comparative politics notes

comparative politics notes - Comparative Politics Chapter 3...

Info iconThis preview shows pages 1–3. Sign up to view the full content.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
Comparative Politics Chapter 3 The exit, voice, and loyalty game (Table 3.1 page 58) Exit- you accept that there has been a deleterious change in your environment and you alter your behavior to acheive the best outcome possible given your new environment. Voice- you use your "voice" (complain, protest, lobby, or take direct action) to try to change the environment back to its original condition. Loyalty- you accept the fact that your environment has changed and you make no change to your behavior. Game Theory is a fundamental tool for analyzing strategic situations. A Strategic Situation is one in which the choices of one actor depend on the choices made by other actors. A Game is a situation in which an individual's ability to acheive her goals depends on the choices made by other actors. Nash Equilibrium- is a set of strategies in a game (one for each player) such that no player has an incentive to unilaterally change her mind given what the other players are doing. (no player has incentive to change their mind given what the other players are doing) In an Extensive Form Game players make their choices sequentially. In a Normal, or Strategic, Form Game players make their choices simultaneously. (pg 59) A Subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium is a set of stategies such that each player is playing a Nash Equilibrium in every subgame. (pg 65) Backward Induction - is the process of reasoning backward, from the end of a game or situation to the begining, in order to determine an optimal course of action. (pg 65) Once we have solved the game we are interested in three things: 1.) the expected outcome of the game 2.) the payoffs each player receives 3.) the equilibrium of the game
Background image of page 1

Info iconThis preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full DocumentRight Arrow Icon
Game Theory Strategy and politics Strategic interactions (Example goal keepers, making decisions off what the other is going to do) First you must figure out in order 1.) players 2.)choice 3.)Strategy- complete contingent plan- a specification of what choice to take at every node a player has regardless of whether the node is reached. 4.)Sequence 5.) Payoff / utility Every terminal node has to show the payoff for each player. Backward induction Start from last node Exit (or E) has to hold a value of greater than 0 In a Regime if the cost of raising voice and exit is high they remain loyal as only possibility. Ressearch and writting Short Papers propose a research question, and critically evaluate and compare at least two existing scholarly answers to it. Have the scholars whose work you've reviewed persuaded you of the validity of their claims? The begining of the paer should include: Question - Preferable to ask in the form of a question. Players - Explain their argument and how yours will differ or agree
Background image of page 2
Image of page 3
This is the end of the preview. Sign up to access the rest of the document.

This note was uploaded on 03/08/2012 for the course PLSC 1340 taught by Professor Sakamoto during the Spring '07 term at SMU.

Page1 / 14

comparative politics notes - Comparative Politics Chapter 3...

This preview shows document pages 1 - 3. Sign up to view the full document.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
Ask a homework question - tutors are online