It is clear that the statute creates a cause of

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Unformatted text preview: on, and embarrassment." Walgreen filed a motion to dismiss Chase's complaint for failure to state a cause of action, urging that because she remained employed with the defendant, she had no claim. Walgreen urges that section 440.205 only authorizes a claim where there has been a discharge from employment. Walgreen also asserted lack of subject matter jurisdiction claiming that the alleged wrongful actions were within the jurisdiction of the Judge of Compensation Claims . The court entered a final order of dismissal with prejudice on January 29, 1999. In its order, the court summarized the parties' legal arguments as follows: 3. The primary argument of the Defendant is that F.S. § 440.205 provides a cause of [**4] action for wrongful termination, but does not provide a cause of action for 128 allegations of threats, intimidation, or coercion absent the termination, discharge, or constructive discharge of the Plaintiff. 4. The Plaintiff's response to the Motion to Dismiss is that the plain language of the statute authorizes a cause of action for threats to discharge, intimidation, or coercion in addition to actual termination or discharge itself. The court agreed with the defendant as a matter of law and concluded that Chase failed to state a cause of action: 5. I have fully considered the case law cited by the parties. I have noted the Supreme Court of Florida decisions which have referenced F.S. § 440.205 as providing a cause of action for wrongful discharge. Neither party has cited any case law specifically addressing the issue of a cause of action for coercion or intimidation where there was not a corresponding termination or discharge from employment. The recent case of de Oca v. Orkin Ext. Co., 692 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997), cited by the Defendant, supports the more limited scope of F.S. § 440.205 advocated by [**5] the Defendant. 6. I have considered the plain language of the statute and the case law argued by both parties. While the plain language of the statute may prohibit an employ...
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This note was uploaded on 09/30/2012 for the course ENC 102 taught by Professor Deria during the Spring '08 term at FIU.

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