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Unformatted text preview: 246 DYNAMIC GAMES OP INCOMPLETE INFORMATION mixed—strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium? Section 4.2 4.3. a. Specify a pooling perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which
both Sender types play R in the following signaling game. 1,2 b. The following three-type signaling game begins with a move
by nature, not shown in the tree, that yields one of the three types Problems . 247 with equal probability. Specify a pooling perfect Bayesian equilib-
rium in which all three Sender types play L. 248 DWAMIC GAMES OF INCOMPLETE INFORMATION 4.4. Describe all the purestrategy pooling and separating perfect
Bayesian equilibria in the following signaling games. ...
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- Spring '12