5 - Philosophy 1 3/5/2008 4:07:00 PM The compatabilist will...

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Philosophy 1 05/03/2008 19:07:00 The compatabilist will probably want to say something similar about what  having free will  entails. Roughly that: o Having free will with respect to my  Φ ing entails sonly that my  Φ ing is  caused in part by my naturally formed mental states (e.g., my intention  or desire to  Φ ). Another Mystery Suppose that incompatiblism is true and that determinism is false o Suppose, as many people now believe, that our world works in the way  that a quantum-mechanical theory has it – not deterministically, but  indeterministically. If the laws of nature are quantum-mechanical, then they merely probilify a set  of outcomes, given certain conditions, rather than determine a unique  outcome, given those same conditions. This indeterministic view of the world seems to make room for free will: o If am I trying to decide between  Φ ing or  Ψ ing, then it is physically  possible that I  ΦΦ  instead. This entails that, while I’m trying to decide whether to  Φ  or to  ΦΦ , both a  future in which I  Φ  and a future in which I  ΦΦ  are open. The problem with Indeterminism
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This note was uploaded on 04/07/2008 for the course PHIL 1 taught by Professor Lewis during the Winter '08 term at UCSB.

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5 - Philosophy 1 3/5/2008 4:07:00 PM The compatabilist will...

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