New york times 955 f supp 558 560 d s c 1996 holding

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Unformatted text preview: v. Lourdes Hosp., Inc., 805 S.W.2d 122, 125 (Ky. 1991); see also Morales, 151 F.3d at 506 (quoting Baylis). Because Ky. Rev. St. Chapter 344 mirrors Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), we use the federal standards for evaluating race discrimination claims. See Kentucky Commission on Human Rights v. Kentucky, 586 S.W.2d 270, 271 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979); see also Wathen v. General Elec. Co., 115 F.3d 400, 405 (6th Cir. 1997). Title VII makes unlawful an employer's decision "to discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin[.]" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994). Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the [*10] burden shifts to the defendant to rebut the presumption of discrimination by providing evidence showing that the plaintiff was terminated for a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason. See Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co., 29 F.3d 1078, 1082 (6th Cir. 1994). The plaintiff may demonstrate that the defendant's explanation was merely pretext by showing 101 (1) that the proffered reason had no basis in fact, (2) that the proffered reason did not actually motivate the termination, or (3) that the proffered reason was not sufficient to motivate the discharge. See id. at 1084. See generally, Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 120 S. Ct. 2097, 147 L. Ed. 2d 105, No. 99-536, 2000 WL 743663 (U.S. June 12, 2000) (holding that a plaintiff's prima facia case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer's asserted justification was false, may permit fact finder to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated). A. Smith's death threat constituted a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for firing him. See, e.g., Lenoir v. Roll Coater, Inc., 13 F.3d 1130, 1132-33 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that employee's threa...
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This note was uploaded on 09/30/2012 for the course ENC 102 taught by Professor Deria during the Spring '08 term at FIU.

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