Unformatted text preview: round of a two period game and there is no discounting. L M R U 8,8 0,9 0,0 C 9,0 0,0 3,1 D 0,0 1,3 3,3 Fully describe a subgame perfect equilibrium in which the players select (U,L) in the first period. 3. Infinitely Repeated Game: Find the conditions on the discount factor, δ , under which cooperation (C) can be supported in the following infinitely repeated game using the Grim Trigger strategy: C D C 3,4 0,7 D 5,0 1,2...
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- Spring '12
- Game Theory, Subgame perfect equilibrium, inﬁnitely repeated game, sub-game perfect equilibria, Yale Open Course