Nature of Emotions 12 9 09

Nature of Emotions - Nature of Emotions 12 9 09 Neosentimentalism and Early Moral Cognition First version of sentimentalism Emotivism o Assertions

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Nature of Emotions 12 9 09 Neosentimentalism and Early Moral Cognition First version of sentimentalism: Emotivism o Assertions vs. other speech acts Assertions can be true or false Other speech acts cannot Orders Expressions of emotions Questions o Moral judgments look like assertions o But, according to emotivists, moral judgments are not assertions; rather, they are expressions of emotions Problem 1 with emotivism o “A person can judge something wrong even if he has lost all dispositions to feelings about it.” Problem 2 o Moral judgments are not used in reasoning Stealing is wrong John is stealing Hence, what John is doing is wrong Reason Only assertions can figure in reasoning “yuck!” or “ouch!” cannot be part of a reasoning Thus it seems that moral judgments are not expressions of emotions, but are assertions after all Neo-sentimentalism o “Moral judgments seem not to be moral sentiments or dispositions for certain
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This note was uploaded on 02/26/2012 for the course HPS 0625 taught by Professor Macheray during the Fall '09 term at Pittsburgh.

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Nature of Emotions - Nature of Emotions 12 9 09 Neosentimentalism and Early Moral Cognition First version of sentimentalism Emotivism o Assertions

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