This preview shows page 1. Sign up to view the full content.
Unformatted text preview: Soc 120: Marriage and the Family
Lecture 25: Understanding Family Violence Family Policy & Social Policy Prof. Elwert Review Formal vs. Functional Definition of the Family Approaches to family law Allison vs. Virginia
virigina took legal- allison took funcitonal Conflict & Domestic Violence History Prevalence Numbers Measurement issues 1 Preview Conflict & Domestic Violence Risk factors Explanations & interpretative frameworks Family Policy & Social Policy The reach of family policy Welfare and welfare reform Intimate Partner Violence: Risk Factors Clear social gradients Domestic violence more frequent among: Poor, low income, low education, unemployed Cohabitation/divorced/remarried vs marriage Young males (<30) Drug & alcohol abuse Race/Ethnicity (Female lifetime victimization 30% Black, 25% white, 15% Asian) cohabited partners are at greater risk of experiencing violence than divorce individuals and cohabited/divorce are more likely to experience violence than married people Obvious problem of selection vs causation Risk factor cause E.g., evidence suggests that greater prevalence of violence in cohabitation vs marriage is due to selection of violent individuals into cohab and out of marriage research suggests: 1st stage of selection: those who are more prone to violence are more likely to cohabit than marry in the ;irst place. -->do this because they are less sure, want to test the waters 2nd stage: married couples that experience violence are more likely to dissolve than cohabiting couples experiencing violence. -->therefore those people engaged in violence stay in the cohabitation pool, and "clean out" the married pool 2 Explanations
indiividuals who witness violence themselves are Social learning when they grow up Aggression-frustration Anger displacement more likely to use violence in their own relationships Social & intergenerational transmission Note: not deterministic
letting out anger on others Social Exchange Rational actor model, calculated abuse Aligns with social gradients of abuse Interpretative Frameworks Medical Model Focus on violence as illness, consequences Political Model Domestic violence as tool of power and control of men over women Supported, facilitated, legitimized by law (e.g. marriage rape exemption), customs (e.g. gender role expectations), social structure (e.g. economic power of men)
political model takes a social view on violence 3 Family Policy Broad set of laws and programs influencing family structure and behavior Family policy is much more than welfare Family policy sets frameworks for everybody E.g. marriage & divorce laws, contraception Programs do not only benefit the poor Also powerful (and expensive) programs primarily targeted at middle & upper class families E.g. tax policies: joint filing, child care deduction, mortgage deduction Family Policy Domains Broadly differentiate between policies Family formation: defense of marriage act that affect
family dissolution: -child custody -alimony -divorce laws -separation of property
gender roles: anti-discrimination laws Family formation Family dissolution Fertility Gender roles (Much overlap) (limit marriage to one man and to one woman) Common law marriage: this is a negative (looking at a non-married couple as married) way that family formation is in;luenced adoption: one way of acquiring kids that is strictly regulated 4 State Regulation of Fertility Fertility Contraception Increasingly tolerated since 1930s (Margaret Sanger) Griswold v CT 1965: birth control for married couples Eisenstadt v Baird 1972: birth control for unmarried couples Carey v Population Services 1977: birth control for minors Abortion Roe v Wade 1973: (conditional) constitutional right to abortion Availability of contraception and abortion led to decline in teenage birth rate Welfare (1935-1996) Social Security Act (1935) Act primarily addressed at men Enshrines family wage system, Forces women out of federal employment Creates AFDC (Aid for families with dependent children) = "Welfare" Entitlement program No time limit on benefits First widows, later all poor families w/ children, in the end predominantly divorced/never married women w/ children First no work requirement (supporting family wage system, breadwinner/homemaker ideal), then gradually work requirements for recipients 5 Aid for Poor Families Today Welfare Reform 1996 PRWORA creates TANF to replace AFDC Block grant Must work w/in two years of receipt (significant blow to breadwinner/homemaker ideology) Caused massive reduction in welfare roles, increase in labor force participation of poor mothers, generally small increase in earnings 5 year lifetime limit on assistance Limits begin to take hold recent stop-gap extensions Earned income tax credit (EITC) Income subsidy for low earners (working poor) w/ children Costliest program for poor families, bigger than TANF Aid for Poor Families Today Notice ideological inconsistencies in incentives Tax code rewards breadwinner homemaker model PRWORA & EITC encourage mother's labor force participation => Different models for different classes! 6 Big Questions What family forms should the government encourage? Marriage ideal vs independence Should there be any interference? What gender roles should the government encourage Female labor force participation vs breadwinner/homemaker and motherhood 7 ...
View Full Document
This note was uploaded on 03/14/2012 for the course SOC 120 taught by Professor Staff during the Fall '08 term at Wisconsin.
- Fall '08
- Social Policy