{[ promptMessage ]}

Bookmark it

{[ promptMessage ]}


PS2_212Fal10 - ECON 212 Game Theory Fall 2010 Prof Andrew...

Info iconThis preview shows pages 1–2. Sign up to view the full content.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
ECON 212 Game Theory Prof. Andrew Postlewaite Fall 2010 University of Pennsylvania Suggested Solution for Problem Set 2 1. Osborne 48.1 Let 2 n +1 be the number of citizens. The Nash equilibria of the game are as follows. (i) n + 1 citizens vote for A and all of them prefer A to win. Consider a citizen who votes for A according to this action pro°le. If he deviates (votes for B), then B is chosen, which is a worse outcome for him, so he doesn±t deviate. Given that n + 1 votes for A, no one who votes for B can±t change the outcome by unilaterally deviating, so no one has an incentive to deviate. (ii) More than n + 3 citizens vote for either A or B. No citizen can change the outcome by unilateral deviation. The action pro°le that everyone votes for his or her own candidate is an equilibrium in which no player uses a weakly dominated action. 2. Osborne 49.1 Suppose a citizen prefers A to B, and B to C. (1) Voting for either A or B is not weakly dominated.
Background image of page 1

Info iconThis preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
Image of page 2
This is the end of the preview. Sign up to access the rest of the document.

{[ snackBarMessage ]}