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Unformatted text preview: First he may want to want you despite a univocal desire, altogether free of conflict and ambivalence, to refrain from. Someone could want someone but they might univocally want to not want that desire to be satisfied. Someone could want something, but do not want their desire to be effective. He explains this when he describes how a physician helping addicts wants to know the desire that the his patients feel for wanting a drug. The physician truly want to feel what they are going through, not the actual addiction of the drug. Additionally, Frankfurt describes how the second order can be either someone wanting something simply or someone wanting a certain desire to be his will. This is violating the second order, and only a nonhuman would be able to have a second order desire without the violation. Humans care about their free will. Frankfurt shows the complications with free will and he seems to stand relatively neutral on the subject....
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This note was uploaded on 04/10/2012 for the course PHIL 262 taught by Professor Scottpaterson during the Spring '08 term at USC.
- Spring '08