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Unformatted text preview: SEEEP: Simple and Efficient End-to-End protocol to Secure Ad hoc Networks against Wormhole Attacks Neelima Gupta Department of Computer Science, University of Delhi [email protected] http://people.du.ac.in/ ngupta/ Sandhya Khurana Department of Computer Science, University of Delhi [email protected] Abstract In this paper, we present a very simple and efficient end- to-end algorithm to handle wormhole attacks on ad hoc net- works. We provide a lower bound on the minimum number of hops on a good route. Any path showing lesser hop- counts is shown to be under attack. Our algorithm requires every node to know its location. With very accurate GPS available, this assumption is not unreasonable. Since our protocol does not require speed or time, we do not need clock synchronization. In the absence of any error in the location, there are no false alarms i.e. no good paths are discarded. We have shown that the effect of error in the location information is negligible. The storage and computation overhead is low. For a path of length l , it takes only O ( l ) space and time which is less as compared to other end-to-end algorithms like Wang etal . Their algorithm uses O ( lm ) storage and O ( lm 2 ) computation time, where m is the number of packets examined. Since their protocol uses speed to detect wormholes, they assume the clocks to be loosely synchro- nized. 1 Introduction Ad-hoc networks have been proposed to support sce- narios where no wired infrastructure exists. Several types of attacks on ad hoc networks have been discussed in lit- erature. Some of these (blackhole or grey holes attack, rushing attack, wormhole attacks) cripple the network by disrupting the route of the legitimate packets while others (flooding attack) inject too many extra packets in the sys- tem thereby consuming system resources like bandwidth, memory/computational power of nodes. In this paper, we address the problem of detecting worm- hole attacks in ad hoc networks. Since the mobile devices use a wireless medium to transmit information, the mali- cious nodes can eavesdrop the packets, tunnel them to an- other location in the network and retransmit them at the other end. Attackers may use out of band channel, high power transmission, packet relay or encapsulation tech- nique to tunnel packets to colluding nodes. The tunnel so created forms a wormhole. The tunneling procedure gener- ates an illusion that the two nodes more than one hop away are in the neighborhood of each other. We call the two nodes as the victim nodes. Since most of the routing protocols maintain a neighbourhood set at each node, false informa- tion about a node’s neighbour can severly affect the discov- ered route. If the routing protocol uses the number of hop- counts to compute the shortest path, it prevents the routes longer than three hops to be discovered between the victim nodes. If the routing protocol uses the round trip delay to compute the shortest path and there exists a fast transmis-...
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- Spring '12
- Computer Science, Distance, Type I and type II errors, routing protocol