She further admits that she told blaney lacroix and

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Unformatted text preview: that LaCroix again emailed her concerns about Henderson to Blaney on November 7, 2002. She also admits that she gave a sub-par presentation to the CEO of GE Digital Energy on December 3, 2002, and that she subsequently informed her supervisors, on December 5, 2002, that she no longer wanted to work in the business. Lastly, although Henderson argues that LaCroix and Blaney were not the primary decision-makers with respect to her termination, Henderson admits that Shepard did not participate in the teleconferences of December 5, 2002 and December 9, 2002. Henderson also does not dispute that Blaney and LaCroix lost confidence in her ability after she said that she wanted to leave the business and that Shepard only approved of LaCroix and Blaney's decision not to allow her to rescind her resignation. Accordingly, Henderson has not shown that there is a factual dispute surrounding the veracity of defendants' proffered explanations for her termination. [10][11] Henderson has also not shown that her status in a protected class contributed to her employer's decision to terminate her. Although she asserts that the demeaning remarks Shepard made regarding Blaney furthers her claim that she terminated because of her gender, these comments are "stray remarks" that cannot be used to prove discrimination. Stray remarks, absent some nexus between the alleged comments and the adverse action, cannot prove a claim of employment discrimination. See Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 239 F.3d 456, 468 (2d Cir.2001). To determine whether a comment is a probative statement evidencing an intent to discriminate or a nonprobative "stray remark," courts consider the following factors: *12 '(1) who made the remark, i.e., a decision-maker, a supervisor, or a low-level coworker; (2) when the remark was made in relation to the employment decision at issue; (3) the content of the remark, i.e ., whether a reasonable juror could view the remark as discriminatory; and (4) the context in which the remark was made, i.e., whether it was related to the decision-making process.' Young v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., No. 3:03CV1161 (PCD), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20788, at *59-60 (D.Con...
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This note was uploaded on 09/30/2012 for the course ENC 102 taught by Professor Deria during the Spring '08 term at FIU.

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