04_BackgroundReading_Excerpt_1FromSpecificAndGeneralKnowledge_JensenMeckling

04_BackgroundReading_Excerpt_1FromSpecificAndGeneralKnowledge_JensenMeckling

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Unformatted text preview: SPECIFIC AND GENERAL KNOWLEDGE, AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE Michael C. Jensen Harvard Business School [email protected] and William H. Meckling University of Rochester Abstract We analyze how the cost of transfering specific knowledge encourages the decentralization of decision rights and how this decentralization generates the rights assignment and control problems. Ignoring agency problems, assigning decisions rights to individuals who have the decision-relevant knowledge and abilities increases efficiency. Self interest on the part of individual decisionmakers, however, requires a control system to motivate individuals to use their decision rights optimally. A capitalist economy solves the rights assignment and control problems by granting alienable decision rights to individuals. Unlike markets, the decision rights assigned to individuals in organizations seldom include the right to alienate those rights. This inalienabiblity of rights requires organizations to solve the rights assignment and control problems by alternative means. They solve these problems by establishing internal rules of the game that: 1) provide a system for partitioning decision rights among agents in the organization, and 2) create a control system that provides a performance measurement and evaluation system and a reward and punishment system. The inherent inefficiency of organizational control systems as compared to alienability means firms cannot survive unless they provide other offsetting advantages such as economies of scale, scope or riskbearing. M. C. Jensen and W. H. Meckling, 1990 Contract Economics, Lars Werin and Hans Wijkander, eds. (Blackwell, Oxford 1992), pp. 251-274. also published in Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Fall 1995, and Foundations of Organizational Strategy, Michael C. Jensen, Harvard University Press, 1998. This document is available on the Social Science Research Network (SSRN) Electronic Library at: http://papers.ssrn.com/ABSTRACT=6658 SPECIFIC AND GENERAL KNOWLEDGE, AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE Michael C. Jensen* Harvard Business School [email protected] and William Meckling University of Rochester Contract Economics, Lars Werin and Hans Wijkander, eds. (Blackwell, Oxford 1992), pp. 251-274. also published in Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Fall 1995, and Foundations of Organizational Strategy, Michael C. Jensen, Harvard University Press, 1998. 1. Introduction In this chapter we analyze the institutional devices through which decisionmaking rights are assigned in markets and within firms and the devices used to motivate agents to make proper decisions. We focus on how the costs of transferring information between agents influences the organization of markets and firms. 1.1 Specific and general knowledge We define specific knowledge as knowledge that is costly to transfer among agents and general knowledge as knowledge that is inexpensive to transmit. Because it is costly to transfer, getting specific knowledge used in decision-making requires decentralizing many decision rights in both the economy and in firms. Such delegation, in turn, creates * This research has been supported by the Managerial Economics Research Center, University of Rochester, and the Division of Research, Harvard Business School. We are grateful for the comments and criticisms of George Baker, Robert Eccles, Lars Werin, and Karen Wruck. Jensen and Meckling 2 1992 two problems: the rights assignment problem (determining who should exercise a decision right), and the control or agency problem (how to ensure that self-interested decision agents exercise their rights in a way that contributes to the organizational objective). Capitalist economic systems solve the rights assignment and control problems by granting alienability of decision rights to decision agents. A right is alienable if its owner has the right to sell a right and capture the proceeds offered in the exchange. Indeed, we define ownership to mean possession of a decision right along with the right to alienate that right, and we believe that when people use the word ownership that is what is meant. This combination of a decision right with the right to alienate that right is also what is generally meant by the term property right so frequently used in economics (see, for example, Alchian and Allen 1983, p. 91; Coase 1960). In contrast to markets, organizations generally do not delegate both decision rights and the alienability of those rights to the agent. A machine operator might be delegated the rights to operate and maintain a machine, but not the rights to sell it and pocket the proceeds. In the absence of alienability, organizations must solve both the rights assignment and control problems by alternative systems and procedures. We discuss the critical role that alienability plays in the market system and some of the substitute control mechanisms used in firms. 1.2 Colocation of knowledge and decision authority F. A. Hayek was an early proponent of the importance of knowledge and its distribution to a well-functioning economy. In his seminal article on "The use of knowledge in society," Hayek (1945, pp. 519ff.) argues that most economists, as well as advocates of centralized planning, misunderstand the nature of the economic problem. "The economic problem of society is. . .not merely a problem of how to allocate `given' resources--if `given' is taken to mean given to a single mind . . . It is rather a problem of how to secure the best use of resources known to any of the members of society, . . . a Jensen and Meckling 3 1992 problem of the utilization of knowledge which is not given to anyone in its totality." Hayek's insight was that an organization's performance depends on the collocation of decision-making authority with the knowledge important to those decisions.1 He argues that the distribution of knowledge in society calls for decentralization. If we . . . agree that the economic problem of society is mainly one of rapid adaptation to changes in the particular circumstances of time and place, . . . decisions must be left to the people who are familiar with these circumstances, who know directly of the relevant changes and of the resources immediately available to meet them. We cannot expect that this problem will be solved by first communicating all this knowledge to a central board which, after integrating all knowledge, issues its orders. We must solve it by some form of decentralization (Hayek 1945, p. 524). Hayek's pioneering work provides a point of departure for analyzing how the distribution of knowledge affects organizational structure and its critical role in the development of a theory of organization. Hayek presumes that markets automatically move decision rights to the agents with the relevant knowledge, and that those agents will use the decision rights properly. Unfortunately he never discusses how this occurs. We show how understanding this issue provides insights into the organizational and managerial problems of firms. In section 2 we discuss the limits of human mental capacities and their implications for the costs of transferring knowledge. Section 3 defines the characteristics of decision rights and rights systems. Section 4 discusses the functions of alienability, its role in solving the rights assignment and control problems in markets, and the implications of the market solution for the internal problems faced by organizations that cannot use alienability to solve the rights assignment and control problem. Section 5 discusses the problems of the firm in colocating decision rights and specific knowledge, and section 6 discusses the technology for partitioning decision rights within the firm. Section 7 discusses internal control systems, and section 8 concludes the chapter. 1 Harris et al. Harris, M. Kriebel, C.H. and Raviv, A. 1982. "Asymmetric Information, Incentives and Intrafirm Resource Allocation." Management Science 28, no. 6, pp. 604-620. also recognize this principle. Jensen and Meckling 4 1992 2. Knowledge 2.1 Limitations on human sensory and mental faculties The opportunity set confronting an individual or a firm is a function of the individual's knowledge. Decision-makers have limited knowledge at two levels. "Technological feasibility" reflects currently limited human knowledge about physical laws. Economic analysis reflects this limitation in the statement that knowledge is given and depends on the state of technology at the time. The second limitation on knowledge, and the one of more concern here, is due to physical limitations specific to each individual, what March and Simon (1958) labelled "bounded rationality" (see also Simon 1955; 1959). Humans have limited mental capability. The computers and sensory systems with which we are individually endowed are a scarce resource with limited storage and processing capability, as well as limited input and output channels. The limitations on human mental and sensory faculties mean that storing, processing, transmitting, and receiving knowledge are costly activities. This limited capacity of the brain means that knowledge possessed by any individual decisionmaker or group of decision-makers is thereby limited to a minuscule subset of the knowledge known to humanity. While decision-makers seldom, if ever, possess all available knowledge, they are constantly creating new knowledge. In maximizing their objective functions, decision-makers deliberately seek out knowledge (including knowledge about what decisions to consider). When knowledge is valuable in decision-making, there are benefits to colocating decision authority with the knowledge that is valuable to those decisions. There are two ways to colocate knowledge and decision rights. One is by moving the knowledge to those with the decision rights; the other is by moving the decision rights to those with the knowledge. The process for moving knowledge to those with decision rights has received much attention from researchers and designers of management information systems. But Jensen and Meckling 5 1992 the process for moving decision rights to those with the relevant knowledge has received relatively little attention in either economics or management. In a market system, collocation of decision rights and knowledge occurs either when those with decision rights expend resources to acquire the knowledge or when those with knowledge buy the decision rights. When the cost of moving knowledge is higher than the cost of moving decision rights, knowledge holders will value the decision rights more highly and will purchase them. Therefore, optimizing behavior on the part of individuals causes the distribution of decision-making rights in the economy to reflect the limitations of human mental and sensory systems. 2.2 Knowledge and the cost of transfer Although knowledge has many characteristics of potential interest, we concentrate here only on the cost of transferring knowledge between people. The cost of transferring knowledge depends on factors such as the nature of the knowledge, the organizational environment, and technology. We use the terms specific and general knowledge to distinguish between knowledge at the extremes of the continuum measuring transfer costs. The more costly knowledge is to transfer, the more specific it is, and the less costly the knowledge is to transfer the more general it is. Transfer, as we use it, means effective transfer, not merely communication. The recipient of knowledge is presumed to understand the message well enough to act on it. The simple purchase of a physics book is not sufficient to transfer the knowledge to the purchaser (as evidenced by students who regularly pay thousands of dollars for help in acquiring such knowledge). Thus, transfer involves the use of storage and processing capacity as well as input/output channels of the human brain. Moreover, knowledge transfers are not instantaneous; it takes people time to absorb information. These delays are costly, and for some decisions such cost can be high, including even the complete loss of opportunities. Jensen and Meckling 6 1992 Hayek (1945) takes the distribution of knowledge in the economy as given and thus never mentions the cost of transferring or producing knowledge even though it is logically the foundation of his analysis.2 Writing during the 1940s British debate over central planning, he attacks central planners on grounds that they will make bad decisions because they will not (indeed cannot) have knowledge of "particular circumstances of time and place." As examples of such knowledge he cites a not-fully-employed machine, someone's particular skills, surplus stock, empty or half-filled freighters, temporary opportunities in real estate, and commodity price differences. Hayek points out that conveying knowledge of particular circumstances to a central authority in statistical form is impossible. Aggregating or lumping together items such as location or quality destroys their usefulness for specific decisions. Adding up the quantity of empty spaces in steamers or logs in widely scattered wood piles, for example, eliminates the time and location information that is so valuable in periods of transportation or energy shortages. Specific knowledge, of which idiosyncratic knowledge of particular circumstances is an example, is often acquired jointly with the production of other goods. When knowledge is a by-product of activities that will be performed anyway, the cost of that knowledge to the acquirer is nil. Idiosyncratic knowledge includes knowledge of specific skills or preferences of individuals, or the peculiarities of specific machines, knowledge of particular unemployed resources or inventories, and knowledge of arbitrage opportunities. Such knowledge, almost by definition, is difficult or impossible to aggregate and summarize. 2 Like Hayek, economists have generally taken the costs of information transfer to be prohibitively large, and, therefore, taken the distribution of knowledge as given. They have analyzed extensively the effects of "information asymmetry" (as it is known in the principal/agent literature) on contracting relations. Williamson Williamson, Oliver E. 1975. Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. New York: Free Press. in his study of institutions defines the concept of "information impactedness" to deal with the organizational implications of transactions where information is "known to one or more parties but cannot be costlessly discerned by or displayed for others" (p. 31). Explicitly recognizing the costs of transferring knowledge is more useful analytically. Jensen and Meckling 7 1992 While the initial acquisition cost of idiosyncratic knowledge tends to be modest, transfer costs are likely to be high relative to the benefits. Because time is often important in taking advantage of opportunties for arbitrage or for exploiting knowledge of unemployed resources, delays in actions are costly. Uncertainty about what specific piece of idiosyncratic knowledge is valuable enlarges transfer costs in a suble way. After the fact, it is often obvious that a specific piece of knowledge critical to a decision could have been transferred at low cost (for example, particular quirks of an organization, person, legal rule, or custom). But transferring this specific piece of knowledge in advance requires knowing in advance that it will be critical. Without such clairvoyance, transfer of the fact must occur as part of a larger and more costly to transfer body of knowledge, most of which will never be used. The expected cost of transferring that larger body of data, not the particular fact, is the relevant transfer cost. Alhtough knowledge of particular circumstances of time and place and idiosyncratic knowledge cannot be summarized in statistics, they can be transmitted to other locations in the decision-making structure. The question is not whether knowledge can be transferred, but at what cost it can be transferred, and whether it is worth it to do so. Transfers yield benefits when the additional knowledge enables the decision-maker to make better choices. The issue is whether decisions will be improved enough to warrant the transfer costs. Quantities and prices are good examples of general knowledge. Unlike idiosyncratic or other specific knowledge, quantities are easily aggregated and transferred amont agents at low cost. Prices, which are also easily communicated among agents, are signals that communicate a large amount of information inexpensively. When a price rises people know it is appropriate to conserve the commodity, and they need not know why its relative supply has shrunk. Even though it is costly, we do observe situations in which colocation is achieved by transferring knowledge. Formal educational programs and the collection, analysis, and Jensen and Meckling 8 1992 dissemination of data are obvious examples. Some firms, such as United and American Airlines, achieved a major competitive advantage with computerized reservation and pricing systems that reduce the cost of transferring knowledge about prices, empty seats, and schedules (see Copeland and McKenney 1990). Particularly challenging information transfer problems arise in situations where optimal decision-making requires integration of specific knowledge located in widely separate individuals. Integrating the specific knowledge of marketing, manufacturing, and R&D personnel to design and bring a new product to the market is an example. While the general applicability of scientific knowledge distinguishes it from idiosyncratic knowledge, it is costly to transfer between agents and, therefore, also falls in the category of specific knowledge. Science creates order out of chaos by excising particulars and providing general rules of cause and effect relations. Scientific knowledge is an essential ingredient in decisions, because it provides the basis for predicting the outcomes of alternative courses of action. At the level of the firm, scientific knowledge plays a central role in the resolution of the key questions that economists address--what to produce and how to produce it. For example, the design and development of products from machinery and buildings to household appliances and drugs depends critically on scientific knowledge. In addition to scientific and idiosyncratic knowledge, knowledge produced by assembling and analyzing knowledge of particular circumstances (through time and/or across circumstances such as location, income, education, age) is a significant input to decision-making. For example, the entrepreneur who wants to capitalize on a particular half-filled freighter must be able to identify the freighter, its location, its cargo capability, etc. On the other hand, someone deciding whether to become an agent to increase the utilization of freighters will want to assemble knowledge about how many partially filled freighters there are, what routes they follow, what kinds of cargo capacity they have, and so on--knowledge that abstracts from the particular circumstances crucial to utilizing Jensen and Meckling 9 1992 fully a particular freighter. Assembled knowledge includes, but is not limited to, that generated by formal statistical methods. Assembled knowledge also includes knowledge gleaned from experience. The exercise of skills such as machine operation, writing, mathematics, or statistics are examples. Knowledge of law, of accounting practices, of contracting practices, of the rules that govern the operation of organized exchanges, etc., is also an important input to decision-making. Assembled knowledge can be either general (as is likely to be true of the output of statistical manipulation of basic data) or specific (as is likely to be true of experiential knowledge). 3. Rights Systems A decision right is the right to decide on and to take an action. Decision rights are the basis for saying that individuals have the "power" to make decisions and to take actions with resources. Power means that a decision made by a party will be operative. In modern societies the ultimate source of this power is the police powers--the threat of physical violence by the state. An entity has the right to take an action with a specific object, if the police powers of the state will be used to help ensure its ability to take the action. The right to choose what action will be taken is an important part of possessing a right. The word "right" in this context has no normative content. In any developed social system the right to take actions with specific physical objects, including our persons, is assigned to specific individuals or organizations. In a private property capitalist system most of these rights are assigned to private individuals or organizations. In a socialist or communist system most of these rights are assigned to the state or the governing party. Jensen and Meckling 10 1992 Although it is not commonly emphasized,3 the usual economic analysis of the price system is founded on the existence of a system of privately "owned" rights. There are two actions of special importance that are an integral part of ownership of a right in a resource: the right to sell the resource (more accurately, to sell rights in the resource) and the right to capture the proceeds of the sale.4 Thus, the objects of exchange in markets are not physical articles per se, but bundles of rights attached to those articles.5 It is this system of alienable rights (almost universally characterized erroneously in our profession as "the price system") that extends the efficient utilization of resources beyond the capacity of any single mind. It provides incentives to make individuals take appropriate actions without anyone having to direct them.6 This is what Adam Smith (1776) called the "invisible hand," and his point was that control of human behavior is inherent in markets. The assignment of decision-making rights in modern societies is largely a matter of law.7 But once assigned, rights are regularly reshuffled by contracts, by purchase and sale, and by managerial assignment within firms. In the case of the United States, the 3 See, for example, Arrow Arrow, Kenneth J. 1971. Control in Large Organizations: Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing: Markham Publishing Co.. An excellent counterexample is Alchian and Allen (1983, and earlier editions dating back to 1969). Including the right to sell the rights in output that an individual or firm creates with the resource. 4 5 It follows that the values established in exchanges are values of bundles of rights, not prices of physical objects. Property whose use is restricted by regulatory constraints or private covenants will sell at different prices from identical property with full use rights. Goods are sometimes alienated illegally, e.g. theft, black markets, drugs and prostitution. When the police powers are not 100 percent effective, rights are not 100 percent secure, and the lower value of such rights will reflect the probability that the rights will be taken (either illegally, or legally through political action such as confiscation or nationalization). In the absence of externalities or monopoly, of course. But externalities are themselves a result of an incomplete definition and assignment of rights. See Coase Coase, Ronald H. 1960. "The Problem of Social Cost." Journal of Law and Economics 3, no. October, pp. 1-44.. Customs and mores, not embodied in law, also confer decision-making powers and contraints on individuals or groups, especially in primitive societies. The social sanctions imposed on those who take actions in violation of social or group norms can have substantial impact on the decision rights of individuals, which is separate from formal legal sanctions of the state. Alternatively, individuals sometimes possess decision-making powers without having legal rights in those resources, e.g. possessors of stolen goods. Those engaged in illegal activities themselves employ threats of physical violence to preserve powers. 6 7 Jensen and Meckling 11 1992 body of law that spells out the assignment of rights is the product of hundreds of years of law-making of three sorts: court decisions (common law), legislative enactments (statutory law, including constitutions), and administrative decrees (administrative law). The private-property capitalist mechanism is the product of thousands of years of evolution. It is highly complex and embraces a multitude of actions, objects, and individuals. Most importantly, however, it functions as a free-standing system. It is automatic; there is no central direction. With minor exceptions, rights to take almost all conceivable actions with virtually all physical objects are fixed on identifiable individuals or firms at every instant of time. The books are kept up to date despite the burden imposed by dynamic forces, such as births and deaths, dissolutions, and new technology. Disputes arise, but evolution has provided a sophisticated arbitration service, the courts, to deal with that problem as well. The extent to which the legal system enforces property rights (the security of decision rights and the right to alienate them) is a major determinant of the effectiveness of markets. The failure of socialist and communist economies (whose distinguishing characteristic is the absence of private rights) is now the topic of headlines throughout the world. The difficulties that Eastern bloc countries are having in attempting to establish capitalist market systems to replace their failed systems is testimony to the complexity and value of market systems.8 These economies provide vivid evidence on the inefficiency and poverty that result from the waste of specific knowledge and the lack of control in the absence of alienable decision rights. Without the assignment of private alienable rights there can be no true market system. Thus, given their failure to establish alienable private rights in resources, it is not surprising that many of these countries are failing in their attempt to create effective market systems. 8 See Crook Crook, C. 1990. Perestroika: And Now for the Hard Part. The Economist, April 28, pp. 1-22. for an excellent survey. Jensen and Meckling 12 1992 4. The Functions of Alienability The alienability of rights deserves special attention in analyzing both markets and organizations because understanding the function of alienability in markets clarifies several critical functions that must be performed in organizations. The analysis thereby focuses attention on the critical issues to be resolved by scholars and practicing managers in their efforts to understand and manage organizations. Alienability is the effective combination of two rights: the right to sell or transfer rights and the right to capture the proceeds of exchange.9 Alienability is not only a necessary condition to exchange, it is the foundation of markets and the institutional device through which markets colocate knowledge with decision rights and control decision-makers. Alienability solves the rights assignment problem. When decision rights are alienable, voluntary exchange creates a process in which the purchase and sale of rights by maximizing individuals collocates knowledge and decision rights. It does so by conveying decision rights to the site of knowledge. In a market system, decision rights are acquired through exchange by those who have knowledge. Voluntary exchange ensures that decision rights will tend to be acquired by those who value them most highly, and this will be those who have specific knowledge and abilities that are most valuable to the exercise of the right. Control is the process and rules governing the measures of performance, and the rewards and punishments meted out in response to individual actions. Control and knowledge are complements in the analysis of organizations. Knowledge and the decision rights possessed by the individual, and the state of the world define the opportunity set from which individual decision-makers can choose. The control system plays a major role in determining which choices individuals make from their opportunity sets. 9 Alienability includes the right to sell or transfer alienability itself. Jensen and Meckling 13 1992 Alienability solves the control problem. By collocating decision rights with rights to their capital value, alienability provides both a measure of performance for individual decision-makers and rewards and punishments to motivate them to use those decision rights efficiently. Market prices for alienable rights reveal the value of assets in alternative uses to current rights holders as well as to potential rights holders. Where resources produce future flows of revenue or consumption services, and rights to those flows are alienable, prices represent the present value of claims to those future flows. These capitalized values perform two important functions in controlling human behavior: 1. They provide a measure of the performance of the parties who have the rights to decide how the asset or assets will be used. 2. They provide the reward or punishment that accrues to the owners of the rights as a result of their decisions. The collocation of decision rights with rights to their capital value accomplished by alienability thus both measures the performance of individuals and capitalizes the wealth consequences of an individual's decisions upon that person. The decision-maker who chooses an action that lowers the value of rights assigned to him or her bears the costs. When the decision-maker chooses actions that enhance the value of the rights, he or she captures the increased value. The major problems with the market control system occur when the legal or technological environments create externalities by not allowing for the definition and assignment of rights that cause an individual to bear the full costs or to capture the full rewards of his or her actions. Pollution or non-patentable inventions are good examples of situations in which decision-makers do not bear the full costs or benefits of their actions. The problems that arose in organizing in Eastern bloc countries without alienability highlight the significance of alienability to organizational structure and efficiency. But the internal organization of the capitalist firm is also an instance of the absence of alienable decision rights. Indeed, we distinguish activities within the firm from Jensen and Meckling 14 1992 activities between the firm and the rest of the world by whether alienability is transferred to agents along with the decision rights. In this view transfers of decision rights without the right to alienate those rights are intra-firm transactions. While firms can sell assets, workers in firms generally do not receive the rights to alienate their positions or any other assets or decision rights under their control. They cannot pocket the proceeds. This means there is no automatic decentralized process which tends to ensure that decision rights in the firm migrate to the agents that have the specific knowledge relevant to their exercise, and that there is no automatic performance measurement and reward system that motivates agents to use their decision rights in the interest of the organization. Explicit managerial direction and the creation of mechanisms to substitute for alienability is required. 4.1 The existence of firms Pushed to its logical extreme, our focus on specific knowledge implies more or less complete atomization of the economy. There is no room for the firm. Firms as we know them would not exist if alienability of all decision rights were granted to each agent along with the rights. There would be nothing left over for the residual claimants in the enterprise, be they entrepreneurs, partners, or stockholders. Firms must obtain advantages from the suppression of alienability that are large enough to offset the costs associated with its absence, or they could not survive open competition with independent agents. Such advantages could come from economies of scale or scope, or the reduction of transaction costs that could not be obtained by independent contracting agents. Knowledge considerations are one cause for the emergence of firms. Indeed, Demsetz (1988, p. 159) argues that "conservation of expenditures on knowledge" determines the vertical boundaries of the firm. Bringing diverse knowledge together to bear on decisions significantly expands the opportunity set because no one person is Jensen and Meckling 15 1992 likely to possess the set of knowledge relevant to a particular decision. In principle, an entrepreneur could assemble the relevant knowledge by individual exchanges, and knowledge transfer on a quid pro quo basis is not an uncommon phenomenon. Consulting and legal services provide obvious examples and so do the network organizations growing in the United States that contract out most internal functions common to organizations (see Kensinger and Martin 1991). Where the production, transfer, and application of knowledge are the primary goods being offered, however, exchanges tend to take the form of long-term relationships, and the most common of these is employment contracts. Such contracts tend to be general in nature--the contents of the exchange are not precisely specified--and they seldom are alienable. The transaction costs emphasized by Coase (1937) and Williamson (1975) are one reason such contracts emerge. Single proprietors who contract on a case-by-case basis for production and application of all knowledge would soon find themselves swamped by transaction costs in all but the smallest-scale firms. The value of proprietary knowledge to competitors or potential competitors is another reason for long-term employment relationships. Longer-term contracts reduce the costs of restricting the flow of valuable knowledge to outsiders. Finally, longer-run relationships encourage individual participants to invest in firm-specific knowledge that has little or no value except within the particular organization The suppression of alienability, while required for the existence of a firm, does impose costs, and we believe that those costs can be reduced by thorough understanding and analysis of the functions performed by alienability. The franchise organization, a rapidly growing sector of the American economy, is a good example of a mixture of firm and market systems that uses alienability of rights as part of the control system. A franchise contract sells the right to manage a divisional profit center to a manager for a franchise fee. The manager receives the capital value right to the residual cash flows, subject to an annual royalty payment and contractual Jensen and Meckling 16 1992 provisions limiting his decision rights in various areas.10 Most importantly for our purposes, the manager receives the right to alienate the franchise contract by sale to others. The contract often restricts alienation rights in various ways, for example by the right of the franchiser to approve the purchaser. Alienability's advantage as a control device is that it rewards and punishes agents by imposing on them the capitalized value of the future costs and benefits of their decisions. In the absence of arm's length transactions this is difficult to implement inside a firm. Nevertheless, mechanisms do exist to provide the functions that alienability normally provides in markets. We turn now to a discussion of these substitute mechanisms and how they help to solve the organizational problems of the firm. 5. The Organizational Problems of the Firm: The Trade-offs between Costs Owing to Poor Information and Agency Costs We have seen how alienability solves the rights assignment and control problems in the economy. Recognizing that firms, by definition, can make relatively little internal use of alienability enables us to see clearly the problems faced by every firm in constructing substitute mechanisms. The assignment and enforcement of decision rights in organizations are a matter of organizational policy and practice, not voluntary exchange among agents. In principle the modern corporation vests all decision rights in the board of directors and the chief executive's office. Decision rights are partitioned out to individuals and to organizational units by the rules established by top-level management and the board of directors. The chief executive's office enforces the rules by rewarding and punishing those who follow or violate the rules. These assignment and 10 See Rubin Rubin, Paul H. 1978. "The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise Contract." Journal or Law and Economics 21, no. April, pp. 223-33. for a description and analysis of the nature of the franchise contract. Like so much of the literature on franchises, this analysis ignores the critical role of alienability in the functioning of this organizational form. ...
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