AID(II) Political


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Unformatted text preview: EXTERNAL FACTORS AID (II) POLITICAL Dr Michael Keating Rich World Poor World PLT/SCL 206 19 November 2007 Governance Governance defined: "the exercise of political power to manage a nation's affairs" Politics Matters (postSAPs) Coming into prominence at the start of the 1990s and becoming a dominant (if contested) discourse in development theory and practice IMF and World Bank key proponents of `governance' From World Bank 1989 SubSaharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth Origins 1) Failure of SAPs The success of neoliberal economic policies contingent upon a functional state which could support marketled development Good Governance therefore a prerequisite for developmental success A theoretical framework which explains these followings without discrediting neoliberal economic policy so political conditions become necessary Origins 1) Failure of SAPs SAPs lacked Political Support Generated a BACKLASH as winners and losers of reform processes emerged Developing States did not implement the programme fully/properly either because of a lack of capacity or of political will Marketled Development Strategies need to be `locked in' somehow Political, Institutional (and if necessary) Constitutional support for neoliberal economic reforms is needed Origins 1) Failure of SAPs NeoPatrimonial States IMPROVED PUBLIC SECTOR MANAGEMENT IS NEEDED Not least to better manage economic conditionalities of SAPs Weak civil society Lack of political opposition Patronage based politics Coercive and arbitrary states Absence of accountability Origins 2) Collapse of USSR Less political pressure on the West so political penetration of the developing world becomes feasible Development of postcommunist societies in Eastern Europe Drive for market reforms (consumer goods) and democracy simultaneous by necessity ExSoviet states gave practical experience with political conditionalities to the IMF Governance Reforms 1) Capacity Building Policy analysis and budget discipline An open budget process Restructuring State Bureaucracies Civil service reform and cutbacks Ensuring private/public separation Promoting Transparency and Accountability Fighting Corruption Democratization and decentralization Creating Political Institutions able to Support Marketled Development Strategies Governance Reforms 2) A legal framework for development The Rule of Law An independent judiciary Training for the judiciary Rules and procedures based on justice, fairness, respect for human rights Capacity to enforce contracts and property rights Fairness, Justice, Liberty Updating legal systems and ensuring consistency Governance Reforms 3) Civil Society Building `pluralistic institutional structures' Creating intermediaries between state and society Supporting voluntary groups, NGOs, universities, trade unions, free press Such groups generate political legitimacy and social consensus Civil society as the framework for political communication (Hirschman's `voice') Promoting accountability, transparency, participation Empowering civil society and reducing the power of the state Proxy for democratization Governance Promotion IMF and World Bank National Development Agencies NGOs, INGOs, Civil Society Actors The Washington Consensus Williamson coined this term to describe the policy consensus between organizations with geographic proximity IMF, World Bank, US Treasury IMF and World Bank Articles of Agreement prevents them from engaging in `political' activities But they can support `administrative' reforms So as long as it sounds technical... Consequently, good governance regards politics in a technical manner Repeating the mistakes of the economic conditionalities Promoting a model of Western political and economic structures and relations (liberalism) Are these organizations themselves transparent, democratic and accountable?? Hence no democratization but support for transparency and accountability and a strong civil society The Technicist Illusion Adrian Leftwich's critique: Governance grounded in the simplistic belief that there is always a technical, administrative or managerial solution to societal problems Good governance detached from social forces, politics and political coalitions, economic interests and the structure of the state For example implementing democracy may be feasible but sustaining democracy in the mediumlong term is far more complex Governance Reforms How can success, failure or even progress be determined or measured? How successful has `enhanced' civil society been in promoting sustainable growth? Is civil society necessarily good? Is corruption necessarily bad? Is participation necessarily good? Democracy Promotion Integral to `good governance' for NGOs and state development agencies Success in ExSoviet States with the formal institutions or trapping of democracy The culture of democracy is more problematic Greece, Spain, Portugal Independence But: Legitimising elite rule, wealth, power and privilege, and organised crime? Democracy Promotion Assumes that democracy will help development but where's the theory, where's the evidence? UK, Western Europe, USA, Germany, Japan, Asian Tigers, China... India a recent possible exception Democracy as a kind of consumer good for wealthy states (S.M. Lipset, South Korea) Democracy prevents key developmental policies from being implemented Land reform Democracy Promotion Hugely costly in Western development aid but ambiguous at best in returns Election aid and observers Sanctions (Kenya) Legal, Constitutional, Institutional assistance Civil Society `Thick' versus `Thin' democracies Substantive Democracy: India Procedural Democracy: Malaysia Political Violence Circulation of Elites UMNO Ethnopolitics ...
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This note was uploaded on 04/07/2008 for the course PLT/SCL 206 taught by Professor Keating during the Fall '07 term at Richmond UK.

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