WorldPolitics_Chapter03_wed_feb1_2

WorldPolitics_Chapter03_wed_feb1_2 - Chapter Three Why Are...

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Chapter Three Why Are There Wars? Wed. Feb 1
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Potential quiz questions: 1. Explain how war may result from problems of information. 2. Describe the strategic situation faced by the US when it was considering crossing the 38 th parallel in 1950 in the Korean war. 3. All of the following were reasons for Iraq to invade Kuwait in 1990 EXCEPT: a. Iraq’s economy was devastated by its war with Iran b. Kuwait was pumping more oil than the limit it had agreed to, which decreased the price for Iraq’s oil c. Iraq claimed Kuwait was pumping Iraqi oil near the border between the two countries d. Kuwait refused to forgive the loans that it had made to Iraq e. A fundamentalist Islamic group was on the verge of taking control of Kuwait’s government
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ANS: E REF: Page 94 KEY: 2003 Iraq War
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Recall where we left off: Varieties of Coercive Bargaining The pre-crisis distribution, or status quo, can be represented as a point on the line. Where the status quo is located compared to the state’s value for war determines which state might have an interest in using force (war may still not happed because the bargaining rage exists) Information – Commitment – Divisibility
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Bargaining anfd the status quo Here A wants a revision of the status quo; A may threaten war; A may even go to war
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Do Wars Happen by Mistake? Wars from Incomplete Information When states have poor information about one another’s willingness and ability to go to war, two mistakes are possible: A state confronted by demands may mistakenly yield too little or not at all A state may demand too much under the mistaken belief that the other side will accede
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Wars despite ( a theoretical ) bargaining range: Wars from Incomplete Information Consider a poker analogy: when some cards are hidden from view, each player knows more than her opponents about the strength of her own hand. The hidden cards are “ private information ,” known only to the player who observes them The game is played under the condition of incomplete information.
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Wars from Incomplete Information Parties lack info on: Capabilities : the state’s physical ability to win Resolve : a state’s willingness to fight (or willingness to bear the costs of war) State faces a risk-return trade-off : get a better deal vs. avoid risk of war
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Why not able to convey information?: Incentives to misrepresent and the
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WorldPolitics_Chapter03_wed_feb1_2 - Chapter Three Why Are...

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