D1s1s22s1s2foralls1and2s1s21s1s2foralls2

Info iconThis preview shows page 1. Sign up to view the full content.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
This is the end of the preview. Sign up to access the rest of the document.

Unformatted text preview: out}. Find the subgame Nash equilibrium to this game, if one exists. A. Firm A plays {Stay Out}; Firm B plays {Hard if Entry}. B. Firm A plays {Entry}; Firm B plays {Hard if Entry}. C. Firm A plays {Entry}; Firm B plays {Soft if Entry}. D. There is no subgame Nash equilibrium to this game. 19. Firm B is the incumbent facing potential entry from its rival; Firm A. Firm A's strategies consist of {Entry, Stay Out}. Firm B's strategies are then {hard if entry; hard if stay out; soft if entry; soft if stay out}. Find the non‐subgame Nash equilibrium to this game, if one exists. A. Firm A plays {Stay Out}; Firm B plays {Hard if Entry}. B. Firm A plays {Entry}; Firm B plays {Hard if Entry}. C. Firm A plays {Entry}; Firm B plays {Soft if Entry}. D. There is no non‐subgame Nash equilibrium to this game. 20. Which of the following conditions correctly describes a Nash equilibrium when two firms are in the market? A. π1(s1*,s2*) ≥ π1(s1,s2*) for all s1. B. π1(s1*,s2*) ≥ π1(s1,s2*) for all...
View Full Document

This note was uploaded on 12/10/2012 for the course ECON 5501 taught by Professor Wing during the Fall '12 term at City University of Hong Kong.

Ask a homework question - tutors are online