PHIL 2 Notes Week 11

Impossible for our passions volitions and actions to

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Unformatted text preview: le contrary to reason to prefer even my own acknowledged lesser good to my greater, and have a more ardent affection for the former than the latter Passions Cannot Be Unreasonable Because They Are Neither True Nor False  ­ Reason is concerned solely with the discovery of truth and falsehood o Hume thinks that truth and falsehood are determined by whether our ideas agree or disagree with the real relations of ideas (demonstrative reasoning) or the real existence of matters of fact (probable reasoning)  ­ So it is impossible for our passions, volitions, and actions to be true or false o They do not agree or disagree with anything else – they are original existences, not copies of anything else o Passions and actions may be good and evil but they cannot be true or false Passions and actions may laudable or blamable; but they cannot be reasonable or unreasonable o Origin or contemporary metaethical theory known as emotivism Moral Distinctions Are Not Based On Reason  ­ Hume’s main concern is moral epistemology: o How does our mind distinguish moral good and evil? How do we distinguish between vice and virtue and pronounce an action b...
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This note was uploaded on 05/24/2012 for the course PHIL 002 taught by Professor Martin during the Fall '08 term at UPenn.

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