graph approach TTough

graph approach TTough - Preventing Wormhole Attacks on...

Info iconThis preview shows pages 1–2. Sign up to view the full content.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
Preventing Wormhole Attacks on Wireless Ad Hoc Networks: A Graph Theoretic Approach L. Lazos 1 , R. Poovendran 1 , C. Meadows 2 , P. Syverson 2 , L. W. Chang 2 1 University of Washington, Seattle, Washington, 2 Naval Research Laboratory, Washington, DC Email: { l lazos, radha } @ee.washington.edu, { meadows, syverson, lchang } @itd.nrl.navy.mil Abstract — We study the problem of characterizing the wormhole attack , an attack that can be mounted on a wide range of wireless network protocols without compromising any cryptographic quan- tity or network node. Making use of geometric random graphs induced by the communication range constraint of the nodes, we present the necessary and sufFcient conditions for detecting and defending against wormholes. Using our theory, we also present a defense mechanism based on local broadcast keys. We believe our work is the Frst one to present analytical calculation of the probabilities of detection. We also present simulation results to illustrate our theory. Index Terms — wormhole, security, vulnerability, ad hoc net- works, geometric random graph. I. INTRODUCTION A wireless ad hoc network may be deployed in hostile environments, where network nodes operate un-tethered. In addition, the wireless medium exposes any message transmis- sion to anyone located within the communication range. In this paper we investigate a speciFc type of emerging security threat known as the wormhole attack [1], [2]. In a wormhole attack an adversary records information at an origin point, tunnels it (via a faster or direct link) to a destination point more than one-hop away, and retransmits the information in the neighborhood of the destination. Since a wormhole attack can be launched without compromising any node, or the integrity and authenticity of the communication, the success of the attack is independent of the strength of the cryptographic method that protects the communication. Hence, a wormhole attack is implemented with few resources and is difFcult to detect. Several approaches have been presented for defending against the wormhole attack [1]–[3]. The solutions proposed attempt to bound the distance that any message can travel using time-based methods [1], [3], cryptography [2], or exploiting location information [1]. Time-based methods either rely on tight synchronization between the network nodes [1], or on measuring the time of ±ight of a challenge-response [3] using clocks with nanosecond accuracy. Location-based methods also require loose synchronization between nodes [1]. In [2], net- work nodes use cluster keys to broadcast to their immediate neighbors. However, the authors of [2] noted their system is This work was supported in part by the following grants: NS² grand ANI-0093187, ARO grant DAAD19-02-1-0242 and by the Collaborative Technology Alliance (CTA) from ARL, DAAD19-01-2-0011.
Background image of page 1

Info iconThis preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full DocumentRight Arrow Icon
Image of page 2
This is the end of the preview. Sign up to access the rest of the document.

Page1 / 7

graph approach TTough - Preventing Wormhole Attacks on...

This preview shows document pages 1 - 2. Sign up to view the full document.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
Ask a homework question - tutors are online