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Unformatted text preview: C L I M A T E C H A N G E T h e I P C C R e s p o n s e Strategies World Meteorological Organization/United Nations Environment INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE Program Note to the Reader The report of the Response Strategies Working Group (RSWG) was compiled through an unprecedented international cooperative effort to deal with the many climate change response strategies. The chairs of the four R S W G subgroups and the coordinators of the five R S W G topic areas took the responsibility for completing their individual reports. Along with their respective governments, they contributed generously of their time and resources to that end. It was not possible or intended to review each subgroup report and topic paper in plenary session. The R S W G report thus constitutes a series of independently prepared underlying documents which attempt to analyze as thoroughly as possible the issues addressed in each subgroup or topic area. The synthesis of the concepts from these underlying reports is the R S W G Policymakers Summary, on which consensus was reached at the R S W G ' s Third Plenary Session in Geneva on June 9, 1990. — F . M . B. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change ( I P C C ) was jointly established by us in 1988. Prof. B. Bolin is the Chairman of the Panel. The Panel's charge was to: a) assess the scientific information that is related to the various components of the climate change issue, such as emissions of major greenhouse gases and modification of the Earth's radiation balance resulting therefrom, and that is needed to enable the environmental and socio-economic consequences of climate change to be evaluated; and b) formulate realistic response strategies for the management of the climate change issue. The Panel began its task by establishing its Working Goups I, II, and III respectively to: a) assess available scientific information on climate change; b) assess the environmental and socio-economic impacts of climate change; and c) formulate response strategies. The Panel also established a Special Committee on the Participation of Developing Countries to promote, as quickly as possible, the full participation of the developing countries in its activities. The Panel has completed its First Assessment Report (FAR). The F A R consists of • the Overview; • the policymakers summaries of the I P C C Working Groups and the Special C o m mittee; • the reports of the I P C C Working Groups. The Overview and the policymakers summaries are to be found in a single volume. The reports of the Working Groups are being published individually. The present volume is based upon the findings of Working Group III. In order to appreciate the linkages among the various aspects of the climate change issue, it is recommended that it be read in the context of the full I P C C First Assessment Report. The Chairman of Working Group III, D r . F. M . Bernthal, and his Secretariat have succeeded beyond measure in mobilizing the cooperation and enthusiasm of literally hundreds of experts from all over the world. They have produced a volume of remarkable depth and breadth and a policymakers summary that is a model of writing aiming at explaining complex issues to the non-specialist. We take this opportunity to congratulate and thank D r . Bernthal for a job well done. G . O . P. OBASI M . K. TOLBA Secretary-General, W M O Executive Director, U N E P OFFICERS OF WORKING GROUP III CHAIRMAN: F . Bernthal (U.S.A.) CO-CHAIRS: E. Dowdeswell (Canada) J. Luo (China) D. Attard (Malta) P. Vellinga (Netherlands) R. Karimanzira (Zimbabwe) L E A D C O N T R I B U T O R S RSWG S U B G R O U P E N E R G Y A N D INDUSTRY: CO-CHAIRS COASTAL Z O N E MANAGEMENT: K. Yokobori (Japan) Shao-Xiong Xie (China) AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY, A N D O T H E R H U M A N ACTIVITIES: D. Kupfer (Germany, Fed. Rep.) R. Karimanzira (Zimbabwe) J. Gilbert (New Zealand) P. Vellinga (Netherlands) RESOURCE U S E A N D M A N A G E M E N T : R. Pentland (Canada) J. Theys (France) I. Abrol (India) TASK A (EMISSIONS SCENARIOS) C O O R D I N A T O R S D. Tirpak (U.S.A.) P. Vellinga (Netherlands) TASK B ( I M P L E M E N T A T I O N MECHANISMS) PUBLIC E D U C A T I O N A N D INFORMATION: G. Evans (U.S.A.) Ji-Bin Luo (China) TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT A N D TRANSFER: K. Madhava Sarma (India) K. Haraguchi (Japan) E C O N O M I C (MARKET) M E A S U R E S : J. Tilley (Australia) J. Gilbert (New Zealand) COORDINATORS FINANCIAL MEASURES: J. Oppeneau (France) P. Vellinga (Netherlands) A. Ibrahim (Egypt) L E G A L A N D INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS: R. Rochon (Canada) D. Attard (Malta) R. Beetham (U.K.) Acknowledgments The work of the Response Strategies Working Group was organized and coordinated by a network of officers from all over the world. I take this opportunity to thank the R S W G Vice-Chairs for their dedication in ensuring that Working Group III was able to fulfill the mission assigned to it. Special credit should go to the cochairs of the four R S W G subgroups and the coordinators of Task A (emissions scenarios) and Task B (implementation measures), who guided the efforts of the hundreds of experts in scores of countries around the world who contributed to the preparation of the specific sections of this report. In addition, I would like to express my gratitude to the staff of the Office of Global Change in the U . S . Department of State, (Daniel Reifsnyder, Frances L i , Stephanie Kinney, Robert Ford, and Granville Sewell), for their support as Secretariat to the R S W G . Special thanks are due the staff of the U.S. National Science Foundation who, under the supervision of D r . L i and D r . Beverly Fleisher, oversaw the publication of this entire compendium. Finally, the Response Strategies Working Group owes an enormous debt of gratitude to I P C C Chairman, Prof. Bert Bolin, for his guidance and counsel, and to the I P C C Secretariat, D r . N . Sundararaman and his staff. —FREDERICK M . BERNTHAL Contents Climate Change The IPCC Response Strategies I II POLICYMAKERS SUMMARY IPCC RESPONSE STRATEGIES W O R K I N G G R O U P REPORTS 1 Introduction 2 Emissions Scenarios xix 1 5 9 Subgroup Reports 3 4 5 6 Energy and Industry 45 Agriculture, Forestry, and Other Human Activities 73 Coastal Zone Management 129 Resource Use and Management 161 Implementation Measures 7 8 9 10 11 Public Education and Information Technology Development and Transfer Economic (Market) Measures Financial Mechanisms Legal and Institutional Mechanisms 209 219 229 245 257 List of Acronyms and Chemical Symbols 269 I POLICYMAKERS SUMMARY O F T H E RESPONSE STRATEGIES W O R K I N G G R O U P OF T H E INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL O N CLIMATE CHANGE ( W O R K I N G G R O U P III) Contents Policymakers Summary Formulation of Response Strategies 1. 2. CHAIRMAN'S I N T R O D U C T I O N xxiii E X E C U T I V E SUMMARY XXV SOURCES O F A N T H R O P O G E N I C G R E E N H O U S E GASES xxix F U T U R E EMISSIONS O F G R E E N H O U S E GASES XXX 2.1 Emissions Scenarios xxxi 2.2 Reference Scenario xxxii xxxiv 3. RESPONSE STRATEGIES FOR ADDRESSING G L O B A L C L I M A T E C H A N G E 4. OPTIONS FOR LIMITING G R E E N H O U S E G A S EMISSIONS XXXV 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 xxxv xl xli xlii xliii 5. 6. Limitation Limitation Limitation Limitation of of of of Net Net Net Net Emissions Emissions Emissions Emissions from from from from the Energy Sector the Industry Sector the Agriculture Sector Forestry and Other Activities F U R T H E R W O R K O N G R E E N H O U S E G A S EMISSION LIMITATION G O A L S MEASURES FOR A D A P T I N G T O G L O B A L C L I M A T E C H A N G E 6.1 Coastal Zone Management 6.2 Resource Use and Management 7. MECHANISMS FOR IMPLEMENTING RESPONSE STRATEGIES 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 Public Education and Information Technology Development and Transfer Economic Mechanisms Financial Mechanisms Legal and Institutional Mechanisms ANNEX I L E G A L A N D INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS xliii xliv xlvi xlviii xlviii xlix xlix li liii lv CHAIRMAN'S INTRODUCTION The First Plenary meeting of Working Group III of the I P C C , the Response Strategies Working Group (RSWG), was held in Washington, January 30February 2, 1989. This meeting was largely organizational, and it was not until after a subsequent R S W G Officers Meeting in Geneva, M a y 8-12, 1989, that the real work by the four R S W G subgroups, the Emissions Scenarios Task Force (Task A ) , and "Implementation Measures" Topic Coordinators (Task B) began. The Second R S W G Plenary Session was held in Geneva, from October 2-6, 1989, to discuss the implementation measures: (1) public education and information; (2) technology development and transfer; (3) financial measures; (4) economic measures; and (5) legal measures, including elements of a framework climate convention. A consensus was reached on five topical papers dealing with these measures, with the understanding that they would be "living documents" subject to further modification as new information and developments might require. The Third Plenary Meeting of R S W G , held in Geneva, June 5-9, 1990, achieved three objectives: 1) It reached consensus on the attached "policymakers summary," the first interim report of the R S W G . 2) It completed final editing and accepted the reports of the four R S W G subgroups, of the coordinators of Task A , and of the coordinators of the five Task B topical papers. These documents comprise the underlying material for the consensus report of this meeting, the policymakers summary; they are not themxxin selves the product of a R S W G plenary consensus, although many governments participated in their formulation. Finally, 3) The Working Group agreed to submit comments on its suggested future work programme to the R S W G Chairman by July 1, 1990, for transmission to the Chair of the I P C C . There was general agreement that the work of the R S W G should continue. The primary task of the R S W G was, in the broad sense, technical, not political. The charge of I P C C to R S W G was to lay out as fully and fairly as possible a set of response policy options and the factual basis for those options. Consistent with that charge, it was not the purpose of the R S W G to select or recommend political actions, much less to carry out a negotiation on the many difficult policy questions that attach to the climate change issue, although clearly the information might tend to suggest one or another option. Selection of options for implementation is appropriately left to the policymakers of governments and/or negotiation of a convention. The work of R S W G continues. The Energy and Industry Subgroup has, since the June R S W G Plenary Meeting, held additional meetings in London (June 1990) and Paris (September 1990), the results of which are not reflected in this report. It should be noted that quantitative estimates provided in the report regarding C F C s , including those in Scenario A ("Business as Usual"), generally do not reflect decisions made in June 1990 by the XXIV POLICYMAKERS Parties to the Montreal Protocol. Those decisions accelerate the timetable to phase out production and consumption of C F C s , halons, carbon tetrachloride, and methyl chloroform. It should further be noted that quantitative estimates of forestry activities (e.g., deforestation, biomass burning, including fuel wood, and other changes in land-use practices), as well as agricultural and other activities provided in the Report continue to be reviewed by experts. Two specific items of unfinished business submitted to R S W G by the Ministers at the November 1989 meeting in Noordwijk are the consideration of the feasibility of achieving: (1) targets to limit or reduce C 0 2 emissions, including, e.g., a 20 percent SUMMARY reduction of C 0 2 emission levels by the year 2005; (2) a world net forest growth of 12 million hectares a year in the beginning of the next century. The subgroup chairs and topic coordinators took the responsibility for completing their individual reports and, along with their respective governments, contributed generously of their time and resources to that end. The R S W G Policymakers Summary is the culmination of the first year of effort by this body. The R S W G has gone to considerable lengths to ensure that the summary accurately reflects the work of the various subgroups and tasks. Given the very strict time schedule under which the R S W G was asked to work, this first report can be only a beginning. —FREDERICK M . BERNTHAL Chairman Response Strategies Working Group Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Working Group III (Response Strategies Working Group) was tasked to formulate appropriate response strategies to global climate change. This was to be done in the context of the work of Working Group I (Science) and Working Group II (Impacts), which concluded that: There are many uncertainties in our predictions particularly with regard to the timing, magnitude, and regional patterns of climate change. Ecosystems affect climate, and will be affected by a changing climate and by increasing carbon dioxide concentrations. Rapid changes in climate will change the composition of ecosystems; some species will benefit while others will be unable to migrate or adapt fast enough and may become extinct. Enhanced levels of carbon dioxide may increase productivity and efficiency of water use of vegetation. In many cases, the impacts will be felt most severely in regions already under stress, mainly the developing countries. The most vulnerable human settlements are those especially exposed to natural hazards, e.g., coastal or river flooding, severe drought, landslides, severe storms and tropical cyclones. We are certain emissions resulting from human activities are substantially increasing the atmospheric concentrations of the greenhouse gases: carbon dioxide, methane, chlorofluoro-carbons (CFCs), and nitrous oxide. These increases will enhance the greenhouse effect, resulting on average in an additional warming of the Earth's surface. The longer emissions continue at present-day rates, the greater reductions would have to be for concentrations to stabilize at a given level. The long-lived gases would require immediate reductions in emissions from human activities of over 60 percent to stabilize their concentrations at today's levels. Based on current model results, we predict under the I P C C "Business-as-Usual" emissions of greenhouse gases, a rate of increase of global mean temperature during the next century of about 0.3°C per decade (with an uncertainty range of 0.2°C to 0.5°C per decade), greater than that seen over the past 10,000 years; under the same scenario, we also predict an average rate of global mean sea level rise of about 6 cm per decade over the next century (with an uncertainty range of 3-10 cm per decade). A n y responses will have to take into account the great diversity of different countries' situations and responsibilities and the negative impacts on different countries, which consequently would require a wide variety of responses. Developing countries, for example, are at widely varying levels of development and face a broad range of different problems. They account for 75 percent of the world population and their primary resource bases differ widely. Nevertheless, they are most vulnerable to the adverse consequences of climate change because of limited access to the necessary information, infrastructure, and human and financial resources. xxv POLICYMAKERS SUMMARY XXVI MAIN 6) Limitation and adaptation strategies must be considered as an integrated package and should complement each other to minimize net costs. Strategies that limit greenhouse gas emissions also make it easier to adapt to climate change. FINDINGS 1) Climate change is a global issue; effective responses would require a global effort that may have a considerable impact on humankind and individual societies. 7) The potentially serious consequences of climate change on the global environment give sufficient reasons to begin by adopting response strategies that can be justified immediately even in the face of significant uncertainties. 2) Industrialized countries and developing countries have a common responsibility in dealing with problems arising from climate change. 3) Industrialized countries have specific responsiblities on two levels: (a) a major part of emissions affecting the atmosphere at present originates in industrialized countries where the scope for change is greatest. Industrialized countries should adopt domestic measures to limit climate change by adapting their own economies in line with future agreements to limit emissions; (b) to cooperate with developing countries in international action, without standing in the way of the latter's development, by contributing additional financial resources, by appropriate transfer of technology, by engaging in close cooperation concerning scientific observation, by analysis and research, and finally by means of technical cooperation geared to forestalling and managing environmental problems. 4) Emissions from developing countries are growing and may need to grow in order to meet their development requirements and thus, over time, are likely to represent an increasingly significant percentage of global emissions. Developing countries have the responsibility, within the limits feasible, to take measures to suitably adapt their economies. 5) Sustainable development requires the proper concern for environmental protection as the necessary basis for continuing economic growth. Continuing economic development will increasingly have to take into account the issue of climate change. It is imperative that the right balance between economic and environmental objectives be struck. 8) A well-informed population is essential to promote awareness of the issues and provide guidance on positive practices. The social, economic, and cultural diversity of nations will require tailored approaches. A FLEXIBLE A N D PROGRESSIVE APPROACH Greenhouse gas emissions from most sources are likely to increase significantly in the future if no response measures are taken. Although some controls have been put in place under the Montreal Protocol for C F C s and halons, emissions of C 0 2 , C H 4 , N 2 0 , and other gases such as several C F C substitutes will grow. Under these scenarios, it is estimated that C 0 2 emissions will increase from approximately 7 billion* tonnes carbon (BTC) in 1985 to between 11-15 B T C by 2025. Similarly, man-made methane emissions are estimated to increase from about 300 teragrams (Tg) to over 500 Tg by the year 2025. Based on these projections, Working Group I estimated that global warming of 0.3°C/decade could occur. The climate scenario studies of Working Group I further suggest that control policies on emissions can indeed slow global warming, perhaps from 0.3°C/decade to 0.1°C/decade. The social, economic, and environmental costs and benefits of these control policies have not been fully assessed. It must be emphasized that implementation of measures to reduce global emissions is very difficult, as * 1 billion = 1000 million Policymakers Summary energy use, forestry, and land use patterns are primary factors in the global economy. To take maximum advantage of our increasing understanding of scientific and socio-economic aspects of the issue, a flexible and progressive approach is required. Subject to their particular circumstances, individual nations may wish to consider taking steps now to attempt to limit, stabilize, or reduce the emission of greenhouse gases resulting from human activities and prevent the destruction and improve the effectiveness of sinks. One option that governments may wish to consider is the setting of targets for C O a and other greenhouse gases. Because a large, projected increase in world population will be a major factor in causing the projected increase in global greenhouse gases, it is es...
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