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Unformatted text preview: strict court recognized that Vickers was alleging a claim of
sex stereotyping, and Vickers cites at least one example where his conduct incited
harassment because the defendants believed him to be acting like a woman.
There are other examples. For instance, on one occasion when Vickers, Dixon, Mueller,
and Anderson were working, Mueller extended a tape measure to touch Vickers's crotch
several times until Vickers got angry and told Mueller to stop. Anderson remarked that 160 Vickers "must be tired, he's not in the mood to play." Compl. at ¶¶ 65-67, J.A. at 35-36.
A few moments later, Dixon grabbed Vickers's breast and remarked "Kiss [the
defendants' nickname for the plaintiff] has titties." Compl. at ¶ 67, J.A. at 36. At another
point, Vickers's truck was rear-ended causing Dixon to express that he did not want his
"favorite bitch" to get hurt and Anderson, Dixon, and Muller to joke that Vickers had
been "rammed in the ass." Compl. at ¶¶ 111-12, J.A. at 45. In yet another instance,
Anderson phoned the station, but when Vickers answered Anderson demanded to speak
to "a real officer." Compl. at ¶ 115, J.A. at 46. The complaint also contains an allegation
that a note was left for the plaintiff in the workplace, purportedly from a woman, asking
if he was "interested" but stating that "I know your plumbing is hooked up wrong."
Compl. at ¶ 124, J.A. at 48.
These allegations, in my view, provide a basis for the inference that the plaintiff was
perceived as effeminate and therefore unworthy to be considered "a real officer." The
permissible conclusion that emerges is that the plaintiff was not tolerated--and the
defendants made the workplace environment hostile--because the job required only
"manly men," not woman-like ones or women themselves. The complaint need only
contain "direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements to sustain a
recovery under some viable legal theory." Johnson v. City of Detroit, 446 F.3d 614, 618
(6th Cir.2006) (emphasis *770 added). Certainly, the complaint is replete with allegations
that the plaintiff also was harassed because of his perceived homosexuality. But as
homosexuality is not a qualifying classification for relief under Title VII, neither is it
disqualifying. That point has been made clear by this court's pr...
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This note was uploaded on 09/30/2012 for the course ENC 102 taught by Professor Deria during the Spring '08 term at FIU.
- Spring '08