SECOND DIVISION[G.R. No. 148496. March 19, 2002.]VIRGINES CALVO doing business under the name and styleVIRGINES CALVO doing business under the name and styleTRANSORIENT CONTAINER TERMINAL SERVICES, INC.TRANSORIENT CONTAINER TERMINAL SERVICES, INC.,petitioner, vsvs.UCPB GENERAL INSURANCE CO., INC. (formerly Allied GuaranteeUCPB GENERAL INSURANCE CO., INC. (formerly Allied GuaranteeIns. Co., Inc.)Ins. Co., Inc.)respondent.Montilla Law Office for petitioner.Leano and Leano Law Office for respondent.SYNOPSISSYNOPSISPetitioner, Virgines Calvo is the owner of Transorient Container Terminal Services,Inc., a sole proprietorship customs broker, was held liable by the RTC and the CA fordamages to the cargo handled by petitioner. On appeal, petitioner contended that: she isnot liable beyond what ordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported byher would require because her company is not a common carrier but a private or specialcarrier; and that the cargo could not have been damaged while in her custody as sheimmediately delivered the containers to SMC's compound. DHITcSThe Supreme Court upheld the assailed decision on appeal, ruling: that petitioner is acommon carrier because the transportation of goods is an integral part of her business:that as such, she is bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the carriage of goods; thatto prove extraordinary diligence, petitioner must do more than merely show the possibilitythat some other party could be responsible for the damage; and that improper packing ofthe goods could be a basis to exempt petitioner from liability, but petitioner accepted thecargo without exception despite the apparent defects in some of the container vans.SYLLABUS1.CIVIL LAW; COMMON CARRIERS; CUSTOMS BROKER AND WAREHOUSEMANAS COMMON CARRIER; CASE AT BAR. — Petitioner contends that contrary to the @ndingsof the trial court and the Court of Appeals, she is not a common carrier but a private carrierbecause, as a customs broker and warehouseman, she does not indiscriminately hold herservices out to the public but only offers the same to select parties with whom she maycontract in the conduct of her business. The contention has no merit. In De Guzman v.Court of Appeals, the Court dismissed a similar contention and held the party to be acommon carrier, . . . as [email protected] in Article 1732 of the Civil Code. . . . There is greater reasonfor holding petitioner to be a common carrier because the transportation of goods is anintegral part of her business. To uphold petitioners' contention would be to deprive thosewith whom she contracts the protection which the law affords them notwithstanding thefact that the obligation to carry goods for her customers, as already noted, is part andparcel of petitioner's business.