CourtCases2010

De oca v orkin exterminating company 692 so 2d at 259

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Unformatted text preview: opinions discussing section 440.205. In Smith v. Piezo Technology and Professional Administrators, 427 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 1983), the court was faced with the issue of whether 135 a private cause of action for wrongful discharge in retaliation for an employee's pursuit of a workers' compensation claim existed since the language of the statute did not expressly provide one. In answering this question, the court held . . .thus, because the legislature enacted a statute that clearly imposes a duty and because the intent of the section is to preclude retaliatory discharge, the statute confers by implication every particular power necessary to ensure the performance of that duty. . . . We hold, therefore, that F.S. § 440.205 [**21] does create a statutory cause of action. Smith at 184. The supreme court addressed section 440.205 again in the case of Scott v. Otis Elevator Company, 572 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1990). The primary issue in the Scott case was whether the plaintiff could recover damages for emotional distress under section 440.205, Florida Statutes. In deciding this issue, the court referred back to its decision in Smith in stating: ". . . we held that while Florida does not recognize a common-law tort for retaliatory discharge, section 440.205 created a statutory cause of action for wrongful discharge." 572 So. 2d at 903. The court then went on to state: "Section 440.205 reflects the public policy that an employee shall not be discharged for filing or threatening to file a workers' compensation claim." Id. In the Smith and Scott cases, the Supreme Court of Florida has clearly stated that section 440.205, Florida Statutes is a "retaliatory discharge" statute and made no reference to the statute covering other retaliatory or adverse actions absent a discharge. In fact, the supreme court in Smith [**22] stated ". . . the intent of the section is to preclude retaliatory discharge. . . . " 427 So. 2d at 184 (emphasis added). The Third District Co...
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This note was uploaded on 09/30/2012 for the course ENC 102 taught by Professor Deria during the Spring '08 term at FIU.

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