PS 391 FINAL Notes

PS 391 FINAL Notes - WEEK 12 R 11/17 LN&N (CH 9) Questions...

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WEEK 12 R 11/17 1. What is economic voting or the “economic vote”? Evaluating the incumbency’s performance with incumbency; reward incumbent for good economic performance or punish for bad (and vote for opposition) Microeconomic: pocketbook - how am I doing ***Macroeconomic: sociotropic - how is the country doing; affect voter opinion 2. What are some of the debates about economic voting? Voters in US usually blame themselves for personal economic problems, but when others are affected, blame is placed on government Economists are highly skeptical that anything government does affects economy 3. When does economic voting seem to happen? 4. What role can parties and candidates play in shaping economic voting? Incumbents take credit for good economic conditions and blame bad one on their policies not being in effect yet. Candidates blame other party for inefficient policy, bad economy Media plays huge role – financial news (unemployment, debt) Wantchekon Questions Experiment – random assignment (no bias in results), control group, treatment 1. Why does Benin present a good "laboratory" for an experiment on clientelism & its effects on voting behavior? Some areas that really strong and always vote the same; other areas that are very competitive for votes 6 set parties, variation of competitiveness, set field of competitors 2. What is the goal of Wantchekon's experiment? How does he set it up (in terms of district selection and platform design)? Effects of clientelism on voting behavior Picks different villages to practice programmatic/patronage campaigning (randomly assigned) o To avoid bias of voting based on ethnicity, gender, religion, party Gets candidates to change up campaign promises Looks at gender/ ethnicity/overall villages’ responses/reactions to different promises (I will improve your wellbeing/I will improve education) 3. What individual voter and candidate features does he try to account for in his study? The types of promises – targeted versus policy Gender, religion, ethnicity, party 4. What is the difference between "redistributive transfers" and "public goods provision"? Redistributive transfers: clientelism, patronage Public goods provision: programmatic 5. How were the experimental platforms communicated to voters? The campaign workers set up events/meetings with voters, to promote message depending on clientelism or programmatic (not even necessariliy politician)
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6. What does Wantchekon find about the effectiveness of clientelism vs. promises of public goods provision? Pork wins – preferred that message over public goods Candidates likely to promise pork after results of this study 7. Where do public policy messages tend to be more effective? Less effective? How does Wantchekon explain this? Gender and occupational difference: Women preferred programmatic because
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This note was uploaded on 03/30/2012 for the course ECO 1111 taught by Professor Xxxx during the Spring '08 term at Kentucky.

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PS 391 FINAL Notes - WEEK 12 R 11/17 LN&N (CH 9) Questions...

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