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Unformatted text preview: Game 3: There is no N.E. in pure strategies in this game. This is a zero-sum game, that is, the payoffs in each box add up to zero. an so in every outcome 'one player's gain is the other player's loss' . Here the losing player always `regrets her action' (i.e., wishes to deviate) which means there is no N.E. in pure strategies. The mixed-strategy equilibrium entails each person assigning probability 1/2 to each of her actions, thereby receiving an expected payoff of 0. 5. 6. See notes. 7. See notes ....
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This note was uploaded on 02/29/2012 for the course ECON 2350 taught by Professor Bardis during the Fall '12 term at York University.
- Fall '12