1930s and again in the Second World War; Egypt and Libya used them in the Yemen and Chad in the postwar period; most recently, Saddam Hussein's Iraq used chemical weapons, first in the war against Iran (19801988) and then against its own Kurdish population at the tailend of the IranIraq war. In each instance, says Rapoport, chemical weapons were used more in desperation than from a position of strength or a desire to cause mass destruction. 'The evidence is that states rarely use them even when they have them', he has written. 'Only when a military stalemate has developed, which belligerents who have become desperate want to break, are they used.' (5) As to whether such use of chemicals was effective, Rapoport says that at best it blunted an offensive but this very rarely, if ever, translated into a decisive strategic shift in the war, because the original stalemate continued after the chemical weapons had been deployed. He points to the example of Iraq. The Baathists used chemicals against Iran when that nasty trenchfought war had reached yet another stalemate. As Efraim Karsh argues in his paper 'The IranIraq War: A Military Analysis': 'Iraq employed [chemical weapons] only in vital segments of the front and only when it saw no other way to check Iranian offensives. Chemical weapons had a negligible impact on the war, limited to tactical rather than strategic [effects].' (6) According to Rapoport, this 'negligible' impact of chemical weapons on the direction of a war is reflected in the disparity between the numbers of casualties caused by chemicals and the numbers caused by conventional weapons. It is estimated that the use of gas in the IranIraq war killed 5,000 but the Iranian side suffered around 600,000 dead in total, meaning that gas killed less than one per cent. The deadliest use of gas occurred in the First World War but, as Rapoport points out, it still only accounted for five per cent of casualties. Studying the amount of gas used by both sides from19141918 relative to the number of fatalities gas caused, Rapoport has written: 'It took a ton of gas in that war to achieve a single enemy fatality. Wind and sun regularly dissipated the lethality of the gases. Furthermore, those gassed were 10 to 12 times as likely to recover than those casualties produced by traditional weapons.' (7) Indeed, Rapoport discovered that some earlier documenters of the First World War had a vastly different assessment of chemical weapons than we have today they considered the use of such weapons to be preferable to bombs and guns, because chemicals caused fewer fatalities. One wrote: 'Instead of being the most horrible form of warfare, it is the most humane, because it disables far more than it kills, ie, it has a low fatality ratio.' (8) 'Imagine that', says Rapoport, 'WMD being referred to as more humane'. He says that the contrast between such assessments and today's fears shows that actually looking at the evidence has benefits, allowing 'you to see things more rationally'. According to Rapoport, even Saddam's use of gas against the Kurds of Halabja in 1988 the most recent use by a state of chemical weapons and the most commonly cited as evidence of the dangers of 'rogue states' getting their hands on WMD does not show that unconventional weapons are more destructive than conventional ones. Of course the attack on Halabja was horrific, but he points out that the circumstances surrounding the assault remain unclear. 'The estimates of how many were killed vary greatly', he tells me. 'Some say 400, others say 5,000, others say more than 5,000. The fighter planes that attacked the civilians used conventional as well as unconventional weapons; I have seen no study which explores how many were killed by chemicals and how many were killed by firepower. We all find these attacks repulsive, but the death toll may actually have been greater if conventional bombs only were used. We know that conventional weapons can be more destructive.' Rapoport says that terrorist use chemical and of biological weapons is similar to state use in that it is rare and , in terms of causing mass destruction, very not effective. He cites the work of journalist and author John Parachini, who says that over the past 25 years only significant four attempts by terrorists to use WMD have been recorded. The most effective WMDattack by a nonstate group, from a military perspective, was carried out by the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka in 1990. They used chlorine gas against Sri Lankan soldiers guarding a fort, injuring over 60 soldiers but killing none. The Tamil Tigers' use of chemicals angered their support base, when some of the chlorine drifted back into Tamil territory confirming Rapoport's view that one problem with using unpredictable and unwieldy chemical and biological weapons over conventional weapons is that the cost can be as great 'to the attacker as to the attacked'. The Tigers have not used WMD since. Korea Neg 14/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors 1NC A2 STRIKES There's zero internal link to this advantage they have no evidence that assumes Obama Bandow is citing someone from the Bush administration if Bush didn't strike there's no chance that Obama will They also have no evidence that says withdrawing troops solves we are more likely to strike if our troops aren't there because they aren't in danger Korea Neg 15/436 Obama won't retaliate he knows the costs Crowley, Senior Editor the New Republic, 10 [Michael, January, "Obama and Nuclear Deterrence", http://www.tnr.com/node/72263] Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors 1NC A2 RETAL/TABOO Los Angeles Times The ran an important story yesterday about the Obama administration's Nuclear Posture Review, which evaluates U.S. policy towards the use of nuclear weapons. Apparently there's a debate inside the administrationone that is splitting the civilians from the generalsnot just about the size of our nuclear stockpile but also how we conceive of possible firststrike and retaliatory policies. A core issue under debate, officials said, is whether the United States should shed its longstanding ambiguity about whether it would use nuclear weapons in certain circumstances, in hopes that greater specificity would give foreign governments more confidence to make their own decisions on nuclear arms. Some in the U.S. argue that the administration should assure foreign governments that it won't use nuclear weapons in reaction to a biological, chemical or conventional attack, but only in a nuclear exchange. Others argue that the United States should promise that it would never use nuclear weapons first, but only in response to a nuclear attack. As the story notes, some experts don't place much weight on how our publiclystated doctrine emerges because they don't expect foreign nations to take it literally. And the reality is that any decisions about using nukes will certainly be caseby case. But I'd still like to see some wider discussion of the underlying questions, which are among the most consequential that policymakers can consider. The questions are particularly vexing when it comes to terrorist groups and rogue states. Would we, for instance, actually nuke Pyongyang if it sold a weapon to terrorists who used it in America? That implied threat seems to exist, but I actually doubt a President Obamaor any president, for that matterwould go through with it. that The U.S. will not retaliate with nuclear weapons--it makes no sense SPRING 2001 (Baker, Research Fellow at Heritage Foundation, Heritage Backgrounder 1477, Sept 20, http://www.heritage.org/Research/MissileDefense/BG1477.cfm) Nuclear retaliation is not appropriate for every kind of attack against America. Some opponents of missile defense believe that the United States has an effective nuclear deterrent that, if necessary, could be used to respond to attacks on the homeland. But no responsible U.S. official is suggesting that the United States consider the use of nuclear weapons in response to the horrific September 11 attacks. In most cases of attack on the U nited tates, S the nuclear option would not be appropriate, but a defense response will almost always be appropriate. The United States needs to be able to resort to defensive options. Korea Neg 16/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors No chance of Korean conflictNorth Korea is simply too weak it has acknowledged it cannot take on the north so it is not willing to start a war that it knows it cannot win that's Sydney Morning Herald `10 North korea has set limits empirically proven Paal, 10 vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (6/3/10, Douglas H., "The Cheonan Attack," http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=23472, JMP) 2NC NO CONFLICT One thing we have observed about Kim Jongil and the North Koreans: they do not let defeats go unanswered. After the loss of the North Korean ship, the commander of its component, known as Unit 586, General Kim Myungguk, was demoted to threestar rank. But on April 25 this year, a month after the torpedo sank the South's Cheonan, Kim received his fourth star again, personally from the Dear Leader. This strongly suggests both a desire for vengeance and a need for the North's leader to maintain his close connection to the armed forces. We have to assume that the North's commanders believed they could pull this operation off without being clearly implicated, even though they would be widely suspected to be responsible. After all, would not the torpedo destroy itself and the evidence would sink to the bottom of the sea? This was intended to reduce the chances that the North would be forced to pay a price directly. And it would give voice to dissidents in the South to criticize and oppose the new Lee Myungbak government, a consistent goal of the North. Now, North Korea and its friends have been surprised by the clear evidence that it was guilty of launching the attack. The quality and integrity of the evidence assembled by the South and its international advisors have thrown Pyongyang (and Beijing) on the defensive. Both North and South have begun the process of sanctioning and threatening each other, though with discernible limits which signal intent to avoid outright conflict. Additionally, the war would only hurt the regimeby causing economic sanctions to spring up against North Korea from the United Nations their reasons why Kim Jung Ill is power hungry is a reason why conflict is not a possibility that's Reuters 10 KJI won't start the suicidal war Reuters, 10 (3/17/10, Jon Herskovitz, "North Korea may turn more menacing but options limited," http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE62G12T20100317, JMP) SEOUL (Reuters) Policy blunders and an economic crunch have put North Korean leader Kim Jongil into one of the riskiest periods of his iron rule, which could make him turn even more aggressive in his dealings with the outside world. But even if he chooses to resort once again to scare tactics to try to boost his bargaining power, he lacks a game changing ace to play that would seriously rattle the international community or spook markets long used to his grandstanding. Unless he is prepared to sail dangerously close to provoking a suicidal war and most experts firmly believe he is not then the most he can do is demonstrate incremental advances in the destructive capability of his armory or boost weapons sales to other countries at odds with the United States. He is quite capable of provoking annoyance and concern, analysts say, but much le ss able to generate the kind of alarm that would cause a serious reassessment of the risks facing governments and financial markets in a region that includes the powerful economies of China, Japan and South Korea. In fact, a signal of reconciliation may be his first step by ending a more than yearlong boycott of international nuclear The status quo disproves the advantage Hosenball 10 indicate that U.S. intelligence has picked up zero intel that the north is preparing for a war of any kind Korea Neg 17/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors Even if more provocations are coming from the North the South will continue to respond diplomatically, this is true for two reasons a. empirics the North bombed cabinet members of the south and had a raid on what is their white house and escalation never occurred b. economics retaliation will not happen because it would devastate the southern economy means provocations never escalate that's Kuwait times `10 <> No escalation Paal, 10 vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (6/3/10, Douglas H., "The Cheonan Attack," http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=23472, JMP) 2NC NO ESCALATION One thing we have observed about Kim Jongil and the North Koreans: they do not let defeats go unanswered. After the loss of the North Korean ship, the commander of its component, known as Unit 586, General Kim Myungguk, was demoted to threestar rank. But on April 25 this year, a month after the torpedo sank the South's Cheonan, Kim received his fourth star again, personally from the Dear Leader. This strongly suggests both a desire for vengeance and a need for the North's leader to maintain his close connection to the armed forces. We have to assume that the North's commanders believed they could pull this operation off without being clearly implicated, even though they would be widely suspected to be responsible. After all, would not the torpedo destroy itself and the evidence would sink to the bottom of the sea? This was intended to reduce the chances that the North would be forced to pay a price directly. And it would give voice to dissidents in the South to criticize and oppose the new Lee Myungbak government, a consistent goal of the North. Now, North Korea and its friends have been surprised by the clear evidence that it was guilty of launching the attack The quality and integrity of the evidence assembled by the South and its international advisors have thrown Pyongyang (and Beijing) on the defensive. Both . North and South have begun the process of sanctioning and threatening each other, though with discernible limits which signal intent to avoid outright conflict. Korea Neg 18/436 No risk of a bioweapons impact multiple reasons Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors 2NC BIOWEAPONS a. Empirics oneil 4 cites a study of the most successful biological attacks in history even after millions of dollars in funding the Tamil tigers were able to kill zero people b. dispersion fo them is impossible Newhouse, CDI Senior Fellow, 2 senior fellow at the Center for Defense Information. Former senior policy advisor on European Affairs to secretary of state. Former director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. (John, World Policy Journal 7/31 V.XIX; N.2 p. 21) Temperature, sunlight, wind, and moisture can all prevent effective delivery of chemical weapons. Biological pathogens are living organisms and more thus fragile than chemical agents. Chlorine in water the supply can kill them Munitions . can as easily vaporize an agent as dispense one. If released from a bomb or warhead, explosive effects would destroy all but 12 percent of the agent. 31 c. preventative measures prevent extinction Space.com 1 (10/30, Survival of the Elitist: Bioterrorism May Spur Space Colonies, http://www.space.com/scienceastronomy/generalscience/colonize_now_0110302.html, AG) Croddy is an expert on chemical and biological weapons at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. Croddy said the threat of a virus wiping out the entire human species is simply not real. Even the most horrific virus outbreak in history, the 1918 Spanish Flu epidemic that killed between 20 million and 40 million people, including hundreds of thousands in the United States, eventually stopped Experts say new strains of the influenza virus emerge every few decades and catch the . human immune system unprepared, but prevention measures and everevolving medical treatments overcome the outbreaks "I'd . be much more concerned about an asteroid hitting the planet," Croddy said. Many scientists argue that there is no need to worry about the mortality of civilization right now. Eric Korea Neg 19/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors Troops in North Korea solves South Korean invasion Side with empirics the North has been deterred from actual confrontation for decades because of U.S. presence, only a risk that U.S. troop reduction changes that. Even liberals that they are citing like Carpenter are on our side that's Huessey 03 Troop presence are the last deterrence from invasion Huessy, 03 Senior Defense Associate at National Defense University Foundation who specializes in nuclear weapons, missile defense, terrorism and 2NC TURN PRESENCE SOLVES NORTH KOREA rogue states (8/13/2003, Peter, "Realism on the Korean Peninsula: Real Threats, Real Dangers," http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=18560, JMP) It may be wishful thinking, but I believe China has the ability to help shape the future in the region in a positive way. For the U.S. to withdraw from the ROK, as proposed by Carpenter, might very well initiate not only another Korean War but also possibly another World War When I lived in Seoul and attended Yonsei University in 196970, my Korean father and Yonsei professor, Hahm Pyong . Choon, later to become Ambassador to the United States and national security adviser to the President of the Republic of Korea, told me there were always those who sought to purchase liberty and freedom on the cheap. At an embassy reception in Washington, he reminded me what he had told me in class: "Those on the left think you are imperialists; those on the right do not want to spend the money". In 1985, the communists planted bombs in Burma where the ROK cabinet was meeting. Professor Hahm was killed by the very same North Korean communists whom wish to see the withdrawal of American forces from the region. To save a few dollars, however unintentionally, we might end up the North Korean army in downtown Seoul. Certainly, armed with nuclear weapons, the North will be difficult at best to deter from such an attack To the people of the Republic of Korea: America will not leave, we will not run, we . will not forget the extraordinary sacrifices we both have made to secure the freedom of your country and ours. This is the basis for the Bush Administration's strategy, and with that sufficient reason it should be supported. Korea Neg 20/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors A2: KOREAN WAR LOW RISK Low probability Russia & CIS Military Weekly, 10 (5/21/10, "Pyongyang can't wage war on South Korea Margelov", http://www.lexisnexis.com) The threats of war coming from North Korea are not serious, Chairman of the Federation Council International Affairs Committee Mikhail Margelov told Interfax. South Korea declared that North Korea sunk its warship in March, and North Korea "threatened a war involving all types of armed forces," Margelov said. The world should offer a diplomatic reaction, because no one needs a new Korean war, he said. "Certainly, the probability of a war between North and South Korea is very small. If North Korean communists wage that war, that would be their last battle because the combat ability of the [North Korean] armed forces is doubtful and economic resources are zero," he said. Thus, Russia has taken "an absolutely reserved and careful position. It has opposed the escalation of tensions and called for a strategic approach to the future of the Korean Peninsula, where people and countries have existed for over 1,000 years," Margelov said. Korea Neg 21/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors A2: KOREAN WAR NO ESCALATION Won't escalate to full scale conflict Paal, 10 vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (6/3/10, Douglas H., "The Cheonan Attack," http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=23472, JMP) One thing we have observed about Kim Jongil and the North Koreans: they do not let defeats go unanswered. After the loss of the North Korean ship, the commander of its component, known as Unit 586, General Kim Myungguk, was demoted to threestar rank. But on April 25 this year, a month after the torpedo sank the South's Cheonan, Kim received his fourth star again, personally from the Dear Leader. This strongly suggests both a desire for vengeance and a need for the North's leader to maintain his close connection to the armed forces. We have to assume that the North's commanders believed they could pull this operation off without being clearly implicated, even though they would be widely suspected to be responsible. After all, would not the torpedo destroy itself and the evidence would sink to the bottom of the sea? This was intended to reduce the chances that the North would be forced to pay a price directly. And it would give voice to dissidents in the South to criticize and oppose the new Lee Myungbak government, a consistent goal of the North. Now, North Korea and its friends have been surprised by the clear evidence that it was guilty of launching the attack. The quality and integrity of the evidence assembled by the South and its international advisors have thrown Pyongyang (and Beijing) on the defensive. Both North and South have begun the process of sanctioning and threatening each other, though with discernible limits which signal intent to avoid outright conflict. No Korean war both sides won't risk escalation out of self interest Kang & Cha, 03 *associate professor of Business at Dartmouth, AND **associate professor of government Georgetown's school of Foreign Service (May/June 2003, David C. Kang, Victor D. Cha, Foreign Policy, "Think Again: The Korea Crisis," http://www.ituassu.com.br/asia_fp1.pdf, JMP) "The DMZ Is the Scariest Place in the World" Yes, if looks could kill. When former U.S. President Bill Clinton called the border between the two Koreas the world's scariest place, he was referring to the massive forward deployment of North Korean forces around the DMZ and the shaky foundations of the 50yearold armistice--not peace treaty--that still keeps the peace between the two former combatants. Since the end of the Korean War in 1953, there have been more than 1,400 incidents across the DMZ, resulting in the deaths of 899 North Koreans, 394 South Koreans, and 90 U.S. soldiers. Tensions have been so high tha tin 1976 the United States mobilized bombers and an aircraft carrier battle group to trim one tree in the DMZ. The deployments and operational battle plans on both sides suggest that if a major outbreak of violence were to start, a rapid escalation of hostilities would likely ensue. In practice, however, no such outbreak has occurred. North Korea has faced both a determined South Korean military, and more important, U.S. military deployments that at their height comprised 100,000 troops and nucleartipped Lance missiles and even today include 37,000 troops, nuclearcapable airbases, and naval facilities that guarantee U.S. involvement in any Korean conflict. The balance of power has held because any war would have disastrous consequences for both sides. Seoul and Pyongyang are less than 150 miles apart--closer than New York is to Washington, D.C. Seoul is 30 miles from the DMZ and easily within reach of North Korea's artillery tubes. Former Commander of U.S. Forces Korea Gen. Gary Luck estimated that a war on the Korean peninsula would cost $1 trillion in economic damage and result in 1 million casualties, including 52,000 U.S. military casualties. As one war gamer described, the death toll on the North Korean side would be akin to a "holocaust," and Kim Jong Il and his 1,000 closest generals would surely face death or imprisonment. As a result, both sides have moved cautiously and avoided major military mobilizations that could spiral out of control. Ironically enough, as for the DMZ itself, although bristling with barbed wire and sown with land mines, it has also become a remarkable nature preserve stretching across the peninsula that is home to wild birds and a trove of other rare species. Korea Neg 22/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors A2: KOREAN WAR NO NORTH PROVOCATIONS No more provocations coming GSN, 6/4 (6/4/10, Global Security Newswire, "War Possible at Any Time, North Korea Says," http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20100604_1842.php, JMP) U.S. Pacific Command head Adm. Robert Willard said today there are no indications that the North is readying that to carry out a third nuclear test or is repositioning its armed forces closer to South Korea. "Right now we're not seeing indications that North Korea is intending the next provocation Willard said. ," "But I think everyone in the region is watching North Korea very closely given their unpredictability," he said while in Singapore for the security conference (Adam Entous, Reuters I, June 4). Korea Neg 23/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors A2: KOREAN WAR NO NORTH INVASION No invasion U.S. can still mount a counter attack and North Korea knows it would destroy its regime Henriksen 3 Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution (Thomas H., "Time to Leave South Korea", Hoover Policy Review, 2003, http://www.hoover.org/publications/digest/3057531.html) Obviously, there are risks. A sudden transformation could cause instability in Asia. North Korea could interpret American withdrawal as a lack of resolve. But this seems unlikely given that an attack across the DMZ, with or without our small Maginotline force, would be seen as an act of war by Washington, triggering a counterattack and imperiling the Pyongyang regime itself. In one sense, the absence of a U.S. force on the DMZ would make a massive U.S. retaliation easier; otherwise American troops would no doubt be overrun by the world's fifth largest army and face the danger of errant friendly fire. The North is deterred from attacking because it knows it would lose Gilbert, 04 Lieutenant Colonel in U.S. Army (5/3/04, David, "Korea 50 Years Later: Why Are We Still There?" http://www.dtic.mil/cgi bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA424189&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf, JMP) North Korea does however, possess a conventional military that is fully capable of launching an attack against South Korea. Even if North Korea does not use or sell a nuclear device it can still threaten the stability of the region with these conventional forces. Based on an intelligence estimate, this conventional first strike capability would most likely result in initial success as Seoul would be temporarily overrun or by passed. However, the logistical constraints of war would preclude the North Korean Armies from continuing the attack. Meanwhile the Combined Forces Command/United Nations Command operating under United States lead would launch a successful counterattack that would liberate Seoul and continue to drive north. This scenario, or one very similar, is the most likely course of events. The North realizes it would not win and that is probably the primary reason it remains north of the DMZ and continues to arm itself against an attack. Because it can no longer count on China or Russia to provide the nuclear umbrella, North Korea must become selfreliant. China, which continues to reach out to the world as they experiment with capitalist economics, becoming South Korea's largest importer in 2003, is keenly interested in resolving this crisis, but not on the side of North Korea. Russia also continues to distance itself from North Korea; supporting the United States on economic issues and military intervention.17 Korea Neg 24/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors A2: KOREAN WAR NO NORTH INVASION Kim Jongil is rational he won't start a war because he knows it would destroy the North Gilbert, 04 Lieutenant Colonel in U.S. Army (5/3/04, David, "Korea 50 Years Later: Why Are We Still There?" http://www.dtic.mil/cgi bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA424189&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf, JMP) The North Korean dictator is well known for his brinksmanship skills and is often viewed as an irrational actor. Is Kim JungIl irrational? I would argue he is a rational actor who is not clearly understood when measured by Western standards. Kim JungIl's behavior is frequently misinterpreted as irrational when in fact he is simply pushing a dangerous situation to the limit so that his opponent will concede. As two Korea analysts have observed, "Dictators generally want to survive, and Kim is no exception. He has not launched a war, because he has good reason to think he would face fatal opposition from the United States and South Korea."12 His will to survive was most recently noted when the leader agree to engage in multilateral six nation talks held in August/September 2003. But in the end Kim JungIl used the talks to once again raise the stakes by announcing the intent to "conduct a nuclear test."13 Kim's maneuvering once again pushed the limit by challenging those observers who may have doubted North Korea's ability to conduct such a test. Korea Neg 25/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors A2: KOREAN WAR NO SOUTH RETALIATION South Korean retaliation unlikely too much at stake UPI, 10 (5/20/2010, "Military Retaliation Not Seen as an Option", http://www.lexisnexis.com) Despite the anger in South Korea over the sinking of its navy ship, any retaliation against North Korea, blamed for the tragedy, is unlikely now, analysts say. The concern is that any such strike could escalate into a bigger conflict on the Korean Peninsula, which is already tense because of North Korea's nuclear program and recent naval clashes between the two Koreas. The 1,200ton ship Cheonan went under March 26 in the Yellow Sea after an explosion and 46 of the 104 sailors aboard either died or are reported missing. An international team of experts probing the incident announced its finding Thursday, saying the ship was torpedoed by a North Korean submarine. The North denied it. South Korean President Lee Myungbak summoned an emergency meeting of his top security advisers to consider countermeasures. "In the shortterm, I do not expect any military retaliation, or escalation that would result in a largescale military conflict or war," Daniel Pinkston, analyst at Seoul's International Crisis Group, told Yonhap news agency. However, he warned of the danger of inadvertent escalation or miscalculation in the long term. Lee was quoted as telling Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd by telephone his government will take countermeasures and make North Korea admit its wrongdoing. CNN reported that under a mutual defense treaty, the United States would need to defend South Korea against any aggression. However a U.S. military official said: "I don't think it will come to that. They know they need to have a response, but there is too much at stake for South Korea to have a confrontation on the Korean peninsula. North Korea has nothing to lose, but South Korea is a serious country with a huge economy." Nicholas Szechenyi at Washington's Center for Strategic and International Studies told CNN, " You have to be careful about military John Delury, a Korea expert at the Asia Society, told CNN other military options for South Korea could include increasing its naval presence along the maritime divide with North Korea, but noted that might trigger a conflict. retaliation because North Korea has thousands of artillery pieces pointed towards the south and could bombard Seoul very quickly." Other measures could include seeking further action by the U.N. Security Council. But Szechenyi said, "The problem is that China is a permanent member of the council and tends to take a very soft position on North Korea, so it is an open question whether the resolution will pass or not." He suggested South Korea might ask the United States to put North Korea back on the list of state sponsors of terror. The North was removed from the list in 2008 as part of a process to convince North Korea to give up its nuclear program in exchange for massive economic aid. Korea Neg 26/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors A2: KOREAN WAR SOUTH WILL SOLVE No war south will repress it Right Vision News, 10 (6/7/10, "Pakistan: South Korea Lee says no possibility of war in Korea", http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/) South Korean President Lee Myungbak on Saturday dismissed the likelihood of a war breaking out on the Korean peninsula, while pledging to clamp down on any action by the North deemed threatening. " There is no possibility of a war. There has been occasionally and locally peacethreatening behaviour (from the North) but we will strongly suppress it," Lee's spokesman, contacted by telephone, quoted him as saying at a meeting with businessmen in Singapore. Korea Neg 27/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors A2: KOREAN WAR CHINA WILL SOLVE China would intervene to prevent escalation Business Monitor Online, 10 (3/26/10, "South's Ship Sunk: What's Next?" http://www.lexisnexis.com) 'Were North and South Korea to engage in even a limited clash, there would be a risk that both sides would send reinforcements to strike each other even harder. Provided that hostilities are kept to within a limited geographic area primarily at sea then the situation could be contained, even if it leads to dozens of casualties. This was the case in 1999 and 2002. The real danger would come if either Pyongyang or Seoul started attacking each other's land, especially territory or facilities not immediately associated with the putative naval clash. This would be interpreted by either side as escalation, raising fears of a wider battle. At that point, the conflict would become far more unpredictable, and China North Korea's only true ally on the international stage would probably feel the need to intervene behind the scenes to force Pyongyang not to take the confrontation too far. This would be highly likely if the US moves to support the South militarily in any West Sea clash.' China wants cooperation and stability China Daily, 10 (6/25/10, BBC, "ROK, US MARK 60 YEARS SINCE START OF KOREAN WAR". l/n) BEIJING As the United States and the Republic of Korea hold a series of events commemorating the Korean War that broke out 60 years ago, China stressed that concerned parties should learn from history and cherish the hardwon peace and stability. "What's important now is to take history as a mirror to build a better future," Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang said on Thursday. He added China is ready to develop friendly cooperation with countries in the region and be committed to safeguarding peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. The ROK navy is expected to stage a drill today to commemorate its first naval battle against the DPRK on the second day of the Korean War. Beside major events in the ROK, commemorations are slated for the US, the American Forces Press Service said "The US and the ROK are seizing this occasion to enhance their alliance and deter the DPRK," said Huang Youfu, director of the Institute of Korean Studies at Beijingbased Central University for Nationalities. China has switched its foreign policy focus to stabilizing the region the plunging economy is forcing it to take an assertive role against North Korea. Korea Times 09 (6/26/09, "China Crosses the Rubicon," Lexis) LONDON For two decades, Chinese diplomacy has been guided by the concept of the country's "peaceful rise." Today, however, China needs a new strategic doctrine, because the most remarkable aspect of Sri Lanka's recent victory over the Tamil Tigers is not its overwhelming nature, but the fact that China provided President Mahinda Rajapaska with both the military supplies and diplomatic cover he needed to prosecute the war. Without that Chinese backing, Rajapaska's government would have had neither the wherewithal nor the will to ignore world opinion in its offensive against the Tigers. So, not only has China become central to every aspect of the global financial and economic system, it has now demonstrated its strategic effectiveness in a region traditionally outside its orbit . On Sri Lanka's beachfront battlefields, China's "peaceful rise" was completed. What will this change mean in practice in the world's hot spots like North Korea , Pakistan, and Central Asia? Before the global financial crisis hit, China benefited mightily from the long boom along its eastern and southern rim, with only Burma and North Korea causing instability. China's west and south, however, have become sources of increasing worry. Given economic insecurity within China in the wake of the financial crisis and global recession, China's government finds insecurity in neighbouring territories more threatening than ever. Stabilizing its neighbourhood is one reason why China embraces the sixparty talks with North Korea, has become a big investor in Pakistan (while exploring ways to cooperate with President Barack Obama's special representative, Richard Holbrooke), signed on to a joint Asia/Europe summit declaration calling for the release from detention of Burmese opposition leader Daw Aung Suu Kyi, and intervened to help end Sri Lanka's 26year civil war. The calculus behind China's emerging national security strategy is simple. Without peace and prosperity around China's long borders, there can be no peace, prosperity, and unity at home. Korea Neg Michigan Institutes `10 28/436 7 Week Juniors China's intervention in Sri Lanka, and its visibly mounting displeasure with the North Korean and Burmese regimes, suggests that this calculus has quietly become central to the government's thinking. Korea Neg 29/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors A2: KOREAN WAR CHINA WILL SOLVE China has already started to take control and establish security in East Asia the US isn't needed to keep the peace. Korea Times 09 (6/26/09, "China Crosses the Rubicon," Lexis) Today, China's government seeks to shape the diplomatic agenda in order to increase China's options while constricting those of potential adversaries. Instead of remaining diplomatically aloof, China is forging more relationships with its neighbours than any of its rivals. This informal web is being engineered not only to keep its rivals from coalescing or gaining privileged influence, but also to restrain the actions of China's local partners so as to dampen tension anywhere it might flare up. China's newfound assertiveness, rather than creating fear, should be seen as establishing the necessary conditions for comprehensive negotiations about the very basis of peaceful coexistence and stability in Asia: respect for all sides' vital interests. In recent years, such an approach ran counter to America's foreignpolicy predisposition of favouring universalist doctrines over a careful balancing of national interests. With the Obama administration embracing realism as its diplomatic lodestar, China may have found a willing interlocutor. China is beginning to take stronger measures to influence North Korea while at the same time maintaining relations Snyder & Byun, 09 *Director of the Center for U.S.Korean Policy at the Asia Foundation and senior associate at Pacific Forum CSIS AND ** Research Associate, Center for U.S.Korea Policy at the Asia Foundation (4/2009, "Year of ChinaDPRK Friendship; North's Rocket Fizzles " http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/0901qchina_korea.pdf) Toplevel diplomacy between Beijing and Pyongyang intensified this quarter in honor of ChinaDPRK Friendship Year and the 60th anniversary of diplomatic relations. Prior to the Lunar New Year holiday in midJanuary, Kim Jongil held his first public meeting since his reported illness with Chinese Communist Party International Liaison Department Head Wang Jiarui. In March, DPRK Prime Minister Kim Yongil paid a return visit to Beijing. The Chinese have accompanied these commemorative meetings with active diplomatic interaction with the U.S., South Korea, and Japan focused on how to respond to North Korea's launch of a multistage rocket. Thus, China finds itself under pressure to dissuade Pyongyang from destabilizing activity and ease regional tensions while retaining its 60year friendship with the North. Meanwhile, South Korean concerns about China's rise are no longer confined to issues of economic competitiveness; the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis has produced its first public assessment of the implications of China's rising economic capabilities for South Korea's longterm security policies. The response to North Korea's rocket launch also highlights differences in the respective nearterm positions of Seoul and Beijing. Following years of expanding bilateral trade and investment ties, the global financial crisis provides new challenges for SinoROK economic relations: how to manage the fallout from a potential decline in bilateral trade and the possibility that domestic burdens will spill over and create new strains in the relationship. Beginning a year of ChinaDPRK friendship The January meeting in Pyongyang between Kim Jongil and Wang Jiarui, chief of the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) International Department, was Kim's first meeting with a foreign guest since his alleged stroke in August 2008. The DPRK state media hailed China's decision to give "free aid" to the North in an apparent effort to demonstrate Pyongyang's solid ties with Beijing at a time of stagnation in inter Korean relations. President Hu has twice extended an invitation to Kim Jongil to visit China according to the North Korean media, leading to speculation that Kim may visit Beijing later this year as part of friendship year activities. SinoDPRK Friendship Year activities were officially launched during a fiveday visit to China by DPRK Premier Kim Yongil and a 100member delegation on March 1721. The visit occurred amid heightened regional concerns over North Korea's planned satellite launch, but it is not clear in what form the Chinese leadership raised the issue with North Korea's visiting premier. Premier Kim held meetings with President Hu Jintao, top legislator Wu Bangguo, and his official counterpart Wen Jiabao. Both sides pledged to use the year of friendship as an opportunity to advance bilateral ties. Kim also met local leaders in Shandong Province, where he agreed to expand North Korea's political, economic, and cultural ties. Hu pointed to a 60year relationship that has "withstood the test of international and domestic changes" while Premier Wen proposed further cooperation on SixParty Talks and denuclearization. He also called for improving bilateral relations through highlevel political dialogue, cultural exchanges, and the pursuit of "common development" through trade and investment, mining exploration, and infrastructure. Based on these diplomatic exchanges, Chinese officials reported that Kim Jongil was healthy and in control and that North Korea had reaffirmed its commitment to denuclearization. The visit also served to underscore China's important role and continued interest in managing security issues surrounding the Korean Peninsula. Wang Jiarui's previous visits to North Korea have coincided with major events; he met Kim Jongil in January 2004 prior to Kim's visit to China, and in February 2005, shortly after North Korea's declaration that it was a nuclearweapon state. China has renewed efforts to sustain high level contacts with Pyongyang following a relative cooling of diplomatic exchanges in the aftermath of North Korea's October 2006 nuclear test. Talk among Chinese analysts of an adjustment from a "special" to a "normal" relationship with North Korea has been replaced with sober assessments of what approaches China can take in the context of the SinoDPRK relationship to secure its own strategic interests. There is also an increased willingness on the part of Chinese analysts to suggest withholding promised benefits and even limited sanctions in an effort to influence North Korean behavior rather than simply using inducements to get North Korea to offer China quid pro quos. Korea Neg 30/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors Korea Neg 31/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors A2: KOREAN WAR NORTH WILL PRESERVE ITS SURVIVAL No war regime wants to preserve its survival Asia Monitor, 09 (7/1/09, "Rising Risk of Military Crash" http://www.lexisnexis.com) Despite its provocative actions, we continue to believe that North Korea does not seek an actual fullscale war. The regime of Kim Jong Il seeks survival, and it knows that war would ultimately lead to its defeat and probable overthrow. Thus, aside from testing the US and the South, the North's current activities reflect Kim's desire to reassert his leadership after a long period of illness, and demonstrate to the outside world and indeed domestic hardliners that there will be no change in Pyongyang's hardline policy if he dies. Regarding the succession itself, South Korea's National Intelligence Service reportedly told a group of legislators that Kim had recently chosen his youngest son, Kim Jong Un, 26, as his eventual successor. Nonetheless, given Kim Jong Un's young age, we consider it more likely that the North's National Defence Commission (NDC) would take power, at least in the interim. The NDC is the country's highest body, headed by Kim Jong Il himself, and its membership was recently expanded to 13. The rising profile of its members suggests that it would form a collective leadership, postKim Jong Il. Korea Neg 32/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors A2: REGIME COLLAPSE ADV 1NC No risk of collapse now Armstrong, 10. Professor of history and director of the Center for Korean Research at Columbia University.. (Charles, 5/26/10, CNN, "The Korean War never ended" http://www.cnn.com/2010/OPINION/05/24/armstrong.north.korea/index.html) Contrary to common belief, North Korea is not facing internal political disarray or economic decline. Kim Jong Il appears to be fully in charge, and harvests for the last two years have been relatively good. Chinese sources estimate a substantial increase in North Korean industrial production over the last year. Whatever may have motivated the attack on the Cheonan, it was not the act of a desperate or divided regime, and the strong sanctions called for by President Lee even if China would agree to support and enforce them are not likely to get North Korea to admit responsibility for the attack or to change its behavior. China won't pressure North Korea fears a collapse Korea Times, 10 (6/9/10, Kang Hyunkyung, "China's double standard on N. Korea," http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2010/06/113_67338.html, JMP) China sided with the rest of the world to impose sanctions on North Korea last year after the latter launched missiles and conducted an underground nuclear test, condemning Pyongyang for escalating tensions on the Korean Peninsula. However, it has remained silent over the North torpedoing the South Korean Navy Cheonan, claiming the lives of 46 ship sailors in March. China's double standard on the reclusive state's belligerent behavior has prompted experts to speculate over its motives. Professor Kenneth Quinones, dean of research evaluation of Japan's Akita International University, told The Korea Times that there has been a change in China's policy toward North Korea since it supported the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) sanctions last year. "China's approval of U.N. sanctions last year caused an intense debate within the Chinese government over whether to use pressure or to try to induce North Korea's cooperation the former U.S. diplomat said. ," Quinones said the foreign ministry preferred using international pressure but the Chinese Communist Party and the People's Liberation Army preferred using inducement. "The party and the army won the debate so after the U.N. sanctions that were approved in June, China moderated its policy toward Pyongyang," he said. Some experts observed China learned a lesson that sanctions beget another bellicose act and that the side effect might cause the patron to rethink punitive actions. ***SUCCESSION / REGIME COLLAPSE ADV ANS Korea Neg 33/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors 2NC NO REGIME COLLAPSE Collapse of the regime is an impossibility in the status quo Kim Jung Ill is in full control, harvests have been good, industrial output is increasing that's the 1nc Armstrong evidence you should prefer it because he is the director of the Center for Korean Research at Columbia University Also, 43 experts are on our side North Korea regime is stable and growing Kim, 6/3 (6/3/10, Kim Taegyu, Korea Times, "Cheonan attack brings stability to NK: SERI," http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2010/06/113_67044.html, JMP) Stability in the communist regime of North Korea has strengthened in the aftermath of the sinking of South Korea's Navy frigate Cheonan, according to a leading private think tank in Seoul. The Samsung Economic Research Institute (SERI), an affiliate of the country's foremost conglomerate Samsung Group, disclosed its survey on Thursday, which showed that the North Korean regime has been beefed up after the Cheonan disaster. A multinational investigation team concluded late last month that the Navy ship had sunk in the West Sea on March 26 due to an unprovoked torpedo attack by North Korea although Pyongyang denies it. "It may sound strange as tensions run high on the Korean Peninsula in the wake of the incident. But experts from both home and abroad agree that the Northern regime has strengthened of late despite the mishap," SERI researcher Bahng Taeseop said. "Its foreign exchange rate has got back on track and the severe inflation was also tamed to reduce volatility there. The Cheonan case and North Korean leader Kim Jongil's visit to China are important factors." SERI interviewed a total of 37 experts on Korean issues from five nations the United States, Japan, China, Russia and South Korea. All are members of the sixparty nuclear talks. The institute said the respondents evaluated the internal stability of North Korea at 44.14 points during the AprilJune period of this year, up from 42.14 points a quarter ago. A stability index reading of 50 points or higher indicates optimistic views are stronger than pessimistic ones and vice versa. "The stability index of North Korea is still less than the benchmark 50 points. But the rating improved despite the Cheonan tragedy, Bahng said. "This might lead to speculation that the North might have intended the torpedo " attack expecting an upside." Korea Neg 34/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors 2NC CHINA WILL NOT STEP IN The Korea times 10 evidence cites a recent change in Chinese attitude the belligerent actions from North Korea means China is no longer willing to pressure Kim Jung Ill, making safe regime change impossible. The lack of influence and new attitude is empirically proven Snyder & Byun, 09 *Director of the Center for U.S.Korean Policy at the Asia Foundation and senior associate at Pacific Forum CSIS AND ** Research Associate, Center for U.S.Korea Policy at the Asia Foundation (1/10, "China Embraces South and North, but Differently," http://csis.org/files/publication/0904qchina_korea.pdf) Highlevel ChinaDPRK exchanges marked the 60th anniversary of diplomatic ties despite UN sanctions against North Korea for its missile and nuclear tests earlier this year. Premier Wen Jiabao's visit to Pyongyang in early October was the high point in those commemorations. KCNA reported that Chairman Kim Jongil personally greeted Wen at Sunan airport upon his arrival on Oct. 4 and that he accompanied Wen in several public appearances. China has highlighted Wen's success in securing Kim's promise of a "conditional return" to SixParty Talks pending progress in direct negotiations with Washington, although Kim's remarks made clear the North's interest in direct USDPRK dialogue rather than SixParty Talks. The fact that Wen did not gain any additional movement by Kim compared to what North Korea had already committed to during Dai Bingguo's visit the previous month raises questions about Chinese influence in Pyongyang, especially in light of rumors that Wen's visit to Pyongyang was in question over the issue. Also, china will not step in to uphold a superpower image MacLeod, 1o (Calum, Correspondent for USA Today, 6/1/10, "A Sunken Ship, and Talk of War", http://www.lexisnexis.com) China has much to gain by maintaining its neutral stance Bermudez says. He says the current crisis gives China , a chance to burnish its reputation as an emerging power particularly in developing nations, where through the years it quietly has expanded trade relations and secured oil and precious mineral rights. "By holding the cards and maneuvering the United States on this issue, (China) shows to its Third World friends, allies and partners that it can handle the United States," Bermudez says. "That adds a lot of political juice to (the Chinese) in the Third World. "They may want this (issue) to stick around a while to keep their dog on a leash and keep the United States looking weak. It serves them politically." Korea Neg 35/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors EXT CHINA WON'T STEP IN China won't change its stance on North Korea Korea Times, 10 (6/9/10, Kang Hyunkyung, "China's double standard on N. Korea," http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2010/06/113_67338.html, JMP) His comments came hours before Chun Yungwoo, second vice foreign minister, returned to Seoul Wednesday empty handed after wrapping up a twoday visit to China. During the trip, the South Korean envoy met with several highranking Chinese officials to try and persuade them to join the Seoulled effort to lock the North into appropriate codes of conduct. South Korea initiated the diplomatic effort in retaliation for the North Korean torpedo attack. Diplomacy, however, appeared to reveal its limitations as the South Korean envoy allegedly failed to influence China to look beyond its socalled strategic interests on the Korean Peninsula. Beijing reportedly remained unchanged in its position to shield Pyongyang from coordinated punitive measures over the Cheonan case. According to media reports, China is unwilling to join any UNSC statements or resolution if they specify North Korea as a player responsible for the act. China thinks the Koreas should resolve the Cheonan incident themselves Korea Times, 10 (6/9/10, Kang Hyunkyung, "China's double standard on N. Korea," http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2010/06/113_67338.html, JMP) ***Note Professor Kenneth Quinones is the dean of research evaluation of Japan's Akita International University 'Cheonan is a domestic issue' Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Yu Myunghwan said in an interview last week that China perceived the Cheonan case as a domestic issue, not an international one, whereas South Korea is pushing for global action against the North. His remarks hinted Beijing believes Seoul should sit down with Pyongyang to resolve the torpedo attack and that the incident is not something that necessarily needs to be addressed at an international level. The minister confessed that the perception gap between the two made it difficult for the South to convince China to join the effort to force the North to take the consequences of its deeds at the UNSC. Based on his observation, China's double standard on North Korea stemmed from the belief that the communist state's nuclear threats such as that of last year, posed a common security threat to the international community including China and Russia, but that its torpedo attack on the warship alarmed only South Korea. Quinones noted that he thinks " it is unrealistic for the government in Seoul to expect Beijing to support a sanctions resolution against North Korea at the UNSC." "Nevertheless, President Lee Myungbak must convince the South Korean people that he is pressing for resolute punishment of North Korea. By pressing for it, he can blame China for blocking such a resolution," he advised. China won't support action against North Korea too much to lose from regime collapse Cornwell, 10 (5/28/10, Rupert, Independent Extra, "The Great Unknown; The Friday Essay the World's Last Stalinist Regime Is On the Brink of Conflict Once Again. What Is it that North Korea Hopes to Achieve by Such Posturing? We Just Can't Know, Argues Rupert Cornwell," http://www.lexisnexis.com) Consider the options from Beijing's viewpoint, and its stance makes perfect sense. North Korea's regime might or might not face terminal collapse without Chinese aid. But if it did collapse, two things would probably happen. There would be a destabilizing influx of North Korean refugees into China, followed by the absorption of the North into the vastly richer and more populous South just as West Germany swallowed an imploding East Germany two decades ago. That would mean a single proAmerican state on China's northeastern border. so, score a huge victory for If Washington on the East Asian geopolitical chessboard, and an equal setback for Beijing. There is, of course, a third option, of moving in concert with the West against North Korea but that would surely see Mr Kim turning his spite against Beijing as well. One way or another, China wants to preserve the status quo , and its economic Korea Neg Michigan Institutes `10 36/436 7 Week Juniors leverage over the US gives it means to do so. Unsurprisingly, therefore, Beijing has conspicuously failed to endorse the findings of the international commission on the fate of the Cheonan. Korea Neg 37/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors U.S. PRESENCE NEEDED POST UNIFICATION / COLLAPSE Large military presence key manage North Korean collapse and unification Dujarric, 04 Visiting Scholar at the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (7/12/04, International Herald Tribune, "Japan's Security Needs U.S. Troops in S. Korea," http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/papers/contribution/dujarric/02.html, JMP) It is, of course, possible that North Korea will collapse. If North Korea does disappear, it will create a major vacuum in Northeast Asia which South Korea alone will not be able to fill. Seoul will need massive foreign financial assistance to deal with unification. It will also require political support. In this context, a large U.S. military presence in the country will be the best symbol of this support and of the commitment of the United States and its allies to the stability of the peninsula. Forces still useful after reunification to deter China and other regional threats Hyugbaeg, 08 professor at the department of political science and diplomacy at Korea University (October 2008, Im Hyugbaeg, U.S.Korea Institute Working Paper Series, "How Korea Could Become a Regional Power in Northeast Asia: Building a Northeast Asian Triad," http://uskoreainstitute.org/wpcontent/uploads/2008/10/USKIWP4.pdf, JMP) ***Note USFK = U.S. Forces in Korea Beyond the Korean peninsula , U.S. support can also prove helpful for South Korea to establish itself as a hub of peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia in general, supporting efforts to maintain regional stability. Should the Koreas be reunified, the role of the USFK could shift to deterring threats from China and to dampen the tensions in the KoreaJapan relationship. As has been shown in the case of U.S. forces in Greece and Turkey, and Israel and Egypt, keeping U.S. forces in two quarrelsome countries of Korea and Japan would not only help secure U.S. interests in those countries but also contribute to maintaining peace between Korea and Japan. (O'Hanlon and Mochizuki, 2003: 150152) Similarly, U.S. backing would lend credibility to Korea to serve as a mediator between China and Japan if and when disputes between the two nations should arise. Troops will even be needed postunification to deter instability Eberstadt, 02 political economist who holds the Henry Wendt Chair in Political Economy at the AEI and is Senior Adviser to the National Bureau of Asian Research (10/1/02, Nicholas, The National Interest, "Our Other Korea Problem," http://www.aei.org/article/19460, JMP) Absent a convincing rationale, the Mutual Defense Treatyand the forward deployment of U.S. forces in Korea for which it providescannot count on the continued support from both the South Korean and American publics that is necessary to sustain it. Since it is manifestly in the interests of Seoul and Washington to keep the U.S.ROK military alliance in good repair, it is incumbent upon American and South Korean policymakers to elucidate that rationale. The original rationalepremised on the risk of hostile external maneuvers against South Koreamay not yet be so passe as some think. If the day arrives that the NorthSouth struggle is no more, however, a compelling rationale for a continuing ROKU.S. alliance can still be made, based upon deterring instability in an economically important, too wellarmed, and notyetsolidlyliberal international expanse. On both sides of the Pacific, national audiences wait to be persuaded of that rationale. Statesmen who understand the value of the relationship would be well advised to devote a little more effort to the task. Korea Neg 38/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors SECURITY ASSURANCES WON'T SOLVE Security assurances won't solve North Korean regime collapse the U.S. must maintain strong defense Green, 09 associate professor of international relations at Georgetown and the Japan Chair at the CSIS (Sep/Oct 2009, Michael J., National Interest, "The Perilous Case of Kim Jong Il," EBSCO, JMP) While the dangers inherent in all three stages of North Korea's demise are considerable, the North Koreans have at least done a service by obliterating any illusions that security assurances or promises of massive World Bank loans will solve the problem for us. The important thing is to recognize all the dimensions of threat represented by the North and to use all instruments of statecraft, from deterrence and pressure to diplomacy, to deal with them. The United States should continue aggressively implementing the sanctions passed in June under un Security Council Resolution 1874 well beyond the next few months. These sanctions are aimed at cutting off North Korean trade in weapons, illicit goods and WMD. They should not be used as pressure to bring North Korea back to the table, as some Russian and Chinese officials have suggested, but instead to deter further provocations and to throw a better net around Pyongyang's proliferation and illicit trade. They should be removed only as the threat is removed. Washington should also be realistic about what negotiations with Pyongyang can and cannot accomplish. The Obama administration has said it is only interested in a verifiable and irreversible agreement. It is extremely unlikely to get one from Pyongyang and we should assume as much. Even without a breakthrough, however, it will be important to test the North's intentions and to retain channels for deescalation and dialogue, particularly given the opaque and uncertain transition under way in Pyongyang. But diplomacy is unlikely to solve this problem and the administration should set expectations accordingly. And the Obama administration should not lose sight of the plight of the North Korean people. The United States should be clear and consistent in building international pressure on the regime for its horrifying humanrights record. More should also be done to provide food and medical assistance to the North Korean people, as long as it can be monitored by something close to international standards. It is also important to continue modest international NGO and training efforts now in place for the North Korean people, as long as the regime itself does not receive cash, technology or propaganda benefits. The more we can expose the North Korean people to the possibilities before them, the better prepared they will be. The United States needs to attend to our defenses. The missiledefense budget should not have been cut in the current defense appropriations bill. We need a robust dialogue with Japan and Korea on how to reinforce confidence in our extended deterrent. We should not be rushing to dismantle our combined forces command with South Korea simply because of bureaucratic inertiaparticularly after 10 million South Koreans asked us not to because of the North Korean threat. A priority for the United States in its relationship with China must be beginning contingency discussions and pushing Beijing to do the same with Seoul. While the sixparty talks may not resume soon, fiveparty talks without North Korea would facilitate broader confidence building and eventual multilateral planning for changes on the peninsula. Finally, it is imperative to demonstrate to North Korea and other potential proliferators that the United States does not and will not accept a nuclear North Korea and will impose significant consequences on the North for its actions. Prudent preparation for the three stages of danger is critical for the peaceful transformation of the Korean peninsula and of Northeast Asia as a whole. Too often U.S. policy with North Korea has become stuck in tactical debates about modes of engagement. It is now time to focus on the strategic. Korea Neg 39/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors EXTERNAL THREATS SUSTAIN THE REGIME Kim uses threats to justify its internal rule Camner, 10 (5/21/10 "Why Would North Korea Sink a South Korean Warship?" http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2010/05/whywouldnorthkoreasinkasouthkorean warship/57089/) On Thursday, the South Korean government announced that the warship it lost in March was sunk by a torpedo attack from North Korea. While South Korea, Japan, and the United States discuss punitive action, North Korea has threatened "allout war" if new sanctions are imposed. This saberrattling by the desperately poor North should not be a surprise, says Kongdan Oh, coauthor of The Hidden People of North Korea; it is simply the most recent provocation by a regime that needs an external state of crisis in order to justify its repressive internal rule. With international pressure mounting on China, the North's closest friend and benefactor, the regime of Kim Jong Il has achieved just that. The Atlantic spoke with Oh, who is also a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, about the crisis and what the North is hoping to accomplish. We know that South Korea has provided compelling evidence that North Korea was responsible for the torpedo. Can you describe specifically what it was that convinced the investigators? First, it is credible due to the accuracy and objectivity of the combined investigation team, which involved almost 25 experts from Korea, the United States, Australia, UK, and Sweden. Those are heavyweights; it wasn't just one or two investigators from Korea. It was global and its level of expertise level was very deep. Their significant discovery was the propeller part that was used in the torpedo. It was obviously a design that North Korea has been using. They weren't caught on the spot, but with all evidence in hand, it shows this is quite close to an ironclad case. Why would the North have done this? As I have been telling the world for the last 15 or 20 years, the internal political dynamic in North Korea is such that they constantly need a crisis. The regime was built on lies. And the two leaders, Kim and Kim, created one of the worst or best cults of personality, perpetuating that they are the most brilliant strategic leaders and the entire world is kowtowing to them. That is a foundation of their propaganda. North Korea is basically a failed state their basic economy is bankrupt. The military industrial economy is only 30 percent functioning. Other than Kim Jong's palace economy and slush fund, the economy doesn't exist. In this state, the leader needs a tool to propagate why he should be in charge of the country. Today, a lot of people know that South Korea is not a slave to the Americans and the Korean economy may even be catching up with the Japanese economy. Information seeps through. So the North Korean regime needs more crisis. The ordinary kind of crisis will not be satisfactory, given the grumbling of the technocratic level of midclass elite who see the North's declining power and know that there is no way out. So the regime has to create a fear of an imminent dangerous and warlike situation so the country will be united in solidarity under the leadership of Kim Jong Il. That's the internal dynamic. For years, it has been one crisis after another. Korea Neg 40/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors 1NC REGIONALISM 1. Bilateral relations solve regionalism Hyugbaeg, 08 professor at the department of political science and diplomacy at Korea University (October 2008, Im Hyugbaeg, U.S.Korea Institute Working Paper Series, "How Korea Could Become a Regional Power in Northeast Asia: Building a Northeast Asian Triad," http://uskoreainstitute.org/wpcontent/uploads/2008/10/USKIWP4.pdf, JMP) ***Note USFK = U.S. Forces in Korea Moreover, strong alliance between the U.S. and South Korea can facilitate the establishment of a multilateral a security regime in Northeast Asia. Korea's strategic positioning, along with the support of USFK lend Korea the military capacity to serve as a balancer or stabilizer within the region Thus, after the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue, the . promote and maintain peace and stability in Northeast Asia. The USFK can play a similar role that American troops stationed in European countries have done for securing a multilateral peace community, such as NATO. Bilateral alliances between the U.S. and Northeast Asian countries would not only complement multilateral security regime , but also bind loose ties of the regional security networks.7 U.S.ROK alliance should be transformed from a collective defense organization aimed solely at deterring North Korea to a regional cooperative security regime that would 2. squo solves South Korea is already playing a greater role with regional countries balancing against the U.S. on certain issues Lee, 09 Seoul National University (December 2009, Geun, "The Nexus between Korea's Regional Security Options and Domestic Politics," www.cfr.org, JMP) Korea's Choices: Past and Present Interestingly, Korea's diplomatic history shows a somewhat consistent pattern of loyalty relations with superpowers. In the premodern era, China exchanged protection, economic benefits, and legitimization for Korea's loyalty. As Asia opened to modernity, Japan colonized Korea, forcing Korean loyalty to the empire. With the end of the Korean War in 1953, Korea invested its full loyalty in the United States, which yielded military and economic gains. But as the international context changed, the exclusive U.S.Korea relationship became more flexible. When the bipolar system collapsed at the end of the Cold War, former enemies began transforming their own identities, which allowed Korea to consider new diplomatic relationships. This new pattern of engagement resulted in "issueoriented balancing," or issuespecific coalitions among different groups of countries. 4 For example, South Korea joined Korea seems increasingly inclined to explore exit options in the U.S.Korea alliance because its voice has been repeatedly ignored in the United States. When the Clinton administration discussed preemptive strikes against North Korea, it failed to consult with the Korean government in North Korea and China in criticizing Japan on the textbook issue and the Yasukuni Shrine, pitting Korea with two Cold War enemies against its Cold War friend. At the Six Party Talks, the views of the Roh Moohyun administration were more similar to those of China and Russia than those of the United States and Japan. After the Cold War, Korea was able to spread risks through a more symmetrical loyalty portfolio. advance. During the 1997 financial crisis, the Clinton administration was reluctant in arranging quick rescue funds to Korea.5 In June 2002, the United States hurriedly released its soldiers who were involved in a vehicle accident that killed two middleschool girls in Korea. In 2008, the U.S. ambassador made a careless comment that "Koreans should learn the science" about mad cow disease. And the United States has been reluctant to pay for the environmental pollution and damage committed by the U.S. army in the Yongsan military base. Based on these experiences, many South Koreans believe there is an asymmetry between their loyalty and voice in the U.S.Korea relationship, and they are turning their eyes toward possible exit options. 3. In theory regionalism solves conflict, but it can't be implemented in actuality Snyder, 2009 (Scott, Asia Foundation, Council on Foreign Relations, " U.S. Domestic Politics and Multilateral Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia," http://asiafoundation.org/publications/pdf/677) c) Current military alliances and security arrangements (i.e., the Six Party Talks) might become insufficient to meet pressing security needs. The United States may promote regionalism more actively if it finds that an intractable conflict--such as the one with North Korea--cannot be resolved satisfactorily using only deterrence and bilateral talks. This raises the question of how one would supplement alliances, not necessarily search for a wholesale alternative. Essentially, the emergence of the Six Party Talks is a manifestation of such a scenario. They were based on the idea that any solution to the North Korean nuclear issue will require the collective involvement of all the parties neighboring North Korea if such a deal is going to stick. However, current developments suggest that the Six Party mechanism is a tool to be used in conjunction with alliance cooperation, not supplanting it. For most U.S. analysts, the idea of multilateral dialogue as a supplement to the alliances is quite reasonable, but the continued existence of conflicting strategic aims among relevant parties in the region suggests that any idea of abandoning the alliances in favor of a multilateral security mechanism is implausible. ***REGIONALISM ADV ANS Korea Neg 41/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors 2NC BILAT=MULTILAT As Theodore Roosevelt would say Talk softly but carry a big stick Hyugbaeg, 08 indicates that multilateral proposals have no weight unless the backing of the United States military is with them More evidence The thesis of their advantage is wrong bilateral alliance don't inhibit multilateralism Hyugbaeg, 08 professor at the department of political science and diplomacy at Korea University (October 2008, Im Hyugbaeg, U.S.Korea Institute Working Paper Series, "How Korea Could Become a Regional Power in Northeast Asia: Building a Northeast Asian Triad," http://uskoreainstitute.org/wpcontent/uploads/2008/10/USKIWP4.pdf, JMP) Many have said that the existing bilateral alliances might act as barriers to multilateral dialogues in Northeast Asia. But I believe the contrary, that existing bilateral alliances could be complementary to multilateral the security cooperation, and vice versa. Strong bilateral alliances and bilateral trust can serve as the foundation for greater multilateral cooperation among partner countries. Northeast Asian countries that have pressing needs for multilateral security cooperation may encourage their bilateral partners to participate in a , multilateral security framework, not to replace bilateral cooperation, but to increase the scope and reach of what can be accomplished toward mutual goals. (Han Yong Sup, 2005) We'll even read evidence specific to obama he will use bilat to promote regionalism Snyder, 2009 (Scott, Asia Foundation, Council on Foreign Relations, " U.S. Domestic Politics and Multilateral Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia," http://asiafoundation.org/publications/pdf/677) How will the Obama administration make its mark on the development of regional security architecture in Northeast Asia? Deputy Secretary of State Jim Steinberg has already outlined three elements of an Obama administration strategy to manage a "post Cold war transition characterized by rising powers and emerging transnational threats." The strategy emphasizes sustaining bilateral ties with traditional allies; building new, cooperative ties with emerging Asian powers; and building "new structures of cooperation, both in the region and across the world which link Asia to the global order ."16 The strategy prioritizes bilateral alliances but clearly anticipates reaching out to rising powers and utilizing regional cooperation structures to buttress the goals of effective alliance management and new forms of engagement. Korea Neg 42/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors 2NC SQUO SOLVES SK IS MULTILATING Squo solves the advantage SK is already promoting regionalism in the status quo because it realizes that the United States commitment will not be permanent it has already opened out in the status quo to other countries that's lee 09 We'll also read evidence in context of the current global economic status it has forced South Korea to obtain multilateral agreements Lee, 09 Seoul National University (December 2009, Geun, "The Nexus between Korea's Regional Security Options and Domestic Politics," www.cfr.org, JMP) Fifth, seeing the latest global financial crisis and the rise of China, many Koreans recognize the need to adjust Korea's external strategy to the changing geoeconomic world. Making exclusive ties with the United States may be a highrisk investment in a past hegemon, while exclusive ties with China would be a highrisk investment in an uncertain future. In this transitional period for geoeconomics, multilateral security cooperation is an attractive partial exit option for Korea. Korea Neg 43/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors 2NC REGIONALISM IMPOSSIBLE Regionalism can not be obtained in Asia their evidence only talks to the question of South Korean credibility, not to the decisions of other countries. Other Asian countries will empirically not abandon bilateral relations in order to join a collective security that's Snyder, 2009 you should prefer it a. recency discusses the failure of collective security agreements over the KJI regime b. empirics cites movements towards collective security in Asia that have failed because of countries' self interest. More reasons why multilateralism is impossible a. Ethnic groups b. Territory c. Emerging powers Lum '09 (Thomas, American Report of The Asia Foundation Emerging Leaders Conference, "Current Developments In Southeast Asia: Implications For U.S." Southeast Asia Relations," http://asiafoundation.org/publications/pdf/641) Southeast Asia has long been a fragmented region, pulled by centrifugal forces of ethnicity, religion, colonial history, and geography. The strength of ASEAN the ability of the organization to act cohesively and purposefully often has been undermined by the lack of common interests among its members. Furthermore, as some countries in the region, such as Indonesia, grow in global stature, they may be tempted to act unilaterally on regional issues. The organization's traditional disunity and unwillingness to impose human rights standards upon its members, particularly Burma, have been sources of tension between ASEAN and the United States. Professor Wang Gungwu put forth three possible future scenarios for ASEAN: (1) an organization that provides a forum for dialogue but remains passive toward regional issues; (2 ) a grouping that becomes ineffectual or breaks apart; and (3) an organization that becomes more assertive as external powers such as the United States and China compete for influence in the region. Wang was cautiously optimistic that the shared interest among Southeast Asian states, the United States, China, and other powers in the region in a strong ASEAN boded well for the organization. ASEAN, along with other regional and Pacific organizations, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), APEC, ASEAN plus 3 (China, Japan, and South Korea), and the East Asia Summit (EAS), have enmeshed Southeast Asian countries, Northeast Asia, Oceania (Australia and New Zealand), India, the United States, and other countries in webs of political, security, and economic dialogue and cooperation. Although some U.S. policy makers have expressed concerns about China's role in the EAS (the United States is not a member), Australia and India are said to help protect U.S. interests and balance China in the grouping. U.S. accession to the TAC in July 2009 gave the United States the option to become a member of the EAS. However, whether the U.S. wishes to become a member of the EAS remains unclear. As the country reports delivered at the conference made clear, the region includes some of the world's richest countries (Singapore) and poorest (Cambodia), varying levels of political development, deep differences of religion, ethnicity, and culture, and divergent international agendas. These disparities in turn pose challenges to political and regional stability and to the cohesion of ASEAN, the organization's ability to respond to regional issues, and its China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam are five disputants that exert overlapping claims over dozens of small islands in the South China Sea. In 2002, ASEAN countries and China signed the "Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea," which commits the parties to the peaceful resolution to territorial conflicts. Despite the lowering of tensions, these competing claims are a latent source of conflict. The United States government supports dialogue to address the issue but does not intend to get directly involved, according to U.S. officials. Two recommendations were offered by conferees. One speaker favored mediation and conciliation suggesting that this was a more Asian way of resolving disputes rather than the more legalistic and adversarial method of arbitration. Another expert argued that collaborative activities, such as joint oil exploration between China and Vietnam in the Spratly Islands, best reduced the likelihood of conflict. relations with the United States. Southeast Asian participants generally agreed on the benefits of regional free trade. The ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), which is to be implemented in 2010 by six ASEAN countries (and 2015 for the remaining signatories), was created as a means to lower the prices of regional products for export, attract foreign investment, and lay the groundwork for an FTA with the United States. The United States market is viewed as vital for the region and as a driver for development, especially for the less developed export economies of Vietnam and Cambodia. One of the main attractions of joining ASEAN for Laos, one of the most isolated countries in the region, was the potential benefits of trade. Southeast Asian exports to the United States have stagnated in recent years, although much of the region's exports of raw materials and components to China end up in finished goods in U.S. stores. Chief economic concerns of the Southeast Asian interlocutors at the conference included preventing bilateral FTAs from undermining regional trade arrangements; countering the perceived reluctance of the United States to move ahead with free trade initiatives; and finding ways to compete economically with China. Regional security issues include terrorist and separatist movements, territorial disputes, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Much progress has been made on combating Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), the Southeast Asian, panIslamist terrorist group. Key leaders have been captured, killed, or executed. However, JI training camps remain operational in the Philippines (Mindanao) and suicide bombers attacked the Jakarta Marriot and Ritz Carlton hotels in July 2009. Although JI's operational links to Al Qaeda are weak, Al Qaedist ideology continues to inspire and motivate the network's actions, according to a regional security expert at the conference. The expert recommended U.S.Southeast Asian efforts to better understand the roots of violent religious extremism. Korea Neg 44/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors A2 TAIWAN WAR Taiwan war won't happen experts agree Adams, 09 reporter for global post and newsweek on China and Taiwan (3/31/09, Jonathon, Global Post, "The dragon sharpens its claws," http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/chinaanditsneighbors/090331/thedragonsharpensitsclaws) Taiwan insists it's an independent state. Beijing sees it as Chinese territory that must one day end its democratic "holiday" and return to the fold. The U.S. has a commitment, albeit an ambiguous one, to help defend Taiwan's democracy against Chinese aggression. That means U.S. Marines, sailors and pilots could one day, perhaps suddenly, be sent to take on Asia's most lethal military, all for the sake of a small island which few Americans can distinguish from Thailand. The good news: most experts agree that conflict will probably never happen. U.S. diplomacy has helped keep the peace in Taiwan the Strait for 60 years. And tensions have eased in the past year with the election of a Taiwan president who is forging better relations with Beijing. Chinese and Taiwanese media reported this week that the two sides' militaries will both attend a conference in Hawaii this summer. Korea Neg 45/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors ROK ALREADY PARTICIPATING IN REGIONALISM South Korea is already promoting and participating in regional multilateral security forums Lee, 09 Seoul National University (December 2009, Geun, "The Nexus between Korea's Regional Security Options and Domestic Politics," www.cfr.org, JMP) Korea's Option of Multilateral Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia The idea of multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia is not a recent one. Since 1988, Korea has advocated regional security cooperation, and in 1994, Korea officially proposed the Northeast Asia Security Dialogue (NEASED) at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Serious discussion of multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia started in 2005 during the Six Party Talks to resolve the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula. In fact, the Six Party Talks have been an important generator of innovative ideas, and participants in the Six Party Talks have gradually realized the importance of a multilateral security mechanism in Northeast Asia, even if they do not share identical interests in such a mechanism.6 From Korea's perspective, a semiregional arrangement like the Six Party Talks produces five main benefits.7 First, a multilateral security arrangement in Northeast Asia composed of the United States, China, Japan, Russia, North Korea, and South Korea will provide insurance to the concerned parties that the agreements struck at the Six Party Talks will not be violated by the participants. Cheating and lack of trust are among the fundamental problems in solving the Korean nuclear crisis, and a multilateral binding of agreements can help solve the problems by increasing transparency and the transaction costs of violating the agreements. it includes all the global powers except the European Union. The United States and China unofficially form the Group of Two (G2), Japan is an economic superpower, and Russia used to be the leader of the Eastern bloc. The high concentration of superpowers in Northeast Asia poses a threat to Korea because an outbreak of greatpower conflict in the region will definitely devastate Korea, if not the world. Therefore, Korea has reason to promote a multilateral security mechanism that increases transparency among global powers and functions as a confidencebuilding measure. South Korea already shifting to a more regional focus Lee, 09 Seoul National University (December 2009, Geun, "The Nexus between Korea's Regional Security Options and Domestic Politics," www.cfr.org, JMP) Domestic Politics of Loyalty Portfolio When international politics create an opportunity for a democratic country to revise its loyalty portfolio, then national policy changes need to be justified through domestic political processes. During the Cold War, Korea was not as free as it is now, and Korean people were not supposed to think about changing Korea's loyalty portfolio. Full investment in the United States paid off in terms of security and Korea had no exit options. Therefore, until Korea became a fullfledged democracy in the 1990s, domestic politics with regard to Korea's foreign and regional policies were almost invisible. Second, a multilateral security arrangement in Northeast Asia is fundamentally a global security arrangement, as As Koreans witness the decreasing will and capacity of the United States to serve as a benevolent hegemon, more and more of them doubt Korea's current loyalty portfolio. In addition, the breakdown of the Cold War system in the early 1990s and the emergence of regional options have changed the previous payoff matrix for Korea. Since these changes in international affairs coincided perfectly with democratization in Korea, Korea has already reshuffled its loyalty investment at a rate that has been dazzling for people accustomed to the Cold War setup. Korea Neg 46/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors ALLIANCE => U.S. REGIONAL INTEGRATION Strong alliance ensures that U.S. integration in the region Twining, 10 Senior Fellow for Asia at the German Marshall Fund of the United States (4/1/10, Daniel, "Strengthening the U.S.Korea Alliance for the 21st Century," http://www.gmfus.org/galleries/ct_publication_attachments/AsiaDanTwiningU.S.KoreaAlliance.pdf) President Lee MyungBak is eager for a closer strategic and economic relationship with the United States. The shared challenge is to strengthen the economic foundations of U.S.South Korean relations; cooperate more closely in regional diplomacy, including in the realm of promoting good governance and human rights; and shift the military alliance from its focus on defending against North Korean aggression--which remains a necessary but not sufficient ambition--to conducting regional and global operations. An enhanced U.S.ROK alliance would advance U.S. interests across Asia by ensuring that the United States remains integrated in the pivotal region where four great Pacific powers--South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia--meet. Looking ahead, Asia's political transformation--with the expansion of democracy from Japan and India to South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, and beyond--may prove as important as Asia's economic transformation in determining the region's strategic future. More people live under democratic rule in Asia today than in any other region. China remains the great exception, but with deft diplomacy and wise leadership, American leadership in Asia will help sustain a pluralistic regional order in which norms of good governance can flourish; over time, this trend is likely to shape China's own internal debate on political reform. In this regard, South Korea--prosperous, democratic, at peace with its neighbors, and enjoying close ties to the United States and other major powers--may represent a model not only for North Korea but for China to follow as the AsiaPacific era dawns. Korea Neg 47/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors ALLIANCES COMPLIMENTS REGIONALISM Regional alliance compliments the transition to regionalism Twining, 10 Senior Fellow for Asia at the German Marshall Fund of the United States (4/1/10, Daniel, "Strengthening the U.S.Korea Alliance for the 21st Century," http://www.gmfus.org/galleries/ct_publication_attachments/AsiaDanTwiningU.S.KoreaAlliance.pdf) A natural next step is deepening trilateral defense cooperation with Japan--not simply on functional missile defense cooperation as argued above or visvis North Korea, as the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group has sought to do 338 Chapter 10 since 1999, but with regard to the broader security environment in East Asia and the Pacific. One useful model is the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue, an important vehicle for defense coordination and planning among the United States, Japan, and Australia which has had the additional benefit of fostering enhanced bilateral security cooperation between Tokyo and Canberra, who signed a separate defense pact in 2007. The ascent to power in Japan of a less nationalist Democratic Party leadership committed to greater Asian regional cooperation makes this a propitious moment to expand the scope and ambition of the U.S.JapanSouth Korea triangle. It also makes possible the creation of other multilateral groupings that would not replace the U.S. alliance system but, if appropriately structured along a transPacific axis, would complement it. These include an institutionalized forum bringing together the five parties that have cooperated in negotiations with North Korea through the SixParty Process. An institutionalized Asian concert bringing together the United States, Japan, South Korea, China, and Russia could be a useful forum both for nearterm coordination on North Korean denuclearization, longerterm planning for contingencies surrounding reunification of the peninsula, and agreeing on rules of regional conduct beyond the peninsula along the lines of the 19th century Concert of Europe. Regional security architecture Both the United States and South Korea have a compelling interest in moving their security partnership beyond the bilateral realm. Regionally lead multilateralism is an effective supplement to the current bilateral alliance system Snyder, 2009 (Scott, Asia Foundation, Council on Foreign Relations, " U.S. Domestic Politics and Multilateral Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia," http://asiafoundation.org/publications/pdf/677) Conclusion The United States maintains an ambivalent and detached attitude toward efforts to build multilateralism in Northeast Asia. Public opinion in the United States on issues related to Asian regionalism is unformed, and elite opinion is essentially satisfied with the status quo. Thus, there is little motivation on the part of the United States to seek alternative security structures in Northeast Asia. The idea of East Asian community is acceptable to the United States, but there is little appetite in the United States to lead such a project. At the same time, a mutually acceptable alternative leadership capable of shepherding such a project has not yet emerged. Moreover, there is little incentive on the part of the United States to pursue an alternative that would compete with or diminish the current alliance structure. But it is becoming clear that alliances alone are insufficient (albeit necessary) to address critical Asian security issues effectively. Multilateral cooperation is proceeding in various forms that are neither challenging to U.S. interests nor a U.S. priority. Korea Neg 48/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors ALLIANCES COMPLIMENTS REGIONALISM Multilateralism can develop alongside alliances Snyder, '09 Senior Adjunct Fellow for Korean Studies, Council on Foreign Relations, Director, Center for U.S. Korea Polciy, the Asia Foundation, "From Nuclear Talks to Regional Institutions: Challenges and Prospects for Security Multilateralism in Northeast Asia," http://asiafoundation.org/in asia/2009/06/24/fromnucleartalkstoregionalinstitutionschallengesandprospectsforsecurity multilateralisminnortheastasia/) A second issue that continues to draw considerable debate related to the establishment of a multilateral security architecture in Northeast Asia is the question of whether such a structure should serve as a replacement for or as a complement to the existing U.S. bilateral alliances with Japan and the Republic of Korea. It has become standard practice for preserving cooperation among states in the future, while conventional wisdom among American analysts is that there is no contradiction between America's Asian alliances and the establishment of a multilateral security framework in Northeast Asia.11 In fact, some American analysts may argue that common values among democratic states may enable the expansion of tasks in the U.S.Japan and U.S.ROK alliances, and that those tasks might be synchronized as part of a regional approach to cooperation that emphasizes common objectives of both alliances to maintain regional stability. This sort of approach also sees an important role for the U.S.led alliance network to play a balancing role in the context of China's rise, for instance, in the context of the idea of a League of Democracies proposed by presidential candidate John enhanced regional cooperation, especially in the security sphere. If the impetus for East Asian community building were to take off, such a development would have an indirect impact on U.S.led alliances to the extent that the establishment of cooperation lessens security dilemmas faced within the region and lays the foundation for cooperative security. But Japan's incomplete reconciliation with the rest of Asia over history, an ongoing regional rivalry between China and Japan, and the perceived need to hedge against the negative possibilities that might result from China's rise make it unlikely that the United States or its allies would be convinced to abandon the alliance framework in favor of cooperative security anytime soon. The United States is already pursuing regionalism in its response to North Korea's security challenge by attempting to mobilize a coordinated response through the six party process. This effort recognizes that the issue cannot be resolved satisfactorily using only deterrence and bilateral talks. The emergence of six party talks recognizes that the North Korean nuclear issue will require the collective involvement of all the parties neighboring North Korea if such a deal is going to "stick." Again, the six party mechanism is a tool to be used in conjunction with alliance cooperation, not supplanting the alliances with another form of security structure in Northeast Asia. For most American analysts, McCain in 2008. Because the alliances have served American interests well for so long, there is a hesitancy among American analysts to feel a strong need for innovation in this area or to respond to Asian desires for Chinese to characterize the concept of alliance as a legacy of the Cold War and to underscore the need to abandon alliance thinking in favor of security multilateralism as a more suitable model for the idea of multilateral dialogue as a supplement to the alliances as a foundation for assuring peace and stability in Northeast Asia is quite reasonable, but the continued existence of conflicting strategic aims among stakeholders in the region suggests that any idea of abandoning the alliances in favor of a multilateral security mechanism is implausible. It is worth thinking through circumstances under which the United States longer plays the role of anchor for the global financial system? Another factor that has strengthened the desirability of alliances has been America's own inability to play the role of sole provider of public goods. To the extent that partnerships and regional coalitions can play a role in multilateralizing the provision of international public goods through joint response to monitoring of sea lanes, multilateral provision of disaster relief, and joint responsibility for managing environmental issues such as climate change, these responses may contribute to American interest in Asian regionalism and might pose significant challenges to the continuation of America's Asian alliances in their current form. Conclusion This paper has examined how North Korea's nuclear pursuits have served to catalyze ad hoc security multilateralism in Northeast Asia over the course of the past two decades. On the one hand, the magnitude of North Korea's challenge to common regional security interests has brought regional actors together and has served as a focal point for the development of a collective regional response to this challenge. On the other hand, there is no other issue beyond North Korea's nuclear challenge that appears to be sufficiently compelling to overcome underlying security dilemmas or to drive the institutionalization of regional security cooperation among Northeast Asian countries. Although the North Korean nuclear issue has promoted habits of cooperation that could be regularized if they were to take root sufficiently that such a dialogue were perceived as serving the collective interests of all participants in the region, there is not yet sufficient reason in the view of this author to expect that any other issue will emerge as the basis for regional collective action in Northeast Asia. might be more positively disposed to taking a more active role in Asian regionalism. For instance, if China were to experience a change in its system and become a democracy, would this development remove the perceived need for U.S.led bilateral alliances and pave the way for cooperative security in Asia? What are the possible regional security implications of a situation in which the United States no Some may argue that the U.S.led alliance structure itself is a major factor inhibiting the development of such cooperation because any good alliance needs an enemy to be targeted against. It is this idea that has led many Chinese analysts to classify [CONTINUED] Korea Neg 49/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors ALLIANCES COMPLIMENTS REGIONALISM [CONTINUED] the U.S.led alliances as a historical relic of the cold war. However, such a view does not take into consideration the idea that the glue holding alliances together might also derive from cooperation that stands for something rather than being focused on a common threat. This emerging rationale for alliance cooperation is doubleedged, however, since existing alliances can also be used to hedge against the possibility of an emerging threat. To the extent that such a hedging strategy is still perceived as useful to ensure the security needs of alliance partners, it is much more likely that U.S.led alliances will continue to develop in tandem with multilateral security cooperation rather than in opposition to such cooperation. To the extent that security multilateralism proves itself to be an effective and constructive contributor to keeping the peace by promoting high levels of mutual trust in Northeast Asia, such a development might make the alliances obsolete. Until then, it is likely that security multilateralism in Northeast Asia will continue to develop on an ad hoc basis in response to specific challenges that require cooperation to successfully manage. Korea Neg 50/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors ECONOMIC DECLINE TURNS MULTILATERALISM Economic decline turns multilateralism Lum '09 (Thomas, American Report of The Asia Foundation Emerging Leaders Conference, "Current Developments In Southeast Asia: Implications For U.S." Southeast Asia Relations," http://asiafoundation.org/publications/pdf/641) In their country reports at the conference, Southeast Asian participants offered interesting insights into the problems of economic, political, and social development. Many of these domestic issues are not the topics of regional summits, although they have regional implications. To varying degrees, Southeast Asian countries have been adversely affected by the global recession and direct competition from China; however, other economic challenges, perhaps more fundamental, include corruption, income disparities, and underdeveloped legal institutions and infrastructure. One participant raised the notion of a "corruption plateau" whereby countries grow rapidly during the first phase of economic development but slow during latter stages due to corruption and low government capacity. Several countries in the region have experienced political instability or human rights violations in recent years which have impacted foreign relations. TimorLeste and Thailand have experienced setbacks to democracy while civil society groups have accused security forces in Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia of abuses. The 2006 military coup in Thailand and alleged human rights violations by security forces in the region have hindered military cooperation with the United States, to varying degrees. Some conferees argued that domestic political battles were responsible for the escalation of border clashes between Thai and Cambodian troops in 200809. The postponement of the ASEAN summit in April 2009 in Thailand due to domestic political unrest was seen as a blow to Thailand's leadership in the organization and a setback to the association's economic agenda, including taking measures to stimulate their economies and promote trade during the global recession . ***ROK SOFT POWER / MODERNIZATION ADV ANS Korea Neg 51/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors A2: ROK MODERNIZATION DETERS CHINA ROK supports Chinese rise the alliance is not needed to balance against China Kang 09 Professor of Government Adjunct Associate Professor at the Tuck School of Business Research Director of the Center for International Business Dartmouth (David C., 4 1, "Between balancing and bandwagoning: South Korea's response to China", http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb3241/is_1_9/ai_n32148831/?tag=content;col1) Why has South Korea accommodated China, instead of fearing its growth and balancing against it? This article makes two central arguments. First, concepts of balancing and bandwagoning are fundamentally difficult to test, and to the extent that the theory can be tested, it appears to be wrong in the case of South Korea. In fact, we observe many cases in which rising powers are neither balanced nor "bandwagoned" but are simply accommodated with no fundamental change either way in military stance or alignment posture. Second, the factors that explain South Korean foreign policy orientation toward China are as much about interests as they are about material power. South Korea sees substantially more economic opportunity than military threat associated with China's rise; but even more importantly, South Korea evaluates China's goals as not directly threatening. Related Results KEYWORDS: balance of power, accommodation, China, Korea, US alliance ********** A central debate in the field of international relations concerns the extent of balancing behavior. Kenneth Waltz's (1993, 17) confident assertion that "hegemony leads to balance" and that it has done so "through all of the centuries we can contemplate" is perhaps the default proposition in international relations. Yet in recent years, the balancing proposition has come under increasing empirical and theoretical scrutiny. Empirically, the absence of obvious balancing against the United States in the postCold War era led to a scholarly debate about why that might be the case (Paul 2005; Pape 2005; Schweller 2004; Brooks and Wohlforth 2005; Wohlforth 1999; Ikenberry 2002; Lieber and Alexander 2005). Theoretically, advances by scholars working in both the rationalist and constructivist traditions have pointed out the myriad ways in which state strategies depend on more than just the distribution of power (Powell 1999; Fearon and Wendt 2002; Kaufman, Little, and Wohlforth 2007). Scholars are also beginning to focus on another case that has the potential to yield significant insights into this debate: China. In the past three decades, China has rapidly emerged as a major regional and global power. Since the introduction of its market reforms in 1978, China has averaged over 9 percent economic growth. Foreign businesses have flocked to invest in the country, and Chinese exports have begun to flood world markets. China is modernizing its military, has joined numerous regional and international institutions, and is increasingly visible in international politics. However, although it would appear that these conditions are ripe for balancing behavior, China has managed to emerge without provoking a regional backlash (Goh 2007/08; Kang 2007; Womack 2003/04). South Koreathe Republic of Korea (ROK)presents perhaps the clearest example of this trend. A balanceofpower perspective would expect South Korea to fear a rapidly growing, geographically and demographically massive authoritarian and Communist China that sits on its border. Not only does China already have the military capability to threaten the peninsula, but the power disparity is widening. China also maintains close relations with North KoreaSouth Korea's main external threat since 1945. Furthermore, the United States and South Korea have enjoyed a close alliance for over a half century, and it was only US military action that prevented the North (in concert with the Chinese) from conquering the South in 1950. Since that time, the United States has stationed military forces in South Korea to prevent a second North Korean invasion. For all these reasons, the conventional perspectives would expect that South Korea fears a rapidly rising China and clings to its alliance with the United States. Yet South Korea has drawn closer to China over the past two decades, not farther away. Furthermore, South Korea has had increasing friction with Japan, a capitalist democracy that shares an alliance with the United States. Indeed, South Korea appears more worried about potential Japanese militarization than it is worried about actual Chinese militarization. Although the USROK alliance remains strong, the key point for this article is that the alliance is not a balancing alliance against China , and the recent adjustments in the alliance were neither aimed at nor the result of China. In sum, there is little evidence that South Korea will attempt to balance China, and even less evidence that South Korea fears China. Korea Neg 52/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors MILITARY PRESENCE KEY TO ROK AUTONOMY U.S. military presence helps preserve ROK autonomy and independence Twining, 10 Senior Fellow for Asia at the German Marshall Fund of the United States (4/1/10, Daniel, "Strengthening the U.S.Korea Alliance for the 21st Century," http://www.gmfus.org/galleries/ct_publication_attachments/AsiaDanTwiningU.S.KoreaAlliance.pdf) The forward presence of American forces in East Asia over the past 60 years, and the role of the U.S. alliance system in enabling access to American trade and investment, also provided a number of broader benefits for the Korean people. U.S. defense of the air and sea lanes of maritime Asia made possible the explosion of trade, both within the region and with the rich economies of the West, that characterized East Asia's postWorld War 2 development model. American security guarantees to Japan and South Korea and the garrisoning of American forces in these and other countries prevented the emergence of raw balanceofpower politics in East Asia, precluding the kind of selfhelp behavior that might otherwise have induced leaders in Tokyo and Seoul to consider developing nuclear weapons to bolster their country's security. America's dominant role as an Asian security provider helped guarantee the autonomy and independence of smaller states, including South Korea and many Southeast Asian nations, that might otherwise have fallen into larger rivals' spheres of influence, or worse. American preponderance in East Asia contributed to what political scientists call underbalancing: U.S. defense commitments to its allies enabled them to spend more of their national resources on social goods and less on defense. The most significant impact was on Japan, which had been Asia's leading revisionist and aggressive great power since the late 19th century. Not only was Japanese military power neutered with its defeat in World War 2; the U.S.Japan alliance effectively contained Japan's remilitarization, enabling Japanese leaders to channel their energies towards economic growth while spending less than one percent of GDP on what was truly a "defensive defense," given the dominant role of America's armed forces in safeguarding Japan from coercion and aggression. In turn, Japan's postwar redefinition of its national interests meant that Korea was, for the first time in centuries, not a subject of predation by its eastern neighbor. Korea Neg 53/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors A2: ROK MODERNIZATION DETERS CHINA South Korea won't balance China trying to expand relations Kang 09 Professor of Government Adjunct Associate Professor at the Tuck School of Business Research Director of the Center for International Business Dartmouth (David C., 4 1, "Between balancing and bandwagoning: South Korea's response to China", http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb3241/is_1_9/ai_n32148831/?tag=content;col1) South Korea represents perhaps the paradigmatic case of how China is reshaping foreign relations in the region. South Korea has shown little inclination to balance China and instead appears on the whole to be moving steadily and, skeptics have argued, naively to expand its relations with China. South Korea and China have similar stances on a range of foreign policy issues, from the best way to deal with North Korea to concerns about the future of Japanese foreign policy. What makes the South Korean case even more vivid is that South Korea has been one of the closest US allies in the region for over sixty years. [FIGURE 2 OMITTED] South Korean military capabilities have remained roughly the same over the past decade, and the ambitious Defense Reform 2020 plan is aimed notably at replacing outdated 1960sera weaponry while maintaining the ability to deal with contingencies regarding North Korea (Han 2006; Bennett 2006). The ROK air force will replace 1960sera F4s and 150 F16s with 60 KF15s and 60 KFXs and 170 KF16s (Table 1) and add 4 AWACS and 4 tankers, and "the resulting force should be a significant improvement in aggregate capabilities" (Bennett 2006, 5). The navy will reduce its outdated surface combat ships and upgrade the submarine force and add Aegis capabilities while reducing the overall quantity of combat ships. The greatest reduction in personnel will come from the army, which will reduce its size by onethird and reduce the number of divisions from fortyseven to twentyfour. Bruce Bennett (2006, 7) notes that although the new ROK military will be "more powerful, it is important to note that this will be a much smaller force ... despite its qualitative improvements, these reductions pose the risk that the 2020 ROK military will be perceived by some as being weaker." It is revealing that South Korea's newest military purchases are mainly maritime in nature, with the newly christened Great King Sejong Aegis destroyer the first of at least three and perhaps six destroyers. If South Korea considered China a threat, ostensibly its force structure would be different. Naval forces are less effective for deterring a land threat from either North Korea or China, but it does reveal that South Korea's main concerns are naval. The Taipei Times, on July 3, 2007, quoted South Korean president Roh commenting on the launch of the Sejong: "South and North Korea will not keep picking quarrels with each other forever.... We have to equip the nation with the capability to defend itself. The Aegis destroyer we are dedicating today could be the best symbol of that capability ." Perhaps even more interestingly, the experimental assault amphibious landing ship has been christened a "Dokdo" class of ships, which did not please the Japanese (Japan Policy and Politics 2005). Korea Neg 54/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors Their evidence is conflating possibility and probability just because South Korea can deter China does not mean they will take the action to do so. They have a vested interests in a Chinese rise to power because they are economically dependent upon them and believe they can act as a regional hegemon in Asia and provide for security since they are allies that's Kang `9 2NC WON'T DETER Korea Neg 55/436 Payne, et. al, 10 cites south Korean officials, the only barrier to prolif, from 2010 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors 2NC THE MODERNIZATION IS NUCLEAR Perceived decline in credibility of security guarantee with spur South Korean proliferation Campbell and einhorn `4 adviser in the CSIS International Security Program, where he works on a broad range of nonproliferation, armscontrol, and other national security Issues Korea Neg 56/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors Cooperation increasing Kellerhals, 10 (6/7/10, "Merle David Jr., Staff Writer, "ShangriLa Conference Highlights AsiaPacific Security Concerns", http://www.lexisnexis.com) Gates said that last year President Obama and Chinese President Hu Jintao made a commitment to " sustained and reliable militarytomilitary relations " between the two nations. But the relationship has been repeatedly interrupted by "the vagaries of political weather." "Regrettably, we have not been able to make progress on this relationship in recent months ," Gates said. The Pentagon wants improved militarytomilitary relations with Chinese military officials at all levels to reduce miscommunication, misunderstanding and miscalculation , he added. Gates said that as regional partners develop new capabilities, they have a responsibility to take a greater role in providing regional and global security. The nations of Asia have been making significant contributions in the Gulf of Aden against highseas piracy, and in securing peace for Iraq and for Afghanistan, he said. But North Korea has provided another reality, one that continues to undermine the peace and stability of East Asia, Gates said. The March 26 unprovoked attack on the South Korean ship Cheonan, in which 46 sailors were killed, is not an isolated event, he added. US hegemony guarantees a peaceful Chinese rise Matthews & Di, 09 professor of Defense Economics at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) **AND Research assistant at RSIS (9/30/09, Ron and Wang, Malaysia Insider, "The dragon marks its peaceful rise," Lexis) TWO events will once again focus the world's attention on the Middle Kingdom. The first is that China's growth rate for this year is slated to hit 8 per cent, suggesting the country will be among the first of the megapowers to recover from the global financial crisis. The second will be tomorrow's sight of China's biggest and most impressive military parade in a decade, in celebration of the 60th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic. Both events will inevitably fuel concerns about China's power. 1NC CHINA ADV power. China's economic power is the result of its unparalleled growth, averaging 9.5 per cent per annum over the past three decades. As a result of this growth, the country has been able to increase its defence expenditure by 17 per cent in each of the last four years. Reflecting this substantial expansion in defence expenditure, China's military power has undergone an impressive transformation , carrying with it the potential to destabilise the world order. China now has the world's biggest However, China views its rise as a peaceful one. Beijing's challenge is to project a soft rather than hard image of its standing army, with more than 2.25 million soldiers and a broad array of advanced military platforms, including nuclear powered submarines. The country is also in the process of acquiring aircraft carriers. Unsurprisingly, China's rising hard power is seen as a threat. The United States, in particular, is nervous of China's burgeoning military budget, at US $70.3 billion (S $99.6 billion), only is 10 per cent of what the US spends. Moreover, China's offensive capability is far inferior to that of the US China's navy . probably cannot sustain naval operations beyond 160km from its shores , its combat aircraft are less than half the number of America's, and much of its artillery is antique by Western standards. China is aware of the international anxieties engendered by its growing military strength, and needs to communicate the purpose and nature of its military 'modernisation' programme. Progress has been made on this front. In June, defence consultative talks between Beijing and Washington were resumed, and last month the two countries held maritime safety talks to reduce incidents such as the recent naval confrontation in the South China Sea. China's Defence Ministry has also launched a Chinese and English website to give an unprecedented amount of information on the country's military capability. The country is also seeking to counterbalance its hard power with a focus on soft power projection, the ultimate goal being to create the image of a benign China. For instance, in the area of maritime territorial disputes, it proposed to shelve disputes and engage in joint developments in 1978, providing the basis for the pathbreaking preliminary agreement with Japan last year to jointly explore gas fields in the East China Sea. China has also cooperated with neighbouring countries in nontraditional security areas such as drug trafficking, piracy, terrorism, money laundering and cyber crimes. The country has also sought to become a good international citizen. It has taken part in peacekeeping operations in international hot spots. In December last year, it sent three ships to the Gulf of Aden to combat piracy in the waters off Somalia. China acted in response to a United Nations Security Council request for assistance. Significantly, it was the Chinese navy's first mission beyond the Pacific. China provides a large amount of overseas aid, both economic and technical. By the end of capability and strategic reach. But is fear justified? There is room for doubt. this For instance , China's 'official' 2009 defence 2005, it had completed 769 projects in Africa, most of which were associated with sustainable development. The country has begun two other major programmes to expand its soft power One is the establishment of the Confucius Institutes. The other is the launch of what has been described as a 'media . aircraft carrier' aimed at the hearts and minds of a global audience. The Chinese government has pumped 45 billion yuan (S $9.3 billion) into supporting four key staterun news organisations China National Radio, China Central Television (CCTV), People's Daily and the Xinhua News Agency to expand the country's influence. There are also plans to launch an international news channel with roundtheclock global news coverage, rather like a Chinese version of the Arab network AlJazeera. China's desire to cultivate the image of a benign and responsible state is likely to curtail any use of its hard power . Therefore, the country's rise should be viewed positively. Presence is the only thing that deters Chinese aggression towards Taiwan withdrawal causes war Alagappa, Senior Fellow EastWest Center PhD, International Affairs, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy Tufts University 03 [Muthia, "Asian security order: instrumental and normative features", p. google books] The United States has also intervened in the increasingly tense standoff between China and Taiwan. The U.S. goal has been to deter China from seeking a military solution (the Taiwan Relations Act of 1974 calls for the United States to come to Taiwan's aid if it is attacked) and, in addition, to dissuade Taiwan from provocative acts of independence. In March 1996, China fired missiles close to Taiwan in anticipation of Taiwanese elections. This action was meant to intimidate Taiwan and had the temporary effect of stalling shipping in the ***U.S. CHINA ADV Korea Neg 57/436 Taiwan Straits. The United States responded by dispatching two aircraft carriers and some fourteen other warships to the area. Through its strategy of "calculated ambiguity" Washington meant to deter possible Chinese aggression and simultaneously to signal its willingness to maintain a cooperative relationship with China. Washington prepared to take similar steps early in 2000 as China once again escalated its rhetoric (this time without launching Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors missiles) in anticipation of an other Taiwanese election (Kaiser and Mufson 2000a), rourlh, U.S. hegemony has contributed to regional order by helping to stave off in Asia the kind of nationalist economic competition (and attendant political friction) that plagued the world economy during the 1930s. The potential for beg garthyneighbor policies certainly emerged during the late 1990s. The Asian financial crisis was a profound shock that might well have led to closed markets, competitive devaluations, and a downward spiral of trade and growth. The management of this crisis was found in Washington rather than Tokyo or elsewhere in the region. During the crisis, the U.S. Federal Reserve lowered interest rates to assure global liquidity and maintain high growth in the United States. As the cri sis eased, the United Stales spurred recovery by taking in the huge flood of ex ports from emerging economies as well as from China and Japan.1' Washington's response to the crisis reflected its regional economic strategy of seeking to liber alize the developmental capitalist markets of Japan and Southeast Asia while at the same time integrating China into the liberal world economy. It is important to recognize the limits of hegemony as a means to promote regional order. In essence, the U.S. hegemonic project in the Asia Pacific is more a holding action than a progressive strategy for resolving security problems. It is an effort to stabilize a status quo that reflects U.S. dominance. Although Washington has worked hard to keep relations among major powers in the region from deteriorating, it docs not seem to have a plan for resolving the longstanding ten sions in these relationships. In fact, since the United States does not want to en courage a balancing coalition against its dominant position, it is not clear that it has a strategic interest in the full resolution of differences between, say, Japan and China or Russia and China. Some tension among these states reinforces their need for a special relationship with the United States. Similarly, Washington has defused regional crises in Asia without States in light of its hegemonic strategy. Unification, after all, would diminish the need for a U.S. military presence in Korea--a any funda mental resolution of the underlying disputes. The series of U.S.initiated economic concessions to North Korea, for example, reflects more an effort to buy time than a plan to transform the politics of the Korean peninsula. Korean unification, in fact, would be a mixed blessing for the United presence U.S. officials believe is important not only to defend South Korea but also to stabilize relations elsewhere in East Asia. Not surprisingly, Washington sought to keep the issue of U.S. forwarddeployed forces off the table as the two Koreas began their detente process in 2000 (Harrison 2001). Washington's diplomacy toward the China Taiwan dispute proceeds in a similar spirit. Decisive steps by Taiwan toward independence would provoke China and raise the potential for military conflict . An aggressive attempt by China to incorporate Taiwan would force the U nited tales either to defend Tai wan or to S appease China--both of which are costly options. For the United Slates, an uneasy stalemate is preferable in current circumstances to any dramatic attempt at resolution. Washington has managed the conflict by trying to protect Taiwan without emboldening it and trying to deter China without isolating or provoking it. No China war Perry & Scowcroft, 9 *Professor at Stanford University, **Resident Trustee of the Forum for International Policy (William & Brent, 2009, "US Nuclear Weapons Policy," Council on Foreign Relations) Economic interdependence provides an incentive to avoid military conflict nuclear confrontation and . Although the United States has expressed concern about the growing trade deficit with China, the economies of the two countries have become increasingly intertwined and interdependent. U.S. consumers have bought massive quantities of cheap Chinese goods, and Beijing has lent huge amounts of money to the U nited tates. Similarly, S Taiwan and the mainland are increasingly bound in a reciprocal economic relationship . These economic relation ships should reduce the probability of a confrontation between China and Taiwan, and keep the United States and China from approach ing the nuclear brink, were such a confrontation to occur. On other nuclear issues, China and the nited tates U S have generally supported each other, as they did in the sixparty talks to dismantle North Korea's nuclear weapons programs. Here the , supportive BeijingWashington relationship points toward potentially promising dialogues on larger strategic issues. No war Adams, 09 reporter for global post and newsweek on China and Taiwan (3/31/09, Jonathon, Global Post, "The dragon sharpens its claws," http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/chinaanditsneighbors/090331/thedragonsharpensitsclaws ) Taiwan insists it's an independent state. Beijing sees it as Chinese territory that must one day end its democratic "holiday" and return to the fold. The U.S. has a commitment, albeit an ambiguous one, to help defend Taiwan's democracy against Chinese aggression. That means U.S. Marines, sailors and pilots could one day, perhaps suddenly, be sent to take on Asia's most lethal military, all for the sake of a small island which few Americans can distinguish from Thailand. The good news: most experts agree that conflict will probably never happen . U.S. diplomacy has helped keep the peace in the Taiwan Strait for 60 years. And tensions have eased in the past year with the election of a Taiwan president who is forging better relations with Beijing . Chinese and Taiwanese media reported this week that the two sides' militaries will both attend a conference in Hawaii this summer. Korea Neg 58/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors Korea Neg 59/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors 2NC CHINA RISE PEACEFUL China rise is peaceful Mathew and Di `9 indicates that it is attempting to project soft power, and promote a diplomatic status this means we control uniqueness on the Chinese advantage Institutions and power relations makes rise peaceful Ikenberry, 08 professor of International Affairs at Princeton University (Jan/Feb 2008, John G., Vol. 87, Issue 1 Foreign Affairs, "The Rise of China and the Future of the West," Proquest) The most important benefit of these features today is that they give the Western order a remarkable capacity to accommodate rising powers. New entrants into the system have ways of gaining status and authority and opportunities to play a role in governing the order. The fact that the United States , China, and other great powers have nuclear weapons also limits the ability of a rising power to overturn the existing order. In the age of nuclear deterrence, greatpower war is, thankfully, no longer a mechanism of historical change. Wardriven change has been abolished as a historical process. groupings. But as the scholar Marc Lanteigne argues, " What separates China from other states, and indeed previous global powers, is that not only it is 'growing up' within a milieu of international institutions far more developed than ever before, but more importantly, it is doing so while making active use of these institutions to promote the country's development of global power status." China, in short , is increasingly working within , rather than outside of, the Western order . China is already a permanent member of the UN Security Council , a legacy of Roosevelt's determination to build the universal body around diverse greatpower leadership. This gives China the same authority and advantages of "greatpower exceptionalism" as the other permanent members. The existing global trading system is also valuable to China, and increasingly so. Chinese economic interests are quite congruent with the current global The Western order's strong framework of rules and institutions is already starting to facilitate Chinese integration. At first, China embraced certain rules and institutions for defensive purposes: protecting its sovereignty and economic interests while seeking to reassure other states of its peaceful intentions by getting involved in regional and global economic system a system that is open and loosely institutionalized and that China has enthusiastically embraced and thrived in. State power today is ultimately China not only needs continued access to the global capitalist system; it also wants the protections that the system's rules and institutions provide The WTO's multilateral trade principles and disputesettlement mechanisms, for example, offer China tools to . based on sustained economic growth, and China is well aware that no major state can modernize without integrating into the globalized capitalist system; if a country wants to be a world power, it has no choice but to join the World Trade Organization (WTO). The road to global power, in effect, runs through the Western order and its multilateral economic institutions. defend against the threats of discrimination and protectionism that rising economic powers often confront. The evolution of China's policy suggests that Chinese leaders recognize these advantages: as Beijing's growing commitment to economic liberalization has increased the foreign investment and trade China has enjoyed, so has Beijing increasingly embraced global trade rules. It is possible that as China comes to champion the WTO, the support of the more mature Western economies for the WTO will wane. But it is more likely that both the rising and the declining countries will find value in the quasilegal mechanisms that allow conflicts to be settled or at least diffused. Korea Neg 60/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors No war China is focused on its economy CRS, 08 (A study prepared by the Congressional Research service for the U.S. Senate Committee for Foreign Relations, April, 08, "China's foreign policy and `soft power' in South America, Asia, and Africa" http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2008_rpt/crschina.pdf) Within the ongoing international debate about what China's ultimate intentions may be for its growing global achievements, it is possible to point to some fundamental objectives that appear to be at least partial motivations for Beijing's current international outreach. Adding to the uncertainty about PRC policies, these presumed objectives at times are in contradiction, suggesting either a lack of coherence or that they reflect internal Chinese disagreements and compromise. China's policy direction is that much harder to predict when some of these key policy objectives are seen to clash, and experience tells us that abrupt shifts in policy, shifts which remain unexplained in many cases, still occur with a fair degree of regularity in the PRC system. Enhancing Sustainable Economic Growth Strong economic development continues to be seen as the core primary objective for the PRC leadership for a host of reasons--not the least of which are to raise the living standards of its enormous population, to dampen social disaffection about economic and other inequities, and to sustain regime legitimacy after the demise of communist ideology as an acceptable organizing principle. China's annual economic growth rates routinely are in the double digits; in 2007, they reached an annual rate of 11.4 percent--the highest since 1994.9 This rapid and sustained economic growth has created voracious domestic appetites for resources, capital, and technology , as well as for markets for Chinese goods, and these appetites have served as powerful drivers of China's international trade and investment agreements. CHINA RISE PEACEFUL ECON Korea Neg 61/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors The global climate prevents China's rise from being violent it will thrive within the Western system Ikenberry, 08 professor of International Affairs at Princeton University (Jan/Feb 2008, John G., Vol. 87, Issue 1 Foreign Affairs, "The Rise of China and the Future of the West," Proquest) The rise of China will undoubtedly be one of the great dramas of the twentyfirst century. China's extraordinary economic growth and active diplomacy are already transforming East Asia, and future decades will see even greater increases in Chinese power and influence. But exactly how this drama will play out is an open question. Will CHINA RISE PEACEFUL INSTITUTIONS China overthrow the existing order or become a part of it? And what, if anything, can the United States do to maintain its position as China rises? Some observers believe that the American era is coming to an end, as the Westernoriented world order is replaced by one increasingly dominated by the East. The historian Niall Ferguson has written that the bloody twentieth century witnessed "the descent of the West" and "a reorientation of the world" toward the East. Realists go on to note that as China gets more powerful and the United States' position erodes, two things are likely to happen: China will try to use its growing influence to reshape the rules and institutions of the international system to better serve its interests, and other states in the system especially the declining hegemon will start to see China as a growing security threat. The result of these developments, they predict, will be tension, distrust, and conflict, the typical features of a power That course, however, is not inevitable. The rise of China does not have to trigger a wrenching hegemonic transition . The U.S.Chinese power transition can be very different from those of the past because China faces an international order that is fundamentally different from those that past rising states confronted. China does not just face the United States; it faces a Westerncentered system that is open, integrated, and rulebased, with wide and deep political foundations. The nuclear revolution, meanwhile, has made war among great powers unlikely eliminating the major tool that rising powers have used to overturn international systems defended by declining hegemonic states. Today's Western order, in short, is hard to overturn and easy to join. This unusually durable and expansive order is itself the product of farsighted U.S. leadership. After World War II, the United States did not simply establish itself as the leading world power. It led in the creation of universal institutions that not only invited global membership but also brought democracies and market societies closer together It built an order that facilitated the . reintegrate the defeated Axis states and the beleaguered Allied states into a unified international system.) Today, China can gain full access to and thrive within this system. And if it does, China will rise, but the Western order if managed properly will live . on participation and integration of both established great powers and newly independent states. (It is often forgotten that this postwar order was designed in large part to transition. In this view, the drama of China's rise will feature an increasingly powerful China and a declining United States locked in an epic battle over the rules and leadership of the international system. And as the world's largest country emerges not from within but outside the established postWorld War II international order, it is a drama that will end with the grand ascendance of China and the onset of an Asiancentered world order. Korea Neg 62/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors Forward deployed ground troops in Asia are critical to deter Chinese expansionism and attempts at seizing Taiwan. The plan collapses the efficacy of the signal sent by US presence this precipitates Chinese invasion of Taiwan. That's Alagappa And, Military presence is the critical balancing force preventing Chinese aggression Goh, 5 Assistant Professor at the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, Singapore (Evelyn, "Meeting the China Challenge: The U.S. in Southeast Asian Regional Security Strategies, http://scholarspace.manoa.hawaii.edu/bitstream/10125/3509/3/PS016.pdf.txt) Traditional friends and allies of the United States in East Asia acknowledge that a key determinant of stability in the region has been the U.S. presence and its role as a security guarantor. In the postCold War period, regional uncertainties about the potential dangers attending a rising China have led some analysts to conclude that almost all Southeast Asian states now see the United States the critical balancing force both in the military and political as , economic spheres. The existing literature on this Southeast Asia U.S.China security dynamic tends to assume that China's rise is leading to a systemic power transition scenario in which the region will have to choose between a rising challenger and the incumbent power. The de facto expectation is that these countries will want to balance against China on the basis that a rising China is threatening. Thus, they will flock toward the United States as the lead balancer. Yet, most key states in the region face complex pressures with regard to China's growing role and do not perceive themselves as having the stark choices of either balancing against or bandwagoning with this powerful neighbor. 2NC WITHDRAW CAUSES CHINESE AGRESION And, it sends an equally important signal demonstrates the costs of conflict Goh, 5 Assistant Professor at the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, Singapore (Evelyn, "Meeting the China Challenge: The U.S. in Southeast Asian Regional Security Strategies, http://scholarspace.manoa.hawaii.edu/bitstream/10125/3509/3/PS016.pdf.txt) Southeast Asian states are not looking so much to contain China as to socialize it while hedging against the possibility of aggression or domination by it. his approach to growing Chinese power hinges on T three elements. First is the successful playing of triangular politicsthe use of bilateral relations with one major power as leverage to make advances in improving relations with another. This is seen, for instance, in Thailand's strategy visvis China and the United States. Second is a strong expectation of deterrence the harnessing of superior U.S. force in the region to persuade Beijing that any aggressive action would be too costly and unlikely to succeed These two elements . together are usually construed to represent "balancing" policies. The third element that is at least equally emphasized, however, is engagementthe meaningful integration and socialization of China into the regional system, cultivating it as a responsible, constructive, status quo regional power. And, military presence prevents China from launching an attack on Taiwan senior military officers confirm CP, 04[China Post,] ("U.S. PRESENCE IN THE PACIFIC DETERRING PRC, U.S. NAVY SAYS," April 2, Lexis) The U.S. military presence in the Western Pacific continues to deter mainland China from launching an attack against Taiwan , according to the Pentagon's most senior naval officer responsible for U.S. forces in the region. Testifying before the House Armed Services Committee on Wednesday, Adm. Thomas Fargo, commander U.S. Pacific Command, noted that the U.S. "ability to dissuade and deter China ... is really very good While the conflicts in ." remains the largest friction point in the relationship between China and the United States," he told the committee. Southwest Asia, the War on Terror and confronting a belligerent North Korea are the immediate focus for the U.S. military, relations between India and Pakistan and the risk of miscalculation across the Taiwan Strait continue to "worry" Adm. Fargo. "The Taiwan issue President Bush has stated the U.S. "support for the 'one China' policy and the three communiques," according to Fargo, but he added, "it should also be equally clear that our national leadership and the Pacific Command are prepared to commit and committed to meet our obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act." The U.S. maintains "a force posture and readiness and an ability to respond to contingencies that will ensure that should the president ask, we can meet those responsibilities under the TRA," he said. Washington continues to watch developments following Taiwan's presidential election U.S. remains conscious that "China in the future is going to have a very modern and capable military he said. ," We'll read uniqueness right now the rise will be peaceful and is based of diplomatic solutions "closely" and has seen "no indication of an imminent military crisis," said the admiral. Though the mainland's military intent is "impossible" to assess, the Matthews & Di, 09 professor of Defense Economics at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) **AND Research assistant at RSIS (9/30/09, Ron and Wang, Malaysia Insider, "The dragon marks its peaceful rise," Lexis) Korea Neg 63/436 Both events will inevitably fuel concerns about China's power. However, Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors TWO events will once again focus the world's attention on the Middle Kingdom. The first is that China's growth rate for this year is slated to hit 8 per cent, suggesting the country will be among the first of the megapowers to recover from the global financial crisis. The second will be tomorrow's sight of China's biggest and most impressive military parade in a decade, in celebration of the 60th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic. China views its rise as a peaceful one. Beijing's challenge is to project a soft rather than hard image of its power. China's economic power is the result of its unparalleled growth, averaging 9.5 per cent per annum over the past three decades. As a result of this growth, the country has been able to increase its defence expenditure by 17 per cent in each of the last four years. Reflecting this substantial expansion in defence expenditure, China's military power has undergone an impressive transformation, carrying with it the potential to destabilise the world order . China now has the world's biggest standing army, with more than 2.25 million soldiers and a broad array of advanced military platforms, including nuclear powered submarines. The country is also in the process of acquiring aircraft carriers. Unsurprisingly, China's rising hard power is seen as a threat. The United States, in particular, is nervous of China's burgeoning military capability and strategic reach. But is this fear justified? There is room for doubt. For instance, China's 'official' 2009 defence budget, at US $70.3 billion (S $99.6 billion), is only 10 per cent of what the US spends. Moreover, China's offensive capability is far inferior to that of the US. China's navy probably cannot sustain naval operations beyond 160km from its shores, its combat aircraft are less than half the number of America's, and much of its artillery is antique by Western standards. China is aware of the international anxieties engendered by its growing military strength, and needs to communicate the purpose and nature of its military 'modernisation' programme. Progress has been made on this front. In June, defence consultative talks between Beijing and Washington were resumed, and last month the two countries held maritime safety talks to reduce incidents such as the recent naval confrontation in the South China Sea. China's Defence Ministry has also launched a Chinese and English website to give an unprecedented amount of information on the country's military capability. The country is also seeking to counterbalance its hard power with a focus on soft power projection, the ultimate goal being to create the image of a benign China. For instance, in the area of maritime territorial disputes, it proposed to shelve disputes and engage in joint developments in 1978, providing the basis for the pathbreaking preliminary agreement with Japan last year to jointly explore gas fields in the East China Sea. China has also cooperated with neighbouring countries in nontraditional security areas such as drug trafficking, piracy, terrorism, money laundering and cyber crimes. The country has also sought to become a good international citizen. It has taken part in peacekeeping operations in international hot spots. In December last year, it sent three ships to the Gulf of Aden to combat piracy in the waters off Somalia. China acted in response to a United Nations Security Council request for assistance. Significantly, it was the Chinese navy's first mission beyond the Pacific. China provides a large amount of overseas aid, both economic and technical. By the end of 2005, it had completed 769 projects in Africa, most of which were associated with sustainable development. other is the launch of what has been described as a 'media aircraft carrier' aimed at the hearts and minds of a global audience. The Chinese government has pumped 45 billion yuan (S $9.3 billion) into supporting four key staterun news organisations China National Radio, China Central Television (CCTV), People's Daily and the Xinhua News Agency to expand the country's influence. There are also plans to launch an international news channel with roundtheclock global news coverage, rather like a Chinese version of the Arab network AlJazeera. The country has begun two other major programmes to expand its soft power One is the establishment of the Confucius Institutes. The . China's desire to cultivate the image of a benign and responsible state is likely to curtail any use of its hard power. Therefore, the country's rise should be viewed positively. Korea Neg 64/436 Adams, 09 a. experts b. empirically 60 years c. recency new taiwanese politicians Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors 2NC NO TAIWAN WAR Korea Neg 65/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors CHINA WON'T BALANCE AGAINST U.S. Their claims are suspect and made by realists with little background knowledge of China no reason China would challenge US heg Shambaugh, 04 Director of the China Policy Program at George Washington University (Winter 04/05, David, "China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order," International Security, Project Muse ) To be sure, this is a subjective assessment, but I would argue that it is a fair portrayal of the views and interests of the U.S. and Chinese governments. On balance, as Table 2 indicates, the United States and China find themselves on the same side of many of the key issues affecting the future of the Asian region, which may well enhance their opportunities for tangible cooperation. Some observers in the United States, however, see China's Asian engagement as an inexorable zerosum attempt to displace the United States as the primary power in the region.94 Some have even called for preemptively containing China before it can truly challenge U.S. preeminence first in Asia and then globally. This policy prescription, which is rooted in the theory of offensive realism, is most notably advocated by the University of Chicago scholar John Mearsheimer. Both the logic and application of offensive realism in this case are, in my view, unsustainable. It is a classic example of an international relations theorist, who is not well grounded in regional area studies, deductively applying a theory to a situation rather than inductively generating theory from evidence. As a China specialist, I do not recognize the China that Mearsheimer describes, and I see no evidence of his "Chinese hegemony" thesis and thus reject his policy prescription of preemptive containment.95 Contemporary international relations involve more than relations among great powers, and even great power interactions are not intrinsically zerosum Hobbesian struggles. Rather they are complex mixtures of interdependence, cooperation amid competition, and structural adjustments . Just as one nation (China) rises, it does not ipso facto follow that another (the United States) must fall--or even decline relatively. Nor does the rising power necessarily seek hegemonic dominance. It is also not inevitable that rising powers challenge the established power , thus producing structural conflict (as, for example, the power transition theory would predict). Not only do the analogies of previous rising powers fail to fit contemporary China, but they also have no precedents in China's past. As historian Wang Gungwu points out, this is not the rst time in history that China has risen: it is the fourth such economic, social, and demographic pressures to precipitate dy nastic decline. Moreover, China does not have a significant history of instance.96 In the QinHan, SuiTang, and MingQing dynasties, external pressures on China's northern and eastern periphery combined with domestic coercive statecraft.97 China's "tribute system," which constituted the regional system in Asia for more than 2,500 years, was characterized by a combination of patronclient ties; economic interdependence; security protection for those closest to China (especially Korea); cultural assimilation into Confucian customs (lai Hua); political ritual (koutou); and benevolent governance (wangdao). The tribute system may have been hegemonic, but it was not based on coercion or territorial expansionism.98 These are essential points to bear in mind when considering China's new ascendance in Asian affairs. Korea Neg 66/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors Korea Neg 67/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors ***OVERSTRETCH*** Korea Neg 68/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors Alt cause afghanistan Pyne, 9 - Vice Chair of the Utah State Legislative Compensation Commission and Vice President of the Association of the United States Army's Utah chapter and a Vice President of the Salt Lake Total Force Chapter of the Military Officers Association of America (David, "Obama failing our troops in Afghanistan," 11/7, http://westernfrontamerica.com/2009/11/07/obamafailingtroopsafghanistan/) 1NC OVERSTRETCH Since we invaded Iraq six and a half years ago and Afghanistan eight years ago, we have lost nearly 7,000 American soldiers and contractors killed in action with tens of thousands more severely wounded at the cost of a trillion dollars thus far. October has been the single deadliest month for US forces since the war began. It shouldn't take a military strategist to realize that after fighting a war for over eight years without any real idea how to win, it might be time to consider a drastic change in strategy. This should include a sober assessment of the cost/benefit analysis of staying and fighting at a rising cost in American blood and treasure versus conserving our military strength and bringing our troops home to defend America from terrorist attack. The Soviets fought an eight year long war in Afghanistan before finally realizing that victory was not a possibility in a conflict which some say began a chain of events that resulted in the collapse of the Evil Empire thanks to Reagan's support of proxy forces against the Soviet invaders. If the Soviet Union could not win after eight years of fighting in Afghanistan, what makes our leaders think that we can? The longer we keep large numbers of troops fighting nowin counterinsurgency wars of attrition Iraq and our in Afghanistan , the weaker and more vulnerable we will become to the point where eventually the American Empire, as some call it, may decline precipitously or perhaps even collapse altogether. Worse yet, America's increasing military weakness highlighted further by Obama's ongoing demolition of our nuclear deterrent might invite a catastrophic attack from our from our SinoRussian alliance enemies. Already some of our retired generals have stated that they believe our Army and Marine Corps ground forces have been broken by their overdeployment in the desert sands of Iraq and Afghanistan. If the Soviet Union could not win after eight years of fighting in Afghanistan, what makes our leaders think that we can? The longer we keep large numbers of our troops bogged down fighting two nowin counterinsurgency wars of attrition in Iraq and Afghanistan, the weaker and more vulnerable we will become to the point where eventually the American Empire, as some call it, may decline precipitously or perhaps even collapse altogether. Worse yet, America's increasing military weakness highlighted further by Obama's ongoing demolition of our nuclear deterrent, might invite a catastrophic attack from our from our SinoRussian alliance enemies. Already some of our retired generals have stated that they believe our Army and Marine Corps ground forces have been broken by their overdeployment the desert sands of Iraq and in Afghanistan. This high tempo of deployments has resulted in much of our military equipment to break down while procurement and readiness are at their lowest levels over the past quarter century. Our national security always suffers when we get bogged down in wars where our troops are asked to bleed and die, but are not permitted by our political leaders to win. Our brave soldiers should never be allowed to sacrifice in this way without the hope of victory! The best way to support our troops is to bring them home to their families and make a commitment that we will not let a week go by without thanking a soldier for their willingness to risk life and limb to defend us all. What is it going to take to get our political leaders to realize that the costs of staying and fighting the long war in Iraq and Afghanistan greatly outweigh the costs of redeploying out of theater? The same voices we hear calling for us to send another 40,000 to 100,000 troops to Afghanistan are the ones that would have called for us to keep surging and fighting in Vietnam in perpetuity at the cost of hundreds of thousands of our soldiers lives. It didn't make sense to do that then and it doesn't make sense to do so now. Ronald Reagan won the Cold War against the Evil Soviet Empire in part by employing proxies to fight and win our battles for us. We need to learn from Reagan and reemploy a strategy of arming and supporting proxies both states and insurgent movements to fight our wars so our troops don't have to. America needs to conserve military strength for its a time when we they may be called upon to fight great power enemies , not waste it bogged down fighting Vietnams in the desert as we have been doing the past several years. Until we do, we will remain in a state of imperial overstretch and strategic paralysis with no reserve forces to fight new hypothetical wars of necessity and with a continuing window of vulnerability which our enemies will undoubtedly continue to exploit. North Korea has already been exploiting our window of vulnerability with their ongoing nuclear missile buildup as has the Islamic Republic of Iran is doing with its near imminent development of weaponized nukes. Even Russia has done so with their invasion of USally Georgia this past year. Troops don't matter naval power maintains dominance Jack S. Levy (Board of Governors' Professor at Rutgers University and former president of both the International Studies Association and the Peace Science Society) and William R. Thompson (Donald A. Rogers Professor of Political Science at Indiana University, former president of the International Studies Association, and Managing Editor of International Studies Quarterly) Summer 2010 " Balancing on Land and at Sea Do States Ally against the Leading Global Power?" http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Balancing_on_Land_and_at_Sea.pdf Contrary to traditional balance of power theory and its argument that states tend to balance against the strongest power in the system, particularly if that lead state is increasing in strength, hypothesis 1 predicts that there is no strong tendency for great powers to balance against the leading sea power in the system, even if it is signicantly increasing in strength. As the marginal frequencies in the right column of table 3 indicate, great power alliances have formed against the lead sea power in 88 cases Korea Neg Michigan Institutes `10 69/436 7 Week Juniors out of a total of 544 possible opportunities, or about 16 percent of the time . This is strong evidence in support of H1 about the absence of a systematic tendency toward balancing against the leading sea power . In marked contrast, great power alliances formed against the leading land power in Europe about 43 percent of the time over the same time period.67 This comparison provides strong support for H1's implication that great powers are signicantly less likely to balance against the leading global sea power than against the leading European land power. No impact to hegemonic decline Richard Haas 2008 (president of the Council on Foreign Relations, former director of policy planning for the Department of State, former vice president and director of foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution, the Sol M. Linowitz visiting professor of international studies at Hamilton College, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a lecturer in public policy at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, and a research associate at the International Institute for Strategic Studies) April "Ask the Expert: What Comes After Unipolarity?" http://www.cfr.org/publication/16063/ask_the_expert.html Does a non polar world increase or reduce the chances of another world war? Will nuclear deterrence continue to prevent a large scale conflict? Sivananda Rajaram, UK Richard Haass: I believe the chance of a world war, i.e., one involving the major powers of the day, is remote and likely to stay that way. This reflects more than anything else the absence of disputes or goals that could lead to such a conflict. Nuclear deterrence might be a contributing factor in the sense that conceivable no dispute among the major powers would justify any use of nuclear weapons but again, I believe the fundamental reason great power relations , are relatively good is that all hold a stake in sustaining an international order that supports trade and financial flows and avoids largescale conflict . The danger in a nonpolar world is not global conflict as we feared during the Cold War but smaller but still highly costly conflicts involving terrorist groups, militias, rogue states, etc. Heg doesn't solve anything Christopher Layne 6 (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) "The Peace of Illusions" p 1767 A second contention advanced by proponents of American hegemony is that the United States cannot withdraw from Eurasia because a great power war there could shape the post conflict international system in ways harmful to U.S. interests. Hence, the United States "could suffer few economic losses during a war, or even benefit somewhat, and still find the postwar environment quite costly to its own trade and investment."sa This really is not an economic argument but rather an argument about the consequences of Eurasia's political and ideological, as well as economic, closure. Proponents of hegemony fear that if great power wars in Eurasia occur, they could bring to power militaristic or totalitarian regimes. Mere, several points need to be made. First, proponents of American hegemony overestimate amount of the influence that the United States has on the international system. There are numerous possible geopolitical rivalries in Eurasia . Most of these will not culminate in war, but it's a good bet that some will. But regardless of whether Eurasian great powers remain at peace, the outcomes are going to be caused more by those states' calculations of their interests than by the presence of U.S. forces in Eurasia. The United States has only limited power to affect the amount of war and peace in the international system, and whatever influence it does have is being eroded by the creeping multipolarization under way in Eurasia . Second , the possible benefits of "environment shaping" have to be weighed against the possible costs of U.S. involvement in a big Eurasian war . Finally, distilled to its essence, this argument is a restatement of the fear that U.S. security and interests inevitably will be jeopardized by a Eurasian hegemon. This threat is easily exaggerated , and manipulated, to disguise ulterior motives for U.S. military intervention in Eurasia . No transition war Carla Norrlof 2010 (an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto) 2010 "America's Global Advantage US Hegemony and International Cooperation" p. 50 Keohane and Snidal's predictions that the waning of American power did not have to jeopardize cooperation were in this context reassuring. As mentioned at the outset of this chapter, Keohane explained the persistence of cooperation in terms of states' continued demand for regimes.40 Snidal demonstrated that collective action depends as much on the hegemon's size, as it does on the size of other actors in the international system. By paying attention to the size of all Great Powers, not just the hegemon, Snidal opened up the possibility that a more symmetrical distribution of power might enhance the prospects for the provision of public goods, thus offering a potential explanation for the otherwise puzzling persistence of cooperation in the 1980s despite America's relative decline. The likelihood for cooperation increases with American decline because the hegemon can no longer singlehandedly provide the good as it declines, so smaller states have to chip in for the good to be provided If one were to use Snidal's production function in the revised model (i.e., by plugging the numbers from . his production function into the revised model), the waning hegemon continues to be taken advantage of. While Snidal was modeling a theory he did not believe in, these distributional implications haunt the literature and cast decline as inescapable and continuous Korea Neg 70/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors 2NC AFGHANISTAN ALT CAUSE Pyne evidence afghanistan will be the death of American ground troops, 100s of thousands of troops are there instead of 10s of thousands Afghanistan will kill readiness Kuhner, 9 the president of the Edmund Burke Institute for American Renewal (Jeffrey, Washington Times, "Obama's quagmire; US should look to its own interests," 9/7, Lexis Academic) America is losing the war in Afghanistan Rather than change course, President Obama is sending 21,000 additional U.S. troops. This will . bring the total to 68,000 American soldiers fighting in Afghanistan, bolstering coalition forces to 110,000. The troop surge, however, will not work. Afghanistan has become Mr. Obama's Vietnam a protracted quagmire draining precious American blood and treasure. August was the deadliest month for U.S. forces, with 47 soldiers killed by Taliban insurgents. More than 300 coalition troops have died in 2009. This is the highest toll since the war began in 2001, and there are still four months to go. The tide of battle has turned against the West. The Taliban is resurgent. It has reasserted control over its southern stronghold in Kandahar. The Taliban is launching devastating attacks in the western and northern parts of the country formerly stable areas. U.S. casualties are soaring The morale . of coalition forces is plummeting Most of our allies with the exception of the Canadians and the British are reluctant to engage the . Islamist militants. American public support for the war is waning. The conflict has dragged on for nearly eight years. (U.S. involvement in World War II was four years, World War I less than one.) Yet, America's strategic objectives remain incoherent and elusive. The war's initial aim was to topple the Taliban and eradicate al Qaeda bases from Afghan territory. Those goals have been achieved. Washington should have declared victory and focused on the more important issue: preventing Islamic fundamentalists from seizing power in Pakistan, along with its nuclear arsenal. Instead, America is engaged in futile nationbuilding. Mr. Obama, like President George W. Bush before him, believes Afghanistan must be transformed by erecting a strong central government, democracy and a modern economy. Washington argues this will prevent terrorism from taking root and bring about lasting "stability." Hence, following a recent reassessment of the war by Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, U.S. commander in Afghanistan, the Obama administration is contemplating deploying 20,000 to 40,000 U.S. troops on top of the 21,000 already pledged. Moreover, billions have been spent building irrigation canals, schools, hospitals and factories. Civilian advisers are being sent to encourage farmers to grow other cash crops besides opium poppies. Western aid money has been used to establish a massive Afghan army, a large police force and a swollen government bureaucracy. Gen. McChrystal said this week that the situation is "serious," but not impossible. He still believes victory is within reach. His new strategy is to protect Afghan civilians from Taliban attacks. He also wants to create a lucrative jobs programs and improve local government services. The goal is to win the "hearts and minds" of the Afghan people. Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, says we must combat Afghanistan's "culture of poverty." Call it humanitarian war through social engineering. Mr. Obama's policy will result in a major American defeat one that will signal the end of America as a superpower and expose us to the world as a paper tiger. Afghanistan is the graveyard of empires. The mighty British and Russian armies were humiliated in drawnout guerrilla campaigns. The country's mountainous geography and primitive tribal culture are ideally suited for insurgent warfare . By sending in more troops, Washington is playing right into the Taliban's hands: We are enabling the Taliban to pick off our forces one by one as they wage a campaign of attrition The Taliban blend with the local population, making it . almost impossible for U.S. forces to distinguish combatants from civilians. American counterinsurgency efforts are thus alienating some of the locals Initially . welcomed as liberators, we are now viewed in some quarters as occupiers. Moreover, much of the West's aid money is siphoned off by greedy politicians in Kabul. President Hamid Karzai's government is corrupt, venal and ineffective. It barely controls onethird of the country. It is despised by many Afghans for its brutality and incompetence. In addition, Mr. Karzai's vicepresidential running mate is a drug trafficker. The West's efforts to forge a cohesive national state based on federalism and economic reconstruction have failed. Warlords are increasingly asserting power in the provinces. The country is fractured along tribal and ethnic lines. The center cannot hold: Afghanistan remains mired in anarchy, blood feuds and weak, decentralized rule. U.S. troops should be deployed to defend U.S. national interests. Their lives should never be squandered for an experiment in liberal internationalism. In fact, such a policy is morally grotesque and strategically reckless. Mr. Obama should quickly withdraw most U.S. forces from Afghanistan. American air power and small, flexible Special Forces units are more than enough to wipe out al Qaeda terrorists The Taliban is too hated to reoccupy the country unless our huge military and economic footprint . drives numerous Afghans into the evil, welcoming arms of extremists. Korea Neg 71/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors The status quo solves hegemony troops and credibility have no vital role you should prefer our evidence which cites empirics over their evidence which is just rhetoric We will still maintain hegemony through naval power 456 times out of 544 chances in which a country could have counterbalanced or rose against the lead sea power they did not, that is 84% percent of the time. Overstretch won't kill heg does not assume latent powers Wohlforth 7 Professor of Government at Dartmouth College and Chair of the Department of Government (Spring 2007, William, "Unipolar stability: the rules of power analysis," Harvard International Review 29.1, p.44, Academic OneFile) US military forces are stretched thin, its budget and trade deficits are high, and the country continues to finance its profligate ways by borrowing from abroad--notably from the Chinese government. These developments have prompted many analysts to warn that the United States suffers from "imperial 2NC HEG INEVITABLE overstretch." And if US power is overstretched now the argument goes, , unipolarity can hardly be sustainable for long. The problem with argument is that it this fails to distinguish between actual and latent power. One must be careful to take into account both the level of resources that can be mobilized and the degree to which a government actually tries to mobilize them. And how much a government asks of its public is partly a function of the severity of the challenges that it faces. Indeed, one can never know for sure what a state is capable of until it has been seriously challenged. Yale historian Paul Kennedy coined the term "imperial overstretch " to describe the situation in which a state's actual and latent capabilities cannot possibly match its foreign policy commitments. This situation should be contrasted with what might be termed " selfinflicted overstretch"a situation in which a state lacks the sufficient resource s to meet its current foreign policy commitments in the short term, but has untapped latent power and readily available policy choices that it can use to draw on this power. This is arguably the situation that the United States is in today. But the US government has not attempted to extract more resources from its population to meet its foreign policy commitments. Instead, it has moved strongly in the opposite direction by slashing personal and corporate tax rates. Although it is fighting wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and claims to be fighting a global "war" on terrorism, the United States is not acting like a country under intense international pressure. Aside from the volunteer could clearly devote a greater proportion of its economy to military spending: today it spends only about 4 percent of its GDP on the military , as compared to 7 to 14 percent during the peak years of the Cold War. It could also spend its military budget more efficiently, shifting resources from expensive weapons systems to boots on the ground. Even more radically it could reinstitute , military conscription , shifting resources from pay and benefits to training and equipping more soldiers. On the economic front it could raise taxes , in a number of ways, notably on fossil fuels, to put its fiscal house back in order . No one knows for sure what would happen if a US president undertook such drastic measures, but there is nothing in economics, political science, or history to suggest that such policies would be any less likely to succeed than China is to continue to grow rapidly for decades. Most of those who study US politics servicemen and women and their families, US citizens have not been asked to make sacrifices for the sake of national prosperity and security. The country would argue that the likelihood and potential success of such powergenerating policies depends on public support, which is a function of the public's perception of a threat. And as unnerving as terrorism is, there is nothing like the threat of another hostile power rising up in opposition to the United States for mobilizing public support. With latent power in the picture, it becomes clear that unipolarity might have more built-in self-reinforcing mechanisms than many analysts realize. It is often noted that the rise of a peer competitor to the United States might be thwarted by the counterbalancing actions of neighboring powers. For example, China's rise might push India and Japan closer to the United Stat - es indeed, this has already happened to some extent. There is also the strong possibility that a peer rival that comes to be seen as a threat would create strong incentives for the United States to end its selfinflicted overstretch and tap potentially large wellsprings of latent power. Also, multiple factors ensures U.S. will be the hegemon Singh 8 School of Politics and Sociology at Birkbeck College, University of London (September 2008, Robert, "The Exceptional Empire: Why the United States Will Not Decline Again," International Politics, Vol. 45, Iss. 5, Pg. 571) But despite Iraq, anti-Americanism and more, on the key dimensions of hard and soft power, Washington's exceptional empire remains remarkably robust in terms of its preponderant power. There remain five reasons to step back from current US woes and to treat the 'new declinism' with a degree of caution. First, in spite of Iraq and the immense stresses that the occupation has imposed on its volunteer personnel and National Guard units since 2003, the US military remains far and away the world's largest and best, unique in its capacity to project force rapidly around the globe and peerless in Korea Neg Michigan Institutes `10 72/436 7 Week Juniors its superiority in conventional warfare and command of the global commons. official The annual US defence budget is now well in excess of $500 billion, excluding the supplemental appropriations for Iraq and Afghanistan (over $100 billion). The global presence of US overseas bases, personnel and bilateral training programmes is without precedent. At just over 4% of US GDP, not only is such a budget much lower in proportionate terms than during the Reagan buildup of the 1980s (still less the Cold War's height under Truman and Eisenhower) but also it is sustainable in economic and political terms over the long haul. Indeed, one important consequence of Iraq has been to consolidate a broad bipartisan consensus in Washington endorsing the further expansion of the US Army and Marine Corps by a minimum of 6% over current personnel levels and a substantial year-on-year increase in the Pentagon budget into the 2010s. In 2008, serious presidential candidates competed not for 'peace dividends', as in 1992, but as to exactly how much more needed to be devoted to defence to wage the global war on terror effectively. 1 The ramifications of this military supremacy and its underlying political consensus are profound. Not only does further expansion of the armed forces increase even more America's singular capacity to meet rising global security challenges (whether 'hard' or 'soft') but it also augurs a multiplier effect on the existing technical and logistical superiority of the US military. In the context of competing powers that are either cutting or not increasing their defence budgets and military personnel or that, as in China's case, are increasing them at a steady but comparatively modest level, the fact of American military supremacy through the 2010s remains unchallenged. There has never existed a nation-state with such preponderant global military power at such low financial cost. Second, but related, while serious concerns about 'overstretch' now exist among the uniformed military and mainstream Democrats and Republicans alike, there is minimal prospect of US forces being required to mount another major occupying war in the mode of Iraq. The challenges confronting America that plausibly will demand military action during the next decade -- from the AfghanPakistan borderlands and possible 'failed states' in both, through Iran's nuclear programme to Chinese threats to Taiwan -- are serious and urgent, but they do not point to an 'Iraq Mk II'. Moreover, although they have mostly turned against the Iraq war, it is difficult to depict Americans as exhibiting a new 'post-Iraq' pacifism. Even in the midst of the worst of the Iraq occupation in 2006, Americans of both parties evinced more belief in the utility and justice of military force than did Europeans, by decisive margins (Kagan, 2006a). Among critics of Bush, the most forceful case against Iraq was not a pacifist opposition to war in principle but rather the pragmatic case that the invasion was a distraction from the war that the US should have been completing emphatically in Afghanistan. History confirms that a 'defeat-phobic' American public is not synonymous with a peaceful one. America consistently remains true to its historical pedigree, as more a 'dangerous nation' than a docile one (Kagan, 2006b). Less than one decade after peace was reached on the Korean peninsula in 1953, for example, a Democratic president, John F. Kennedy, initiated America's prolonged and costly commitment to Vietnam. Five decades after the respective conclusions of their wars, tens of thousands of US troops remained in Germany, Japan and South Korea. Five years after America's first and worst military defeat in south-east Asia, Americans elected Ronald Reagan to the presidency to restore and reassert US strength against an 'evil empire'. More recently, no nation has gone to war so frequently in such a short time frame as the US since the Cold War's conclusion. Between 1989 and 2003, America engaged in military interventions nine times: in Panama in 1989, Somalia in 19921993, Haiti in 1994, Bosnia in 1995-1996, Kosovo in 1999, Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq three times (1991, 1998, 2003) -- an average of one major action every 18 months (Daalder and Kagan, 2007, 1). It is therefore difficult to herald the Iraq war -- whatever its ultimate course -as the last major US conflict of the early 21st century. The likelihood is not whether there will be further US military interventions after Bush but rather where, when and how. Moreover, such wars will likely continue to be waged through 'coalitions of the willing' rather than through formalized multilateral organizations, the limits of which Afghanistan now attests to in addition to Kosovo previously. The costs of military action in a unipolar world, and the incentives towards it, are mightily different from the bipolar Cold War. Beyond this, the superiority of US forces and technology -- with a growing 'interoperability gap' even with Washington's closest allies -- ensures that a unilateralism of necessity, not choice, is now a fact of life for many American military interventions . Whether or not the war on terror provides a its interests and ideals. Third, and despite Iraq, America's extensive network of global alliances remains formidably impressive. As Bradley Thayer observes, 'Far from there being a backlash against the United States, there is worldwide bandwagoning with it' (Layne and Thayer, 2007, 106-107). Of 192 nations in the world, Thayer identified only five as 'opposed' to America : China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea and Venezuela. Eightyfour states are US allies, comprising most 1 (84 to 5) represents a rather positive outcome for the world's primary power. The brute reality remains that most countries wish to align with the US, actively do so, and benefit directly from its security guarantees, open markets and international trade. Even -- especially -- in relation to rising powers such as China and India, national interests typically point in the direction of either actively supporting or passively acquiescing in the American-led international system rather than challenging it. Iraq was an aberration, not a norm, in this regard. Simply put, there has been no hard balancing against major economic and military powers, including 25 members of NATO, 14 major non-NATO allies, 19 Rio Pact members, seven Caribbean Regional Security System members, 13 members of the Iraq coalition not in the other categories, along with Afghanistan, Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan and Tunisia. A ratio of 17 to macro-securitization paradigm comparable to the Cold War, the historical record is not one that suggests that the US will indefinitely refrain from violence in support of Washington of consequence since the end of the Cold War. Despite the setting-up of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, Sino-Russian hostility to the US has not produced a concerted balancing effort, limited as it is by mutual distrust and suspicion, traditional great power rivalry, divergent capacities and strategic goals and -- in Beijing's case -- dependence on the critical US market for its exports and growth. Such hard balancing as has occurred has been aimed not at Washington but Moscow and Beijing: by, respectively, East European and other EU states and Japan, Australia, India and South Korea. America may be unloved in American economic indicators are universally and intractably negative. Not only is the US the world's largest (estimates vary between 20 and 30% of world GDP) and most efficient economy but also the dollar remains the world's reserve currency despite the euro's rise. The Bush years have seen America continue to experience historically low levels of inflation, unemployment and interest rates and -- until this year -- strong rates of growth. The twin deficits of the federal budget (at some $250 billion) and current account (6% of GDP) do make the US the world's leading debtor, as it was previously at the end of Reagan's two terms as president. But the economic health of both China and Japan relies heavily on their continuing to purchase parts of the world, if opinion surveys are to be believed. But it is not generally opposed. Fourth, contrary to Cox's claim, it is not the case that Korea Neg Michigan Institutes `10 73/436 7 Week Juniors dollars and securities based on the dollar to keep their currencies weak and the US market for their exports strong. The US economy remains huge, robust and the world's most productive, competitive and innovative (not least in information technology), just as its research institutes and universities dominate those of other nations. American takeovers cause a tremendous productivity advantage over non-American alternatives for firms outside the US 'as if the invisible hand of the American marketplace were somehow passing along a secret handshake to these firms' (Van Reenen et al. , 2007). America's strength rests on the of the 21st century approaches, the enormous, productive and flexible US economy remains central to the international economic system, the dominant source of its operating rules, and the best positioned to take advantage of coming changes precisely because it is so consistently adept at adjusting. Fifth, if these hard fundamental soundness, openness and innovative energy of its dynamic economy. Consequently, as the end of the first decade power resources of the US remain potent, those propelling the rise of its potential rivals are by no means clear, coherent or reliable. Much of the commentary on America's principal competitors effectively assumes their linear rise and an inevitable disharmony with US interests (and ideals) accompanying a concomitant erosion of American predominance. But such assumptions are not necessarily well founded. Korea Neg 74/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors 2NC NO IMPACT TO HEG Hegemony is not a magic wand the status quo proves that it cannot prevent countries from acting in a hostile manner, prevent multipolarity from forming, cannot influence the decision of other countries, and __________ That is layne `6 You should be very skeptical of their heg authors, they all paint u.s. hegemony as the end all be all in order to justify future interventions. Also the alternative is not conflict multipolarity does not cause conflict because countries depend on the international flow of trade so they seek to cooperate, no nuclear weapons would be used because the costs would be too great that is 1nc Haas and Norloff evidence Korea Neg 75/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors Korea Neg 76/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors ***PROLIF ADVANTAGE*** Korea Neg 77/436 China won't pressure North Korea fears a collapse Korea Times, 10 (6/9/10, Kang Hyunkyung, "China's double standard on N. Korea," http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2010/06/113_67338.html, JMP) Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors 1NC PROLIF China sided with the rest of the world to impose sanctions on North Korea last year after the latter launched missiles and conducted an underground nuclear test, condemning Pyongyang for escalating tensions on the Korean Peninsula. However, it has remained silent over the North torpedoing the South Korean Navy Cheonan, claiming the lives of 46 ship sailors in March. China's double standard on the reclusive state's belligerent behavior has prompted experts to speculate over its motives. Professor Kenneth Quinones, dean of research evaluation of Japan's Akita International University, told The Korea Times that there has been a change in China's policy toward North Korea since it supported the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) sanctions last year. "China's approval of U.N. sanctions last year caused an intense debate within the Chinese government over whether to use pressure or to try to induce North Korea's cooperation the former U.S. diplomat said. ," Quinones said the foreign ministry preferred using international pressure but the Chinese Communist Party and the People's Liberation Army preferred using inducement. "The party and the army won the debate so after the U.N. sanctions that were approved in June, China moderated its policy toward Pyongyang," he said. Some experts observed China learned a lesson that sanctions beget another bellicose act and that the side effect might cause the patron to rethink punitive actions. Obama won't retaliate he knows the costs Crowley, Senior Editor the New Republic, 10 [Michael, January, "Obama and Nuclear Deterrence", http://www.tnr.com/node/72263] Los Angeles Times The ran an important story yesterday about the Obama administration's Nuclear Posture Review, which evaluates U.S. policy towards the use of nuclear weapons. Apparently there's a debate inside the administrationone that is splitting the civilians from the generalsnot just about the size of our nuclear stockpile but also how we conceive of possible firststrike and retaliatory policies. A core issue under debate, officials said, is whether the United States should shed its longstanding ambiguity about whether it would use nuclear weapons in certain circumstances, in hopes that greater specificity would give foreign governments more confidence to make their own decisions on nuclear arms. Some in the notes, some experts don't place much weight on how our publiclystated doctrine emerges because they don't expect foreign nations to take it literally. And the reality is that any decisions about using nukes will certainly be caseby case. But I'd still like to see some wider discussion of the underlying questions, which are among the most consequential that policymakers can consider. The questions are particularly vexing when it comes to terrorist groups and rogue states. Would we, for instance, actually nuke Pyongyang if it sold a weapon to terrorists who used it in America? That implied threat seems to exist, but I actually doubt a President Obamaor any president, for that matterwould go through with it. that U.S. argue that the administration should assure foreign governments that it won't use nuclear weapons in reaction to a biological, chemical or conventional attack, but only in a nuclear exchange. Others argue that the United States should promise that it would never use nuclear weapons first, but only in response to a nuclear attack. As the story Korea Neg 78/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors The Korea times 10 evidence cites a recent change in Chinese attitude the belligerent actions from North Korea means China is no longer willing to pressure Kim Jung Ill, making safe regime change impossible. The lack of influence and new attitude is empirically proven Snyder & Byun, 09 *Director of the Center for U.S.Korean Policy at the Asia Foundation and senior associate at Pacific Forum CSIS AND ** Research Associate, Center for U.S.Korea Policy at the Asia Foundation (1/10, "China Embraces South and North, but Differently," http://csis.org/files/publication/0904qchina_korea.pdf) Highlevel ChinaDPRK exchanges marked the 60th anniversary of diplomatic ties despite UN sanctions against North Korea for its missile and nuclear tests earlier this year. Premier Wen Jiabao's visit to Pyongyang in early October was the high point in those commemorations. KCNA reported that Chairman Kim Jongil personally greeted Wen at Sunan airport upon his arrival on Oct. 4 and that he accompanied Wen in several public appearances. China has highlighted Wen's success in securing Kim's promise of a "conditional return" to SixParty Talks pending progress in direct negotiations with Washington, although Kim's remarks made clear the North's interest in direct USDPRK dialogue rather than SixParty Talks. The fact that Wen did not gain any additional movement by Kim compared to what North Korea had already committed to during Dai Bingguo's visit the previous month raises questions about Chinese influence in Pyongyang, especially in light of rumors that Wen's visit to Pyongyang was in question over the issue. Also, china will not step in to uphold a superpower image MacLeod, 1o (Calum, Correspondent for USA Today, 6/1/10, "A Sunken Ship, and Talk of War", http://www.lexisnexis.com) China has much to gain by maintaining its neutral stance Bermudez says. He says the current crisis gives China , a chance to burnish its reputation as an emerging power particularly in developing nations, where through the years it quietly has expanded trade relations and secured oil and precious mineral rights. "By holding the cards and maneuvering the United States on this issue, (China) shows to its Third World friends, allies and partners that it can handle the United States," Bermudez says. "That adds a lot of political juice to (the Chinese) in the Third World. "They may want this (issue) to stick around a while to keep their dog on a leash and keep the United States looking weak. It serves them politically." 2NC NO PRESSURE Korea Neg 79/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors 2NC NO RETAL No retaliation Crowley in 10 cites experts that indicates that the posture which their evidence is citing holds no real weight and that obama would never respond with nuclear force but instead would just be conventional The U.S. will not retaliate with nuclear weapons--it makes no sense SPRING 2001 (Baker, Research Fellow at Heritage Foundation, Heritage Backgrounder 1477, Sept 20, http://www.heritage.org/Research/MissileDefense/BG1477.cfm) Nuclear retaliation is not appropriate for every kind of attack against America. Some opponents of missile defense believe that the United States has an effective nuclear deterrent that, if necessary, could be used to respond to attacks on the homeland. But no responsible U.S. official is suggesting that the United States consider the use of nuclear weapons in response to the horrific September 11 attacks. In most cases of attack on the U nited tates, S the nuclear option would not be appropriate, but a defense response will almost always be appropriate. The United States needs to be able to resort to defensive options. ***CHINA SOFT POWER ADV ANS Korea Neg 80/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors CHINA'S INFLUENCE WILL GROW China's leadership will inevitably grow in Asia. BBC, 09 (7/23/9, "US Wants to Return to Asia to Contain China's Influence," Lexis) Some analysts said that following the rapid improvement of China's national power, the increase of China's influence in the Asian region is an objective fact. But experts said that China does not harbor an ambition to contend with the United States for leadership in this region. China's influence in Asia has an unstoppable development trend. In face of reality, the United States may possibly choose to strengthen cooperation with China to maintain US influence in Asia. Of course, the United States may also choose a balanced manner to impede the increase of China's influence in Asia. But choosing both engagement and containment in dealing with China is still a consideration for the United States to protect its largest interests. China has the power to punish North Korea over the sinking of the Cheonan and will continue to exercise influence in the region. Kartokin, 10 Senior China Analyst with the Department of the Navy (5/27/10, Jesse, "All Eyes on China in Wake of Cheonan Sinking" http://www.jamestown.org/single/? no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=36431&tx_ttnews[backPid]=13&cHash=7b6d6a4171) Calling for "resolute countermeasures" against North Korea, South Korean President Lee Myungbak expressed his desire to deal with Pyongyang "through strong international cooperation" (Christian Science Monitor, May 20). Park Hyungjun, the senior political affairs secretary to President Lee, underscored China's central role in any international response to the Cheonan incident. Park noted that "we will explain [the investigation results] to China in full, so that we can have China play its role in the issue." As a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, the host of the SixParty Talks, and North Korea's principal benefactor, China will exercise immense influence over the type and severity of any punishment meted out against Pyongyang. In response to the Cheonan report and Seoul's accompanying call for sanctions, North's Korea's Central News Agency insisted this constitutes an "intolerable, grave provocation [and] a declaration of war" (KCNA, May 24). Characterizing the Cheonan incident as a "conspiratorial farce to harm and stifle the DPRK", Pyongyang pledged to "mete out a thousandfold punishment to the puppet war thirsty forces" (KCNA, May 26). North Korea later indicated it would fire upon South Korea's loudspeakers that are slated to resume propaganda messaging along the demilitarized zone (Seoul Hankyoreh, May 26). Beijing's vague official commentary and highlevel diplomatic contact with North Korea in the wake of the sinking triggered significant concern in South Korea (Yonhap [South Korea], May 24). Beijing's guarded statements reflect an effort to appear impartial and focused on preventing escalation rather than assigning blame or delivering justice. A PRC Foreign Ministry spokesperson called on all parties to "remain cool and exercise restraint" (Xinhua News Agency, May 7). China's deputy foreign minister characterized the incident as "unfortunate" but refrained from blaming North Korea (Global Times [China], May 21). Meanwhile, the Beijing Review reiterated Beijing's general opposition to economic sanctions against Pyongyang, suggesting they are politically ineffective and only cause the public to suffer (Beijing Review, May 17). Of greater significance to South Korean observers, Hu welcomed Kim JongIl to Beijing on 20 April, just days after South Korean President Lee consulted with Chinese President Hu Jintao in Shanghai. South Korean commentators suggested that Beijing's unexpected invitation to the North Korean leader was inappropriate and insulting given the cloud of suspicion hanging over the Kim regime (Yonhap, May 12 and 13; JoongAng Ilbo [South Korea], May 8). South Korean media expressed concern that China's strategic interest in North Korean stability will override any pressure to deal firmly with Pyongyang. The moderate Korea Times predicted that even the most damning evidence concerning North Korean involvement in the Cheonan sinking will not lead Beijing to change its stance on North Korea (The Korea Times, May 10). The more conservative JoongAng Ilbo called South Korea's "strategic partnership" with Beijing "a delusion," insisting that China will always embrace strategies that enable it to exercise influence over the Korean Peninsula (JoongAng Ilbo, May 8). Korea Neg 81/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors CHINESE SOFT POWER INCREASING China's soft power is growing and primarily used for peaceful development. Zheng, 09 program manager and research assistant in the CSIS Technology and Public Policy Program (March 09, Denise E, "China's use of soft power in the developing world" http://www.voltairenet.org/IMG/pdf/Chinese_Soft_Power.pdf) China's approach to foreign policy underwent a tremendous transformation during the past half century, shifting from the warandrevolution period under the rule of Mao Zedong to an era of peace and development under more recent leadership. Two decades ago, China was viewed as an austere and monolithic communist country that threatened the development of democracy in Asia and elsewhere in the world--an image that was exacerbated by the callous response of the Chinese Communist Party, and thus the state, to the 1989 student protests, quashing a nascent democracy movement in China. in 1978 by Deng Xiaoping, have transformed China into one of the world's largest destinations for foreign direct investment and a vital link in global supply chains. Beijing's "go global" strategy--an incentivedriven program promoting Chinese firms to pursue rigorous investments abroad--is exemplary of China's transformation: prosperity from years of doubledigit economic growth has not only made China attractive to foreign investors but has also endowed China with the capital to be a major consumer in the global marketplace. As the world watches China transform remarkable economic growth, Today China is increasingly capitalist, modern, and globalized. Economic reforms, initiated , there is increasing anxiety that, after 25 years of Beijing has significantly elevated its capacity to influence world affairs and that it will use this newfound strength coercively. Some experts believe that China poses a serious challenge to the United States for the role of the world's leading superpower--the first credible threat since the existence of the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Conscious of the apprehension surrounding its rise and worried that such sentiments could impede continued economic growth, Beijing has sought to attach itself to the slogan "peaceful development" in an effort to reassure others that its newfound strength is benign. Indeed, compared with the years of Mao, China today appears much more "charming"--a transformation that can at least be partially credited to its growing soft power, arguably Beijing's most valuable foreign policy tool. Soft power is the ability to shape the preferences of others through appeal and attraction. A defining feature of soft power is noncoercive . The currency of soft power is culture, political values, and foreign policies, and when these factors are perceived as legitimate, they form group norms that have the capacity to shape behavior and motivate actions. Since the idea of soft power was coined in the 1990s by Joseph Nye, there has been an ongoing debate about whether it includes a country's military resources and economic strength. According to Nye, a wellrun military with vast resources can give rise to admiration from other countries. Similarly, the prosperity of a nation's economic system (economic power) can attract other countries and cause them to adopt similar economic institutions and policies.1 Walter Russell Mead argues that the projection of a nation's economic success can attract other states to believe that its increasing influence is desirable, inevitable, or perhaps permanent. He believes that economic strength is "sticky" because countries that adopt similar economic institutions and policies will find it more difficult to leave the system.2 China's growing economy is a major source of its increasing appeal in the developing world. Wealth and the potential to be wealthy are attractive, and money confers normative power and provides the means to disseminate culture and ideas. As Joseph Nye aptly states, "seduction is almost always more effective than coercion."3 Aware of the benefits of a sophisticated softpower portfolio, Chinese leaders are aiming to deepen relationships with all regions of the world, particularly the developing nations of Africa, the Americas, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. Beijing uses a variety of tools to increase its influence in the developing world that include economic incentives and military cooperation; however, traditional soft power has also become a growing piece of how China acquires its influence. Although the nature of China's relationships with the regions explored in this volume is largely economic, Beijing has also sought to strengthen these relationships by promoting regional economic integration and security mechanisms, emphasizing the role of the United Nations, participating in humanitarian missions, providing concessionary loans and debt relief, increasing cultural and academic exchange programs, and engaging local communities through skilled diplomats. There is a distinct style in China's approach to relationship building: it practices an omnidirectional friendship policy that emphasizes the importance of state sovereignty and noninterference with the objective of securing stable and sustainable access to resources and opening new export markets to fuel its economy.4 Differences in regional geopolitical dynamics, however, require Beijing to tailor its softpower strategy in each of the four regions it is active. What types of activities are the Chinese pursuing in these regions to strengthen their influence? How do geopolitical factors affect China's approach to each of these regions? Is China's soft power effective? This volume, a compilation of essays by senior CSIS scholars, is designed to take a deeper look at what China is doing in these regions and what China's softpower activities mean for the United States. It is part of a broader project that examines the future of U.S.China relations in 2009 and beyond. Korea Neg 82/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors CHINESE SOFT POWER INCREASING China's soft power will continue to grow as the U.S. declines CRS, 08 (A study prepared by the Congressional Research service for the U.S. Senate Committee for Foreign Relations, April, 08, "China's foreign policy and `soft power' in South America, Asia, and Africa" http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2008_rpt/crschina.pdf) Whether one is reading press accounts and scholarly treatises or traveling through the regions under discussion, the PRC seems to be everywhere. It is tempting to begin to think in alarmist terms, thereby magnifying presumed PRC strengths as well as perceived U.S. weaknesses. Many concerned observers focus on the competitive strengths that PRC soft power has in relation to the United States, pointing out that the PRC international approach is particularly strong in areas where the U.S. political system and U.S. values make it less competitive. Some suggest that these PRC strengths have a brighter future in today's global economy, meaning that China will have increasing economic and political soft power clout internationally at the expense of the United States. Still, a closer look at some of the PRC's presumed assets suggests that they may have downsides as well. No Strings The recipient governments of PRC trade and investment are particularly attracted to the fact that Chinese money generally comes with none of the pesky human rights conditions, good governance requirements, approvedproject restrictions, and environmental quality regulations that characterize U.S. and other Western government investments. With an authoritarian government that has few if any democratic imperatives, China has capitalized on its willingness to make such ``unrestricted'' international investments as part of its ``winwin'' international strategy. Korea Neg 83/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors CHINA BECOMING MORE RESPONSIBLE IN REGION China is becoming a more responsible stakeholder in the region Kartokin, 10 Senior China Analyst with the Department of the Navy (5/27/10, Jesse, "All Eyes on China in Wake of Cheonan Sinking" http://www.jamestown.org/single/? no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=36431&tx_ttnews[backPid]=13&cHash=7b6d6a4171) Beijing's growing international engagement is motivated in part by a desire to bolster its international image. Over the past decade in particular, Beijing has sought to assure the world of its "peaceful development," insisting that China will not destabilize the existing order as it becomes more powerful. Beijing has also seemingly embraced the U.S. formulation of becoming a "responsible stakeholder," implying that it will more actively contribute to the global order from which it benefits. Beijing has curtailed its weapons proliferation, contributed naval forces to the multinational antipiracy mission in the Gulf of Aden and leveraged its unique relationship with Pyongyang as an asset in the SixParty Talks. The Cheonan incident illustrates the threat that Pyongyang can pose to Beijing's desired narrative. Korea Neg 84/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors CHINA'S SOFT POWER EXAGGERATED China's soft power is exaggerated the US will be ahead for a long time Zheng, 09 program manager and research assistant in the CSIS Technology and Public Policy Program (March 09, Denise E, "China's use of soft power in the developing world" http://www.voltairenet.org/IMG/pdf/Chinese_Soft_Power.pdf) Although Beijing has devoted significant effort to increasing its softpower capability, the extent to which China's soft power has actually increased is often exaggerated. Two recent public opinion studies conducted by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and the Pew Global Attitudes Project suggest that China's real softpower achievements are not as impressive as some analysts suggest. In other words, the statement that the world finds China more charming is not entirely supported by empirical evidence. The soft power of the United States still exceeds that of China by a substantial margin, even in China's own neighborhood. In a study conducted by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, which surveyed public opinion in Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, Vietnam, the United States, and China, the United States was regarded by every state (with the exception of China) as the most influential in the key areas of soft power: economics, culture, human capital, diplomacy, and politics.19 A majority of respondents saw China as a future leader of Asia; however, it is uncertain whether Asian states see this as an entirely positive thing. In fact, the United States is seen as a stabilizing and countervailing force in the Asia region as China takes on a greater role. Trends in international opinion toward China reflect similar results. According to a Pew Global Attitudes Project released in July 2008, which surveyed 21 countries in all regions of the world during the year preceding publication of the study, the United States has improved its image in ten states while China's image has improved in only two states.20 Three states view the United States less favorably today than a year ago, and nine states view China less favorably. Although China's influence in world affairs is seen as strong, particularly in Asia and Africa, an overwhelming number of countries perceive that China acts in a unilateral fashion. Both of these public opinion studies indicate a worrisome disconnect between how China perceives itself and the world and how the rest of the world perceives China. Domestically, the Chinese believe that China's expanding influence is viewed positively and is welcomed by the rest of the world. Many countries have a considerable degree of apprehension about China's rise, however, and are unconvinced that China is irrevocably on the path of peaceful development. Yet, one unmistakable finding is that developing countries have a significantly more positive view of China's rising influence than developed countries, suggesting that China's soft power strategy in Africa, Latin America, and Central Asia are yielding results. Korea Neg 85/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors SEVERAL FACTORS UNDERMINE CHINESE SOFT POWER China's attempts to gain soft power are failing lack of human rights, free speech, and democracy Ford, 10 (4/29/10, Peter, Christian Science Monitor, "On eve of Shanghai Expo 2010, China finds 'soft power' an elusive goal; Chinese authorities have seized on the Shanghai Expo 2010 the largest in history as another chance to enhance 'soft power' that is generated by the spread of cultures, values, diplomacy, and trade. The expo opens this weekend" Lexis) At the heart of the Shanghai World Expo stands the host nation's pavilion, a giant latticed crown painted crimson. Packed with exhibits portraying daily Chinese life, China's ethnic diversity, and the standard bearers of Chinese philosophy, the display shows China's friendliest face to the world. Hard on the heels of the Beijing Olympics, the authorities here have seized on the Expo the largest in history Learning how to win friends and influence people is a task to which the government has attached the highest priority in recent years. It appears, however, to be failing. A BBC poll released in April found that only onethird of respondents in 14 countries believe China is a positive influence, down from onehalf just five years ago. IN PICTURES: Shanghai World Expo 2010 "The government is putting a lot of as another chance to improve the rising giant's international image. resources and a lot of attention into boosting China's 'soft power,' but they've got a lot of problems with the message," says David Shambaugh, head of the China Policy Program at George Washington University in Washington. "The core aspects of their system" such as oneparty rule, media censorship, and suppression of critics "are just not appealing to outsiders." Chinese policymakers and academics are increasingly fascinated by "soft power," whereby nations coopt foreign governments and citizens through the spread of their cultures, values, diplomacy, and trade, rather than coerce them by military might. Frustrated by Western domination of global media, from entertainment to news, and by what it sees as unfair coverage, China has launched a $6.6 billion campaign to tell its own story to the world by building its own media empires. Li Changchun, the ruling Communist Party's top ideology official, was blunt in a 2008 speech: "Whichever nation's communications capacity is the strongest, it is that nation whose culture and core values spread far and wide ... that has the most power to influence the world," he said. Is the message convincing? But this is not enough, says Li Xiguang, head of the International Center for Communications Studies at Tsinghua University in Beijing. Even the bestpaid messengers need a convincing message. "The United States has built its soft power by making its value and political system ... universal values," he says. "China will not beat the US in soft power until we have a better and newer form of democracy, freedom, and human rights." China has had some success in projecting soft power in developing countries, especially in Africa. "Wherever you go in Africa, roads are being built, and the people building them are Chinese," says Aly Khan Satchu, a financial analyst in Nairobi. "China expresses its soft power through building infrastructure." China's rapid economic development is an inspiration to many Africans, says Mr. Satchu. "The Chinese are selling themselves as having experienced catchup and offering to help African governments do the same," he says. Chinese firms are also preparing to bid on highspeed railroads in California and elsewhere in the United States. Americans are familiar with some Chinese cultural icons. "Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon" (2000) was a blockbuster movie, and Houston Rockets basketball star Yao Ming is a household name. But China lacks a Hollywood or a USstyle TV industry. Part of the problem, suggests Pang Zhongying, of Beijing's Renmin University, is that English, unlike Chinese, is an international language. Even with the creation of more than 200 Confucius Institutes around the world teaching Chinese, "I don't think China can overcome this difficulty in the short term." At the same time, says Franois Godement, director of the Asia Centre in Paris, however admired Chinese culture may be, "it is less easily translatable" to other cultures. Political control issuesAdding to the government's difficulties is its insistence on controlling all expressions of contemporary Chinese culture. Beijing squandered an opportunity at last year's Frankfurt book fair, which showcased Chinese literature, by pressing for a ban on exiled writers. Press coverage focused not on Chinese authors but on Beijing's heavy hand. This desire for complete political control, says Professor Godement, means that "they don't give creators the freedom to create works that would project soft power." "There is a huge gap between the official Chinese judgment and that of outsiders," adds Professor Pang. "There are many intellectuals in China, but a good intellectual is not necessarily an officially recognized one." The government has opted instead to pursue public diplomacy, or "overseas propaganda," Rarely does a month pass without a visit to Beijing by media managers and journalists from one developing country or another. But this is not the same as projecting soft power, Mr. Shambaugh notes. "China has a huge soft power deficit," says Pang. "The current Chinese model solves problems, of course, but it is also part of the problem. People outside China will pick China's virtues, but try to avoid its disadvantages. We should learn from such natural as it is known here. choices, from the impression that China can only build roads and schools. That is a problem we must address." IN PICTURES: Shanghai World Expo 2010 Related: China earthquake: day of mourning Official and grassroots relief groups rally in wake of China earthquake Web, religious freedom on agenda as USChina rights dialogue resumes All China coverage Korea Neg 86/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors CHINESE SOFT POWER WON'T SOLVE Chinese soft power won't solve human rights abuses and lack of freedom The Economist, 10 (1/9/10, "From the charm to the offensive: Banyan," Lexis) China's smile diplomacy shows its teeth IF A single impulse has defined Chinese diplomacy over the past decade, it is its smile: near and far, China has waged a charm offensive. With its land neighbours, India excepted, China has amicably settled nearly all border disputes; it has abjured force in dealing with SouthEast Asian neighbours over still unsettled maritime boundaries. On the economic front, the freetrade area launched on January 1st between China and the Association of SouthEast Asian Nations is the world's biggest, by population. China's smiling leaders promise it will spread prosperity. Farther afield, China has scattered roads and football stadiums across Africa. By the hundreds, it has set up Confucius Institutes around the world to spread Chinese language and culture. More than anything, the Beijing Olympics were designed to showcase gentle President Hu Jintao's notions of a "harmonious world". In all this, the leaders appear not simply to want to make good a perceived deficit in China's soft power around the world. A more brutal calculus prevails: without peace, prosperity and prestige abroad, China will have no peace and prosperity at home. And without that, the Chinese Communist Party is dust. Yet of late smiles have turned to snarls. The instances appear unrelated. Last month China bullied little Cambodia into returning 22 Uighurs seeking political asylum after bloody riots and a brutal crackdown in Xinjiang last summer. On December 25th, despite China's constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech, a veteran humanrights activist, Liu Xiaobo, received a long prison sentence for launching a charter that called for political freedoms. Western governments had urged leniency. Britain had also called for clemency for Akmal Shaikh, a Briton caught smuggling heroin into Xinjiang. Mr Shaikh seems to have been duped by drugs gangs. His family insist he suffered mental problems and delusions. Yet the courts refused a psychiatric evaluation. Britain's prime minister, Gordon Brown, said he was "appalled" by Mr Shaikh's execution. In turn, China lashed out at this supposed meddling and ordered Britain to "correct its mistakes". SinoBritish relations, painstakingly improved in recent years, have come unravelled. It is harder to complain of foreign meddling when Chinese actions have global consequences. During the Asian financial crisis of 199798 the Chinese held the yuan steady as currencies all about them crumbled. Not only did that avert a round of titfortat devaluations. The regional respect China earned, its diplomats argue, paved the way for the charm offensive that soon followed. Newfound respect gave China a taste for more. In contrast, during this downturn many complain that China's dogged pegging of its currency to the dollar harms others. As the world's fastestgrowing big economy, with the biggest currentaccount surplus and foreign reserves, its currency ought by rights to be rising. By several yardsticks the yuan is undervalued and Americans and Europeans fear this leaves them with the pain of global rebalancing. ASEAN furnituremakers and nail foundries also beg for relief from the mercantilist advantage that a manipulated currency gives China. Most striking of all were China's actions at the Copenhagen summit on climate change, where the world's biggest emitter appeared churlish. In a bid to avoid being pinned down to firm commitments, China insisted that all figures and numerical targets be stripped out of the final accord, even those that did not apply to China. Further, China's prime minister, Wen Jiabao, at first did not deign to sit down with President Barack Obama on the final day, sending relatively junior officials instead. China may have got a deal it liked, but at the cost of a publicrelations disaster. Some think this a prelude to a prickly, more unpleasant China in the decade ahead, but it is too soon to conclude that. More likely, China will now try to patch up relations with Britain, and keep putting a positive gloss on Copenhagen. Peace and prosperity is still the calculus. China is spending billions cranking up its state media to go global, taking Mr Hu's message of "harmony" to a worldwide audience. But the message of harmony will ring hollow abroad if it is secured by muzzling voices at home. Besides, there is now less goodwill to go around. A smile is fresh at first, but loses its charm if held for too long. One problem with China's smile diplomacy, says the man who coined the phrase, Shi Yinhong of Renmin University in Beijing, is that China's global impact--its demand for resources, its capacity to pollute--is so much greater than a decade ago. " For all we may smile, you can still smell us," he says. That even applies in places, such as Africa, where enthusiasm for China was once unbounded. China has more than a presentational problem. For instance, it sends Africa both destabilising arms and peacekeepers, the one generating demand for the other. China's manufactures destroy local industries. Many Africans resent Chinese firms' deals with their unpleasant leaders and blame them when leaders pocket the proceeds. China's clout makes a mockery of two guiding tenets of its charm offensive: relations on the basis of equality; and noninterference. That calls for a new diplomacy. China's presentational problems with the old one speak of an abiding lack of sophistication, and an attachment to a ritualistic diplomacy illsuited to fastmoving negotiations, such as in Copenhagen, where the outcome is not precooked. Over the case of Mr Shaikh, the official press indulged in the predictable and puerile ritual of railing about the historical indignity of the Opium War. Yet even many Chinese recognise that the world--and even drugpushing British gunboatdiplomacy--has changed, and that it may be time to move on. Banyan demands that China correct its mistakes. Korea Neg 87/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors 1NC REUNIFICATION Reunification won't happen anytime soon LIM 2010 (John, writer for the Georgetown Federalist, "Breaking Open the Berlin Wall of the Korean Peninsula," Feb 25, http://www.thegeorgetownfederalist.com/content/breakingopenberlinwallkoreanpeninsula) The political stability of the Korean Peninsula is of particular importance to me. As my family is from Korea, the last thing I would want is for the North Korean communists to run over my grandparents' orchard in South Korea. Since President Harry Truman forbade General Douglas McArthur from reunifying the Korean people, the conflict has been locked in a stalemate, with no end in sight. Now that North Korea presents itself as a viable threat through its acquisition of nuclear weapons, a resolution to this problem does seem closer than ever before. The prospect of a continuation of the Korean War has never been as real as it is now, and it appears that a new war on the peninsula would be far deadlier than the first. Additionally, the possibility of a peaceful reunification of the two Koreas, a long time vision of the Korean people and the official stance of every South Korean government since the 1990s , seems further and further away. Squo solves relations high Cha 10 Senior Adviser and Korea Chair of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (Victor Cha, "The New Old Reliable," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1/13/10, http://csis.org/node/23301/expert) The final quarter of 2009 included a number of significant developments in USKorea ties . President Barack Obama made his first trip to Seoul in November, and Special Envoy for North Korea Policy Stephen Bosworth traveled to Pyongyang in December. The summit between Presidents Obama and Lee Myungbak marked the continuation of an historical high in relations between the two countries . On issues affecting the alliance, Obama and Lee found common ground on North Korea, while they inched forward with the KoreaUS free trade agreement. Meanwhile, Bosworth's three days of talks with North Korean officials brought the most encouraging signs of a return to the sixparty process since talks broke down at the end of 2008. The Obama administration is faring well on the Korean Peninsula , even as relations with other major powers of the region become more complicated. Those accompanying Obama on his trip to Asia informally acknowledged that Korea was the "best stop" on the trip and sensed a personal connection between the two leaders. Turn withdrawal kills relations Feffer '05 codirector of Foreign Policy In Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies. (10/3/2005, John, "The Future of U.S.South Korean Security Relations" http://www.fpif.org/articles/the_future_of_us south_korean_security_relations) Finally, the United States and South Korea must grapple with issues related to U.S. ground forces In 2004, the Bush . administration announced a onethird reduction of U.S. troops in South Korea. Over and above its political dimensions, this decision directly stems from a much longer process of force restructuring. The Pentagon's assessment is essentially correct that troops in fixed positions with slowmoving tanks fight yesterday's wars. U.S. deterrent capacity largely resides in firepower based outside the peninsula, such as the Fifth Air Force and the Seventh Fleet in Japan. But this reality raises provocative questions. Do U.S. forces in Korea serve only a symbolic rather than a deterrent function? And why didn't the Bush administration consider troop reductions as a bargaining chip in negotiations with North Korea? Several studies suggest that South Korea could repulse an attack by North Korea without U.S. support. This should come as no surprise, since the South has been outspending the North in the military sphere by a factor of two since 1990. The North Korean military has been adversely affected by food shortages, energy shortages, and spare part shortages, and North Korea's military has not kept pace with the latest technological developments. Les Aspin, former U.S. secretary of defense, has estimated that South Korea's military strength represented 60% of the coalition forces arrayed against Iraq in the first Gulf War while North Korea's represented 60% of the total Iraqi offensive force at that time. And we all know the results of that unequal fight, even though Iraq, unlike North Korea, was a relatively prosperous oilrich country. No one should underestimate North Korea's ability to destroy Seoul with an artillery barrage or the North Korean military's ability to fight against an invader. However, North Korea's capacity for launching a conventional attack with troops and tanks is no longer the threat it was 50 or even 20 years ago, and it is this conventional type of attack that U.S. forces are prepared to counteract. But if U.S. forces stationed in Korea have largely lost their specific deterrent function, they still serve other roles. The South Korean government values the U.S. military presence as a concrete sign of alliance health and U.S. commitment to its defense, even if that defense would be largely undertaken by forces based outside the peninsula And North Korean leaders, it has been reported, are not opposed to a U.S. military presence even after unificationperhaps in a . peacekeeping capacityas an insurance policy against revived Japanese militarism. Moreover, there is the question of the impact that future U.S. troop reductions could have on investor confidence in South Korea. ***REUNIFICATION ADVANTAGE Korea Neg 88/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors US presence is critical to smooth reunification MITCHELL 2003 (Derek J. Mitchell is a senior fellow in the International Security Program at CSIS, "A Blueprint for U.S. Policy toward a Unified Korea," Washington Quarterly, 26:1) Calum The United States should be flexible about the structure of its presence on the peninsula but firm about maintaining some form of presence after unification. During a difficult transition, a continued U.S. presence on the peninsula will allow a unified Korea to focus on the challenges of domestic development, including the long process of reconciliation, rather than on its external security. The United States should consult closely with Korean authorities concerning an appropriate structure according to regional security needs and domestic Korean sensitivities. Korea Neg 89/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors 1. Reunification won't occur in the status quo recent tensions from the North Korean sides have made diplomatic negotiations impossible that's lim 2010 Side neg on this debate a. recency it's from 2010 and cites recent tensions their evidence is from 2003 and doesn't assume current status of the KJI regime b. Even if it is in their interests mistrust will prevent PBS 2003 (PBS Frontline, "FaceOff: A Short History of the United StatesNorth Korea Conflict," January, http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/northkorea/history.html) The barbed wire that was rolled out on the 38th parallel became the demarcation point for two Koreas. Korea's division between the capitalist South and communist North, a line drawn by the world's superpowers, cut right across the middle of the country and separated countless families. On both sides of the line, there has been an almost palpable longing for reunification ever since. Over the last 10 years, dialogue between the two Koreas offered hope for a reunified country. Relations between the United States and North Korea also warmed. But then the latest crisis broke out, revealing a residue of profound mistrust. 2NC NO REUNIFICATION Korea Neg 90/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors If we win that relations are high in the status quo a unified north korea will default to U.S. for protection, not China, that is the claim from the 1ac Relations are high now because of Obama he has committed to diplomatic talks on the South Korean peninsula and has found common ground with lee that's the Cha 10 evidence 2NC RELATIONS HIGH Korea Neg 91/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors The plan sends the middle finger to South Korean officials just as North Korea is becoming more and more crazy as shown by the sinking of the South Korean ship the U.S. abandons it's military commitment gorund troops are the physical reassurance that South Korea is looking for that's the 1nc feffer 05 evidence Additionally, the instance of the plan specifically kills relations because it does not consult with South Korea first Campbell & Einhorn, 04 senior vice president and director of the International Security Program at CSIS, AND ** senior adviser in the CSIS 2NC PLAN KILLS RELATIONS International Security Program, where he works on a broad range of nonproliferation, armscontrol, and other national security issues (Kurt M. Campbell and Robert J. Einhorn, The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices, "12. Avoiding the Tipping Point: Concluding Observations," ed by Campbell, Einhorn and Mitchell B. Reiss, JMP) However, bolstering the confidence of nuclear abstainers in the reliability of U.S. security assurances requires more than tangible support . It is essential, especially as the United States transforms its worldwide force structure, that Washington go out of its way to consult closely with friends and allies whose interests are affected to explain the rationale for the adjustments accommodate any requests that it reasonably can , to , and to demonstrate that the changes do not erode the U.S. security commitment. In the case of the repositioning of U.S. forces in Korea, more harm was done to U.S.South Korean alliance relations by the peremptory manner in which decisions made in Washington were presented to the Korean allies than by the content or even the timing of the moves. In dealing with the abstainers, the United States should not wait until the specter of nuclear reconsideration arises. It should instead anticipate possible problems and try to head them off with preventative diplomacy. In anticipation of the unwelcome prospect that North Korea will persist in pursuing a nuclear weapons capability , the United States should begin consulting privately now with its South Korean a nd Japanese allies on how to cope with that contingency without them having to acquire independent nuclear deterrent capabilities. Similarly, discreet discussions should be held with Seoul about the possibility that a nucleararmed North Korea would some day collapse and be absorbed into South Korea and that a reunified Korea would inherit the DPRK?s nuclear arsenal. Well before that contingency arises, the United States should seek a commitment from South Korean authorities that in exchange for a continued American security assurance, a reunified Korea would give up its nuclear inheritance and remain a nonnuclear weapons state. Preventative diplomacy could also be useful in the case of Turkey. In discussions involving NATO, the European Union, and Turkey about future defense structures and missions and about Turkey's place in the evolving European architecture, the United States should be conscious of the importance of ensuring that Ankara remains confident enough about its security situation to maintain its nonnuclear course. And with an eye to keeping Egypt in the nonnuclear camp, we should encourage Israel not to do or say anything in the nuclear realm such as publicly declaring or testing its nuclear capability that could generate pressures in Egypt for pursuing a nuclear option. Korea Neg 92/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors U.S. presence is the only instance in which unification could actually occur allows the peninsula to focus on domestic concerns instead of external concerns since it has the United States' backing that's Mitchell `3 2NC PRESENCE SOLVES REUNIFICATION Korea Neg 93/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors ***OTHER*** Korea Neg 94/436 Iranian prolif inevitable Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors AT: IRAN PROLIF London 10 --Professor Emeritus of Humanities @ NYU, resident of the Hudson institute, a worldrenowned think tank, former dean of the Gallatin School of Individualized Study, member of the Council on Foreign Relations and of the International Institute of Strategic Studies, affiliated professor @ U of Haifa in Israel, and Outstanding Person (Herbert, "Dark War Clouds Loom on MidEast Horizon", 23 June 2010, http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=37630 on 6/23/10) The gathering storm in the Middle East is gaining momentum. War clouds are on the horizon and, as with conditions prior to World War I, all it takes for explosive action to commence is a trigger. Turkey's provocative flotilla--often described in Orwellian terms as a humanitarian mission--has set in motion a flurry of diplomatic activity, but if the Iranians send escort vessels for the next round of Turkish ships, it could present a casus belli. It is also instructive that Syria is playing a dangerous game with both missile deployment and rearming Hezbollah. According to most public accounts, Hezbollah is sitting on 40,000 long, medium and shortrange missiles and Syrian territory has served as a conduit for military material from Iran since the end of the 2006 Lebanon War. Should Syria move its own scuds to Lebanon or deploy its troops as reinforcement for Hezbollah, a wider regional war with Israel could not be contained. In the backdrop is an Iran with sufficient fissionable material to produce a couple of nuclear weapons It will take some time to weaponize missiles but the road to that goal is . , synchronized in green lights since neither diplomacy nor , diluted sanctions can convince Iran to change course . Iran is poised to be the hegemon in the Middle East. It is increasingly considered the "strong horse," as American forces incrementally retreat from the region. Even Iraq, ironically, may depend on Iranian ties in order to maintain internal stability. From Qatar to Afghanistan, all political eyes are on Iran. For Sunni nations like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, regional strategic vision is a combination of dealmaking to offset the Iranian Shia advantage and attempting to buy or develop nuclear weapons as a counterweight to Iranian ambition. However, both of these governments are in a precarious state. Should either fall, all bets are off in the Middle East neighborhood. It has long been said that the Sunni "tent" must stand on two legs, if one, falls, the tent collapses. Should that tent collapse and should Iran take advantage of that calamity, it could incite a SunniShia war. Or feeling its oats and no longer dissuaded by an escalation scenario with nuclear weapons in tow, war against Israel is a distinct possibility. However implausible it may seem at the moment, the possible annihilation of Israel and the prospect of a second Holocaust could lead to a nuclear exchange. The only wild card that can change this slide into warfare is an active United States policy. Yet curiously, the U.S. is engaged in both an emotional and physical retreat from the region. Despite rhetoric that suggests an Iran with nuclear weapons is intolerable, that rhetoric has done nothing to forestall that eventual outcome. Despite the investment in blood and treasure to allow a stable government to emerge in Iraq, the anticipated withdrawal of U.S. forces has prompted President Maliki to travel to Tehran on a regular basis. And despite historic links to Israel that gave the U.S. leverage in the region and a democratic ally, the Obama Administration treats Israel as a nationalsecurity albatross that must be disposed of as soon as possible. As a consequence, the U.S. is perceived in the region as the "weak horse," the one that is dangerous to ride. In every Middle East capital the words "unreliable and United States" are linked. Those seeking a moderate course of action are now in a distinct minority. A political vacuum is emerging, one that is not sustainable and one the Iranian leadership looks to with imperial exhilaration. Korea Neg 95/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors Korea Neg 96/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors ***CASE TURNS*** Korea Neg 97/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors US TROOPS SOLVE ASIA PEACE American military presence in Korea maintains peace and strong USROK relations SHARP 2010 (Gen. Walter Sharp, Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/U.S. Forces Korea, Congressional Documents and Publications, March 26) Calum The Korean Peninsula sits at the center of Northeast Asia a dynamic region that has significant national interests for the U.S. n1 Northeast Asia is home to four of the world's six largest militaries in terms of personnel and two nuclear powers (China and Russia). n2 The region contains 25% of the world's population and is an economic powerhouse. n3 In 2009, Northeast Asia housed five of the world's 19 largest economies that collectively accounted for 24.8% of global gross domestic product during that year. n4 Countries in the region also accounted for 25.8% of U.S. trade in goods during 2009. n5 At the end of 2008, the U.S. direct investment position in Northeast Asia was valued at $220.7 billion. n6 While Northeast Asia has grown into a major economic region, it is also characterized by uncertainty, complexity, and rapid change. Historical animosities, territorial disputes, competition over access to resources, and struggles for regional hegemony have combined to pose difficult and longterm security challenges not only for regional states but also for the international community. U.S. force presence in the ROK is a longterm investment in regional peace and stability and both maintains security commitments to the ROK established under the Mutual Defense Treaty and reinforces American engagement with actors throughout Northeast Asia. U.S. force presence in the ROK also helps set the conditions for denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and eventual reunification of the two Koreas in a peaceful manner. A strong ROK U.S. Alliance, with a meaningful U.S. force presence on the Korean Peninsula, is essential to meet the security challenges posed in the dynamic and economically growing region of Northeast Asia. As observed in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, achieving core missions of American armed forces requires strong security relationships with allies and partners that are best enabled and maintained through longterm presence and sustained interaction. Withdrawal from Korea permanently decreases American security influence Richardson, 06 Washingtonbased analyst who covered East Asian security issues as a presidential management fellow with the US Department of Defense, cofounder of The Korea Liberator weblog focused on North Korea (Coreyu, "South Korea Must Choose Sides", Asia Times, September 9th 2006, June 27th 2010, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/HI09Dg02.html, KONTOPOULOS) Vastly reducing or withdrawing USFK can only harm US security, it cannot help it. USFK has helped maintain peace and allowed the US to project influence in the region for the past six decades; removing that presence would be foolish and difficult to replicate once done. It is also important to keep in mind that the next presidential election will likely result in a less antiAmerican administration. Korea Neg 98/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors GROUND FORCES KEY Ground troops are critical--US Air Force assets in Korea are inadequately trained for rapid response SHARP 2010 (Gen. Walter Sharp, Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/U.S. Forces Korea, Congressional Documents and Publications, March 26) Calum My first priority as Commander of UNC, CFC, and USFK is to maintain trained, ready, and disciplined combined and joint commands that are prepared to fight and win. This has been the focus of U.S. forces stationed in Korea for more than 50 years and for the CFC since it was established in 1978. Maintaining "fight tonight" readiness is the primary reason U.S. forces are stationed in the ROK, supporting the alliance between the American and Korean people in defense of the ROK. The Alliance stands ready to address the full spectrum of conflict that could emerge with little warning on the Korean Peninsula. This spectrum of conflict ranges from major combat operations under conditions of general war or provocation, to multiple possibilities of destabilizing conditions on the Peninsula, to humanitarian assistance operations, and even the elimination of weapons of mass destruction. Given these varied potential security challenges, it is imperative that our forces maintain the highest possible level of training and readiness. In order to address the full spectrum of conflict that could emerge on the Korean Peninsula, the Command has developed and constantly refines plans to deter aggression against the ROK, defeat aggression should deterrence fail, and respond to other destabilizing conditions that could affect the ROK. U.S. and ROK military personnel develop and maintain their warfighting skills through tough, realistic training to include theaterlevel exercises that leverage a variety of facilities and ranges located in the ROK. The Command conducts two annual exercises: Key Resolve/Foal Eagle and Ulchi Freedom Guardian. Key Resolve, a Command Post Exercise focused on crisis management, trains and sharpens skills on how we will fight today using existing organizational structures where CFC executes command and control over the combined force. Foal Eagle is a largescale combined field training exercise that includes the strategic deployment of American forces from bases in the U.S. as well as the participation of thousands of ROK troops. Key Resolve and Foal Eagle ensure that CFC remains ready today to decisively defeat any aggression that is directed against the ROK. The second annual exercise Ulchi Freedom Guardian is a computersimulated warfighting exercise that focuses on the development of Alliance command and control structures that will exist after the transition of wartime OPCON of ROK forces in April 2012. Maintaining "fight tonight" readiness can only occur when training is conducted that prepares forces to address the full spectrum of operations that characterizes today's complex operational environment. It is vital that Command training facilities and events support the full transformation of U.S. military forces stationed in the ROK. The U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps possess adequate training resources in the ROK to maintain unit combat readiness to include the rehearsal of robust amphibious operations. But USFK still faces challenges with respect to the training of air forces located in the ROK. We have made progress with our ROK hosts in scheduling and maximizing use of limited ranges. However, there is still insufficient training range capability and capacity. A continued shortfall in electronic warfare training capability and restrictions placed on precision guided munitions training pose deficiencies that must be addressed. Deployments of U.S. air forces to training events outside the Korean Peninsula mitigate current training shortfalls and ensure the same standard of training and readiness as American combat air forces not located in the ROK. This is not a longterm solution, however, and I continue to work with the ROK government to find a solution to this key training and readiness issue. Korea Neg 99/436 TROOPS KEY TO MULTILAT/ROK Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors US troop presence is critical to multilateralism and relations with the ROK--they give Korea a stronger voice in US policy decisions CHA 2003 (Victor, associate professor of government and D. S. SongKorea Foundation Endowed Chair at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, "Focus on the Future, Not the North," Washington Quarterly 26:1) Calum Second, the core countries have strong reasons themselves to accept bases rather than merely access arrangements with the United States. Alliances offer allies ways to dampen U.S. tendencies toward unilateralism.26 In the Korean case, an alliance with two independent militaries would enable Seoul to say "no" to the United States in ways that they could not before. In military terms, this situation might not be ideal, particularly given the history of this alliance, but politically this potential could be the ultimate symbol of a new, more equal, and longterm alliance relationship. Some European allies did not allow the United States to fly over their air space during attacks on Libya in 1986. U.S. allies also did not allow U.S. planes to refuel on their territories while carrying supplies to Israel during the 1973 Mideast war.27 Under certain circumstances, the ROK might refuse to allow the United States liberties with the bases. Bases, rather than places, actually give Korea more leverage. With a relationship based merely on access arrangements, saying "no" could mean the end of that relationship, as happened with New Zealand. A relationship undergirded by a basing and forward presence, however, is much more difficult to abrogate. Korea Neg 100/436 US FORCES KEY Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors US forces are key to defend South Korea--despite some weaknesses, North Korea would overwhelm the ROK STEVENS 2006 (Colonel Wayne Stevens, US Army War College, "Is US Forces Korea Still Needed on the Korean Peninsula?" March 15, http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc? AD=ADA448328&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf) Calum Strategically, the U.S. focus has been to preserve peace on the peninsula and stability within the region. In order to maintain that focus the U.S. has relied on a large U.S. military force deployed alongside ROK forces to respond to the North Korean threat. U.S. and ROK forces on the peninsula do not appear large enough to defeat a robust North Korean military without suffering a significant number of casualties and destruction from DPRK's TaepoDong, Scuds, and other missiles according to Pennsylvania Congressman Curt Weldon, House Committee Member on Armed Services.77 Some may argue that the ROK has the capability to defeat the North, however, one should not assume an ROK victory with certainty because of the military power of North Korea. The DPRK has a very dangerous army with the world's largest Special Operations Force (about 120,000) and has the ability to launch an estimated 500,000 missiles on South Korea within hours.78 The ROK currently does not have the missile defense or air power capability to counter North Korea's artillery capability. 79 The DPRK, with a military force of about 1.1 million, significantly outnumbers the ROK and U.S. forces on the peninsula of 680,000 and about 34,000 respectively. 80 The number advantage alone will not guarantee victory, but it does tend to improve the chance for success by wearing down the enemy with larger and more frequent attacks. U.S. Joint Forces Command and supporting combatant commands can provide remarkably more combat power such as U.S. Air Force Fighter Wings, U.S. Army Divisions, U.S. Marines Expeditionary Forces, among others by employing the following capabilities: the F15 Eagle for air superiority; the F15E Strike Eagle for enemy suppression; B1 Lancer bomber; MQ1 Predator for both reconnaissance and strike capability; 81 and additional brigade combat teams (BCT) are more self sustaining and, therefore, can undertake longer durations of conflict.82 Finally, stability in Northeast Asia not only includes the North Korean threat, but also the ongoing tensions between China and Taiwan. Rapid US reaction is critical to defend South Korea STEVENS 2006 (Colonel Wayne Stevens, US Army War College, "Is US Forces Korea Still Needed on the Korean Peninsula?" March 15, http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc? AD=ADA448328&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf) Calum If war breaks out on the peninsula, the ROK will most likely require considerably more than 34,000 U.S. troops to assist.87 The need for U.S. forces within Northeast Asia capable of rapidly deploying from within the region instead of from the U.S. will enhance the ROK's ability to stop DPRK's aggression quickly. The joint and flexible capabilities of the U.S. forces such as air superiority, precision guided missiles, and BCTs that are more capable of independent action and more responsive to regional combatant commanders can give the ROK forces a distinctive edge during combat operations and ensure the U.S. strategic focus of maintaining stability within the region.88 Some have argued for removing or reducing the U.S. forces on the peninsula because DPRK's nuclear capability negates the need for U.S. conventional forces in the South.89 Despite the lack of conclusive proof that North Korea actually has nuclear weapons; the DPRK may find it harder to prove that they do not have nuclear weapons. North Korea already admitted that they are conducting a nuclear weapons program and the North has extracted spent fuel and reprocessed the fuel into weaponsgrade plutonium.90 Although the nuclear argument may have some validity, a major U.S. concern is the need to have forward deployed basing to allow U.S. forces to project its military power. The forces in the ROK provide the U.S. with the capability to continue its deterrence mission and also to fight the Global War on Terror (GWOT) on foreign soil before it reaches the U.S.91 Korea Neg 101/436 NUCLEAR UMBRELLA GOOD Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors Preserving the US nuclear umbrella for South Korea is critical to peace in Asia MITCHELL 2003 (Derek J. Mitchell is a senior fellow in the International Security Program at CSIS, "A Blueprint for U.S. Policy toward a Unified Korea," Washington Quarterly, 26:1) Calum The U.S. nuclear umbrella over South Korea and Japan during the past 50 years has been an essential element of the bilateral security alliance and has been effective in maintaining ROK security. The U.S. commitment has enabled the ROK to renounce the development, stockpiling, or deployment of nuclear weapons and has prevented emergence of a regional arms race. Encouraging a unified Korea to renounce WMD because of the U.S. retention of its nuclear umbrella will serve this end and further solidify the basis of a postunification security alliance. Korea Neg 102/436 WAR/ALLIED PROLIF Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors Troop withdrawal causes North Korean attack and allied proliferation DAVINO 2004 (Colonel Michael Davino, US Army War College, "Should The U.S. Continue to Maintain Forces in Korea?" May 3, http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc? AD=ADA423338&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf) Calum Although the region's economy and the support we receive from our allies are important, the major reason for maintaining the U.S. presence in the region, particularly in South Korea, is as a deterrent to the DPRK. "North Korea poses many problems, of which its two nuclear programmes the main worry of the moment are just the start. Also alarming are its missile development and proliferation [and] its chemical and biological warfare capacity...." 21 Northeast Asia therefore, is a critical region in the struggle against proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile technology. Our national security strategy requires that "we must be able to stop rogue states before they are able to ...use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies and friends."22 Both the PRC and Russia are nuclear powers, it is likely that the DPRK has several nuclear weapons, and the ROK and Japan are clearly capable of developing them. However, the presence of U.S. forces in the region and the implied willingness of the U.S. to provide a nuclear umbrella for the ROK and Japan, has been enough to keep them from pursuing their own nuclear weapons programs. A total withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Korean Peninsula, or elsewhere in the Northeast Asia region, at a time when tensions over the North Korean nuclear program are increasing, would risk sending the wrong message to both our allies and the North Koreans. Korea Neg 103/436 PROLIF LINKS Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors US military presence deters North Korean aggression and proliferation Stevens 2006 (Colonel Wayne Stevens, US Army War College, "Is US Forces Korea Still Needed on the Korean Peninsula?" March 15, http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA448328&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf) The events of September 11, 2001 brought about changes in the structuring of U.S. military security within the ROK but not in the overall strategic defense objectives of the U.S. For example, the U.S. continues to serve as a deterrent against DPRK aggression and a stabilizing factor not only for the Korean peninsula but for the region of Northeast Asia as well.22 Understandably the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan along with the Global War on Terrorism and other U.S. security commitments in Korea and Europe required the repositioning of military forces to help reduce the operational tempo placed on other units. The Second Infantry Division deployed a brigade combat team to Iraq that had been helping to deter North Korean aggression. However, other instruments of power were in place to demonstrate America's commitment to the ROK. The U.S. has employed diplomatic and economic instruments of power in addition to military power to deter DPRK aggression. Hopefully, the combined efforts of the instruments of power will create a lasting peace that will eventually lead to unification of the two Koreas. Some may argue that since 9/11 the ROK is less important to the U.S.23 A more accurate assessment however would be that despite the global attention being focused on Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. still views its commitment to the ROK as essential. The U.S. is particularly concerned about DPRK's nuclear weapons program and the possibility of DPRK proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). North Korea will continue to draw a watchful eye from the U.S. for several reasons: (1) DPRK is viewed as a security threat due to their large military forces and WMD capabilities; (2) if DPRK collapsed it would create a humanitarian disaster rife with hunger and huge number of refugees; and (3) DPRK poses a proliferation threat with regard to WMD to both state and nonstate actors.24 Korea Neg 104/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors Korea Neg 105/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors ALLIED PROLIF LINKS Withdrawal causes South Korea prolif Eberstadt, et. al, 07 *Ph.D. in Political Economy and Government from Harvard, Political economist, Senior Adviser to the National Board of Asian Research, **Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, ***Research Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (*Nicholas, **Aaron L., ***Christopher, "Toward an AmericaFree Korea", American enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, October 6th 2007, June 24th 2010, http://www.aei.org/article/26924, KONTOPOULOS) A Nuclear Crisisin South Korea. If forced to pursue a wholly independent selfdefense in a hostile security environment, Seoul would face overwhelming pressures to develop its own nuclear arsenal. Indeed, the rapidity with which participants at the conference, American and Korean, progressive and conservative, arrived at this conclusion was chillingespecially given the likely implications for regional stability, further nuclear proliferation and South Korea's international standing. Pullout causes allied prolif Davino 4 (Colonel Michael Davino, US Army War College, "Should The U.S. Continue to Maintain Forces in Korea?" May 3, http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA423338&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf) Although the region's economy and the support we receive from our allies are important, the major reason for maintaining the U.S. presence in the region, particularly in South Korea, is as a deterrent to the DPRK. "North Korea poses many problems, of which its two nuclear programmes the main worry of the moment are just the start. Also alarming are its missile development and proliferation [and] its chemical and biological warfare capacity...." 21 Northeast Asia therefore, is a critical region in the struggle against proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile technology. Our national security strategy requires that "we must be able to stop rogue states before they are able to ...use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies and friends."22 Both the PRC and Russia are nuclear powers, it is likely that the DPRK has several nuclear weapons, and the ROK and Japan are clearly capable of developing them. However, the presence of U.S. forces in the region and the implied willingness of the U.S. to provide a nuclear umbrella for the ROK and Japan, has been enough to keep them from pursuing their own nuclear weapons programs. A total withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Korean Peninsula, or elsewhere in the Northeast Asia region, at a time when tensions over the North Korean nuclear program are increasing, would risk sending the wrong message to both our allies and the North Koreans. Pull out causes Asian tensions and proliferation Swanstrm 5--Exec dir., Silk Road Studies, Uppsala U. PhD, Peace and Conflict Studies (Niklas, The Korean Peninsula in the U.S.'s Post9/11 MilitarySecurity Paradigm, http://www.silkroadstudies.org/docs/conference_papers/2004/The %20Korean%20Peninsula.pdf, AMiles) For China and Japan, security has decreased somewhat in Northeast Asia and specifically in the Korean peninsula as the US has directed its attention towards other regions. The general structure of the conflicts are however the same, i.e. the Korean peninsula, nuclear proliferation and the Taiwan straits.57 A perceived withdrawal of American troops is neither in Chinas nor Japans interest. China fears that South Korea and especially Japan will strengthen their own forces and even possibly acquire nuclear weapons if the North Korean nuclear development can not be staled.58 Japan feels far more comfortable under American military protection than under an unclear military arrangement where the Chinese would be the far strongest actor in the short and long term. All the Northeast Asian states will be forced to deal with increased financial commitments to the military if the US withdraws and the tension continues. American presence in the region has provided for security, but maybe more importantly it has kept down the military expenditure for Japan and South Korea. Filling a power vacuum in the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia at large will be costly for economic development in the region. Whether or not it is admitted, the US has been a guarantor of stability since the 1950's and in practice kept down military spending. If the US withdrawal takes up phase there will be an increased military expenditure in Northeast Asia to meet new challenges in an uncertain region that risk destabilizing the Korean peninsula. Korea Neg 106/436 PRESENCE GOOD WAR Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors US presence in Korea key to stop global nuclear war Swanstrm 5--Exec dir., Silk Road Studies, Uppsala U. PhD, Peace and Conflict Studies (Niklas, The Korean Peninsula in the U.S.'s Post9/11 MilitarySecurity Paradigm, http://www.silkroadstudies.org/docs/conference_papers/2004/The %20Korean%20Peninsula.pdf, AMiles) Looking closer at one of the more threatening subregions, the Korean peninsula, we can see some worrisome changes after 9/11 but also possibilities for tension reduction, this especially in relation to changes in US policy. For half a decade America has been a stabilizing factor in the Northeast Asia. This through the active support for democratic and economic development among their allies and in the region at large, and in the defense of the South Korean border against a possible invasion by North Korea. The American presence in the Korean peninsula has been one of the US main operations in the region and changes in the US militarysecurity paradigm will directly affect the security not only in the Korean peninsula but in Northeast Asia in general. The changes in US policy in Korean peninsula is of particular interest since one of two remaining "axis of evil", and arguable the worst according to US perceptions, North Korea, with a possible nuclear capability and prior links to terrorism is situated here. Moreover, Northeast Asia could be argued to be the last remnants of the Cold War, with the largest concentration of troops against one border in the Korean peninsula (close to two million), which occasionally erupts in skirmishes.2 Moreover, the military expenditure in Northeast Asia is rapidly increasing as a result of the high level of tension and low level of trust between the actors in the region.3 A war in the region would threaten both the worlds' security as at lest two, potentially three, nuclear powers would be involved in the conflict, and the economic development globally would be reversed as a large part of the economic growth is in Northeast Asia. This makes a destabilization of the region one of the most threatening not only to regional stability, but also to international stability. Therefore it is crucial to understanding the new security environment and the US role in it. Korea Neg 107/436 PRESENCE GOOD ASIA Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors American military presence in Korea maintains peace and strong USROK relations Sharp 2010 (Gen. Walter Sharp, Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/U.S. Forces Korea, Congressional Documents and Publications, March 26) The Korean Peninsula sits at the center of Northeast Asia a dynamic region that has significant national interests for the U.S. n1 Northeast Asia is home to four of the world's six largest militaries in terms of personnel and two nuclear powers (China and Russia). n2 The region contains 25% of the world's population and is an economic powerhouse. n3 In 2009, Northeast Asia housed five of the world's 19 largest economies that collectively accounted for 24.8% of global gross domestic product during that year. n4 Countries in the region also accounted for 25.8% of U.S. trade in goods during 2009. n5 At the end of 2008, the U.S. direct investment position in Northeast Asia was valued at $220.7 billion. n6 While Northeast Asia has grown into a major economic region, it is also characterized by uncertainty, complexity, and rapid change. Historical animosities, territorial disputes, competition over access to resources, and struggles for regional hegemony have combined to pose difficult and longterm security challenges not only for regional states but also for the international community. U.S. force presence in the ROK is a longterm investment in regional peace and stability and both maintains security commitments to the ROK established under the Mutual Defense Treaty and reinforces American engagement with actors throughout Northeast Asia. U.S. force presence in the ROK also helps set the conditions for denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and eventual reunification of the two Koreas in a peaceful manner. A strong ROK U.S. Alliance, with a meaningful U.S. force presence on the Korean Peninsula, is essential to meet the security challenges posed in the dynamic and economically growing region of Northeast Asia. As observed in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, achieving core missions of American armed forces requires strong security relationships with allies and partners that are best enabled and maintained through longterm presence and sustained interaction. Korea Neg 108/436 PRESENCE GOOD JAPAN Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors Withdrawal rcauses Japanese militarization Kim 6--IR, Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (Sunghan, Realigning Expectations for the ROKU.S. Relationship: are We Ignoring a Glass More Than Half Full?, http://www.mansfieldfdn.org/programs/program_pdfs/rok_us_kim.pdf, AMiles) In addition, the withdrawal of U.S. forces in Korea would gradually strengthen feeling in Japan that it should cease to serve as a host country for the U.S. military presence because Japan, which will have probably become a "normal state" with military capability at that point, needs to prepare for a happy divorce with the United States. Opposing voices in Japan toward the U.S. military presence will be stronger, thereby endangering the U.S. presence even in Japan. This is not the scenario that China wants to see, since Japan without a U.S. security umbrella means that Japan will embark on rapid military buildup. USFK and USFJ should thus be treated as a single basket . For now, however, it seems that the U.S. believes Japan will continue to host the U.S. military presence even after the U.S. has left Korea since Japan is in need of U.S. assistance to become a normal state in the international security arena. In this vein, mutual expectations between Seoul and Washington toward ROKU.S. and JapanU.S. alliances appear to be unbalanced. Presence Good--US/ROK Alliance Module US forces are the lynchpin of USROK relations--these solve terrorism, peacekeeping, economic growth, and peace in Korea Sharp 2010 (Gen. Walter Sharp, Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/U.S. Forces Korea, Congressional Documents and Publications, March 26) A key part of U.S. security policy in Asia is the construction of a comprehensive strategic alliance with the ROK as specified in the June 2009 Joint Vision statement. This comprehensive strategic alliance will be bilateral, regional, and global in scope and will be based on common values and mutual trust. We will maintain a robust defense posture backed by allied capabilities which support both nations' security interests. Just as today, in the future the ROKU.S. Alliance will remain vital to securing peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia as a whole. The U.S. will maintain its commitment to the defense of the ROK through the employment of capabilities postured both on and off the Korean Peninsula. Similarly, the U.S. welcomes recent moves by the ROK to expand its role in the international community at a level that is commensurate with its growing international stature. The U.S. will continue to provide extended deterrence for the ROK using the full range of military capabilities to include the nuclear umbrella, conventional strike, and missile defense capabilities. As the ROKU.S. Alliance evolves in the future, we will cooperate on a wideranging set of global security challenges that are of mutual interest to include peacekeeping activities, stabilization and reconstruction efforts, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief. Over the next decade or so the security component of the Alliance will experience some of the most profound changes since the Mutual Defense Treaty was signed in 1953. Three of these key changes are the transition of wartime OPCON, relocation of U.S. forces stationed in the ROK onto two enduring hubs, and tour normalization. These transformational changes will strengthen the Alliance and enhance its stabilizing role on the Korean Peninsula and in the wider area of Northeast Asia. The process of change will also be supported by implementation of the ROK Defense Reform 2020 initiative. As the Alliance transforms, United Nations Command will continue to provide a coalition of 15 nations ready to provide support for defense of the ROK as well as conduct its armistice maintenance functions through the Military Armistice Commission. Through Alliance transformation we seek to build a better future for Koreans and Americans by establishing a durable peace on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia and setting the conditions for peaceful reunification of the two Koreas. As Alliance partners, the ROK and U.S. will work together toward achieving complete and verifiable elimination of North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programs. In the AsiaPacific region the Alliance will work jointly with regional institutions and partners to foster prosperity, maintain peace, and improve the daily lives of people. To enhance security in the AsiaPacific area the ROK and U.S. governments will advocate for and take part in effective cooperative regional efforts to promote mutual understanding, confidence, and transparency regarding security issues among nations of this region. The two governments will also work closely to address the global challenges of the North Korean threat, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction proliferation, and piracy. The ROK and U.S. will also enhance coordination on peacekeeping operations and postconflict stabilization and development assistance. In the end, the two countries will work toward achieving Alliance goals through strategic cooperation at every level. V. SUMMARY This year marks the 60th anniversary of the start of the Korean War. Thanks to the sacrifice and selfless service of a countless number of Koreans, Americans, and people of other nationalities, North Korea's aggression was repelled. This year also marks the 57th anniversary of signing the ROKU.S. Mutual Defense Treaty. Thanks to the peace and stability created by the Alliance structures that emanated from this mutual defense pact, the ROK has been able Korea Neg 109/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors to develop into a democratic industrialized state with a high standard of living and a growing role in the international community. By promoting peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, the ROKU.S. Alliance has not only set the conditions for successful development of the ROK over the last six decades, but also promoted peace and stability in the broader region of Northeast Asia a region of key national interest to the U.S. Korea Neg 110/436 UNIFICATION TURN (UNIFICATION GOOD) Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors Strong US military presence is critical to managing Korean unification and preventing war--the impact is free trade and economy collapse MITCHELL 2003 (Derek J. Mitchell is a senior fellow in the International Security Program at CSIS, "A Blueprint for U.S. Policy toward a Unified Korea," Washington Quarterly, 26:1) Calum This article assumes that the outcome of unification will be primarily on South Korean terms and defines unification as the creation of a unified polity rather than unified societies or economic structures. The circumstances under which unification may occur--peaceful integration, the gradual or sudden collapse of the DPRK, or war--is an important if unpredictable variable in any policyplanning assessment of Korea's future. Nonetheless, however unification occurs, a number of fundamental U.S. strategic interests in postunification Korea, and postunification East Asia more broadly, will remain substantially similar to what they are today. [End Page 123] Regional stability may become even more critical in the tenuous period of uncertainty and turmoil likely to characterize Korea's transition. Having fought three major wars in East Asia during the twentieth century, including one on the Korean peninsula that resulted in a substantial loss of American lives and resources, the United States understands well the importance of helping to maintain stability, prevent the emergence of regional rivalries, and promote the peaceful resolution of differences within and among regional nations. Nearly a halfmillion U.S. citizens live, work, and study in the AsiaPacific region. More than onethird of total U.S. trade is conducted with the region, with millions of U.S. jobs depending on its continued growth and development. Sustained regional economic growth through the promotion of market economies and open sealanes--essential to the free flow of resources and trade into and within the region--will remain just as much a core U.S. national security interest following unification as it is now. Longterm U.S. active engagement in East Asia--whether political, diplomatic, economic, or military--has traditionally managed to promote a peaceful security environment by providing a buffer against tensions. To continue to safeguard its regional interests, even after change on the Korean peninsula, U.S. security strategy should preserve U.S. treaty alliances as the cornerstone of peace and stability in East Asia. It is unlikely that a multilateral institution akin to NATO will be possible in Asia for the foreseeable future. The U.S. alliance structure and regional military presence will remain the most viable guarantor of regional security in its absence. At the same time, Korean unification will not minimize the profound U.S. interest in strengthening U.S. engagement with other nonallied nations in the region, particularly China, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, and Vietnam. Multilateral dialogues to promote a common approach to regional affairs and to sustain broad regional support for the alliance structure will also be increasingly necessary and appropriate. To give form to this ongoing commitment to regional security and to mitigate potential military rivalries, the United States will have to maintain a robust and credible military presence in the region. This presence will have to be altered to address the new domestic environment in Korea as well as the changed security environment in the region. The maintenance of a ready, balanced, and forwarddeployed U.S. force would fulfill important U.S. interests in regional deterrence and burden sharing and would demonstrate political commitment that a fully remote posture off the peninsula [End Page 124] would preclude. Ideally, a unified Korea would maintain a capable, conventional, national military, prepared and trained to work with the United States not only to defend the Korean homeland but also to promote regional stability. Korea Neg 111/436 UNIFICATION TURN (UNIFICATION GOOD) Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors US presence is critical to smooth reunification MITCHELL 2003 (Derek J. Mitchell is a senior fellow in the International Security Program at CSIS, "A Blueprint for U.S. Policy toward a Unified Korea," Washington Quarterly, 26:1) Calum The United States should be flexible about the structure of its presence on the peninsula but firm about maintaining some form of presence after unification. During a difficult transition, a continued U.S. presence on the peninsula will allow a unified Korea to focus on the challenges of domestic development, including the long process of reconciliation, rather than on its external security. The United States should consult closely with Korean authorities concerning an appropriate structure according to regional security needs and domestic Korean sensitivities. Korea Neg 112/436 A2: UNIFICATION = WITHDRAWAL INEVITABLE Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors Unified Korea would still seek to retain US troops MITCHELL 2003 (Derek J. Mitchell is a senior fellow in the International Security Program at CSIS, "A Blueprint for U.S. Policy toward a Unified Korea," Washington Quarterly, 26:1) Calum A unified Korea also will arguably have a substantial interest in accepting a U.S. military presence on the peninsula following unification. This presence would serve as a key component of continued alliance relations and the overall U.S. regional military presence to preserve stability throughout East Asia. Korea's continued hosting of U.S. forces would sustain the special relationship between the governments and armed forces of both sides, facilitate their coordination of regional strategy, and continue to serve as a deterrent to others seeking advantage on the peninsula. The US will continue to support troops in Korea after unification MITCHELL 2003 (Derek J. Mitchell is a senior fellow in the International Security Program at CSIS, "A Blueprint for U.S. Policy toward a Unified Korea," Washington Quarterly, 26:1) Calum A final wildcard is the continued commitment of the U.S. populace, including Congress, to sustaining its role as security guarantor in East Asia and to expending the economic, political, and military resources necessary to maintain its presence. Currently, no evidence exists that the United States will attenuate its commitments to East Asia in the future, following Korean unification or otherwise. Given the nature of democracy, however, U.S. domestic politics or public opinion could complicate U.S. international policy. The state of the region, the world, and the U.S. domestic environment at the time of unification is impossible to predict. Variables include developments in the war on terrorism; the U.S. fiscal situation; U.S. relations with other regional states; and the political, military, and financial support of regional allies and friends to help meet U.S. interests. Nonetheless, given the tremendous interest the United States will retain in the peace and stability of East Asia following unification, as indicated above, the U.S. regional security strategy of alliances, military presence, and sustained diplomatic engagement will likely endure regardless of such potential complications. Korea Neg 113/436 UNIFICATION BAD ARMS RACE Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors Unification causes an arms race and extinction Richardson, 06 Washingtonbased analyst who covered East Asian security issues as a presidential management fellow with the US Department of Defense, cofounder of The Korea Liberator weblog focused on North Korea (Coreyu, "South Korea Must Choose Sides", Asia Times, September 9th 2006, June 27th 2010, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/HI09Dg02.html, KONTOPOULOS) North Korea is the wildcard. If in the next few years reunification were to occur through a North Korean collapse, the death of Kim Jongil, or a possible but unlikely mutual agreement South Korea would suddenly find itself straddled with the enormous cost of integrating North Korea. These costs would dwarf the already massive increase South Korea would have been undertaking in defense spending, something it would clearly be unprepared and unable to accomplish while maintaining its defense investment. A Korea faced with an economic dilemma of such magnitude would find maintaining its conventional military forces at current levels impossible. At the same time, it would feel more vulnerable than ever, even with US security assurances. For a nation paranoid about the possibility of outside influence or military intervention, strapped for cash, and obsessed about its position in the international hierarchy, the obvious route might be to either incorporate North Korean nuclear devices (if they actually exist), or build their own, something South Korean technicians could easily accomplish. North Korea, after all, has set the example for economically challenged nations looking for the ultimate in deterrence. One might argue that clear and firm US security guarantees for a reunified Korea would be able to dissuade any government from choosing the nuclear option. If making decisions based purely on logic the answer would be probably yes. Unfortunately, the recent Korean leadership has established a record of being motivated more by emotional and nationalistic factors than logical or realistic ones. Antics over Dokdo and the Yasukuni Shrine and alienating the US serve as examples. But the continuation of the "Sunshine Policy" tops those. Japan must then consider its options in countering an openly nuclear, reunified Korea without USFK. Already building momentum to change its constitution to clarify its military, it's not inconceivable that Japan would ultimately consider going nuclear to deter Korea. As in South Korea, there is no technological barrier preventing Japan from building nuclear weapons. While the details of the race and escalation of tensions can vary in any number of ways and are not inevitable, that an arms race would occur is probable. Only the perception of threat and vulnerability need be present for this to occur. East Asia could become a nuclear powder keg ready to explode over something as childish as the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute between Korea and Japan, a Diaoyu/Senkakus dispute between China and Japan, or the Koguryo dispute between Korea and China. Korea Neg 114/436 NORTH KOREA THREAT/ A2: SOUTH CAN DEFEND Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors North Korea is a military threat to the South SHARP 2010 (Gen. Walter Sharp, Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/U.S. Forces Korea, Congressional Documents and Publications, March 26) Calum Though aging and technologically inferior, North Korea's massive army and vast artillery forces continue to represent a substantial threat capable of initiating limited offensives against the ROK that could potentially cost thousands of lives and billions of dollars in damage. North Korea also continued to develop its missile forces by attempting a multistage space launch vehicle, as well as multiple theater ballistic missile launches. Pyongyang continued to focus resources on its conventional and asymmetric military forces despite food shortages and a faltering economy. North Korea's missile capabilities remain a significant regional and global threat. North Korea Threat Outlook My number one concern will remain Pyongyang's continuing attempts to develop its nuclear and missile capabilities. The full potential of these capabilities would threaten the U.S., our regional allies, and the international community. We must also be mindful of the potential for instability in North Korea. Combined with the country's disastrous centralized economy, dilapidated industrial sector, insufficient agricultural base, malnourished military and populace, and developing nuclear programs, the possibility of a sudden leadership change in the North could be destabilizing and unpredictable. In the future, Pyongyang may continue its strategy of periodically heightening tensions. We must never be complacent about the possibility that North Korea might take additional provocative steps or even launch an attack on the ROK. To address this threat, UNC/CFC/USFK must maintain the highest level of readiness. Korea Neg 115/436 USROK RELATIONS TURN Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors US forces are the lynchpin of USROK relations--these solve terrorism, peacekeeping, economic growth, and peace in Korea SHARP 2010 (Gen. Walter Sharp, Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/U.S. Forces Korea, Congressional Documents and Publications, March 26) Calum A key part of U.S. security policy in Asia is the construction of a comprehensive strategic alliance with the ROK as specified in the June 2009 Joint Vision statement. This comprehensive strategic alliance will be bilateral, regional, and global in scope and will be based on common values and mutual trust. We will maintain a robust defense posture backed by allied capabilities which support both nations' security interests. Just as today, in the future the ROKU.S. Alliance will remain vital to securing peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia as a whole. The U.S. will maintain its commitment to the defense of the ROK through the employment of capabilities postured both on and off the Korean Peninsula. Similarly, the U.S. welcomes recent moves by the ROK to expand its role in the international community at a level that is commensurate with its growing international stature. The U.S. will continue to provide extended deterrence for the ROK using the full range of military capabilities to include the nuclear umbrella, conventional strike, and missile defense capabilities. As the ROKU.S. Alliance evolves in the future, we will cooperate on a wideranging set of global security challenges that are of mutual interest to include peacekeeping activities, stabilization and reconstruction efforts, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief. Over the next decade or so the security component of the Alliance will experience some of the most profound changes since the Mutual Defense Treaty was signed in 1953. Three of these key changes are the transition of wartime OPCON, relocation of U.S. forces stationed in the ROK onto two enduring hubs, and tour normalization. These transformational changes will strengthen the Alliance and enhance its stabilizing role on the Korean Peninsula and in the wider area of Northeast Asia. The process of change will also be supported by implementation of the ROK Defense Reform 2020 initiative. As the Alliance transforms, United Nations Command will continue to provide a coalition of 15 nations ready to provide support for defense of the ROK as well as conduct its armistice maintenance functions through the Military Armistice Commission. Through Alliance transformation we seek to build a better future for Koreans and Americans by establishing a durable peace on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia and setting the conditions for peaceful reunification of the two Koreas. As Alliance partners, the ROK and U.S. will work together toward achieving complete and verifiable elimination of North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programs. In the AsiaPacific region the Alliance will work jointly with regional institutions and partners to foster prosperity, maintain peace, and improve the daily lives of people. To enhance security in the AsiaPacific area the ROK and U.S. governments will advocate for and take part in effective cooperative regional efforts to promote mutual understanding, confidence, and transparency regarding security issues among nations of this region. The two governments will also work closely to address the global challenges of the North Korean threat, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction proliferation, and piracy. The ROK and U.S. will also enhance coordination on peacekeeping operations and postconflict stabilization and development assistance. In the end, the two countries will work toward achieving Alliance goals through strategic cooperation at every level. V. SUMMARY This year marks the 60th anniversary of the start of the Korean War. Thanks to the sacrifice and selfless service of a countless number of Koreans, Americans, and people of other nationalities, North Korea's aggression was repelled. This year also marks the 57th anniversary of signing the ROKU.S. Mutual Defense Treaty. Thanks to the peace and stability created by the Alliance structures that emanated from this mutual defense pact, the ROK has been able to develop into a democratic industrialized state with a high standard of living and a growing role in the international community. By promoting peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, the ROKU.S. Alliance has not only set the conditions for successful development of the ROK over the last six decades, but also promoted peace and stability in the broader region of Northeast Asia a region of key national interest to the U.S. Korea Neg 116/436 A2: ROK / US RELATIONS Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors Relations resilient--economic ties Lim 7--Fellow at the Korea Development Institute (Wonhyuk, Economic Consequences of ROKU.S. Separation, 27 November 2007, http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/07086Lim.html, AMiles) It may be argued that this reference case is of limited use for this scenario because cooler heads ultimately prevailed on both sides, especially with regard to the phased reduction of the USFK. However, in the present context of assessing the economic impact of ROKU.S. separation under various scenarios, it is important to note that even the most acrimonious exchange of words between the allies in recent memory did not have a large spillover effect on bilateral economic relations. In fact, investment and trade ties between the U.S. and ROK have been the saving grace of the bilateral relationship over the past five years. Korea Neg 117/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors Korea Neg 118/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors MUST END DEFENSE TREATY Terminating the defense treaty is key to solve the plan is necessary but not sufficient Bandow 98 Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and Robert A. Taft Fellow at the American Conservative Defense Alliance (Doug Bandow, "America's Obsolete Korean Commitment", Orbis, 42(4), Fall, Ebsco) Whatever the ROK's position, however, Washington should terminate the Mutual Defense Treaty and return to its noninterventionist roots, Seoul, Manila, Singapore, Tokyo, and others in East Asia will always be prepared to fight "to the last American." But Washington should risk the lives and wealth of its citizens only when interests fundamental to its own political community are at stake, lest American soldiers be reduced to the status of gambit pawns in somebody else's chess game. ***SOLVENCY ARGUMENTS Korea Neg 119/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors 1NC/2NC UNIQUENESS U.S. presence is sustainable committed to maintaining credible deterrence Kellerhals, 10 (6/7/10, "Merle David Jr., Staff Writer, "ShangriLa Conference Highlights AsiaPacific Security Concerns", http://www.lexisnexis.com) Washington Pursuing common interests in the AsiaPacific region has increased common security even as the region contends with new and evolving challenges, says U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates. Speaking at the ShangriLa Dialogue in Singapore June 5, Gates said the region faces challenges from rising powers and failing states, the proliferation of ballistic missiles, extremist violence and cyberthreats against the trade and commerce on which Asia's economic stability depends. "Confronting these threats is not the task of any one nation acting alone. My government's overriding obligation to allies, partners and the region is to reaffirm America's security commitments in this region," Gates said. The region's unprecedented economic growth and political development since the end of World War II was not a foregone conclusion. Rather, Gates said, it was enabled by clear choices and commitments to peace and stability. The region, he said, made commitments to open commerce; to a just international order and the rule of law; to open access to the sea, air, space and cyberspace; and to resolve conflict without force. The United States, after considerable assessment by the Obama administration of the costs and risks in its national security strategy, is increasing its deterrent capabilities in a number of ways in the AsiaPacific region. The first is developing missile defenses that are flexible and deployable to counter a growing ballistic missile threat, Gates said. The severest threat has come from efforts by North Korea to develop nuclear weapons and the longrange missiles to deliver them. Gates said the United States is renewing its commitment to "a strong and effective deterrence" for the U.S. homeland and the defense of allies and partners across the region. While President Obama has pledged to work toward a world free of nuclear weapons, the United States will maintain a safe, secure and effective nuclear arsenal as long as these weapons exist. Gates said that, as the United States has demonstrated for more than 60 years, the strength of the U.S. commitment and deterrent power in the AsiaPacific region is expressed by the continued presence of substantial U.S. forces in the region. The U.S. defense posture in Asia is shifting to one that is more geographically distributed, operationally resilient and politically sustainable, Gates said. This comes, he acknowledged, with a major buildup on Guam and with the agreement recently reached on basing with Japan. In particular Gates was referring to an agreement to relocate a Marine air station near Futenma to a lesspopulous area on Okinawa. "It is important to note that we should not measure U.S. presence, and the associated impact and influence, solely in terms of conventional military bases," Gates told delegates to the ninth annual Asian security conference. "Rather, we must think more about U.S. presence in the broader sense of what we achieve in the region the connections made, the results accomplished." Gates elaborated on the concept of U.S. presence to include everything from visiting military medical teams and civil engineering personnel to partner militaries training together to enhance capabilities for contributing to international security efforts. "These kinds of activities reflect a priority of the overall United States security strategy: to prevent and deter conflict by better deploying and integrating all elements of our national power and international cooperation," Gates said. Deterring conflict includes sustained diplomatic, economic and cultural ties to maintain stability and improve relationships, he said. ***DETERRENCE DA Korea Neg 120/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors DETERRENCE NOW Military exercises boosting deterrence TendersInfo, 10 (6/7/10, "United States: US Defense Secretary Announces Plans for Joint South Korean Military Exercises, http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy) U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates says the United States will participate in combined military exercises with South Korea to counter North Korea's recent provocative military action. He made the announcement Saturday at an Asia security summit for defense ministers and intelligence officials in Singapore. During his speech Saturday at an Asia Summit in Singapore, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates again condemned North Korea's provocative military action in sinking a South Korean warship in March and killing 46 sailors. He said the incident is part of larger pattern of reckless behavior and that North Korea continues to undermine the peace and security of Asia. "North Korea has for some time faced the choice of continuing as a destitute, international pariah, or charting a new path. Since then, the North Korean regime has only further isolated itself from the international community," he said. North Korea has denied any involvement in the attack, but a multinational investigation team concluded that North Korea was responsible. Gates promised continued U.S. support for South Korea and said the two nations will conduct joint military exercises in response to the sinking. Korea Neg 121/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors A2: N/U TROOP REDUCTIONS NOW Status quo does not involve any reduction in U.S. troops despite transfer of wartime OPCON Yonhap, 10 (2/4/10, "U.S. commander says `no change' in troop number in S. Korea," Nationwide International News, lexis) The number of U.S. troops in South Korea will remain unchanged after Seoul takes back the wartime operational control of its troops from Washington, the top U.S. commander here said Wednesday, strongly denying speculation of weakened U.S. military support after the transition. "The U.S. troop numbers will stay the same as we fight sidebyside. The transition does not mean the United States will reduce its commitment," Gen. Walter Sharp told a group of graduating cadets of the Korea Military Academy. "We will never reduce our responsibility to defend Korea. It will always be our No. 1 responsibility." The U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) currently retains wartime operational control, or OPCON, over South Korea's military, a legacy of the 195053 Korean War, when the U.S. and South Korea fought against the North. Seoul, which is technically still at war with Pyongyang as their conflict ended in a truce rather than a peace treaty, is slated to take back OPCON on April 17, 2012. The scheduled OPCON transfer has spawned concerns over a weakening of South Korea's defensive capabilities amid Pyongyang's continuing nuclear ambitions that led to an atomic test in 2006 and another in 2009. The U.S. commander's remarks are in line with a statement by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell, who told a group of journalists in Seoul Wednesday that his government is seriously considering concerns in Korea and is willing to closely discuss the issue. "We are doing a number of things right now," Sharp said. "We are developing one bilateral plan both countries will agree to ... and developing a list of capabilities our secretary of defense and (Seoul's Defense) Minister Kim Taeyoung will agree to. One thing is the nuclear umbrella." Sharp said that the "time has come for Korea to take on more responsibilities for the defense on the peninsula." "This is the first responsibility for any nation to defend its own people," he said. Minister Kim called the slated date of the OPCON transfer "bad timing" during a local defense forum last month, indicating the South Korean government may ask Washington to reschedule the transition. Gen. Sharp added that there are four things the USFK must do: deter North Korea; rapidly carry out war plans in the case of attack from the North; engage with other partners in northeast Asia; and work together on overcoming global security issues with South Korea when the country's military is strong enough. "The Korean military is an outstanding military that we are very proud to be serving sidebyside," he said. "Korea is helping to build up peace not only along the demilitarized zone, but in hot spots in many other places around the world." Korea Neg 122/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors A2: N/U RESTRUCTURING Restructuring of U.S. troops presence in South Korea will not jeopardize Korean security Roehrig, 08 Associate Professor in the National Security Decision Making Department, at the U.S. Naval War College (Terence Roehrig, "Restructuring the U.S. Military Presence in Korea: Implications for Korean Security and the U.S.ROK Alliance," Academic Paper Series, http://www.keia.org/Publications/OnKorea/2008/08Roehrig.pdf) For the United States, the withdrawal and relocation of U.S. troops have been important parts of its effort to transform the military, and U.S. military leaders are convinced that restructuring along with the transfer of wartime OPCON will not jeopardize Korean security. According to the USFK commander, Gen. Burwell B. Bell, the three ROK armies that defend the peninsula "are powerful fighting forces. They're very, very capable."33 Concerning the command transfer, General Bell noted that the ability to deter and defeat North Korea, if necessary, is the most important consideration "and nothing will be done, in transferring any command relationships, that jeopardizes that fundamental."34 Korea Neg 123/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors 1NC LINKS Withdrawal in the midst of Korean threats will send the wrong message to both adversaries and allies spurring proliferation and global aggression Facts on File.com, 07 (8/7/07, "U.S.South Korea Relations." Issues & Controversies On File: n. pag. Issues & Controversies. Facts On File News Services, http://www.2facts.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/i0800190) Proponents maintain that the combination of a U.S. military withdrawal from South Korea and North Korean threats of nuclear proliferation would prompt other countries in the region to build up their own military capabilities to counter those of North Korea South Korea and Japan . , they say, might pursue nuclear programs of their own if they feel threatened. China might increase its missile capabilities in response, which in turn could lead its adversaries, such as Taiwan, to expand their own military options, supporters argue. The absence of U.S. forces countering North Korea could increase the threat of military confrontation in the area and lead to a general trend of nuclear development, supporters warn. The U.S. military presence in South Korea, they say, provides a security guarantee to the region and helps keep the balance between competing powers. Removing U.S. forces could damage cohesion in the area, they argue. "To pull our troops out of South Korea would risk creating a leadership vacuum in the region and cause further destabilization," says William Cohen, who was secretary of defense under President Bill Clinton (D, 19932001). Supporters contend that removing U.S. troops from the South could be seen as backing down from a confrontation with the North. Such a move might be seen around the world as a sign of weakness , they caution, which could embolden U.S. adversaries and encourage similarly aggressive and belligerent positions in other situations. That precedent would be especially dangerous when applied to nuclear proliferation, they argue. "Any movement of American forces would almost certainly involve countries and individuals taking the wrong message ," says Kurt Campbell, former deputy assistant secretary of defense. "The main one would be this: receding American commitment, backing down in the face of irresponsible North Korean behavior." Will cause Japan to nuclearize and embolden China against Taiwan Dao, 03 (1/5/03, James, NY Times, "Why Keep U.S. Troops in South Korea?" http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/05/weekinreview/05JDAO.html, JMP) Deciding if now is the time depends on how well the United States is able to project power across the Pacific, as well as on its responsibilities as the globe's presumptive supercop. Withdrawing forces in Korea would reverberate powerfully in Tokyo, Beijing, Taipei and beyond, raising questions in an already jittery region about Washington's willingness to maintain stability in Asia. "In the present mood, the Japanese reaction could be quite strong," said Zbigniew Brzezinski, the national security adviser to Jimmy Carter. "And under those circumstances, it's hard to say how the Chinese might respond." Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency. The arguments against withdrawal then still apply today, Mr. Brzezinski says. A secure Korea In the 1970's, Mr. Brzezinski took part in the last major debate over reducing American forces in Korea, when President Carter, motivated by postVietnam doubts about American power, proposed withdrawing ground forces from the peninsula. He faced resistance from the South Korean government, the makes Japan more confident, he contends. An American withdrawal from Korea could raise questions about the United States' commitment to the 40,000 troops it has in Japan. And that could drive anxious Japanese leaders into a military buildup that could include nuclear weapons, he argues. "If we did it, we would stampede the Japanese into going nuclear," he said. Other Asian leaders would be likely to interpret a troop withdrawal as a reduction of American power, no matter how much United States the asserts its commitment to the region. China might take the opportunity to flex its military muscle in the Taiwan Straits and South China Sea. North Korea could feel emboldened to continue its efforts to build nuclear arms. "Any movement of American forces would almost certainly involve countries and individuals taking the wrong message," said Kurt Campbell, a deputy assistant secretary of defense during the Clinton administration. "The main one would be this: receding American commitment, backing down in the face of irresponsible North Korean behavior. And frankly, the ultimate beneficiary of this would be China in the long term." Korea Neg Michigan Institutes `10 124/436 7 Week Juniors "Mindsets in Asia are profoundly traditional," he said. "They calculate political will by the numbers of soldiers , ships and airplanes that they see in the region." Korea Neg 125/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors 2NC LINK BLOCK Our link outweighs the plan will be read as weakness and embolden adversaries Facts on File.com, 07 (8/7/07, "U.S.South Korea Relations." Issues & Controversies On File: n. pag. Issues & Controversies. Facts On File News Services, http://www.2facts.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/article/i0800190) An absence of U.S. military power in the region, supporters argue, would also encourage other regional powers to increase their military forces in defense against the threat posed by North Korea. That, in turn, could cause other countries to arm themselves against potential threats, sparking an escalating arms race that could spread throughout the region and beyond, supporters contend. It is possible that one or more countries involved would soon develop nuclear weapons, they say. Removing troops from South Korea would also be bad policy for the U.S., supporters argue. It would be taken as sign of weakness, a they contend, and a victory on the part of North Korea . Proponents argue that such a move would send a signal to others that aggressive behavior can be used to force the U.S. to back down. Withdrawal will devastate U.S. military credibility, spur global aggression by adversaries Henricks, 05 Lieutenant Commander, Civil Engineer Corps, United States Navy (2/14/05, Todd B., "Adverse Effects of Prospective U.S. Forces Korea Troop Realignments," http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA463965&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf, JMP) USFK Force Realignments Will Have Adverse Effects on U.S.ROK Relations Moving USFK military forces out of South Korea will have adverse effects on the U.S.ROK alliance in the following areas: The ROK will consider the United States as having broken defense commitments ; the ROK will be left vulnerable to attack due to lack of adequate military advancements; and the ROK will question the United States' commitment of defense should North Korea attack. ROK will consider the United States as having broken defense commitments. A significant factor to remember is that the Korean War has not officially ended. Even though there has been an "armed truce" which has been in place for over 50 years, withdrawing U.S. troops would be tantamount to leaving an ally on the battlefield to be run over by the enemy. "By deploying USFK in a forward area as a `tripwire'12 in order to defend and retaliate against the North Korean attack, the United States has successfully deterred North Korea's attack."13 treaty with South Korea and abandonment of that longstanding ally...could seriously degrade the importance of military power as a U.S. foreign policy implement, undercut U.S. interests in national credibility, and perhaps encourage aggression against other U.S. friends around the world. Civil war on the Korean Peninsula probably would erupt. The Republic of Korea and Japan might feel needs to develop their own nuclear weapons."14 The deterrence of North Korea and the defense of South Korea is firmly grounded in the presence of USFK military forces, for "...it is impossible to talk about the [U.S.ROK] alliance without focusing on USFK."15 Although this is an extreme picture of the U.S.ROK alliance situation, it still deserves some consideration. "Abrogation of the U.S. security Korea Neg 126/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors 2NC LINK BLOCK U.S. military presence is key to deter a number of Asian conflicts perception of decline will gut U.S. credibility Auslin, 10 resident scholar at AEI (Michael, 3/17/10, "U.S.Japan Relations: Enduring Ties, Recent Developments," House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and the Global Environment, http://www.aei.org/speech/100130, JMP) Despite this litany of problems both real and perceived, the U.S.Japan alliance, and the broader relationship it embodies, remains the keystone of U.S. policy in the AsiaPacific region. There is little doubt that America and Japan share certain core values that tie us together, including a belief in democracy, the rule of law, and civil and individual rights, among others, which should properly inform and inspire our policies abroad. Moreover, after the cataclysm of World War II, we have worked together to maintain stability in the western Pacific, throughout the Cold War and after. Without the continued Japanese hosting of U.S. forces, our forwardbased posture is untenable , particularly in a period of growing Chinese military power in which the acquisition of advanced weapons systems indicates increased vulnerability of U.S. forces over time. There are over 35,000 U.S. military personnel in Japan, and another 11,000 afloat as part of the 7th Fleet, while threequarters of our military facilities are in Okinawa. Maintaining this presence is a fulltime job for officials on both sides of the Pacific. Both Washington and Tokyo have revised the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) governing the U.S. military in Japan to respond to local concerns over judicial access to U.S. service members, and domestic pressures to reduce Japan's $4 billion annual Host Nation Support (HNS) are a continuing feature of bilateral discussions. The new Japanese government has indicated its desire to consider further revision of SOFA and HNS, which portends continued, sometimes difficult negotiations between both sides, though I would be surprised by any significant changes in either. It is clear, however, that the presence of U.S. military forces is welcomed by nearly all nations in the AsiaPacific region sends a signal of American commitment to the region. From a historical standpoint, the postwar American and presence in the AsiaPacific has been one of the key enablers of growth and development in that maritime realm. And today, for all its dynamism, the AsiaPacific remains peppered with territorial disputes and longstanding grievances, with few effective multilateral mechanisms such as exist in Europe for solving interstate conflicts. Our friends and allies in the area are keenly attuned to our continued forwardbased posture, and any indications that the United States was reducing its presence might be interpreted by both friends and competitors as a weakening of our longstanding commitment to maintain stability in the Pacific. The shape of Asian regional politics will continue to evolve, and while I am skeptical of what can realistically be achieved by proposed U.S.JapanChina trilateral talks, it seems evident that we must approach our alliance with Japan from a more regionally oriented perspective, taking into account how our alliance affects the plans and perceptions of other nations in the region. A significant reduction of US forces is interpreted as a declining commitment to regional stabilityensures regional instability, proliferation, and lowering of power projection Parker 03 U.S. Colonel (Richard H. Parker, "US Military Presence in a Unified Korea," Strategy Research Project, 4/7/03, http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA414532) As world events influence changes in U.S. interests, the objectives of the forward military presence in Korea already relate to more than just fulfilling a promise to the Korean nation and opposing North Korean aggression. Serious reduction of U.S. forces, or diplomatic and political activities, may be interpreted throughout Asia as a declining commitment to regional stability. After all, the United States maintains forces in Germany today, despite the demise of the Soviet Union and its threat more than ten years ago. In this region, with reliance on bilateral relationships, the effect of U.S. reduced effort in any way would be more profoundly felt. The time is ripe for the United States to lay a foundation and prepare for a future of opportunities, instead of waiting for the inevitable challenges. If the United States desires to protect its national interests in regard to Northeast Asian regional stability, ensure nuclear weapon nonproliferation, access to key markets and resources, and enhance force projection capabilities, the US must maintain a forwardbased military presence in a unified Korea. Korea Neg 127/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors 2NC CRUSHES U.S. INFLUENCE Withdrawal will wreck U.S. influence Kang & Cha, 03 *associate professor of Business at Dartmouth, AND **associate professor of government Georgetown's school of Foreign Service (May/June 2003, David C. Kang, Victor D. Cha, Foreign Policy, "Think Again: The Korea Crisis," http://www.ituassu.com.br/asia_fp1.pdf, JMP) "The United States Should Pull Its Troops Out of an Ungrateful South Korea" Not yet. Massive demonstrations, Molotov cocktails hurled into U.S. bases, and American soldiers stabbed on the streets of Seoul have stoked anger in Congress and on the oped pages of major newspapers about South Korea. As North Korea appears on the nuclear brink, Americans are puzzled by the groundswell of antiAmericanism. They cringe at a younger generation of Koreans who tell cbs television's investigative program 60 Minutes that Bush is more threatening than Kim, and they worry about reports that South Korea's new president, Roh Moohyun, was avowedly antiAmerican in his younger days. Most Koreans have complicated feelings about the United States. Some of them are antiAmerican, to be sure, but many are grateful. South Korea has historically been one of the strongest allies of the United States. Yet it would be naive to dismiss the concerns of South Koreans about U.S. policy and the continued presence of U.S. forces as merely emotional. Imagine, for example, how Washingtonians might feel about the concrete economic impact of thousands of foreign soldiers monopolizing prime real estate downtown in the nation's capital, as U.S. forces do in Seoul. Korean alliance enters uncharted territory. The North Koreans would claim victory, and the United States would lose influence in one of the most dynamic economic regions in the world--an outcome it neither wants nor can afford. In the long term, such a withdrawal would also pave the way for Chinese regional dominance. Some South Koreans might welcome a But hasty withdrawal of U.S. forces is hardly the answer to such transPacific anxiety, particularly as the U.S.South larger role for China--a romantic and uninformed notion at best. Betting on China, after all, did not make South Korea the 12th largest economy and one of the most vibrant liberal democracies in the world. The alternatives to the alliance are not appealing to either South Koreans or Americans. Seoul would have to boost its relatively low level of defense spending (which, at roughly 3 percent of gross domestic product, is less than that of Israel and Saudi Arabia, for example). Washington would run the risk of jeopardizing its military presence across East Asia, as a U.S. withdrawal from the peninsula raised questions about the raison d'tre for keeping its troops in Japan. A revision in the U.S. military presence in Korea is likely within the next five years, but withdrawal of that presence and abrogation of its alliance are not. Korea Neg 128/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors 2NC PLAN CAUSES WITHDRAWAL FROM JAPAN Withdrawing troops from South Korea will encourage Japanese nuclearization Campbell & Sunohara, 04 senior vice president and director of the International Security Program at CSIS, AND ** visiting fellow in the International Security Program at CSIS (Kurt M. Campbell and Tsuyoshi Sunohara, The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices, "9. Japan: Thinking the Unthinkable," ed by Campbell, Einhorn and Mitchell B. Reiss, JMP) Even the recent efforts by the U.S. Department of Defense, under Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, to revise America's global military posture have engendered anxiety in Japan and other countries. For example, when it became known that the Pentagon was considering withdrawing some U.S. military forces from South Korea, some South Korean officials indicated they were losing confidence in the U.S. security commitment to their country.78 Former national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski warned that such actions could trigger not only Seoul but also Tokyo to consider a nuclear weapons option: "Conceivably, if we withdraw from South Korea, then South Korea either will have to defend itself somehow, in which case it may need nuclear weapons, and that would certainly further intensify pressure on Japan to respond."79 Withdrawal from South Korea will cause escalatory war and devastate U.S. influence across Asia and lead to pullout from Japan Eberstadt, 02 political economist who holds the Henry Wendt Chair in Political Economy at the AEI and is Senior Adviser to the National Bureau of Asian Research (10/1/02, Nicholas, The National Interest, "Our Other Korea Problem," http://www.aei.org/article/19460, JMP) An American troop withdrawal from Korea, or the downgrading of the U.S. presence into a peacekeeping force, would generate far reaching reverberationsthough some U.S. analysts favor such a course of events. One such reverberation would concern the future of U.S. forward bases in Japan. For Japan to be the only East Asian state hosting U.S. troops , this on top of the continuing controversy in Japanese domestic politics with regard to Okinawa, might be hard to sustain for long. Thus, an American military pullout from South Korea, far from leading to a bolstering of U.S. forces elsewhere in East Asia, might trigger a major diminution of American influence in the Pacific. The worst of all outcomes would a politically rancorous American withdrawal from Korea at a time when a highly armed be North Korean state fronting an effective charm offensive saw opportunities to further its old ambitionthe reunification of the peninsula under its aegis. Those particulars could all too easily set the stage for a potentially devastating conflict in Korea, with spillover potential to other major powers. But even presuming genuine rapprochement between North and South and some measure of stability in Korea, an American withdrawal from Korea would still create a security vacuum and invite a latterday version of the Great Game of realpolitik the Pacific powers played so roughly in the region a century ago. A U.S. military withdrawal from Korea might be welcomed in Moscow or Beijing, but, in truth, both are ambivalent about the departure of the American military presence in Korea. In public they support U.S. withdrawal, but privately they recognize that Northeast Asia would be a less stable neighborhoodand a region less disposed to economic growthwithout the U.S. military presence. Although any lossesin terms of diminished economic potential and reduced national securitywould be distributed unevenly in the region, all the Pacific powers and South Korea would lose from an end to the U.S.ROK military alliance and the U.S.dominated security order in East Asia. Of all the political actors in East Asia, only the DPRKthe region's lone radical revisionist statecould reasonably expect any benefits. Withdrawal from Korea will force pullout from Japan risks nuclearization Campbell & Sunohara, 04 senior vice president and director of the International Security Program at CSIS, AND ** visiting fellow in the International Security Program at CSIS (Kurt M. Campbell and Tsuyoshi Sunohara, The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices, "9. Japan: Thinking the Unthinkable," ed by Campbell, Einhorn and Mitchell B. Reiss, JMP) Domestic Factors As the only people to have had a nuclear weapon used against them, the Japanese have long maintained a pacifist stance when it comes to nuclear and military issues. Even with the current debate regarding constitutional reform and Japan's becoming a normal state (that is, remilitarizing), the Japanese public has not lessened its resistance to an independent nuclear capability. The depth of this antinuclear sentiment is such that only major changes in the international or domestic environment, and probably only a combination of such changes, could engender a domestic political environment more permissive toward Japan's acquiring nuclear weapons. Domestic factors do exist, however, that could lead to such a development. For example, although broadly supportive of the JapaneseAmerican alliance, the Japanese people have expressed discontent with some of its manifestations. A substantial portion of the Japanese public, for instance, opposes the American military presence in Japan and would like to see it much reduced or even eliminated entirely. Such feelings are especially prevalent on the island of Okinawa, where the American military occupies approximately onesixth of the island and American troops repeatedly behave improperly in the eyes of the local population. This sentiment could very well increase if the United States continues with its plans to integrate its East Asian military bases more deeply into the global war on terror (thereby making the bases in particular should U.S. forces have to withdraw from the Korean Peninsula as a result of a decision by the government of either South Korea or a newly reunified Korea, the Japanese government would find it hard to justify Japan's becoming the sole Asian country hosting American military bases. However, if Washington carried out a major reduction in the U.S. military presence without sufficient consultation with or approval of the Japanese government, it could be an inducement for Japanese leaders to reconsider a nuclear weapons option. and Japan in general more likely terrorist targets) and sustains unpopular American military operations in the Middle East.84 Likewise, Korea Neg 129/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors 2NC GROUND FORCES KEY Withdrawing only ground troops weakens U.S. commitment to the Korean peninsula and harms U.S. China relations Kim 99 Associate Professor at the Institute of Foreign Affairs & National Security (SungHan Kim, "Stability and Security on the Korean Peninsula: Developing a Research Agenda," The University of California at San Diego, 5/2627/99, http://www.cap.lmu.de/transatlantic/download/kim.doc.) Another alternative is for the United States to withdraw its ground troops from Korea leaving behind only naval and air force units in a unified Korea. This may well be an approach by which Washington would retain its existing role of ensuring regional security while at the same time enjoying increased flexibility. Seen from the standpoint of the United States, this option is compatible with the policy of ensuring safe passage in the Pacific, while avoiding possible criticism of infringing upon the sovereignty of Korea that may be raised over a continued presence of U.S. ground troops in Korea, in addition to checking the emergence of hegemonic activity in the region. Nevertheless, a drawback of this scenario is that in light of its lack of ground forces, the U.S. commitment to "automatic involvement" in any development on the Korean peninsula would be seen as considerably weakened. The presence of ground troops constitutes the clearest evidence of the political determination of the United States. Therefore, if Washington's political commitment appears diminished due to the withdrawal of all but its naval and air forces, the effectiveness of U.S. forces in Japan would also decline markedly. Moreover, if the United States were to maintain naval forces along Korea's west coast across from the Chinese coastal territory, Beijing would likely react sensitively, a factor which could harm U.S.China relations. Permanently stationing ground troops is key to deterrence uniquely signals U.S. commitment and boosts credibility of the nuclear umbrella Payne, et. al, 10 Professor in Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University (March 2010, Dr. Keith Payne, Study Director Thomas Scheber Kurt Guthe, "U.S. Extended Deterrence and Assurance for Allies in Northeast Asia," http://www.nipp.org/National%20Institute%20Press/Current %20Publications/PDF/US%20ExtendDeterfor%20print.pdf, JMP) Forward Deployments The forward presence of U.S. military forces has value for deterrence and assurance that is well recognized. Forces routinely deployed on or near the territory of an ally not only, or even primarily, augment the armed strength of that country, but also serve as a concrete and continuing reminder that the United States has a strong interest in its security and will fight in its defense. Permanently stationed ground forces, in particular, seem to have an assurance effect not duplicated by temporary deployments (port calls to show the flag, for example), probably because they are unlikely to be withdrawn overnight and often are positioned where they will be directly engaged by an enemy attack, thus ensuring U.S. involvement in a conflict. The likelihood, if not certainty, that U.S. forces would be engaged in a conflict can lend credibility to an associated nuclear guarantee. If forward deployments include U.S. nuclear weapons, those arms themselves offer a tangible assurance that the ally is covered by the nuclear umbrella. The United States has deployed general purpose forces in South Korea for more than a half century. From the mid1950s to the late 1960s, the U.S. troop level in the ROK was 60,00070,000. During the Vietnam War, in line with his "Guam Doctrine" to make U.S. allies in Asia shoulder more of the defense burden, President Nixon ordered the withdrawal of some 18,000 troops from South Korea, reducing the total there to 43,000. In the 1976 presidential campaign, Jimmy Carter pledged to pull out all U.S. ground forces from South Korea, but as president removed only a token number (roughly 3,000 troops). The Carter cut subsequently was reversed by President Reagan to bolster the U.S. commitment to the ROK. As part of the postCold War retraction of American forces from overseas deployments, President George H.W. Bush ordered the troop level in South Korea reduced to 36,000 and then suspended further withdrawals in light of concern about the North Korean nuclear weapons program. The U.S. force on the peninsula increased slightly and stabilized at somewhat more than 37,000 during the number of troops dropped to 28,500, where it remains today.54 At this level, South Korea is the country with the third largest peacetime deployment of American troops, behind only Germany (54,000) and Japan (33,000).55 One South Korean observer cites this ranking as an indication of the high priority the United States assigns to the defense of the ROK.56 According to an opinion survey conducted in early 2008, most South Koreans (70 percent) see the overall U.S. military presence the Clinton administration. Between 2004 and 2006, as a result of the Global Posture Review conducted by the George W. Bush administration, in East Asia as contributing to regional stability.57 Korea Neg 130/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors LINK EXTENSIONS Total withdrawal of U.S. forces reduces commitment to deterrence and risks war especially in a time of tensions Davino 04 Director for Manpower, Personnel, and Administration of the United States Pacific Command (Michael F. Davino, "Should the U.S. Continue to Maintain Forces in Korea?" Strategy Research Project, 3/15/04, http://74.125.155.132/scholar?q=cache:L0E672qcx5cJ:scholar.google.com/ +USFK+should&hl=en&as_sdt=80000000) Although the region's economy and the support we receive from our allies are important, the major reason for maintaining the U.S. presence in the region, particularly in South Korea, is as a deterrent to the DPRK. " North Korea poses many problems, of which its two nuclear programmes the main worry of the moment are just the start. Also alarming are its missile development and proliferation [and] its chemical and biological warfare capacity ...." 21 Northeast Asia therefore, is a critical region in the struggle against proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile technology. Our national security strategy requires that "we must be able to stop rogue states before they are able to ...use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies and friends."22 Both the PRC and Russia are nuclear powers, it is likely that the DPRK has several nuclear weapons, and the ROK and Japan are clearly capable of developing them. However, the presence of U.S. forces in the region and the implied willingness of the U.S. to provide a nuclear umbrella for the ROK and Japan, has been enough to keep them from pursuing their own nuclear weapons programs. A total withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Korean Peninsula, or elsewhere in the Northeast Asia region, at a time when tensions over the North Korean nuclear program are increasing, would risk sending the wrong message to both our allies and the North Koreans. Korea Neg 131/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors U.S. PRESENCE PREVENTS ALLIED PROLIF U.S. presence key to nonproliferation and trade prevents South Korea and Japan nuclearization Printz 06 Lieutenant Colonel (3 15, Scott, "A U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN A POSTUNIFIED KOREA: IS IT REQUIRED?", http://www.dtic.mil/cgi bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA448748&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf) The U.S. will continue to maintain vital interests in the region and retain a credible military presence to protect them. U.S. vital interests in the Asia Pacific region include increased foreign trade, a key component to continued U.S. prosperity. Currently, U.S. trade with Asia far exceeds trade with Europe representing thirty percent of all U.S. exports and millions of domestic jobs.48 The U.S. will continue to honor treaty obligations with Korea and Japan and seek to maintain open navigation and security of the strategic sea lanes in the region. Maintaining alliances and remaining engaged in the region is important to a successful nonproliferation strategy. Failure to successfully mediate the current North Korean nuclear crisis and maintain a balance of power in the region may result in South Korea and Japan pursuing WMD . Korea Neg 132/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors WITHDRAWAL => WITHDRAWAL FROM JAPAN US withdrawal from South Korea would lead to withdrawal form Japan JIR, 01 (6/2/01, Jane's Intelligence Review, "A US military presence in Asia: offshore balancer or local sheriff?". cns.miis.edu/pubs/eanp/sheriff.pdf) Korean reunification The gradual improvement in NorthSouth Korean relations and the possibility of reunif ication have important implications for the US military presence on the Korean penin sula and in Asia at large. If North and South Korea reunify will US troops stay and, if so, at what level? Views in the region differ. The leaders of the ROK and the DPRK have called for US troops to stay. Their reluctance to see US troops depart is tied to concerns over the fact that they are sandwiched between sev eral large powers including China, Russia, Japan and the USA. There are fears about the creation of a power vacuum. However, if reunification occurred, the direction of South Korean public opinion is unclear and leaders in Seoul might not be able to resist the popular sentiment in favour of US withdrawal. The South Korean public has been increasingly displeased with US troop presence and reunification will lead to either/both an official or unofficial reassessment of US troop presence. Many within Washington and Tokyo are becoming increasingly concerned that if the US leaves the Korean peninsula this will put pressure on Japan as the single largest military base of operation in Asia. Such a development could spark a similar public debate in Japan, leading to calls for a reduction or withdrawal from Japan, especially if Japan's recession persists. There are already reports indicating that consideration of reduced or even withdrawn US ground forces in Japan and the ROK is under review in Washington . Continued US military presence in Korea may be seen by Beijing as being directed at China. Beijing's current tacit acceptance of regional politics among China, Japan, Taiwan and the two Koreas. China and the USA hold opposite views about the benefits of alliances and about the structure of Asian security. Chinese officials persistently call for the USA to abandon its military alliances as the centrepiece of its military strategy in Asia. Beijing views these as a means to contain China and to dominate the AsiaPacific theatre. US TMD programmes in Asia raise similar concerns in Beijing. These contrasting vis ions between the USA and China of alliance and regional security suggest the emer gence of a competition for influence bet ween Beijing and Washington in the Asian theatre. China will look for every oppor tunity to limit US influence and weaken US alliances in Asia. The challenges to the USA's military presence in Asia will come from the changing regional politics among China, Japan, Taiwan and the two Koreas. the USA on the peninsula is both an accep tance of the historical legacy of the Korean War and recognition of the usefulness of the USA in maintaining a balance in a situation in which Korea is still divided. However, reunification changes this calculation. Bei jing will likely view troops in Korea as a way for the USA to position itself as a regional hegemon in an effort to limit China's free dom of movement in Asia. China has already officially suggested that US troops depart after reunification. Such concerns on the part of Beijing could have a spillover influence on other regional security issues. US Japan and USTaiwan defence ties will begin to have direct bearing on SinoUS relations as Beijing comes to view both of these as part of a broader regional strategy to contain and limit China's role as a regional power. Korea Neg 133/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors A2: TURN WITHDRAWAL => REGIONALISM Withdrawal will cause a power vacuum and force allies to go nuclear Twining, 10 Senior Fellow for Asia at the German Marshall Fund of the United States (4/1/10, Daniel, "Strengthening the U.S.Korea Alliance for the 21st Century," http://www.gmfus.org/galleries/ct_publication_attachments/AsiaDanTwiningU.S.KoreaAlliance.pdf) In the second scenario, a U.S. retreat into isolationism (perhaps following withdrawal leading to a selfinflicted defeat in Afghanistan) or accelerated material decline (perhaps induced by failure to reverse America's alarming levels of national debt)-- perhaps toxically combined with reduced U.S. defense expenditures and/or political leaders unwilling to rally the American public for a continued leadership role in world affairs--would induce the weakening of Washington's alliance commitments in East Asia and its willingness to remain the region's security guarantor. Such a regional order that was "ripe for rivalry" would resemble that forecast by American strategists after the Cold War, when an American withdrawal from the region and raw balancing behavior in the midst of dynamic power shifts seemed likely to make "Asia's future look like Europe's [conflictprone] past."7 Such a balanceofpower order would feature selfhelp behavior by Asian states of the kind that has been mitigated to date by American defense commitments. Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan might develop and deploy nuclear weapons as the only means of securing their autonomy and defense against the Chinese military giant in their midst (and additionally, in South Korea's case, against a Japanese neighbor of whom Seoul historically has been equally wary). Chinese leaders might find themselves free to pursue their declared revisionist aims in the South China Sea, no longer constrained by America's Seventh Fleet and robust alliance network, while lesser Asian states whose territorial claims conflict with China's would find they had less ability to leverage a lessengaged America's support in their favor. Korea Neg 134/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors A2: NAVY / AIR FORCE SOLVES It would take days to relocate troops Dao, 03 (1/5/03, James, NY Times, "Why Keep U.S. Troops in South Korea?" http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/05/weekinreview/05JDAO.html, JMP) In addition, the United States is creating a base for four submarines in Guam and has a maintenance and logistics base in Singapore. The United States Pacific Command is headquartered in Hawaii. From those bases, American warplanes could reach South Korea in hours. But it would take days for an armada of warships or troop carriers to arrive from Japan. Adm. Dennis Blair, now retired, who commanded American forces in the Pacific until last year, argues that even if the threat from North Korea dissipates, the United States should keep forces on the peninsula in case of crises in other parts of Asia. "A soldier, marine or sailor in Korea or Japan was much more useful than one in Hawaii or San Diego, just because of the sailing time it takes to get then across the Pacific," he said. Takes weeks to deploy naval forces ground troops key to check escalation Henricks, 05 Lieutenant Commander, Civil Engineer Corps, United States Navy (2/14/05, Todd B., "Adverse Effects of Prospective U.S. Forces Korea Troop Realignments," http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA463965&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf, JMP) Another consideration is deployment time to the Korean Peninsula should the DPRK decide to provoke USFK forces at the DMZ. When The People's Republic of China (PRC) tested shortrange ballistic missiles near Taiwan in 1995/6, the United States responded by dispatching a pair of aircraft carrier battle groups to the area. It took on the order of two weeks to get these warships into the area.22 With the current operations tempo of the U.S. armed forces, a twoweek response time to the Korean Peninsula would most likely be a bestcase scenario. The wars in which the U.S. military fights today (such as Desert Shield/Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom) testify to the need for large numbers of ground troops and ground troop support to accomplish the mission. Technological advances in military hardware in and of themselves cannot win wars and keep the peace. A war on the Korean Peninsula would not be different in this respect. The proximity of Seoul, South Korea to the DMZ (approximately 25 miles) provides another reason for a robust USFK troop presence to keep the DPRK from provoking hostilities at the DMZ. One author even noted, "Korea is a country where the decisive military arm is likely to be the infantry if it is adequately backed by mortar and artillery fire and close air support."23 Korea Neg 135/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors TERRORISM IMPACT 2NC U.S. forces in Korea are key to deterrence and the war on terror Colonel Stevens, 06 (3/15/06, Colonel Wayne Stevens, "Is U.S. Forces Korea Still Needed on the Korean Peninsula?" http://www.dtic.mil/cgi bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA448328&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf, JMP) If war breaks out on the peninsula, the ROK will most likely require considerably more than 34,000 U.S. troops to assist.87 The need for U.S. forces within Northeast Asia capable of rapidly deploying from within the region instead of from the U.S. will enhance the ROK's ability to stop DPRK's aggression quickly. The joint and flexible capabilities of the U.S. forces such as air superiority, precision guided missiles, and BCTs that are more capable of independent action and more responsive to regional combatant commanders can give the ROK forces a distinctive edge during combat operations and ensure the U.S. strategic focus of maintaining stability within the region.88 Some have argued for removing or reducing the U.S. forces on the peninsula because DPRK's nuclear capability negates the need for U.S. conventional forces in the South.89 Despite the lack of conclusive proof that North Korea actually has nuclear weapons; the DPRK may find it harder to prove that they do not have nuclear weapons. North Korea already admitted that they are conducting a nuclear weapons program and the North has extracted spent fuel and reprocessed the fuel into weaponsgrade plutonium.90 Although the nuclear argument may have some validity, a major U.S. concern is the need to have forward deployed basing to allow U.S. forces to project its military power. The forces in the ROK provide the U.S. with the capability to continue its deterrence mission and also to fight the Global War on Terror (GWOT) on foreign soil before it reaches the U.S.91 The impact is extinction SidAhmed, 4 (Mohamed, Managing Editor for AlAhali, "Extinction!" August 26September 1, Issue no. 705, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm) A nuclear attack by terrorists will be much more critical than Hiroshima and Nagazaki , even if and this is far from certain the weapons used are less harmful than those used then, Japan, at the time, with no knowledge of nuclear technology, had no choice but to capitulate. Today, the technology is a secret for nobody. So far, except for the two bombs dropped on Japan, nuclear weapons have been used only to threaten. Now we are at a stage where they can be detonated. This completely changes the rules of the game. We have reached a point where anticipatory measures can determine the course of events. Allegations of a terrorist connection can be used to justify anticipatory measures, including the invasion of a sovereign state like Iraq. As it turned out, these allegations, as well as the allegation that Saddam was harbouring WMD, proved to be unfounded. a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This could lead to a third world war , from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without winners and losers. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers. What would be the consequences of And, retaliation causes nuclear war Corsi, 5 PhD in political science from Harvard. (Jerome, excerpt from Atomic Iran, http://911review.org/Wget/worldnetdaily.com/NYC_hit_by_terrorist_nuke.html) The combination of horror and outrage that will surge upon the nation will demand that the president retaliate for the incomprehensible damage done by the attack. The problem will be that the president will not immediately know how to respond or against whom. The perpetrators will have been incinerated by the explosion that destroyed New York City. Unlike 911, there will have been no interval during the attack when those hijacked could make phone calls to loved radioactive rubble. Still, the president, members of Congress, the military, and the public at large will suspect another attack by our known enemy Islamic terrorists. ones telling them before they died that the hijackers were radical Islamic extremists. There will be no such phone calls when the attack will not have been anticipated until the instant the terrorists detonate their improvised nuclear device inside the truck parked on a curb at the Empire State Building. Nor will there be any possibility of finding any clues, which either were vaporized instantly or are now lying physically inaccessible under tons of The first impulse will be to launch a nuclear strike on Mecca, to destroy the whole religion of Islam. Medina could possibly be added to the target list just to make the point with crystal clarity. Yet what would we gain? The moment Mecca and Medina were wiped off the map, the Islamic world more than 1 billion human beings in countless different nations would feel attacked. Nothing would emerge intact after a war between United States Islam. The apocalypse would be upon us. Then, too, we would face the and an immediate threat from our longterm enemy, the former Soviet Union. Many in the Kremlin would see this as an opportunity to grasp the victory that had been snatched from them by Ronald Reagan when the Berlin Wall came down. A missile strike by the Russians on a score of American cities could possibly be preemptive. Would the U.S. strategic defense system be so in shock that immediate retaliation would not be possible? Hardliners in Moscow might argue that there was never a better opportunity to destroy America . In China, our newer Communist enemies might not care if we could retaliate. With a population already over 1.3 billion people and with their population not concentrated in a few major cities, the Chinese might calculate to initiate a nuclear blow on the United States. What if the United States retaliated with a nuclear counterattack upon China? The Chinese might be able to absorb the blow and recover. The North Koreans might calculate even more recklessly. Why not launch upon America the few missiles they have that could reach our soil? More confusion and chaos might only advance their position. If Russia, China, and the United States could be drawn into attacking one another, North Korea might emerge stronger just because it was overlooked while the great nations focus on attacking one another. Korea Neg 136/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors Korea Neg 137/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors NORTH KOREAN INVASION IMPACT 1NC/2NC Withdrawal will cause North Korea invasion of Seoul even the libertarians agree Huessy, 03 Senior Defense Associate at National Defense University Foundation who specializes in nuclear weapons, missile defense, terrorism and rogue states (8/13/2003, Peter, "Realism on the Korean Peninsula: Real Threats, Real Dangers," http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=18560, JMP) However, Carpenter has long advocated a unilateral withdrawal of our U.S. forces from the Republic of Korea, under the guise of arguing that such a reduction of U.S. forces would save taxpayer dollars, as well as U.S. lives, should there be an armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula. In fact, Carpenter, in conversations I have had with him, readily agrees that a U.S. withdrawal from the Korean Peninsula might very well precipitate an invasion by the communists in the North with the aim of quickly capturing Seoul and then suing for peace in an agreement that would eventually give control over a unified country to the communists. Apart from the fact that U.S. forces withdrawn from the ROK would be redeployed elsewhere in the U.S. and thus save the U.S. taxpayers nothing and given that U.S. military forces deployed overseas and at home have declined by over 1 million soldiers since the end of the Cold War, a withdrawal from the ROK by the United States would do nothing except cause another Korean War, kill millions of Korean civilians and soldiers and place in danger the ability of Japan to maintain its economy in the face of a Korean Peninsula in communist hands. As every Commander of U.S. forces in Korea since 1979 has told Congress in public testimony, Japan is not defensible if Korea is taken by the communists. A blockade of trade routes to and from Japan would become a realistic weapon in the hands of the PRC, not dissimilar to a blockade of Taiwan by the PRC portrayed by Patrick Robinson in Kilo Class. Will escalate to global nuclear war Huessy, 03 Senior Defense Associate at National Defense University Foundation who specializes in nuclear weapons, missile defense, terrorism and rogue states (8/13/2003, Peter, "Realism on the Korean Peninsula: Real Threats, Real Dangers," http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=18560, JMP) It may be wishful thinking, but I believe China has the ability to help shape the future in the region in a positive way. For the U.S. to withdraw from the ROK, as proposed by Carpenter, might very well initiate not only another Korean War but also possibly another World War When I lived in Seoul and attended Yonsei University in 196970, my Korean father and Yonsei professor, Hahm Pyong . Choon, later to become Ambassador to the United States and national security adviser to the President of the Republic of Korea, told me there were always those who sought to purchase liberty and freedom on the cheap. At an embassy reception in Washington, he reminded me what he had told me in class: "Those on the left think you are imperialists; those on the right do not want to spend the money". In 1985, the communists planted bombs in Burma where the ROK cabinet was meeting. Professor Hahm was killed by the very same North Korean communists whom wish to see the withdrawal of American forces from the region. To save a few dollars, however unintentionally, we might end up the North Korean army in downtown Seoul. Certainly, armed with nuclear weapons, the North will be difficult at best to deter from such an attack To the people of the Republic of Korea: America will not leave, we will not run, we . will not forget the extraordinary sacrifices we both have made to secure the freedom of your country and ours. This is the basis for the Bush Administration's strategy, and with that sufficient reason it should be supported. Korea Neg 138/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors A2: ROK CAN DEFEND ITSELF Fiscal constraints preventing South Korea defense upgrades Payne, et. al, 10 Professor in Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University (March 2010, Dr. Keith Payne, Study Director Thomas Scheber Kurt Guthe, "U.S. Extended Deterrence and Assurance for Allies in Northeast Asia," http://www.nipp.org/National%20Institute%20Press/Current%20Publications/PDF/US%20ExtendDeterfor%20print.pdf, JMP) Seoul instead sees other means, both diplomatic and military, of dealing with the North Korean nuclear danger. On the diplomatic front, there are the talks, sanctions, and inducements intended to convince Pyongyang to give up its nuclear weapons capabilities. The military response likewise involves multiple measures. Two weeks after the first North Korean nuclear test, Gen. Lee Sanghee, thenchairman of the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff, issued a directive to the chiefs setting forth a threepart approach to the new threat: deterrence of nuclear aggression; precision strikes against enemy nuclear facilities; and defense against nuclear attack.80 For deterrence, Seoul will continue to rely on the U.S. nuclear guarantee. That guarantee, according to South Korean sources, is backed by nuclear Tomahawk landattack missiles on attack submarines, nuclear cruise missiles or freefall bombs on B52H or B2 longrange bombers, or nuclear bombs on shorterrange F15E or F16 strike aircraft.81 If deterrence fails, the ROK military expects to detect indications that a North Korean nuclear attack is imminent and then conduct preemptive air and missile strikes against nuclearrelated targets.82 For this purpose, the military plans to acquire improved intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities (airborne and groundbased early warning radar and Global Hawk drones),83 upgraded strike aircraft (F15Ks),84 precisionguided munitions (Joint Direct Attack Munitions, Joint AirtoSurface Standoff Missiles, and laserguided penetrating bombs),85 and longerrange missiles (the 1,000km Hyunmu 3 cruise missile and a 500km ballistic missile now in research and development).86 To counter North Korean nuclear missiles that escape destruction on the ground, additional active defenses (Aegisequipped destroyers and advanced Patriot batteries) will be deployed.87 Implementation of the ambitious second and third parts of the approach (precisionstrike capabilities and defenses) has been hampered by fiscal constraints on the ROK defense budget.88 The central importance of the first part, the U.S. nuclear guarantee, is evident in the previously discussed South Korean efforts to underscore and understand more fully that commitment. South Korea can't afford to replace U.S. ISR capabilities which are key to defense Henricks, 05 Lieutenant Commander, Civil Engineer Corps, United States Navy (2/14/05, Todd B., "Adverse Effects of Prospective U.S. Forces Korea Troop Realignments," http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA463965&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf, JMP) South Korea's Strong Economic Development Enhances its Ability to Defend Itself The South Korean economy has undergone tremendous growth over the past several years. It is fast becoming an economic stronghold in the PacificAsian arena. Due in part to their strong economy, "ROK forces are undergoing modernization and improvements in many key areas through indigenous weapons production, coproduction, and procurement through Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and direct commercial channels."25 However, this modernization will take several years, even decades, and cannot be realistically relied upon to cover current vulnerabilities caused by prospective USFK force realignments. Additionally, the issue of cost sharing with the U.S. for the U.S.ROK alliance has been raised due to the strong South Korean economy. "Economic success makes it possible for the ROK to share a larger portion of securityrelated costs on the Korean Peninsula. However, it must be noted that these contributions come while the ROK is also modernizing its force structure, establishing a more modern command and control system, improving the quality of life for its armed forces, and experience increasing political pressures to expand spending on domestic programs."26 However, a South Korean author cautions that, "The U.S. advanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities are an essential part of defending South Korea should deterrence fail. Its ISR assets are estimated to cost $15 billion, which [the] South Korean economy could not afford as of today in the short run."27 Therefore, despite a strong and growing economy, the ROK is not currently in a position to absorb the costs associated with the current prospective USFK troop withdrawals. 25 Advanced weaponry and air defenses not in place and ROK must still train troops Henricks, 05 Lieutenant Commander, Civil Engineer Corps, United States Navy (2/14/05, Todd B., "Adverse Effects of Prospective U.S. Forces Korea Troop Realignments," http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA463965&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf, JMP) The ROK will be left vulnerable to attack due to lack of adequate military advancements. A main consideration regarding moving USFK troops out of the ROK is that what USFK will lack in numbers of troops will be made up in advanced military technology. However, the question needs to be addressed as to when that military technology will arrive on the Korean Peninsula. As of yet, USFK has not put in place advanced weaponry and air defenses necessary to adequately defend against the massive DPRK forces, artillery, and shortrange missiles. "The recent relocation of USFK [forces] from forward areas to rear areas is based upon the premise that this will not reduce U.S. deterrent power because the mobilization speed and superiority of U.S. precisionguided weaponry will compensate for the increased distance from North Korea's front line. However, South Koreans are concerned about the possibility that the United States might reduce its deterrent power for South Korea to defend Seoul in the initial stage of war."16 With a very robust economic growth in recent years, South Korea has gained the ability to take significant steps in growing and modernizing their own military capabilities, diminishing the need for a large U.S. military presence. However, there are critical technologies that are essential to the defense of their country that the Korea Neg Michigan Institutes `10 139/436 7 Week Juniors ROK lacks at this time that will take several years to put in place. Additionally, the USFK must take into account not only placing advanced military technology in the ROK, but also the training time necessary to bring ROK forces up to minimum proficiency levels to operate such technology. "If the United States were to reposition the 2nd ID's [USFK 2nd Infantry Division] assets, it would not be certain whether South Korea could successfully defend itself at an early stage of a second Korean war."17 Korea Neg 140/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors U.S.ROK ALLIANCE DA 1NC U.S. ground forces key to maintain a credible nuclear guarantee for Seoul Payne, et. al, 10 Professor in Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University (March 2010, Dr. Keith Payne, Study Director Thomas Scheber Kurt Guthe, "U.S. Extended Deterrence and Assurance for Allies in Northeast Asia," http://www.nipp.org/National%20Institute%20Press/Current %20Publications/PDF/US%20ExtendDeterfor%20print.pdf, JMP) Forward deployment of forces then, one of the , is principal ways in which the United States assures the South Koreans its commitment to their defense Forwarddeployed forces are the embodiment of that of . commitment and the mechanism by which the United States would become engaged in any new Korean war. In certain circumstances, the direct engagement of American conventional forces in such a conflict could increase the prospect of U.S. nuclear use. This connection reinforces the nuclear guarantee to Seoul For these purposes, the . presence of some notinsignificant U.S. ground force in South Korea more is important than the specific number of troops or their disposition. While U.S. nuclear weapons in the past were forward deployed in South Korea, a nuclear presence on the peninsula has not been essential to the nuclear guarantee. US forces are the lynchpin of USROK relations--these solve terrorism, peacekeeping, economic growth, and peace in Korea Sharp 2010 (Gen. Walter Sharp, Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/U.S. Forces Korea, Congressional Documents and Publications, March 26) Calum A key part of U.S. security policy in Asia is the construction of a comprehensive strategic alliance with the ROK as specified in the June 2009 Joint Vision statement. This comprehensive strategic alliance will be bilateral, regional, and global in scope and will be based on common values and mutual trust. We will maintain a robust defense posture backed by allied capabilities which support both nations' security interests. Just as today, in the future the ROKU.S. Alliance will remain vital to securing peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia as a whole. The U.S. will maintain its commitment to the defense of the ROK through the employment of capabilities postured both on and off the Korean Peninsula. Similarly, the U.S. welcomes recent moves by the ROK to expand its role in the international community at a level that is commensurate with its growing international stature. The U.S. will continue to provide extended deterrence for the ROK using the full range of military capabilities to include the nuclear umbrella, conventional strike, and missile defense capabilities. As the ROKU.S. Alliance evolves in the future, we will cooperate on a wideranging set of global security challenges that are of mutual interest to include peacekeeping activities, stabilization and reconstruction efforts, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief. Over the next decade or so the security component of the Alliance will experience some of the most profound changes since the Mutual Defense Treaty was signed in 1953. Three of these key changes are the transition of wartime OPCON, relocation of U.S. forces stationed in the ROK onto two enduring hubs, and tour normalization. These transformational changes will strengthen the Alliance and enhance its stabilizing role on the Korean Peninsula and in the wider area of Northeast Asia. The process of change will also be supported by implementation of the ROK Defense Reform 2020 initiative. As the Alliance transforms, United Nations Command will continue to provide a coalition of 15 nations ready to provide support for defense of the ROK as well as conduct its armistice maintenance functions through the Military Armistice Commission. Through Alliance transformation we seek to build a better future for Koreans and Americans by establishing a durable peace on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia and setting the conditions for peaceful reunification of the two Koreas. As Alliance partners, the ROK and U.S. will work together toward achieving complete and verifiable elimination of North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programs. In the AsiaPacific region the Alliance will work jointly with regional institutions and and take part in effective cooperative regional efforts to promote mutual understanding, confidence, and transparency regarding security issues among nations of this region . two The governments will also work closely to address the global challenges of the North Korean threat, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction proliferation, and piracy. The ROK and U.S. will also enhance coordination on peacekeeping operations and postconflict stabilization and development assistance. In the end, the two countries will work toward achieving Alliance goals through strategic cooperation at every level. V. SUMMARY This year marks the 60th anniversary of the start of the Korean War. Thanks to the sacrifice and selfless service of a countless number of Koreans, Americans, and people of other nationalities, North Korea's aggression was repelled. This year also marks the 57th anniversary of signing the ROKU.S. Mutual Defense Treaty. Thanks to the peace and stability created by the Alliance structures that emanated from this mutual defense pact the ROK has been able to develop into a democratic , industrialized state with a high standard of living and a growing role in the international community. By promoting peace and partners to foster prosperity, maintain peace, and improve the daily lives of people. To enhance security in the AsiaPacific area the ROK and U.S. governments will advocate for ***U.S.ROK ALLIANCE DA Korea Neg Michigan Institutes `10 141/436 7 Week Juniors stability on the Korean Peninsula, the ROKU.S. Alliance has not only set the conditions for successful development of the ROK over the last six decades, but also promoted peace and stability in the broader region of Northeast Asia a region of key national interest to the U.S. Prevents South Korean prolif Hughes, 2007 [Christopher W., PhD University of Sheffield, 1997, Reader/Associate Professor, University of Warwick. "North Korea's Nuclear Weapons: Implications for the Nuclear Ambitions of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan," January, Asia Policy No 3, http://www.nbr.org/publications/asia_policy/AP3/AP3Hughes.pdf] South Korea's history of considering its nuclear options closely corresponds with and demonstrates well the four principal drivers governing the potential for nuclear proliferation. The national security consideration has clearly been paramount for South Korea. Its geographical situation at the intersection of the security interests of the major powers in Northeast Asia presents South Korea with a number of longterm security and related alliance dilemmas. During the Cold War, the most pressing of these security dilemmas was obviously the confrontation with North Korea, and Seoul, lacking confidence in its own national resource constraints to deter Pyongyang, turned to U.S. alliance conventional and nuclear security guarantees. Consequently, the possibility of the alliance dilemma of U.S. abandonment was what formed the prime driver for South Korea's first attempt at acquiring nuclear weapons . South Korea's perception of declining U.S. implacability in the face of North Korea provocations in the late 1960s, U.S. rapprochement with China in the early 1970s, and U.S. plans to scale back its troop deployments (under the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations) all galvanized President Park to begin to seek nuclear weapons. Park was only dissuaded from this option by U.S. threats to cease security and economic guarantees altogether. South Korea was then forced to return to the shelter of the U.S. nuclear umbrella in the absence of its own deterrent, thus enabling the reaffirmation of U.S. security guarantees.54 Escalates to global nuclear war Cirincione, 2000 Director of the NonProliferation Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Spring 2000, Joseph, Foreign Policy, "The Asian Nuclear Reaction Chain", JStor) The blocks would fall quickest and hardest in Asia, where proliferation pressures are already building more quickly than anywhere else in the world. If a nuclear breakout takes place in Asia, then the international arms control agreements that have been painstakingly negotiated over the past 40 years will crumble Moreover the United States could . , find itself embroiled its fourth war on in the Asian continent in six decadesa costly rebuke to those who seek the safety of Fortress America by hiding behind national missile defenses. Consider what is already happening: North Korea continues to play guessing games with its nuclear and missile programs; South Korea wants its own missiles to match Pyongyang's; India and Pakistan shoot across borders while running a slowmotion nuclear arms race; China modernizes its nuclear arsenal amid tensions with Taiwan and the United States; Japan's vice defense minister is forced to resign after extolling the benefits of nuclear weapons; and Russiawhose Far East nuclear deployments alone make it the largest Asian nuclear powerstruggles to maintain territorial coherence. Five of these states have nuclear weapons; the others are capable of constructing them. Like neutrons firing from a split atom, one nation's actions can trigger reactions throughout the region, which in turn, stimulate additional actions. These nations form an interlocking Asian nuclear reaction chain that vibrates dangerously with each new development. If the frequency and intensity of this reaction cycle increase, critical decisions taken by any one of these governments could cascade into the second great wave of nuclearweapon proliferation, bringing regional and global economic and political instability and, perhaps, first combat the use of a nuclear weapon since 1945. Korea Neg 142/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors 2NC OVERVIEW DA Outweighs the case a. We control magnitude on all conflicts South Korean proliferation breaks efforts to remain non nuclear ensuring a chain reaction across the entire continent all conflicts become nuclear b. perception nature of the link makes it faster and more probable it does not rely on a series of links the plan sparks immediate proliferation in South Korea c. Probability accidents are likely Cimbala, 2008 [Stephen, Distinguished Prof. Pol. Sci. Penn. State Brandywine, Comparative Strategy, "Anticipatory Attacks: Nuclear Crisis Stability in Future Asia", 27, InformaWorld] If the possibility existed of a mistaken preemption during and immediately after the Cold War, between the experienced nuclear forces and command systems of America and Russia, then it may be a matter of even more concern with regard to states with newer and more opaque forces and command systems. In addition, the Americans and Soviets (and then Russians) had a great deal of experience getting to know one another's military operational proclivities and doctrinal idiosyncrasies, including those that might influence the decision for or against war. Another consideration, relative to nuclear stability in the present century, is that the Americans and their NATO allies shared with the mass destruction may be presented by states or nonstate actors motivated by cultural and social predispositions not easily understood by those in the West nor subject to favorable manipulation during a crisis. The spread of nuclear weapons in Asia presents a complicated mosaic of possibilities in this regard. States with nuclear forces of variable force structure, operational experience, and commandcontrol systems will be thrown into a matrix of complex political, social, and cultural crosscurrents contributory to the possibility of . In addition to the existing nuclear powers in Asia, others may seek nuclear weapons if war they feel threatened by regional rivals or hostile alliances. Containment of nuclear proliferation in Asia is a desirable political objective for all of the obvious reasons. Nevertheless, the present century is unlikely to see the nuclear hesitancy or risk aversion that marked the Cold War, in part, because the military and political discipline imposed by the Cold War superpowers no longer exists, but also Soviets and Russians a commonality of culture and historical experience. Future threats to American or Russian security from weapons of because states in Asia have new aspirations for regional or global respect.12 The spread of ballistic missiles and other nuclearcapable delivery systems in Asia, or in the Middle East with reach into Asia, is especially dangerous because plausible adversaries live close together and already are engaged in ongoing disputes about territory or other issues.13 The Cold War Americans and Soviets required missiles and airborne delivery systems of intercontinental range to strike at one another's vitals. But shortrange ballistic missiles or fighter bombers suffice for India and Pakistan to launch attacks at one another with potentially "strategic" effects . China shares borders with Russia, North Korea, India, and Pakistan; Russia, with China and NorthKorea; India, with Pakistan and China; Pakistan, with India and China; and so on. The short flight times of ballistic missiles between the cities or military forces of contiguous states means that very little time will be available for warning and attack assessment by the defender. Conventionally armed missiles could easily be mistaken for a tactical nuclear first use. Fighterbombers appearing over the horizon could just as easily be carrying nuclear have first strikevulnerable forces and commandcontrol systems that increase decision pressures for rapid, and possibly mistaken, retaliation. This potpourri of weapons as conventional ordnance. In addition to the challenges posed by shorter flight times and uncertain weapons loads, potential victims of nuclear attack in Asia may also possibilities challenges conventional wisdom about nuclear deterrence and proliferation on the part of policymakers and academic theorists. For policymakers in the United States and NATO, spreading nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in Asia could profoundly shift the geopolitics of mass destruction from a European center of gravity (in the twentieth century) to an Asian and/or Middle Eastern center of gravity (in the present century).14 This would profoundly shake up prognostications to the effect that wars of mass destruction are now passe, on account of the emergence of the "Revolution in Military Affairs" and its encouragement of informationbased warfare.15 Together with this, there has emerged the argument that largescale war between states or coalitions of states, as opposed to varieties of unconventional warfare and failed states, are exceptional and potentially obsolete.16 The spread of WMD and ballistic missiles in Asia could overturn these expectations for the obsolescence or marginalization major of interstate warfare. Korea Neg 143/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors TURNS KOREAN CONFLICT Turns Korean conflict Snyder, Et. Al. '10 director of the Center for U.S.Korea Policy and senior associate of Washington programs in the International Relations program of The Asia Foundation (Charles L. Pitchard and John H. Tilleli Jr. 2010. "US Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula" ww.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Korean_PeninsulaTFR64.pdf) strong U.S.South Korea alliance remains the foundation for coor A dination of policy toward North Korea . Both U.S. president Barack Obama and South Korean president Lee Myungbak have agreed that their top policy objective visvis North Korea is its complete denu clearization . Their common goal is to promote a regional strategy that constrain North Korea s 's destabilizing activities and counters the risks resulting from its nuclear and missile activities. In the wake of the ship sinking, the two administrations have worked particularly closely to forge bilateral and multilateral responses designed to strengthen deter rence and ensure that North Korea cannot engage in such provocations with impunity . Korea Neg 144/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors Turns china and asia Twining, 10 Senior Fellow for Asia at the German Marshall Fund of the United States (4/1/10, Daniel, "Strengthening the U.S.Korea Alliance for the 21st Century," http://www.gmfus.org/galleries/ct_publication_attachments/AsiaDanTwiningU.S.KoreaAlliance.pdf) By structuring an Asian security system that favors democratic forms of social organization and cooperation among liberal states to provide the public goods that undergird the regional order, the U.S. alliance system, and the U.S.ROK alliance within it, the institutional partnership between Washington and Seoul helps Asian states move towards regional communitybuilding based on consensual norms of economic liberalism, good governance, military and diplomatic transparency, and the common security they provide. At the same time, South Korea's alliance with America hedges against the development of nonconsensual order by shaping a a regional balance of power and influence that constrains the possibilities for Chinese hegemony a nd shores up the independence of lesser states within a pluralistic regional order. Therefore, South Korea's alliance with the United States should remain its preferred external alignment because it reinforces Seoul's position within its preferred pathways to regional order and serves as a useful hedge against the development of alternative regional systems detrimental to South Korea's autonomy and security. In this reading, the U.S.ROK alliance is not a Cold War legacy whose utility ended with that conflict. Nor is it merely a hedge against North Korean aggression until the Pyongyang regime mellows in a way that diminishes the danger it poses to the South and/or puts the peninsula on a track towards peaceful reunification. Rather, the U.S.South Korea alliance is a vital tool for both Seoul and Washington to shape Asia's developing regional order and their respective roles within it. TURNS CHINA ***UNIQUENESS Korea Neg 145/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors 2NC RELATIONS HIGH Relations high support after the Cheonan incident proves. Feulner, 10 (2/4/10, Edwin Feulner, PhD., President of the Heritage Foundation, "The Status of the U.S.Korea Relationship in 2010," http://www.heritage.org/Research/Lecture/TheStatusoftheUSKoreaRelationshipin 2010) DH President Obama's summit meeting in Seoul was the one oasis of calm in an otherwise dramatic yet unproductive Asian trip. Such relative calm is in itself quite significant, particularly in light of the expansive and violent antiU.S. beef demonstrations that transfixed Seoul last year as well as the strained bilateral relations during the Roh Moohyun administration (200308). Though there were few "deliverables" from the summit meeting, Barack Obama and Lee Myung bak had the opportunity to further develop their personal relationship as they coordinated policies on critical issues. The Obama Administration's adoption of a firm policy toward Pyongyang in response to North Korean provocations has brought Seoul and Washington closer together , removing what could have been a strong policy dispute. In 2009, the U.S. and ROK successfully completed North Korea contingency plans (for situations other than fullscale war) that had languished during the Roh administration. Though given impetus by concerns of Kim Jongil's failing health in late 2008, the Lee administration was far more receptive than Roh, who felt such discussions were an infringement on South Korean sovereignty. USKorea relations at a historical highrecent Obama troop proves Cha 10 Senior Adviser and Korea Chair of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (Victor Cha, "The New Old Reliable," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1/13/10, http://csis.org/node/23301/expert) The final quarter of 2009 included a number of significant developments in USKorea ties . President Barack Obama made his first trip to Seoul in November, and Special Envoy for North Korea Policy Stephen Bosworth traveled to Pyongyang in December. The summit between Presidents Obama and Lee Myungbak marked the continuation of an historical high in relations between the two countries . On issues affecting the alliance, Obama and Lee found common ground on North Korea, while they inched forward with the KoreaUS free trade agreement. Meanwhile, Bosworth's three days of talks with North Korean officials brought the most encouraging signs of a return to the sixparty process since talks broke down at the end of 2008. The Obama administration is faring well on the Korean Peninsula , even as relations with other major powers of the region become more complicated. Those accompanying Obama on his trip to Asia informally acknowledged that Korea was the "best stop" on the trip and sensed a personal connection between the two leaders. Relations are stronger than ever quotes ambassadors Yonhap News, 6/23 (6/23/10, Kim Deokhyun, Yonhap News Agency, South Korea's only news agency, "Alliance between S. Korea, U.S. 'stronger than ever': U.S. ambassador," http://english. yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2010/06/23/6/0301000000AEN20100623006200315F.HTML) DH U.S. ambassador The to Seoul on Wednesday called the South KoreaU.S. alliance "stronger than ever " as they continue their "unfinished" mission of defending the Asian ally. "The enduring alliance between the two countries was rooted in shared sacrifice, common value and mutual respect ," said Kathleen Stephens during her speech at a U.S military headquarters in Seoul. "It is an alliance that is stronger than ever." Korea Neg 146/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors US military commitment to South Korea strong now. Armacost, et. al., 10 (5/10, Michael H. Armacost, Distinguished Fellow at the Shorenstein AsiaPacific Research Center, former U.S. Ambassador to Japan and the Philippines; and former under secretary of state for political affairs, other members of the New Beginnings Policy Research Study Group, a joint venture of The Korea Society and Stanford University's Shorenstein Center, "`New Beginnings' in the U.S.ROK Alliance: Recommendations to the Obama Administration," iis db.stanford.edu/evnts/6219/New_Beginnings_FINAL_May_2010.pdf) DH The Obama administration has engaged in very close consultations and planning with South Korea on security matters. In the Joint Vision statement with President Lee, as well as on other occasions, President Obama himself reconfirmed the United States' commitment to the security of the Republic of Korea, including the nuclear umbrella At the 41st U.S.ROK Security Consultative Meeting on October 22, 2009, the U.S. and South . Korean defense ministers responded forcefully to the North Korean nuclear and missile tests a few months earlier. In their Joint Communiqu, Secretary Gates "reiterated the firm and unwavering U.S. commitment to the defense of the ROK using both capabilities postured on the Korean Peninsula and globally available U.S. forces and capabilities that are strategically flexible to deploy to augment the combined defense in case of crisis."11 He also committed to maintain the current U.S. troop level (about 28,500) in Korea. He stressed that the United States will continue to "provide extended deterrence for the ROK, using the full range of military capabilities, to include the U.S. nuclear umbrella, conventional strike, and missile defense capabilities." 12 We are pleased that the Obama administration has continued implementation of alliance reforms initiated by the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations. These include the consolidation and relocation southward of U.S. military bases; the transfer of USFK headquarters out of Seoul; and the movement from a U.S.led to a ROKled security structure on the peninsula, with continued full support by the United States. We are confident that the changes will not only make the alliance more sustainable over the long run in South Korean domestic political terms but will also enhance the alliance's deterrent and defensive capabilities. Relations strong because of OPCON transfer solves all perception links delay was designed to send a message. VOA News, 6/27 (6/27/10, VOA News, "US, South Korea Postpone Transfer of Wartime Force Control," http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/asia/USSouthKoreaPostponeTransferofWartimeForceControl 97264784.html) DH President Barack Obama has agreed to a South Korean request to postpone the transfer of operational control during wartime of South Korea's armed forces to Seoul, part of steps designed to send a clear message to North Korea about the strength of the U.S.South Korea alliance . Confirmation of the decision, which would delay transfer of wartime control of forces from 2012 until late 2015, came during the bilateral meeting in Toronto between President Obama and South Korean President Lee Myungbak. MILITARY COMMITMENT STRONG NOW In that meeting, President Obama expressed solidarity with the people of Korea in the wake of the sinking of the South Korean warship Cheonan in March, which an international investigation said was caused by a North Korean torpedo. President Obama said President Lee had handled the matter with judgment and restraint, and had rightly insisted on North Korea being held to account for its actions in the U.N. Security Council. There must be consequences, said Mr. Obama, for such irresponsible behavior on the international stage. "The purpose of the decision is to send a clear message of the U.S. staying power in the region at a time when that message is important given North Korean conduct over the last year and a half," said Ambassador Jeff Bader, Senior "This extension will strengthen the current transition plan , will allow us to synchronize more closely with South Korea's lead of the combined defense, and that the result will be a more capable alliance," said Russel. Director for Asian Affairs at the National Security Council. Danny Russel, Director for Korea and Japan at the National Security Council, also briefed reporters. The South Korean president said they also discussed in detail other follow up steps, and agreed that Korea and the United States would do all they can deter any acts of North Korean aggression. Transferring wartime control of forces, referred to as OPCON, was part of a bilateral agreement negotiated in 2007 under the Bush administration. Briefing reporters in Toronto, U.S. officials said South Korea suggested the postponement last February before the sinking of the South Korean ship. Korea Neg 147/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors RELATIONS UP NOW Relations high now opcon proves Rhodes et. al., 6/26 (6/26/10, Ben Rhodes, Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications, Mike Froman, Deputy National Security Advisor for International Economics, Ambassador Jeff Bader, Senior Director for Asian Affairs at the National Security Council, and Danny Russel, Director for Asian Affairs at the National Security Council, "Conference Call Briefing by Ben Rhodes, Mike Froman, Ambassador Jeff Bader, and Danny Russel," White House Office of the Press Secretary, http://m.whitehouse.gov/thepress office/conferencecallbriefingbenrhodesmikefromanambassadorjeffbaderanddannyrus) DH MR. RHODES: This is Ben Rhodes, I'd just note that that was Danny Russel. And I'd just add that in general the U.S.Korean alliance is one that we believe is really is on as strong footing as has been in quite some time. The depth of cooperation that we've had with President Lee and his government over the last year and a half is quite substantial and extends, of course, to economic issues. But also in the political and security realm, we've really been in lockstep with the Koreans. And we view the delay in opcon as a significant step both, again, signaling the U.S. commitment to the region, which President Obama has made a key pillar of his foreign policy approach, as well as a key signal, particularly given the current state of play on the Korean Peninsula, about the depth of America's commitment to the alliance and to the stability and security of the region. So I would just echo my colleague's comments and underscore the importance of the delay in opcon transfer and the full range of activities that we're taking to deepen and strengthen this alliance. Relations high FTA proves Business Wire, 6/28 (6/28/10, Business Wire, "ACE Comments on U.S.Korea Free Trade Agreement," http://www.marketwatch.com/story/acecommentsonuskoreafreetradeagreement20100628? reflink=MW_news_stmp) DH Evan G. Greenberg, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of ACE Limited, today provided the following statement regarding the Obama Administration's commitment to advance the U.S.Korea Free Trade Agreement. "I commend President Obama for announcing his commitment to ratify the U.S.Korea Free Trade Agreement. "This agreement will strengthen our commercial ties, create enormous potential economic benefits and create good paying jobs here in the United States. It will also help solidify further our longstanding alliance with the people of South Korea and be a fitting tribute to our enduring friendship 60 years after the start of the Korean War. "ACE will continue to work with the Administration and Congress to demonstrate the benefits of the agreement and to meet the President's timeline for its approval." USROK relations strong security arrangement proves. Feulner, 10 (2/4/10, Edwin Feulner, PhD., President of the Heritage Foundation, "The Status of the U.S.Korea Relationship in 2010," http://www.heritage.org/Research/Lecture/TheStatusoftheUSKoreaRelationshipin 2010) DH The U.S.South Korea security relationship is currently very strong and enjoys far greater confluence of policies than areas of contention. Progress has been made on transforming the two countries' military relationship into a true strategic alliance of equal partners. For example, Seoul's announcement that it will send civilian and military personnel to support coalition efforts in Afghanistan is an indication that South Korea is adopting global responsibilities commensurate with its capabilities. As such, it marks a sharp contrast with the new Japanese government's reluctance to do more than offer economic assistance. Washington's growing unease with the new Hatoyama government provides an opportunity for Seoul to be recognized as the U.S.'s closest ally that best understands the need to confront global security challenges. In his New Year's Day speech, President Lee underscored the need for Seoul to pursue "global diplomacy" in 2010 in order to achieve a "greater Republic of Korea." President Lee's drive for his country to play a greater diplomatic, economic, and security role on the world stage is reflected in South Korea's selection as the site of the G20 summit in November. Korea Neg Michigan Institutes `10 148/436 7 Week Juniors We are seeing a further development of the mature U.S.ROK military relationship without the former acrimony on either side. And decisions once taken, are accepted by both sides. In other words, everything already decided is not going to stay open to future debate. Here I think of wartime command and control. Korea Neg 149/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors RELATIONS UP NOW USROK relations strong now outweighs USJapan relationship. Feulner, 10 (2/4/10, Edwin Feulner, PhD., President of the Heritage Foundation, "The Status of the U.S.Korea Relationship in 2010," http://www.heritage.org/Research/Lecture/TheStatusoftheUSKoreaRelationshipin 2010) DH South Korea is a stalwart U.S. ally that has long been overshadowed by Washington's repeated references to Japan as the "cornerstone" of U.S. security in Asia. Growing strains in the U.S.Japanese alliance following the Democratic Party of Japan's accession to power highlight Tokyo's unwillingness and inability to play a major international security role. South Korea, on the other hand, has demonstrated the ability and willingness to engage on the world stage in support of such shared values as freedom and democracy. The Obama Administration therefore should affirm its commitment to defend South Korea against security threats, welcome its return to coalition efforts for rebuilding Afghanistan, and signal U.S. commitment to free trade by ratifying the South KoreaU.S. FTA. Finally, let me say two things directly to all of you, my Korean friends and allies. On two recent visits to my office in Washingtonone by the leader of an important Korean NGO and one by a senior Korean journalistI was told that the "Korean people are very proud to have been selected as the host for the November G20 Meeting, as it shows Korea's new global role." US ROK Alliance is strong now Korea Herald, 6/30 (6/30/10, Korea Herald, "KAFS event celebrates ROKU.S. alliance," http://www.koreaherald.com/national/Detail.jsp?newsMLId=20100630000705) DH Korea America Friendship Society, a nonprofit organization dedicated to enhancing the KoreaU.S. relationship, held its annual event in Seoul on Tuesday to appreciate the service of U.S. forces stationed in South Korea. The 19th Korea America Friendship Night was attended by some 800 people, including Gen. Walter L. Sharp, commander of the U.S. Forces Korea, and Vice Foreign Minister Shin Kaksoo and Mark A. Tokola, deputy chief of mission at the U.S. Embassy. During the twohour event, which highlighted the success of the sixdecadeold bilateral alliance, KAFS conferred its annual awards to four U.S soldiers and a Defense Department employee for their dedication to improving bilateral relations. During his congratulatory address, KAFS President Han Chulsoo underscored the sacrifices that the U.S. troops have made since the outbreak of the Korean War six decades ago. "As a Korean War veteran myself, 60 years ago, I witnessed USFK service members fighting bravely to defend freedom and democracy against the invasion of the North Korean communist army and I confidently say that today's Republic of Korea stands as it is because of their invaluable sacrifices and suffering," Han said. Calling the KoreaU.S. alliance "the strongest in the world," Sharp said that the two militaries are ready to deter any aggression from North Korea. "During the past 60 years, the Republic of KoreaU.S. alliance has thrived and has been a corner stone of peace in Northeast Asia. But in light of North Korea's unprovoked and deliberate sinking of the Cheonan, it is more important than ever that we continue to strengthen the bonds of our two nations," the commander said. Korea Neg 150/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors RELATIONS UP NOW The state department just reaffirmed our security commitment to the ROK. McKellogg, 6/23 (6/23/10, Kelly, Press Officer in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, "Assistant Secretary Campbell Discusses His Recent Trip to Seoul and Tokyo," Official Blog of the State Department http://blogs.state.gov/index.php/entries/assistant_secretary_campbell_ seoul_tokyo/) DH Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian And Pacific Affairs Kurt M. Campbell traveled to the East Asia region, June 1518, to consult with U.S. allies on a broad range of bilateral, regional, and global issues. Assistant Secretary Campbell had positive discussions with senior officials in both Seoul, June 1617, and Tokyo, June 17 18. In his discussions on the sinking of the Cheonan with ROK officials, he reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to working closely with the Republic of Korea and other allies and partners to reduce the threat that North Korea poses to regional stability. Assistant Secretary Campbell and his ROK interlocutors agreed that North Korea should change its unacceptable behavior, by ceasing belligerent actions toward its neighbors, abiding by UNSC Resolutions 1718 and 1874, and taking irreversible steps toward elimination of its nuclear weapons programs. In his discussions, Assistant Secretary Campbell and his counterparts also reaffirmed that the United States supports the Republic of Korea's call for UN Security Council action. USROK bilateral relations high Obama just reaffirmed security commitment and the opcon transfer was delayed. Rhodes et. al., 6/26/10 (6/26/10, Ben Rhodes, Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications, Mike Froman, Deputy National Security Advisor for International Economics, Ambassador Jeff Bader, Senior Director for Asian Affairs at the National Security Council, and Danny Russel, Director for Asian Affairs at the National Security Council, "Conference Call Briefing by Ben Rhodes, Mike Froman, Ambassador Jeff Bader, and Danny Russel," White House Office of the Press Secretary, http://m.whitehouse.gov/thepress office/conferencecallbriefingbenrhodesmikefromanambassadorjeffbaderanddannyrus) DH First, the Korea bilat. The other issues that came up were first the President expressed his strong solidarity with President Lee and the Korean people in the wake of the sinking of the Cheonan; the unshakeable commitment of the United States to the alliance with the Republic of Korean and to the defense of the Republic of Korea. He noted that we're working together to craft a clear message in response to the North Korean actions, including at the U.N. Security Council, where the South Koreans, U.S., and other members have been making progress on a statement. That will part of the reaction, but not the entire reaction. In addition, the President, at the request of President Lee, agreed that the what's called opcon, operational control over South Korean forces in wartime, should be transfer of that operational control should be postponed from 2012 to the end of 2015. This was done at the the South Koreans first raised this with us early in the year, I believe in February, before the Cheonan. The purpose of the decision is to send a clear message of the U.S. staying power in the region, at a time when that message is important. Given North Korean conduct over the last year and a half, we judged it important to respond positively to President Lee's suggestion that we stretch out the transfer of operational control by a few years. Korea Neg 151/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors BRINKS Brink ROK has abandonment fears now Suh, 10 Associate Professor and Director of Korea Studies at SAIS, (J.J., Foreign Policy in Focus, "Allied to Race? The U.S.Korea Alliance and Arms Race." http://www.fpif.org/articles/allied_to_race_the_us korea_alliance_and_arms_race) Abandonment fear may do more than merely dampen the supplementary effect of an alliance. The more strongly a state fears abandonment, the more likely it is to explore ways to reduce the likelihood of abandonment. Such "chainganging" can take various forms. It can provide services that its ally desires, as for example when President Park dispatched two divisions of the Korean military to Vietnam to help out the United States. It may seek to influence the opinion of decision makers with economic assistance or purchase orders. It may even try lobbying as a last resort, as the Koreagate scandal revealed. Abandonment fear increasing full withdrawal would deck alliance Suh, 10 Associate Professor and Director of Korea Studies at SAIS, (J.J., Foreign Policy in Focus, "Allied to Race? The U.S.Korea Alliance and Arms Race." http://www.fpif.org/articles/allied_to_race_the_us korea_alliance_and_arms_race) At the same time, South Korea's abandonment fear is increasing as the alliance goes through a transformation. Wartime operational control is scheduled to be returned to the ROKA by 2012, and the Combined Forces Command (CFC) to be disbanded by the same time, according to the agreement signed in February 2007. The USFK is being moved away from frontline positions to rear areas--Osan and Daegu--while its overall size is shrinking. These changes are creating a fear among some Koreans, particularly conservatives, that Washington might abandon Korea at a time of crisis. The twin fears of entrapment and abandonment are visible in the defense reform plan for 2020. On the one hand, in order to reduce entrapment fears, the MND emphasizes the need to develop an independent defense capability: "it is now more urgent than anytime before that we must develop our own capability to defend ourselves in order to ensure our survival." To develop the capability, it is restructuring the ROKA's command control system and acquiring the weapons systems necessary for the ROKA's independent command control. Korea Neg 152/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors A2: N/U TROOP REDUCTIONS NOW A substantial number of troops remain fulfills U.S. commitment Payne, et. al, 10 Professor in Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University (March 2010, Dr. Keith Payne, Study Director Thomas Scheber Kurt Guthe, "U.S. Extended Deterrence and Assurance for Allies in Northeast Asia," http://www.nipp.org/National%20Institute%20Press/Current%20Publications/PDF/US%20ExtendDeterfor%20print.pdf, JMP) The Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the ROK, signed in October 1953, two months after the Korean War armistice, was intended in large part to assure Seoul that, though the war was over, South Korea would not be abandoned by the United States.7 The treaty thus declares the determination of the two parties "to defend themselves against external armed attack so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that either of them stands alone in the Pacific area." Each recognizes that "an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties...would be dangerous to its peninsula was, and is, considered by South Korea to be an essential earnest of the U.S. commitment, the treaty grants the United States "the right to dispose [its] land, air and sea forces in and about the territory of the Republic of Korea as determined by mutual agreement."8 Though U.S. troop strength in South Korea was substantially reduced after the war, a sizable force remained (the more than 300,000 soldiers stationed there in 1953 dropped to 85,000 two years later).9 Today, roughly 28,500 service members are deployed in the ROK 10 . Adjustments now not undermining commitment to ROK critical to deter North Korea Breer, May 2010 own peace and safety and declares it would act to meet the common danger." Because an American military presence on or near the [William, Senior Adviser, Center for Strategic and International Studies, "U.S. Alliances in East Asia: Internal Challenges and External Threats," May, http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/05_east_asia_breer.aspx] Under our mutual defense treaty with the Republic of Korea we deploy sizable ground and air forces to the peninsula to backup ROK defenses in the event of aggression by North Korea . We have made clear to the North the that American commitment to the defense of South Korea is rock solid , and the peace has been maintained. While the U.S. posture has effectively deterred North Korea from a frontal attack, it has not prevented North sinking of an ROK warship. The biggest challenge posed by North Korea is its determination to acquire deployable Korea from mounting provocations, ranging from the capture of the USS Pueblo in 1968, through the treecutting incident in 1976, to the recent apparent nuclear weapons which would threaten U.S. interests throughout East Asia, potentially pose an existential threat to Japan, and create a proliferation problem of vast proportions. Our treaty relationships with Japan and Korea, and our many decades of experience working together, have greatly facilitated our cooperation on this issue. From time to time, base issues (one of our major bases is in the center of Seoul) and occasional incidents caused by American personnel have aroused latent nationalism among the people, which has in the past resulted in large scale demonstrations, strains in our relations with the host government, and pressure to relocate our facilities. That we are making necessary adjustments to our deployments without significantly reducing our support for the ROK or the effectiveness of our deterrent is a credit to the common sense and foresight of Korean and American officials , many of whom have devoted entire careers to the management of the defense of the ROK. Current South Korean fears supercharge our link a full withdrawal signals US abandonment of the Korean peninsula, crushing the alliance Campbell et al, 09 Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Kurt M., Center for a New American Security, "Going global: the future of the U.S.South Korea alliance." Ed. by Campbell et al, "Going global: the future of the U.S.South Korea alliance." P. 68 http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CampbellPatel_Going%20Global_February09_0.pdf) Another significant domestic hurdle that the alliance will have to overcome is the fear of alliance abandonment in South Korea, particularly by conservative supporters of the current regime. The changing nature of the U.S. military engagement in South Korea, including drawdowns in troop levels , force relocations, and the goal of transferring wartime OPCON of the Korean forces back to the ROK by 2012, has sparked deep fears of abandonment in South Korea's Ministry of National Defense (MND). Many South Korean officers, as well as many members of the South Korean public, view the reduction in American forces from 38,000 troops in 2005 to 28,500 in 2008 as a precursor to the eventual withdrawal of all American forces from the ROK. 28 The U.S. push in 2006 for "strategic flexibility" of USFK only increased concerns that more U.S. troops were likely to be withdrawn from the peninsula. Even though these fears are overstated, the pace and significance of the current changes in the U.S. military presence on the peninsula continue to stoke concerns. U.S. civilian and military Korea Neg Michigan Institutes `10 153/436 7 Week Juniors leaders have worked diligently to dispel these fears. Such efforts will continue to be necessary for the next administration and should not be overlooked. Korea Neg 154/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors A2: N/U TROOPS MOVED AWAY FROM DMZ Troop move away from DMZ won't undermine the trip wire and even if it did the U.S. remains committed to the ROK Payne, et. al, 10 Professor in Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University (March 2010, Dr. Keith Payne, Study Director Thomas Scheber Kurt Guthe, "U.S. Extended Deterrence and Assurance for Allies in Northeast Asia," http://www.nipp.org/National%20Institute%20Press/Current%20Publications/PDF/US%20ExtendDeterfor%20print.pdf, JMP) The disposition of U.S. troops in South Korea has been as important as their number. Since the end of the Korean War, U.S. ground forces have been deployed astride the invasion corridors between the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and Seoul. Stationed in this manner, they have functioned as a trip wire that, by making U.S. involvement in a war "automatic," presumably has helped deter the North from launching an attack and certainly has helped allay fear in the South of abandonment by the United States. This situation is changing, however. In a process initiated by the Global Posture Review, the United States is repositioning its forces away from the DMZ to locations farther south on the peninsula. The objectives of the relocation are several: to move U.S. forces beyond the range of North Korean artillery; strengthen their ability to counterattack an invasion; increase their availability for contingencies outside Korea (by consolidating forces around two basing "hubs" with ready access to air and sealift); achieve a better balance between U.S. and South Korean military responsibilities (by improving ROK capabilities and making U.S. capabilities more "air and naval centric"); and lessen tensions with the South Korean population (by reducing the number of bases and returning land for civilian use).58 This changed disposition of U.S. forces has raised two concerns in South Korea. First, without the trip wire of American troops near the DMZ, the deterrent to North Korean attack might be weaker.59 Second, the availability of U.S. forces on the peninsula for other contingencies could result in "the denuding and decoupling of the U.S. security presence."60 In response to these concerns, American officials argue that the United States remains firmly committed to the defense of South Korea and that the "trip wire" for that commitment is not "how many U.S. troops are arranged in any particular location on the peninsula," but "the letter and spirit of our mutual defense treaty, backed up by the substance of our alliance and our strong military forces."61 They also point to plans for threeyear, family accompanied tours of duty by U.S. military personnel in South Korea as a clear sign that the United States intends to maintain its commitment to the ROK for the long haul By 2020, up to 14,000 families of American service members could be . on the peninsula.62 While longer, accompanied tours offer a number of advantages over the current oneyear stints (reduced training demands, for example), their assurance value has been emphasized by Secretary of Defense Gates, Adm. Michael Mullen, the Joint Chiefs chairman, and Gen. Walter Sharp, the commander of U.S. forces in Korea: Secretary Gates: "[T]he United States will maintain an enduring and capable military presence on the Korean Peninsula. Our longterm commitment is signified by our plans to make three year accompanied tours the norm for most U.S. troops in Korea--similar to arrangements we have in Europe."63 Adm. Mullen: "The whole issue of extending the tours, bringing the families, investing the money is a significant increase in the commitment to the Republic of Korea and to the alliance...."64 Gen. Sharp: "[Familyaccompanied tours] hugely shows our commitment to Northeast Asia. One of the fears you hear on OpCon Transition in Korea is what is the US going to do on the 18th of April 2012, after OpCon Transition? Are you all out of here? We remind the Koreans we would be really stupid to do that. They remind us occasionally we have done stupid things in the past. But then when we point to the fact that hey, we're bringing all of these families over. And it's not just abo ut North and South Korea, it is about the importance of the region to the United States, the vital national interest. ... the more presence we have in Korea of families shows the commitment of the United States and I think that in and of itself reduces the likelihood of [North Korean leader] Kim Jong Il making a mistake in doing an attack. Many of us lived in Germany in the mid `80s across the Fulda Gap where there were lots of nuclear weapons. ...it's not exactly the same [in Korea], but there is a parallel there of being shown that you're dedicated and that you're not leaving is a great deterrent value that's there."65 In short, U.S. troops in South Korea no longer may be a trip wire, but they--and now their dependents as well--still provide an immediate presence that symbolizes the U.S. commitment to the defense of the ROK. Korea Neg 155/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors 2NC LINK SECURITY GUARANTEE We can lose that the plan helps relations and still win our link Just because South Korea likes the United States does not mean it still searches for security once there exists a lack of troops. This is not a relations disad. View the link debate through the lens of perception even if troops are not key to deter the north, South Korea perceives that it is. Also, South Korea views troop presence as a blood commitment illustrating that that the U.S. is willing to sacrifice for their safety that is the 1nc payne et al evidence And, Their 1ac advantage proves our link the fact that we would not be drawn into a conflict if the North attempted to take over South Korea is a reason why South Korea will be scared out of their mind U.S. forces are key to maintain a health alliance even if they aren't key to deterrence Feffer '05 codirector of Foreign Policy In Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies. (10/3/2005, John, "The Future of U.S.South Korean Security Relations" http://www.fpif.org/articles/the_future_of_us south_korean_security_relations) Finally, the United States and South Korea must grapple with issues related to U.S. ground forces In 2004, the Bush . administration announced a onethird reduction of U.S. troops in South Korea. Over and above its political dimensions, this decision directly stems from a much longer process of force restructuring. The Pentagon's assessment is essentially correct that troops in fixed positions with slowmoving tanks fight yesterday's wars. U.S. deterrent capacity largely resides in firepower based outside the peninsula, such as the Fifth Air Force and the Seventh Fleet in Japan. But this reality raises provocative questions. Do U.S. forces in Korea serve only a symbolic rather than a deterrent function? And why didn't the Bush administration consider troop reductions as a bargaining chip in negotiations with North Korea? Several studies suggest that South Korea could repulse an attack by North Korea without U.S. support. This should come as no surprise, since the South has been outspending the North in the military sphere by a factor of two since 1990. The North Korean military has been adversely affected by food shortages, energy shortages, and spare part shortages, and North Korea's military has not kept pace with the latest technological developments. Les Aspin, former U.S. secretary of defense, has estimated that South Korea's military strength represented 60% of the coalition forces arrayed against Iraq in the first Gulf War while North Korea's represented 60% of the total Iraqi offensive force at that time. And we all know the results of that unequal fight, even though Iraq, unlike North Korea, was a relatively prosperous oilrich country. No one should underestimate North Korea's ability to destroy Seoul with an artillery barrage or the North Korean military's ability to fight against an invader. However, North Korea's capacity for launching a conventional attack with troops and tanks is no longer the threat it was 50 or even 20 years ago, and it is this conventional type of attack that U.S. forces are prepared to counteract. But if U.S. forces stationed in Korea have largely lost their specific deterrent function, they still serve other roles. The South Korean government values the U.S. military presence as a concrete sign of alliance health and U.S. commitment to its defense, even if that defense would be largely undertaken by forces based outside the peninsula And North Korean leaders, it has been reported, are not opposed to a U.S. military presence even after unificationperhaps in a . peacekeeping capacityas an insurance policy against revived Japanese militarism. Moreover, there is the question of the impact that future U.S. troop reductions could have on investor confidence in South Korea. U.S. Troop presence is the only way to improve and modernize the U.S.ROK Alliance Twining, 10 Senior Fellow for Asia at the German Marshall Fund of the United States (4/1/10, Daniel, "Strengthening the U.S.Korea Alliance for the 21st Century," http://www.gmfus.org/galleries/ct_publication_attachments/AsiaDanTwiningU.S.KoreaAlliance.pdf) STRENGTHENING THE U.S.KOREA ALLIANCE FOR THE 21st ALLIANCE In light of this wider frame--the imperative of strengthening the partnership between Washington and Seoul to shape Asia's evolving order and Korea's leadership at its core--what would an agenda for strengthening the U.S.South Korean alliance over the coming decade look like? Both countries have conducted the Strategic Cooperation for Alliance Partnership talks in an effort to define and operationalize a broader role for the alliance in regional and global affairs. Such a program could be built around the four pillars of enhanced military cooperation, regional security architecture, regional economic liberalization, and global partnership. Enhanced military cooperation U.S. troop presence The in South Korea remains the living embodiment of the alliance and the U.S. commitment to the security of the Republic of Korea. The revolution in modern warfare that allows effective power projection from offshore air, sea, and space platforms should not overrule the commonsense judgment there is no substitute for the permanent deployment an integrated that of American military presence on the LINK Korea Neg Michigan Institutes `10 156/436 7 Week Juniors Korean peninsula. Contrary to some conventional wisdom, such a deployment may prove as valuable to the security of Korea and the interests of the United States in a postunification environment as they do today in deterring North Korean aggression. Therefore, any roadmap for strengthening the U.S.ROK alliance should include bolstering political and public support for a continuing American troop presence on the peninsula , even as the U.S.ROK command structure evolves. South Korea's planned assumption of full command authority over Korean forces in 2012 modernizes the alliance as an equal partnership; the challenge for military leaders in both countries will be ensuring that changing commandandcontrol authorities do not dilute the potency of what has been one of the world's most effective combined military force. Korea Neg 157/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors The nature of the plan is a link lack of consultation will independently kill the alliance Campbell & Einhorn, 04 senior vice president and director of the International Security Program at CSIS, AND ** senior adviser in the CSIS 2NC LINK ALLIANCE International Security Program, where he works on a broad range of nonproliferation, armscontrol, and other national security issues (Kurt M. Campbell and Robert J. Einhorn, The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices, "12. Avoiding the Tipping Point: Concluding Observations," ed by Campbell, Einhorn and Mitchell B. Reiss, JMP) However, bolstering the confidence of nuclear abstainers in the reliability of U.S. security assurances requires more than tangible support. It is essentia l, especially as the United States transforms its worldwide force structure, that Washington go out of its way to consult closely with friends and allies whose interests are affected to explain the rationale for the adjustments, accommodate any requests that it reasonably can to , and to demonstrate that the changes do not erode the U.S. security commitment. In the case of the repositioning of U.S. forces in Korea, more harm was done to U.S.South Korean alliance relations by the peremptory manner in which decisions made in Washington were presented to the Korean allies than by the content or even the timing of the moves. In dealing with the abstainers, the United States should not wait until the specter of nuclear reconsideration arises. It should instead anticipate possible problems and try to head them off with preventative diplomacy. In anticipation of the unwelcome prospect that North Korea will persist in pursuing a nuclear weapons capability, the United States should begin consulting privately now with its South Korean and Japanese allies on how to cope with that contingency without them having to acquire independent nuclear deterrent capabilities. Similarly, discreet discussions should be held with Seoul about the possibility that a nucleararmed North Korea would some day collapse and be absorbed into South Korea and that a reunified Korea would inherit the DPRK?s nuclear arsenal. Well before that contingency arises, the United States should seek a commitment from South Korean authorities that in exchange for a continued American security assurance, a reunified Korea would give up its nuclear inheritance and remain a nonnuclear weapons state. Preventative diplomacy could also be useful in the case of Turkey. In discussions involving NATO, the European Union, and Turkey about future defense structures and missions and about Turkey's place in the evolving European architecture, the United States should be conscious of the importance of ensuring that Ankara remains confident enough about its security situation to maintain its nonnuclear course. And with an eye to keeping Egypt in the nonnuclear camp, we should encourage Israel not to do or say anything in the nuclear realm such as publicly declaring or testing its nuclear capability that could generate pressures in Egypt for pursuing a nuclear option. Korea Neg 158/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors Any change is perceived as a movement away from South Korea even if it is not true public misconception controls the spin Hwang '04 is Policy Analyst for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation. (12/21/2004, Balbina, "Minding the Gap: Improving U.S.ROK Relations", http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2004/12/MindingtheGapImprovingUSROKRelations) Nevertheless, perceptions matter in foreign pol , and both Washington and Seoul should pay heed to the changing icy environments in both coun tries. Various components of the leadership in both countries have been making concerted efforts to adjust the formal details of the alliance to reinvigorate the relationship and improve its efficiency. For example, as part of the Department of Defense's Global Posture Review, the Pentagon and the ROK Defense Ministry have been discussing the future of the alliance with the object of implementing needed changes to the U.S. force structure on the Korean peninsula. As part of the plan to increase the efficiency and efficacy of the alliance and the U.S. defense commitment, they have agreed to a gradual drawdown and repositioning of U.S. forces on the peninsula. While both governments A2 PUBLIC LINK TURN wholeheartedly agree on the positive benefits of restructuring, public misperception, particularly among South Koreans, has undermined these efforts. Restructuring has been falsely characterized as a unilateral move by Washington, indicating either a reduction of U.S. commitment or preparation for a sudden attack on North Korea. In reality, such changes to the alliance structure actually strengthen the American com mitment to the ROK's defense, as evidenced by the U.S. pledge of $11 billion over the next 10 years for joint development of the ROK military. Regrettably, such misperceptions undermine the strength of the alliance , just when full cooperation and a combined show of strength are critical to resolving the North Korean nuclear problem peace fully. Although some critics argue that Washington should postponeif not abandonefforts to restructure the alliance during this particularly tense time with North Korea, the uncertainties caused by North Korea make improving the alliance even more urgent. Moreover, given the perennial nature of the North Korean threat, there may never be a good timemuch less a better time for restructuring. Both Washington and Seoul must focus on bridging the gap in public attitudes toward the future of the alliance. The alliance has served the interests of both countries for the past half century and will continue to do so in the future if current misgivings are overcome. President Roh and the South Korean leadership should reassess their priorities andgiven how much South Korean and regional security depends on the alliancemake every effort to lead their country toward a positive and enthusiastic embrace of the relationship. President Bush and his Administration should work toward understanding the immense changes that have occurred in South Korea and exhibit greater sensitivity to South Korean concerns. Both sides need to commit to improving dialogue and com munication across all levels of the government and society if the alliance is to thrive and prosper. Statistical research shows that Korean conservatives and progressives both support US troop presence Chae and Kim 2008 (Haesook Chae is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at BaldwinWallace College in Berea, Ohio; Steven Kim is an assistant professor at the AsiaPacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu. "Conservatives and Progressives in South Korea," Washington Quarterly, 31:4) Calum First, the characterization that conservatives are uniformly proAmerican needs some minor but significant revision. As figure 3 shows, conservatives are reliable supporters of the U nited tates. When it comes to the specific issue of South S Korean armed forces, however, conservatives adopt the position more closely associated with the progressives that the military should move toward greater independence from the United States (SKMILTARY). Support for the alliance with the United States and support for a stronger, more selfreliant Korean military thus are not mutually exclusive. An interesting corollary is that conservatives, much like progressives, are also opposed to the deployment of U.S. troops outside of the Korean peninsula (USSTRTGC). It appears that the argument made by the United States that flexibility in troop strength would not diminish South Korea's security and would promote vital U.S. interests has not persuaded proAmerican conservatives. Conservatives, although proAmerican, are nationalists first. Second, the survey data reveal that progressive attitudes are also more complex than previously thought. Figure 3 confirms that progressives are antiAmerican , holding that South Korea and the United States have divergent interests in dealing with North Korea (SKUSINTR) and that the United States does not take South Korean interests into consideration significantly [End Page 85] when dealing with North Korea (USCARE). They also hold that the United to reunification hopes (USREUNFY). Obviously, this assessment of the United States is fairly negative, consistent with the prevailing model on what progressives believe. On questions related to the South KoreanU.S. alliance, however, pro gressives depart from their perceived role. Progressives believe that the U.S. troop presence in South Korea has led to economic prosperity for their nation (USPROMOTE). They believe in strengthening the alliance and oppose a precipitous withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea (SKUSALNC, SKALLYUS, USFKRMVL). In general and in a hypothetical situation in which conflict breaks out between the United States and China over the Taiwan Strait, progressives hold that South Korea should not waver in its alliance with the United States in exchange for closer ties with China (TAIWANand SKALLYCH). The paradoxical conclusion is that progressives , while censuring U.S. activity in the Korean peninsula, still value the alliance with the United States. Although progressives value the alliance, they have mixed feelings toward it. Progressives view North Korea with ambivalence, both as a kin nation with which to be reconciled and as a mortal threat to be constrained. The South KoreanU.S. alliance is critical to both of these impulses. From one perspective, progressives believe that U.S. forces in Korea (USFK) are an obstacle to peacefully engaging with North Korea. At the same time, however, progressives are mindful that the alliance has staved off North Korea aggression. Alliance with the United States, then, occupies the rather complex position of being simultaneously the chief obstacle to States was responsible for the partition of the two Koreas (USPARTTN), was a hindrance to democratic development in South Korea (USDEMOCY), and presently is an obstacle Korea Neg 159/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors interKorean reconciliation and the chief guardian of South Korea's security. Although progressives and conservatives embrace the South KoreanU.S. alliance, they disagree on how it should be structured. In February 2007, Seoul and Washington signed a bilateral agreement that will transfer operational control of the South Korean military to the South Korean government in 2012. (The United States has maintained command authority over U.S. and South Korean forces since the Korean War .) Progressives endorse this change in leadership as an enhancement of national autonomy, believing it will be done without diminishing the deterrent value or adversely affecting U.S. commitments [End Page 86] to South Korea (TWCINDPN, TWCALNC, and TWCPROVK). Progressives want the alliance but on their own terms. Conservatives , on the other hand, oppose any change to the command structure, believing it would weaken the alliance and encourage North Korean aggression. For conservatives, the alliance and U.S. leadership in it go hand in hand, and one cannot be rejected without the other. What emerges from the survey data is a complex picture. There exists a clearcut ideological split on views of the U nited tates, S but the political camps converge on the South KoreanU.S. alliance, agreeing that the alliance is of critical importance because of a stilldangerous North. Yet, the two camps see the alliance in different ways. For progressives, the alliance should accommodate movement toward interKorean reconciliation; for conservatives, security is preeminent, and thus no one should tamper with the alliance. Nevertheless, both sides essentially agree that the alliance is valuable to South Korea's national interests. This pragmatic approach from the progressive camp is a major finding because many analysts in South Korea and the United States have expressed the concern that the alliance may become increasingly tenuous due to widespread and growing antiAmerican sentiment. This study shows that antiAmerican sentiments do not contradict but rather coexist with a general support for the alliance. Korea Neg 160/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors LINK FIGHT THE WAR Withdrawal will crush U.S.South Korean relations and the erode deterrence versus North Korea Dujarric, 04 Visiting Scholar at the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (7/12/04, International Herald Tribune, "Japan's Security Needs U.S. Troops in S. Korea," http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/papers/contribution/dujarric/02.html, JMP) Though it is possible that these moves will be reversed, as things change right now the United States is poised to permanently downgrade its presence on the Korean Peninsula. If these changes do take place, they will have a dramatic impact on Japan. The SeoulWashington military relationship critical element is a of the ties that bind South Korea to the United States. A decline in the U.S. presence on the peninsula will weaken the alliance between Seoul and Washington. The militaries of the two countries will stop enjoying the close relationship that a large U.S. presence creates and South Koreans will doubt the credibility of the American commitment. The U.S. ability to influence South Korea will decline while the South Korean capacity to make itself heard in Washington will also diminish. American deterrence will also decline. A North Korean attack is unlikely but one must be ready for lowprobability events North Korea will . interpret the U.S. move as a sign that the United States does not care about North Korea. Moreover, as events in Iraq have demonstrated, heavy ground forces are still very relevant to fighting a war. A USFK shorn of most of its army forces will be less potent. Korea Neg 161/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors LINK SECURITY Security relationship is the lynchpin for all relations Campbell, et al, 09 Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Kurt M., Center for a New American Security, "Going global: the future of the U.S.South Korea alliance." Ed. by Campbell et al, "Going global: the future of the U.S.South Korea alliance." P. 7980 http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CampbellPatel_Going%20Global_February09_0.pdf) fears of alliance abandonment remain pervasive within the South Korean leadership. In order to move the alliance into the 21st century, both countries must abandon the politics of abandonment. The United States must first take the lead in firmly reiterating to South Korea its unwavering commitment to the alliance and the security of the peninsula . Moreover, as the base relocation and OPCON transfer processes continue, U.S. policymakers must actively seek out and listen to the concerns of their South Korean counterparts . In turn, South Korean In spite of U.S. efforts to convince South Korea of its commitment to the alliance, leaders must recognize that an expanded mandate for the alliance does not have to jeopardize peninsular security. South Korean leaders must demonstrate their continued commitment to defense modernization and timely fulfillment of the OPCON transfer. Korea Neg 162/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors LINK PUBLIC South Korea public supports presence Snyder, 08 Senior Associate in the International Relations program of The Asia Foundation and Pacific Forum CSIS (Scott, Asia Policy, "U.S.ROK Civil Society Ties: Dynamics and Prospects in a PostAlliance World." In "What If? A World without the U.S.ROK Alliance." Ed. by Nicholas Eberstadt, Aaron L. Friedberg & Geun Lee Number 5, (January 2008), 4359) South Korean public attitudes are likely to be a highly important factor in shaping the sustainability of the alliance or popular attitudes toward the United States in a postalliance context . A comprehensive review of South Korean public opinion conducted by the RAND Corporation in 2003 shows that South Koreans have consistently recognized the importance of the U.S. troop presence and that seven people in ten believe that U.S. forces should remain in South Korea for at least five years or more. In 2004 the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and the East 18 Ultimately, most South Koreans think both that the United States has more influence on ROK foreign policy than any single actor in South Korea's own government and that the U.S. presence is beneficial to South Korea's security. Fiftythree percent selected the United States as South Korea's preferred partner in international affairs. use of force."19 The survey showed that According to this survey, the future of the U.S.ROK security alliance is contested within South Korean society. Note that 32% of South Koreans preferred a continuation of the status quo; 37% (a slight plurality of respondents) preferred a stronger relationship with the United States; and 31% wanted South Korea to take a more independent role in foreign affairs. 20 The Fulbright program sponsored a 2007 poll of more than a thousand Koreans that showed that 92% of respondents believe the U.S.ROK alliance should be maintained or strengthened, while only 8% say that the alliance should be weakened or terminated. In that poll, 20% of the participants chose China as the country with which South Korea should maintain close ties for the sake of national interests, while 79% chose the United States.21 Asian Institute cosponsored a binational survey on attitudes toward the U.S.ROK relationship that revealed South Korean concern over "perceived U.S. unilateralism, especially how it relates to American These numbers suggest that the South Korean public would be concerned under current circumstances over a withdrawal of U.S. forces. The figures also suggest that the end of the alliance would be considered a significant event that would require considerable adjustments in the worldview of South Koreans . On the one hand, South Koreans might welcome the potential added autonomy and independence that would accompany the end of the alliance. On the other hand, the population remains aware of and insecure about the country's geopolitical neighborhood, particularly the possibility of a rise in rivalry between South Korea's two geographically closest neighbors, Japan and China. ROK public opinion of the US dramatically affects the strength of relations. Armacost, et. al., 10 (5/10, Michael H. Armacost, Distinguished Fellow at the Shorenstein AsiaPacific Research Center, former U.S. Ambassador to Japan and the Philippines; and former under secretary of state for political affairs, other members of the New Beginnings Policy Research Study Group, a joint venture of The Korea Society and Stanford University's Shorenstein Center, "`New Beginnings' in the U.S.ROK Alliance: Recommendations to the Obama Administration," iis db.stanford.edu/evnts/6219/New_Beginnings_FINAL_May_2010.pdf) DH Since the alliance is an enduring interest of the United States, we must take into account not only the views of the current government in South Korea but also longterm trends in South Korean public opinion. Happily, South Korean attitudes toward the United States and the alliance have improved substantially over the past five years. However, the conservative and progressive camps in the ROK remain polarized, thus issues involving the United States can quickly become politicized. tensions are again rising in South Korea, as the important June 2 provincial and local elections approach. South Korean conservatives have been pleased with President Obama, especially his North Korea policy, but they are frustrated by his failure to pursue Congressional ratification of the KORUS FTA. They likewise question U.S. insistence on adhering to the timeline of the 2007 agreement to transfer wartime operational control of South Korean forces to the ROK. Meanwhile, progressives hold President Obama in high regard, both for his liberal domestic policies and because they view his election as reflecting increased racial equality in the United States. They are concerned, however, that the United States under President Obama is not more aggressively engaging North Korea in bilateral diplomatic dialogue. Given his personal popularity in South Korea, President Obama could effectively help to strengthen the longterm basis of the alliance by taking time to reach out to the South Korean public. We recommend that he consider engaging the younger generation in South Korea during future visits, such as the November 2010 G20 summit in Seoul. Korea's inclusion in the Visa Waiver Program (VWP) has proven successful in increasing South Korean tourism to the United States and in making South After a rocky start, Lee Myungbak has seen his popularity return to the 50 percent level, but his party is divided internally among his own supporters and those of former party chairwoman and prospective presidential candidate Madame Park Geunhye. Progressives are in disarray, having last year suffered the death of their main leaders, former ROK Presidents Kim Daejung and Roh Moohyun. Political Overall Relations Korea Neg 163/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors Koreans regard the bilateral relationship as a partnership. The Work, English Study and Travel (WEST) program for student exchanges is also potentially very helpful. It encountered startup problems, some of which have been resolved. We recommend robust support for the program and the early initiation of U.S. student exchanges to Korea along similar lines. Korea Neg 164/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors ROK PUBLIC LINK EXT South Korean public supports the military alliance Kang, 08 Professor in the Government department and Adjunct Professor at the Tuck School of Business, Dartmouth College (David C., "InterKorean Relations in the Absence of a U.S.ROK Alliance." in" in "What If? A World without the U.S.ROK Alliance" ed. by Nicholas Eberstadt, Aaron L. Friedberg & Geun Lee. Asia policy, number 5 (january 2008), 2541) In fact, the South Korean public has consistently favored the U.S.ROK alliance, even while overwhelmingly supporting an engagement strategy. These two attitudes are not incompatible; both maintaining strong relations with the United States and avoiding risky or destabilizing policies toward North Korea are seen as critical to South Korean security. Even during the second nuclear crisis of the past few years, when concerns about U.S. adventurism and unilateralism increased, South Korean support for engagement did not significantly waver. During the times of highest tension, South Koreans consistently felt that U.S. threats were destabilizing. For example, in 2005 the Chosun Ilbo found that 65.9% of South Koreans born in the 1980s (i.e., age 16 to 25) would side with North Korea in the case of a war between North Korea and the United States "that was instigated by the U.S."8 Important to note about this response is that South Koreans, who do not automatically side with North Korea, have seen U.S foreign policy as provocative. Korea Neg 165/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors 2NC GROUND TROOPS KEY Permanently stationing ground troops is key to deterrence uniquely signals U.S. commitment and boosts credibility of the nuclear umbrella Payne, et. al, 10 Professor in Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University (March 2010, Dr. Keith Payne, Study Director Thomas Scheber Kurt Guthe, "U.S. Extended Deterrence and Assurance for Allies in Northeast Asia," http://www.nipp.org/National%20Institute%20Press/Current%20Publications/PDF/US%20ExtendDeterfor%20print.pdf, JMP) Forward Deployments The forward presence of U.S. military forces has value for deterrence and assurance that is well recognized. Forces routinely deployed on or near the territory of an ally not only, or even primarily, augment the armed strength of that country, but also serve as a concrete and continuing reminder that the United States has a strong interest in its security and will fight in its defense. Permanently stationed ground forces, in particular, seem to have an assurance effect not duplicated by temporary deployments (port calls to show the flag, for example), probably because they unlikely to be withdrawn overnight are and often are positioned where they will be directly engaged by an enemy attack, thus ensuring U.S. involvement in a conflict. The likelihood, if not certainty, that U.S. forces would be engaged in a conflict can lend credibility to an associated nuclear guarantee. If forward deployments include U.S. nuclear weapons, those arms themselves offer a tangible assurance that the ally is covered by the nuclear umbrella. The United States has deployed general purpose forces in South Korea for more than a half century. From the mid1950s to the late 1960s, the U.S. troop level in the ROK was 60,00070,000. During the Vietnam War, in line with his "Guam Doctrine" to make U.S. allies in Asia shoulder more of the defense burden, President Nixon ordered the withdrawal of some 18,000 troops from South Korea, reducing the total there to 43,000. In the 1976 presidential campaign, Jimmy Carter pledged to pull out all U.S. ground forces from South Korea, but as president removed only a token number (roughly 3,000 troops). The Carter cut subsequently was reversed by President Reagan to bolster the U.S. commitment to the ROK. As part of the postCold War retraction of American forces from overseas deployments, President George H.W. Bush ordered the troop level in South Korea reduced to 36,000 and then suspended further withdrawals in light of concern about the North Korean nuclear weapons program. The U.S. force on the peninsula increased slightly and stabilized at somewhat more than 37,000 during the Clinton administration. Between 2004 and 2006, as a result of the Global Posture Review conducted by the George W. Bush administration, the number of troops dropped to 28,500, where it remains today.54 At this level, South Korea is the country with the third largest peacetime deployment of American troops , behind only Germany (54,000) and Japan (33,000).55 One South Korean observer cites this ranking as an indication of the high priority the overall U.S. military presence in East Asia as contributing to regional stability.57 United States assigns to the defense of the ROK.56 According to an opinion survey conducted in early 2008, most South Koreans (70 percent) see the Forward deployed forces key to reassure allies and signal U.S. commitments Cossa, et. al, 09 President of Pacific Forum CSIS (February 2009, Ralph A. Cossa, Brad Glosserman, Michael A. McDevitt, Nirav Patel, James Przystup, Brad Roberts, The United States and the AsiaPacific Region: Security Strategy for the Obama Administration, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA498204&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf, JMP) Sustain Military Engagement and Forward Presence The United States must maintain a forwarddeployed military presence in the region that both reassures friends and reminds others that America will remain the ultimate guarantor of regional peace and stability. The United States can enhance its military presence in the region by undertaking, together with allies and partners, investments to improve interoperability and allow U.S. military relationships to make greater contributions to regional security, including on nontraditional contingencies such as humanitarian relief operations. Korea Neg 166/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors TROOPS PREVENT ROK PROLIF Absent US troops South Korea would proliferate and undermine its soft power expert consensus Eberstadt et al, 07 Henry Wendt Scholar in Political Economy at AEI (Nicholas, Christopher Griffin research fellow at AEI, Friedberg prof at Princeton, AEI, 10/6/2007, "Toward an AmericaFree Korea." http://www.aei.org/article/26924) Alternative Security Alliances or Alignments. South Korea inhabits an historically dangerous neighborhood: In addition to North Korea, the other nearby countries are China, Russia and Japan. Without a U.S. military alliance, where would South Korea turn for a partnership to enhance regional security? Even a summary review emphasizes the obviousall other candidates for a Northeast Asian alliance are far less attractive than the U.S. from South Korea's standpoint. None of them could compensate fully for the loss of an American military guarantee, and many of them might require significantly greater sacrifices of sovereignty than does the current pact with Washington. Without a local ally, however, South Korea's only other option would be armed neutralitya modern day return to Korea's dreaded fate in the past as "a shrimp among whales." A Nuclear Crisisin South Korea. If forced to pursue a wholly independent selfdefense in a hostile security environment, Seoul would face overwhelming pressures to develop its own nuclear arsenal. Indeed, the rapidity with which participants at the conference, American and Korean, progressive and conservative, arrived at this conclusion was chillingespecially given the likely implications for regional stability, further nuclear proliferation and South Korea's international standing. Korea Neg 167/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors WITHDRAWAL LINKS Withdrawal will undermine commitment to South Korea Henricks, 05 Lieutenant Commander, Civil Engineer Corps, United States Navy (2/14/05, Todd B., "Adverse Effects of Prospective U.S. Forces Korea Troop Realignments," http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA463965&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf, JMP) The ROK will doubt the United States' commitment for defense of the ROK after North Korean attack. Currently, the United States Department of Defense appears to be consumed with activities in Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. military is stretched thin and could not adequately address similar operations at the same time in another theater such as the Korean Peninsula. This is evidenced by the fact that late in 2004 nearly 3,600 troops were pulled out of South Korea for the purpose of redeployment to Iraq. Additionally, the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps are now asking retirees to return to active service in record numbers just to be able to continue operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. "Tripwire not only played a significant role in deterring North Korea's attack, but also guaranteed the U.S. commitment to defend South Korea by sending more troops to South Korea later."18 A significant withdrawal of USFK forces would signal a lessening commitment by the United States or even weakness on its part to defend South Korea in the event of attack. Withdrawal will crush commitment to Seoul Huessy, 03 Senior Defense Associate at National Defense University Foundation who specializes in nuclear weapons, missile defense, terrorism and rogue states (8/13/2003, Peter, "Realism on the Korean Peninsula: Real Threats, Real Dangers," http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=18560, JMP) Ted Carpenter of the CATO Institute wrote last week (http://www.inthenationalinterest.com/Articles/Vol2Issue31/Vol2Issue31Carpenter.html) how foolish such a strategy was, arguing that China could exercise little, if any, influence over the regime in North Korea, frightened as North Korea was by the hostile attitude of the United States and its deployment of U.S. military forces in both the Republic of Korea and the region. Carpenter and his colleagues at CATO have argued for nearly a quarter of a century that U.S. forces should withdraw from the Republic of Korea, not because we are not defending that country, but because the North is insufficiently reckless to initiate hostilities regardless of the U.S. presence, and, all things being equal, the U.S. military should simply withdraw from the ROK and the region. Ironically, many on the left argue that the US military presence in Korea is actually preferred by the DPRK because it acts as a brake on a possible invasion of the North by rogue elements within the ROK military. While both positions are fanciful, the impact of a constant refrain from Carpenter, and his CATO colleague Doug Bandow (see his essay in In the National Interest, at http://www.inthenationalinterest.com/Articles/Vol2Issue23/Vol2iss23Bandow.html) , that U.S. military forces in the ROK should unconditionally come home, undermines the security and freedom of the region and leaves the impression of a United States now tired of its security commitment to Seoul. U.S. military presence key to critical to the U.S.ROK alliance Henricks, 05 Lieutenant Commander, Civil Engineer Corps, United States Navy (2/14/05, Todd B., "Adverse Effects of Prospective U.S. Forces Korea Troop Realignments," http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA463965&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf, JMP) CONCLUSION "The imminent prospect of North Korea becoming a nuclear power is the most severe threat to the security of the United States and the rest of the Western world today. The anxiety that this prospect brings with it is compounded by the fact that there are no realistic prospects of solution to this threat being offered."34 This nuclear threat is inescapably intertwined with North Korea's conventional military threat on the Korean Peninsula and its diplomatic snubbing of the international community and the United States. One very important factor in dealing with the rogue state of North Korea is a firm U.S.ROK alliance, the foundation of which is a robust USFK military presence in South Korea. For many years, there have been calls for withdrawal of USFK troops from the Korean Peninsula, citing the diminished utility and function of increased the need to pull troops away from their critical function in the ROK. However, this paper has highlighted several reasons why partial or these forces in their role in the U.S.ROK alliance. More recently, strains on the U.S. military due to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have dramatically complete withdrawal of USFK troops from the Korean Peninsula should be delayed. The United States must remain determined and strong in the face of any rogue nation who threatens the safety and security of the United States and the international community. Korea Neg 168/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors OPCON LINKS OPCON control is a major issue in USROK relations could destroy global cooperation. Hwang, 10 (3/25/10, Jin Ha Hwang, Assemblyman, National Assembly, the Republic of Korea, Symposium on OpCon Transfer and its Implications for the U.S.ROK Alliance, Center for U.S.Korea Policy, "Should We Continue the Planned ROKUS OPCON Transfer?" asiafoundation.org/ resources/pdfs/HwangKeynote100325.pdf) DH This successful development of the alliance is a monumental bilateral achievement built on robust and deep rooted political trust. Now, the alliance is an indispensable pillar for achieving the common national interests of the two nations and furthermore making an even greater contribution to international peace and prosperity. In this respect, the ROKUS alliance is our pride and proud legacy, and what we have to sustain and develop for the future. During more than a half century, the two nations have made bold decisions and overcome challenging issues facing us. By the same token, we must explore what to address, develop, and take required steps for building a future oriented global alliance. Based on a mutual understanding of this strategic requirement, leaders of the Republic of Korea and the United States announced Joint Vision in the summit meeting in June, 2009. Now, we are closely working for implementing this Joint Vision. Recently, there are several challenging issues required for strategic and better solutions between the two nations. Issues such as the KORUS FTA, wartime operational control transfer (wartime OPCON transfer) are likely to have a significant impact on the strength and future shape of the ROKUS alliance. Among these issues, I believe that OPCON transfer, which was agreed in 2007, is the most critical issue that needs immediate attention from the two nations. Comparing to other bilateral issues, OPCON transfer will influence the security environment of the Korean Peninsula and the entire Asian region as well. In addition, it will become a key variable which may change the course of developing global cooperation between the two nations. I understand that the main purpose of holding today's symposium is to discuss this important issue. It is very regrettable that we could not have an opportunity to discuss the issue of the planned OPCON transfer so far in the United States, although there were many opportunities for public discussion in Korea. I must stress that we need to thoroughly examine the issues concerning ROKUS OPCON transfer today, and hope that our discussion will contribute to gathering momentum for promoting strategic understanding about OPCON transfer and to exploring solutions through consultations between the two governments. The Korean people are strongly opposed to OPCON transfer. Hwang, 10 (3/25/10, Jin Ha Hwang, Assemblyman, National Assembly, the Republic of Korea, Symposium on OpCon Transfer and its Implications for the U.S.ROK Alliance, Center for U.S.Korea Policy, "Should We Continue the Planned ROKUS OPCON Transfer?" asiafoundation.org/ resources/pdfs/HwangKeynote100325.pdf) DH Most recent several public polls revealed that approximately ranging from 60% to 70% of respondents opposed OPCON transfer. The main reason for the opposition is that the Korean public is more concerned than ever before about the escalation of North Korea's military threats, including uncertain prospects for resolving North Korea's nuclear problem. In addition, increasing potential for the occurrence of a sudden change in North Korean regime attracts wide attention from the public. In contrary to this public trend, those who supported former President Roh and members of opposition party still hold to the planned OPCON transfer, but they are losing support from the public. Furthermore, the Korean people have doubt that the planned OPCON transfer underestimates the concerns raised by the Korean public while North Korea continues escalating its military and nonmilitary threats without hesitation. Also, Koreans worry that the ROK government does not reflect their concerns in ongoing consultations with the U.S. government in the process of implementing the planned OPCON transfer because of U.S. strong stance on continuing the OPCON transfer without revision. In addition, the Korean people suggest that OPCON transfer is not a matter with U.S. Department of Defense only, but between the two governments. Korea Neg 169/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors OPCON LINKS Transition of military command to the South Korean military would devastate relations Armacost, et. al., 10 (5/10, Michael H. Armacost, Distinguished Fellow at the Shorenstein AsiaPacific Research Center, former U.S. Ambassador to Japan and the Philippines; and former under secretary of state for political affairs, other members of the New Beginnings Policy Research Study Group, a joint venture of The Korea Society and Stanford University's Shorenstein Center, "`New Beginnings' in the U.S.ROK Alliance: Recommendations to the Obama Administration," iis db.stanford.edu/evnts/6219/New_Beginnings_FINAL_May_2010.pdf) DH The most controversial planned alliance change is the transfer in 2012 of wartime operational control over South Korean forces to the ROK itself. After the Korean War began, South Korea put most of its military forces under the operational control of a U.S. general. This remained the case until 1994, when South Korea reassumed operational control of its forces in peacetime. In 2007, at the initiative of President Roh Moohyun, the United States agreed on a date in April 2012 by which to complete arrangements that would allow South Korea to exercise operational control over its own forces in wartime as well. Associated with this change, the governments agreed to replace the U.S.ROK Combined Forces Command (CFC), led by a U.S. general, with two separate but fully coordinating U.S. and ROK commands, each under its own leadership. Since reaching the agreement, the two governments and militaries have engaged in systematic and intensive planning, consultation, and exercises to ensure that the alliance's ability to deter aggression and defend the ROK will be enhanced when the transfer is made. Many Koreans, especially conservatives and veterans and some current military and civilian officials, oppose carrying out the transfer as planned. Some question the motives and judgment of progressive South Korean president Roh Moohyun in initiating the change. Some fear that the South Korean military will not be ready by 2012, due to underfunding of Korean defense programs. Others fear that the switch from CFC to a cooperative command structure and a Koreanlead defense risks a diminution of the American political commitment to South Korea's security or the wartime fighting efficiency of allied forces. Some believe that North Korea's continuing development of nuclear weapons, which South Korea does not have, requires a U.S.led defense. Some Korean opponents of the transfer argue for a delay, others for outright cancellation , of the planned switchover. OPCON transfer kills USROK alliance. Hwang, 10 (3/25/10, Jin Ha Hwang, Assemblyman, National Assembly, the Republic of Korea, Symposium on OpCon Transfer and its Implications for the U.S.ROK Alliance, Center for U.S.Korea Policy, "Should We Continue the Planned ROKUS OPCON Transfer?" asiafoundation.org/ resources/pdfs/HwangKeynote100325.pdf) DH North Korea continues opposing the stationing of U.S. forces in Korea. To this end, North Korea has taken a wedge strategy between the ROK and the United States for instigating antiAmericanism in Korea by claiming that the ROK government's military sovereignty is lost to the United States. In order to strengthen this position, North Korea has stated its position that it is not willing to have military talks with the ROK which does not have military sovereignty. For these reasons, North Korea greatly welcome the decision of disbanding CFC and OPCON transition, and advertising these changes to North Korean people as the success of its efforts for restoring ROK military sovereignty. At the sametime, it is certain that North Korea perceives that the ROK US alliance becomes weak as a result of OPCON transfer. And, North Korea would be likely to harshly push its demand of changing armistice condition into peace treaty. These conditions provide favorable ground for North Korea to reach the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea, beyond the disbandment of CFC and OPCON transfer. In addition to sending the wrong signal to North Korea, OPCON transfer would be likely to have a significant impact on U.S. pursuit of national interests in Northeast Asia. As the ROKUS alliance has been regarded as a strategic linchpin for achieving U.S. national interests in the reason, regional states are likely to regard the ROK US OPCON transfer as an indication of strategic weakness between the two nations. Why do we push the planned OPCON transfer while sending a wrong signal to North Korea and regional states? Should we disband CFC when responding to the escalation of North Korea's threats? Are we now closing a fire station despite increasing possibility that North Korea may put a fire? Korea Neg 170/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors Korea Neg 171/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors UNIFICATION LINKS Unification kills relations Eberstadt et al, 07 Henry Wendt Scholar in Political Economy at AEI (Nicholas, Christopher Griffin research fellow at AEI, Friedberg prof at Princeton, AEI, 10/6/2007, "Toward an AmericaFree Korea." http://www.aei.org/article/26924) What would the Korean Peninsula look like under such an arrangement? One feature would almost certainly be the end of the U.S. alliance with the Republic of Korea (ROK). Pyongyang has long maintained that it will not accept a permanent arrangement for the peninsula that permits the continued presence of "imperialist forces." If Seoul wishes to contemplate a confederation with North Korea, it must also prepare for a world without the U.S.ROK alliance. Unification kills the alliance perceived as unnecessary Eberstadt, 02 Henry Wendt Scholar at AEI (Nicholas, AEI, 10/1/2002, "Our Other Korea Problem." http://www.aei.org/article/19460) Be this as it may, a popular perception of significant movement toward intraKorean reconciliation unavoidably invites the reexamination of the U.S.ROK military alliance. Absent a compelling new rationale for its continuation, this alliance will come under mounting pressure for revision, and even termination, if the electorate in South Korea (or the United States) no longer finds the "North Korean threat" to be credible. That perception of progress is set to sharpen because President Kim, now approaching the end of his term, has defined his legacy in terms of his "engagement" with the North. The president and his party are entering an election campaign in which their own credibility rests upon the perception that their approach has substantially deflated the threatand will deflate it still further if the South Korean electorate continues to back them. As recently as June 2002, President Kim confidently declared that "the possibility of a military confrontation is lessening" in the Korean peninsula, and that the situation was indeed "heading toward stability and peace." (Ironically, just days later, North Korean gunships sank a South Korean naval vessel in the Yellow Sea.) If President Kim seems prey to wishful thinking, however, he is hardly alone. The South Korean public, like so many other OECD electorates, is eager to enter into a peaceful and prosperous millennium. Irrespective of varying estimates of Pyongyang's current intentions, there is a widespread and entirely natural longing in the South to be rid of the North Korean threat and to jettison the burdens it entails. From the North Korean point of view, of course, the sight of the South Korean political system taking itself in can only be cause for surprised celebration and a determination to further its purposes. In the past, North Korea's international diplomacy has not been famously successful in persuading the unconvinced of its pacific intentions (to put it mildly). But if an objective of North Korea's tactical reorientation since 1999 has been to foster conditions conducive to a U.S. pullout from South Korea, the program looks to be progressing nicely. North Korea's new approach to dissolving the U.S.ROK alliance looks like a waiting gamean implicit calculation that patience and selfcontrol will reap strategic dividends. Strange as it may sound, the North Korean leadership may be betting that time is on its sideat least as far as the U.S.ROK military alliance is concerned. Korea Neg 172/436 WAR SOLVES ROK RELATIONS Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors Mutual war against North Korea would preserve the USROK alliance MITCHELL 2003 (Derek J. Mitchell is a senior fellow in the International Security Program at CSIS, "A Blueprint for U.S. Policy toward a Unified Korea," Washington Quarterly, 26:1) Calum Finally, how unification is achieved, including the nature and degree of international involvement in the unification process, will shape the outlook of Korea toward its external environment and the context in which Korea ultimately will make its strategic choices. For instance, should North Korea collapse, the need for U.S. engagement and external security guarantees is likely to be greater than if unification comes through peaceful integration over time. Should the United States fight alongside the South in a war against the North, the fresh strategic and personal bonds created would likely tie the two sides closely together for many years thereafter. Alternatively, should unification occur under conditions in which Koreans view the United States as hindering rather than helping the process, resentment could build between the United States and the Korean people, poisoning postunification relations regardless of objective calculations of mutual national interests. Korea Neg 173/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors A2: TURN OPPOSITION TO TROOPS Leaders recognize the necessity of troops overwhelms public opposition Yeo 6/23 Assistant Professor in the Department of Politics at the Catholic University of America (6/23/10, Andrew, Foreign Policy in Focus, "AntiBase Movements in South Korea: Comparative Perspective on the Asia Pacific." http://www.fpif.org/articles/antibase_movements_in_south_korea) Although antibase movements may successfully mobilize, as witnessed in Maehyangri and Pyeongtaek, they may not be equally successful in shaping policy outcomes. More often than not, activists face significant structural constraints. In all antibase movements, whether in Okinawa, South Korea, Guam or the Philippines, activists face great challenges when confronting U.S. base issues because political elites tend to prioritize robust alliance relations with the U.S. Whether a progressive or conservativeleaning government, regardless of who comes to power, political leaders in Tokyo and Seoul generally accept in principle the necessity for U.S. forces to provide regional stability in the mid to longterm. A proU.S. consensus among political leaders and bureaucracies, particularly within the defense and foreign policy establishments, drowns out activist calls for an alternative security framework centered on a reduction of U.S. forces. This ideological constraint makes it difficult for antibase movements to shift public discussion on U.S. base issues. Moreover, host governments constantly receive a mixture of political pressure and economic incentives to support U.S. alliance obligations. While some government elites are genuinely sympathetic to the plight of local residents, in most cases political and economic forces prevent these actors from executing policy changes that would significantly eliminate or ameliorate the negative effects of U.S. military presence. Korea Neg 174/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors A2: RELATIONS RESILIENT There's no going back a relations downturn would threaten relations forever Eberstadt et all, 07 Henry Wendt Scholar in Political Economy at AEI (Nicholas, Christopher Griffin research fellow at AEI, Friedberg prof at Princeton, AEI, 10/6/2007, "Toward an AmericaFree Korea." http://www.aei.org/article/26924) The "Humpty Dumpty" Problem. The participants at the conference discussed a whole variety of scenarios under which the alliance could come to an end: amicable or acrimonious; gradual or abrupt; carefully planned in advance or suddenly sundered in the midst of crisis. In none of these scenarios, however, was it possible to posit an easy way to piece the USROK military relationship back together again if, at some point in the future, Seoul decided to seek a renewed American security guarantee. It is difficult to forge a military alliance under the best of circumstances. Efforts at reengagement, where each side would try to select only the items most attractive to its own interests, are most unlikely to reconstitute a robust and resilient relationship. Korea Neg 175/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors A2: REGIONALISM SOLVES Regionalism fails without strong US presence dominated by China Twining, 09 Senior Fellow for Asia at the German Marshall Fund of the United, consultant to the U.S. government on South Asia and Asian security issues (Dan, Foreign Policy, "A crib sheet for President Obama's upcoming Asian summitry." http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/11/10/a_crib_sheet_for_president_obamas_upcoming_asian_summitry) Most East and Southeast Asian states favor an "open" form of regionalism that enmeshes external powers like the United States and India, making them shared partners with an equal stake in regional stability and prosperity. Smaller Asian states want to avoid the construction of "closed," Sinocentric regional institutions that would cause them to unduly fall under Beijing's sway, in part by preventing them from balancing their economic dependence on China with similarly deep trade and investment relations with other major economies. Washington has a compelling interest in participating in Asian regional institutions to prevent the construction of any kind of Greater Chinese CoProsperity Sphere, one that would risk diminishing U.S. access to important markets and make it harder for the United States to remain what Secretary Gates calls a "resident power" in the region. Korea Neg 176/436 A2: KOREAN ANTIAMERICANISM Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors Statistical research shows that Korean conservatives and progressives both support US troop presence CHAE AND KIM 2008 (Haesook Chae is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at BaldwinWallace College in Berea, Ohio; Steven Kim is an assistant professor at the AsiaPacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu. "Conservatives and Progressives in South Korea," Washington Quarterly, 31:4) Calum First, the characterization that conservatives are uniformly proAmerican needs some minor but significant revision. As figure 3 shows, conservatives are reliable supporters of the United States. When it comes to the specific issue of South Korean armed forces, however, conservatives adopt the position more closely associated with the progressives that the military should move toward greater independence from the United States (SKMILTARY). Support for the alliance with the United States and support for a stronger, more selfreliant Korean military thus are not mutually exclusive. An interesting corollary is that conservatives, much like progressives, are also opposed to the deployment of U.S. troops outside of the Korean peninsula (USSTRTGC). It appears that the argument made by the United States that flexibility in troop strength would not diminish South Korea's security and would promote vital U.S. interests has not persuaded pro American conservatives. Conservatives, although proAmerican, are nationalists first. Second, the survey data reveal that progressive attitudes are also more complex than previously thought. Figure 3 confirms that progressives are antiAmerican, holding that South Korea and the United States have divergent interests in dealing with North Korea (SKUSINTR) and that the United States does not take South Korean interests into consideration significantly [End Page 85] when dealing with North Korea (USCARE). They also hold that the United States was responsible for the partition of the two Koreas (USPARTTN), was a hindrance to democratic development in South Korea (USDEMOCY), and presently is an obstacle to reunification hopes (USREUNFY). Obviously, this assessment of the United States is fairly negative, consistent with the prevailing model on what progressives believe. On questions related to the South KoreanU.S. alliance, however, pro gressives depart from their perceived role. Progressives believe that the U.S. troop presence in South Korea has led to economic prosperity for their nation (USPROMOTE). They believe in strengthening the alliance and oppose a precipitous withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea (SKUSALNC, SKALLYUS, USFKRMVL). In general and in a hypothetical situation in which conflict breaks out between the United States and China over the Taiwan Strait, progressives hold that South Korea should not waver in its alliance with the United States in exchange for closer ties with China (TAIWANand SKALLYCH). The paradoxical conclusion is that progressives, while censuring U.S. activity in the Korean peninsula, still value the alliance with the United States. Although progressives value the alliance, they have mixed feelings toward it. Progressives view North Korea with ambivalence, both as a kin nation with which to be reconciled and as a mortal threat to be constrained. The South KoreanU.S. alliance is critical to both of these impulses. From one perspective, progressives believe that U.S. forces in Korea (USFK) are an obstacle to peacefully engaging with North Korea. At the same time, however, progressives are mindful that the alliance has staved off North Korea aggression. Alliance with the United States, then, occupies the rather complex position of being simultaneously the chief obstacle to interKorean reconciliation and the chief guardian of South Korea's security. Although progressives and conservatives embrace the South KoreanU.S. alliance, they disagree on how it should be structured. In February 2007, Seoul and Washington signed a bilateral agreement that will transfer operational control of the South Korean military to the South Korean government in 2012. (The United States has maintained command authority over U.S. and South Korean forces since the Korean War.) Progressives endorse this change in leadership as an enhancement of national autonomy, believing it will be done without diminishing the deterrent value or adversely affecting U.S. commitments [End Page 86] to South Korea (TWCINDPN, TWCALNC, and TWCPROVK). Progressives want the alliance but on their own terms. Conservatives, on the other hand, oppose any change to the command structure, believing it would weaken the alliance and encourage North Korean aggression. For conservatives, the alliance and U.S. leadership in it go hand in hand, and one cannot be rejected without the other. What emerges from the survey data is a complex picture. There exists a clearcut ideological split on views of the United States, but the political camps converge on the South KoreanU.S. alliance, agreeing that the alliance is of critical importance because of a still dangerous North. Yet, the two camps see the alliance in different ways. For progressives, the alliance should accommodate movement toward interKorean reconciliation; for conservatives, security is preeminent, and thus no one should tamper with the alliance. Nevertheless, both sides essentially agree that the alliance is valuable to South Korea's national interests. This pragmatic approach from the progressive camp is a major finding because many analysts in South Korea and the United States have expressed the concern that the alliance may become increasingly tenuous due to widespread and growing antiAmerican sentiment. This study shows that antiAmerican sentiments do not contradict but rather coexist with a general support for the alliance. Korea Neg 177/436 A2: KOREAN ANTIAMERICANISM Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors AntiAmericanism won't hurt relations--even Koreans who dislike the US view the alliance as a necessary evil CHAE AND KIM 2008 (Haesook Chae is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at BaldwinWallace College in Berea, Ohio; Steven Kim is an assistant professor at the AsiaPacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu. "Conservatives and Progressives in South Korea," Washington Quarterly, 31:4) Calum Third, South Korea should cultivate its alliance with the United States. Regardless of political orientation, the public supports maintaining the alliance. Counterintuitive though it may seem, strong antiAmerican sentiments should not be interpreted as a demand to terminate or weaken the alliance. Progressives are able to sustain both a negative view of the United States and a positive view of the alliance. For many progressives, the U.S. military presence is a necessary evil. Korea Neg 178/436 A2: ROK WILL SIDE WITH CHINA Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors Even with antiAmerican feelings Koreans oppose China more CHAE AND KIM 2008 (Haesook Chae is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at BaldwinWallace College in Berea, Ohio; Steven Kim is an assistant professor at the AsiaPacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu. "Conservatives and Progressives in South Korea," Washington Quarterly, 31:4) Calum There is no essential difference between progressives and conservatives on relations with China and Japan, as figure 4 vividly demonstrates. When asked to rate their feelings toward China, progressives and conservatives answered in the negative with nearly the same intensity (FEELCHNA). The same result was seen with Japan, the responses being much more negative (FEELJAPN). This concord is all the more remarkable when juxtaposed with how the United States elicited opposite responses from the two camps. Consider in particular how China compared with the United States. When asked to what extent respondents thought China took South Korea's interests into account when acting on North Korea, both clusters registered nearly the same unfavorable value (CHCARE). Yet, the same question about the United States elicited opposite opinions from the two clusters. Even among progressives, who generally held that both China and the United States neglect the welfare of South Korea, China was thought to be more remiss. On the issue of whether China is an asset or an obstacle to the reunification of the two Koreas, both groups again gave very similar ratings perceiving China as an obstacle (CHREUNFY). On the other hand, the same question about the United States elicited opposite responses (USREUNFY). The conclusion is that China [End Page 87] is negatively viewed across the South Korean political spectrum, whereas the United States is a dividing factor between the two clusters. South Koreans won't support China--even with antiAmerican sentiment they still prefer the US CHAE AND KIM 2008 (Haesook Chae is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at BaldwinWallace College in Berea, Ohio; Steven Kim is an assistant professor at the AsiaPacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu. "Conservatives and Progressives in South Korea," Washington Quarterly, 31:4) Calum Figure 5 is based on a survey question that asked respondents whether South Korea should maintain closer ties with the United States or China for the sake of national interest. An overwhelming majority, 90 percent of conservatives and 74 percent of progressives, chose the United States. This finding suggests that, for South Koreans, China is not a competitive alternative to the United States at the moment. This result may be explained by the wariness of China displayed in figure 4. The expressed preference for the United States contradicts the pervasive belief of an increasing public tilt toward China either as a result of or in tandem with growing antiAmericanism. Figure 6 further confirms the relative insignificance of China to South Korea's national interests. Respondents were asked with whom South Korea should most cooperate if faced with the crisis of the sudden collapse of the [End Page 89] North Korean regime. Only a tiny minority, 4 percent of conservatives and 5 percent of progressives, chose China over other countries and international bodies. Consistent with their proAmerican image, a plurality of conservatives (44 percent) chose the United States, while a plurality of progressives (46 percent) chose the United Nations. A large majority of progressives (69 percent) chose an international entity, whether the UN or the sixparty talks group (23 percent), over any single nation. Korea Neg 179/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors Korea Neg 180/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors Korea Neg 181/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors 2NC INTERNAL LINK NUCLEARIZATION Decline in the credibility of the umbrella will push the South to nuclearize Payne, et. al, 10 Professor in Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University (March 2010, Dr. Keith Payne, Study Director Thomas Scheber Kurt Guthe, "U.S. Extended Deterrence and Assurance for Allies in Northeast Asia," http://www.nipp.org/National%20Institute%20Press/Current%20Publications/PDF/US%20ExtendDeterfor%20print.pdf, JMP) adverse The consequences of a U.S. nuclear guarantee that no longer assures Seoul should not be underestimated. Coverage by the nuclear umbrella has played an important role in discouraging South Korea from building a nuclear arsenal of its own, for example. If the guarantee were to lack credibility , one of the barriers to a revived South Korean nuclear weapons program would be lowered. And a nuclear ROK would be a wild card in a region already faced with the prospect of greater instability in the future. Perceived decline in credibility of security guarantee with spur South Korean proliferation Campbell & Einhorn, 04 senior vice president and director of the International Security Program at CSIS, AND ** senior adviser in the CSIS International Security Program, where he works on a broad range of nonproliferation, armscontrol, and other national security issues (Kurt M. Campbell and Robert J. Einhorn, The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices, "12. Avoiding the Tipping Point: Concluding Observations," ed by Campbell, Einhorn and Mitchell B. Reiss, JMP) Alleviate Security Concerns With the exception of Syria, all the countries covered in this study derive substantial security benefits from their association with the United States. Some (Germany, Japan, South Korea, Turkey) are formally allied with the United States through bilateral or multilateral (that is, NATO) security treaties; one (Taiwan) has received commitments in the form of U.S. legislation and presidential policies; another (Saudi Arabia) has relied on informal understandings and close defense cooperation; and still another (Egypt) has been an intimate partner of the United States in regional peace arrangements and bilateral security ties. These various security relationships with the United States have been perceived erosion in the reliability of security guarantees from the United States dramatically change can the calculation the costs and benefits of of remaining nonnuclear . global basis the United States is now proceeding with a massive overhaul of its force deployments overseas. As U.S. forces are reconfigured and repositioned to meet the evolving requirements of the war on terrorism, friends and allies (including some whose perceptions of the terrorist threat and prescriptions for dealing with it differ from those of Washington) may wonder whether these changes are fully consistent with their own security priorities For example, many South Koreans, including strong supporters of the U.S.South Korean alliance, are . troubled by plans to relocate U.S. troops away from the demilitarized zone and out of Seoul, especially while the impasse over North Korea's nuclear program remains unresolved. Japanese are speculating about how U.S. force realignments in Korea and elsewhere will eventually affect them. In Southwest Asia, while U.S. forces are now heavily committed to stabilizing and rebuilding Iraq and Afghanistan, major questions exist about the future of America's military presence in the region. In the period ahead, questions may arise about the continued value of the U.S. factor in the security equations of a number of the countries studied. In response to fundamental changes in the international security environment since the end of the cold war especially the demise of the Soviet threat to Europe, the spread of WMD and other asymmetrical military capabilities, the emergence of failed states and militant Islamic movements, and the growth of wellfinanced, capable terrorist networks operating on a instrumental in each country's nuclear calculus. Indeed, in the cases of South Korea and Taiwan, historical the record suggests that INTERNAL LINK/IMPACT Korea Neg 182/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors It causes broader East Asian prolif Wimbush 2008 Director of the Center for Future Security Strategies and Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute (S. Enders, "A Parable: The U.S.ROK Security Relationship Breaks Down." In "What If? A World without the U.S.ROK Alliance." Ed. by Nicholas Eberstadt, Aaron L. Friedberg & Geun Lee. Asia policy, number 5 (january 2008), 724) Third, because everyone sees beforehand that the U nited tates S is departing, changes to the strategic and security landscape commence long before the actual pullout of U.S. troops from South Korea Indeed by the time troops depart most . and expectations. Fourth, in this scenario incentives to go nuclear are extremely powerful Japan is likely to be the trigger . , Taiwan likely will move in this direction, and even South Korea will find the strategic logic of becoming a nuclear weapons state difficult to resist . Thus, a wave of proliferation could flow : if Japan goes nuclear, Indonesia, Australia, Malaysia, and perhaps others will likely be close behind. Fifth, the rapid shifting of alliances and relationships in this scenario is creating strange bedfellows--some for only tactical advantage, some issuebased and of short duration. This strategic dance will accelerate and intensify as the breakdown of the U.S.ROK alliance becomes evident. Any attempt by South Korea to go it alone in this world is difficult to actors have designed strategies that anticipate the consequences of U.S. withdrawal. Rather than a onetime event, this scenario is a long process with many different timelines 2NC PROLIF imagine; to the contrary, Seoul's objectives will need to be adjusted to reflect the realities of the new partnerships occurring around South Korea. Sixth, in the absence of the alliance--or even with the threat of dissolution--a number of other actors rapidly acquire incentives to stimulate the ROK's sense of threat from North Korea. Seventh, the Japan that eventually emerges from this process--more nationalistic, assertive, well armed, and nuclear--may not be the Japan other Asian countries wish to see. Japan has over the last few decades tempered its historical persona among Asians who used to fear first and foremost that this Asian state would become a "normal nation." Do the dynamics associated with a breakdown of the U.S.ROK security alliance encourage the evolution of a Japan that is again "abnormal"? Collapses the NPT and spreads globally Halloran, 2009 [Richard, Military correspondent for The New York Times for ten years, 524, "The Dangers of a Nuclear Japan," Real Clear Politics, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2009/05/24/nuclear_japan_96638.html] That anxiety reinvigorated a debate about whether Japan should acquire a nuclear deterrent has of its own and reduce reliance on the US Japan its . has the technology , finances, industrial capacity, skilled and personnel to build a nuclear force although it would be costly and take many years. , The consequences of that decision would be earthshaking It . would likely cause opponents to riot in the streets and could bring down a government. South Korea, having sought at least once to acquire nuclear weapons, would almost certainly do so. Any hope of dissuading North Korea from building a nuclear force would disappear. China would redouble its nuclear programs And for . the only nation ever to experience atomic bombing to acquire nuclear arms would surely shatter the already fragile international nuclear nonproliferation regime. The main reason Japan has not acquired nuclear arms so far has been a lack of political will. After the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, the Japanese experienced a deepseated nuclear allergy. That and the threat from the Soviet Union during the Cold War kept Japan huddled under the US nuclear umbrella. Korea Neg 183/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors RELATIONS Korea Neg 184/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors IRAN PROLIF MODULE Alliance key to Iran talks and USIran relations Campbell et al, 09 Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Kurt M., Center for a New American Security, "Going global: the future of the U.S.South Korea alliance." Ed. by Campbell et al, "Going global: the future of the U.S.South Korea alliance." P. 79 http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CampbellPatel_Going%20Global_February09_0.pdf) The most recent concrete manifestation of this shift is in South Korea's progressive nuclear diplomatic negotiations with Iran. South Korea has an active diplomatic mission in Tehran, as do the Iranians in Seoul. Bilateral trade between South Korea and Iran accounted for $8 billion in 2007, a figure that is likely to increase in the coming years. 67 The ROK has been outspoken in its opposition to Iran's opaque nuclear program, including supporting U.S.led UN sanctions. Moreover, a poll released by the BBC World Service in 2008 reports that 76 percent of South Koreans believe that Iran is producing nuclear energy for civil and military purposes . 68 In fact, South Korea is just one of three countries (out of 21 and second to Israel) surveyed that has greater support for more stringent diplomatic and economic sanctions, as well as possible coercive measures against Iran. 69 This indicates a greater public recognition in South Korea of the interconnectedness of its security with WMD proliferation. This is not to suggest that South Korea has enough leverage to compel the Iranian government to change course (although its trade and infrastructure investments would be useful bargaining chips), but it does show how the U.S. ROK alliance could provide an alternative vehicle to engage the Iranians. South Korea has unique diplomatic access to the Iranian regime and could be helpful a intermediary in setting up meetings and dialogue with key Iranian interlocutors. This would be particularly important if the United States decided to take steps to normalize relations with Iran. Relations solve Iran prolif restrictions appear less arbitrary and become more effective. Chubin and Green, '98 (Autumn 1998, Shahram Chubin, Executive Research Director at the Geneva Center for Security Policy, and Jerrold D. Green, Director of the Center for Middle East Public Policy at the RAND Corporation, "Engaging Iran: A US Strategy," Survival, vol. 40, no. 3, pp. 15369) Improved relations with Iran make it possible to suggest criteria that are less comprehensive and that have a chance of being met. A strategy of engagement could substitute disclosure for denial, linking steps increasing transparency by the recipient state to fewer restrictions on technology flow . As mutual confidence is established and dialogue resumes, restraints on Iranian WMD potential will appear both less arbitrary or inclusive and less urgent. At present, the US lacks any criteria or yardstick to measure either a satisfactory level degree of assurance or success. UNSCOM in Iraq has shown that complete assurance is not possible and Overall political relations will dictate how strict the US demands are for reassurance on WMD. They will not substitute for inspections, but they will make it possible to formulate realizable criteria acceptable to both parties. This would meet the needs of access to technology on the one hand and assurances about compliance with prohibitions on WMD development on the other. technology than on the state of political relations. that a comparably intrusive system is unlikely to be practical in Iran. As US relations with Europe, Israel, and Japan show, the degree of assurance required depends less on capability than on intent, less on Extinction Kurtz 06 (Stan, Senior Fellow at Ethics and Public Policy Center, "Our Fallout Shelter Future" The National Review, 28 Aug 2006, Lexis) Proliferation optimists, on the other hand, see reasons for hope in the record of nuclear peace during the Cold War. While granting the risks, proliferation optimists point out that the very horror of the nuclear option tends, in practice, to keep the peace. Without choosing between hawkish proliferation pessimists and dovish proliferation optimists, Rosen simply asks how we ought to act in a post-proliferation world. Rosen assumes (rightly I believe) that proliferation is unlikely to stop with Iran. Once Iran gets the bomb, Turkey and Saudi Arabia are likely to develop their own nuclear weapons, for self-protection, and so as not to allow Iran to take de facto cultural-political control of the Muslim world. (I think you've got to at least add Egypt to this list.) With three, four, or more nuclear states in the Muslim Middle East, what becomes of deterrence? A key to deterrence during the Cold War was our ability to know who had hit whom. With a small number of geographically separated nuclear states, and with the big opponents training satellites and specialized advance-guard radar emplacements on each other, it was relatively easy to know where a missile had come from. But what if a nuclear missile is launched at the U nited States from somewhere in a fully nuclearized Middle East, in the middle of a war in which, say, Saudi Arabia and Iran are already lobbing conventional missiles at one another? Would we know who had attacked us? Could we actually drop a retaliatory nuclear bomb on someone without being absolutely certain? And as Rosen asks, What if Korea Neg 185/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors the nuclear blow was delivered against us by an airplane or a cruise missile ? It might be almost impossible to trace the attack back to its source with certainty, especially in the midst of an ongoing conventional conflict. We're familiar with the horror scenario of a Muslim state passing a nuclear bomb to terrorists for use against an American city. But imagine the same scenario in a multi-polar Muslim nuclear world. With several Muslim countries in possession of the bomb, it would be extremely difficult to trace the state source of a nuclear terror strike. In fact, this very difficulty would encourage states (or ill-controlled elements within nuclear states -- like Pakistan's intelligence services or Iran's Revolutionary Guards) to pass nukes to terrorists. The tougher it is to trace the source of a weapon, the easier it is to give the weapon away. In short, nuclear proliferation to multiple Muslim states greatly increases the chances of a nuclear terror strike . Right now, the Indians and Pakistanis "enjoy" an apparently stable nuclear stand-off. Both countries have established basic deterrence, channels of communication, and have also eschewed a potentially destabilizing nuclear arms race. Attacks by Kashmiri militants in 2001 may have pushed India and Pakistan close to the nuclear brink. Yet since then, precisely because of the danger, the two countries seem to have established a clear, deterrence-based understanding. The 2001 crisis gives fuel to proliferation pessimists, while the current stability encourages proliferation optimists. Rosen points out, however, that a multi-polar nuclear Middle East is unlikely to follow the South Asian model. Deep mutual suspicion between an expansionist, apocalyptic, Shiite Iran, secular Turkey, and the Sunni Saudis and Egyptians (not to mention Israel) is likely to fuel a dangerous multi-pronged nuclear arms race. Larger arsenals mean more chance of a weapon being slipped to terrorists. The collapse of the world's non-proliferation regime also raises the chances that nuclearization will spread to Asia n powers like Taiwan and Japan. And of course, possession of nuclear weapons is likely to embolden Iran, especially in the transitional period before the Saudis develop weapons of their own. Like Saddam, Iran may be tempted to take control of Kuwait's oil wealth, on the assumption that the U nited States will not dare risk a nuclear confrontation by escalating the conflict. If the proliferation optimists are right, then once the Saudis get nukes, Iran would be far less likely to make a move on nearby Kuwait. On the other hand, to the extent that we do see conventional war in a nuclearized Middle East, the losers will be sorely tempted to cancel out their defeat with a nuclear strike. There may have been nuclear peace during the Cold War, but there were also many "hot" proxy wars. Korea Neg 186/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors DISEASE MODULE Alliance solves pandemics coordination against deadly flu strains Snyder, 09 director of the Center for U.S.Korea Policy and senior associate of Washington programs in the International Relations Program of the Asia Foundation (Scott, CSIS, April, "Pursuing a Comprehensive Vision for the U.S.South Korea Alliance." Google Scholar) An emerging challenge illustrated by the spread of SARS in 2004 is the need to coordinate in response to the spread of pandemic diseases. In many ways, the SARS epidemic was a wakeup call that served to raise awareness among publics and governments of the need to promote functional cooperation in this area. The promotion of a coordinated political response that explicitly includes coordination on threats to nontraditional security issues such as the spread of pandemic diseases not only provides an opportunity to encourage new forms of coordinated early warning and response capacity--for instance, through promotion of new and the closer relationships between the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and South Korean counterpart agencies --but also can serve to promote technical exchange and capacity building to enhance the capability of both nations to respond. Some of this work has already been initiated through global and regional coordination efforts under the auspices of the United Nations, the AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC), and respective national emergency management and health administration authorities including the KCDC (Korean Centers for Disease Control and Prevention). As an industrialized nation with an advanced health research sector, South Korean scientists are wellplaced to take leading roles in coordination, detection, and prevention efforts in connection with the H5N1 virus and mutated strains of bird flu. Many of these strains are originating in Southeast Asia, but the migratory path of some species of these birds puts South Korea on the front line as a population that could be affected by such mutations.32 In addition, given KOICA's level of commitment and activity in Southeast Asia, the agency might consider focusing some of its ODA and technical cooperation toward the building of capacity to respond to such pandem ics--for instance, by providing antivirals and test kits, supporting distribution planning, develop ing relevant human resources, and enhancing surveillance systems. The alliance provides an existing infrastructure and opportunity to promote technical cooperation among military specialists on the broader security implications of fighting against pandemic diseases and opportunities for coordinated action in response to such a threat. For instance, pro motion of best practices in response to any outbreak of infectious disease and capacity to respond to such a threat, information sharing, and joint research on causes of and responses to pandemic diseases may provide both governments with early warning regarding new types of threats and a resulting enhanced capacity to protect publics in both countries from harm.33 Extinction Fox, 98 Command Surgeon Joint Readiness Training Council [William, Phantom Warriors, Parameters, Winter, http://carlislewww.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/97winter/fox.htm] HIV is a pandemic killer without a cure, and viruses such as EbolaZaire are merely a plane ride away from the population centers of the developed world. Viruses like Ebola, which are endemic to Africa, have the potential to inflict morbidity and mortality on a scale not seen in the world since the Black Plague epidemics of medieval Europe, which killed a quarter of Europe's population in the 13th and 14th centuries.[16] These diseases are not merely African problems; they present real threats to [hu]mankind. They should be taken every bit as seriously as the concern for deliberate use of eapons of m ass d estruction. w Korea Neg 187/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors WARMING MODULE Alliance solves warming South Korea is a model for clean energy development Snyder, 09 director of the Center for U.S.Korea Policy and senior associate of Washington programs in the International Relations Program of the Asia Foundation (Scott, CSIS, April, "Pursuing a Comprehensive Vision for the U.S.South Korea Alliance." Google Scholar) An emerging area of cooperation in the U.S.ROK relationship is climate change . South Korea imports 97 percent of its energy needs and is one of the globe's top ten emitters of carbon dioxide 42 , and therefore shares similar interests with the United States on clean development. South Korea is a member of the Bush administration initiative on climate change, the AsiaPacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP), cofounded by Australia and the United States in January of 2006, and including China, India, Japan, and the Republic of Korea, to promote technology co operation on climate and environmentrelated issues, including in the areas of clean fossil energy, aluminum, coal mining, renewable energy, power generation, cement, buildings and appliances, and steel.43 The APP has dozens of projects located across the region, including several in Korea devoted to such research areas as the expansion of biodiesel use, cleaner fossil energies, develop ment of indices for renewable energies and distribution, and solar technologies.44 There is poten tial for this initiative to gain in profile under the Obama administration. The initiative's nonbinding framework for cooperation, however, is seen in some quarters as a weak alternative to global legal agreements to limit greenhouse gas emissions. Under the Obama administration, it is likely that the United States will once again seek to play an active role in pro moting a global understanding of how to respond to the global challenges posed by climate change issues. At the G8 Summit in Hokkaido in July 2008, Lee Myung Bak pledged to serve as a bridge between the United States and developing countries on future climate change discussions . To the extent that South Korea can define a bridging role and take concrete actions to promote cooperation on climate change issues, such an initiative would likely be appreciated by the new administration. Seoul has recently taken promising steps domestically toward putting the country on a path toward cleaner development: In August 2008, Lee Myung Bak put the issue high on the agenda by declaring a national vision of "low carbon, green growth," and in early 2009, he sought to include a substantial "green" component in the country's economic stimulus efforts, which if implemented would likely fund renewable energy research and subsidize ecofriendly businesses. Further, the current popularity of the concept of green growth in Korea , combined with Korea's appeal as a developmental model for several countries in greater Asia, make Korea an attractive partner for the United States in seeking to promote bilateral or multilateral efforts to combat global warming . To build the foundation for such cooperation, the two governments should use the APP framework to provide strong support to existing and nascent initiatives at the local level, such as the crossbor der consortium of ecocities envisioned by Daejeon Green Growth Forum chairman Yang Jiwon and his collaborators in Palo Alto, California, and elsewhere.45 Such efforts should complement the leadershiplevel pursuit of a global climate treaty in the leadup to the UN Climate Summit in Copenhagen in December 2009. Extinction Tickell, 08 [Oliver, Climate Researcher, The Guardian, 811, "On a planet 4C hotter, all we can prepare for is extinction", http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/aug/11/climatechange] We need to get prepared for four degrees of global warming, Bob Watson told the Guardian last week. At first sight this looks like wise counsel from the climate science adviser to Defra. But the idea that we could adapt to a 4C rise is absurd and dangerous. Global warming on this scale would be a catastrophe that would mean, in the immortal words that Chief Seattle probably never spoke, "the end of living and the beginning of survival" for humankind. Or perhaps the beginning of our extinction. The collapse of the polar ice caps would become inevitable, bringing longterm sea level rises of 7080 metres. All the world's coastal plains would be lost complete with ports, cities, transport and industrial infrastructure, and much of the world's most productive , farmland. The world's geography would be transformed much as it was at the end of the last ice age, when sea levels rose by about 120 metres to create the Channel, the North Sea and Cardigan Bay out of dry land. Weather would become extreme and unpredictable, with more frequent and severe droughts, floods and hurricanes. The Earth's carrying capacity would be hugely reduced. Billions would undoubtedly die . Watson's call was supported by the government's former chief scientific adviser, Sir David King, who warned that "if we get to a fourdegree rise it is quite possible that we would begin to see a runaway increase". This is a remarkable understatement. The climate system is already experiencing significant feedbacks, notably the summer melting of the Arctic sea ice. The more the ice melts, the more sunshine is absorbed by the sea, and the more the Arctic warms. And as the Arctic warms, the release of billions of tonnes of methane a greenhouse gas 70 times stronger than carbon dioxide over 20 years captured under melting permafrost is already under way. To see how far this process could go, look 55.5m years to the PalaeoceneEocene Thermal Maximum, when a global temperature increase of 6C coincided with the release of about 5,000 gigatonnes of carbon into the atmosphere, both as CO2 and as methane from bogs and seabed sediments. Lush subtropical forests grew in polar regions, and sea levels rose to 100m higher than today. It appears that an initial warming pulse triggered other warming processes. Korea Neg 188/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors Many scientists warn that this historical event may be analogous to the present: the warming caused by human emissions could propel us towards a similar hothouse Earth. Korea Neg 189/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors SOLVES HEG Relations spill over globally key to US global influence Campbell et al, 09 Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Kurt M., Center for a New American Security, "Going global: the future of the U.S.South Korea alliance." Ed. by Campbell et al, "Going global: the future of the U.S.South Korea alliance." P. 60 http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CampbellPatel_Going%20Global_February09_0.pdf) America's ability to maintain stability and project power in the Asia Pacific has long depended on its huband spoke system of bilateral alliances. South Korea has been a valuable component of this system, serving as a regional hub of U.S. power, and projecting "spokes" of U.S. influence across the region It has become more and . more obvious, however, that the sum of South Korea's influence and interests can no longer be viewed merely in a regional context. The ROK is actively establishing new economic and diplomatic relationships with countries across the globe. Similarly, the South Korean military is already engaging in complex outofarea operations. President Lee has embraced and expanded these global aspirations, embarking on a process to establish a "green Korea" and transform the country into a world leader on climate change. 2 Korea Neg 190/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors ECON MODULE Alliance solve global economy Pritchard, et. al, 09 former special envoy for negotiations with North Korea and cochair of the Independent Task Force on U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula (6/16/09, Jack Pritchard, John Tilelli former commanderinchief of the United Nations Command and U.S. Forces in Korea and cochair of the Independent Task Force on U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula, and Scott Snyder director of the Independent Task Force on U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula, The Baltimore Sun, "Viewpoint: A new chapter for U.S.South Korea alliance," http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/oped/balop.viewpoint16jun16,0,5349044.story, JMP) While all eyes have been trained on North Korea's belligerent and aggressive actions in recent weeks, it is important to note that the U.S.South Korea alliance has emerged as a linchpin the in Obama administration's efforts to successfully manage an overcrowded global agenda, and a pivotal tool for safeguarding U.S. longterm interests in Asia. When South Korea's President Lee Myungbak meets with President Barack Obama at the White House Tuesday, the two leaders must effectively address three main areas: policy coordination to address North Korea's nuclear threat, the development of a global security agenda that extends beyond the peninsula, and collaboration to address the global financial crisis as South Korea takes a lead on the G20 process. By conducting a second nuclear test in May, followed by a number of missile launches, North Korea has forced its way onto the Obama administration's agenda. First and foremost, effective U.S.South Korea alliance coordination is critical to managing both the global effects of North Korea's nuclear threat on the nonproliferation regime and the regional security challenges posed by potential regime actions that lead to further crisis in the region. North Korea's internal focus on its leadership succession, and the apparent naming of North Korean leader Kim Jong and Lee must also develop coordinated contingency plans in the event of internal instability in North Korea. Through effective U.S.South il's littleknown and inexperienced youngest son as his successor, make the task of responding to North Korea's aggressive and destabilizing actions all the more challenging. Both deterrence and negotiation must be pursued on the basis of close consultations. Presidents Obama Korea alliance coordination, it should be possible to forge a combined strategy capable of managing the nuclear, proliferation, and regional security dimensions of North Korea's threat. A coordinated position would also strengthen the administration's hand in its efforts to persuade China to put pressure on North Korea. Both countries also face hostage crises involving citizens detained in North Korea. The recent conviction of two U.S. journalists heightens the stakes for the United States, although the administration has tried to decouple their plight from Pyongyang's missile tests. Second, Presidents Obama and Lee should set the stage for a reinvigorated vision of a broader role for the U.S.South Korea alliance as an important component of a broader U.S. strategy toward East Asia. A critical aspect of this vision is a mutual commitment to jointly address sources of global and functional instability beyond the peninsula. Lee Myungbak has offered a vision of a global Korea that features an expanded commitment to peacekeeping and development assistance that is in greater proportion to South Korea's economic clout as the world's 13th largest economy. As the thirdlargest contributor of troops to Iraq, South Korea has also demonstrated its capacity to make valuable contributions to post conflict stabilization. The U.S.South Korea alliance can serve as a platform by which South Korea can make such contributions in many other areas, including Afghanistan. South Korea has already made commitments to send engineers and medical personnel to Afghanistan. It is poised now to expand its contributions, in line with its broadening scope of interest in contributing to global stability and its economic prowess. Third, South Korea is an essential partner in addressing the global financial crisis. Its emphasis on fighting protectionism and promotion of stimuli at the April G20 leaders meeting in London illustrate how closely its priorities are aligned with those of the United States. A U.S. Federal Reserve Bank line of credit to South Korea last fall played a critical role in stabilizing the South Korean's currency and forestalled a possible repeat of South Korea's difficulties in the Asian financial crisis of a decade ago. The Obama and Lee administrations have the opportunity to send a powerful signal opposing protectionism by winning legislative support in both countries for the KoreaU.S. Free Trade Agreement negotiated by their predecessors. With the necessary revisions to meet new political conditions, Mr. Lee and Mr. Obama should urge their respective legislatures to consider early ratification of the trade pact. This would both support more effective coordination on the global financial crisis and underscore its value as a precedent that sets high standards for trade agreements in Asia, in contrast to the proliferation of Asian trade agreements that do little to promote a more open Asian trade and investment environment. U.S.South Korean coordination to manage North Korea's challenge to nonproliferation norms, the global financial crisis , and the transition in Afghanistan will underscore the practical value of alliance contributions to meet mutual interests in global security and prosperity For this reason, Presidents Obama and Lee have a compelling interest in establishing a firm foundation for unlocking the potential of . alliance cooperation in the service of our shared interests. Extinction Bearden, 2000 [Tom, US Army Lieutenant, Director, Association of Distinguished American Scientists, Fellow Emeritus, Alpha Foundation's Institute for Advanced Study, "The Unnecessary Energy Crisis: How To Solve It Quickly", http://cheniere.org/techpapers/Unnecessary%20Energy %20Crisis.doc, 6/12] Bluntly, we foresee these factors -- and others { } not covered -- converging to a catastrophic collapse of the world economy in about eight years. As the collapse of the Western economies nears, one may expect catastrophic stress on the 160 developing nations as the developed nations are forced to dramatically curtail orders. History bears out that desperate nations take desperate actions. Prior to the final economic collapse , the stress on nations will have increased the intensity and number of conflicts, to the point where the arsenals of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) now possessed by some nations, are almost certain to be released. As an example, suppose a starving North Korea {i} launches nuclear weapons based upon Japan and South Korea , including U.S. forces there, in a spasmodic suicidal response. Or suppose a desperate China whose long range nuclear missiles can reach the United States attacks Taiwan. In addition to immediate Korea Neg Michigan Institutes `10 191/436 7 Week Juniors responses, the mutual treaties involved in such scenarios will quickly draw other nations into the conflict , escalating it significantly. Strategic nuclear studies have shown for decades that , under such extreme stress conditions, once a few nukes are launched, adversaries and potential adversaries are then compelled to launch on perception of preparations by one's adversary. The real legacy of the MAD concept is this side of the MAD coin that is almost never discussed. Without effective defense, the only chance a nation has to survive at all, is to launch immediate fullborne preemptive strikes and try to take out its perceived foes as rapidly and massively as possible. As the studies showed, rapid escalation to full WMD exchange occurs, with a great percent of the WMD arsenals being unleashed. The resulting great Armageddon will destroy civilization as we know it, and perhaps most of the biosphere, at least for many decades. Korea Neg 192/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors Solves heg and global stability Snyder, 09 director of the Center for U.S.Korea Policy and senior associate of Washington programs in the International Relations Program of the Asia Foundation (Scott, CSIS, April, "Pursuing a Comprehensive Vision for the U.S.South Korea Alliance." Google Scholar) 5.Provide means by which to pursue U.S. regional and global interests The U.S.ROK alliance, as part of a U.S.led network of global security relationships designed to secure stability and prosperity, is an important instrument by which the United States is able to pursue the objective of promoting global stability. The alliance, especially if considered as part of a broader global network, provides the means by which to mobilize support for efforts to promote stability and security on terms beneficial to the United States and its allies around the world. EXT SOLVES HEG Korea Neg 193/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors 2NC LAUNDRY LIST IMPACTS Relations good prolif, terrorism, economy, and energy policy MyungBak, 6/23 (6/23/10, Lee MyungBak, President of the ROK, "U.S., Republic of Korea have 60year partnership," http://www.ajc.com/opinion/usrepublicof556207.html? printArticle=y) DH Now, the Republic of Korea hopes to contribute to global peace and common prosperity . The year the Korean War started, we were one of the poorest countries in the world with a per capita GDP of less than 40 U.S. dollars. In 2009, we officially joined the OECD Development Assistance Committee, becoming a country that once received aid to one that now provides for others. This transformation took place in just one generation. Attaining and maintaining peace is our shared responsibility. In this regard, the Republic of Korea is taking part in peacekeeping operations in 14 countries around the world. This year, we will be hosting the G20 Summit in Seoul and in 2012 we will host the second Nuclear Security Summit, which was first hosted by the United States. These will all be opportunities for us to strengthen international cooperation, which is so vital in resolving many of the global challenges we face collectively. By doing our part, we hope to ensure a better future for all. The Republic of Korea is a partner, working together with the United States in many parts around the world. The Joint Vision for the Alliance that President Barack Obama and I agreed to last year is a vision for a strategic alliance befitting the 21st century. The vision helps us face the global challenges of today and tomorrow such as climate change, nuclear proliferation, terrorism, financial crisis and energy security through close partnership based on shared value and mutual trust. Such partnerships allow us to prepare for and effectively tackle the multifaceted challenges we are bound to face. Alliance solves terror, prolif, human rights, energy security and SinoJapan conflict Kim, 09 professor of the Graduate School of International Studies at Korea University, "The U.S.ROK Alliance in the 21st Century," ed. by JungHo Bae and Abraham Denmark. "Strengthening of the ROKU.S. Alliance for the 21st Century." " p. 354, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/USROK%20Alliance%20in%20the%2021st %20Century_Denmark%20and%20Fontaine.pdf) There are three reasons why the ROKU.S. strategic alliance system is needed. First, it can work as an effective countermeasure against the struggle for regional hegemony between China and Japan as well as against new security threats. South Korea and the U.S. should cooperate even after the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue to deal with security threats in the 21st century, including terrorism, proliferation of WMDs, the humanitarian crisis, energy security and in minimizing the possibility of struggle for hegemony between China and Japan. 38 U.S. Policy Toward the Korea Peninsula Korea Neg 194/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors USSouth Korean cooperation solves terrorism, prolif, piracy, drug trafficking, climate change, poverty, human rights and disease Snyder, Et. Al. '10 director of the Center for U.S.Korea Policy and senior associate of Washington programs in the International Relations program of The Asia Foundation (Charles L. Pitchard and John H. Tilleli Jr. 2010. "US Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula" ww.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Korean_PeninsulaTFR64.pdf) EXT LAUNDRY LIST Strong alliance coordination with South Korea has ensured peninsu lar stability for more than five decades, initially in response to North Korea's conventional threat and now in promoting a coordinated response to North Korea's efforts to develop nuclear weapons. While successfully deterring North Korea, the alliance also provided the polit ical stability necessary for South Korea's economic and political trans formation into a leading market economy with a vibrant democratic political system. South Korea's democratic transformation has allowed a more robust and enduring partnership with the United States that also applies to a growing list of regional and global security, economic, and political issues beyond North Korea. Presidents Obama and Lee recognized the potential for such cooperation through the adoption of a Joint Vision Statement at their White House meeting in June 2oo9.43 Citing shared values between the two countries, the statement outlines an agenda for broadened global coop eration on peacekeeping, postconflict stabilization, and development assistance, as well as for addressing a wide range of common challenges to human security, including "terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, piracy, organized crime and narcotics, climate change, poverty, infringement on human rights, energy security, and epidemic disease ."44 The Joint Vision Statement also underscores U.S. commitments to defend South Korea from North Korea's nuclear challenge by providing extended deterrence to protect South Korea--that is, a pledge to use its nuclear arsenal in response to any nuclear attack on South Korea--and to transition the role of U.S. forces in South Korea from a leading to a supporting role. It also pledges to strengthen bilateral economic, trade, and investment ties through ratification of the KoreaU.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA). The Task Force believes that the Joint Vision Statement constitutes a valuable foundation for U.S.ROK cooperation and should be implemented fully. The Korean decision in late OEYY9 to provide a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) to Afghanistan is a welcome contribution to the global security issue at the top of the Obama administration's agenda, and South Korea's role as host and chair of the Group of Twenty (Gro) summit in OEYSY and the OEYSOE nuclear security summit is a basis on which the United States and South Korea can build cooperation to manage recovery from the global financial crisis. The role of the alliance as a platform for constructive South Korean regional diplomacy is likely to become more important in the context of rising Chinese influence. When paired with the U.S.Japan alliance, which is based on a complementary set of values and interests, the U.S.led alliance system in Northeast Asia is a cornerstone for regional stability and provides a framework for promoting East Asian security cooperat ion. Korea Neg 195/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors 2NC PROLIF IMPACT Alliance solves prolif Campbell, et al, 09 Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Kurt M., Center for a New American Security, "Going global: the future of the U.S.South Korea alliance." Ed. by Campbell et al, "Going global: the future of the U.S.South Korea alliance." P. 60 http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CampbellPatel_Going%20Global_February09_0.pdf) Nonproliferation is one of the most obvious areas for global alliance cooperation, as well as being one of the top national security priorities for South Korea and the U nited tates. S Despite nearly two decades of cooperation in addressing the North Korean nuclear threat and mutual shared interest in preventing proliferation, this remains an issue on which South Korea and the U nited tates S have sometimes seemed to work at cross purposes. The immediate specter of North Korea's nuclear program has always shaded the lens through which South Korea and the United States approach nonproliferation efforts, and it has at times hampered a closer collaboration on this issue. In recent years, there has been a lingering perception in South Korea that the U.S. administration's focus on China's leadership in the SixParty Talks indicates an undervaluing of South Korea's support and partnership on this issue. Likewise, South Korea's failure to participate in PSI, the Bush administration's key nonproliferation effort, led to disappointment and disillusionment over the potential for closer cooperation. 70 Obama has stated that nuclear proliferation is perhaps the most significant challenge facing the international community and that strong nonproliferation policies will be a priority for his administration. 71 He has also stated his intent to institutionalize and broaden the scope of the Bush administration's PSI. 72 The incoming administration's desire to broaden PSI's scope provides an opportunity for South Korea to reframe the domestic debate over signing the PSI. South Korea's decision to join the initiative should no longer be viewed merely in opposition to North Korea, but rather in opposition to broader global proliferation networks . The decision to support the U.S. administration' efforts on this front will pave the way for a deepened and closer engagement s on nonproliferation. Proliferation leads to extinction Utgoff, Deputy Director of Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division 02 of Institute for Defense Analysis (Victor A., Summer 2002, Survival, p.87-90 Victor A Utgoff, Deputy Director of Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of Institute for Defense Analysis, Summer 2002, Survival, p.87-90) In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed towards a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear "six shooters" on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather together on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations. Korea Neg 196/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors 2NC MIDDLE EAST PROLIF IMPACT Alliance solves regional and Middle East prolif Schriver and Kato, 09 Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, adjunct fellow with the CSIS International Security Program (Randy and Kazuyo, Center for a New American Security, "Going global: the future of the U.S.South Korea alliance." Ed. by Kurt Campbell et al, "The U.S.ROK Alliance: Regional Challenges for An evolving Alliance." P. 5354 http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CampbellPatel_Going%20Global_February09_0.pdf) With regard to proliferation, although the bulk of U.S.ROK collaboration is -- for obvious reasons -- directed at peninsular concerns, it is worth noting South Korea's recent cooperation in law enforcement efforts against criminal networks that span the region, as evidenced by Busan authorities' recent seizure of highquality counterfeit bills smuggled by ethnic Korean Chinese citizens. 21 More explicit integration of these efforts into existing counterterrorism cooperation should be a priority of the incoming U.S. administration. Nor are the security dimensions of the U.S.ROK alliance limited to the AsiaPacific region. South Korea has deployed about 660 troops in Iraq for reconstruction and has sent six experts to join the Regional Reconstruction Team in Iraq since February 2007. The United States also has expecta tions for South Korea to play an even bigger role in international affairs and assist in reconstruction efforts in the Middle East. Proliferation leads to extinction. Utgoff, 02 Deputy Director of Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of Institute for Defense Analysis [Victor A., "Proliferation, Missile Defence and American Ambitions," Survival, Summer, p. 8790] Further, the large number of states that became capable of building nuclear weapons over the years, but chose not to, can be reasonably well explained by the fact that most were formally allied with either the United States or the Soviet Union. Both these superpowers had strong nuclear forces and put great pressure on their allies not to build nuclear weapons. Since the Cold War, the US has retained all its allies. In addition, NATO has extended its protection to some of the previous allies of the Soviet Union and plans on taking in more. Nuclear proliferation by India and Pakistan, and proliferation programmes by North Korea, Iran and Iraq, all involve states in the opposite situation: all judged that they faced serious military opposition and had little prospect of establishing a reliable supporting alliance with a suitably strong, nucleararmed state. What would await the world if strong protectors, especially the United States, were [was] no longer seen as willing to protect states from nuclearbacked aggression? At least a few additional states would begin to build their own nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them to distant targets, and these initiatives would spur increasing numbers of the world's capable states to follow suit. Restraint would seem ever less necessary and ever more dangerous. point, halting proliferation will come to be seen as a lost cause and the restraints on it will disappear. Once that happens, the transition to a Meanwhile, more states are becoming capable of building nuclear weapons and longrange missiles. Many, perhaps most, of the world's states are becoming sufficiently wealthy, and the technology for building nuclear forces continues to improve and spread. Finally, it seems highly likely that at some highly proliferated world would probably be very rapid. While some regions might be able to hold the line for a time, the threats posed by wildfire proliferation in most other areas could create pressures that would finally overcome all restraint. Many readers are probably willing to accept that nuclear proliferation is such a grave threat to world peace that every effort should be made to avoid it. However, every effort has not been made in the past, and we are talking about much more substantial efforts now. For new and substantially more burdensome efforts to be made to slow or stop nuclear proliferation, it needs to be established that the highly proliferated nuclear world that would sooner or later evolve without such efforts is not going to be acceptable. And, for many reasons, it is not. First, the dynamics of getting to a highly proliferated world could be very dangerous. Proliferating states will feel great pressures to obtain nuclear weapons and delivery systems before any potential opponent does. Those who succeed in outracing an opponent may consider preemptive nuclear war before the opponent becomes capable of nuclear retaliation. Those who lag behind might try to preempt their opponent's nuclear programme or defeat the opponent using conventional forces. And those who feel threatened but are incapable of building nuclear weapons may still be able to join in this arms race by building other types of weapons of mass destruction, such as biological weapons. [The article continues...] The war between Iran and Iraq during the 1980s led to the use of chemical weapons on both sides and exchanges of missiles against each other's cities. And more recently, violence in the Middle East escalated in a few months from rocks and small arms to heavy weapons on one side, and from police actions to air strikes and armoured attacks on the other. Escalation of violence is also basic human nature. Once the violence starts, retaliatory exchanges of violent acts can escalate to levels unimagined by the participants before hand. Intenseand blinding anger is a common sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shootout with nuclear weapons, and that such response to fear or humiliation or abuse. And such anger can lead us to impose on our opponents whatever levels of violence are readily accessible. In shootouts will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations. late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear 'sixshooters' on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every Korea Neg 197/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors Korea Neg 198/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors 2NC IRAN IMPACT Iranian nukes spread regionally and kill the NPT. Boozman and Rubin, 09 (US Rep and Michael, Res. Scholar AEI and Seniro Lecturer Naval Postgraduate School, Federal News Service, "HEARING OF THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE; SUBJECT: IRAN: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY;", 722, L/N) The last point I want to make, which has direct relevance to both the popular protests, which we've seen, and the issue of Iran's ideology, is that a lot of people say that should Iran develop nuclear weapons capability, we could live with a nuclear Iran because they're not suicidal. The problem is that among certain portions of the people that would be in command and control, specifically within the supreme leader circle and the IRGC, there may be people that are ideologically committed to the destruction of Israel. Now, should there be a popular uprising when Iran has that nuclear capability, they may feel that they have nothing to lose with the calculation that, look, we're done for anyway and is the United States or Europe really going to retaliate against an already changed regime? Therefore, it's essential for the peace and stability in the region that Iran not be allowed to get this far in the first place. Thank you. REP. BOOZMAN: And with Iran having nuclear ability, then the Saudis and the whole region are going to feel threatened, aren't they, and also start the proliferation. We're already hearing perhaps, you know, deals with Pakistan and things like that with the Saudis. MR. RUBIN: You're absolutely correct. It would be a cascade of instability and the nuclear nonproliferation regime would be dead. Nuclear war Cimbala, 08 [Stephen, Distinguished Prof. Pol. Sci. Penn. State Brandywine, Comparative Strategy, "Anticipatory Attacks: Nuclear Crisis Stability in Future Asia", 27, InformaWorld] If the possibility existed of a mistaken preemption during and immediately after the Cold War, between the experienced nuclear forces and command systems of America and Russia, then it may be a matter of even more concern with regard to states with newer and more opaque forces and command systems. In addition, the Americans and Soviets (and then Russians) had a great deal of experience getting to know one another's military operational proclivities and doctrinal idiosyncrasies, including those that might influence the decision for or against war. Another consideration, relative to nuclear stability in the present century, is that the Americans and their NATO allies shared with the Soviets and Russians a commonality of culture and historical experience. Future threats to American or Russian security from weapons of mass destruction may be presented by states or nonstate actors motivated by cultural and social predispositions not easily understood by those in the West nor subject to favorable manipulation during a crisis. The spread of nuclear weapons in Asia presents a complicated mosaic of possibilities in this regard. States with nuclear forces of variable force structure, operational experience, and command control systems will be thrown into a matrix of complex political, social, and cultural crosscurrents contributory to the possibility of war. In addition to the existing nuclear powers in Asia, others may seek nuclear weapons if they feel threatened by regional rivals or hostile alliances. Containment of nuclear proliferation in Asia is a desirable political objective for all of the obvious reasons. Nevertheless, the present century is unlikely to see the nuclear hesitancy or risk aversion that marked the Cold War, in part, because the military and political discipline imposed by the Cold War superpowers no longer exists, but also because states in Asia have new aspirations for regional or global respect.12 The spread of ballistic missiles and other nuclearcapable delivery systems in Asia, or in the Middle East with reach into Asia, is especially dangerous because plausible adversaries live close together and are already engaged in ongoing disputes about territory or other issues.13 The Cold War Americans and Soviets required missiles and airborne delivery systems of intercontinental range to strike at one another's vitals. But shortrange ballistic missiles or fighterbombers suffice for India and Pakistan to launch attacks at one another with potentially "strategic" effects. China shares borders with Russia, North Korea, India, and Pakistan; Russia, with China and NorthKorea; India, with Pakistan and China; Pakistan, with India and China; and so on. The short flight times of ballistic missiles between the cities or military forces of contiguous states means that very little time will be available for warning and attack assessment by the defender. Conventionally armed missiles could easily be mistaken for a tactical nuclear first use. Fighterbombers appearing over the horizon could just as easily be carrying nuclear weapons as conventional ordnance. In addition to the challenges posed by shorter flight times and uncertain weapons loads, potential victims of nuclear attack in Asia may also have first strikevulnerable forces and commandcontrol systems that increase decision pressures for rapid, and possibly mistaken, retaliation. This potpourri of possibilities challenges conventional wisdom about nuclear deterrence and proliferation on the part of policymakers and academic theorists. For policymakers in the United States and NATO, spreading nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in Asia could profoundly shift the geopolitics of mass destruction from a European center of gravity (in the twentieth century) to an Asian and/or Middle Eastern center of gravity (in the present century).14 This would profoundly shake up prognostications to the effect that wars of mass destruction are now passe, on account of the emergence of the "Revolution in Military Affairs" and its encouragement of informationbased warfare.15 Together with this, there has emerged the argument that largescale war between states or coalitions of states, as opposed to varieties of unconventional warfare and failed states, are exceptional Korea Neg 199/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors and potentially obsolete.16 The spread of WMD and ballistic missiles in Asia could overturn these expectations for the obsolescence or marginalization of major interstate warfare . Korea Neg 200/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors 2NC HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACT Alliance solves North Korean and Chinese human rights abuses Schriver and Kato, 09 Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, adjunct fellow with the CSIS International Security Program (Randy and Kazuyo, Center for a New American Security, "Going global: the future of the U.S.South Korea alliance." Ed. by Kurt Campbell et al, "The U.S.ROK Alliance: Regional Challenges for An evolving Alliance." P. 5354 http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CampbellPatel_Going%20Global_February09_0.pdf) The alliance also appears poised to play a key role in U.S. efforts to manage some of the region's most critical security challenges, including those linked to proliferation and to the management of China's rising power. Former U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Alexander Vershbow recently pointed to South Korea's ability to address human rights violations not only in North Korea but also in other places such as Burma and China. 20 Given the importance of South Korean trade relations with these Asian countries, a united U.S.ROK front is likely to increase the impact of efforts to improve the governance and domestic freedoms of these countries. And, as a continuing host of U.S military forces, South Korea's decisions about the location and structure of USFK will undoubtedly play a role in influencing Chinese perceptions of American and regional intentions toward it. Global human rights violations make extinction inevitable Human Rights Web, 94 (An Introduction to the Human Rights Movement Created on July 20, 1994 / Last edited on January 25, 1997, http://www.hrweb.org/intro.html) The United Nations Charter, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and UN Human Rights convenants were written and implemented in the aftermath of the Holocaust, revelations coming from the Nuremberg war crimes trials, the Bataan Death March, the atomic bomb, and other horrors smaller in magnitude but not in impact on the individuals they affected. A whole lot of people in a number of countries had a crisis of conscience and found they could no longer look the other way while tyrants jailed, tortured, and killed their neighbors. Many also realized that advances in technology and changes in social structures had rendered war a threat to the continued existence of the human race. Large numbers of people in many countries lived under the control of tyrants, having no recourse but war to relieve often intolerable living conditions. Unless some way was found to relieve the lot of these people, they could revolt and become the catalyst for another wide-scale and possibly nuclear war. For perhaps the first time, representatives from the majority of governments in the world came to the conclusion that basic human rights must be protected, not only for the sake of the individuals and countries involved, but to preserve the human race. Korea Neg 201/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors ALLIANCE SOLVES ENERGY COOPERATION EXT Alliance solves energy cooperation spills over to developing nations Schriver and Kato, 09 Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, adjunct fellow with the CSIS International Security Program (Randy and Kazuyo, Center for a New American Security, "Going global: the future of the U.S.South Korea alliance." Ed. by Kurt Campbell et al, "The U.S.ROK AlliAnce: Regional Challenges for An evolving Alliance." P. 44 http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CampbellPatel_Going%20Global_February09_0.pdf) Another potentially fruitful avenue for multilateral energy cooperation involving South Korea and the United States is the strengthening of the AsiaPacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP), a seven nation partnership that constitutes more than onehalf of the world's energy consumption and a significant fraction of its nonoil energy resources. The APP's emphasis on the diffusion of energyefficient technologies and practices is especially appropriate for Asia given the region's wide variation in energy and environmental practices and its especially pressing need to reconcile economic growth with increasingly acute concerns over environmental protection. Through the APP as well as their bilateral relations, the United States and South Korea should cooperate with each other and with other advanced industrial nations to provide these technologies to countries that currently lack them. In addition, they should find ways to transmit knowledge of best environmental practices and standards to developing economies to help them create the conditions for longterm sustainable development and economic growth without imposing a high environmental and health cost on other countries in the region. Korea Neg 202/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors 2NC SOLVES FREE TRADE Relations key to Asian free trade Manyin, 05 Asian Analyst with the Congressional Research Service (Mark E., AEI, "South KoreaU.S. Economic Relations: Cooperation, Friction, and Prospects for a Free Trade Agreement (FTA)." http://www.aei.org/docLib/20060201_CRSREportforCongress.pdf) However, President Roh reportedly did not raise the issue during his June 9, 2005 summit with President Bush, which occurred less than a week after the PortmanKim meeting. The summit meeting dealt with security issues and was held in part to counter perceptions of tension in the U.S.South Korea alliance. The absence of an FTA from the summit agenda raised the question of how high a priority it is for the Roh Administration, though there are reports that the two governments are discussing whether FTA talks can be launched when President Bush travels to Pusan, South Korea, in November 2005 to attend a summit of leaders from the APEC forum. Ultimately, the decision on whether or not to launch an FTA is likely to boil down to a matter of trust between the Bush and Roh administrations. Korean officials say that they need a pledge that FTA talks will proceed in order to weather the domestic political opposition expected if they relax the screen quota and lift the beef ban. Many U.S. officials say that Korea's action on these two issues is a litmus test for whether Seoul is politically capable of making the compromises the United States will expect in an FTA agreement. Spills over to other FTAs Levy, 09 resident scholar at AEI (Philip I., American Enterprise Institute, "Our other Korea problem." http://www.aei.org/article/100648) The U.S. bungling of the KORUS FTA matters not just because of the foregone economic benefits mentioned above. U.S. behavior sends signals about our reliability as an ally, both in economic matters and beyond. The U.S. Congress had authorized the Bush administration to negotiate the agreement. The Koreans had made politically painful public concessions on the understanding that they had reached the moment of truth and that the concessions would lead to a vote on the agreement. Instead, the vote was scuttled and the Koreans faced Congressional demands to negotiate some more. What should trade negotiators around the world conclude? All negotiators like to postpone the most difficult concessions until the last moment, but how can they know when that moment has arrived with the United States? Does the U.S. Trade Representative really represent the United States, or should partners be talking with the chairman of the House Ways and Means Trade Subcommittee instead? And what of the U.S. role in Asia? The United States has long sought to portray itself as dependable and indispensable in the region. The U.S. image has mattered even more of late as regional political structures have become rather fluid. China has promoted an East Asian Summit that excludes the United States as an alternative to groupings like APEC. The United States hardly looks dependable when it snubs one of its closest allies in the region. What's more, how confident can we now be that Asian countries will draw a sharp distinction between our unreliability on trade and our reliability in providing a security umbrella? This is all the more important considering that the latest South Korean visit to Washington came against the backdrop of further threatening behavior by the North. Korea Neg 203/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors 2NC SOLVES CHINESE AGGRESSION Strong alliance is key to check Chinese regional hegemony Hyugbaeg, 08 professor at the department of political science and diplomacy at Korea University (October 2008, Im Hyugbaeg, U.S.Korea Institute Working Paper Series, "How Korea Could Become a Regional Power in Northeast Asia: Building a Northeast Asian Triad," http://uskoreainstitute.org/wpcontent/uploads/2008/10/USKIWP4.pdf, JMP) There are many conditions present to indicate the need for a renewal of, as well as a redefinition of the U.S.ROK alliance. For starters, the power paradigm in East Asia is gradually shifting away from the old "hub and spokes" system of the Cold War era, to a new, more flexible and agile system of bilateral alliancebuilding between the U.S. and individual East Asian countries. Within this new system, the nature of U.S. relations with South Korea is directly related to and affected by the nature of U.S. relations with China and Japan. For instance, in a scenario where the U.S. were to perceive a rising threat from China that would effectively challenge U.S. hegemony, it is likely that the U.S. would respond by strengthening its bilateral ties to East Asian littoral states, such as Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea, in order to counter and contain that threat. (Lampton, 2004) In such a case, where the national interest of China and the U.S. conflict with each other, South Korea's best option would be to strengthen its ties to the U.S. and limit the expansion of Chinese influence over the Korean peninsula. Beyond its traditional role of deterring North Korean aggression, a strong, redefined U.S.ROK alliance could give South Korea important leverage against China's rising global economic and political influence.5 China would fill in absent US commitments Kang, 08 Professor in the Government department and Adjunct Professor at the Tuck School of Business, Dartmouth College (David C., "InterKorean Relations in the Absence of a U.S.ROK Alliance." in" in "What If? A World without the U.S.ROK Alliance" ed. by Nicholas Eberstadt, Aaron L. Friedberg & Geun Lee. Asia policy, number 5 (january 2008), 2541) China is the most likely country to have increased influence on the peninsula in the absence of a U.S.ROK alliance. For the time being, South Korean and Chinese interests appear to be fairly consistent: increasing the economic and cultural opening of North Korea, focusing on stability rather than regime change in North Korea, and avoiding a costly collapse of the regime. Alliance solves China rise Snyder, 09 director of the Center for U.S.Korea Policy and senior associate of Washington programs in the International Relations Program of the Asia Foundation (Scott, CSIS, April, "Pursuing a Comprehensive Vision for the U.S.South Korea Alliance." Google Scholar) 4.Hedge against the possibility that China's rise is not benign For U.S. security planners, the U.S.ROK alliance, as an important part of the U.S.led alliance network in Asia, represents an important instrument by which it is possible to hedge against any potential destabilizing aspects of China's rise. The alliance serves as a visible constraint against Chinese military expansion and as an instrument by which to channel Chinese strategic choices and deter China from consideration of expansionist aims that might threaten security of American allies. The alliance is a tangible means by which to discourage China from attempting to become a rulebreaker rather than abiding by currently established international norms of state behavior. Korea Neg 204/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors 2NC SOLVES DETERRENCE & STABILITY Alliance solves Northeast Asian stability and deterrence. Snyder, 09 director of the Center for U.S.Korea Policy and senior associate of Washington programs in the International Relations Program of the Asia Foundation (Scott, CSIS, April, "Pursuing a Comprehensive Vision for the U.S.South Korea Alliance." Google Scholar) Both countries benefit from the stabilizing role of the alliance, and the U.S. presence on the peninsula that it codified, in ensuring economic prosperity, including safeguarding sealanes criti cal to energy security. The mutual defense commitments of the alliance deter aggression against both countries. For the United States, the alliance also supports continuing U.S. engagement in Northeast Asia, provides a hedge against the possibility that a rising China might one day threaten regional and global stability, and is a means through which the United States can pursue and protect its regional and global interests. For South Korea, the alliance is likely to have enduring strategic value as a means by which to enhance its own security without tilting toward one or the other of South Korea's larger nextdoor neighbors, and the alliance is a platform for South Korea to project its international image more effectively. The respective objectives outlined as follows constitute enduring strategic interests and mutual needs that the alliance will be able to serve if it is properly structured and maintained. 1. Safeguard regional stability, economic prosperity, and energy security An early and enduring goal of the alliance is the objective of safeguarding stability in Northeast Asia by mitigating regional rivalries that could lead to conflict. The alliance is an investment in stability that has enabled decades of economic growth and prosperity in the region, and it also safeguards that growth by reducing costs that would otherwise accrue from higher costs that would have to be covered by other means. In particular, the U.S.led alliance framework has re inforced maritime security necessary to enable safe and secure trade including supplies of oil and other energy resources to Asia and South Korea from other regions of the world. 2. Deter regional aggression through mutual defense commitment U.S. led alliance arrangements in Northeast Asia continue to prevent the likelihood of aggres sion or conflict in Northeast Asia by providing deterrence against any possible hostile force that might seek to take advantage of perceived weakness on the part of American alliance partners. The defense commitment provides for common security and mitigates the likelihood that costly inter state conflict will break out in Northeast Asia. Korea Neg 205/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors 2NC SOLVES ECONOMY U.S.South Korea alliance is key to managing Obama's global agenda including North Korea and the financial crisis Pritchard, et. al, 09 former special envoy for negotiations with North Korea and cochair of the Independent Task Force on U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula (6/16/09, Jack Pritchard, John Tilelli former commanderinchief of the United Nations Command and U.S. Forces in Korea and cochair of the Independent Task Force on U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula, and Scott Snyder director of the Independent Task Force on U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula, The Baltimore Sun, "Viewpoint: A new chapter for U.S.South Korea alliance," http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/oped/balop.viewpoint16jun16,0,5349044.story, JMP) While all eyes have been trained on North Korea's belligerent and aggressive actions in recent weeks, it is important to note that the U.S.South Korea alliance has emerged as a linchpin in the Obama administration's efforts to successfully manage an overcrowded global agenda, and a pivotal tool for safeguarding U.S. longterm interests in Asia. When South Korea's President Lee Myungbak meets with President Barack Obama at the White House Tuesday, the two leaders must effectively address three main areas: policy coordination to address North Korea's nuclear threat, the development of a global security agenda that extends beyond the peninsula, and collaboration to address the global financial crisis as South Korea takes a lead on the G20 process. By conducting a second nuclear test in May, followed by a number of missile launches, North Korea has forced its way onto the Obama administration's agenda. First and foremost, effective U.S.South Korea alliance coordination is critical to managing both the global effects of North Korea's nuclear threat on the nonproliferation regime and the regional security challenges posed by potential regime actions that lead to further crisis in the region. North Korea's internal focus on its leadership succession, and the apparent naming of North Korean leader Kim Jongil's littleknown and inexperienced youngest son as his successor, make the task of responding to North Korea's aggressive and destabilizing actions all the more challenging. Both develop coordinated contingency plans in the event of internal instability in North Korea. deterrence and negotiation must be pursued on the basis of close consultations. Presidents Obama and Lee must also Through effective U.S.South Korea alliance coordination, it should be possible to forge a combined strategy capable of managing the nuclear, proliferation, and regional security dimensions of North Korea's threat. A coordinated position would also strengthen the administration's hand in its efforts to persuade China to put pressure on North Korea. Both countries also face hostage crises involving citizens detained in North Korea. The recent conviction of two U.S. journalists heightens the stakes for the United States, although the administration has tried to decouple their plight from Pyongyang's missile tests. Second, Presidents Obama and Lee should set the stage for a reinvigorated vision of a broader role for the U.S.South Korea alliance as an important component of a broader U.S. strategy toward East Asia. A critical aspect of this vision is a mutual commitment to jointly address sources of global and functional instability beyond the peninsula. Lee Myungbak has offered a vision of a global Korea that features an expanded commitment to peacekeeping and development assistance that is in greater proportion to South Korea's economic clout as the world's 13th largest economy. As the thirdlargest contributor of troops to Iraq, South Korea has also demonstrated its capacity to make valuable contributions to postconflict stabilization. The U.S.South Korea alliance can serve as a platform by which South Korea can make such contributions in many other areas, including Afghanistan. South Korea has already made commitments to send engineers and medical personnel to Afghanistan. It is poised now to expand its contributions, in line with its broadening scope of interest in contributing to global stability and its economic prowess. Third, South Korea is an essential partner in addressing the global financial crisis. Its emphasis on fighting protectionism and promotion of stimuli at the April G20 leaders meeting in London illustrate how closely its priorities are aligned with those of the United States. A U.S. Federal Reserve Bank line of credit to South Korea last fall played a critical role in stabilizing the South Korean's currency and forestalled a possible repeat of South Korea's difficulties in the Asian financial crisis of a decade ago. The Obama and Lee administrations have the opportunity to send a powerful signal opposing protectionism by winning legislative support in both countries for the KoreaU.S. Free Trade Agreement negotiated by their predecessors. With the necessary revisions to meet new political conditions, Mr. Lee and Mr. Obama should urge their respective legislatures to consider early ratification of the trade pact. This would both support more effective coordination on the global financial crisis and underscore its value as a precedent that sets high standards for trade agreements in Asia, in contrast to the proliferation of Asian trade agreements that do little to promote a more open Asian trade and investment environment. U.S.South Korean coordination to manage North Korea's challenge to nonproliferation norms, the global financial crisis, and the transition in Afghanistan will underscore the practical value of alliance contributions to meet mutual interests in global security and prosperity. For this reason, Presidents Obama and Lee have a compelling interest in establishing a firm foundation for unlocking the potential of alliance cooperation in the service of our shared interests. Korea Neg 206/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors SOLVES DEMOCRACY PROMOTION Military Presence in South Korea is critical to democracy promotion Lane 2k Editor and political analyst of the New Republic (1/17/00, "The Democracy Wave; Has it crested?" pg online @ lexis//au) Thanks to American power, then, fascism and communism have been mostly vanquished . The remaining task is to and the Balkans. It may take more than a century to handle all of this unfinished business. But, if the United States is serious about remove them where they linger (China, North Korea, Cuba, Iraq, Serbia), and to cope with or overcome other ideologically based obstacles to democracy like Islamic fundamentalism, the "Asian values" canard, and the tribal and ethnic strife that bedevil the Arab world, subSaharan Africa, the Caucasus, defending and consolidating democracy, it will have to identify democracy's enemies and oppose them , both with the force of our ideas and, where necessary, with just plain force. In short, what Joseph Nye has called "soft power" foreign aid, trade, and the other persuasive tools which Carothers and Diamond emphasize may not be enough. "Hard power," the maintenance of a strong U.S. military and a network of global security commitments and alliances capable of protecting democracies and resisting aggressive dictatorships, will surely continue to play an indispensable role. Doubters need only ask themselves whether democracy in Taiwan, South Korea, or even Japan would be stabilized or destabilized by a U.S. pullout from East Asia where China increasingly flexes its military muscles. Robust Military Presence is key to South Korean economic growth and democracy promotion It strengthens the alliance Lee 6/28/10 President of the Republic of Korea ("A promise fulfilled; American sacrifice is redeemed by a partnership in peace" pg online @ lexisnexis//au) As we commemorate the 60th anniversary of the Korean War, I offer our deepest, most sincere gratitude to all the American veterans and their families for what they did. The friendship and bond that we share is reinforced by a strong and robust military alliance, which in turn has been the basis for the Republic of Korea's remarkable twin achievements of the past six decades, namely, achieving economic growth and becoming a true liberal democracy. Now, the Republic of Korea hopes to contribute to global peace and common prosperity. The year the Korean War started, we were one of the poorest countries in the world, with a per capita gross domestic product of less than $40. In 2009, we officially joined the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's Development Assistance Committee (DAC), transitioning from a country that once received aid to one that now provides for others. This transformation took place in just one generation. Attaining and maintaining peace is our shared responsibility. In this regard, the Republic of Korea is taking part in peacekeeping operations in 14 countries around the world. This year, we will be hosting the Group of 20 Summit in Seoul, and in 2012, we will host the second Nuclear Security Summit, which was first hosted by the United States. These all will be opportunities for us to strengthen international cooperation, which is so vital in resolving many of the global challenges we face collectively. By doing our part, we hope to ensure a better future for all. The Republic of Korea is a partner, working together with the United States in many parts of the world. The Joint Vision for the Alliance that President Obama and I agreed to last year is a vision for a strategic alliance befitting the 21st century. The Vision helps us face the global challenges of today and tomorrow, such as climate change, nuclear proliferation, terrorism, the financial crisis and energy security through a close partnership based on shared values and mutual trust. Such partnerships enable us to prepare for and effectively tackle the multifaceted challenges we are bound to face. Korea Neg 207/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors SOLVES NORTH KOREAN NUCLEARIZATION Alliance is key to North Korea denuclearization Korb and Ogden, 05 *assistant secretary of defense during the Reagan administration and is now a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, AND **coordinator of the Center for American Progress's International Rights and Responsibilities program (Lawrence and Peter, Center for American Progress, "A Time for U.S. Diplomacy in East Asia." http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2005/05/b673063.html) Worsening relations between China and Japan will also further damage an already strained U.S.South Korean alliance, which again would be a serious blow to our efforts to denuclearize the Korean peninsula. Any strategy that involves "squeezing" North Korea through economic and military embargoes, of course, requires the full and determined cooperation of the South. Though it is blatant hypocritical for Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's to declare that "Japan needs to face up to history squarely," it is far harder to dismiss South Korea's anger over what they perceive as an insufficiently contrite or introspective Japan a Japan where the prime minister pays visits to a shrine that commemorates, among others, 14 Class A convicted war criminals; where six of eight state sanctioned textbooks make no mention of the tens of thousands of "comfort women" who were forced into sexual servitude by the Japanese in WWII; and where the textbook used by the majority of students whitewashes the forcible relocation of some 700,000 people to Japan to serve as laborers during the war. Alliance solves North Korean nuclearization Lee, 09 visiting research fellow at KINU and adjunct professor at Ewha Woman's University. (ChoonKun, Center for a New American Security, "The U.S.ROK Alliance in the 21st Century," ed. by JungHo Bae and Abraham Denmark. "North Korea's Policy toward the United States and the Coordination between the United States and South Korea A Korean Perspective." p. 113, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/USROK%20Alliance%20in%20the%2021st %20Century_Denmark%20and%20Fontaine.pdf) Through the brinkmanship diplomacy with nuclear weapons and long range missiles, North Korea seems to believe that they can survive and even be the unifier of the Korean Peninsula. I have mentioned that the United States and South Korea would and should not allow North Korea to think and act that way. The goals of the United States and South Korea is to denuclearize North Korea and to help them to change their defunct regimes and build a unified Korea which will be ruled by the liberal and democratic government on the Korean Peninsula. To achieve this noble goal, the United States and South Korea must cooperate. With cooperation, the United States and South Korea can achieve their national goal more easily and effectively. To cooperate, South Korea and the United States should share ideas about North Korea. The two countries should have the common views and answers to the following questions: what is the problemof North Korea?; what does it mean to solve the North Korea's nuclear problem?; and, what should be the future of Korea? The preconditions for cooperation between the United States and South Korea in solving the North Korean problems are sharing the common answers to the above questions. North Korea is a failed state ruled by a rogue leader who cannot even provide food and shelter to his own people, while endangering the international community with nuclear weapons and long range missiles. Therefore, it is imperative for the peace loving people of the world to remove nuclear weapons from the hands of the North Korean dictator. For permanent peace in Northeast Asia, we should have a vision to build a unified country with liberal and democratic government on the Korean peninsula. We believe that the United States and South Korea under the Obama and Lee presidencies share the common visions and will succeed in solving the problems raised by North Korea with full cooperation. Korea Neg 208/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors SOLVES KOREAN STABILITY Alliance solves Korean stability and South Korean economy Bae, 10 Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Studies at Yonsei University, Seoul, Korea, and was a Research Associate of the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies at Princeton University (JongYun, Asian Survey, "South Korean Strategic Thinking toward North Korea." Google Scholar, http://caliber.ucpress.net.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/pdfplus/10.1525/as.2010.50.2.335) The alliance is virtually unassailable because the foremost objective in strategic thinking is stability. This is seen as essential for the South Korean economy, sandwiched between technologically moreadvanced producers in Japan and the U.S. and the rising, lowcost producers of China. The alliance with the U.S. may be primarily a means to keep North Korea from invading or otherwise destabilizing the South, but it also is a bulwark of dependability for the South and the region. Thus, its significance is much broader than many have suggested. Although both Kim Daejung and Roh Moohyun propelled several quietly progressive policies toward North Korea, they never denied the importance of the American alliance, even at times of policy discord on the North Korean nuclear issue. Nonetheless, the value of the alliance could be called into question if the U.S. gets trigger happy toward the North--or if force realignment aimed at a possible war over Taiwan were to lead many in Korea to perceive the American troops as a source of instability. Korea Neg 209/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors SOLVES ROK TENSION WITH NEIGHBORS Security cooperation with U.S. restrains ROK tensions with neighbors Levin 4, Senior Analyst at the RAND Corporation, (Norman D, "Do the Ties Still Bind?: The USROK Security Relationship After 9/11," http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2004/RAND_MG115.pdf) Second, the security relationship strengthens ROK interests in supporting U.S. efforts to counter North Korea's WMD, missile, and arms transfer activities. It also increases ROK incentives to cooperate with U.S. counterproliferation objectives more broadly. By reassuring South Koreans of the U.S. commitment, moreover, security cooperation helps restrain ROK tensions with its neighbors, thereby diminishing potential ROK interest in its own WMD program. South Korea's move to develop nuclear weapons in the 1970s when it thought the U.S. defense commitment was waning is a good object lesson. Korea Neg 210/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors SOLVES WAR ON TERRORISM Cooperation key to ROK support for war on terrorism Levin 4, Senior Analyst at the RAND Corporation, (Norman D, "Do the Ties Still Bind?: The USROK Security Relationship After 9/11," http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2004/RAND_MG115.pdf) Third, security cooperation provides a means for strengthening Korea's role in the war on terrorism and in future coalition warfare. To be sure, this goal faces significant hurdles. Aside from the continuing threat from North Korea, which necessarily takes up the bulk of ROK attention and resources, few Koreans outside the policy and security communities have a fully globalized concept of security. To the extent that they think about a world after OEF, they see neither much threat to them nor much required of them. Many Korean citizens, moreover, are focused less on the war on terrorism per se than on the war's effect on their relations with North Korea. And even given the will, Korea's lack of refueling, longrange transport, and other capabilities hinders a significantly expanded ROK role in coalition activities. Still, the South Korean military is moving perceptibly in this direction. The ROK Army Chief of Staff is developing a rapid reaction force concept for use outside of Korea, for example, and the ROKAF has concrete plans for a power projection capability. The value Koreans place on the security alliance, moreover, creates the potential for continuing ROK support as the war on terrorism moves forward. And Korea has additional capabilities it could provide in such areas as engineering, medical, countermining, and special operations that could be helpful. Although the deployment of Korean combat troops will require either an increased sense of threat or a harder U.S. sell than was attempted for Afghanistan, the ROK has communicated that all options are on the table. This suggests that any specific requests that the U.S. might tender will receive serious examination. The U.S. request for combat troops for Iraq will be an important test case. As noted above, Korean support for the war in Iraq has been framed almost entirely thus far in terms of its importance for close alliance relations. Relations solve terrorism Campbell et al, 09 Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Kurt M., Center for a New American Security, "Going global: the future of the U.S.South Korea alliance." Ed. by Campbell et al, "Going global: the future of the U.S.South Korea alliance." P. 7273 http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CampbellPatel_Going%20Global_February09_0.pdf) America will not be able to neutralize terrorists in Afghanistan, Iraq, or Pakistan by itself or through purely kinetic operations. Key to America's success in stabilizing both nations will be assistance from allies and nations around the world. Stronger coordination between Seoul and Washington on reconstruction assistance will be a key element of success. Even though aid coordination between South Korea and America remains limited, Seoul's assistance is a growing and positive indication of a gradual strategic alignment to manage and deal with nontraditional security challenges. America should therefore encourage South Korea to make use of its increased global presence and take a larger leadership role in such efforts. South Korea's existing work to expand its global reach suggests three key areas that could be usefully incorporated into a new softpower vision for the U.S.ROK alliance: development assistance, trade agreements, and civil society partnerships. Korea Neg 211/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors A2: NORTH EAST ASIAN PROLIF IS STABLE Northeast Asia poses unique prolif risks which go global multiple reasons. Moltz, 06[James Clay, Deputy director and research professor at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, and associate Professor on the National Security Affairs faculty of the Naval Postgraduate School, Nov, "FUTURE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION SCENARIOS IN NORTHEAST ASIA," The Nonproliferation Review 13.3, Informaworld] Over the next 10 years, Northeast Asia could become one of the most volatile regions of the world when it comes to nuclear weapons. Compared to other areas, it has a higher percentage of states with not only the capability to develop nuclear weapons quickly, but also the potential motivation .1 With the exception of Mongolia, all the countries in the region-- Russia, China, North Korea, South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan--already have civilian nuclear power infrastructures. They also have experience with nuclear weapons. Northeast Asia has two established nuclear weapon states--Russia and China--and North Korea is a presumed nuclear power. Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are considered "threshold" states--all have had nuclear weapons development programs and could resume them in the future. Adding potential volatility to the mix, Northeast Asia suffers from underlying political and security fault lines: the legacy of the Cold War on the Korean Peninsula; enduring Korean and Chinese enmity over Japanese atrocities committed before and during World War II; RussoJapanese disputes over the Kuril Islands; and the tensions created by China's growing effort to rein Taiwan into its governance. For these and other reasons, regional security institutions in Northeast Asia are weak and tend to be based around bilateral commitments (SinoNorth Korean, U.S. Japanese, U.S.South Korean, and U.S.Taiwanese). The nuclear character of Northeast Asia is further defined by the fact that the United States used nuclear weapons twice against Japan in August 1945 and eventually stationed 3,200 nuclear weapons in South Korea, Guam, the Philippines, Taiwan, and the formerly U.S.held islands of Chichi Jima, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa.2 Major and minor wars involving regional powers were fought in the years from 1945 to 1991: the Chinese Civil War, the Taiwan Strait crisis, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, border skirmishes between China and the Soviet Union, and the 1979 SinoVietnamese War. Given this violent history, it is remarkable that further nuclear proliferation did not occur. The role of U.S. security guarantees with Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan clearly played a major role in this sometimes lessthanwilling restraint. In recent years, however, there has been a gradual erosion of political support for U.S. forces in both South Korea and Japan. North Korea's withdrawal from the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 2003 also has caused both states to reevaluate their decisions to halt nuclear weapons programs. Moreover, the views of some top officials in the George W. Bush administration regarding the acceptability of nuclear weapons may be eroding national restraint and increasing the willingness of countries to go the final step, using their nuclear capabilities to make up for any conventional defense gaps. This essay examines potential nuclear proliferation trends among the states of Northeast Asia to 2016 from the context of early postCold War predictions, current capabilities, and possible future "trigger" events. It offers the if left unattended, existing political and security tensions could cause Northeast Asia to become the world's most unfortunate conclusion that several realistic scenarios could stimulate horizontal or vertical nuclear proliferation .3 Indeed, nuclearized area by 2016, with six nuclear weapon states. Such a scenario would greatly exacerbate U.S. security challenges and probably spark nuclear proliferation elsewhere in the world. Korea Neg 212/436 ROK ALLIANCE KEY TO UNIFICATION Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors Strong alliance with the US is key to stability during Korean unification MITCHELL 2003 (Derek J. Mitchell is a senior fellow in the International Security Program at CSIS, "A Blueprint for U.S. Policy toward a Unified Korea," Washington Quarterly, 26:1) Calum Arguably, Korea's interest will continue to lie in the retention of its alliance with the United States following unification. Despite some frictions, the alliance has served to help preserve Korea's essential freedom of action and to facilitate its historic political and economic development over many decades. Maintaining an alliance with the United States will also help preserve the U.S.led, alliancebased security structure in East Asia that has served as a stabilizing force in the region, hedged against the rise of an aggressive regional power, and protected Korea from becoming the political if not military battleground upon which the major Asian powers have historically sought regional advantage. Indeed, a unified Korea will need the stability and reassurance engendered by its alliance with the United States more than ever during the many years of transition following unification, particularly under collapse or war scenarios. ^^^DETERRENCE Korea Neg 213/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors U.S. forces in Korea are key to deterrence and the war on terror Colonel Stevens, 06 (3/15/06, Colonel Wayne Stevens, "Is U.S. Forces Korea Still Needed on the Korean Peninsula?" http://www.dtic.mil/cgi bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA448328&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf, JMP) If war breaks out on the peninsula, the ROK will most likely require considerably more than 34,000 U.S. troops to assist.87 The need for U.S. 2NC IMPACT TERRORISM forces within Northeast Asia capable of rapidly deploying from within the region instead of from the U.S. will enhance the ROK's ability to stop DPRK's aggression quickly. The joint and flexible capabilities of the U.S. forces such as air superiority, precision guided missiles, and BCTs that are more capable of independent action and more responsive to regional combatant commanders can give the ROK forces a distinctive edge during combat operations and ensure the U.S. strategic focus of maintaining stability within the region.88 Some have argued for removing or reducing the U.S. forces on the peninsula because DPRK's nuclear capability negates the need for U.S. conventional forces in the South.89 Despite the lack of conclusive proof that North Korea actually has nuclear weapons; the DPRK may find it harder to prove that they do not have nuclear weapons. North Korea already admitted that they are conducting a nuclear weapons program and the North has extracted spent fuel and reprocessed the fuel into weaponsgrade plutonium.90 Although the nuclear argument may have some validity, a major U.S. concern is the need to have forward deployed basing to allow U.S. forces to project its military power. The forces in the ROK provide the U.S. with the capability to continue its deterrence mission and also to fight the Global War on Terror (GWOT) on foreign soil before it reaches the U.S.91 Retaliation causes nuclear war Corsi, 5 PhD in political science from Harvard. (Jerome, excerpt from Atomic Iran, http://911review.org/Wget/worldnetdaily.com/NYC_hit_by_terrorist_nuke.html) The combination of horror and outrage will that surge upon the nation will demand that the president retaliate for the incomprehensible damage done by the attack. The problem will be that the president will not immediately know how to respond or against whom. The perpetrators will have been incinerated by the explosion that destroyed New York City. Unlike 911, there will have been no interval during the attack when those hijacked could make phone calls to loved radioactive rubble. Still, the president, members of Congress, the military, and the public at large will suspect another attack by our known enemy Islamic terrorists. ones telling them before they died that the hijackers were radical Islamic extremists. There will be no such phone calls when the attack will not have been anticipated until the instant the terrorists detonate their improvised nuclear device inside the truck parked on a curb at the Empire State Building. Nor will there be any possibility of finding any clues, which either were vaporized instantly or are now lying physically inaccessible under tons of The first impulse will be to launch a nuclear strike on Mecca, to destroy the whole religion of Islam. Medina could possibly be added to the target list just to make the point with crystal clarity. Yet what would we gain? The moment Mecca and Medina were wiped off the map, the Islamic world more than 1 billion human beings in countless different nations would feel attacked. Nothing would emerge intact after a war between United States Islam. the and The apocalypse would be upon us. Then, too, we would face an immediate threat from our longterm enemy, the former Soviet Union. Many in the Kremlin would see this as an opportunity to grasp the victory that had been snatched from them by Ronald Reagan when the Berlin Wall came down. A missile strike by the Russians on a score of American cities could possibly be preemptive. Would the U.S. strategic defense system be so in shock that immediate retaliation would not be possible? Hardliners in Moscow might argue that there was never a better opportunity to destroy America . In China, our newer Communist enemies might not care if we could retaliate. With a population already over 1.3 billion people and with their population not concentrated in a few major cities, the Chinese might calculate to initiate a nuclear blow on the United States. What if the United States retaliated with a nuclear counterattack upon China? The Chinese might be able to absorb the blow and recover. The North Koreans might calculate even more recklessly. Why not launch upon America the few missiles they have that could reach our soil? More confusion and chaos might only advance their position. If Russia, China, and the United States could be drawn into attacking one another, North Korea might emerge stronger just because it was overlooked while the great nations focus on attacking one another. Korea Neg 214/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors Korea Neg 215/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors Korea Neg 216/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors UNIQUENESS OPCON DELAY The delay of the OPCON transfer reflects strong USROK relations. Arirang, 6/28 (6/28/10, Arirang, Korea's Global TV, "US Expert: "Delay of OPCON Transfer Reflects ROKUS Alliance at Its Peak," http://www.arirang.co.kr/News/News_View.asp? nseq=104403&code=Ne2&category=2) DH An American expert on the Korean peninsula evaluated the latest agreement to delay the wartime operational control to 2015 as a rational decision made based on mutual trust between South Korea and the United States. Bruce Bechtol a professor of International Relations at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College told Seoul's Yonhap News Agency that the agreement was made possible largely due to the strong alliance between the two states after President Lee Myungbak took office. While stressing that the postponement of the OPCON transfer reflects the strongerthanever ROKUS alliance Bechtol said the South Korean government should boost its defense expenditures and military reform programs to expand the country's military readiness. OPCON SPECIFIC Korea Neg 217/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors LINK OPCON PART OF USFK OPCON command is held by USFK the plan would eliminate this. JiHyun, 10 (6/30/10, Kim JiHyun, The Korea Herald, "OPCON delay expected to apply pressure on North," http://www.koreaherald.com/national/Detail.jsp?newsMLId=20100630000853) DH The South Korean military is solely responsible for defending the country in times of peace, but the allied military would take over during war. The U.S. commander of the Combined Forces Command who concurrently is the commander of the U.S. Forces Korea would be chief of military operations under such circumstances. Critics here have issued steady calls for a deferral of the transfer, citing the less than reconciliatory interKorean relations and North Korea's relentless attempts at provocations. Korea Neg 218/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors OPCON GOOD DETERRENCE OPCON deters North Korean aggression and reassures the ROK Hwang, 10 (3/25/10, Jin Ha Hwang, Assemblyman, National Assembly, the Republic of Korea, Symposium on OpCon Transfer and its Implications for the U.S.ROK Alliance, Center for U.S.Korea Policy, "Should We Continue the Planned ROKUS OPCON Transfer?" asiafoundation.org/ resources/pdfs/HwangKeynote100325.pdf) DH Second, there is a strong concern that the planned OPCON transfer would be likely to weaken ROKUS combined deterrence capability and signaling a wrong message to North Korea. The top strategic priority of the ROKUS alliance is to prevent a crisis and so maintaining peace and prosperity, and increase a mutual national interest. But, it is widely understood that OPCON transfer significantly weakens ROKUS combined deterrence capability. Needless to say, repelling an invasion of North Korea is a critical mission, but deterrence should be a more important strategic goal. The ROK military is capable of countering North Korea's conventional invasion, but it is still questionable how well it could respond to North Korea's diverse and unconventional military capability including weapons of mass destruction. I would like to stress that it is imperative to unify ROKUS command structure for maintaining the strategic effectiveness of combined deterrence and warfighting capability under the condition that the ROK military alone is not able to secure deterrence capability against North Korea. It is a common understanding that dissolving a unity of combined command structure would be likely to weaken the readiness posture of U.S. forces in Korea. Accordingly, it is not the right time to discuss the disbandment of combined deterrence capability while the two nations are required to strengthen for North Korea's conventional military threats, and now including its unconventional and asymmetric threats posed by weapons of mass destruction. In addition, maintaining capable deterrence posture alleviates the Korean people's concerns. OPCON transfer kills deterrence of the DPRK. Bechtol, 10 (4/22/10, Bruce E. Bechtol Jr., professor of international relations at the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, The Korea Times, "Fallacies about Wartime OPCON," http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2010/06/160_64658.html) DH Fallacy Three: The new structure will work just as well as the present structure. The current structure that has proven to work so effectively since its inception will be replaced by two separate structures that will work together in a much different manner. Much of what is simply combined operations and planning today is projected to become coordination via boards, bureaus, coordination centers and cells. Unity of command will vanish and the battlefield environment will become more complicated. Fallacy Four: Failure to implement wartime OPCON by 2012 will send the wrong message to the North Koreans. In fact, just the opposite is true. The North Koreans can interpret and in fact are likely to interpret that a divided command signals a lessening of the U.S. defense commitment to South Korea. In addition, the vulnerabilities created by a change in wartime OPCON before ROK forces have needed capabilities presents less, not more of a deterrent to North Korea. Korea Neg 219/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors OPCON GOOD DETERRENCE OPCON transfer would send the wrong signal to the DPRK and destroy the US deterrent effect on the peninsula. Forgach, 10 (3/3/10, Leslie Forgach, research assistant at the American Enterprise Institute, American Enterprise Institute, Center for Defense Studies, "USROK OPCON Transfer Should Wait," http://www.defensestudies.org/?p=1824) DH South Korea has sounded the alarm again over the plan to disband the U.S.ROK Combined Forces Command and transfer of wartime operational control of ROK forces to South Korea by 2012. Defense Minister Kim Tae young came out for the second time last week and said: "I hope that the U.S.led defense scheme will remain further, given the North Korean nuclear and missile threat." While he was careful to appeal to the core U.S. security concerns on the peninsula (nuclear and missile threats), what should really make both countries think twice about a premature transfer is the mounting instability within North Korea and the asymmetric landbased threat the country poses. The timing of the transfer couldn't be worse, as North Korea ramps up for 2012, the year that marks the 100th birthday of Kim Il Sung (the country's founding father and "Great Leader"), as well as the year Pyongyang projected it would become a "strong and powerful nation" -- a projection the regime could seek to manifest in shows of force. Growing domestic instability, as seen in unprecedented public protests and a hike in hunger related deaths, along with a looming succession crisis, will also make the next three years a particularly bad time to experiment with a hasty reconfiguration of South Korea's command and control, potentially putting allied contingency operations at stake. Three years is also not enough time for the South Koreans to fill the existing gaps in their defense capabilities (in terms of missile defense, command and control systems, critical logistical capabilities, etc.), especially with a shrinking defense budget. The United States' initial rationale for the transfer is also increasingly being called into question (see here and here). And the decision to go ahead with the transfer despite South Korea's protests, and despite the increasing instability across the DMZ, only further reveals that our view of the North Korean threat is dangerously myopic. We tend to solely focus on the nuclear threat and not the asymmetric challenges that the country presents, such as Pyongyang's long range artillery deployed along the DMZ or their surprisingly formidable special operations forces -- the largest in the world, at (reportedly) one million strong. The damage North Korea could do on the ground is unimaginable, as they like to remind us. The maintenance of a unified command -- one timetested over 30plus years -- is an assurance that the allies will be ready on the ground if conflict arises. OPCON transfer sends the wrong signal to the North and kills US extended deterrence. Nalwa, 10 (6/7/10, Preeti Nalwa, Institute of for Defense Studies and Analysis, "The "Cheonan" Fallout: Erosion of Confidence," http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/TheCheonanFalloutErosion ofConfidence_pnalwa_070610) DH However, sceptics both in the U.S. and South Korea had looked upon the agreement with strong concern believing that the planned OPCON transfer would weaken ROKUS combined deterrence capability and would send a wrong signal to North Korea. According to them, the critical question was whether South Korea would be able to respond to North Korea's unconventional military capability including weapons of mass destruction. To North Korea, ROKUS OPCON transfer would also indicate strategic weakness in command and control operations between the two nations. Critics argue that the requirement of seamless commandandcontrol systems between the military leaders from both countries would be seriously affected under the strained battle conditions. A resolution opposing OPCON transfer before resolving North Korea's nuclear problem was also adopted at the Defence Committee of National Assembly on December 22, 2006. Korea Neg 220/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors OPCON GOOD DETERRENCE OPCON transfer weakens US extended deterrence and destroys the nuclear umbrella in Korea. Kim, 10 (5/10, HyunWook Kim, Professor at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS) in South Korea, The Asia Foundation's Center for U.S.Korea Policy, "Nuclear Posture Review and Its Implications on the Korean Peninsula," http://www.nautilus.org/ publications/essays/napsnet/policyforumsonline/security20092010/10028Kim.html) DH The NPR states that U.S. nuclear weapons may still play a role in deterring a conventional or CBW attack against the U.S. or its allies, which implies the possibility of a U.S. preemptive strike against North Korea. This clearly illustrates the Obama government's rejection of the No First Use policy, which is an irritant to the North. In order to persuade Pyongyang to return to the sixparty process, the U.S. should pose its policies more flexibly, even though its strategies should consistently emphasize dialogue and sanctions. Also, the NPR states that the United States will use nuclear weapons only to protect the vital interests of the U.S. or its allies, but it is not clear what those vital interests are. It is essential for Washington to clearly specify those interests to maintain a favorable position in negotiating with North Korea. Second, the 2010 NPR indicates that although a U.S. "nuclear umbrella" is provided by a combination of the strategic forces of the U.S. Triad, nonstrategic nuclear weapons deployed forward in key regions, and U.S. based nuclear weapons, many of these weapons were removed at the end of the Cold War. Instead, the U.S. has developed missile defense (MD), counterweapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities, conventional power projection capabilities, and integrated command and control as its main tools for enhancing regional security. While continuing to maintain nuclear deterrence, the United States seeks to strengthen its regional deterrence capability through MD or conventional longrange missiles. Such a possibility raises the concern that U.S. deterrence capability achieved with nuclear weapons could be weakened, including U.S. extended deterrence capabilities provided to South Korea. South Korean concerns over U.S. extended deterrence pertain to the planned transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) scheduled for 2012. The possible weakening of U.S. nuclear extended deterrence as suggested in the NPR could mean a decline in U.S. defense support to South Korea, and in turn a weaker defense capability of the ROK visvis North Korea. Furthermore, the uncertain number of U.S. forces on the Korean peninsula associated with strategic flexibility of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) would signal a weakening of defense capability to the Korean people. Concerning MD, South Korea is currently developing Korea Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) and is not participating in the U.S.centered MD system. South Korea considers that joining the U.S. MD system might provoke North Korea and worsen South Korea's relationship with China. Japan, on the other hand, is partially included in the U.S. MD system. Such a situation leaves open the logical possibility that U.S. troops stationed in Japan might be more effective in deterring North Korea than the U.S.ROK alliance. It is important for both the U.S. and South Korea to develop a concrete plan for extended deterrence. The U.S. clearly stated in the 2010 NPR its commitment to provide "a credible extended deterrence posture and capabilities" not only through nuclear weapons but also through conventional military forces and MD. A tailored deterrence capability should be established between the U.S. and Korea, a process through which both sides could ascertain that the new extended deterrence does not imply a weakening U.S. nuclear umbrella but a new strategy for more efficient deterrence. One important part of this strategy would be to establish an integrated operation system by strengthening interoperability between KAMD and the U.S. MD system. Tailored extended deterrence should be established separately for Korea and Japan, covering not only nuclear elements but also diverse military, economic, political and legal elements that would produce more comprehensive extended deterrence measures. Korea Neg 221/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors OPCON GOOD PRESSURE DPRK The OPCON transfer delay will pressure North Korea in light of the Cheonan incident. JiHyun, 10 (6/30/10, Kim JiHyun, The Korea Herald, "OPCON delay expected to apply pressure on North," http://www.koreaherald.com/national/Detail.jsp?newsMLId=20100630000853) DH South Korea and the U.S. last week announced that they have agreed to delay the transfer of wartime operation at control by more than three years to 2015. The decision comes months after the government denied the existence of related discussions. The move also follows mounting concerns here about North Korean military provocations in the wake of the sinking of the Cheonan in March. A fivenation investigation team led by Seoul has concluded that Pyongyang was culpable for sinking the 1,200 ton Navy corvette, an incident that took the lives of 46 sailors on board the ship. North Korea denies any involvement. Shortly following the announcement of the delay, Pyongyang said it would bolster its nuclear arsenal in a "newly developed way." The reclusive regime said the measures were necessary to counter "hostile U.S. policies and military threats." Many noted that it was obvious that the decision to delay the transfer of wartime operational control also called OPCON was meant to send a signal to the reclusive regime for its latest provocative actions involving the Cheonan. "The decision definitely reflects pressure that Washington may have wanted to apply to North Korea," said Kim Sunghan, a professor at Korea University Graduate School of International Studies. Seoul and Washington, under the current administrations, had clearly stated that incentives would be given for the North to forfeit its nuclear weapons programs. They also indicated that pressure would follow if Pyongyang continued to pursue nuclear arms. OPCON delay will pressure North Korea. JiHyun, 10 (6/30/10, Kim JiHyun, The Korea Herald, "OPCON delay expected to apply pressure on North," http://www.koreaherald.com/national/Detail.jsp?newsMLId=20100630000853) DH Ceaseless brinkmanship from the North appears to have accentuated the need for the delay. Explaining the backdrop of the OPCON situation, the president`s top aide on security matters said Seoul and Washington reached a consensus on the need for more time for the OPCON transition after North Korea conducted longrange missile and nuclear tests last year. Foreign Minister Yu Myunghwan on June 24 also said the allies saw the need for an adjustment in the OPCON transfer following Pyongyang's second nuclear test. "Changes in the way (the allies) perceived the situation began to change following the second nuclear test by North Korea," Yu said. After a denouncement from the U.N. Security Council for its rocket launch the same year, the North said it would "permanently" quit the stalled sixway talks aimed at ending its nuclear development. Late president Roh Moohyun was the architect of the 2012 transfer of the military control. The liberalminded leader at the time told the public that it was time that the South Korean military attained more selfreliance. He more or less requested the transfer, and Washington had no reason to deny the demand as that meant less of a burden on its shoulders in its operations on the Korean Peninsula, those close to the matter said. Korea Neg 222/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors OPCON GOOD ROK MILITARY COLLAPSE OPCON transfer would produce the kind of uncoordinated command that doomed the Iranian hostage rescue effort destroy ROK readiness. O'Hanlon, 10 (4/30/10, Michael E. O'Hanlon, Director of Research and Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, The Brookings Institution, "OpCon Transfer or OpCon Confusion: Making the Best of a Dubious Idea," http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0430_korea_ohanlon.aspx) DH As a longstanding student of military operations and a student of Korean matters as well, I would like to argue against the idea of the socalled OpCon Transfer, as now planned by Seoul and Washington for 2012. The article is fairly brief; I will make seven specific points rather than offer a comprehensive assessment. Let me begin by simply reminding those who may have forgotten much of the genesis in the modern America debate, at least, about why we believe in unity of command. There are a number of case studies and a number of important military arguments, but for me, it comes down to something that happened thirty years ago this spring, which was the failure of the Iran hostage rescue effort. Now, in one sense, perhaps this is not a perfect analogy because much of the problem with the Iran hostage rescue attempt was the lack of proper planning and training. We had a combination of multiple services, but to some extent the metaphor, the image is army Special Forces flying Air Force helicopters out of operating off navy ships and all done without a regional command structure because this predated the 1986 Goldwater Nichols reforms. It helped motivate those reforms in fact. And that was part of what was ultimately seen as the problem, that we didn't have people that were really in the business of routinely operating together and there was not a clarity about accountability or command. OPCON transfer kills readiness O'Hanlon, 10 (4/30/10, Michael E. O'Hanlon, Director of Research and Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, The Brookings Institution, "OpCon Transfer or OpCon Confusion: Making the Best of a Dubious Idea," http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0430_korea_ohanlon.aspx) DH Two more points. I think the right approach is not just to delay, but to abolish the plan of OpCon transfer. In fact it's not really OpCon transfer; though we use that term, in fact it's OpCon division, it's the creation of OpCon confusion. And with a lot of good people trying to minimize that, we're still going from unity of command to duality of command. That's what OpCon transfer is. So, in some sense, the term itself is oxymoronic for the reasons I've been trying to argue. And therefore, I think it's a bad idea. I think the right way to think about this is to preserve unity of command and think about the date when we can start potentially taking turns in charge. Even today, we already have political sharing of responsibility which is the most important way for the alliance to make sure it's equitable for the sovereign prerogatives of both sides, U.S. and ROK. Regarding military command, I would rather wait whatever number of years is deemed appropriate before we are in the position where American forces could be under the theater wide control of an ROK commander. Then we can perhaps alternate every two to three years. Until that point, with apologies and with respect to Korean colleagues, until we're at that point, I think the top military command should remain exclusively in American hands. And the reasons are that despite the fact that I would consider the ROK military to be definitely one of the ten best on the planet and may be even one of the top five, the U.S. armed forces are still somewhat better and more experienced. The United States is still spending half a trillion of dollars a year on its core defense establishment, which means that the amount we're spending each year, preparing that part of the force structure, which would deploy to the Korean peninsula and environs in a war, is at least 100 billion dollars a year. Because we would deploy 300,000 to 600,000 American forces depending on how you think about it, on what scenario you envision. The equivalent peacetime cost of that much American force structure is between 100 and 200 billion dollars a year in raw numbers. I don't need to say this is all about money, but I'm giving you one crude metric to underscore the point that as much as the ROK military has come a long way is a very impressive organization, the United States still spends so much more and has invested so much more over the years that I think frankly, American power would be still the somewhat stronger part of the overall alliance. Korea Neg 223/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors Korea Neg 224/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors OPCON GOOD LOOSE NUKES Even if the North doesn't attack, securing loose nuclear weapons in the event of a collapse will require a unified command. O'Hanlon, 10 (4/30/10, Michael E. O'Hanlon, Director of Research and Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, The Brookings Institution, "OpCon Transfer or OpCon Confusion: Making the Best of a Dubious Idea," http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0430_korea_ohanlon.aspx) DH Fifth point, some people may say, "Well all these concerns may be theoretically appropriate or valid but come on, it's Korea in 2010. They will say that the North Koreans are not going to be so silly as to fight and this is, therefore, not really a great concern and the only scenario that really is a concern is a North Korean collapse. So, let's not get too hung up on these kinds of, you know, somewhat outdated military arguments. And if it's a collapse scenario, there should be a peacekeeping mission and therefore a lot of this detailed warplanning is less crucial. Well, my response to that hypothetical argument is: don't forget, even if that's true, even if a collapse scenario becomes our number one concern, this would be collapse in a country with 8 or 10 nuclear weapons. And any resulting mission is going to have to make the securing of those 8 or 10 nuclear weapons its top priority, along with the protection of Seoul from any kind of renegade or partial or occasional firing of North Korean artillery and missiles from any individual North Korean commanders who may decide to use this period of chaos to settle scores or to carry out actions that they have planned for in a different kind of scenario. And so those would be the main military concerns, which means that trying to deploy special forces very quickly around North Korea, trying to target and eliminate artillery and ballistic missile launchers through a complex air and ground operation. Trying to secure North Korea's border, not just in some general, generic sense, but with specific tactical intelligence obtained within North Korea to give us a sense of where the nuclear weapons may be headed if they are on the move. These things are all going to be top priorities, even in a collapse scenario. And in fact they are not just top priorities, in some generic sterile sense, I'm understating the significance here. We are talking about nuclear weapons potentially on the loose. With who knows, what buyers, what destination in mind. There would not have been a more serious threat to American or Korean national security in a long time. In fact, arguably this would be a greater direct threat to the United States than the Korean War itself had been in 1950 to 1953. Because the possibility of nuclear weapons getting out there on the black market is a great threat to American cities, and obviously to Korean cities as well. So, this is going to be a lot more than a Balkansstyle peacekeeping mission or even something resembling the stabilization mission in Afghanistan's. It's going to be a fight for national survival for the ROK and the United States with the potential for these 8 or 10 nuclear weapons to be the most dire direct threat to our security since World War II. And, I don't think I'm being melodramatic, I think this is factual and an accurate assessment of the kind of risks that we would be facing if indeed North Korea began to collapse. And therefore, integrated operations that involve special forces, air power, tactical intelligence and many other assets would be of crucial significance. This is not going to be just a bigger version of a peacekeeping mission, if it happens. 50/29 scenarios may seem more benign to some people than 50/27 scenarios. They don't seem more benign to me, in terms of what is at stake. And I think for those missions, we still have to integrate a lot of different kinds of capabilities and there is not a clear distinction between ground and air and naval operations, or between conventional and special forces, or between ROK roles and U.S. roles. Korea Neg 225/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors OPCON GOOD LOOSE NUKES Loose nukes cause nuclear terrorism. Grier, 10 (4/13/10, Peter Grier, Christian Science Moniter, "Nuclear summit: How much 'loose nukes' material is out there?" http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/ForeignPolicy/2010/0413/NuclearsummitHow muchloosenukesmaterialisoutthere) DH Why is President Obama's nuclear summit focused on controlling fissile materials? It's simple: Obtaining enough plutonium or highly enriched uranium is the most important step toward getting a nuclear weapon. It's possible that Al Qaeda or some other terrorist group could steal or buy readymade nukes, of course. But the world's warheads are relatively secure and accounted for, according to Robert Gallucci, a former US ambassadoratlarge for nonproliferation issues. The stockpiles of fissile materials sprinkled around the globe are another matter. "I think the chances of Al Qaeda acquiring fissile material and making its own improvised nuclear device are greater than the chances it will get an alreadyfabricated weapon and detonate that," said Mr. Galluci, now president of the MacArthur Foundation, in a Monday speech. Mr. Obama's summit already has produced some agreements intended to help corral the world's "loose nuke" problem. On Monday, Ukraine, Canada, and Malaysia all agreed to either reduce or tighten controls on their stores of highly enriched uranium. On Tuesday, Mexico made a similar commitment. Global nuclear war Corsi, 5 PhD in political science from Harvard. (Jerome, excerpt from Atomic Iran, http://911review.org/Wget/worldnetdaily.com/NYC_hit_by_terrorist_nuke.html) The combination of horror and outrage that will surge upon the nation will demand that the president retaliate for the incomprehensible damage done by the attack. The problem will be that the president will not immediately know how to respond or against whom. The perpetrators will have been incinerated by the explosion that destroyed New York City. Unlike 911, there will have been no interval during the attack when those hijacked could make phone calls to loved ones telling them before they died that the hijackers were radical Islamic extremists. There will be no such phone calls when the attack will not have been anticipated until the instant the terrorists detonate their improvised nuclear device inside the truck parked on a curb at the Empire State Building. Nor will there be any possibility of finding any clues, which either were vaporized instantly or are now lying physically inaccessible under tons of radioactive rubble. Still, the president, members of Congress, the military, and the public at large will suspect another attack by our known enemy Islamic terrorists. The first impulse will be to launch a nuclear strike on Mecca, to destroy the whole religion of Islam. Medina could possibly be added to the target list just to make the point with crystal clarity. Yet what would we gain? The moment Mecca and Medina were wiped off the map, the Islamic world more than 1 billion human beings in countless different nations would feel attacked. Nothing would emerge intact after a war between the United States and Islam. The apocalypse would be upon us. Then, too, we would face an immediate threat from our longterm enemy, the former Soviet Union. Many in the Kremlin would see this as an opportunity to grasp the victory that had been snatched from them by Ronald Reagan when the Berlin Wall came down. A missile strike by the Russians on a score of American cities could possibly be preemptive. Would the U.S. strategic defense system be so in shock that immediate retaliation would not be possible? Hardliners in Moscow might argue that there was never a better opportunity to destroy America. In China, our newer Communist enemies might not care if we could retaliate. With a population already over 1.3 billion people and with their population not concentrated in a few major cities, the Chinese might calculate to initiate a nuclear blow on the United States. What if the United States retaliated with a nuclear counterattack upon China? The Chinese might be able to absorb the blow and recover. The North Koreans might calculate even more recklessly. Why not launch upon America the few missiles they have that could reach our soil? More confusion and chaos might only advance their position. If Russia, China, and the United States could be drawn into attacking one another, North Korea might emerge stronger just because it was overlooked while the great nations focus on attacking one another. Korea Neg 226/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors A2: OPCON TRANSFER GOOD OPCON transfer hurts US strategic flexibility and kills the perception of a US security commitment to the ROK. Hwang, 10 (3/25/10, Jin Ha Hwang, Assemblyman, National Assembly, the Republic of Korea, Symposium on OpCon Transfer and its Implications for the U.S.ROK Alliance, Center for U.S.Korea Policy, "Should We Continue the Planned ROKUS OPCON Transfer?" asiafoundation.org/ resources/pdfs/HwangKeynote100325.pdf) DH The U.S. government was first surprised by the ROK government's strong request for opening negotiations about OPCON transfer. Also, the U.S. administration was concerned that linking national pride and OPCON transfer by the ROK government might cause antiAmerican movements in Korea like that the United States experienced after two middleschool girls' death by an U.S. military armored vehicle. For this reason, the Bush administration began negotiations with the ROK government by relating the transfer to its Global Posture Review (GPR) developed since 2002 and a new concept of Strategic Flexibility of U.S. forces abroad. In other words, the U.S. government concluded that the strategic flexibility of U.S. forces in Korea is seriously constrained because the Korean people strongly oppose the movement of U.S. troops in Korea outside the Korean Peninsula under a situation that CFC exists and its American fourstar commander holds a wartime operational control. Thus, the U.S. government accepted Korea's demand for transferring OPCON in a bid to increase the strategic flexibility of U.S. Forces in Korea. Namely, as the ROK government requested the transfer to purse its own national interests, the United States took this opportunity to pursue its own strategic interests. In the process of making a decision about disbanding CFC and OPCON transition, the U.S. government was relatively free of domestic political burden because Americans believe that the station of U.S. forces in Korea would be enough to conduct its commitment to defend the Republic of Korea. I must stress that the U.S. government held two critical misunderstandings when deciding OPCON transfer. The first misperception is that the ROK government unconditionally opposes a dispatch of U.S. forces into other parts of the world. The ROK and the United States reached a mutual agreement about the relocation of USFK into other regions when required by U.S. global demand with preparing a strategic alternative in advance. In some cases, the ROK government sent its military troops instead of USFK. The other misperception is that maintaining U.S. troops in Korea is enough to fulfill the U.S. commitment to defend the Republic of Korea and emphasizing strategic flexibility of U.S. forces. It seems that this approach stimulates the Koreans' perception that the United States might change its strategic view of Korea as a forward base for its military operations, no longer complete commitment for defending Korea. Despite opposition from the National Assembly and the Korean people, the former ROK administration kept its campaign promise. And, as the U.S. government agreed to the ROK's request, the two governments finalized negotiation about OPCON transfer. The ROK defense minister Kim, JangSoo and the U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates agreed to a future command structure at the 38th Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) in 2006, and then announced in February 2007 a plan of disbanding the CFC and transferring OPCON to the ROK by April of 2012. In summary, I would like to point out that the two nations agreed upon OPCON transfer without basing the decision on common alliance objectives, but instead to pursue their own national interests based on their strategic misunderstandings. It was as if two trains bound for different final destinations met accidently at an unscheduled station and then continued on to their original destinations. Korea Neg 227/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors A2: PLANNING SOLVES Planning can't solve there are still too many problems. O'Hanlon, 10 (4/30/10, Michael E. O'Hanlon, Director of Research and Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, The Brookings Institution, "OpCon Transfer or OpCon Confusion: Making the Best of a Dubious Idea," http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0430_korea_ohanlon.aspx) DH The notion that you can somehow cleanly delineate one subtheater from another, so that Koreans could be in charge primarily of land operations and Americans of air and naval for example. It is a bit misleading given the range and lethality and speed of modern weapons. It is not as if we are going to only use naval weapons at sea and only use air weapons in the air and use only ground weapons on the ground. It's not the way modern combat occurs. A third point responds to points made to me by an unnamed American friend based in the U.S. military command in Korea. He wrote me to defend the concept of the new command. One of the points he made is that we do in fact under this new plan have some simplicity of command. We do have certain regions of the battle field that the U.S. is supposed to be in charge of and certain parts of the battle field where the ROK would be in charge. Well, I've already begun to address this in my earlier comment, but it's, I admire the efforts of the colonel and others trying to make lemonade out of lemons. And I have no doubt that we are better served by American and Korean military professionals who are trying to make this work. But it doesn't make it a good idea. The fact that a lot of these problems are being addressed and partially solved does not make the overall genesis of the notion a good one. So, we can admire the commitment of individual military personnel in particular who are trying to make the best of this situation. It doesn't mean, however, that just because a number of problems have been patched up that we should remain committed to it. In the end, I think that at its core is probably not a prudent idea. A fourth point is my response to the American officer who recently defended the Opcon Transfer plan on the grounds that, with all the preparations we are doing now, the plan will anticipate and resolve the various issues that might arise in wartime due to the complexities and discontinuities of the new command structure. That makes Korea different from, for example, the 1980 hostage rescue incident. And because of that, even if there are some imperfections in the concept and logic of this, this officer argued that we will be Ok in the end. Well my response to that is very simple and is the old military adage, that no plans survive contact with the enemy. I don't care how many people have thought about 50/27 and how many people have thought about 50/29 (and there have been a lot of great people working on both over the years), the plan is going to have to be modified in real time if and when we ever employ forces in wartime. I think that is such an obvious point that I'm not even going to burden you with further details of the argument. We can come back to it in discussion if you doubt me, but by way of motivation I will make one observation, which is, and I don't think that we'd ever do it this badly in the U.S.ROK alliance, but look how much trouble we have with the Iraq war plan. And to some extent, this was because of a pretty good plan that had been developed by General Zinni and others over the years was discarded by General Franks and Secretary Rumsfeld and phase four was essentially ignored. Then things happened that we did not anticipate, and we almost "lost" the war after we had "won" it. I don't mean to revisit the entire Iraq war plan, but in terms of the specifics, let's not ever pretend that we could know what war is going to look like in advance. Because no plan is going to survive contact with the enemy, we need adaptability. We are going to have to make decisions in real time. Korea Neg 228/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors A2: ROK MILITARY SOLVES The ROK military is incapable of independent command lacks necessary experience with high tech communications, intelligence, and amphibious combat operations. Bechtol, 10 (4/22/10, Bruce E. Bechtol Jr., professor of international relations at the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, The Korea Times, "Fallacies about Wartime OPCON," http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2010/06/160_64658.html) DH Fallacy Six: The ROK military will have the capabilities to deal with the disestablishment of the CFC by 2012. This is completely untrue. South Korea will not have the C4I (command, control, communications, computers and intelligence) capabilities, the counterbattery artillery capabilities, the counterSOF (special operations forces) capabilities nor the air interdiction, close airsupport and air transport capabilities. The ROK Marine Corps and Navy do not have the capability nor are they likely to in the foreseeable future for largescale amphibious operations in terms of logistics efforts, air support, C4I, naval gunnery support,and amphibious lift. In short, they are incapable of taking the lead in amphibious operations one of the key efforts in any counter attack against North Korea. These are just a few key areas that would affect the warfight but there are many more. Korea Neg 229/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors A2: BRIDGING SOLVES US bridging capabilities can't solve the need for OPCON. Bechtol, 10 (4/22/10, Bruce E. Bechtol Jr., professor of international relations at the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, The Korea Times, "Fallacies about Wartime OPCON," http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2010/06/160_64658.html) DH Fallacy Seven: Bridging capabilities provided by the U.S. will fill all of the gaps from a lack of capabilities the ROK military will have in 2012 and thus there will be no vulnerabilities in defense or deterrence. Again this is untrue, as the projected military infrastructure essentially replaces a system that works very well with a system that continues to undergo major adjustments as time progresses and that is much more ad hoc. Just in the past year, announced changes to the projected structure of the new commands include combining air operations after 2012, with all ROK air forces under U.S. command, combining amphibious operations under U.S. command and combining taking control of North Korean weapons of mass destruction (WMD) under U.S. command. In short, the changes that have been made by necessity essentially create several miniCFCs and a command structure that is inferior in capability to the current structure. If one is to discuss ``bridging capabilities," the best bridging capability would be to simply push wartime OPCON change back until the ROK military has the capabilities necessary to fulfill the roles and missions called for. ***ROK ECON DA*** Korea Neg 230/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors INVESTMENT 1NC SK ECON Plan guts investment in South Korea which collapses its economy Magnum 04 Brigadier Commanding General for Special Operations in South Korea (Spring 2004, Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, "Joint Force Training: Key to ROK Military Transformation", pg online @ [http://www.kida.re.kr/data/2006/04/13/06_ronald_s_mangum.pdf]//au) Many Koreans ignore the fact that while the ROK economy performed exceptionally well during the Asian economic crisis of the late 1990s, it is a fragile economy that is dependent regional stability to encourage continued foreign on investment. Investors state that a strong military presence in South Korea provides stability against foreign aggression, which gives investors the confidence to put money in the Korean economy . Because Korea relies so heavily on the import of natural resources to fuel its industry, lack of the foreign investment to permit the purchase of those resources would be devastating Consequently, maintaining a strong military, whether . independent of a U.S. military presence or not, is critical to maintaining the health of the South Korean economy . This fact is often overlooked in the ROK public's emotional rush to seek equality in its relationship with the U nited States. Furthermore, without strong public will to support and pay for the transformation of ROK forces into a strong regional military, the ROK public may not let its government spend the money necessary to improve the capability of its forces. South Korean economy is key to Asian democracy NEWSWEEK 1292010 ("Selling South Korea," http://www.newsweek.com/2010/01/28/sellingsouthkorea.html) Calum In short, the South Korean model is a more mature cousin of China's--a hybrid economy, part free market, part statecontrolled--but with more freedom for the market and for political dissent. Now Lee is positioning South Korea within Asia as a dynamic alternative to both China's mighty command economy and Japan's nogrowth economy. In Southeast Asia, South Korea has long been admired for completing an economic miracle in just one generation, moving its 48 million people out of poverty and entering the ranks of fully industrialized nations, with average per capita income that surpassed $20,000 in 2007. And, unlike China, South Korea has achieved economic and political growth at the same time , with an increasingly wellestablished multiparty democracy that respects free speech and election results. South Korea, says U.S. Ambassador Kathleen Stephens, is "the best example in the postWorld War II era of a country that has overcome enormous obstacles to achieve this kind of success ." Many Southeast Asian nations, alarmed by the harsh sides of the China model, look to South Korea as an alternative . Vietnam is sending civil servants there, studying how in the 1970s and '80s Seoul used massive government support, such as cheap loans, to develop strategic industries such as steel and petrochemicals as the backbone of its export economy. As part of Vietnam's effort to develop capital markets, it also now runs a stock exchange in Hanoi, built with the help of training join programs that teach economic and business management Developing countries are eager to learn . " South Korea's economic model because of its relevance to them," says Euh Yoondae, a Korea University economist currently heading a presidential committee to promote the national brand. "Our open economic system is more appealing to them than, say, that of China." Extinction Diamond, 95 Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, founding coeditor of the Journal of Democracy, Professor of Political Science and Sociology and Coordinator of the Democracy Program at the the Center on Democracy at Stanford University (Larry, "Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors and instruments, issues and imperatives : a report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict", December 1995, June 26th 2010, http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/di.htm, KONTOPOULOS) the Korea Stock Exchange. Officials from Vietnam, Cambodia, Indonesia, and Uzbekistan regularly visit South Korea to Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. Korea Neg 231/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors INVESTMENT 1NC U.S. ECON Independently, withdrawal will stop U.S. foothold in the Asian Pacific Market which will collapse the U.S. economy Kinne 04 Colonel and US Army Researcher (5/3/04, "U.S. Strategy Towards North Korea" pg online @ [http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA423691]//au) Strategic withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea would present some unique economic challenges for the United States. As discussed earlier, removal of forces might promote a peaceful solution that affords the U.S. and other regional actor's access to a new and emerging North Korean market. Although remotely possible, this is highly unlikely given the North's past history and aggressive nature. More than likely, the U.S. would lose global and regional credibility, unfettered access to the AsianPacific market, and the ability to influence regional economic policies. Our departure might also lead to reduced levels of foreign investment (other than by U.S.) due to security concerns. Loss of this foothold in the Asian Pacific market would be cataclysmic to the U.S. economy. Approximately 25 percent of our annual imports come from this region.14 In addition, the emergence of China as a potential global super power will require that the U.S. remain fully entrenched in this region in order to contain and shape China's ascendancy into the global marketplace. Global nuclear war Mead 09 (Walter Russell, Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, New Republic, February 4, http://www.tnr.com/politics/story.html?id=571cbbb928874d81854292e83915f5f8&p=2] So far, such halfhearted experiments not only have failed to work; they have left the societies that have tried them in a progressively worse position, farther behind the frontrunners as time goes by. Argentina has lost ground to Chile; Russian development has fallen farther behind that of the Baltic states and Central Europe. Frequently, the crisis has weakened the power of the merchants, industrialists, financiers, and professionals who want to develop a liberal capitalist society integrated into the world. Crisis can also strengthen the hand of religious extremists, populist radicals, or authoritarian traditionalists who are determined to resist liberal capitalist society for a variety of reasons. Meanwhile, the companies and banks based in these societies are often less established and more vulnerable to the consequences of a financial crisis than more established firms in wealthier societies. As a result, developing countries and countries where capitalism has relatively recent and shallow roots tend to suffer greater economic and political damage when crisis strikesas, inevitably, it does. And, consequently, financial crises often reinforce rather than challenge the global distribution of power and wealth. This may be happening yet again. None of which means that we can just sit back and enjoy the recession. History may suggest that financial crises actually help capitalist great powers maintain their leadsbut it has other, less reassuring messages as well. capitalist system under the Anglophone powers, If financial crises have been a normal part of life during the 300year rise of the liberal so has war. The wars of the League of Augsburg and the Spanish Succession; the Seven Years War; the American Revolution; the Napoleonic Wars; the two World Wars; the cold war: The list of wars is almost as long as the list of financial crises. Bad economic times can breed wars. Europe was a pretty peaceful place in 1928, but the Depression poisoned German public opinion and helped bring Adolf Hitler to power. If the current crisis turns into a depression, what rough beasts might start slouching toward Moscow, Karachi, Beijing, or New Delhi to be born? The United States may not, yet, decline, but, if we can't get the world economy back on track, we may still have to fight. Korea Neg 232/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors 2NC OVERVIEW Korea Neg 233/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors East Asian democracy is key to global democracy it prevents China's rise Friedman 09 Prof in Political Science U Wisconsin (Edward, Dissent, "China: A Threat to or Threatened by Democracy?" Winter, http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=1318) THESE CCP antidemocratic policies are significant . Democratization tends to occur regionally --for example, after SOLVES CHINA 19741975 in Southern Europe, subsequently in Latin America, in the late 1980s in East Asia (the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan), and after November 1989 in Eastern and Central Europe. The CCP regime, in contrast, aims to create a n Asian region where its authoritarian ruling groups are unchallenged, in which regional institutions are inoculated against democratization. China's successes in that direction make it hard to imagine Asia, in any foreseeable future, becoming defined by a democratic ethos that makes authoritarian China seem the odd nation out. An exception is democratic Taiwan. Starting in the 1990s, Beijing has portrayed Taiwan as a troublemaking polity and a chaotic society. But the basic interests of China's economic modernizers are to move as quickly as possible into advanced technology and Information Technology (IT). This requires improving economic relations with Taiwan, a world leader in IT. Good relations between Beijing and Taipei would increase exchanges of students, tourists, families, and entrepreneurs across the Taiwan Strait. Democratic Taiwan, over time, could come to seem to Chinese victims of a repressive, greedy, corrupt, and arbitrary political system to be China's better future. If Singapore, in a postLee Kuan Yew era, would then democratize, that, too, could help make democracy seem a natural regional alternative to politically conscious Chinese. For the CCP is trying to solve its governance problems, in part, by evolving into a Singaporetype authoritarianism, a technocratic, professional, minimally corrupt, minimally cruel, oneparty, administrative state. In sum, although the CCP's foreign policy works against the spread of democracy, there are some ways in which regional forces could yet initiate a regional democratization . The future is contingent on unknowable factors. One key is Indonesia. There are political forces in Jakarta that oppose Beijing's efforts in Southeast Asia to roll back the advance of democracy. If Indonesia were to succeed, and if nations in South Asia, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, were also to democratize, it is possible to imagine politically conscious Chinese seeking to ride a wave of regional democratization, especially if Taiwan and Singapore were both admirable democratic alternatives. Although regional factors make all this unlikely, enough wild cards are in play that China's democratization is not impossible. HAVING EXAMINED regional forces, we must then ask about the political possibilities inherent in the way economic forces create new social groups that interact with the different interests of state institutions. First, China's growth patterns have polarized the division of wealth such that China may soon surpass Brazil as the most unequal (but stable) major country in the world. All students of democratic transitions agree that great economic inequality makes ruling groups resistant to a democratization that they believe would put their illgotten gains at risk. This consensus hypothesis, that democratic transitions are more likely where economic polarization is limited, is formalized in a rationalchoice model in Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson's Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Too much economic inequality is a huge obstacle blocking a democratic transition. The rising urban middle classes prefer to be defended by the authoritarian state rather than risk their status and fortunes in a democratic vote, where the majority is imagined as poor, rural, and vengeful against economic winners, imagined as an undeserving and traitorous upper stratum. To be sure, there are democratic tendencies that result from the move from collective farming to household agriculture and from the rise of property rights, a new middle class, literacy, wealth, and so on--as Seymour Martin Lipset long ago argued. But an adaptable and resilient CCP regime that continues to deliver rapid economic growth is not going to be abandoned by rising classes worried about vengeance by the losers in a polarized society. Still, China is combining rapid industrialization with a climb into postmodern service and hightechnologybased growth in which industrial workers can seem a dying breed, an albatross to further growth. Core areas of industrialization are beginning to hollow out. It is possible to imagine the losers from China's continuing rapid growth--for example, sixty million laidoff former State Owned Enterprise (SOE) workers--turning against the regime. Should a global financial shock cause China to lose its export markets, instability might threaten the regime. As Haleb's Black Swan suggests, a full exploration of democratic possibilities should look into all the wildcard factors. The regime's economic reformers, however, could be portrayed as having sold the nation's better future to Western imperialism if Chinese lost their jobs because of an economic virus spreading from New York and London to Shanghai. And then, opponents of the government would not back a move to democracy. The West would be seen as a fount of evil, and then both the people and the ruling groups might choose a transition to a more chauvinistic and militarist order that would renounce China's global openness as a betrayal of the nation's essence. History suggests that left nationalists within the regime, who largely control the security and propaganda apparatuses, would be militantly against any opening to democracy. Such a neofascist ruling coalition might turn to military adventures or close China's doors in order to appeal to nativists--in ways, however, that would lose China the sources of continuing high growth. That is, neofascist hardliners might implement policies that would alienate many people in China and in Asia, and thereby create a counterforce that might find democracy attractive. But such imaginings rest too much on longterm speculations about concatenating factors leading to distant futures. Such meanderings of the mind should not be confused with confident predictions about a democratic outcome. Still, it is clear that much depends on how the postMao right authoritarian populist system relates to social contradictions. The CCP is moving toward presidential succession rules similar to what Mexico institutionalized in its earlier era of a oneparty dominant presidential populism. Mexico had a oneterm president for six years who chose his successor; China has a president who serves two fiveyear terms and chooses his successor at the close of the first. Chinese analysts fear that as economic stagnation, corruption, and debt delegitimated Mexico's presidential populism, so the same could happen with China. The danger is dubbed Latin Americanization. Anxious analysts worry about the entrenchment of greedy local interests that resist the many adaptations required for the continuing rapid growth that wins legitimacy and stability for the regime. Ever less charismatic and weaker presidents in China will lack the clout to defeat the vested interests who will act much as landed elites acted in the days of the ancien rgime to block the changes required for economic growth. Resultant stagnation would create a regime crisis, as occurred in Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s, leading there to a wave of military coups, but also, in the 1980s, to a democratic opening in Mexico--because, among other things, Mexico uniquely abutted the United States and wished to benefit from greater access to the U.S. market. China has no similarly large and attractive democratic neighbor, unless globalization so reduces distance that the two sides of the Pacific seem no further apart than the English Channel did in the eighteenth century. This is a real possibility in our age of transportation and communication revolutions. The internal Chinese analysis of a future crisis brought on by Latin Americanization should be treated seriously. But East Asian economic growth seems to me to be of a different order than Latin America's. Region is decisive. In addition, household agriculture and physical mobility in China make it likely that Kuznets curve factors, in which the economic gap narrows after an initial widening as a country develops, will operate in China in the future. That is, the forces of polarization will be reversed. Chinese household agriculture is very different from the world of the landed elites that emerged out of slaveplantation Latin America. Perhaps there will turn out to be truth to the analogy of a feudallike CCPtype system rooted in Russian czarist feudal institutions with the repressed labor relations of plantation slavery and its aftermath. My own hunch, however, is that anxiety about Latin Americanization in China is an indicator that the regime remains preemptive, flexible, and responsive to threats and will, therefore, head off dangers to the regime, nipping them in the bud. It is a resilient regime, not a fragile one. ALTHOUGH WE may be seeing through a glass darkly to try to locate forces of regime instability or democratization in China, what is clear is how to analyze the forces at work that will decide whether it is more or less likely that China will democratize. An analyst should try to understand how the forces of region, of groups and interests fostered by the economic moment globally and at home, and of the state, comprehended in terms of the strength and weakness of its diverse and conflicting elements, interact. My own reading of this interaction is that democracy is not impossible but , that far a more likely outcome is either continuity, that is, evolutionary change toward a dominantparty populist presidentialism imagining itself as becoming more like authoritarian Singapore, or a transition in a more chauvinistic and militaristic direction China is not likely to democratize in any immediate future, but it is not . inconceivable. China is a superpower probing, pushing, and pulling the world in its authoritarian direction. Japan is out of touch in imagining a superior Japan leading China into an East Asian Community, with Japan showing China the way in everything from environmentalism to shared high standards of living. For Confucian China, China is the core, apex, and leader of an Asian community. The CCP intends for authoritarian China to establish itself as a global pole. China will similarly experience it as a threatening American arrogance for the U.S. government to assume that an incredibly successful China, imagining itself as a moral global pole leading humanity in a better direction, needs to be saved by American missionaries of democracy. The democracies might be able to promote an end to systemic abuses of human rights in China, but Americans will not be heard in Chinese ruling circles unless they abandon a democratization agenda in which change for the better in China presupposes ending the leadership Korea Neg 234/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors prone world disorder of Americanled democracypromotion being replaced by a beneficent Chinese world order of authoritarian growth with stability. There may be far less of a challenge to China from democracy than there is a challenge to democracy from China. Democracy promoter Larry Diamond concludes in his recent book The Spirit of Democracy that democracy is in trouble across the world because of the rise of China, an authoritarian superpower that has the economic clout to back and bail out authoritarian regimes around the globe. "Singapore . . . could foreshadow a resilient form of capitalistauthoritarianism by China, Vietnam, and elsewhere in Asia ," which delivers "booming development, political stability, Sovereign Investment Funds, " Asia will determine the fate of democracy ," at least in the foreseeable future. Authoritarian China, joined by its authoritarian friends, well is on the way to defeating the global forces of democracy. low levels of corruption, affordable housing, and a secure pension system." Joined by ever richer and more influential petro powers leveraging the enormous wealth of role of the CCP. Appeasement is the price of longterm good relations. The alternatives seem too costly. There is no other longlasting basis for trustful cooperation with the government in Beijing than to accept the regime's legitimacy. CCP ruling groups imagine foreign democracypromotion as a threat to China's--and the world's--better future, identified, of course, as at one with the interests of CCP ruling groups. Can the world afford not to treat China as the superpower it is? The CCP imagines a chaotic and war Korea Neg 235/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors TURNS NORTH KOREA Turns the case North Korea will take advantage of declining investment to start another war Yonhap News 03 (1/8/03, "South Korea's Defence Ministry asserts reasons for alliance with US military" pg online @ lexisnexis//au) Seoul, 8 January: The Defence Ministry asserted the raison d'etre of the military alliance with the U nited States and the US Forces Korea (USFK) in an article carried by the January issue of its monthly Defence News. The article is a response to rising antiUS sentiment in the wake of the deaths of two teenage girls after an accident involving a US military vehicle in June and the acquittal, by a US military court, of the two soldiers driving it late last year. The ministry, considering the call for US troop withdrawal from South Korea has reached "a critical level", started to keep the calls from proliferating. On the other hand, the USFK has also launched various programmes intended to improve the image of Americans in the eyes of Korean people, such as the one helping needy Koreans. The highlights of the article the ministry's Public Relations and Troop Information Office contributed to the magazine are: Deterrence of War on the Korean Peninsula The peninsula is geopolitically situated between world powers, and this situation will remain even after Korea is reunified in the future. South Korea has to be prepared, in cooperation with the United States and the neighbouring countries, for North Korea's incessant threat of war. It should also keep close watch on the military movements of Japan and China. The South KoreaUS alliance should be changed in accord with changes in the security situation, but a selfdependent defence system alone cannot meet the security demand of the country. The defence alliance with the United States was intended to defend the Korean Peninsula from communist powers and now is needed to keep a balance of power in Northeast Asia. Reduced Defence Spending and Contribution to Economic Growth In the halfcentury postKorean War, South Korea saw its economy grow 200 times while North Korea's increased only five times. The South's rapid growth was decisively due to the SeoulWashington alliance and the USFK. US troop pullout would result in an exodus of foreign investors from the country which would in turn throw the economy into confusion North Korea might . then seize the opportunity and wage another war on the country The net assets of the USFK are valued at 14bn US dollars, with the figure rising to 30bn dollars if . its war equipment and supplies in stock are taken into account. It would further rise to more than 100bn dollars if the reinforcements in case of emergency are taken into consideration. South Korea's defence budget can never afford to pay such a huge expense. Support of Reconciliation and Cooperation with North Korea North Korea is endeavouring to lower the function of the South KoreaUS defence alliance as war deterrent, because the alliance and the USFK prevent it from achieving the aim of communising the whole of the Korean Peninsula. One of the easiest ways to keep North Korea from seeing its dream of emerging as the final victor on the peninsula come true is to cement further the existing alliance with the United States. UNIQUENESS Korea Neg 236/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors 2NC ECON FINE South Korean economy improving but still vulnerable investment is key AFP 7/6 (7/6/10, "IMF raises South Korea growth forecast," http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5htfyFtNWtKHP7VMZ3f7qKve1BjXA via GoogleNews) SEOUL -- The International onetary und Tuesday raised its growth forecast for South Korea for this year to 5.75 percent, M F pointing to an impressive recovery from the global crisis. Asia's fourthlargest economy will grow 5.75 percent this year and 5.0 percent next year, the fund forecast after a regular review of the country's economy . The projection compares with the fund's previous forecast in April of 4.5 percent expansion this year and 5.0 percent next year and is in line with Seoul's own prognosis of 5.8 percent growth. South Korea has staged an "impressive" recovery since early 2009 thanks to supportive macroeconomic and financial policies and normalisation in global trade, the IMF said in a statement. "In particular, the recovery is expected to be led by the rebound in fixed investment and the turning of the inventory cycle," it said. South Korea boasted a rapid recovery from the 200809 global financial crisis faster, boosted by low interest rates and other expansionary measures. The strong recovery fuelled debate about the right time to raise the key interest rate, which has been frozen at a record low 2.0 percent. The IMF suggested South Korea start raising its monetary policy rate gradually "to avoid falling behind the curve" and called for a "carefully calibrated exit" from supportive macroeconomic policies. South Korea's vulnerability to the potentially destabilising effects of volatile international capital flows remains significant, it said. "For an exportdependent economy with an open capital account, the best line of defence remains a flexible exchange rate to avoid generating expectations of one way bets ." The crisis has exposed the risks of relying on exports, the IMF said, adding that strengthening domestic sources of growth would reduce vulnerability to economic downturns elsewhere in the world. "Reducing the policy bias towards exports and bolder reforms to increase productivity in the nontradable sector would be welcome," it said. South Korean economy is strong now but downturn is possible Interactive Investor 2010 ("South Korea June exports top forecasts; inflation eases," July 1, http://www.iii.co.uk/news/? type=afxnews&articleid=7970684&action=article) Calum South Korean exports rose more than expected in June to a record, easing some investor doubts about the strength of global demand and reinforcing the market's view that interest rates could go up as early as next week. Annual consumer price inflation unexpectedly slowed in June from May on softer raw materials prices. But inflation is widely expected to accelerate later this year on rising services prices in line with a recovery in the privatesector demand. " The monetary policy board looks optimistic about the economy and is highly likely to raise interest rates by 25 basis points next week," said Jun Minkyoo, economist, Korea Investment & Securities. But he said economic prospects remained uncertain. A central bank inflation researcher said on Thursday the Bank of Korea may lift its consumer price inflation forecast for the second half of the year when it releases economic forecasts this month. A slew of economic indicators showed Asia's fourthlargest economy was faring better than expected despite widespread concerns that Europe's debt crisis could hit the global economy. Korea Neg 237/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors UNIQUENESS SK ECONOMY STRONG Now is the key time for Korea to make strong economic decisions Korea Times 7/4 (7/4/10, "Fullfledged recovery," http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2010/07/137_68777.html, Google News) Encouraging data indicated the Korean economy has already returned to a precrisis level . The Ministry of Strategy and Finance said Sunday that the nation enjoyed a projected 7.2percent growth in gross domestic product (GDP) in the first half of this year. The projection was based on the tentative growth rate of 6.3 percent in the second quarter of the year, following an 8.1percent rise in the first quarter. The strongerthanexpected performance raises expectations for a fullfledged recovery from the unprecedented global economic crisis. And optimism grows that the economy may outgrow the government's predicted growth rate of 5.8 percent for 2010 . Certainly, South Korea deserves to jumpstart the economy. Of course, Korea was lucky to make the most of the ongoing global recovery that has fueled praise for its economic resilience and proper response to the worldwide recession. In other words, the nation has optimized its massive stimulus packages both domestic demand and exports. The growth pace is predicted to slow down in the coming months. However, the government is likely to meet its growth target as long as the economy grows at least 4.5 percent in the latter half of the year. Against this backdrop, the Lee Myungbak administration is required to take new economic policy directions to ensure sustainable growth. First of all, the government had better start unwinding the stimulus measures in order to put the economy back on a normal mode . Needless to say, fiscal expansion and monetary easing are a prescription for a recessionbound economy. But if such an emergency recipe is in place for a prolonged period, it could do more harm than good to the economy. Fortunately, policymakers and central bankers are well aware of the sideeffects of the stimulus packages. Last month, they hinted at initiating an exit plan sooner or later. It is important to give a right signal to all economic players so that they can prepare themselves for the imminent exit strategies . Some analysts cautiously predict that the Bank of Korea (BOK) may begin to raise its key interest rate as early as next month . The proper timing of a rate hike is crucial to nipping inflationary pressure in the bud to avoid economic bubbles. It is also necessary to deactivate fiscal expansion to move toward a balanced budget and realize fiscal soundness. Last but not least, policymakers should shift from quantitative growth to qualitative one as the economy is on a strong recovery path. The nation's reliance on exports has deepened, raising concerns about its structural weakness in case of a future global crisis . Another problem is that the ongoing recovery has done little to create jobs. Thus, the dilemma is how to tackle the chronic phenomenon of ``jobless" growth. Without job generation, a higher economic growth rate is only a pie in the sky for the people. Now, the government must work out policies that will bring real benefits to the people. The BOK has maintained its interest rate at a record low of 2 percent for 16 months in a row. But, most salaried workers and lowincome earners still find it difficult to get bank loans. The authorities need to make sure that looming exit strategies will not take their toll on the populace. The Lee administration should take timely and appropriate action to show that it policies are really for the people. ROK economy high now--trade and manufacturing Chosun 7/6 (7/6/10, Chosun Ilbo, "Korean Economy Sees FasterThanExpected Recovery in First Half," http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2010/07/05/2010070500901.html) The Korean economy is showing signs of recovery as it enters the second half of 2010 . It is projected to have grown 7.2 percent in the first six months thanks to robust domestic demand and steady exports . The Ministry of Strategy and Finance forecasts that the economy may have expanded by 6.3 percent in the second quarter following the first quarter's 8.1 percent onyear rise. Officials predict that Korea is now a step closer to posting 5.8 percent annual economic growth as the Finance Ministry forecast. Production growth in many sectors including mining, manufacturing and the service industry contributed to the growth, along with the trade balance which has stayed in the black for five straight months. With the economy seeing signs of a fasterthanexpected recovery, the Finance Ministry also stated that the country needs to begin normalizing fiscal and monetary policies. Meanwhile the government has expressed concern over the fact that Korea, like many other Asian countries, is overly reliant on China. Warning that this may hinder growth in the future, it pointed to strengthening domestic demand as the key to building a more robust economy. Korea Neg 238/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors UNIQUENESS INVESTMENT INCREASING Foreign investment is high now its key to South Korean and Asian economies Korea Times 5/25 (5/25/10, "Foreign investments return" pg online @ lexisnexis//au) High expectation for South Korea's economic rebound lured foreign investments in its stock and bond markets last year. The Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) announced Monday that the amount of listed stocks owned by nonKorean investors increased by 125.3 trillion won ($103.73 billion), or 73.4 percent, to 296 trillion won, compared with a year earlier, and their bond volume totaled 56.49 trillion won, up 19.29 trillion won from the previous year. "Thanks to rising hopes for an economic recovery, influx of money to the emerging markets, including Korea has been advancing since March 2009," said Choi Hyunphil, a senior manager of Financial Investment Department at the FSS. An economist also attributed the bright outlook to an economic bounce to the surge of investment "The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers * Company Dossier in September 2008 added to . the selling pressure in South Korea and the local financial markets suffered a major exodus by foreign investors," said Lee Changseon, managing director of the financial research department at LG Economic Research Institute. "However, since then, the Korean economic recuperated in 2009, which helped the holding amount to move up." He also said, "From a medium or longterm perspective, the local financial markets are era." likely to get better, as the Asian market is expected to play an important role in the world economy in the postcrisis Foreign Investment is High its increasing ROK surplus UPI 6/29 (6/29/10, "S. Korea's Current Account Surplus Hits 6Month High In March" pg online @ lexisnexis//au) South Korea's current account surplus hit a sixmonth high in May on robust exports, a fall in dividend payouts to foreign investors and reduced spending on overseas travel, the central bank said Tuesday. The current account surplus reached US$3.83 billion in May, up from a revised $1.42 billion the previous month, according to the Bank of Korea (BOK). The current account is the broadest measure of crossborder trade. The May numbers marked the largest surplus since the $4.28 billion registered in November 2009, the bank said. South Korea's current account remained in the black for the fourth straight month in May. The BOK said May's surplus came mainly because heightened geopolitical risks and the eurozone debt crisis weakened the local currency, prompting people to spend less on overseas trips. A fall in dividend payouts to foreign investors also helped the country post the surplus. The central bank forecast that South Korea is expected to see a significantly large surplus for June as overseas shipments remain brisk amid the global economic recovery. "As exports of chips and cars remain robust and companies try to bolster their balance sheets ahead of the end of the halfyear, the goods balance for June is likely to expand," Lee Youngbog, head of the BOK's balance of payments statistics team, told a press conference and relayed by /Yonhap/ news agency today. Investment is Improving Samsung Proves TendersInfo News 5/14 (5/14/10, "Korea Republic of : Samsung Life Rises in IPO" pg online @ lexisnexis//au) Samsung Life, now the largest financial firm on the Korea Exchange by market capitalization, opened at 119,500 won a share 8.6% above the offering price of 110,000 won. The $4.4 billion offering was South Korea's largest ever. It attracted robust demand from domestic and foreign investors, pricing near the top of the range of 90,000 won to 115,000 won the banks handling the sale had said the shares might sell for. Samsung Life's shares eventually closed at 114,000 won, down from the opening price as foreign investors locked in profits. Shinyoung Securities analyst Park Eunjoon said that Samsung shares will be boxed within a 110,000 won to 120,000 won range for the next few months. "But in the mid to long term, Samsung Life's share looks attractive given steady economic growth, an improving investment environment and expectations for rate hikes in the second half of this year," he said. Korea Neg 239/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors UNIQUENESS INVESTMENT INCREASING Regional Economy and ROK investment is projected to increase WSJ 7/15 (Shri Navaratnam, Philip Vahn, 7/15/10, "Asian Shares Off Lows; Digest China Data, AgBank Debut Weak ", pg online @ [http://online.wsj.com/article/BTCO20100715700130.html]//au) China's gross domestic product rose 10.3% onyear in the second quarter, from the first quarter's 11.9% growth rate, and undershot market expectations centered on a 10.5% increase. The country's consumer price index rose 2.9% in June, easing from May's 3.1% rise and well below economists' expectations of a 3.3% increase. Property stocks and some financials led the recovery in Shanghai with China Vanke up 3.4%, China Merchants Bank 1.0% higher and Poly Real Estate Group up 2.3%. Agricultural Bank of China rose only marginally on its highly anticipated debut. The stock's lackluster performance cast doubt over the rural lender's ability to exercise the greenshoe option on its initial public offering to claim the record for the biggest listing. AgBank's shares were up 1.1% from its IPO price of CNY2.68 at CNY2.71. "Such a worry reflects people's caution about the rural lender's operation as well as the uncertainties the whole banking industry is facing, including the potentially huge rebound in bad loans following China's tightening in the property market," said Shen Jun, a strategist at BOC International (China). Tokyo shares fell to profittaking following Wednesday's 2.7% rise. Exporters' stocks were under pressure from the yen's gains against the U.S. dollar and the euro on Wednesday. Kyocera was down 0.8% and Fanuc fell 0.7%. Eurosensitive shares were down, with Canon off 2.0% and Sony down 2.3%. Auto makers were also weak, with Toyota Motor falling 2.5% and Nissan Motor off 2.8%. However, shares were mostly off their earlier lows after the Bank of Japan kept its policy target interest rate at 0.1% and upgraded its real economic growth projection for this fiscal year to 2.6% from 1.8% forecast three months earlier, as expectations grow that solid exports will continue to benefit the broader economy. In Sydney, the market was choppy but had recouped some of its earlier losses. Materials, cyclicals and banks were leading the benchmark index down. "(U.S. data) last night is an example of what we're likely to confront for coming months," said Shaw Stockbroking head of trading Jamie Spiteri. "You can potentially get some reasonable profit results, but then there's that broader economic uncertainty. There's no strong recovery momentum. You will see some rebalancing when markets get oversold, but I don't see a sustained recovery in equities occurring as yet," he said. BHP Billiton fell 0.7%, while Rio Tinto was off 0.6%, but both were off their lows. Major banks were down, with ANZ bank off 1.0% and National Australia Bank down 0.7%. Nufarm slumped 26% after warning late Wednesday that its fiscal year profit would be 50% below its previous guidance. On Thursday it said it won't achieve a banking covenant on the ratio of earnings to net interest for year ending July 31. Australian tollroad operator Intoll Group bucked the market, rocketing 31% after saying it received a A$3.47 billion conditional takeover proposal from Canada Pension Plan Investment Board. Intoll's peers were also up on the news, with Transurban up 1.6% and ConnectEast up 3.9%. The Korean market was taking a breather, but strong foreign investor demand recently was expected to continue supporting the market. Investor Confidence and Regional Growth is high VOA News 08 (7/19/08, "Voa News: Asian Markets Rebound; Growth Outlook Dims Due To Financial Market Woes" pg online @ lexisnexis//au) Asia's financial markets recovered strongly Friday as investors took their cue from U.S. central bank intervention with the pumping of over $200 million into fragile credit markets and government measures to boost share trading volumes. The Hong Kong and Shanghai indices surged over nine per cent after the Chinese government cut taxes on share purchases and bought shares in stateowned banks. Japan's Nikkei index gained almost four percent while shares in South Korea leapt over 4.5 percent as investor confidence returned to the markets driven on by a strong U.S. market recovery. Foreign Investment is high Asia Pulse 4/26 (4/26/10 " S. Korea To Begin Exit Plans After Private Sector Recovers: Bok Gov" pg online @ lexisnexis//au) The quarterly World Economic Outlook report, released Wednesday by the International Monetary Fund, advised most advanced economies to maintain a "supportive thrust" this year through expansionary fiscal and lowinterest rate policies to further sustain growth and employment. "Multispeed recoveries imply that policies will necessarily be tied to individual country circumstances," the IMF report said. "But there are spillovers when the timing of policy actions varies, and economies should take these into account in setting policies." The IMF has projected South Korea's economy to expand 4.5 per cent this year, citing robust exports, growing domestic demand and inflows of foreign investment. The BOK puts the figure at 5.0 per cent. LINKS / INTERNAL LINKS Korea Neg 240/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors 2NC LINK BLOCK Plan guts foreign investment Magnum says regardless of their actual deterrent effect, investors perceive troops as critical to stability and would pull out post plan this collapses the economy because South Korea is so import dependent It's empirically proven AFP News 03 (3/27/03, "North Korea not a US target top South Korean presidential advisor" pg online @ lexisnexis//au) Washington has not ruled out using a military option to deal with North Korea's nuclear crisis and Pyongyang has accused Washington of planning a preemptive strike. But Ban said South Korea had received assurance from US President George W. Bush and other top US officials that the standoff would be resolved peacefully. Recent moves by North Korea to escalate the crisis and signs of friction in the USSouth Korean alliance have spooked foreign investors, Ban said. Reports that the United States was ready to withdraw ground troops from South Korea have added to the uncertainty Ban, who visited . Hong Kong and New York recently to reassure investors, said he was surprised at the level of alarm generated by the nuclear crisis and fears of war which he blamed on groundless speculation about US intentions A senior South Korean government official . said that Seoul would have a major say in how the crisis was resolved. "In no circumstance would the United States take unilateral action without full consultation with the Korean government." Highlevel military talks are scheduled for next month to discuss the possible relocation of some of the 37,000 US that bisects Seoul. troops stationed in South Korea from bases near the demilitarized zone (DMZ) on the border with North Korea to areas south of the Han river Perception is critical Eberstadt et. al, 07 *Ph.D. in Political Economy and Government from Harvard, Political economist, Senior Adviser to the National Board of Asian Research, **President of The National Bureau of Asian Research Policy Think Tank, ***Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, ****Research Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, *****Senior Vice President for Political and Security Affairs at The National Bureau of Asian Research Policy Think Tank, ******Senior Project Director and Director of the Pyle Center for Northeast Asian Studies at the National Bureau of Asian Research Policy Think Tank (*Nicholas, **Richard J., ***Aaron L., ****Christopher, *****Roy D., ******Travis, "A World without the U.S.ROK Alliance: Thinking about 'Alternative Futures'", National Bureau of Asian Research, September 11th 2007, June 24th 2010, p. 22, KONTOPOULOS) PDF Teddy A less pleasant scenario for the economy in a postalliance ROK would be an increase in tensions in the region without an alliance to serve as a deterrent force and crisis control mechanism. The threat posed by a recalcitrant, unreformed North analysis, the alliance bolsters investor confidence against possible geopolitical shocks without the alliance ; , South Korea's domestic and international markets would be significantly more vulnerable Even without . disruptive flashpoint crises, the perception that the ROK had become more risky a place to do business could become self fulfilling : if the risk premium , South rose Korea would perforce a be less competitive platform in the world economy. Korea or by a regional territorial dispute among the great powers could quickly raise concerns that Seoul is a likely victim with little control over its own future. In the final Investors comments prove JoongAng Daily, 03 (2/15/03, "Welcoming social chaos," http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=1935073) Amid the rising tensions between the United States and North Korea over Pyeongyang's nuclear weapons program, talk about whether U.S. troops should be pulled out of South Korea is perplexing The South Korean public's outcry over the accidental killing of two teenagers run over . by a U.S. armored vehicle has induced antiAmerican slogans, which sparked discomfort in Washington. Reports that Washington raised the pullout issue with Presidentelect Roh Moohyun's special envoys visiting the United States were met with halfdoubt here. But now that U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has told the Senate Armed Services Committee that he wanted to realign the long American military presence in South Korea, the withdrawal issue seems accepted as an established fact. But the government and Mr. Roh's aides have not stated their positions on the issue. They are behaving as if the problem were not theirs. They vaguely said that a pullout would not take place, or that a realignment is part of Washington's global strategy. Looking at both countries' attitudes toward the issue, it seems that talks on a withdrawal are not part of a close strategic cooperation between two allies. Mr. Rumsfeld told senators that he had accepted a suggestion by Seoul's incoming president to study the bilateral relationship. The U.S. defense secretary went on to say that the U.S. government was considering shifting U.S. forces away from the fortified border between North and South Koreas and perhaps removing some of the 37,000 U.S. troops stationed in the south. The suggested pullout of American troops from the Demilitarized Zone and the Seoul area is interpreted as Washington's message that U.S. forces in the South would no longer play the role as a tripwire to warn Pyeongyang that any attack from the North would automatically involve U.S. troops. As suggested by the presidentelect's remark, "It is better to struggle than to suffer death in a war," it is clear that his perception of and prescription for the North Korea nuclear standoff is different from Washington's. We hope Mr. Roh has not prompted the United States to question why it should keep its troops We hope that we could defend ourselves without depending on American troops in the near future. Now is not the time to raise the question of removing U.S. forces from the peninsula. They play a crucial role as a deterrent. Without U.S. troops the situation here would be extremely unstable, scaring off foreign investors and causing tremendous economic and social chaos. Washington and Seoul should not forget that. here in the face of such differences. We cannot overemphasize the importance of the U.S. military presence in South Korea . Korea Neg 241/436 US presence key to the economy IPS 04 (9/5/04, "South Korea: When U.S. Cuts Troops, Ties With Seoul Will Change" pg online @ lexisnexis//au) Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors But some U.S. academics question the assumption that ties with South Korea have been overly dependent on security issues, such as North Korea. "It's a mistake to look at South Korean attitudes toward the U.S. military alliance solely in terms of security considerations," Selig Harrison, director of the Asian programme of the Centre of International Policy, said at the same discussion. "The economics of the situation are very important." He explained that South Korea gets many other benefits from U.S. military presence, a line of argument that U.S. officials also used in countries like the Philippines which for nearly a century hosted the largest U.S. army and naval bases outside the continental United States. The U.S.South Korea alliance , Harrison pointed out, " creates a climate of stability favourable for foreign investment for the and preferential economic treatment by international financial institutions that South Korea has received for example, the 1997 International Monetary Fund bailout He estimated the direct cost of U.S. forces in South Korea to be roughly two billion U.S. dollars a year, apart from billions of dollars in military ". grants and foreign military sales. He argued that the "almost unspoken, underlying but very real reason why the prospect of an end of the alliance is unsettling to the South Koreans" is that "the U.S. military presence and the alliance commitment of the United States provides a very large economic subsidy to South Korea, an economic cushion, if you will". U.S. plays a key role reassures investors Levin 4, Senior Analyst at the RAND Corporation, (Norman D, "Do the Ties Still Bind?: The USROK Security Relationship After 9/11," http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2004/RAND_MG115.pdf) Linked to this role as a regional stabilizer is the importance of the U.S. in the South Korean economy. To be sure, the U.S. is no longer South Korea's largest trading partner. This position has now been taken over by China.10 The relative U.S. share in South Korean exports and imports, moreover, continues to decline. Whereas the U.S. accounted for more than 50 percent of Korea's total trade in the 1960s, by the beginning of the 2000s the U.S. share had fallen to less than half of that. In 2002, the U.S. took less than 20 percent of Korea's merchandise exports and supplied less than 15 percent of Ko rea's merchandise imports.11 Still, the U.S. continues to play a major role affecting South Korean economic prospects . The U.S. remains a leading trade partner for South Korea, for example, taking in over the past decade between onefourth and onefifth of total ROK exports.12 It is also the largest foreign investor South in Korea , accounting in 2002 for roughly half of all foreign investment.13 Close security ties with the U.S. reassure foreign investors more broadly , a critical role given the uncertain prospects in North Korea, the continuing nuclear standoff, and Pyongyang's demonstrable unpredictability. South Korea's former ambassador to the U.S., Yang SungChul, implicitly highlighted the importance of this role in a recent speech by repeatedly stressing the connection between the level of tension on the Korean Peninsula and South Korea's economic prospects.14 The new government of Roh Moohyun has stressed the linkage between security ties with the U.S. prospects for South Korean and the economy particularly heavily. This emphasis appears intended at least partly to appeal to young Koreans who no longer worry much about the North Korean threat but worry a great deal about the South Korean economy. A broader intention is to reassure foreign investors nervous about apparent strains between South Korea and the United States. Korea Neg 242/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors ROK will have to increase defense spending collapses the economy Eberstadt, et al, 07 Henry Wendt Scholar in Political Economy at AEI (Nicholas, Christopher Griffin research fellow at AEI, Friedberg prof at Princeton, AEI, 10/6/2007, "Toward an AmericaFree Korea." http://www.aei.org/article/26924) Economic Performance. Dramatically higher defense expenditures would in the first place a put substantial additional burden on Seoul's national budget . More generally, South Korea's economic prospects would also likely suffer in a post alliance world. In the longer run, international (and domestic) investors would almost surely lose confidence in the country without the assurance the alliance provides against a recurrence of hostilities on the peninsula. To the extent that trade "follows the flag," the country's trade patterns would also shift away from the U.S. and towards greater dependence upon a. While the U.S.ROK alliance does not appear Chin to be a major driver of bilateral economic relations, it does nonetheless provide incalculable but possibly nontrivial economic benefits. Would Washington be willing to fight for a Free Trade Agreement with as South Korea if Seoul was not a military ally much less step in to help with the economic reconstruction of northern Korea if the Pyongyang regime collapsed in a postalliance era? 2NC DEFENSE SPENDING LINK Korea Neg 243/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors Withdrawal crushes South Korean econ defense expenditures Suh, 10 Associate Professor and Director of Korea Studies at SAIS, (5/17/10, J.J., Foreign Policy in Focus, "Allied to Race? The U.S.Korea Alliance and Arms Race," http://www.fpif.org/articles/allied_to_race_the_us korea_alliance_and_arms_race) Using the second, more indirect measure is more complicated for it involves counterfactual estimates. One needs to estimate the marginal increase in Seoul's defense expenditure if the alliance were terminated. This in turn involves assessing two kinds of costs. First, if the alliance were terminated and the American military withdrawn, Korea would first have to fill the void with its own forces at its own cost. Some 40,000 American soldiers would have to be replaced with Koreans, and all the facilities manned by Americans would have to be managed by Koreans. These extra personnel would have to be paid, and the operating costs of the facilities would have to be borne by Seoul. This is exactly the argument that the Ministry of National Defense made in its defense of the alliance: The U.S. Forces in Korea help us [Koreans] reduce our defense spending, which contributes to our continued economic development. If we take into account all the equipment and materials that the USFK maintains in country as well as the several billion dollars it spends on maintenance and operations, its opportunity cost is tremendous. If the USFK should be withdrawn, it would take an astronomical amount of additional defense expenditures to compensate for its absence. Plan forces massive increase in defensive spending hurts ROK spending Eberstadt, et al, 07 Henry Wendt Scholar in Political Economy at AEI (Nicholas, Christopher Griffin research fellow at AEI, Friedberg prof at Princeton, AEI, 10/6/2007, "Toward an AmericaFree Korea." http://www.aei.org/article/26924) burden on Seoul's national budget. More generally, South Korea's economic prospects would also likely suffer in a post alliance world. In the longer run, international (and domestic) investors would almost surely lose confidence in the country without the assurance the alliance provides against a recurrence of hostilities on the peninsula. To the extent that trade "follows the flag," the country's trade patterns would also shiftaway from the U.S. and towards Economic Performance. Dramatically higher defense expenditures would in the first place put a substantial additional EXT DEFENSE SPENDING greater dependence upon China. While the U.S.ROK alliance does not appear to be a major driver of bilateral economic relations , it does nonetheless provide incalculable but possibly nontrivial economic benefits. Would Washington be as willing to fight for a Free Trade Agreement with South Korea if Seoul was not a military allymuch less step in to help with the economic reconstruction of northern Korea if the Pyongyang regime collapsed in a postalliance era? Korea Neg 244/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors 2NC DEFENSE SPENDING LINK Presence provides a significant defense subsidy for South Korea stops massive increases in its defense spending Harrison, 06 has visited North Korea 9 times and is Director of the Asia Program and Chairman of the Task Force on U.S. Korea Policy at the Center for International Policy (Feb 2006, Selig S., originally appeared in The Korea Policy Review, "The New Face of the South KoreaU.S. Alliance and the North Korea Question," http://www.japanfocus.org/Selig_S_Harrison/2141, JMP) A more common answer was that the U.S. alliance creates a climate of stability favorable for foreign trade and investment. But no one mentioned what I consider the real, unspoken, underlying reason why the prospect of an end to the U.S. alliance is unsettling to South Korea: the U.S. military presence and the alliance commitment provide the massive economic subsidy to the South mentioned earlier. This unspoken reason was once spelled out to me by a former U.S. Ambassador to South Korea, the late William J. Porter, later Ambassador to Saudi Arabia. In April, 1971, I was visiting Seoul for the Washington Post and had a long conversation with Porter, who was a very plainspoken man. He was angry. He was engaged at that time in bitter negotiations with the Park Chung Hee military regime over the size of the U.S. military presence in the South. He had successfully pushed the Nixon Administration to cut down the U.S. presence from 60,000 to 40,000 troops, but South Korea was fighting it tooth and nail. "That's not surprising," he said. "They have attached themselves to the big fat udder of Uncle Sam and naturally they don't want to let go." The subsidy provided by the U.S. presence enables South Koreans to postpone hard choices concerning how fast, and how far, to move toward reunification, and thus it postpones hard choices between civilian and military budgetary priorities. The U.S. presence enables the South to minimize the sacrifices that would otherwise be necessary to maintain its existing high levels of defense spending. By the same token, the withdrawal of U.S. forces would force Seoul to decide whether it should seek the same level of security now provided by the U.S. presence by upgrading defense expenditures--or whether, instead, the goal of accommodation and reunification with the North would be better served by negotiating a mutual reduction of forces with the North. Lowerincome groups in the South would benefit from a diversion of resources from military spending to social welfare programs. The South's upper and middleincome minority, by contrast, has acquired a vested interest in the status quo. Without its U.S. subsidy, Seoul would have to double or triple its military budget if it wanted to replace the conventional forces now deployed for its defense by the United States _ not to mention the much higher outlays that independent nuclear forces would require. defense spending Jeon, 06 Colonel of the Republic of Korea Army (Sang Jo, "Transforming the ROKUS Alliance", U.S. Army War College, March 15th 2006, June 25th 2010, p. 23, KONTOPOULOS) PDF Teddy USFK's primary mission is, along with the ROK Armed Forces, to deter aggression against the Republic of Korea and, if necessary, fight and win decisively. 11 Other responsibilities include: to support the UNC and CFC; to coordinate planning among US component commands in Korea; to exercise operational control (OPCON) of assigned US forces as directed by Combatant Commander, United States Pacific Command (USPACOM); to coordinate US military assistance to the ROK; to function as US Defense Representative in Korea; and to oversee US governmental administrative coordination as provided for in USPACOM Instruction 5400.20E.12 The US, with the world's most powerful military, plays a major role in multiple current operations and contingency situations. Practically, USFK complements the ROK military by providing intelligence collection and early warning means.13 In addition, the US provides augmented forces and a nuclear umbrella to deter any North Korean intent to invade South Korea. USFK contributes to the ROK economy by reducing Korea's national security budget and helping to foster stability. US Koreanrelated military expenditures are significan t, when one considers equipment, personnel, material, operational costs, and programs such as the ammunition and other material included US War Reserve Stocks for AlliesKorea (WRSAK). For Korea the resources required to offset the US contribution would be enormous--in the billions of dollars. Korea Neg 245/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors LINKS--DEFENSE SPENDING Withdrawal will force South Korea to boost military spending Young, 09 Legal assistant to the chairman of the Council on KoreaU.S. Security Studies in Seoul. (Lee Jae, 3/4/09, "Upgrading the South KoreaU.S. alliance," http://www.upiasia.com/Security/2009/03/04/upgrading_the_south_koreaus_alliance/3491/) Consequently, the South Korean government will impose on itself the new responsibility of securing a military surge in time of emergency. This responsibility is burdensome in that South Korea will have to persuade U.S. forces to intervene swiftly and actively if they are needed. As long as the South KoreaU.S. alliance exists, the United States can be expected to provide military support. But the partial withdrawal of U.S. military forces means that South Korea cannot maintain the same level of military presence and deterrence over the North it has had so far. It will have to increase military spending to make up for the U.S. withdrawal. The plan causes increased South Korean defense spending LEE AND MOON 2010 (Chung In Moon, professor of political science at Yonsei University; Sangkeun Lee, Ph. D. candidate specializing in North Korean politics at Department of Political Science, Yonsei University, AsiaPacific Journal, Feb 13, http://www.japanfocus.org/Chung_inMoon/3333) Alliance effects also appear to have profound impacts on defense spending.38 When there was a strong U.S. security commitment, South Korea's defense spending was minimal. But when the United States showed signs of disengagement or waning security commitment, South Korea proceeded to increase its defense spending. For example, the reduction of American forces in South Korea through the withdrawal of its 7th infantry division in 1971 prompted the Park government to increase rapidly its defense budget in the early 1970s. The phenomenal rise in defense spending from 1976 to 1979 can also be explained by alliance effects, as South Korea allocated six percent of its GNP in compliance with American demands of defense burdensharing. The unexpected rise in defense spending during the progressive Roh Moohyun government was also closely related to alliance effects. Roh's efforts to seek greater military independence from the U.S. led to an increase in military spending. Conversely, the conservative Lee government's decision to reduce the defense budget is known to have been predicated on the restoration of strong alliance ties with the United States. Thus, the alliance factor has proven central to the patterns of defense spending in South Korea. Only the plan will cause significantly increased ROK defense spending BANDOW 2004 Doug, senior fellow at Cato, The Korean Conundrum: America's Troubled Relations with North and South Korea, p. 4) The ROK's military lags in quantity of soldiers and materiel, but only because Seoul has chosen to rely on the U.S. military tripwire (the troop presence that guarantees U.S. involvement in any war on the peninsula) rather than build up its own forces. South Korean military deficiencies could be made up virtually at will, should Seoul decide to invest the necessary resources. But it will do so only if it must do so. And that will be the case only if Washington drops its unnecessary and unnatural defense subsidy of the South. South Korea will prioritize economic development over defense spending as long as US troops remain BANDOW 2003 (Doug, senior fellow at the Cato Institute. A former special assistant to President Ronald Reagan, he is the author of Tripwire: Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World and coauthor of The Korean Conundrum: America's Troubled Relations with North and South Korea, "Cutting the Tripwire: It's time to get out of Korea," Reason Magazine, July 2003, http://reason.com/archives/2003/07/01/cuttingthetripwire/1) To the extent that the South's military lags behind its antagonist's, that is a matter of choice, not necessity. Nothing prevents Seoul from building a larger force. Rather, the American tripwire discourages it from doing so. As the South acknowledges in its own defense reports, it chose to focus on economic development at the expense of military strength a plan it can follow securely as long as America protects it. Korea Neg 246/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors US KEY FOR DEFENSE SPENDING US strategic decisions are the key factor in South Korean military spending--it's not tied to North Korean threats FEFFER 2009 (John, CoDirector of Foreign Policy in Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies, "Ploughshares into Swords: Economic Implications of South Korean Military Spending," February, http://www.keia.org/Publications/AcademicPaperSeries/2009/APSFeffer.pdf) But neither North Korea's declining capabilities under the two Kims, nor rapprochement under Roh, nor more aggressive rhetoric under Lee appear to have had the direct effect on the levels of South Korean military spending that one might expect from the Cold War dynamic on the Korean peninsula. South Korean spending went up in the fi rst two cases--and most dramatically at precisely the time of greatest rapprochement--and moderated in the last case. To understand the dynamics of South Korean military spending, we must look to other external factors. Chief among these has been the United States. Signifi cant spikes in South Korean military spending have occurred three times in South Korean history, each one corresponding with perceived or actual changes in U.S. defense posture in the region. The fi rst, Park Chunghee's emphasis on a selfreliant defense, came in the wake of U.S. troop reductions pushed through by President Richard M. Nixon in the early 1970s.28 The second came at the end of the 1980s when Roh Taewoo used similar language--the "Koreanization of Korean defense"--in response to U.S. military transformation at the end of the Cold War.29 Finally, the efforts by Kim Daejung and particularly Roh Moohyun have represented a third wave in Korean military spending, again a modernization effort in response to U.S. global force transformation. Korea Neg 247/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors DEFENSE SPENDING UNIQ Lee will control defense spending now LEE AND MOON 2010 (Chung In Moon, professor of political science at Yonsei University; Sangkeun Lee, Ph. D. candidate specializing in North Korean politics at Department of Political Science, Yonsei University, Asia-Pacific Journal, Feb 13, http://www.japanfocus.org/-Chung_in-Moon/3333) Ironically, the pattern of defense spending under the Lee Myungbak government, which won the presidential election on a conservative platform emphasizing a strong national defense, has been quite different. Although the actual amount of defense spending rose slightly as part of a fiscal stimulus package to cope with the global financial crisis, the relative share of total government spending was radically reduced to 10.8 percent in 2009. The Lee government has also announced plans to cut the estimated budget for the Defense Reform 2020 from the original budget of 621.3 trillion won to 599.3 trillion won.9 Current increases are small--some programs are being cut while others increase KOREA TIMES 5-17-2010 ("Lee Directs 3 Trillion Won Rise in Arms Buying," http://pacificfreeze.ips-dc.org/2010/05/lee-directs3-trillion-won-rise-in-arms-buying/) "Upon the President's direction, defense authorities are expected to review current arms acquisition plans and readjust their priorities," the source told The Korea Times. "The focus will be on how to thwart the North's asymmetrical and irregular operations." Irregular and asymmetric warfare uses more special forces to conduct operations than regular forces, as well as the unconventional use of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons systems. A Cheong Wa Dae spokesman said President Lee hadn't directed detailed plans on the arms programs, adding the military will decide upon these. "For example, buying helicopters for maritime and air-to-ground operations will gain speed in order to help prevent the infiltration of North Korean special forces into the South, or to drop our commandos into enemy areas," the source noted. Other weapons to be affected by a potential increase in defense expenditure would include upgrades of warships' sonar, deployment of a sound surveillance systems (SOSUS) for islands near the sea border, development of three-dimensional anti-air radar and an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) bomb, and the acquisition of bunker-busting bombs, he said. "On the other hand, arms programs aimed at deterring North Korea's conventional threats could be put on the back burner for the time being," he added, apparently referring to the production of the K2 Black Panther main battle tank and K21 infantry fighting vehicle. Korea Neg 248/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors INVESTOR CONFIDENCE investor confidence Eberstadt et. al, 07 *Ph.D. in Political Economy and Government from Harvard, Political economist, Senior Adviser to the National Board of Asian Research, **President of The National Bureau of Asian Research Policy Think Tank, ***Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, ****Research Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, *****Senior Vice President for Political and Security Affairs at The National Bureau of Asian Research Policy Think Tank, ******Senior Project Director and Director of the Pyle Center for Northeast Asian Studies at the National Bureau of Asian Research Policy Think Tank (*Nicholas, **Richard J., ***Aaron L., ****Christopher, *****Roy D., ******Travis, "A World without the U.S.-ROK Alliance: Thinking about 'Alternative Futures'", National Bureau of Asian Research, September 11th 2007, June 24th 2010, p. 22, KONTOPOULOS) PDF Teddy A less pleasant scenario for the economy in a post-alliance ROK would be an increase in tensions in the region without an alliance to serve as a deterrent force and crisis control mechanism. The threat posed by a recalcitrant, unreformed North Korea or by a regional territorial dispute among the great powers could quickly raise concerns that Seoul is a likely victim with little control over its own future. In the final analysis, the alliance bolsters investor confidence against possible geopolitical shocks; without the alliance, South Korea's domestic and international markets would be significantly more vulnerable. Even without disruptive flashpoint crises, the perception that the ROK had become a more risky place to do business could become self-fulfilling: if the risk premium rose, South Korea would perforce be a less competitive platform in the world economy. Korea Neg 249/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors MILITARY PRESENCE KEY TO INVESTOR CONFIDENCE & ECON Military Presence facilitates foreign investment and economic growth Hwang 06 PhD and Senior Policy Analyst for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center (10/16/06, "The U.S.Korea Alliance on the Rocks: Shaken, Not Stirred" pg online @ [http://www.heritage.org/Research/Lecture/TheUSKoreaAllianceontheRocksShakenNotStirred]//au) For South Korea, the alliance was born out of desperate necessity after the Korean War ; for without American commitment, the precarious Armistice agreement would surely not have lasted long. For the United States, the alliance was a product of the regional and global context of the Cold War and its geostrategic rationale of containment and deterrence. The bilateral Mutual Defense Treaty was a pointed effort at reversing Acheson's miscalculation by declaring to the region and the world that the United States was going to be involved and present in Asia. Over the decades, the U.S.ROK relationship has far exceeded expectations, proving to be one of the best in America's history and often touted as an exemplary model for other alliances . It has successfully served not only to deter North Korean aggression but also as one of the pillars of U.S. security strategy in East Asia: to promote stability and pros perity in the region. The alliance has also been the basis for direct and indirect U.S. economic assistance to South Korea, which has reduced its security expenditures and facilitated continuous and rapid economic growth. Furthermore, creating a stable security environment has allowed foreign investors and trade partners to have greater confidence in the economic future of Korea. US Military Commitment to South Korea increases investor confidence Korea Herald 03 (5/16/03, "Summit gets mixed reactions; Seoul experts divided on outcome of RohBush talks" pg online @ lexisnexis//au) "The summit was fruitful in that both sides restored mutual trust, and they took the first step to continue the nuclear talks between Pyongyang and Washington," said Yun Dukmin, professor at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security. Yun said the joint statement will also function as a warning against North Korea to deter them from taking military provocations. Kim Changsoo, researcher at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, said South Korea received the U.S. promise of strong military commitment in return for agreeing on a warning against the North's nuclear issue. "The U.S. military commitment should help clear worries of foreign investors about the security of South Korea," Kim said. President Bush reaffirmed in the joint statement that the U.S. military will maintain its commitment with a robust forward presence on the peninsula. US presence is critical to attracting foreign investment and Northeast Asian stability Behn 03 Washington Times Correspondent to South Korea (9/3/03, "Roh vows again to seek vote on rule" pg online @ lexisnexis//au) Just up the road, American and South Korean troops who train relentlessly to protect the border from invasion stand unflinchingly at attention just a concrete block away from equally determined North Korean soldiers. The desire for a moreequal relationship with the United States does not mean everyone wants the Americans to leave. Many believe the U.S. presence in South Korea is crucial to maintaining regional stability and attracting steady flows of foreign investment "We need a continued military presence for the time being and even after . unification," says Park Jin, spokesman for the conservative Grand National Party, which controls 149 seats in the 273member National Assembly. "U.S. forces are not just a deterrent to the North; they are a stabilizer in Northeast Asia." Korea Neg 250/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors WITHDRAWAL CAUSES ECONOMIC INSTABILITY Withdrawal spurs regional and economic instability Kinne 04 Colonel and US Army Researcher (5/3/04, "U.S. Strategy Towards North Korea" pg online @ [http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc? Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA423691]//au) The economic advantages associated with the strategic withdrawal of forces from the Korean peninsula would consist of reduced costs associated with maintaining a forward presence and potential access to North Korean markets should a U.S. withdrawal facilitate future peace. Likewise, the disadvantages far outweigh the advantages should our withdrawal result in a resumption of conflict. Removal of forces would also signal a change in U.S. resolve, no doubt influencing both regional and economic stability. The historical conquest of South Korea by Japan makes it possible that Korea would align itself with China for economic and security support if needed. Loss of U.S. credibility, prestige, and influence in the AsianPacific region could rapidly follow. Korea Neg 251/436 IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL LINK Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors Immediate withdrawal crushes investor confidence Eberstadt et. al, 07 *Ph.D. in Political Economy and Government from Harvard, Political economist, Senior Adviser to the National Board of Asian Research, **President of The National Bureau of Asian Research Policy Think Tank, ***Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, ****Research Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, *****Senior Vice President for Political and Security Affairs at The National Bureau of Asian Research Policy Think Tank, ******Senior Project Director and Director of the Pyle Center for Northeast Asian Studies at the National Bureau of Asian Research Policy Think Tank (*Nicholas, **Richard J., ***Aaron L., ****Christopher, *****Roy D., ******Travis, "A World without the U.S.-ROK Alliance: Thinking about 'Alternative Futures'", National Bureau of Asian Research, September 11th 2007, June 24th 2010, p. 22, KONTOPOULOS) PDF Teddy The specific nature of any U.S.ROK breakup would naturally have a significant impact on investor confidence in a post alliance South Korea. An acrimonious, relatively quick breakup would force investors to respond quickly to unpredictable developments, raising the possibility that they would not have sufficient time to anticipate changes. International panics, domestic capital flight, or other "contagion" effects would be possible consequences. If the alliance split over a relatively prolonged, predictable period that minimized uncertainty, however, some participants felt that investor confidence might not elicit major macroeconomic responses for the ROK or the Northeast Asian region. Korea Neg 252/436 LINKS Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors US presence fosters stability that causes growth Crichton et. al, 09 *Col of the U.S. Army, **Col of the U.S. Army and Commander's Initiative Group, ***Major of U.S. Army, Creative Director/Layout and Design/Writer/Editor of USFK Strategic Digest (*Jane Crichton, **Lee Torres, ***Jerome L. Pionk, "The Region Today: Korea's Strategic Environment", USFK Strategic Digest, 2009, June 25th 2010, p. 5, KONTOPOULOS) PDF Teddy When measured in terms of Gross Domestic Product, Northeast Asia now possesses five of the world's 20 largest economies. China maintains the world's 2nd largest economy, Japan the 3rd, Russia 9th, and the Republic of Korea the 13th. As an indicator of how much the region has grown, Northeast Asia now accounts for 24 percent of all global trade, up from less than three percent fifty years ago. To facilitate this economic growth, regional stability is imperative for the interests of the U.S. and its allies in the region. It is an enabler of continued economic prosperity, increased democracy, observance of human rights, and supports sociopolitical values that complement the societies of the United States and its allies. The USFK mission and priorities support the achievement of national security principles by focusing on strengthening the Alliance and ensuring regional peace and stability. The USFK mission is to support the ROKU.S. Combined Forces Command in defending the Republic of Korea against external aggression and to maintain peace and stability in East Asia. The command's three priorities are to be prepared to fight and win; to strengthen the ROKU.S. Alliance; and improve the quality of life for Servicemembers, Department of Defense civilians, and families. The priorities are interdependent and support one another. For example, strengthening the alliance through joint exercises and cultural events ensures the Alliance is more prepared to fight and win in defense of the ROK. The United States military strategy for Northeast Asia is based on the maintenance of mutual defense and security treaties with the Republic of Korea and Japan, as well as its forward military presence in the region to serve American commitments to those allies. Within that framework, the ROKU.S. Alliance is a critical component to regional stability that enables regional prosperity. Northeast Asia will remain one of the world's most important regions for the foreseeable future and the ROKU.S. Alliance will remain a lynchpin in ensuring it remains peaceful and prosperous. US presence key to economic growth Crichton et. al, 09 *Col of the U.S. Army, **Col of the U.S. Army and Commander's Initiative Group, ***Major of U.S. Army, Creative Director/Layout and Design/Writer/Editor of USFK Strategic Digest (*Jane Crichton, **Lee Torres, ***Jerome L. Pionk, "The Region Today: Korea's Strategic Environment", USFK Strategic Digest, 2009, June 25th 2010, p. 45, KONTOPOULOS) PDF Teddy However, Northeast Asia also stands today as one of the world's most prosperous regions. It has transformed from a war ravaged corner of the world to being home to some of the world's largest economies, while enjoying dramatic economic growth during a half century of unparalleled stability. Other than the failed economic policies of North Korea, each Northeast Asian country has prospered under a stable environment to which the United States has contributed in no small way with its commitment to security and free market economies. This prosperity has dramatically changed each regional country's formula for determining national interests, thus creating a unique and dynamic strategic environment. Security alliance key to economic growth Crichton et. al, 09 *Col of the U.S. Army, **Col of the U.S. Army and Commander's Initiative Group, ***Major of U.S. Army, Creative Director/Layout and Design/Writer/Editor of USFK Strategic Digest (*Jane Crichton, **Lee Torres, ***Jerome L. Pionk, "Future of the Alliance", USFK Strategic Digest, 2009, June 25th 2010, p. 21, KONTOPOULOS) PDF Teddy The ROKU.S. Alliance remains the key stabilizing force in the region, helping to facilitate economic growth while providing the secure and peaceful environment conducive to steady economic expansion across the region. The U.S. partnership with the Republic of Korea will continue to evolve to ensure the Alliance is poised to remain the vanguard for peace and stability well into the future. Korea Neg 253/436 LINKS Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors Our links are empirically true lack of security hurts the South Korean economy Eberstadt et. al, 07 *Ph.D. in Political Economy and Government from Harvard, Political economist, Senior Adviser to the National Board of Asian Research, **President of The National Bureau of Asian Research Policy Think Tank, ***Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, ****Research Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, *****Senior Vice President for Political and Security Affairs at The National Bureau of Asian Research Policy Think Tank, ******Senior Project Director and Director of the Pyle Center for Northeast Asian Studies at the National Bureau of Asian Research Policy Think Tank (*Nicholas, **Richard J., ***Aaron L., ****Christopher, *****Roy D., ******Travis, "A World without the U.S.-ROK Alliance: Thinking about 'Alternative Futures'", National Bureau of Asian Research, September 11th 2007, June 24th 2010, p. 21, KONTOPOULOS) PDF Teddy The contours of any discussion regarding the impact of postalliance defense expenditures on South Korea's economy naturally follow the assumptions that participants hold about postalliance security requirements. The conclusions described in the preceding section informed this debate, and indicate that meeting the need to respond to North Korea's military capabilities in the absence of an alliance would likely be a significant burden on the South Korean economy. Possible regional competition could also significantly impact South Korea's future defense spending in the absence of an alliance with the United States, as the weapons systems required for competition with such powers as China, Russia, or Japan are even more expensive than many of those required by the North Korean threat. Historical experience from the 1970s provides an example of how a rupture in U.S.ROK relations might affect Seoul's defense spending in a postalliance environment. In that decade, the GDP share of South Korea's defense expenditures rose from 4% to 6% over the course of the decade and President Park Chunghee imposed a "national defense tax." In addition, the Park government's push for defense selfsufficiency ushered in a "heavy and chemical industry" drive that proved immensely costly for the ROK in terms of economic distortions and lingering dirigiste policy inclinations. To be sure, circumstances are different today: the ROK is far more productive than it was in the early 1970s, and some of the economic policy mistakes of the past have been thoroughly aired in both policy circles and popular discussion. But other differences with the past do not necessarily increase freedom of maneuver by comparison with the earlier ROK political economy. Would the South Korean public today accept the potentially huge financial burden of a selfreliant defense establishment in the face of rising social expenditures and a less favorable demographic structure? That question once again raises the prospect that a postalliance South Korea might look to nuclear weaponry as a costeffective means of bolstering the country's defensive capabilities. Withdrawal from Korea hurts investor confidence Eberstadt, et. al, 07 *Ph.D. in Political Economy and Government from Harvard, Political economist, Senior Adviser to the National Board of Asian Research, **Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, ***Research Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (*Nicholas, **Aaron L., ***Christopher, "Toward an AmericaFree Korea", American enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, October 6th 2007, June 24th 2010, http://www.aei.org/article/26924, KONTOPOULOS) Teddy Dramatically higher defense expenditures would in the first place put a substantial additional burden on Seoul's national budget. More generally, South Korea's economic prospects would also likely suffer in a post alliance world. In the longer run, international (and domestic) investors would almost surely lose confidence in the country without the assurance the alliance provides against a recurrence of hostilities on the peninsula. Korea Neg 254/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors A2: LINK TURNS / "X" ISSUE HURTING INVESTMENT NOW Our link outweighs their turns the stability of the alliance is the most critical factor for investors Xinhua 03 (4/2/03 "Iraqbound troops will benefit South Korea: president" pg online @ lexisnexis//au) Enhancing the alliance with the United States would be beneficial to resolving the nuclear issue of the Democratic People 's Republic of Korea (DPRK), said Roh. He said "there are differences" between South Korea and its traditional ally the United States, but "now the differences are dwindling." Although the United States reiterated that the DPRK nuclear issue was different from the Iraq situation, and it also shared the view with South Korea that the nuclear standoff should be resolved peacefully, South Korea should notice that "danger still exists here", said Roh. "Close cooperation on the nuclear issue between South Korea and the United States is very important," the president said. Roh told lawmakers that many foreign investors thought a deteriorated South KoreaUS alliance was the most harmful factor for the South Korean economy. Measures should be taken to "ease the anxiety." Korea Neg 255/436 A2: LINK TURNS Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors No link turns best case scenarios don't benefit the economy Eberstadt et. al, 07 *Ph.D. in Political Economy and Government from Harvard, Political economist, Senior Adviser to the National Board of Asian Research, **President of The National Bureau of Asian Research Policy Think Tank, ***Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, ****Research Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, *****Senior Vice President for Political and Security Affairs at The National Bureau of Asian Research Policy Think Tank, ******Senior Project Director and Director of the Pyle Center for Northeast Asian Studies at the National Bureau of Asian Research Policy Think Tank (*Nicholas, **Richard J., ***Aaron L., ****Christopher, *****Roy D., ******Travis, "A World without the U.S.-ROK Alliance: Thinking about 'Alternative Futures'", National Bureau of Asian Research, September 11th 2007, June 24th 2010, p. 20, KONTOPOULOS) PDF Teddy Although some participants strenuously maintained that South Korea could surely "cope" with the economic consequences of an end to the alliance with Washington, such protestations rather missed the point of the exercise. All governments cope by definition. For an alternative futures analysis focused upon strategy and international security, the more pertinent issues were whether a termination of the U.S.ROK alliance would speed or slow growth in South Korea (and by how much) and whether the end of the alliance with the United States would affect South Korea's relative pace of economic growth as compared to other actors in the region. This introductory and exploratory session did not offer any quantitative estimates, but it is noteworthy that none of the participants suggested that terminating the alliance would either benefit the South Korean economy or aid the ROK in growth relative to the rest of the Northeast Asian region. Conferees did, however, identify a number of possible costs and obstacles. No risk of a link turn--South Korea won't decrease military spending FEFFER 2009 (John, CoDirector of Foreign Policy in Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies, "Ploughshares into Swords: Economic Implications of South Korean Military Spending," February, http://www.keia.org/Publications/AcademicPaperSeries/2009/APSFeffer.pdf) As a result of the global economic crisis, government budgets around the world are shrinking. In Northeast Asia, however, the military portions of the governments seem to be shrinkproof. "Japan, Taiwan and South Korea could resist major cuts in defense spending in the short term due to commitments to `recapitalizing their militaries,'" according to Richard Bitzinger.77 China, too, is better positioned to maintain the pace of its military spending because it, alone among industrial powers, is still anticipating signifi cant, though reduced, growth next year.78 Korea Neg 256/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors Korea Neg 257/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors A2: SPENDING GOOD--ECON Even if military spending can stimulate the economy, it has a net negative effect due to opportunity costs and trade complications FEFFER 2009 (John, CoDirector of Foreign Policy in Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies, "Ploughshares into Swords: Economic Implications of South Korean Military Spending," February, http://www.keia.org/Publications/AcademicPaperSeries/2009/APSFeffer.pdf) The evidence, however, that government investments in the military--at a time of plenty or paucity--are the best growth stimulus is quite weak. Military investments produce jobs, generate some spinoff technologies, and take advantage of some spinon developments. But other government investments contribute more to economic growth. Localization, meanwhile, does not make strict economic sense, given the opportunity costs, although establishing indigenous production for certain capacities, particularly in the software fi eld, is reasonable.82 Arms exports, although they reduce the costs of localization through economies of scale and boosting the operating capacity of defense sector manufacturing, put South Korea in a diffi cult position of muscling into a highly competitive fi eld. Arms exports often come with strings such as reciprocal purchases. Moreover given the arms race dynamic in the region--and spending has taken place at a faster clip now than 15 years ago (Table 3)--government investments even into potentially lucrative arms export sectors can be counterproductive. And armaments, as the United States discovered with al Qaeda, have a tricky habit of ending up in the hands of those against whom increased military budgets are intended to protect. Korea Neg 258/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors Korea Neg 259/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors A2: SPENDING GOOD--INFLUENCE Soft power is net more effective for South Korea--military buildups will only cause arms races FEFFER 2009 (John, CoDirector of Foreign Policy in Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies, "Ploughshares into Swords: Economic Implications of South Korean Military Spending," February, http://www.keia.org/Publications/AcademicPaperSeries/2009/APSFeffer.pdf) If the economic arguments for increasing military spending are either weak, counterproductive, or irrelevant, why should South Korea continue with Defense Reform 2020, particularly at a time of global economic crisis? Countering North Korea doesn't require such an upgrade. Replacing U.S. capabilities is sensible--if indeed the United States plans to pull out--but only defers the question: what are all the new weapons for? South Korea cannot compete with Japan, China, or Russia militarily--certain aspirations to superpower status notwithstanding--and its own modernization plans may only encourage greater spending among its neighbors. From the perspective of comparative advantage, then, South Korea should focus on its "soft power," which has garnered accolades from both within and outside the country.85 And it should focus government investments not on the military but on the "green" stimulus that Lee Myungbak has launched. South Korean diplomacy and green technology: such smart power makes more economic-- and geopolitical--sense than preparing to fi ght last century's wars or helping to create the future insecurity that Defense Reform 2020 was meant to address. Korea Neg 260/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors Korea Neg 261/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors A2: WON'T TAKE THE RISK South Korea will ignore the cost of defense increases even if they hurt the economy FEFFER 2009 (John, CoDirector of Foreign Policy in Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies, "Ploughshares into Swords: Economic Implications of South Korean Military Spending," February, http://www.keia.org/Publications/AcademicPaperSeries/2009/APSFeffer.pdf) Ultimately, however, these arguments based on economic rationales are irrelevant. The Korean government has ignored economic feasibility in the past when allocating money to the military. The push for localization has more to do with nationalism than economic necessity (and echoes North Korea's vain efforts to achieve food selfsuffi ciency). Many of the specifi cally economic arguments--such as the necessity of devoting a certain percentage of the GDP to the military--are arbitrary.83 Government subsidies of the military, as evidenced by the "national security exception" in free trade agreements, lie outside the realm of socalled economic laws.84 Korea Neg 262/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors ROK ECONOMY MODELED South Korea's economy is modeled throughout Asia Korea Times 10 (5/18/10, "Korean model setting example" pg online @ lexisnexis//au) A growing number of Asian nations are rushing to learn from South Korea's experience and knowhow in economic advancement and coping with the financial crisis as the country recovers at the fastest rate from the global meltdown. Asian community, which is expected to become a bigger export market following the crisis. Yeo Hankoo, 42, a former director at the Former ranking government officials are playing a leading role in exporting the country's economic development model and improving its image in the Ministry of Knowledge Economy, has advised developing countries on foreign investment and economic development policies at the World Bank since March. The international economic organization asked Yeo to share the nation's knowhow and economic strategies with developing countries. The Korean government also has provided similar consulting services under the "Knowledge Sharing Program" (KSP) since 2004. The KSP is a program designed to help other countries develop their economic potential using Korea's experience of rapid economic growth. The budget for the KSP increased five times between 2007 and 2010. It has increased every year, even during the financial crisis from 15 billion won in 2007, the final year of the Roh Moohyun administration, to 75 billion won in 2010 under President Lee Myungbak. The nation had presented consulting services to 15 countries on 134 topics by 2009. The government said that the nation's unique experience attracted many developing countries. "Recognizing Korea's uniqueness as a successfully transitioned donor status country, there have been increasing requests by governments of developing countries to share Korea's experience in this area," the Ministry of Strategy and Finance said on its official Web site. "Korean researchers are also increasingly engaged in research in this field to perform more efficiently and effectively in sharing knowledge on economic development experiences." Retired high ranking officials, including former ministers, are the main manpower pool for the program. Kwon Okyu, former deputy prime minister, has served as project manager for Indonesia. Kwon advised to the nation on several topics, such as economic policies, regulations for financial firms and midterm financial plans. He visited the finance minister of Indonesia in Jakarta and shared his knowledge on the issues. Hyun Jungtaik, former president of the Korea Development Institute, provided consulting services for Uzbekistan on the Navoi Free Industrial Economic Zone, which the advised on the management of the zone in January based on Korea's experiences of operating various free economic zones. Lee Hyungkoo, nation kicked off in December 2008. Navoi Province is located in the central part of Uzbekistan, and is the largest industrial center in the country. Hyun former labor minister, was asked by Kazakhstan to work for the nation as an economic advisor last year while he was serving as a leader of KSP. He willingly accepted the proposal and shared his expertise. This year, more nations will join the KSP including the United Arab Emirates. Korea suggested providing the economic consulting service when it bid to export nuclear power plants to the Middle East nation. South Korea has been a model for developing Asian economies as it is considered an impressive success story of transforming a warravaged agrarian economy into a manufacturing powerhouse. IMPACTS Korea Neg 263/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors U.S. ECONOMY IMPACT South Korean economy is key to the US economy Hubbard 01 Former U.S. Ambassador to Korea (11/8/01, "Ambassador Hubbard's Remarks to the FKI November 8, 2001" pg online @ [http://statelists.state.gov/scripts/wa.exe?A2=ind0111b&L=uskoreakr&D=1&P=352]//au) So, today I will try to give you a U.S. perspective on U.S.Korea trade relations, on Korea's economic prospects, and on the economic aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks. To begin with trade, Korea is a vitally important partner of the U.S., with a large and growing market, both in and outside of Seoul. Korea is the world's 11thlargest economy. Last year, the U.S. and Korea did roughly $68 billion in twoway trade, with U.S. Department of Commerce figures showing that the U.S. registered a $12 billion deficit. The U.S. is Korea's largest export market; Korea is America's 6thlargest export market, and our 4thlargest market for agricultural products. American firms are very active in Korea, and in most sectors they are maintaining or gradually increasing their market shares. Another indicator of U.S. business interest in the Korean market comes from the Commercial Section of our Embassy, which has supported the efforts of over 3,000 U.S. firms this year. The American Chamber of Commerce in Korea also reflects this high level of commercial interest in the Korean market. It is one of the largest and most active AMCHAM chapters in the world. The Korean economy has made an impressive recovery from the financial crisis of four years ago. Recently, however, growth has slowed as exports decline to Korea's largest markets, which are also experiencing their own economic downturns. Korea depends heavily on exports to sustain growth, making it especially vulnerable to drops in world demand. A case in point is the worldwide downturn in electronic commodities, which has affected the Korean economy. Despite the sluggish export situation during 2001, the Korean economy has impressively managed to achieve a modest expansion, even as many other competing Asian economies contract and fall into recession. A robust South Korean economy is key to US economic growth and competitiveness Asia Pulse 09 (10/16/09, "Korea FTA Promoted As Stimulus To Struggling U.S. Economy" pg online @ lexisnexis//au) In remarks clearly aimed at the Democratic Congress, concerned about a backlash from trade unions over possible job cuts, Han said the South Korean economy is big enough to help boost the slumping U.S. economy by "creating and maintaining jobs in the United States." "Korea's GDP is $1US trillion," he said, referring to the gross domestic product. "It is the third largest market in Asia. It's the seventh largest U.S. trading partner. It's the sixth largest market for the U.S. agricultural products, and the second largest market for the U.S. service industry. It's the seventh largest market for the U.S. infrastructure and information technology." Twoway trading volume reached $83US billion in 2008, with trade in services reaching $19US billion in 2007, according to U.S. government figures. The U.S. International Trade Commission estimates that the reduction of Korean tariffs and tariffrate quotas on goods alone would add $10US billion to $12US billion to the annual U.S. GDP, and around $10US billion to U.S. annual goods exports to Korea. Han also pointed out that U.S. goods may lose competitiveness in South Korea , which he said "would like to be the hub of free trade agreements in East Asia," referring to the free trade deal South Korea initialed Thursday with the European Union, and similar deals Seoul is seeking with China, Japan, India and other countries. Korea Neg 264/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors GLOBAL ECONOMY IMPACT South Korean economic collapse causes Korean instability and global depression Korea Times 98 (9/23/98, "Seoul, Tokyo Underestimate Opportunity For Cooperation" pg online @ lexisnexis//au) As North Korea's future becomes unclear, and South Korea has faced an economic crisis, adjustments between Seoul and Tokyo over North Korea policy have begun to take on a strategic meaning. Our worstcase scenarios would be for North Korea to collapse before South Korea can economically rebuild itself. If that type of nightmare becomes a reality, South Korea would not be able to bear the huge cost necessary for North Korea's relief and rehabilitation. Even in the minimum calculations, the cost would probably be several times the size of the present foreign debts (150 billion dollars). However, if the South Korean economy collapses totally, it would affect Japan and would trigger a global depression from Japan.'' Basically, even if we could avoid a second Korean War, we are on the same boat. South Korean economic collapse crushes the global economy and the US dollar China News 97 (12/14/97, "S Korean Recession Will Greatly Affect Taiwan" pg online @ lexisnexis//au) Taiwan's economy will be affected in at least three major aspects if the South Korean currency continues to depreciate, according to the Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA). According to an analysis report issued by the MOEA yesterday morning, the South Korean economic downturn will first impact on the global economic development since it is the world's 11th largest economy and 12th trading nation. If the South Korean economic recession continues, it will surely weaken the global economic development. Taiwan's economy will unlikely avoid such impact since the staggering slide of South Korea's won would bring about a reorganization of competitiveness among commodities of developing countries , according to the MOEA's analysis. Secondly, the South Korean economic debacle would affect Taiwan's steel, petrochemcials, electronics and textile industries in a short term because both countries have been strong competitors in these industries. Taiwan, however, would soon catch up with South Korea and even overpass it in this regard since the economic crisis would worsen South Korea's financial capabilities and loaning credibility and thus weaken its enterprises' ability for longterm and sustainable operations, the MOEA said in the analysis. Moreover, the increasing deficit between Taiwan and South Korea will continue and will be difficult to be wiped out in a short term due to the sliding of South Korea's won. South Korea's economic crisis has worsened due to its increasing debts. As investors have losing out their confidence in the South Korean currency, analysts anticipated a slide to a record low of 2,000 wons against a US dollar. Korea Neg 265/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors LOW OIL PRICES IMPACT East Asian economic crisis lowers oil prices PREMnotes 98 (March 1998, "The effect will East Asia's crisis have on developing countries?", The World Bank, Number 1, http://www1.worldbank.org/prem/premnotes/premnote1.pdf) MGM East Asia's financial crisis will affect other developing countries in five main ways: by shrinking foreign private capital flows, reducing trade volumes, lowering the prices of traded goods, widening spreads for borrowers, and depressing international interest rates. Smaller capital flows The crisis has already limited the availabil ity of foreign private capital. New interna tional market transactions fell about onethird in November and December 1997, and crossborder bank lending is expected to be much lower in 1998. The reduction in private flows has caused macroeconomic tightening in many devel oping countries, leading to a multipliereffect on the slowdown in growth and a reduction in the need for external finance. Brazil, the Czech Republic, Russia, and Poland have raised shortterm interest rates and, in some instances, cut budget deficits. Reduced access to external capital has been exacerbated by domestic capital flight. Because most large developing economies depend on private capital flows, these developments have the poten tial to cause a widespread recession. Reduced trade volumes External adjustment and currency devalu ations in the five most affected East Asian countries will lower exports from the rest of the world by about 1.5 percent. Combined, reduced import demand in East Asia and export displacement else where will cause growth in world export volumes to drop about 0.7 percent in 1998 relative to previous projections (figure 2). As a result developing country growth should fall about 1.0 percent. Besides East Asia, the two most affected regions are the Middle East and North Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean--each suffers about a 1.0 percent drop. (These data refer to the firstround partial equilibrium effect. In practice, some of the adjustment will come through price.) The direct effect on China and India will be small because of their enormous economies and limited trade ties to East Asia, but they will lose moderately from competition in third markets. Lower prices The crisis will have a deflationary effect on the prices of traded goods. Commodity prices (oil, natural rubber, timber, rice, and metals) have already fallen (on top of other factors working in the same direction). The five hardesthit East Asian countries account for about 7 percent of world trade in manufactures, and the dollar price of their exports is expected to fall about 9 percent. Besides East Asia, the regions suffering the largest terms of trade declines are the Middle East and North Africa, Latin America, and SubSaharan Africa. Terms of trade effects vary widely by country (figure 3). The biggest losers are oil exporters--notably Algeria, which in 1998 will suffer a 12.5 percent loss in its terms of trade attributable solely to the cri sis. But oil importers, notably Turkey, gain substantially. Among other countries, exporters of metals and primary commodities will fare worse than exporters of manufactures. Many countries that will lose-- Colombia, Peru, Russia, South Africa--are exporters of minerals and oil but also have a diversified export base, with significant manufactures. Their terms of trade losses will range from 19 percent. Korea Neg 266/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors ALLIANCE IMPACT South Korea's economy is key to Northeast Asian stability and the alliance Hubbard 01 Former U.S. Ambassador to Korea (11/8/01, "Ambassador Hubbard's Remarks to the FKI November 8, 2001" pg online @ [http://statelists.state.gov/scripts/wa.exe?A2=ind0111b&L=uskoreakr&D=1&P=352]//au) To summarize my views on the Korean economy and our bilateral trade relationship , the United States has an important and overriding interest in a stable and prosperous Korea. American companies, workers and consumers all benefit from economic prosperity in Korea and healthy trade flows between our two nations. A strong, vibrant Korean economy is important to U.S. interests, just as an expanding U.S. economy and open market is important to Korea's. Of course, our interest in Korea extends well beyond economics and trade. A strong, healthy Korea is critical to our fundamental interests in Northeast Asia. Korea has been, and will continue to be, our friend, partner, and ally. The U.S.ROK security alliance has been the linchpin of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia for half a century, and remains so today. Korea Neg 267/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors DEMOCRACY IMPACT South Korean economic growth is key to US democracy and human rights promotion Woo 6 Senior Research Fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (8/22/06, "Finding vision and rationale for future ties; Korea can enjoy more benefits than losses from alliance with U.S." pg online @ lexisnexis//au) For the United States, South Korea in a continued alliance would mean a valuable cooperator in managing the international order, not to mention its economic value as a key trade partner . Strong security ties with South Korea will be helpful to the American war on terrorism and other peacekeeping activities . A continued U.S. military presence in Asia as a vacuum filler will be conducive to Asian stability which in turn is helpful to American prosperity. Above all, a prosperous and stable South Korea will remain as a shining example of American success in disseminating democracy and capitalism. Once the two nations find the alliance mutually beneficial, the task of finding visions and rationale for a future alliance and unveiling the blueprint falls to them, too. Here are some guidelines. First, considering the changes in the U.S. global strategy and priorities, quality rather than quantity or size should be appreciated in the future alliance. Second, even after the threat from the North fades away, the alliance will have to remain as one sharing common values like democracy, human rights, market economy, etc. Third, in the future alliance, South Korea will have to play a more primary role than now and bear an increasing defense burdensharing reflective of South Korea's economic growth and political achievement. South Korea sets an economic and democratic model for Asia Newsweek 2/8/10 ("Selling South Korea; Lee Myungbak wants to move his country to the center of the world." pg online @ lexisnexis//au) In short, the South Korean model is a more mature cousin of China'sa hybrid economy, part free market, part state controlledbut with more freedom for the market and for political dissent. Now Lee is positioning South Korea within Asia as a dynamic alternative to both China's mighty command economy and Japan's nogrowth economy. In Southeast Asia, South Korea has long been admired for completing an economic miracle in just one generation, moving its 48 million people out of poverty and entering the ranks of fully industrialized nations , with average per capita income that surpassed $20,000 in 2007. And, unlike China, South Korea has achieved economic and political growth at the same time, with an increasingly wellestablished multiparty democracy that respects free speech and election results. South Korea, says U.S. Ambassador Kathleen Stephens, is "the best example in the postWorld War II era of a country that has overcome enormous obstacles to achieve this kind of success." Many Southeast Asian nations, alarmed by the harsh sides of the China model, look to South Korea as an alternative. Vietnam is sending civil servants there, studying how in the 1970s and '80s Seoul used massive government support, such as cheap loans, to develop strategic industries such as steel and petrochemicals as the backbone of its export economy. As part of Vietnam's effort to develop capital markets, it also now runs a stock exchange in Hanoi, built with the help of the Korea Stock Exchange. Officials from Vietnam, Cambodia, Indonesia, and Uzbekistan regularly visit South Korea to join training programs that teach economic and business management. "Developing countries are eager to learn South Korea's economic model because of its relevance to them," says Euh Yoondae, a Korea University economist currently heading a presidential committee to promote the national brand. "Our open economic system is more appealing to them than, say, that of China." Korea Neg 268/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors DEMOCRACY IMPACT Strong South Korean economy is key to democracy promotion and regional economic cooperation Korea Times 6/30/10 ("Importance of Korean development model rising" pg online @ lexisnexis//au) South Korea's spectacular rise as an economy and democracy provides a valuable model for upandcoming countries , experts said Wednesday in Washington, D.C. At a forum coorganized by the Asia Foundation, scholars discussed the lessons to be learned from Korea's transformation from one of the world's poorest nations to rank as the 14th largest economy. Lee Jaymin, a professor at Yonsei University, underlined the importance of an outwardlooking development strategy and global integration in creating a powerful economy. He said that while other underdeveloped countries attempted to reduce The forum came as the country, the first to evolve from a major recipient of aid to a donor nation, is considering exporting its development model abroad. foreign dependency by bolstering local production of industrialized products, Korea got ahead by employing a timely exportoriented approach. 'All economic miracles in the last sixty years have occurred through raising the degree of integration,' he said. 'Integration is a necessary condition for successful growth, making it possible to access the market, capital and technology provided by advanced countries.' During its industrialization, Korea was able protect its domestic market, give subsidies to its industries, and regulate foreign investment by exporting freely to advanced countries. Professors Kwack Sungyeung of Howard University and Lee Youngsun of Hallym University pointed to uncompromising leadership as key for emerging countries, citing that of former President Park Chunghee, who spearheaded the industrialization. His Korea's resources for national reconstruction, they said. Kwak and Lee said Korea's zeal for education as well as government determination to break, once and for all, the vicious cycle of poverty and economic stagnation inspired the Korean people to come together and mobilized expansion of educational institutions also contributed greatly to the rise. Looking to the future, Professor Park Myung lim of Yonsei University said the country can expand on the model by acting as a regional mediator. According to Park, such a role would help stabilize East Asia, where economic cooperation is increasingly important but major powers still jockey to secure their interests. USROK alliance facilitates South Korean economic growth and democracy Nye 09 Professor of IR at Harvard University (11/13/09, "South Korea's Growing Soft Power" pg online @ [http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2009/11/137_55438.html]//au) South Korea has found that an alliance with a distant power like the U nited States continues to provide a useful insurance policy for life in a difficult neighborhood. In a recent survey of G20 nations published in the newspaper Chosun Ilbo, the Hansun Foundation ranked South Korea 13th in the world in terms of national power. South Korea ranked 9th in hard power resources but performed more poorly in terms of soft power. In the newspaper's words, `` state of the art factories, hightech weapons, advanced information communications infrastructure are the key components that a country must have for stronger international competitiveness." But for these ``hard power" ingredients to become true engines of the country's growth and prosperity, they must be backed by more sophisticated and highly efficient ``soft power." South Korea has impressive softpower potential . Sometimes, Koreans compare their country of 50 million to a neighbor like China or a superpower like the U.S. and believe that they cannot compete with such giants. That may be true in the domain of hard military power, but it is not true of soft More recently, despite its impressive hardpower resources, power resources. Many countries that are smaller than South Korea do well with soft power. The political clout of countries such as Canada, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian states is greater than their military and economic weight, owing to the incorporation of attractive causes such as economic aid or peacemaking in their definitions of their national interest. For example, in the past two decades, Norway, a country of only five million people, has taken a lead in peace talks. Similarly, Canada and the Netherlands have enhanced their soft power not only by their policies in the U.N., but also by overseas development assistance. Such legitimizing policies are readily available to South Korea. Moreover, in terms of attractive values, South Korea has a compelling story to tell. In 1960, it had approximately the same level of economic wealth as Ghana, one of the more prosperous of the newly independent countries in Africa. Today, the two countries are vastly different. Over the next halfcentury, South Korea became the world's 11th largest economy, with per capita income reaching more than $15,000. It joined the OECD and is an important member of the G20. It has become the home of worldfamous brands and a leader in the adoption of the Internet and information technology. Even more important, South Korea also developed a democratic political system , with free elections and peaceful transfer of power between different political parties. Human rights are well protected, as is freedom of speech. South Koreans often complain about the disorderliness of their political system, and the Hansun Foundation Report rated South Korea 16th among the G20 in the efficiency of legislative activities, and 17th in political stability and efficiency. According to the survey, ``The low standings are not surprising, given habitually violent clashes between governing and opposition parties over sensitive bills and unending bribery scandals involving politicians." Nevertheless, while improvement in these areas would certainly enhance South Korea's soft power, the very fact of having an open society that is able to produce and discuss such criticisms makes South Korea attractive. Finally, there is the attractiveness of South Korean culture. The traditions of Korean art, crafts, and cuisine have already spread around the world. Korean popular culture has also crossed borders, particularly among younger people in neighboring Asian countries, while the impressive success of the Korean diaspora in the U.S. has further enhanced the attractiveness of the culture and country from which they came. Indeed, the late 1990s As a result, South Korea is beginning to design a foreign policy that will allow it to play a larger role in the international institutions and networks that will be essential to global governance. and its soft power is not prisoner to the geographical limitations that have constrained its hard power throughout its history. saw the rise of ``hallyu," or ``the Korean wave" the growing popularity of all things Korean, from fashion and film to music and cuisine. In short, South Korea has the resources to produce soft power, Korea Neg 269/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors CHINESE DEMOCRACY IMPACT East Asian democracy is key to global democracy it prevents China's rise Friedman 09 Prof in Political Science U Wisconsin (Edward, Dissent, "China: A Threat to or Threatened by Democracy?" Winter, http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=1318) CCP antidemocratic policies are significant. Democratization tends to occur regionally --for example, after 19741975 in Southern Europe, subsequently in Latin America, in the late 1980s in East Asia (the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan), and after November 1989 in Eastern and Central Europe. The CCP regime, in contrast, aims to create an Asian region where its authoritarian ruling groups are unchallenged, in which regional institutions are inoculated against democratization . China's successes in that direction make it hard to imagine Asia, in any foreseeable future, becoming defined by a democratic ethos that makes authoritarian China seem the odd nation out. An exception is democratic Taiwan. THESE Starting in the 1990s, Beijing has portrayed Taiwan as a troublemaking polity and a chaotic society. But the basic interests of China's economic modernizers are to move as quickly as possible into advanced technology and Information Technology (IT). This requires improving economic relations with Taiwan, a world leader in IT. Good relations between Beijing and Taipei would increase exchanges of students, tourists, families, and entrepreneurs across the Taiwan Strait. Democratic Taiwan, over time, could come to seem to Chinese victims of a repressive, greedy, corrupt, and arbitrary political system to be China's better future. If Singapore, in a postLee Kuan Yew era, would then democratize, that, too, could help make democracy seem a natural regional alternative to politically conscious Chinese. For the CCP is trying to solve its governance problems, in part, by evolving into a Singaporetype authoritarianism, a technocratic, professional, minimally corrupt, minimally cruel, oneparty, administrative state. although the CCP's foreign policy works against the spread of democracy, there are some ways in which regional forces could yet initiate a regional democratization. The future is contingent on unknowable factors. One key is Indonesia. There are political forces in Jakarta that oppose In sum, Beijing's efforts in Southeast Asia to roll back the advance of democracy. If Indonesia were to succeed, and if nations in South Asia, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, were also to democratize, it is possible to imagine politically conscious Chinese seeking to ride a wave of regional democratization, especially if Taiwan and Singapore were both admirable democratic alternatives. Although regional factors make all this unlikely, enough wild cards are in play that China's democratization is not impossible. HAVING EXAMINED regional forces, we must then ask about the political possibilities inherent in the way economic forces create new social groups that interact with the different interests of state institutions. First, China's growth patterns have polarized the division of wealth such that China may soon surpass Brazil as the most unequal (but stable) major country in the world. All students of democratic transitions agree that great economic inequality makes ruling groups resistant to a democratization that they believe would put their illgotten gains at risk. This consensus hypothesis, that democratic transitions are more likely where economic polarization is limited, is formalized in a rationalchoice model in Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson's Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Too much economic inequality is a huge obstacle blocking a democratic transition. The rising urban middle classes prefer to be defended by the authoritarian state rather than risk their status and fortunes in a democratic vote, where the majority is imagined as poor, rural, and vengeful against economic winners, imagined as an undeserving and traitorous upper stratum. To be sure, there are democratic tendencies that result from the move from collective farming to household agriculture and from the rise of property rights, a new middle class, literacy, wealth, and so on--as Seymour Martin Lipset long ago argued. But an adaptable and resilient CCP regime that continues to deliver rapid economic growth is not going to be abandoned by rising classes worried about vengeance by the losers in a polarized society. Still, China is combining rapid industrialization with a climb into postmodern service and high technologybased growth in which industrial workers can seem a dying breed, an albatross to further growth. Core areas of industrialization are beginning to hollow out. It is possible to imagine the losers from China's continuing rapid growth--for example, sixty million laidoff former State Owned Enterprise (SOE) workers--turning against the regime. Should a global financial shock cause China to lose its export markets, instability might threaten the regime. As Haleb's Black Swan suggests, a full exploration of democratic possibilities should look into all the wildcard factors. The regime's economic reformers, however, could be portrayed as having sold the nation's better future to Western imperialism if Chinese lost their jobs because of an economic virus spreading from New York and London to Shanghai. And then, opponents of the government would not back a move to democracy. The West would be seen as a fount of evil, and then both the people and the ruling groups might choose a transition to a more chauvinistic and militarist order that would renounce China's global openness as a betrayal of the nation's essence. History suggests that left nationalists within the regime, who largely control the security and propaganda apparatuses, would be militantly against any opening to democracy. Such a neofascist ruling coalition might turn to military adventures or close China's doors in order to appeal to nativists--in ways, however, that would lose China the sources of continuing high growth. That is, neofascist hardliners might implement policies that would alienate many people in China and in Asia, and thereby create a counterforce that might find democracy attractive. But such imaginings rest too much on longterm speculations about concatenating factors leading to distant futures. Such meanderings of the mind should not be confused with confident predictions about a democratic outcome. Still, it is clear that much depends on how the postMao rightauthoritarian populist system relates to social contradictions. The CCP is moving toward presidential succession rules similar to what Mexico institutionalized in its earlier era of a oneparty dominant presidential populism. Mexico had a one term president for six years who chose his successor; China has a president who serves two fiveyear terms and chooses his successor at the close of the first. Chinese analysts fear that as economic stagnation, corruption, and debt delegitimated Mexico's presidential populism, so the same could happen with China. The danger is dubbed Latin Americanization. Anxious analysts worry about the entrenchment of greedy local interests that resist the many adaptations required for the continuing rapid growth that wins legitimacy and stability for the regime. Ever less charismatic and weaker presidents in China will lack the clout to defeat the vested interests who will act much as landed elites acted in the days of the ancien rgime to block the changes required for economic growth. Resultant stagnation would create a regime crisis, as occurred in Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s, leading there to a wave of military coups, but also, in the 1980s, to a democratic opening in Mexico--because, among other things, Mexico uniquely abutted the United States and wished to benefit from greater access to the U.S. market. China has no similarly large and attractive democratic neighbor, unless globalization so reduces distance that the two sides of the Pacific seem no further apart than the English Channel did in the eighteenth century. This is a real possibility in our age of transportation and communication revolutions. The internal Chinese analysis of a future crisis brought on by Latin Americanization should be treated seriously. But East Asian economic growth seems to me to be of a different order than Latin America's. Region is decisive. In addition, household agriculture and physical mobility in China make it likely that Kuznets curve factors, in which the economic gap narrows after an initial widening as a country develops, will operate in China in the future. That is, the forces of polarization will be reversed. Chinese household agriculture is very different from the world of the landed elites that emerged out of slaveplantation Latin America. Perhaps there will turn out to be truth to the analogy of a feudallike CCPtype system rooted in Russian czarist feudal institutions with the repressed labor relations of plantation slavery and its aftermath. My own hunch, however, is that anxiety about Latin Americanization in China is an indicator that the regime remains preemptive, flexible, and responsive to threats and will, therefore, head off dangers to the regime, nipping them in the bud. It is a resilient regime, not a fragile one. ALTHOUGH WE may be seeing through a glass darkly to try to locate forces of regime instability or democratization in China, what is clear is how to analyze the forces at work that will decide whether it is more or less likely that China will democratize. An analyst should try to understand how the forces of region, of groups and interests fostered by the economic moment globally and at home, and of the state, comprehended in terms of the strength and weakness of its diverse and democracy is not impossible, but that a far more likely outcome is either continuity, that is, evolutionary change toward a dominantparty populist presidentialism imagining itself as becoming more like authoritarian Singapore, or a transition in a more chauvinistic and militaristic direction. China is not likely to democratize in any immediate future, but it is not inconceivable. China is a superpower probing, pushing, and pulling the world in its authoritarian direction. Japan is out of touch in imagining a superior Japan leading China into an East Asian Community, with Japan showing China the way in everything from environmentalism to shared high standards of living. For Confucian China, China is the core, apex, and leader of an Asian community. The CCP intends for authoritarian China to establish itself as a global pole. China will similarly experience it as a threatening American arrogance for the U.S. government to assume that an incredibly successful China, imagining itself as a moral global pole leading conflicting elements, interact. My own reading of this interaction is that humanity in a better direction, needs to be saved by American missionaries of democracy. The democracies might be able to promote an end to systemic abuses of human rights in China, but Americans will not be heard in Chinese ruling circles unless they abandon a democratization agenda in which change for the better in China presupposes ending the leadership role of the CCP. Appeasement is the price of long term good relations. The alternatives seem too costly. There is no other longlasting basis for trustful cooperation with the government in Beijing than to accept the regime's legitimacy. CCP ruling groups imagine foreign democracypromotion as a threat to China's--and the world's--better future, identified, of course, as at one with the interests of CCP ruling groups. Can the world afford not to treat China as the superpower it is? The CCP imagines a chaotic and warprone world disorder of Americanled democracypromotion being replaced by a beneficent Chinese world order of authoritarian growth with There may be far less of a challenge to China from democracy than there is a challenge to democracy from China. Diamond concludes in his recent book The Spirit of Democracy that democracy is in trouble across the world because of the rise of China, an authoritarian superpower that has the economic clout to back and bail out authoritarian regimes around the globe. "Singapore . . . could foreshadow a resilient form of capitalistauthoritarianism by China, Vietnam, and elsewhere in Asia," which delivers "booming development, political stability, low levels of corruption, affordable housing, and a secure pension system." Joined by ever richer and more influential petro powers leveraging the enormous wealth of Sovereign Investment Funds, " Asia will determine the fate of democracy," at least in stability. Democracypromoter Larry Korea Neg 270/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors the foreseeable future. Authoritarian China, joined by its authoritarian friends, is well on the way to defeating the global forces of democracy. Korea Neg 271/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors CHINESE DEMOCRACY IMPACT Democracy Promotion checks global nuclear war Muravchik 01 Resident Scholar at AEI (Josh, "Democracy and Nuclear Peace", July, http://www.npecweb.org/Syllabus/Muravchik.pdf) The greatest impetus for world peace and perforce of nuclear peace is the spread of democracy. In a famous article, and subsequent book, Francis Fukuyama argued that democracy's extension was leading to "the end of history." By this he meant the conclusion of man's quest for the right social order, but he also meant the "diminution of the likelihood of largescale conflict between states." 1 Fukuyama's phrase was intentionally provocative, even tongueincheek, but he was pointing to two downtoearth historical observations: that democracies are more peaceful than other kinds of government and that the world is growing more democratic. Neither point has gone unchallenged. Only a few decades ago, as distinguished an observer of international relations as George Kennan made a claim quite contrary to the first of these assertions. Democracies, he said, were slow to anger, but once aroused "a democracy ... fights in anger ... to the bitter end." 2 Kennan's view was strongly influenced by the policy of "unconditional surrender" pursued in World War II. But subsequent experience, such as the negotiated settlements America sought in Korea and Vietnam proved him wrong. Democracies are not only slow to anger but also quick to compromise. And to forgive. Notwithstanding the insistence on unconditional surrender, America treated Japan and that part of Germany that it occupied with extraordinary generosity. In recent years a burgeoning literature has discussed the peacefulness of democracies. Indeed the proposition that democracies do not go to war with one another has been described by one political scientist as being " as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations 3 ." Some of those who find enthusiasm for democracy off putting have challenged this proposition, but their challenges have only served as empirical tests that have confirmed its robustness. For example, the academic Paul Gottfried and the columnistturnedpolitician Patrick J. Buchanan have both instanced democratic England's declaration of war against democratic Finland during World War II. 4 In fact, after much procrastination, England did accede to the pressure of its Soviet ally to declare war against Finland which was allied with Germany. But the declaration was purely formal: no fighting ensued between England and Finland. Surely this is an exception that proves the rule. The strongest exception I can think of is the war between the nascent state of Israel and the Arabs in 1948. Israel was an embryonic democracy and Lebanon, one of the Arab belligerents, was also democratic within the confines of its peculiar confessional division of power. Lebanon, however, was a reluctant party to the fight. Within the councils of the Arab League, it opposed the war but went along with its larger confreres when they opted to attack. Even so, Lebanon did little fighting and soon sued for peace. Thus, in the case of Lebanon against Israel, as in the case of England against Finland, democracies nominally went to war against democracies when they were dragged into conflicts by authoritarian allies. The political scientist Bruce Russett offers a different challenge to the notion that democracies are more peaceful. "That democracies are in general, in dealing with all kinds of states, more peaceful than are authoritarian or other non democratically constituted states ... is a much more controversial proposition than 'merely' that democracies are peaceful in their dealings with each other, and one for which Russett cites his own and other statistical explorations which show that while democracies rarely fight one another they often fight against others. The trouble with such studies, however, is that they rarely examine the question of who started or caused a war. To reduce the data to a form that is quantitatively measurable, it is easier to determine whether a conflict has occurred between two states than whose fault it was. But the latter question is all important. Democracies may often go to war against dictatorships because the dictators see them as prey or underestimate their resolve. Indeed, such examples abound. Germany might have behaved more cautiously in the summer of 1914 had it realized that England there is little systematic evidence," he says. 5 Democracy is not just a mechanism; it entails a spirit of compromise and selfrestraint. At bottom, democracy is the willingness to resolve civil disputes without recourse to violence. Nations that embrace this ethos in the conduct of their domestic affairs are naturally more predisposed to embrace it in their dealings with other nations Russett aimed to explain why . hesitation in ... calling down on themselves all the miseries of war." 8 But this valid insight is incomplete. There is a deeper explanation. democracies are more peaceful toward one another. To do this, he constructed two models. One hypothesized that the cause lay in the mechanics of democratic decisionmaking (the "structural/institutional model"), the other that it lay in the democratic ethos (the "cultural/normative model"). His statistical assessments led him to conclude that: "almost always the cultural/normative model shows a consistent effect on conflict occurrence and war. The structural/institutional model sometimes provides a significant relationship but often does not." 9 If it is the ethos that makes democratic states more peaceful toward each other, would not that ethos also make them more peaceful in general? Russett implies that the answer is no, because to his mind a critical element in the peaceful behavior of democracies toward other democracies is their anticipation of a conciliatory attitude by their counterpart. But this is too pat. The attitude of liveandletlive cannot be turned on and off like a spigot. would fight to vindicate Belgian neutrality and to support France. Later, Hitler was emboldened by his notorious contempt for the flabbiness of the democracies. North Korea almost surely discounted the likelihood of an American military response to its Page 2 invasion of the South after Secretary of State Dean Acheson publicly defined America's defense perimeter to exclude the Korean peninsula (a declaration which merely confirmed existing U.S. policy). In 1990, Saddam Hussein's decision to swallow Kuwait was probably encouraged by the inference he must have taken from the statements and actions of American officials that Washington would offer no forceful resistance. Russett says that those who claim democracies are in general more peaceful "would have us believe that the United States was regularly on the defensive, rarely on the offensive, during the Cold War." 6 But that is not quite right: the word "regularly" distorts the issue. A victim can sometimes turn the tables on an aggressor, but that does not make the victim equally bellicose. None would dispute that Napoleon was responsible for the Napoleonic wars or Hitler for World War II in Europe, but after a time their victims seized the offensive. So in the Cold War, the United States may have initiated some skirmishes (although in fact it rarely did), but the struggle as a whole was driven onesidedly. The Soviet policy was "class warfare"; the American policy was "containment." The socalled revisionist historians argued that America bore an equal or larger share of responsibility for the conflict. But Mikhail Gorbachev made nonsense of their theories when, in the name of glasnost and perestroika, he turned the Soviet Union away from its historic course. The Cold War ended almost instantlyas he no doubt knew it would. "We would have been able to avoid many ... difficulties if the democratic process had developed normally in our country," he wrote. 7 To render judgment about the relative peacefulness of states or systems, we must ask not only who started a war but why. In particular we should consider what in Catholic Just War doctrine is called "right intention," which means roughly: what did they hope to get out of it? In the few cases in recent times in which wars were initiated by democracies, there were often motives other than aggrandizement, for example, when America invaded Grenada. To be sure, Washington was impelled by selfinterest more than altruism, primarily its concern for the wellbeing of American nationals and its desire to remove a chip, however tiny, from the Soviet game board. But America had no designs upon Grenada, and the invaders were greeted with joy by the Grenadan citizenry. After organizing an election, America pulled out. In other cases, democracies have turned to war in the face of provocation, such as Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982 to root out an enemy sworn to its destruction or Turkey's invasion of Cyprus to rebuff a powergrab by Greek nationalists. In contrast, the wars launched by dictators, such as Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, North Korea's of South Korea, the Soviet Union's of Hungary and Afghanistan, often have aimed at conquest or subjugation. The big exception to this rule is colonialism. The European powers conquered most of Africa and Asia, and continued to hold their prizes as Europe democratized. No doubt many of the instances of democracies at war that enter into the statistical calculations of researchers like Russett stem from the colonial era. But colonialism was a legacy of Europe's predemocratic times, and it was abandoned after World War II. Since then, I know of no case where a democracy has initiated warfare without significant provocation or for reasons of sheer aggrandizement, but there are several cases where dictators have done so. One interesting piece of Russett's research should help to point him away from his doubts that democracies are more peaceful in general. He aimed to explain why democracies are more peaceful toward each other. Immanuel Kant was the first to observe, or rather to forecast, the pacific inclination of democracies. He reasoned that "citizens ... will have a great The citizens and officials of democracies recognize that other states, however governed, have legitimate interests, and they are disposed to try to accommodate those interests except when the other party's behavior seems threatening or outrageous. Korea Neg 272/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors CHINESE DEMOCRACY IMPACT Chinese Democratization prevents a SinoJapan War Friedman 2k Professor of Pol. Sci. at U. Wisconsin (Edward, Hawkins Chair, in "What if China Doesn't Democratize? Implications for War and Peace, Ed. Edward Friedman and Barrett L. McCormick, p. 99105) If China does not democratize, Beijing's hostility to Tokyo could facilitate a war in the twentyfirst century . In the section on "SinoJapanese Relations" in his 1997 study of Asia 's Deadly Triangle, Kent Calder, a senior adviser to the U.S. State Department for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, foresees arms races, tensions, and flashpoints for war.2 . Even during the May 1999 Chinese riots sparked by the murderous NATO bombing of China's embassy in Belgrade, many angry Chinese still focused on Japan. Web postings included, "The Americans are the enemy of the Chinese Communist Party. The Japanese are the enemy of the Chinese people. Which is more dangerous?" "Let me predict that in thirty years the U.S. embassy in Japan will be attacked by ten Chinese guided missiles." "China should take care of Japan first." "Right! China should take care of the Japanese devils first. It should start with a boycott of Japanese goods!" "Some say don't forget June 4 [the crushing of the 1989 democracy movement]. If you can't remember September 18 [1931 Japanese invasion], then you are not a true Chinese." "Where will the Chinese people find their living space in the future? In the ocean! We need to move toward the east, toward the east, toward the east!" Except for the era from 1972 to 1982, a special moment when Mao Zedong's policy line of allying with any nation possible against a threatening Soviet Union dominated Chinese politics, making for a momentary TokyoBeijing entente, Japan has been treated by the People's Republic of China as a real or potential enemy. In the original Valentine's Day 1950 military treaty with Stalin, Mao took as China's adversary "aggression on the part of Japan or any other state that may collaborate in any way with Japan." 3 As Moscow worried after World War II about German revanchism, so Beijing naturally worried about Japanese revanchism. There should be no doubt that what the two Axis powers did to people they conquered was evil, absolute evil. China's foreign minister, however, declared on August 15, 1951, "The United States Government and the Yoshida government are conspiring to rearm Japan, to enslave the Japanese people, and to drive Japan once again onto the path of aggression." 4 Leninist ideology had imperialism as expansionist and impoverishing. But obviously China's first getting it wrong and then later abandoning Leninism have changed little in Beijing's attitude toward Tokyo. . Entering the twentyfirst century, even cosmopolitan Chinese intellectuals tend to see Japan as dynamized by rightwing super patriots, as a government and people which are unrepentant for World War II atrocities in China. Chinese patriotism is dangerously out of touch with core Japanese political realities. When Kishi Nobuske became Japan's prime minister, China's foreign minister in 1958 denounced the U.S. Japan security treaty, claiming, "Under the name of `mutual defense,' the United States could despatch Japanese troops to China's Taiwan and to any place in the West Pacific." 5 Obviously the charges were untrue. No such thing, or anything close, ever occurred. But China kept drumming up fear of and hate toward Japan. . On December 7, 1958 the New China News Agency announced that Japan's arms expansion plans took "nuclear armament as the core" and made Japan the "arsenal for Southeast Asia." 6 Actually, there were no such plans. Nonetheless, the security treaty that Prime Minister Kishi renegotiated in 1960 was again erroneously denounced by China in 1960: "This treaty not only provides for Japan's unlimited arms expansion and accelerated nuclear armament but also its dispatch of troops to foreign lands." 7 Obviously, this is a lie. The dynamics of these dangerous forces lie deep inside China's authoritarian nationalism Throughout, China views Japan as tomorrow's military threat That deadly anger pervades Chinese society Republic, , not informing the Chinese people about the actual attitudes of Japan's people in Japan's antiwar constitutional democracy in opposing nuclear weapons or resisting military involvement in the Cold War. Beijing has successfully kept burning and fomenting in China hate for Japan. A 1984 book noted that, "The political relationship between Beijing and Tokyo reached an alltime low during 1969 and 1970 when the Chinese assailed the revival of Japanese militarism."8 Just prior to a brief and transient 1972--82 era of good relations, Beijing again launched massive campaigns against Japan, claiming that the result of President Nixon's Guam doctrine of no longer having America fighting ground wars on the continent of Asia would be that Japan would replace America in Asia, that is, Japan would go nuclear and have its military take over for the American military in Southeast Asia. Early in 1972, when Nixon and Kissinger discussed removing the American military from Taiwan, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai asked, "Can the U.S. control the `wild horse' of Japan?" 9 China was especially worried that the United States, while withdrawing its own troops from Taiwan, might encourage its Japanese allies to station their forces on the island." Hanoi leader Pham Van Dong told Mao in November 1968 that Vietnamese "were very much afraid that Japan would ... participate in the Vietnam war." 10 During a visit to North Korea in spring 1970, "Zhou [Enlai] argued vigorously that 'Japanese militarism has revived and has become a dangerous force of aggression in Asia.' "" Vietnam's Communist Party Chief Le Duan agreed with Zhou in 1971 that "Japan Ruling groups in China, for the first twenty years of the People's continually revved up indignation toward an alleged revival of Japanese militarism "China may become a superpower ... with a proud 5,000 year history. China currently is already more than a nation; it is a civilization, a cultural force that has influenced her neighbors throughout history. . . . It can shape regional politics." 22 That shaping influence includes the use of force. A former top U.S. official, Charles W. has a plan for Southeast Asia. It wants to control the region." 12 [He Continues...] As Benito Lim put it in September 1996 in Beijing at the Twenty First Century Forum, Aware of China's vision of its future and its willingness to use force, former Japanese Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa told the U.S.Japan Society in Seattle on March 12, 1996 24 that " Freeman Jr., after talking with leaders in Beijing, reported that "China's leaders have always said they would go to war to prevent the permanent division of China. They now believe that they are likely to have to do so. China's armed forces have begun a decadelong effort to acquire the capabilities and do the planning required to have a serious chance of overwhelming Taiwan's formidable defenses." 23 the most serious issues Japan may confront in the future may well be those related to China." In China, "nationalistic impulses haven't been entirely fulfilled.... Neighboring countries are aware of a `big China' and must inevitably have strong concerns." Indeed, "the other newly industrializing countries of Asia along with Japan would not feel comfortable being influenced heavily by China. This is why a continued American presence in the Pacific is necessary." Most directly worrisome as a cause of war, the Japanese prime minister found, were China's military actions aimed against Taiwan. "The issue of Taiwan for Japan is similar to that of Calais in relations between France and England, or Gibraltar during the Napoleonic wars, or the issue of Iceland or the Azores during World War II. . . . For maritime nations, they are vital lifelines of support." Actually, the problem has been intensified by postMao reform. As Soviet Russian reformer Khrushchev's government was legitimated by the Great Patriotic War against Nazi Germany and made opposition to purported military revanchism in an actually democratic and antiwar Germany central to Moscow's expansionism in East Europe, 25 so unfounded concerns about and against a democratic Japan inflame nationalist passions and war potential even for reformers in postMao China 26 The Chinese people continually remind themselves of their suffering at the hands of Japanese aggressors, supposedly from 18741945, that is, the entire modern era, and swear that it shall never be allowed to happen again, interpreting virtually every Japanese gesture as if Japanese militarism might soon be on the march all over Asia. Japan is treated as inherently evil. Actions premised on such worst case readings readily create security dilemmas because defensive efforts by Tokyo are taken in Beijing to be threats that must be met in a titfortat way. A peace and prosperity in the AsiaPacific region in the twentyfirst century require a major change in BeijingTokyo relations, a move toward genuine reconciliation. This large change may be impossible unless China democratizes. Analogous transitions which illuminate what is at stake include initial efforts at democratization in Russia allowing, at least vicious spiral has been unleashed. Consequently, Germany to Hitler's invasion of France, France and Germany were regularly at war with each other. Mistrust, hate, and desires for vengeance suffused the relationship. momentarily, an end to Cold War tensions, and, more clearly, post World War II GermanFrench reconciliation after Germany democratized. Prior to Germany's democratization, from Napoleon's invasion of Only the trust, transparency, and cooperation facilitated by democratization could, over time, reduce the hates and angers that provided the tinder that could be ignited into war by unfortunate incidents and domestically needed maneuvers . So I believe it is with China and Japan. Democratization, and getting past the passions of early democratization, are required for genuine ChinaJapan reconciliation. As French and Poles both decided to treat the postNazi German democracy as not responsible for Nazi crimes, so Chinese will have to change their view of democratic Japan if peace is to prevail. Korea Neg 273/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors CHINESE DEMOCRACY IMPACT That goes nuclear Lim 05 Prof. IR at Nanzan U. in Japan (Robyn, Prof. IR Nanzan U. in Japan, "Geostrategic Trends in Asia", 16, http://www.icasinc.org/2005/2005l/2005lrxl.html) For example, the hubris on display in Beijing may lead Russia and Japan to sink their differences in order to align against a "rising" China that threatens them both. It would not be the first time Russia and Japan have resolved their differences, the precedent having been set in the period from 1907 to 1916. Indeed, recent visits by senior Japanese army officers to the Russian Far East would have any old geopolitiker sniffing the breeze. As noted, the history of Whales 3: Elephants 0 stands as a warning of the difficulties that China faces in managing its "peaceful" rise. It is all starting to look redolent of what happened in Germany early last century when an arrogant and foolish young Kaiser sacked that great helmsman Bismarck. Wanting too much too soon, the Kaiser soon provoked the formation of the very coalition of the flanking powers (France and Russia) that Bismarck had laboured so hard to prevent. That soon led into a disastrous war. Currently, those advising Deng's successors are said to be studying this history. But are they learning the right lessons? If not, it will be a familiar story of greed, hubris and miscalculation leading to war. And this time with nuclear weapons as part of the equation . Chinese democratization is key to reducing the risk of war with Japan. Friedman 2k Professor of Pol. Sci. at U. Wisconsin (Edward, Hawkins Chair, in "What if China Doesn't Democratize? Implications for War and Peace, Ed. Edward Friedman and Barrett L. McCormick, p. 99105) To be sure, China's military might should not be exaggerated. But, ignoring the regional facts, places where China already is bullying neighbors is also a mistake. Illusions protect warprone forces . Were China a democracy, there could be voices in a debate calling attention to millennia of Chinese wars of incorporation and expansion. A democratic debate in China might somewhat puncture virtually genetic notions of Japanese evil , Chinese purity, and an aggrieved China as the eternal victim. In a democracy, supporters of ChinaJapan reconciliation as more important than demands for endless Japanese apologies could ask, "Should Vietnam demand that China apologize and face history for the Ming [dynasty] invasion of Dai Viet in the fifteenth century, when Chinese commanders claimed 7 million killed and that the plains were turned red?" And should China apologize for any of the subsequent Chinese attacks on the Vietnamese state over the next four centuries. What should reparations be? 32 It might be possible in a Chinese democracy to get the viewpoints of China's anxious neighbors into China's policy debate. As in its 1999 view of war in Yugoslavia which brackets Kosovo victims of Serbian policy, Beijing sees no neighbors or minorities as victims of China. Democratization in China would cool antiJapanese sentiment. Friedman 2k Professor of Pol. Sci. at U. Wisconsin (Edward, Hawkins Chair, in "What if China Doesn't Democratize? Implications for War and Peace, Ed. Edward Friedman and Barrett L. McCormick, p. 99105) Were China a democracy, its antiJapan passion might be cooled by the complexities of openness and transparency. Chinese specialists in Japanese history could add to the public debate large facts which Beijing's authoritarian censors suppress. 37 Japanese do not imagine themselves as eternal aggressors against China. Through much of Japanese history, as one Japanese analyst noted, "Japan tried to maintain diplomatic relations with China on an equal basis. China, however, never recognized Japan or any other nation under heaven as an equal, viewing the rest of the world as below itself." 38 That is, much of Japanese history is an attempt to end subordination to China . Chinese are not taught that China's neighbors have historic grievances toward an unwelcome Chinese hegemony. Korea Neg 274/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors CHINESE DEMOCRACY IMPACT Only Chinese democratization allows the conditions of stable peaceful SinoJapanese relations. Friedman 2k Professor of Pol. Sci. at U. Wisconsin (Edward, Hawkins Chair, in "What if China Doesn't Democratize? Implications for War and Peace, Ed. Edward Friedman and Barrett L. McCormick, p. 99105) Both Tokyo and Washington should be committed to full engagement with Beijing, to an equivalent of NATO member Germany's 1969 Ostpolitik. But that enlightened Germany policy that meant to enrich Germany's Communist neighbors and help them appreciate the virtues of peaceful cooperation (engagement) did not prevent the crushing of Solidarity in Poland in 1980 or block an intensification of a second Cold War in the 1970s caused by Brezhnev's militarism. It is worth recalling the tensions in Europe in the early 1980s as Pershing missiles were deployed to match Soviet Russia's SS20 missiles. Engagement with vigilance has to be a longterm commitment despite nasty bumps along the way. Demagogues in Washington or Beijing could easily derail it. The road to peace and prosperity in the AsiaPacific region will not be smooth. Growth will not by itself reverse the nasty chauvinistic dynamics pulsating in China. American policymakers, if they wish to preserve peace and prosperity, will have to face up to the real dangers that lie within resurgent Chinese antiJapanese, Sinocentric chauvinism . Yet outsiders cannot change China. Only Chinese can do that. Only with a democratization of China by Chinese can Chinese develop the critical selfunderstanding that can facilitate a reimagining of Japan , thereby creating a peace oriented foundation for genuine ChinaJapan reconciliation Korea Neg 275/436 IMPACT FREE TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors South Korean economic recovery is key to its soft power--that's key to global free trade and environmental protection NEWSWEEK 1292010 ("Selling South Korea," http://www.newsweek.com/2010/01/28/sellingsouthkorea.html) For the first time in modern history, South Korea is laying claim to lead the club of rich nations. South Korea became the first member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development--the group of 30 wealthy nations--to emerge from the global recession when it recorded 0.4 percent growth in the third quarter of last year. This year the OECD expects South Korea's GDP to expand by 4.4 percent, the highest growth rate of any of its members. Teddy Now President Lee Myungbak wants to turn the end of the economic crisis into an opportunity. He knows the crash has accelerated the decline of American might, as well as the rise of China and other emerging powers, and he aims to exploit the gap between them. His goal is to transform South Korea from a successful but selfinvolved economic power into a respected global soft power with the clout to mediate between rich and poor nations on global issues such as climate change and financial regulation. In particular, Lee is pushing to revive momentum on a global freetrade deal--stalled in large part due to hostility from poor nations--while defending the poor by pushing for more international supervision of the global financial system. At the same time, he is trying to establish South Korea as a leader in the fight against global warming by agreeing that the country will cut emissions by 30 percent by 2020--one of the most aggressive targets in the world--even though it is not obligated to do so because it is still considered a developing nation under the Kyoto Protocol. To many in South Korea, the selection of Seoul as the site of the November 2010 summit of the G20--the group of 20 leading economic powers--is an acknowledgment of how well it has managed the current economic and environmental crises. "The old order is being dismantled and replaced by the new order," Lee said from the Blue House in a televised New Year's speech. "We have to make our vision the world's vision." Lee is one of only two former CEOs to lead a major trading power--Italy's Silvio Berlusconi is the other--and he runs South Korea like the justdoit boss he was at Hyundai, where staff called him "the Bulldozer." At Hyundai he led a company known for fearless forays into foreign markets, whether it was building huge bridges in Malaysia or selling cars with stunning success in the crowded U.S. market. Now he is trying to make South Korean culture--still on the defensive after a long history of colonial occupations--as cosmopolitan as Hyundai's culture. He's pushing for greater use of English and generally trying to open up South Korea to the world. In his first big political job, as mayor of Seoul, he created a huge ruckus when he ripped up the downtown to expose a boardedup stream--but it is now a major draw for commerce and tourism. Lee's grand domestic ambition as president is a multibilliondollar plan to refurbish South Korea's four major rivers despite protests from environmentalists and opposition members. Lee believes the project will boost local economies by creating jobs and promoting tourism and commerce. Lee's popularity ratings, after an early plummet driven by a decision to allow U.S. imports of beef, are now at more than 50 percent as voters warm to his vision of newly developed South Korea as a model nation to be emulated by many developing countries. South Korea's successful management of the economic crisis surely helps. Early on, the country was battered like the rest of the world. The South Korean won dropped 30 percent in the first three months of the crisis, the stock market dropped by half, and foreign investors left in droves. But unlike most other rich nations, South Korea had recent experience with a major financial meltdown. Many of its current leaders are veterans of the Asian crisis that crippled the country's economy in 1998, and they knew how to manage a free fall. Lee's team immediately moved to save threatened banks and companies by setting up $200 billion in various funds to guarantee payment of their debts and for other forms of emergency aid. They struck currencyswap deals with major economies such as the U.S. to secure dwindling reserves of foreign currency and frontloaded public spending so that 65 percent of the country's $250 billion budget was spent during the first half of 2009, ensuring that the money got into the economy rapidly--but without adding new debts. A government focus on protecting jobs kept consumer sentiment relatively high, and the Bank of Korea cut interest rates by 3.25 percentage points to 2 percent, a historic low. All the while, Lee worked relentlessly to quiet calls for protectionism at home and abroad, at a time when many other leaders, including Barack Obama and Hu Jintao, were beginning to succumb. Lee's administration is pushing for a slew of freetrade agreements with the U.S., the European Union, Peru, Colombia, Canada, Australia, and even China and Japan, if possible, says Abraham Kim, a Korea analyst at the politicalrisk consultancy Eurasia Group. Lee also lobbied hard at the Pittsburgh meeting of the G20 last year to have Seoul selected as the site of the next summit this autumn, an event he hopes to organize as a comingout party. "He is trying to use the crisis to enhance the reputation of South Korea and help it to be widely recognized as a developedworld state," says Kim. "This is partly a nationalism thing, but more importantly, Korea Neg 276/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors they are trying to get out from under Japan's and China's shadow. South Korea needs to find its niche for its longterm competitive survival." Free trade solves nuclear war Copley News Service, 99 (December 1) Teddy For decades, many children in America and other countries went to bed fearing annihilation by nuclear war. The specter of nuclear winter freezing the life out of planet Earth seemed very real. Activists protesting the World Trade Organization's meeting in Seattle apparently have forgotten that threat. The truth is that nations join together in groups like the WTO not just to further their own prosperity, but also to forestall conflict with other nations. In a way, our planet has traded in the threat of a worldwide nuclear war for the benefit of cooperative global economics. Some Seattle protesters clearly fancy themselves to be in the mold of nuclear disarmament or antiVietnam War protesters of decades past. But they're not. They're specialinterest activists, whether the cause is environmental, labor or paranoia about global government. Actually, most of the demonstrators in Seattle are very much unlike yesterday's peace activists, such as Beatle John Lennon or philosopher Bertrand Russell, the father of the nuclear disarmament movement, both of whom urged people and nations to work together rather than strive against each other. These and other war protesters would probably approve of 135 WTO nations sitting down peacefully to discuss economic issues that in the past might have been settled by bullets and bombs. As long as nations are trading peacefully, and their economies are built on exports to other countries, they have a major disincentive to wage war. That's why bringing China, a budding superpower, into the WTO is so important. As exports to the United States and the rest of the world feed Chinese prosperity, and that prosperity increases demand for the goods we produce, the threat of hostility diminishes. Many antitrade protesters in Seattle claim that only multinational corporations benefit from global trade, and that it's the everyday wage earners who get hurt. That's just plain wrong. First of all, it's not the militaryindustrial complex benefiting. It's U.S. companies that make hightech goods. And those companies provide a growing number of jobs for Americans. In San Diego, many people have good jobs at Qualcomm, Solar Turbines and other companies for whom overseas markets are essential. In Seattle, many of the 100,000 people who work at Boeing would lose their livelihoods without world trade. Foreign trade today accounts for 30 percent of our gross domestic product. That's a lot of jobs for everyday workers. Growing global prosperity has helped counter the specter of nuclear winter. Nations of the world are learning to live and work together, like the singers of antiwar songs once imagined. Those who care about world peace shouldn't be protesting world trade. They should be celebrating it. Environmental destruction causes extinction Coyne and Hoekstra, 07 *Professor in the Department of Ecology and Evolution at the University of Chicago AND ** Associate Professor in the Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology at Harvard University (*Jerry and *Hopi, "The Greatest Dying", The New Republic, September 24th 2007, June 26th 2010, http://www.truthout.org/article/jerrycoyneandhopiehoekstrathegreatestdying , KONTOPOULOS) Every year, up to 30,000 species disappear due to human activity alone. At this rate, we could lose half of Earth's species in this century. And, unlike with previous extinctions, there's no hope that biodiversity will ever recover, since the cause of the decimation us is here to stay. To scientists, this is an unparalleled calamity, far more severe than global warming, which is, after all, only one of many threats to biodiversity. Yet global warming gets far more press. Why? One reason is that, while the increase in temperature is easy to document, the decrease of species is not. Biologists don't know, for example, exactly how many species exist on Earth. Estimates range widely, from three million to more than 50 million, and that doesn't count microbes, critical (albeit invisible) components of ecosystems. We're not certain about the rate of extinction, either; how could we be, since the vast majority of species have yet to be described? We're even less sure how the loss of some species will affect the ecosystems in which they're embedded, since the intricate connection between organisms means that the loss of a single species can ramify unpredictably. But we do know some things. Tropical rainforests are disappearing at a rate of 2 percent per year. Populations of most large fish are down to only 10 percent of what they were in 1950. Many primates and all the great apes our closest relatives are nearly gone from the wild. And we know that extinction and global warming act synergistically. Extinction exacerbates global warming: By burning rainforests, we're not only polluting the atmosphere with carbon dioxide (a major greenhouse gas) but destroying the very plants that can remove this gas from the air Conversely, global warming increases extinction, both directly (killing corals) and indirectly (destroying the habitats of Arctic and . Antarctic animals). As extinction increases, then, so does global warming, which in turn causes more extinction and so on, into a downward spiral of destruction. Why, exactly, should we care? Let's start with the most celebrated case: the rainforests. Their loss will worsen global warming raising temperatures, melting icecaps, and flooding coastal cities. And, as the forest habitat shrinks, so begins the inevitable contact between organisms that have not evolved together, a scenario played out many times, and one that is never good. Dreadful diseases have successfully jumped species boundaries, with humans as prime recipients We have gotten aids from apes, sars from civets, and Ebola from fruit bats. . Additional worldwide plagues from unknown microbes are a very real possibility. But it isn't just the destruction of the rainforests that should trouble us. Healthy ecosystems the world over provide hidden services like waste disposal, nutrient cycling, soil formation, water purification, and oxygen production. Such services are best rendered by ecosystems that are diverse. Yet, through both intention and accident, humans have introduced exotic species that turn biodiversity into monoculture. Fastgrowing zebra mussels, for example, have outcompeted more than 15 species of native mussels in North America's Great Lakes and have damaged harbors and watertreatment plants. Native prairies are becoming dominated by single species (often genetically homogenous) of corn or wheat. Thanks to these developments, soils will erode and become unproductive which, along with temperature change, will diminish agricultural yields. Meanwhile, with increased pollution and runoff, as well as reduced forest cover, ecosystems will no longer be able to purify water; and a shortage of clean water spells disaster . In many ways, oceans are the most vulnerable areas of all. As overfishing eliminates major predators, while polluted and warming waters kill off phytoplankton, the Korea Neg 277/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors intricate aquatic food web could collapse from both sides. Fish, on which so many humans depend, will be a fond memory. As phytoplankton vanish, so does the ability of the oceans to absorb carbon dioxide and produce oxygen. (Half of the oxygen we breathe is made by phytoplankton, with the rest coming from land plants.) Species extinction is also imperiling coral reefs a major problem since these reefs have far more than recreational value: They provide tremendous amounts of food for human populations and buffer coastlines against erosion. In fact, the global value of gross domestic product of all countries combined. And that doesn't include tangible goods like fish and timber . "hidden" services provided by ecosystems those services, like waste disposal, that aren't bought and sold in the marketplace has been estimated to be as much as $50 trillion per year, roughly equal to the Life as we know it would be impossible if ecosystems collapsed. Yet that is where we're heading if species extinction continues at its current pace. Extinction also has a huge impact on medicine. Who really cares if, say, a worm in the remote swamps of French Guiana goes extinct? Well, those who suffer from cardiovascular disease The recent discovery of a rare South American leech . has led to the isolation of a powerful enzyme that, unlike other anticoagulants, not only prevents blood from clotting but also dissolves existing clots. And it's not just this one species of worm : Its wriggly relatives have evolved other biomedically valuable proteins, including antistatin (a potential anticancer agent), decorsin and ornatin (platelet aggregation inhibitors), and hirudin (another anticoagulant). Plants, too, are pharmaceutical gold mines. The bark of trees, for example, has given us quinine (the first cure for malaria), taxol (a drug highly effective against ovarian and breast cancer), and aspirin . More than a quarter of the medicines on our pharmacy shelves were originally derived from plants. The sap of the Madagascar periwinkle contains more than 70 useful alkaloids, including vincristine, a powerful anticancer drug that saved the life of one of our friends. Of the roughly 250,000 plant species on Earth, fewer than 5 percent have been screened for pharmaceutical properties . Who knows what lifesaving drugs remain to be discovered? Given current extinction rates, it's estimated that we're losing one valuable drug every two years. Our arguments so far have tacitly assumed that species are worth saving only in proportion to their economic value and their effects on our quality of life, an attitude that is strongly ingrained, especially in Americans That is . why conservationists always base their case on an economic calculus. But we biologists know in our hearts that there are deeper and equally compelling reasons to worry about the loss of biodiversity: namely, simple morality and intellectual values that transcend pecuniary interests. What, for example, gives us the right to destroy other creatures? And what could be more thrilling than looking around us, seeing that we are surrounded by our evolutionary cousins, and realizing that we all got here by the same simple process of natural selection? To biologists, and potentially everyone else, apprehending the genetic kinship and common origin of all species is a spiritual experience not necessarily religious, but spiritual nonetheless, for it stirs the soul. But, whether or not one is moved by such concerns, it is certain that our future is bleak if we do nothing to stem this sixth extinction. We are creating a world in which exotic diseases flourish but natural medicinal cures are lost; a world in which carbon waste accumulates while food sources dwindle; a world of sweltering heat, failing crops, and impure water. In the end, we must accept the possibility that we ourselves are not immune to extinction. Or, if we survive, perhaps only a few of us will remain, scratching out a grubby existence on a devastated planet. Global warming will seem like a secondary problem when humanity finally faces the consequences of what we have done to nature: not just another Great Dying, but perhaps the greatest dying of them all. Korea Neg 278/436 CHINA INFLUENCE IMPACT Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors Chinese influence causes USChina war Layne and Thayer, 07 *Associate Professor at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and **Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota, Associate Professor in the Dept. of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University (*Christopher and **Bradley A., "American Empire: A Debate", Google Books, p. 75, 2007, June 25th 2010, KONTOPOULOS) So what should the United States do about China? If the United States persists with its strategy of primacy, the odds of a SinoAmerican conflict are high. Current American strategy commits the United States to maintaining the geopolitical status quo in East Asia, a status quo that reflects American primacy. The United States' desire to preserve the status quo, however, clashes with the ambitions of a rising China. As a rising great power, China has its own ideas about how East Asia's political and security order should be organized. Unless U.S. and Chinese interests can be accommodated, the potential for future tension--or worse--exists. Moreover, as I already have demonstrated, the very fact of American primacy is bound to produce a geopolitical backlash--with China in the vanguard--in the form of counter hegemonic balancing. Nevertheless, the United States cannot be completely indifferent to China's rise. Extinction Straits Times, 00 (Ching Cheong, Straits times, July 25 2000, l/n) The highintensity scenario postulates a crossstrait war escalating into a fullscale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a fullscale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and horror of horrors raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a fullscale SinoUS war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. MajorGeneral Pan Zhangqiang, president of the militaryfunded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation. Korea Neg 279/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors A2: REGIONAL DEMOCRACY HIGH NOW Regional Democracy is low now Korea Herald 05 (5/5/05, "East Asia needs a dispute settlement system" pg online @ lexisnexis//au) Among some 230 nations in the world today, only 21, let alone their increasingly deepening and widening economic interdependence, China, South Korea and Japan are the principal regional actors. countries have kept their constitutions since World War II without extralegal interruption. These countries are in Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand. Only Japan belongs to this exclusive club among nonWestern nations. According to the Freedom House 2005 Annual Global Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties, out of 192 countries, 89 are "free," 54 are "partly free" and 49 are "not free." Within Northeast Asia, China is designated as an authoritarian regime, North Korea, a totalitarian regime, and five South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Mongolia and Russia are categorized as democracy. Among these five, however, Russia is rated "not free" in both political rights and civil liberties. In another survey, Freedom House examined freedom of the press in 2004. Out of 193 countries, North Korea was rated last (193rd), while China and Russia were also "not free," ranked 173rd and 148th in the world, respectively. Japan (33rd), Taiwan (50th) and South Korea (68th) were "free," while Mongolia (80th) was "partly free." It is evident from the above that unlike in North America and Europe, democracy has not fully arrived in Northeast Asia. Geographically, historically and culturally Leaving aside the semantic squabble over President Roh Moohyun's vision, South Korea as a "balancer" is a misnomer. These nations plus North Korea comprise members of this region, and Russia, as a Eurasian state, and Mongolia can also claim regional membership. While the United States has no geographic contiguity in this region, it has been the "balancer" with its large military presence in South Korea, Japan and Okinawa, its bilateral defense treaty with South Korea , security treaty with Japan, and its relatively recent yet dominant political and economic linkages with these countries. The regional security complexity is further compounded by two fundamental factors. One is a set of unresolved issues such as divided Korea, the ChinaTaiwan question and the territorial disputes between China, Japan and other Southeast Asian countries over island chains in the East China Sea and South China Sea. The other is the region's conflict resolution mechanism, in particular, and democratization, in general, both of which are still in their inchoate stage. China is a far cry from democracy despite opening up the country and instituting reforms for the last three decades which have been, by and large, positive. Russia, too, is undergoing democratization but is not yet a democracy. In spite of its attempt to "reform" Korea Neg 280/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors Korea Neg 281/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors Korea Neg 282/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors Korea Neg 283/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors Korea Neg 284/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors Korea Neg 285/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors ***ROK PEACEKEEPING DISAD*** Korea Neg 286/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors ROK PEACEKEEPING DA 1NC U.S. presence is giving South Korea the security and cover to boost its role in world security especially peacekeeping operations Axe, 10 independent military correspondent based in South Carolina. He has reported from Iraq, Afghanistan, East Timor, Lebanon, Somalia, Chad and other conflict zones (4/27/10, David, The Diplomat"South Korea's Secret War," http://thediplomat.com/2010/04/27/southkoreassecretwar/, JMP) More than half a century since the end of the Korean War and the beginning of a long period of relative military isolation, South Korea is gradually, and quietly, playing a larger role in world security. peaceful affair. Despite strong US support, South Korea's rise as a military power is complicated by domestic politics, and by a belligerent North Korea. To avoid provoking foreign and domestic opposition, Seoul has cleverly disguised its newest overseas military operation as a strictly Despite a technologically advanced military and a gross domestic product just shy of $1 trillion, making it the world's 15th wealthiest country, the Republic of Korea has rarely deployed troops outside its borders. Granted, more than 300,000 South Koreans fought in the Vietnam War, and about 5,000 died. But it wasn't until 1999, when Seoul sent 400 soldiers to boost a UN force trying to stabilize East Timor, that the country of 49 million participated in an overseas military campaign. South Korean medics and engineers joined the USled coalitions in Afghanistan in 2001 and in Iraq in 2003. The Afghan mission was curtailed after the Taliban kidnapped a South Korean church group in Afghanistan and murdered 2 of its 23 members. The extremists released the surviving captives when Seoul promised to stick to a planned withdrawal by the end of 2007; the departing South Koreans left behind only a small civilianrun hospital at Bagram Air Field, outside Kabul. The Iraqi mission ended peacefully in 2008. That year, Seoul also sent a warship to patrol Somali waters for pirates. But it was a second deployment to Afghanistan in 2010 that marked South Korea's true debut as a military power. In response to US President Barak Obama's call for a bigger international coalition in Afghanistan, Seoul last year pledged a Provincial Reconstruction Team and a powerful infantry force to accompany the team--a total of around 500 troops. South Korea also plans to send helicopters to support these ground troops. The aircraft, scheduled to arrive this year, will integrate into the US Army's 3rd Combat Aviation Brigade based at Bagram, according to brigade commander Colonel Don Galli. Engineering and reconstruction are core strengths of the Korean military. But the planned Afghan PRT represents a `facesaving vehicle' for Seoul, providing political cover for the combat force, according to Scott Snyder, an analyst with the San Franciscobased Asia Foundation. While South Korea is committed to making a meaningful contribution to the Afghan war, sending fighting troops `is somewhat sensitive in the South Korea political context,' Snyder told The Diplomat magazine. Hence the `reconstruction' rubric. All the same, Snyder said there's been less domestic discomfort with the Afghan deployment than many observers public is getting more comfortable' with sending troops abroad, Snyder said. Just not so comfortable that they don't demand a soft sell. A `Global Korea' expected. An alliance of small opposition parties promised to fight the deployment, but is unlikely to reverse Seoul's decision. `The South Korean That shift has its roots in the USled international coalition that defended South Korea five decades ago and helped rebuild the country after the war. `The new administration [in Seoul] is emphasizing this theme of a "global Korea," which increasingly hits on the idea that South Korea had been a recipient of international contributions and now it's time for South Korea to pay that back,' Snyder said. But Seoul's appetite for a broader security role is complicated by ongoing tensions with North Korea. In May last year, Pyongyang officially withdrew from the truce that ended the Korean War, amid the North's escalating efforts to develop nuclear weapons. North and South Korea have sparred over their disputed sea border. In November, North and South Korean naval vessels opened fire on each other. A North Korean sailor died in that exchange. On March 26, a South Korean patrol boat, the Cheonan, exploded and sank in the Yellow Sea. Fortysix sailors died. Officials have blamed the sinking on an `external' explosion--perhaps from a mine or a torpedo--rather than some internal malfunction. That means Cheonan might have been attacked. Seoul has been careful not to directly accuse Pyongyang of orchestrating an attack, but Foreign Minister Yu MyungHwan did say the UN Security Council might become involved if emerging evidence implicates North Korea. Seoul's guarded response to the Cheonan sinking underscores President Lee MyungBak's intention to avoid direct confrontation with Pyongyang. South Korea seeks to expand outward as a military power, rather than continuing to focus its security apparatuses solely on its neighbour. After all, overseas military operations can be cloaked in peaceful rhetoric, while confrontations with North Korea frequently and obviously result in bloodshed. The South Korean contingent in Afghanistan illustrates Seoul's veiled approach to a wider security role. The Korean troops, with their helicopters and armoured vehicles, form a `heavy' reconstruction team that is, in fact, virtually indistinguishable from a US Army combat task force. And in fact, both the Korean PRT and a typical US task force conduct many of the same kinds of operations. After all, the Afghanistan war is a counterinsurgency campaign, where efforts to win Afghans' allegiance drive military planning. In Afghanistan, the only important distinction between the South Koreans and the Americans is rhetorical. Seoul is not the first government to attempt this sleight of hand in the interest of deploying forces to Afghanistan. The Dutch government deployed a similar heavy PRT to the southern part of the country soon after the USled invasion in 2001. The Hague sold the deployment as a strictly peaceful, reconstruction exercise--never mind the jet fighters, artillery and helicopter gunships that accompanied the engineers. The rhetoric of peace was the only way to avoid a popular backlash against the operation. The Taliban poked holes in The Hague's cover story when hundreds of armed extremists attacked Dutch positions in Uruzgan Province in June 2007. It was one of the largest pitched battles of the year for NATO forces. Several Dutch soldiers died, while more than a hundred Afghan civilians were killed when the Dutch fired artillery and dropped bombs on heavily populated areas. In the aftermath of the fighting, elements in the Dutch government advocated cancelling the Afghanistan deployment; it took more than two years of political manoeuvring, but in February The Hague announced it would evacuate its troops this year. As long as Seoul pursues a similar strategy to disguise its growing war role, it runs the risk of a political conflagration similar to The Hague's, if and when South Korean forces come under attack in Afghanistan. Korea Neg 287/436 US Cover Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors South Korea is hardly striking out on its own as a burgeoning power. At every step, Seoul's closest ally is providing cover. The United States has offered support at every level--even at Bagram, where US Air Force security personnel protect the South Korean hospital. `They do a good job for us,' says nurse Chon Jung Ae, referring to the US guards. Seoul's military expansion has a strong foundation in the continued presence of US forces in the South. The strong US military contingent in South Korea ensures the country can direct resources towards other conflicts, without jeopardizing its security visavis the North. More than 25,000 US troops are permanently based in the Republic of Korea to help defend against any North Korean attack. Washington considers the defence of South Korea so important that the Pentagon has barred US troops in the country from ever deploying to Iraq or Afghanistan. `Our numberone priority in Korea is to be prepared to deter and defend,' US Army Gen. Skip Sharp, Commander of U.S. Forces Korea, told The Diplomat. Still, Sharp said the USSouth Korean alliance is `definitely blossoming into something larger' than mere territorial defence. `I really do think we are looking at what kind of training capability we need on the [Republic of Korea] side, not only against the North Korean threat, but future threats as well.' This year's Afghanistan deployment is a big step towards a South Korean military that routinely participates in a wider range of missions abroad. Major weapons purchases are consistent with this trend, and might point to an even greater world security role for Seoul in coming years. In 2007, South Korea commissioned the first of three small aircraft carriers. If and when Seoul buys naval fighters to fly from them, the 14,000ton vessels will be among the most powerful in Asia--and capable of projecting South Korea's influence all over the world. By then, no doubt, the rhetorical veil in place in Afghanistan will be both unnecessary, and impossible to maintain. South Korean peacekeeping forces are key to global peace and successful war on terror Colonel Groves, 07 currently assigned as the UCJ39, UN Command, Combined Forces Command and U.S. Forces Korea (September 2007, Col. Bryan Groves, Army, "Republic of Korea Peacekeeping Operations--Ensuring Peace and Stability Around the World," http://www3.ausa.org/webpub/DeptArmyMagazine.nsf/byid/TWAH765RK9/$File/Groves.pdf?OpenElement, JMP) Playing a larger role on the world stage is not without its costs. Paying his respects to Sgt. Yoon Jangho, who was killed in a suicide bombing in Afghanistan, President Roh Moohyun expressed the agony he went through before deciding to send ROK soldiers to Iraq and Afghanistan: "It is sometimes unavoidable to ask the nation's soldiers to shoulder the burden of maintaining world peace. Knowing every life is precious, it is not easy to send soldiers abroad to assume such a role." reasonable but also in the nation's best interests. ROK leaders know that by actively participating in international peacekeeping operations, supporting efforts to prevent weapons of mass destruction proliferation and by helping sustain the global war on terrorism, they are contributing to a better future for their own citizens. Korea currently has more than 2,200 troops serving as peacekeepers and observers in 12 countries. In every instance , they have successfully accomplished their mission and have been welcomed by the local people. The Iraqi minister of domestic affairs told Korean assemblymen visiting Iraq in September 2006 that the Iraqi people consider the Korean soldiers in the Zaytun Division as their brothers and kindly asked for their continued presence in Iraq. Still, the ROK government is convinced that supporting international efforts to fight terrorism is not only The ROK understands that global peace and security are essential to a growing world economy and the prosperity of its citizens. The ROK has repeatedly demonstrated that it is willing to use its military towards that end, and the men and women of the armed forces of the Republic of Korea have answered the call repeatedly and in outstanding fashion. Extinction SidAhmed, 04 political analyst (Mohamed, Managing Editor for Al-Ahali, "Extinction!" August 26- September 1, Issue no. 705, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm) What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This could lead to a third world war, from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without winners and losers. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers. ROK peacekeepers are key to antipiracy forums Twining, 10 Senior Fellow for Asia at the German Marshall Fund of the United States (4/1/10, Daniel, "Strengthening the U.S.Korea Alliance for the 21st Century," http://www.gmfus.org/galleries/ct_publication_attachments/AsiaDanTwiningU.S.KoreaAlliance.pdf) Korea Neg Michigan Institutes `10 288/436 7 Week Juniors Another new multilateral mechanism could be functional groupings of principal Indian and Pacific Ocean powers, including the five above plus India, Australia, and Indonesia, (1) to develop a joint antipiracy and disaster relief naval force, and (2) to build regional peacekeeping capacity for joint peacekeeping operations under UNmandated operations in Africa and the Middle East. South Korea, with its capable armed forces, could play an important role in both the peacekeeping and the antipiracy forums, inculcating habits of cooperation among IndoPacific powers that could spill over into other functional realms. Piracy causes oil spikes Yusef, 09 Foreign Policy In Focus contributor and a program officer at the Engaging Governments on Genocide Prevention Program (EGGP) at George Mason University (Hussein, Foreign Policy in Focus, "What's Next for Somalia." ed. John Feffer, http://www.fpif.org/articles/whats_next_for_somalia) This neglect resulted in the presence of pirates in Somalia, who have the finances, the physical access to one of Africa's largest coastlines, and the technology to capture a range of merchant ships. Spoils have included a huge Saudi oil supertanker carrying $100 million of oil. In 2008 alone, pirates attacked more than 100 ships. In response to the threat of the Somali pirates, warships from several countries, including Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Denmark, and the United States, are now operating in the Gulf of Aden off of Somalia to protect shipping lanes. If the United States doesn't fully engage with Somalia , piracy will grow. Oil prices will rise due to security demands, higher insurance rates, ransoms, and longer shipping routes. Oil price spike collapses the global economy Kenneth M. Pollack (Director of Research at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. From 1995 to 1996 and 1999 to 2001, he served as Director for Persian Gulf Affairs on the staff of the National Security Council) 2003 " Securing the Gulf " America's primary interest in the Persian Gulf lies in ensuring the free and stable flow of oil from the region to the world at large. This fact has nothing to do with the conspiracy theories leveled against the Bush administration during the runup to the recent war. U.S. interests do not center on whether gas is $2 or $3 at the pump, or whether Exxon gets contracts instead of Lukoil or Total. Nor do they depend on the amount of oil that the United States itself imports from the Persian Gulf or anywhere else. The reason the United States has a legitimate and critical interest in seeing that Persian Gulf oil continues to flow copiously and relatively cheaply is simply that the global economy built over the last 50 years rests on a foundation of inexpensive, plentiful oil, and if that foundation were removed, the global economy would collapse. Today, roughly 25 percent of the world's oil production comes from the Persian Gulf, with Saudi Arabia alone responsible for roughly 15 percent a figure expected to increase rather than decrease in the future. The Persian Gulf region has as much as two thirds of the world's proven oil reserves, and its oil is absurdly economical to produce, with a barrel from Saudi Arabia costing anywhere from a fifth to a tenth of the price of a barrel from Russia. Saudi Arabia is not only the world's largest oil producer and the holder of the world's largest oil reserves, but it also has a majority of the world's excess production capacity, which the Saudis use to stabilize and control the price of oil by increasing or decreasing production as needed. Because of the importance of both Saudi production and Saudi slack capacity, the sudden loss of the Saudi oil network would plyze the global economy, probably causing a global downturn at least as devastating as the Great Depression of the 1930s, if not worse. So the fact that the United States does not import most of its oil from the Persian Gulf is irrelevant: if Saudi oil production were to vanish, the price of oil in general would shoot through the ceiling, destroying the American economy along with everybody else's. Econ collapse causes power vacuum multiple nuclear wars, terrorism, and extinction Aaron L. Friedberg (professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton University, served from 2003 to 2005 in the office of the Vice President of the United States as deputy assistant for nationalsecurity affairs and director of policy planning. PhD in Politics from Harvard) and Gabriel Schoenfeld (senior fellow at the Hudson Institute in Washington DC and a resident scholar at the Witherspoon Institute in Princeton) October 21, 2008 "The Dangers of a Diminished America" http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122455074012352571.html? mod=rss_opinion_main Then there are the dolorous consequences of a potential collapse of the world's financial architecture. For decades now, Korea Neg Michigan Institutes `10 289/436 7 Week Juniors and the stability of our economy, among other things, made it easier for us to run huge budget deficits, as we counted on foreigners to pick up the tab by buying dollardenominated assets as a safe haven. Will this be possible in the future? Meanwhile, traditional foreign-policy challenges are multiplying. The threat from al Qaeda and Islamic terrorist affiliates has not been extinguished. Iran and North Korea are continuing on their bellicose paths, while Pakistan and Afghanistan are progressing smartly down the road to chaos. Russia's new militancy and China's seemingly relentless rise also give cause for concern. If America now tries to pull back from the world stage, it will leave a dangerous power vacuum. The stabilizing effects of our presence in Asia, our continuing commitment to Europe, and our position as defender of last resort for Middle East energy sources and supply lines could all be placed at risk. In such a scenario there are shades of the 1930s, when global trade and finance ground nearly to a halt, the peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers led by the remorseless fanatics who rose up on the crest of economic disaster exploited their divisions. Today we run the risk that rogue states may choose to become ever more reckless with their nuclear toys, just at our moment of maximum vulnerability. The aftershocks of the financial crisis will almost certainly rock our principal strategic competitors even harder than they will rock us . The dramatic free fall of the Russian stock market has demonstrated the fragility of a state whose economic performance hinges on high oil prices, now driven down by the global slowdown. China is perhaps even more fragile, its economic growth depending heavily on foreign investment and access to foreign markets. Both will now be constricted, inflicting economic pain and perhaps even sparking unrest in a country where political legitimacy rests on progress in the long march to prosperity. None of this is good news if the authoritarian leaders of these countries seek to divert attention from internal travails with external adventures . Korea Neg 290/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors PEACEKEEPING NOW South Korea has significant peacekeepers in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia Lee, 09 President of the East Asia Institute and a professor at the Department of Public Administration at Sungkyunkwan University. (SookJung, "South Korea's Soft Power Diplomacy." EAI Issue Briefing No. MASI 200901 www.eai.or.kr/data/bbs/eng_report/200908061729956.pdf) Within the policy community in Seoul, some have criticized this new attention to soft power diplomacy. They point out that much of the debate lacks concrete descriptions of what the exercise Korean soft power would look like. Others argue that South Korea is bet ter off contributing resources to the world first before hastily talking about soft power. Despite a steep rise in its developmental assistance around the world, its ODA (Official Developmental Assistance) remains only a meager 0.05 percent of its Gross National In come, which stood at US$455.3 million in 2006. This ratio is far below the average 0.3 percent achieved by the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) member nations. South Korea's Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) contribution through either the United Nations or other multilateral military opera tions is more impressive. It has so far dispatched about 30,000 soldiers as part of peacekeeping activities to eighteen countries and twentyone regions since it first sent army engineers to Somalia in 1993. The bulk of Korea's PKO activities has involved sending hundreds of noncombatant forces to Afghanistan since Febru ary 2002 (scheduled to return by December 2012) and about 20,000 noncombatant forces to Iraq from Sep tember 2004 to December 2008. Both of these com mitments were backed up by UN Security Council resolutions. And in midMarch of 2009, a Korean de stroyer with Special Forces soldiers onboard was sent to the Middle East to escort Korean vessels in danger of hijackings by Somali pirates. Recently the destroyer rescued a Dutch ship that had pirates in pursuit. PKO now quick deployment of troops Jung, 08 staff writer, Korea Times (SungKi, "S. Korea Seeks Rapid PKO Deployment." http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2008/04/205_17198.html) South Korea is seeking ways to enable the quick deployment of its peacekeeping troops to troubled regions worldwide by institutionalizing a prior parliamentary endorsement system, officials of the foreign and defense ministries said Sunday. The plan is part of efforts to facilitate and increase the country's participation in global peacekeeping operations (PKO) to upgrade its economic status in the international community, they said. It was recently reported to Presidentelect Lee Myungbak's power transition team. To that end, the incoming administration plans to revise laws pertaining to the deployment of PKO forces, the officials said. Under the current law, the government is required to obtain parliamentary approval whenever it wants to send PKO troops to foreign nations. UNIQUENESS Korea Neg 291/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors PEACEKEEPING/MODERNIZATION NOW South Korea is modernizing its fleet now to fight pirates globally SungKi 2008 Defense News Staff Writer (Jung, Defense News, "S. Korean Navy To Expand BlueWater Ops." http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3778078) SEOUL South Korea's Navy is seeking to expand its capabilities beyond coastal defense against a North Korean invasion into opensea operations to cope with emerging threats. Adm. Jung Okkeun, chief of naval operations, expressed strong confidence in plans to modernize his fleet into a powerful bluewater force with greater mobility and operational range that can rapidly deploy to an area of conflict. "Given about 50 percent of the world's naval powers are deployed in the region surrounding the Korean Peninsula, the South Korean Navy should make strenuous efforts to modernize its fleet to not only deal with North Korea's threat, but also counter emerging regional threats," Jung said. "In that context, our service should go in a direction toward building mobile squadrons capable of longrange overseas operations." Most recently, this has led to interest in dispatching naval forces to fight piracy in the waters off Somalia. "We're ready to deploy our ships to waters off the coast of Somalia and now awaiting final approval from the government," Jung said Oct. 14 during a parliamentary audit of the Navy at the Gyeryongdae military headquarters in South Chungcheong Province. "Currently, some 21 nations are operating their warships in waters off Somalia. Our Navy's dispatching of troops to the region will help conduct joint operations with other navies, as well as protect our cargo ships and sailors from pirates." The Ministry of National Defense said Oct. 15 that the government plans to send a team of officials to Somali waters this month to decide whether dispatching ships and troops would effectively thwart abduction attempts by pirates. Yu Myunghwan, minister of foreign affairs and trade, said related government ministries were discussing the dispatch of a 4,300ton Chungmugong Yi Sunshin class KDXII destroyer to fight pirates in the African region. The South Korean Navy has six KDXII destroyers equipped with Harpoon shiptosurface missiles, RAM Mk 31 shiptoair guided missiles, a 30mm Goalkeeper system for engaging seaskimming antiship missiles, and the domestically built SLQ200K Sonata electronic warfare system. Located along the route of a crudeoil pipeline connecting the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean, and racked by civil war, Somalia's coastline has become infamous for piracy. Reports said more than 1,000 pirates have hijacked vessels from foreign nations and taken more than $30 million in ransom. South Korean cargo ships have also suffered a series of hijackings in recent years. Eight crewmembers of two Dongwon Fisheries tuna ships were released in 2006 for a ransom of $800,000 after being held hostage for four months by Somali pirates. Two Daechang Fishing boats were hijacked in May last year, and their 25 crewmembers released six months later. Last month, Somali pirates kidnapped a cargo vessel carrying eight South Korean and 13 Myanmar crewmembers. Seoul is negotiating with the kidnappers for their release. ROK peacekeeping operations are increasing wants to be seen as a global partner Snyder, 08 director of the Center for Korea Policy at The Asia Foundation and a senior associate at Pacific Forum CSIS (Scott, Aug. 7, Asia Foundation, "Recovering The Potential of the U.S.South Korea Relationship." http://asiafoundation.org/inasia/2008/08/07/recoveringthepotentialoftheussouthkorearelationship/) American and South Korean interests have converged and now expand well beyond the narrow focus on security interests that emerged as a result of the Korean War. South Korea's successful economic modernization and its political consolidation into a vibrant democracy underscore the attraction of South Korea as a key Asian partner. South Korea has developed the economic, political, and security capacity to be considered as a firsttier partner in promoting both regional and global stability as evidenced by South Korea's contributions to peace operations in Timor Leste and Iraq. The United States will increasingly require strengthened regional partnerships to underwrite regional and global stability and prosperity. Cooperation with likeminded allies in the AsiaPacific is likely to be at a premium as the center of gravity for global economic and political interactions shifts away from Europe and toward Asia in the twentyfirst century. South Korea will be near the top of the list of countries that have the capacity and interest to work together with the United States. South Korea's new president Lee Myungbak has articulated aspirations to play an expanded international role by promoting the phrase "Global Korea." South Korea's economic development and its peaceful political transition from authoritarianism to democracy stands as a model to which many developing countries aspire. The South Korean government has committed to doubling its budget for overseas development assistance by 2010 and is seeking ways to enhance its contributions to international peacekeeping. Korea Neg 292/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors Korea Neg 293/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors PEACEKEEPING/MODERNIZATION NOW Korea is increasing peacekeeping operations now combating piracy Sangheee, 09 ROK Minister of National Defense (Lee, Korea Times, "Advanced Korean Military Reaches Out to the World." http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2010/04/270_40101.html) ***PKO = peacekeeping operations In an effort to further increase its PKO participation in the future, Korea will create a permanent PKO unit and develop relevant legislations and systems. The Korean military is also working with the international community to address common security threats facing the world, such as piracy and international disasters, and building a coordinating body against such threats. In the wake of the Sichuan earthquake and the cyclone in Myanmar last year, Korea did not spare any effort in providing active assistance and relief to the disasterstruck areas. To partake in the international response to piracy, Korea will deploy a naval vessel to Somalia in March and continue to act as a responsible member of the world as it increases its level of practical contributions toward world peace. ROK navy modernizing now Roehrig, 10 Associate Professor in the National Security Decision Making Department, at the U.S. Naval War College (Terrence, International Journal of Korean Studies, "ROKU.S. Maritime Cooperation: A Growing Dimension of the Alliance." www.icks.org/publication/pdf/2010SPRINGSUMMER/6.pdf) In addition to the United States and South Korea's sharing a broader, more global set of security concerns, the ROKN has also made significant advancements in its naval capabilities with the construction of stateoftheart destroyers, a largedeck amphibious ship, and extensive plans for further expansion of ROK naval capabilities. Consequently, South Korea is simply able to do more by taking on a larger array of roles and missions while still maintaining a careful watch on Korean coastal waters. As a result of these changes in the security environment and increased ROK naval capability, maritime cooperation is broadening the base of the ROKU.S. alliance with a greater global footing that can address common security concerns beyond those on the peninsula. South Korean peacekeeping increasing now launched new unit Bernama Malaysian News 6/1 ("South Korea Launches Permanent Peacekeeping Unit." http://www.bernama.com/bernama/v5/newsworld.php?id=510189) SEOUL, July 1 (Bernama) South Korea launched a 1,000strong military unit Thursday to help international peacekeeping operations led by the United Nations as it seeks to raise awareness of wider global responsibilities. The peacekeeping unit from the Special Warfare Command will be deployed to an international crisis environment within a month after South Korea agrees to join such mission, Yonhap news agency quoted the Army as saying in a statement. Previously, South Korea had to hastily recruit soldiers from different military units to send its troops on the U.N. led peacekeeping missions, causing administrative and other difficulties. The new unit, named "International Peace Supporting Standby Force," also befit a rise of South Korea from the ruins of the 195053 Korean War, said Gen. Hwang Euidon, the Army chief of staff, in a statement. "The launch of the permanent peacekeeping unit is a significant turning point for a rise of the nation's fortunes ," quoted as Hwang saying in the statement. Separately, the Army has operated two units to back up the peacekeeping unit since early this year. The two units are made up of 1,000 special forces and another 1,000 noncombat troops, said Col. Yoo Jaeik, who is in charge of peacekeeping operations for the Army. South Korea, which holds the chairmanship of the Group of 20 leading economies this year, is actively seeking to increase its international responsibilities. Early this year, the nation sent about 240 troops to help rebuild the quakehit Haiti . Another 320member contingent was set to start its mission this week in Afghanistan to protect the nation's civilian aid workers there. Last year, the Navy sent a destroyer to fight pirates off the coast of Somalia. Korea Neg 294/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors PIRACY DECREASING Piracy decreasing specifically in the gulf of Aden Hennessy 6/15 staff writer, VOA news (Sarah, VOA News, "Report says Pirate Attacks Down in 2010." Report says Pirate Attacks Down in 2010) Piracy attacks declined worldwide during the first half of the year, according to the International Maritime Bureau. But it says Somali pirates are increasing their range and capabilities. The coast of Somalia remains a major piracy hotspot, the location of more than half this year's pirate attacks. But International Maritime Bureau Director Pottengal Mukundan says the target area is widening. "The fact is that the Somali pirates are ranging further out than they have ever done before. We are talking of going 1,000 nautical miles [1,609 kilometers] away from the coast in order to attack ships, board them, hijack them and then bring them back into Somalia until a ransom is paid for their release," noted Mukundan. The International Maritime Bureau recorded 196 piracy incidents in the first six months of the year about 20 percent less than the same period last year. In the Gulf of Aden there were 86 pirate attacks in the first half of 2009 and 33 so far this year. Mukundan says foreign navies, which have operated in the Gulf of Aden since 2009, have been instrumental in reigning in piracy in the area. But he says piracy is more difficult to manage in the Indian Ocean. Korea Neg 295/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors 2NC LINK BLOCK Close security ties with the U.S. is key to ROK's military deployments abroad Levin 4, Senior Analyst at the RAND Corporation, (Norman D, "Do the Ties Still Bind?: The USROK Security Relationship After 9/11," http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2004/RAND_MG115.pdf) Also important are the strategic benefits Korea receives from the broader U.S. role as regional stabilizer. At best Korean views toward Japan are ambivalent, and China looms large as a major uncertainty. Relations among the major Asian powers themselves are problematic, with an unstable mix of historical animosities, contemporary suspicions, and unresolved territorial and other issues. Close security ties with the U.S. relieve the ROK of the need to address these imponderables by itself and buy time for Koreans to sort out relations with their powerful neighbors. They also facilitate Korea's desire to play a larger security role beyond the Korean Peninsula, as reflected in U.S. political, military, and logistical support for Korea's constructive role in the Republic of Georgia, Western Sahara, and East Timor. U.S. support motivates ROK participation in peacekeeping operations Levin 4, Senior Analyst at the RAND Corporation, (Norman D, "Do the Ties Still Bind?: The USROK Security Relationship After 9/11," http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2004/RAND_MG115.pdf) Such support illustrates a broader point not widely appreciated: South Korea has supported the U.S.--including political, material, and human support--in virtually every major conflict the U.S. has waged since World War II, from Korea and Vietnam to Afghanistan and Iraq. Not many U.S. allies can say that. Korea has also participated in smaller peacekeeping operations in such places as Mozambique and East Timor, usually at U.S. urging and with U.S. logistical and other assistance. Such support reflects the high value South Koreans place on their alliance with the U.S. and can legitimately be listed as one of the benefits the U.S. derives from the security relationship. Security cooperation encourages ROK participation in peacekeeping operations Levin 4, Senior Analyst at the RAND Corporation, (Norman D, "Do the Ties Still Bind?: The USROK Security Relationship After 9/11," http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2004/RAND_MG115.pdf) Fourth, security cooperation encourages broader Korean horizons and a positive ROK security role beyond the war on terrorism. This is reflected in Korea's decisions to deploy over 400 troops to East Timor and participate in Cope Thunder, RIMPAC, and other multilateral military exercises.24 A second reflection is active ROK participation in the United Nations' (UN's) Standing Arrangement Program for Peacekeeping Operations, which designates forces to be ready for UNled peacekeeping operations. Small, if hesitant, steps to foster expanded U.S.ROKJapan and ROKJapan military cooperation might be considered a third reflection. To be sure, Korean wariness about Japan remains an obstacle to major advances. Still, as a younger, selfconfident generation gradually assumes power in South Korea, this obstacle may diminish. In the meantime, the U.S. connection is critical to fostering expanded Korean military interactions with Japan. Although it is true that U.S. security cooperation with Korea cannot by itself dictate progress in this area, it is also true that little progress is likely in its absence. LINKS Korea Neg 296/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors U.S. KEY TO ROK PIRACY SOLUTIONS US ground forces allow for ROK maritime operations including piracy Roehrig, 10 Associate Professor in the National Security Decision Making Department, at the U.S. Naval War College (Terrence, International Journal of Korean Studies, "ROKU.S. Maritime Cooperation: A Growing Dimension of the Alliance." www.icks.org/publication/pdf/2010SPRINGSUMMER/6.pdf) ROKU.S. maritime cooperation is significant, positive, and the level of cooperation continues to grow. Seoul and Washington conduct many important exercises to improve cooperation, and intelligence sharing continues to be an important strength. The maritime environment poses serious challenges for the global maritime community. Piracy remains a challenge off the coast of Somalia and in the Straits of Malacca, and a rash of bad weather and earthquakes in Southeast Asia once again demonstrated the need for disaster relief that is lead by the navies in the region. Maritime activities are part of a broader ROKU.S. security alliance that has been largely focused on deterring an attack by North Korea, particularly a ground assault across the DMZ. There has always been a maritime component to this relationship, but it has usually been secondary to the needs on the ground. While the North Korean threat remains, the list of challenges to South Korean and U.S. security is changing and increasing. Some of these challenges --piracy, ensuring the free flow of commerce, terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief-- are important maritime concerns shared by Washington, Seoul, and the larger global community. US forces key to train ROK navy Roehrig, 10 Associate Professor in the National Security Decision Making Department, at the U.S. Naval War College (Terrence, International Journal of Korean Studies, "ROKU.S. Maritime Cooperation: A Growing Dimension of the Alliance." www.icks.org/publication/pdf/2010SPRINGSUMMER/6.pdf) While maritime cooperation between Seoul and Washington remains strong, there are three areas that need continued, more immediate, attention to improve ROKU.S. maritime cooperation. First, South Korea will need further training to improve its participation in the U.S. led PSI. South Korea has been a relatively new participant in this effort and needs to continue work on its ability to contribute to these operations. Second, countering special operations forces remains a complicated mission, one that requires continued training and exercises with the United States. When South Korea assumes the lead for this mission in 2012, it will require increased training and exercises between the ROKN and USN to ensure the capability to block the insertion of DPRK's special operations forces along the thousands of miles of ROK coastline. Finally, North Korea's submarine fleet remains a serious problem. South Korea continues work on its plans to improve its submarine force, but, in the near term, Pyongyang's submarines remain a problem. Consequently, greater cooperation and attention to anti submarine warfare is an important priority in maintaining ROK maritime security. IMPACTS Korea Neg 297/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors AFRICAN WAR IMPACT 2NC Somali pirates cause African regional instability World Beat, 09 Publication of Foreign Policy in Focus Think tank (Ed. John Feffer, codirector of Foreign Policy In Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies. World Beat vol. 4, num. 5, Feb 3, 2009. "Our Pirates and Theirs." http://www.fpif.org/articles/our_pirates_and_theirs) Hussein Yusuf disagrees. "Somalia poses a grave danger to the United States and the Horn of Africa today," the FPIF contributor writes in What's Next for Somalia. "Despite the U.S. 'Global War on Terror,' piracy in the Gulf of Aden threatens the supply of oil and commercial trade to the West. Islamic extremists threaten the stability of this region more than ever." Yusuf and Nesbitt offer contrasting interpretations in their strategic dialogue on this topic. Regional instability causes global nuclear war Deutsch PhD and political risk consultant 02 Jeffrey, and Founder, Rabid Tiger Project, 11/18/02 (http://www.rabidtigers.com/rtn/newsletterv2n9.html) The Rabid Tiger Project believes that a nuclear war is most likely to start in Africa . Civil wars in the Congo (the country formerly known as Zaire), Rwanda, Somalia and Sierra Leone, and domestic instability in Zimbabwe, Sudan and other countries, as well as occasional brushfire and other wars (thanks in part to "national" borders that cut across tribal ones) turn into a really nasty stew. We've got all too many rabid tigers and potential rabid tigers, who are willing to push the button rather than risk being seen as wishywashy in the face of a mortal threat and overthrown. Geopolitically speaking, Africa is open range. Very few countries in Africa are beholden to any particular power. South Africa is a major exception in this respect not to mention in that she also probably already has the Bomb. Thus, outside powers can more easily find client states there than, say, in Europe where the political lines have long since been drawn, or Asia where many of the countries (China, India, Japan) are powers unto themselves and don't need any "help," thank you. Thus, an African war can attract outside involvement very quickly. Of course, a proxy war alone may not induce the Great Powers to fight each other. But an African nuclear strike can ignite a much broader conflagration, if the other powers are interested in a fight. Certainly, such a strike would in the first place have been facilitated by outside help financial, scientific, engineering, etc. Africa is an ocean of troubled waters, and some people love to go fishing. Korea Neg 298/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors GLOBAL ECONOMY IMPACT 2NC Asian piracy on Singapore port crushes the markets global economic turmoil Marshall, 10(Andrew, 3/5/2010, Insurance Journal, "Maritime Terrorism Could Have Global Economic Impact." http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/international/2010/03/05/107926.htm) This is because while specialization in global supply chains has brought significant efficiency gains, it has also brought vulnerability. Disruption to a key node in the supply chain can cause dramatic and unpredictable turbulence in the whole system. That was why global semiconductor prices nearly doubled following an earthquake that hit Taiwan in 1999, and why Hurricane Katrina spread turbulence throughout world markets. "A major terrorist attack that closed a port ... for weeks would have severe economic consequences on world trade because it would inflict major disruptions in complex justintime supply chains that comprise the global economy," the World Economic Forum said in its Global Risks 2010 report, released in January. In a research paper for RAND, terrorism risk analyst Peter Chalk said: "Maritime attacks offer terrorists an alternate means of causing mass economic destabilization." Disrupting the mechanics of the global 'just enough, just in time' cargo freight trading system could potentially trigger vast and cascading fiscal effects, especially if the operations of a major commercial port were curtailed," he added. The Strait of Malacca between peninsular Malaysia and Sumatra is among the world's busiest shipping lanes, used by more than 70,000 ships in 2007. Up to 80 percent of China's oil imports and 30 percent of its iron ore imports, and 90 percent of Japan's crude oil imports, pass through the Strait. Any attack could also have a big impact on shipments of some major commodities from Sumatra, Indonesia's main producing island of palm oil, rubber and coffee. Singapore is the world's top container shipping port and biggest ship refueling hub. And because of the central importance of Singapore's port to its economy, an attack that shut it down even temporarily would have a major negative impact on local stocks and the Singapore dollar. Markets would suffer even if the mere threat of attack led some shippers to avoid Singapore. The 2002 suicide bomb attack on the French supertanker Limburg led to a tripling of war risks premiums levied on ships calling at Aden and a 93 percent drop in container terminal throughput there. Piracy in the Malacca Strait became so serious a decade ago that in 2005 the Joint War Committee of the Lloyd's Market Association added the area to its list of war risk zones, sending premiums sharply higher. The decision was reversed in 2006 following lobbying from Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia. Korea Neg 299/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors GLOBAL ECONOMY IMPACT 2NC Econ collapse causes power vacuum multiple nuclear wars, terrorism, and extinction Aaron L. Friedberg (professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton University, served from 2003 to 2005 in the office of the Vice President of the United States as deputy assistant for nationalsecurity affairs and director of policy planning. PhD in Politics from Harvard) and Gabriel Schoenfeld (senior fellow at the Hudson Institute in Washington DC and a resident scholar at the Witherspoon Institute in Princeton) October 21, 2008 "The Dangers of a Diminished America" http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122455074012352571.html? mod=rss_opinion_main Then there are the dolorous consequences of a potential collapse of the world's financial architecture. For decades now, Americans have enjoyed the advantages of being at the center of that system. The worldwide use of the dollar, and the stability of our economy, among other things, made it easier for us to run huge budget deficits, as we counted on foreigners to pick up the tab by buying dollardenominated assets as a safe haven. Will this be possible in the future? Meanwhile, traditional foreignpolicy challenges are multiplying. The threat from al Qaeda and Islamic terrorist affiliates has not been extinguished. Iran and North Korea are continuing on their bellicose paths, while Pakistan and Afghanistan are progressing smartly down the road to chaos. Russia's new militancy and China's seemingly relentless rise also give cause for concern. If America now tries to pull back from the world stage, it will leave a dangerous power vacuum. The stabilizing effects of our presence in Asia, our continuing commitment to Europe, and our position as defender of last resort for Middle East energy sources and supply lines could all be placed at risk. In such a scenario there are shades of the 1930s, when global trade and finance ground nearly to a halt, the peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers led by the remorseless fanatics who rose up on the crest of economic disaster exploited their divisions. Today we run the risk that rogue states may choose to become ever more reckless with their nuclear toys, just at our moment of maximum vulnerability. The aftershocks of the financial crisis will almost certainly rock our principal strategic competitors even harder than they will rock us. The dramatic free fall of the Russian stock market has demonstrated the fragility of a state whose economic performance hinges on high oil prices, now driven down by the global slowdown. China is perhaps even more fragile, its economic growth depending heavily on foreign investment and access to foreign markets. Both will now be constricted, inflicting economic pain and perhaps even sparking unrest in a country where political legitimacy rests on progress in the long march to prosperity. None of this is good news if the authoritarian leaders of these countries seek to divert attention from internal travails with external adventures. Korea Neg 300/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors MIDDLE EAST STABILITY IMPACT 2NC ROK military deployments stabilize Middle East and South Asia Twining, 10 Senior Fellow for Asia at the German Marshall Fund of the United States (4/1/10, Daniel, "Strengthening the U.S.Korea Alliance for the 21st Century," http://www.gmfus.org/galleries/ct_publication_attachments/AsiaDanTwiningU.S.KoreaAlliance.pdf) With regard to land power, South Korea's military deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq set an important precedent for future contributions by the Korean armed forces to stabilization and security operations in the arc of instability encompassing the Middle East and South Asia. U.S.ROK combined training and exercises could increasingly focus on enlarging the South Korean army's capacities for counterinsurgency and postconflict stabilization with an eye on future challenges beyond the peninsula. This program to add a globaloperations dimension to the interoperability between the American and South Korean armies on the peninsula would build on existing joint training and planning for stabilization operations following a potential collapse of the North Korean regime. Middle East instability threatens nuclear war Morgan, 07 political writer (Stephen J., Political Writer and Former Member of the British Labour Party Executive Committee, "Better another Taliban Afghanistan, than a Taliban NUCLEAR Pakistan!?", 9-23, http://www.freearticlesarchive.com/article/_Better_another_Taliban_Afghanistan__than_a_Taliban_NUCLEA R_Pakistan___/99961/0/) However events may prove him sorely wrong. Indeed, his policy could completely backfire upon him. As the war intensifies, he has no guarantees that the current autonomy may yet burgeon into a separatist movement. Appetite comes with eating, as they say. Moreover, should the Taliban fail to reconquer al of Afghanistan, as looks likely, but captures at least half of the country, then a Taliban Pashtun caliphate could be established which would act as a magnet to separatist Pashtuns in Pakistan. Then, the likely break up of Afghanistan along ethnic lines, could, indeed, lead the way to the break up of Pakistan, as well. Strong centrifugal forces have always bedevilled the stability and unity of Pakistan, and, in the context of the new world situation, the country could be faced with civil wars and popular fundamentalist uprisings, probably including a military fundamentalist coup d'tat. Fundamentalism is deeply rooted in Pakistan society. The fact that in the year following 9/11, the most popular name given to male children born that year was "Osama" (not a Pakistani name) is a small indication of the mood. Given the weakening base of the traditional, secular opposition parties, conditions would be ripe for a coup d'tat by the fundamentalist wing of the Army and ISI, leaning on the radicalised masses to take power. Some form of radical, military Islamic regime, where legal powers would shift to Islamic courts and forms of shira law would be likely. Although, even then, this might not take place outside of a protracted crisis of upheaval and civil war conditions, mixing fundamentalist movements with nationalist uprisings and sectarian violence between the Sunni and minority Shia populations. The nightmare that is now Iraq would take on gothic proportions across the continent. The prophesy of an arc of civil war over Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq would spread to south Asia, stretching from Pakistan to Palestine, through Afghanistan into Iraq and up to the Mediterranean coast. Undoubtedly, this would also spill over into India both with regards to the Muslim community and Kashmir. Border clashes, terrorist attacks, sectarian pogroms and insurgency would break out. A new war, and possibly nuclear war, between Pakistan and India could no be ruled out. Atomic Al Qaeda Should Pakistan break down completely, a Talibanstyle government with strong Al Qaeda influence is a real possibility. Such deep chaos would, of course, open a "Pandora's box" for the region and the world. With the possibility of unstable clerical and military fundamentalist elements being in control of the Pakistan nuclear arsenal, not only their use against India, but Israel becomes a possibility, as well as the acquisition of nuclear and other deadly weapons secrets by Al Qaeda. Invading Pakistan would not be an option for America. Therefore a nuclear war would now again become a real strategic possibility. This would bring a shift in the tectonic plates of global relations. It could usher in a new Cold War with China and Russia pitted against the US. Korea Neg 301/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors Korea Neg 302/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors ROK FORCES SOLVE PIRACY ROK peacekeeping is key it guards slow, vulnerable ships in Somali pirateinfested area and deters pirate attacks Roehrig, 10 Associate Professor in the National Security Decision Making Department, at the U.S. Naval War College (Terrence, International Journal of Korean Studies, "ROKU.S. Maritime Cooperation: A Growing Dimension of the Alliance." www.icks.org/publication/pdf/2010SPRINGSUMMER/6.pdf) In 2008, the ROK National Assembly approved South Korea's first foreign deployment of naval forces for an antipiracy mission in the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia. The KDXII destroyer, Munmu the Great , commanded by Captain Jang Sungwoo, was dispatched in March 2009 with 300 personnel on board for a six month deployment to the region. The ship participated in the U.S.led Combined Task Force (CTF) 151 along with the navies of 16 other countries including Canada, Germany, Japan, Russia, the Netherlands, Spain, and India. CTF 151 is a multinational force organized to protect the shipping lanes and conduct counterpiracy operations around the Horn of Africa. While in the Gulf, ROKS Munmu the Great guarded 325 commercial vessels, 140 of which were Korean ships. Over 450 South Korean ships use this shipping route each year, and onethird of these are particularly slow, making them vulnerable to pirate attack. Increasingly, ROK commercial vessels are becoming targets for pirates in the region. While in the Gulf of Aden, Munmu the Great participated in 22 missions and repelled seven piracy attacks, including one against a North Korean ship, the Dabkasol. In one operation, Munmu the Great responded to a distress call from an Egyptian ship on its way from the Red Sea to India, and the South Korean commander sent a helicopter with a team of snipers to rescue the vessel. Soon after, the ROKN helicopter was joined by a U.S. Navy helicopter to carry out the first joint ROKU.S. naval operation since participating in CTF 151.60 According to Captain Jang, "Allied forces gave high marks to the Korean Navy's capabilities and assigned us the most pirateinfested area northern Bosaso off of Somalia . We are proud to raise Korea's reputation in the international community."61 The Munmu the Great has since returned home and was relieved by another ROKN KDXII destroyer, Daejoyeong. In November 2009, a third KDXII destroyer, Chungmugong Yi Soonshin, left to relieve the Daejoyeong. The new contingent of the Cheonghae unit will carry an antisubmarine Lynx helicopter and a 30man underwater demolition unit.62 Despite the considerable distance from South Korea, ROKN participation played an important role in protecting its commercial interests. Moreover, its presence also helped to deter attacks on other ships in the region. South Korea's peacekeeping forces are significant they train and coordinate global forces Hwang, 09 Senior Special Advisor to Ambassador Christopher Hill, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs at the U.S. State Department (Balbina, "A Roadmap for Expanding U.S.ROK Alliance Cooperation Cooperation on Global Issues: Peacekeeping." asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/HwangPeacekeepingAbstract.pdf) The growing convergence in the global strategic outlooks of the two countries is a welcome development and a necessary requirement for any further transformation of the alliance. South Korea's contribution to international peacekeeping and stabilization operations remains, however, comparatively limited. Despite its middlepower status , ROK can play a unique leadership role in the global community by actively increasing its support for and participation in peacekeeping missions around the world both by offering PKO training and through direct participation. Although it will not be an easy task, with careful coordination and management, South Korea has the potential to make a significant contribution to international stability through PKO activities. Korea Neg 303/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors PIRACY HURTS TRADE Piracy undermines key trade routes Mukudan, 08 ship captain and writer at ICC Commercial Crime Services (Pottengal, ICC Commercial Crime Services helps businesses stay in business by deterring crime, "Unprecedented rise in piratical attacks." http://www.iccccs.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=306:unprecedentedrisein piraticalattacks&catid=60:news&Itemid=51) In the third quarter of 2008, a total of 26 vessels were hijacked by Somali pirates with 537 crew members taken hostage. A further 21 vessels were fired upon by Somali pirates in the same period. As of 30 September 2008, 12 vessels remain captive and under negotiation with over 250 crew being held hostage. Captain Mukundan added: "The number of piracy attacks off the coast of Somalia is unprecedented. Pirates in the Gulf of Aden are growing increasingly brazen, attacking vessels, including tanker and large bulk carriers, with impunity. This major international seaway requires immediate increased protection and naval intervention." The shift of attacks from the East coast of Somalia into the Gulf of Aden as initially indicated in the IMB second quarter report, has begun to threaten shipping and trade passing through this extremely important trade route between Asia and Europe. Piracy targets the Gulf of Aden Mukudan, 08 ship captain and writer at ICC Commercial Crime Services (Pottengal, ICC Commercial Crime Services helps businesses stay in business by deterring crime, "Unprecedented rise in piratical attacks." http://www.iccccs.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=306:unprecedentedrisein piraticalattacks&catid=60:news&Itemid=51) The latest piracy statistics released by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) Piracy Reporting Centre (PRC) indicate a dramatic increase in attacks of piracy for the first nine months of 2008. Somalia, Nigeria, and Indonesia remain international piracy hotspots, ranking first, second and third in acts of piracy up to the end of Q3 2008. A total of 199 incidents were reported to the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre (PRC) in the first nine months of 2008. The third quarter of 2008 saw reported incidents spike to 83, a significant increase when compared to the 53 reported in the first quarter and the 63 reported in the second quarter. The reported acts of piracy committed to date in 2008 have included 115 vessels boarded, 31 vessels hijacked, and 23 vessels fired upon. A total of 581 crewmembers were taken hostage, nine kidnapped, nine killed and seven missing presumed dead. IMB Director Captain Pottengal Mukundan stated: "The increased frequency of piracy and heightening levels of violence are of significant concern to the shipping industry and all mariners. The types of attacks, the violence associated with the attacks, the number of hostages taken, and the amounts paid in ransoms for the release of the vessels have all increased considerably." Much of the increase in piracy can be directly attributed to the increasingly dangerous Gulf of Aden and East coast of Somalia. This region ranks as the number one piracy danger zone with the 63 incidents reported there accounting for almost a third of the overall reported attacks. Korea Neg 304/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors PIRACY HURTS TRADE Piracy hurts US trade Dillon 2000 Dillon is Policy Analyst for Southeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation (Dana, Heritage Foundation, "Dillon is Policy Analyst for Southeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation." http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2000/06/PiracyinAsiaAGrowing BarriertoMaritimeTrade) The United States is the world's largest trading nation, and although the dollar amount of losses due to piracy is difficult to assess, America's reliance on trade makes any attack on ships in foreign waters or ports, especially those of its trading partners, a maritime concern. Both the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Coast Guard consider maritime piracy a problem that merits U.S. participation in regional seminars on the issue. Although today's pirates target their victims in ways that may limit a direct U.S. response, several steps can be taken to help protect maritime trade and to assist other nations in improving their ability to combat piracy and reduce the threat. Piracy crushes U.S.Asian trade Dillon 2000 Dillon is Policy Analyst for Southeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation (Dana, Heritage Foundation, "Dillon is Policy Analyst for Southeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation." http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2000/06/PiracyinAsiaAGrowing BarriertoMaritimeTrade) The three components of maritime industry most affected by piracy are the shippers (manufacturers that own the cargo), carriers (companies that own the vessels), and insurers of the ships and cargoes. In the highly competitive shipping market, the carriers often decide not to report incidents of piracy. They appear to prefer to cover the losses out of their own resources rather than pay increased insurance costs after placing a claim or incurring delays due to an official investigation that can result in additional port costs of up to $10,000 a day. With many pirate attacks going unreported, calculating the amount of financial damage caused by this maritime crime is very difficult; estimates range as high as $16 billion annually.4 Beyond the physical danger to seamen and the loss of property, the rising costs associated with piracy and imposed on shippers, carriers, and insurers threaten America's diplomatic efforts in Asia. To recoup their losses from piracy, insurers raise rates for carriers that cross the more dangerous waters; some carriers feel compelled to employ armed guards. Both activities raise the cost of shipping. As the United States lobbies to reduce trade barriers in Asia, these increased costs from piracy serve as a non tariff barrier to trade. In addition, the added insurance costs and safety risks for trading in particularly dangerous ports act as an indirect economic boycott, restraining companies from conducting business with many of America's friends or allies that are least able to afford direct efforts to combat the piracy. Korea Neg 305/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors PIRACY HURTS TRADE Piracy threatens global trade via the Gulf of Aden hurting the economy MARAD, 08 US Dept of Transportation Maritime Administration (Official Government report, 12232008, "Economic Impact of Piracy in the Gulf of Aden on Global Trade." Pdf) Over 80 percent of international maritime trade moving through the Gulf of Aden is with Europe. Although those economies are currently more directly affected by the attacks, piracy poses significant burdens on governments and the maritime industry as they take steps to protect themselves from being attacked or hijacked. These actions may include a larger military presence in highrisk areas, rerouting ships to bypass the Gulf of Aden, paying higher insurance premiums, hiring private security guards, and installing nonlethal deterrent equipment. Ultimately, the costs of these actions are passed along to the tax payer and the consumer. The carrier has basically two courses of action against piracy in the Gulf of Aden: Avoiding the area by rerouting vessels via the Cape of Good Hope, or accepting the risk of operating ships through the area by enhancing vessel security. Rerouting may be a viable option for lower value cargoes, such as some bulk commodities . However, for high value consumer goods or items needed for justintime manufacturing, the added delay may be unacceptable to the shipper. For example, routing a tanker from Saudi Arabia to the United States via the Cape of Good Hope adds approximately 2,700 miles to the voyage. This longer distance will increase the annual operating cost of the vessel by reducing the delivery capacity for the ship from about six roundtrip voyages to five voyages, or a drop of about 26 percent. The additional fuel cost of traveling via the Cape of Good Hope is about $3.5 million annually. The cost of avoiding risk becomes more complex in the liner trades. A long route change would result in the need for an additional vessel in order to maintain the scheduled service and capacity commitments of the liner operation. For example, a routing from Europe to the Far East via the Cape of Good Hope, rather than through the Suez Canal, would incur an estimated additional $89 million annually, which includes $74.4 million in fuel and $14.6 million in charter expenses. In addition, the rerouting would increase transit times by about 5.7 days per ship. This would result in the need for an additional vessel to maintain the service frequency. However, these costs do not consider the disruption in the logistics chains. The cost of the war risk binder for ships transiting the Gulf of Aden is estimated at $20,000 per ship per voyage, excluding injury, liability, and ransom coverage. A year ago, the cost of the additional insurance premium was only $500.1 It is estimated that the increased cost of war risk insurance premiums for the 20,000 ships passing through the Gulf of Aden could reach as much as $400 million. 2 Clearly, this estimate represents an upper bound on the additional insurance cost as not all vessels will seek the additional coverage, and the estimate excludes rebates given when no claim is exercised on the policy. Korea Neg 306/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors ROK SOFT POWER IMPACT Key to South Korea's international leadership Colonel Groves, 07 currently assigned as the UCJ39, UN Command, Combined Forces Command and U.S. Forces Korea (September 2007, Col. Bryan Groves, Army, "Republic of Korea Peacekeeping Operations--Ensuring Peace and Stability Around the World," http://www3.ausa.org/webpub/DeptArmyMagazine.nsf/byid/TWAH765RK9/$File/Groves.pdf?OpenElement, JMP) The Republic of Korea (ROK) has long been a case study in successful democratization and economic development. Now, recent world events have shown that the ROK is assuming a leadership role in the international community. ROK peacekeeping operations in Iraq and Lebanon are evidence of that leadership. The ROK is sending significant foreign aid to countries where it has deployed its soldiers to support peacekeeping operations. Indeed, the ROK pledged $260 million towards reconstruction in Iraq in 2003. (Since then, the ROK upped its pledge to $460 million. Its military has spent more than $48.6 million for humanitarian assistance and reconstruction in Iraq, and the ROK government's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade has spent another $250 million on development projects in Iraq. The ROK has budgeted $37 million for aid to Lebanon this year.) ***UNIFICATION DISAD*** Korea Neg 307/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors Korea Neg 308/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors 1NC BIODVIERSITY US troop withdrawal would build Chinese support for Korean unification--this is the only possible scenario VAN NGUYEN 2009 (Peter Van Nguyen is a freelance writer based in Sydney, Australia. His articles have been published in OpEdnews, Asia Times Online and Foreign Policy JournalUPI Asia 2009 "U.S. bases are obstacle to Korean reunification," Oct 13, http://www.upiasia.com/Security/2009/10/13/us_bases_are_obstacle_to_korean_reunification/1193/) The United States and South Korea recently agreed on a contingency plan in case the North Korean government collapses. The plan includes joint military operations to control the influx of refugees and to secure the North's nuclear weapons. It also outlines the reunification of the two Koreas under a liberal and democratic leadership, with the cooperation of China. The United States believes that if the North collapsed, China would have to back reunification to demonstrate that it is a responsible player in regional cooperation. But in order to get the Chinese to endorse the plan, the United States would have to give up its strategic military bases in South Korea and order a complete withdrawal of U.S. troops from the region. Both Koreas have been constantly eyed by foreigners due to their geostrategic value in Northeast Asia. For China, Japan and the United States, the Koreas have provided a buffer zone for more than half a century since the end of the Korean War. The Korean peninsula is also seen as a predetermined battlefield if war breaks out between China, the United States and Japan. This would leave the warring states relatively untouched, as the three nations could avoid hitting each other's territories, which would escalate the conflict and make it difficult for all parties to disengage for fear of losing face. But both Koreas would have to face the brunt of a fullscale war. For China, protecting North Korea means keeping the United States and its allies from encroaching on its border. China would rather maintain the status quo than accept a reunified Korea under South Korean administration. Therefore, China will do its best to stabilize North Korea and rebuild its political structure in line with Chinese interests. China might be forced to accept a reunified Korea if it wants to maintain an international image as a peacepromoting country. However, unless it gets some kind of security guarantee without losing the strategic balance in the region, there is little incentive for it to allow reunification to take place unchallenged . Since the end of the Korean War the United States has maintained a large military contingent in South Korea to deter an invasion attempt by the North. The U.S. military presence keeps China's ambitions in check and in the bargain offers Japan some security, as the Japanese fear reprisals from the Chinese for atrocities committed during World War II. Besides, China's growing economic and military clout has increased the necessity for a military presence in South Korea. However, U.S. military bases in South Korea could pose the greatest obstacle to a peaceful reunification of the Koreas . Even a unified Korea might not want the U.S. military, as reunification would make the objective of providing deterrence against the North redundant. A U.S. military base in a united Korea would only strain ties with China, as it would be difficult to explain why it was required if the North Korean threat no longer exists. Also, millions of North Koreans have a deeply embedded resentment against the United States and are highly suspicious of its geopolitical moves in the region. Many believe that the South Korean government is a puppet of the United States. Stationing troops in Korea after reunification would only reinforce this belief. This would create a deep rift within the Koreas and threaten to derail the reunification process. The complete withdrawal of all U.S. military bases and personnel from the Korean peninsula should follow after a timetable has been set, allowing the new Korea to handle its own security. The question is, will the United States pull out all its troops in order to allow the peaceful reunification of the Koreas? The United States has been dreading a scenario in which its military bases in South Korea could come under threat. The United States may not withdraw its troops, as that would leave a strategic vacuum. It would risk losing influence over Korea to China, whose economy is touted to race ahead of that of the United States. Although complete U.S. withdrawal would be ideal, an alternative would be to allow China to set up bases in the northern part of Korea, similar to Kyrgyzstan allowing Russia and China to set up bases to ease their concerns over the U.S. military presence. This would have its challenges, however, and might increase the chances of military confrontation. But regardless of the implications and consequences, the United States will hesitate to remove its bases. China would probably ask for a U.S. troop withdrawal as a precondition to the reunification of the two Korea's under a liberal and democratic government. Korea Neg 309/436 That destroys biodiversity in the DMZ--it's a key ecosystem CNN 2003 ("Korea's DMZ: The thin green line," August 25, http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/east/08/22/korea.bio.dmz/) Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors (CNN) From the fields of Normandy to the forests of Ardennes, battlefields around the globe have healed their wounds and nature has fought back. Nowhere is this more evident than in the heavilyfortified border zone between North and South Korea. The Demilitarized Zone, or DMZ as it is more popularly known is now one of the few untouched havens for Northeast Asia's wildlife. Some say the only threat to its survival is peace. "Scientists have done a pretty good job of studying biodiversity in South Korea since the 1950's and I am confident that there is no place like the DMZ on the peninsula," Ke Chung Kim of the DMZ Forum told CNN. The zone was established at the end of the threeyear Korean War in 1953 and while intensive agriculture and industrialization has ravaged both the North and South since, tight security measures have left the environment in the DMZ largely undisturbed for the last 50 years. As a result, the ribbon of untouched land along the 38th parallel has now become an important refuge for two of the world's most endangered birds: the whitenaped and the redcrowned crane. Other rare species include Asiatic black bears, Chinese gorhals and egrets. According to some accounts there may even be Korean tigers in the DMZ a subspecies of the Siberian tiger, one of the rarest tigers on the planet. In total more than 20,000 migratory fowl utilize the border area. They manage to avoid setting off land mines although nowadays some may be too old to be active. The 4kilometerwide by 250kilometer long (2.5 miles by 155 miles) DMZ stretches across the entire width of the Korean Peninsula, encompassing a cross section of ecosystems and landscapes . The corridor follows the Military Demarcation Line established by the 1953 Armistice Agreement between the two Koreas which are still technically at war. After the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 the DMZ is the last remaining Cold Warstyle frontier on the planet, bristling with sensors, tank traps and automatic artillery. Up to two million soldiers guard the world's most heavily fortified border, whilst listening to the sound of crested shell ducks and swan geese. "The DMZ and its adjacent Civilian Control Zone are unique containing wetlands, forests, estuaries, mountains, coastal islands, riparian valleys and agricultural fields," says Hall Healy of Facilitated Solutions International, an organization that aids conservation groups working in the border area. Biodiversity and barbed wire In the event of a formalized peace breaking out between the two Koreas any biological reserve would compete with other proposals for the land, even though the South Korean government has said the DMZ is a priority ecosystem. While poverty alleviation would likely prevent North Korea from putting much weight on nature conservation in the DMZ, for its southern neighbor it would be the prospect of further economic development and integration with the North that would be a driving force for development. Yet pressure from the DMZ Forum, DMZ Vets and the Korean Federation for Environmental Movement (KFEM) to declare the area a "biodiversity zone," has been growing. Since much of the natural Korean natural habitat has been degraded by industrialization, urbanization and agriculture, conservationists hope that the DMZ will be preserved for its beauty and significance. "South Korea's habitats have been exploited many times over and North Korea's environmental conditions are dismal at best," says Kim. "North Korean environmental demise is the result of persistent mismanagement of forests, military destruction, and poverty," he says. In the South, the picture is not much better. A 1994 biodiversity study revealed that almost 30 percent of the country's mammals, 48 percent of reptiles and 60 percent of amphibians are either extinct or endangered. The peninsula, which covers a combined area the size of Pennsylvania and New York State, already has a combined population of about 70 million, which could rise to 100 million by 2025. This is putting more pressure on the area to the north of Seoul and to the south of Pyongyang, the North Korean capital. The distance between the two cities is only 194 kilometers and every month, development creeps nearer to the demilitarized zone. "Similar flora and fauna may have existed in other locations before, but due to development, these locations are now highly fragmented and do not possess the diversity of species they once did," says Healy. Many conservationists see the DMZ as a readymade nature reserve. It is already well defined and controlled by a body separate to both countries the Military Armistice Commission. Only the future will tell. At present the conservationists best bet is for the barbed wire to stay in place to keep the developers out and the wildlife intact. Korea Neg 310/436 Extinction Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors WATSON 2006 (Captain Paul, Founder and President of Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, dude on Whale Wars, Last Mod 917, http://www.eco action.org/dt/beerswil.html) The facts are clear. More plant and animal species will go through extinction within our generation than have been lost thorough natural causes over the past two hundred million years. Our single human generation, that is, all people born between 1930 and 2010 will witness the complete obliteration of one third to one half of all the Earth's life forms, each and every one of them the product of more than two billion years of evolution. This is biological meltdown, and what this really means is the end to vertebrate evolution on planet Earth. Nature is under siege on a global scale. Biotopes, i.e., environmentally distinct regions, from tropical and temperate rainforests to coral reefs and coastal estuaries, are disintegrating in the wake of human onslaught. The destruction of forests and the proliferation of human activity will remove more than 20 percent of all terrestrial plant species over the next fifty years. Because plants form the foundation for entire biotic communities, their demise will carry with it the extinction of an exponentially greater number of animal species perhaps ten times as many faunal species for each type of plant eliminated. Sixtyfive million years ago, a natural cataclysmic event resulted in extinction of the dinosaurs. Even with a plant foundation intact, it took more than 100,000 years for faunal biological diversity to reestablish itself. More importantly, the resurrection of biological diversity assumes an intact zone of tropical forests to provide for new speciation after extinction. Today, the tropical rain forests are disappearing more rapidly than any other bioregion, ensuring that after the age of humans, the Earth will remain a biological, if not a literal desert for eons to come. The present course of civilization points to ecocide the death of nature. Like a runaway train, civilization is speeding along tracks of our own manufacture towards the stone wall of extinction. The human passengers sitting comfortably in their seats, laughing, partying, and choosing to not look out the window. Environmentalists are those perceptive few who have their faces pressed against the glass, watching the hurling bodies of plants and animals go screaming by. Environmental activists are those even fewer people who are trying desperately to break into the fortified engine of greed that propels this destructive specicidal juggernaut. Others are desperately throwing out anchors in an attempt to slow the monster down while all the while, the authorities, blind to their own impending destruction, are clubbing, shooting and jailing those who would save us all. SHORT MEMORIES Civilized humans have for ten thousand years been marching across the face of the Earth leaving deserts in their footprints. Because we have such short memories, we forgot the wonder and splendor of a virgin nature. We revise history and make it fit into our present perceptions. For instance, are you aware that only two thousand years ago, the coast of North Africa was a mighty forest? The Phoenicians and the Carthaginians built powerful ships from the strong timbers of the region. Rome was a major exporter of timber to Europe. The temple of Jerusalem was built with titanic cedar logs, one image of which adorns the flag of Lebanon today. Jesus Christ did not live in a desert, he was a man of the forest. The Sumerians were renowned for clearing the forests of Mesopotamia for agriculture. But the destruction of the coastal swath of the North African forest stopped the rain from advancing into the interior. Without the rain, the trees died and thus was born the mighty Sahara, sired by man and continued to grow southward at a rate of ten miles per year, advancing down the length of the continent of Africa. And so will go Brazil. The precipitation off the Atlantic strikes the coastal rain forest and is absorbed and sent skyward again by the trees, falling further into the interior. Twelve times the moisture falls and twelve times it is returned to the sky all the way to the Andes mountains. Destroy the coastal swath and desertify Amazonia it is as simple as that. Create a swath anywhere between the coast and the mountains and the rains will be stopped. We did it before while relatively primitive. We learned nothing. We forgot. So too, have we forgotten that walrus once mated and bred along the coast of Nova Scotia, that sixty million bison once roamed the North American plains. One hundred years ago, the white bear once roamed the forests of New England and the Canadian Maritime provinces. Now it is called the polar bear because that is where it now makes its last stand. EXTINCTION IS DIFFICULT TO APPRECIATE Gone forever are the European elephant, lion and tiger. The Labrador duck, gint auk, Carolina parakeet will never again grace this planet of ours. Lost for all time are the Atlantic grey whales, the Biscayan right whales and the Stellar sea cow. Our children will never look upon the California condor in the wild or watch the Palos Verde blue butterfly dart from flower to flower. Extinction is a difficult concept to fully appreciate. What has been is no more and never shall be again. It would take another creation and billions of years to recreate the passenger pigeon. It is the loss of billions of years of evolutionary programming. It is the destruction of beauty, the obliteration of truth, the removal of uniqueness, the scarring of the sacred web of life To be responsible for an extinction is to commit blasphemy against the divine. It is the greatest of all possible crimes, more evil than murder, more appalling than genocide, more monstrous than even the apparent unlimited perversities of the human mind. To be responsible for the complete and utter destruction of a unique and sacred life form is arrogance that seethes with evil, for the very opposite of evil is live. It is no accident that these two words spell out each other in reverse. And yet, a reporter in California recently told me that "all the redwoods in California are not worth the life on one human being." What incredible arrogance. The rights a species, any species, must take precedence over the life of an individual or another species. This is a basic ecological law. It is not to be tampered with by primates who have molded themselves into divine legends in their own mind. For each and every one of the thirty million plus species that grace this beautiful planet are essential for the continued wellbeing of which we are all a part, the planet Earth the divine entity which brought us forth from the fertility of her sacred womb. As a seacaptain I like to compare the structural integrity of the biosphere to that of a ship's hull. Each species is a rivet that keeps the hull intact. If I were to go into my engine room and find my engineers busily popping rivets from the hull, I would be upset and naturally I would ask them what they were doing. If they told me that they discovered that they could make a dollar each from the rivets, I could do one of three things. I could ignore them. I could ask them to cut me in for a share of the profits, or I could kick their asses out of the engine room and off my ship. If I was a responsible captain, I would do the latter. If I did not, I would soon find the ocean pouring through the holes left by the stolen rivets and very shortly after, my ship, my crew and myself would disappear beneath the waves. And that is the state of the world today. The political leaders, i.e., the captains at the helms of their nation states, are ignoring the rivet poppers or they are cutting themselves in for the profits. There are very few asses being kicked out of the engine room of spaceship Earth. With the rivet poppers in command, it will not be long until the biospheric integrity of the Earth collapses under the weight of ecological strain and tides of death come pouring in. And that will be the price of progress ecological collapse, the death of nature, and with it the horrendous and mind numbing specter of massive human destruction. Korea Neg 311/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors Korea Neg 312/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors REUNIFICATION UNIQUNESS Reunification won't happen anytime soon LIM 2010 (John, writer for the Georgetown Federalist, "Breaking Open the Berlin Wall of the Korean Peninsula," Feb 25, http://www.thegeorgetownfederalist.com/content/breakingopenberlinwallkoreanpeninsula) The political stability of the Korean Peninsula is of particular importance to me. As my family is from Korea, the last thing I would want is for the North Korean communists to run over my grandparents' orchard in South Korea. Since President Harry Truman forbade General Douglas McArthur from reunifying the Korean people, the conflict has been locked in a stalemate, with no end in sight. Now that North Korea presents itself as a viable threat through its acquisition of nuclear weapons, a resolution to this problem does seem closer than ever before. The prospect of a continuation of the Korean War has never been as real as it is now, and it appears that a new war on the peninsula would be far deadlier than the first. Additionally, the possibility of a peaceful reunification of the two Koreas, a long time vision of the Korean people and the official stance of every South Korean government since the 1990s , seems further and further away. USNorth Korean hostility means no reunification now PBS 2003 (PBS Frontline, "FaceOff: A Short History of the United StatesNorth Korea Conflict," January, http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/northkorea/history.html) The barbed wire that was rolled out on the 38th parallel became the demarcation point for two Koreas. Korea's division between the capitalist South and communist North, a line drawn by the world's superpowers, cut right across the middle of the country and separated countless families. On both sides of the line, there has been an almost palpable longing for reunification ever since. Over the last 10 years, dialogue between the two Koreas offered hope for a reunified country. Relations between the United States and North Korea also warmed. But then the latest crisis broke out, revealing a residue of profound mistrust. Korea Neg 313/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors Korea Neg 314/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors WITHDRAWAL LINKS Withdrawal of US troops is key to unification--American military presence pulls the ROK into US strategy LEE 2006 (Lee Chulkee, a professor in international relations at the Dongguk University, "Strategic Flexibility of U.S. Forces in Korea," March 9, http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0619Lee.html) What the U.S. really fears is the emergence of a situation where growing antiAmerican sentiment and public opinion for the withdrawal of USFK necessitate American troops to leave Korea, because this will seriously jeopardize the global strategies of Washington. The greatest danger of "the strategic flexibility of the USFK is that Korea will be firmly incorporated into the global hegemonic strategy of the U.S. The global strategy and Northeast Asian policy of the United States are to check and blockade China through the USJapan alliance as the main axis and KoreaUS alliance as the subsidiary axis. But they will force a confrontation and a division in Northeast Asia, creating a new cold war order in the region. If confrontation and enmity persist in Northeast Asia, peace and reunification of Korean peninsula will become remote and national division will be perpetuated. Korea cannot have a futureoriented security policy without a critical selfreflection on its security policy which is subordinate to Washington. Korea must make efforts to extricate itself from America's military strategy and policy framework. Korea must change its perception and idea. Selfreliant national defense and amelioration of security environment for Korea depend on how much room Korea will have for independent security strategies and policies free from the U.S. military strategies and policies. If the existing KoreaUS alliance system rather endangers our national security and aggravates our security environment, we cannot but raise a basic question whether such an alliance system is really necessary. Therefore, it is necessary to fundamentally reexamine the Korea's current security paradigm that entirely depends on the KoreaUS alliance system. We must build a cooperative multilateral security system for Northeast Asia, instead of a bilateral alliance system. Peace and reunification of Korean peninsula will be possible only when Northeast Asian order becomes multilateral, balanced and cooperative. This depends on how much Korea can effectively play the role of a balancer in the Northeast Asia. Only US withdrawal would permit Korean unification KLUG 2004 (Korean Liberation and Unification Group, "Remove U.S. Troops from South Korea," Oct 14, http://www.gopetition.com/petitions/removeustroopsfromsouthkorea.html) North Korea continues to live in isolation from the rest of the world, depending wholly on China, now shying away from Communism, to survive. Recently, North Korea has been aggravated by U.S. attempts to disarm its nuclear weapons. Anti North Korean feelings in the South have now been replaced with antiAmerican ones. Several riots by college universities have resulted in mass violence. America continues to OCCUPY South Korea. It's been globally proven that the only way that unification will be successful if U.S. troops leave South Korea. If, heaven forbid, there is a rekindled conflict between the divided nation, only then would the U.S. have any jurisdiction of sending military troops to a land not even part of its own country. Korea Neg 315/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors Korea Neg 316/436 Michigan Institutes `10 7 Week Juniors WITHDRAWAL LINKS U.S. military withdrawal leads to Korean unification MEYER 2009 (Carlton Meyer is a former U.S. Marine Corps officer who participated in military exercises in Korea, "The Pentagon's Favorite Demon," June 18, http://www.fff.org/comment/com0906h.asp) North Korea is still touted as a major threat to the United States, yet that conflict persists because of a refusal of the United States to agree to North Korea's demand that all foreign troops leave the Korean peninsula once an armistice is signed. As some U.S. troops are withdrawn from Iraq and Congress looks to cut budgets, generals are busy exaggerating threats. North Korea's million man army is mostly a collection of conscripts wit