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Unformatted text preview: player in any winning coalition. d. district 2 – 7.59% unaccounted for when using Banzhaf vs actual population %. e. {p1 p2 } {p1 p2 p3} {p1 p2 p4} {p1 p3 p4 } {p1 p2 p3 p4} Banzhaf power index (as percentage, rounded to 2 decimal places) Share of population (as percentage, rounded to 2 decimal places) Difference P 1 50% 16/29 = 55.17% 5.17% P 2 30% 8/29 = 27.59% 2.41% P 3 10% 4/29 = 13.79% 3.79% P 4 10% 1/29 = 3.45% 6.55% f. g. no dictator. p1 has veto power – b/c is critical player in every winning coalition no dummy. h. district 1 has 5.17% unaccounted for using the banzhaf method in comparison to its actual population. i. The higher quota (21) is fairer because it results in the lowest maximum difference between a district’s banzhaf power index percentage and its actual population percentage. Also, there is no dummy in the higher quota election....
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This note was uploaded on 04/02/2012 for the course COMMUNICAT 313 taught by Professor Herk during the Spring '12 term at Rutgers.
 Spring '12
 herk

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