24afirmwithmarketpowerhasanindividualconsumerdemandofq

Info iconThis preview shows page 1. Sign up to view the full content.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
This is the end of the preview. Sign up to access the rest of the document.

Unformatted text preview: s1 and π2(s1*,s2*) ≥ π2(s1*,s2) for all s2. C. π1(s1*,s2*) ≥ π2(s1,s2*) for all s1 and π2(s1*,s2*) ≥ π1(s1*,s2) for all s2. D. π1(s1,s2*) ≥ π2(s1*,s2*) for all s1 and π2(s1*,s2) ≥ π1(s1*,s2*) for all s2. Refer to the following normal form game of advertising for question. (Game 10.17) 5 21. Consider the above advertising game. Firms A and B know the game will be played for exactly 5 periods. What is the Nash equilibrium to this game? A. {Do Not Advertise, Do Not Advertise}. B. {Advertise, Advertise}. C. {Do Not Advertise, Do Not Advertise} provided the interest rate is less than 0.10 percent. D. {Advertise, Advertise} provided the interest rate is less than 0.50 percent. 22. A monopoly produces widgets at a marginal cost of $10 per unit and zero fixed costs. It faces an inverse demand function given by P = 50 ‐ Q. What are the profits of the monopoly in equilibrium? A. $300. B. $400. C. $500. D. $600. 23. A monopoly produces widgets at a marginal cost of $10 per unit and zero fixed costs....
View Full Document

Ask a homework question - tutors are online