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Unformatted text preview: Nicole Katzman September 22, 2011 Lecture 6 War and Peace: Bargaining and War States go to War for: Territory (buffer states like Poland are constantly dealing with Russia/Germany) Policies Weapons programs Human rights abuses Support for threatening groups or states Regime type Graph shows ethnic, strategic, and economic conflict. Ethnic conflicts usually dont end up in non-conflict, but they rise in political and militarized conflict Percentage change in the likelihood of the different outcome associated with each kind of territorial dispute. Territory that has strategic or ethnic value increases the likelihood of militarized conflict. The Puzzle War is a costly way for states to settle their disputes. Why do states sometimes wage war rather than resolve their disputes through negotiations? Countries have conflicts of interest all the time. Only some disputes are resolved by force. (Why not all the time?-puzzle) The Costs of War Expensive United States has high military spending Discretionary budget- national defense is about 50% A Domestic Analogy Why are most disputes settled out of court? Both sides can predict the damages that might be awarded. Who will win/lose? Punishments? Lawyers and court time are expensive and time consuming. To save the costs of going to trial, most disputes are settled early. Another Domestic Analogy Territorial Disputes and the Risk of Interstate Conflict-40-30-20-10 10 20 30 No conflict Political conflict M ilitarized conflict ercent change in probability Ethn ic Strateg ic Econom ic Why are most union contracts negotiated without a strike? Strikes are made from conflict between union/workers and management Prevailing wages are well known. Strikes are costly to both workers and owners. Both sides have an interest in reaching a settlement, there is a sense of what the outcome is going to be The Insight As long as war is costly, some bargain must exist that both sides would prefer to fight. If so, war can only arise as a result of bargaining failure. Bargaining in the shadow of war is crisis bargaining or coercive diplomacy. The Bargaining Theory of War The BargainingTheoryof War As ideal point Bs ideal point X As share of territory from deal at X Bs share of territory from deal at X x = any bargain A B Countries A and B; a piece of territory between them. Since both prefer more territory to less, As ideal point is at the extreme right, Bs at extreme left....
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- Fall '08
- International Relations