Impacts 1 skfta key to us south korea alliance

Info iconThis preview shows page 1. Sign up to view the full content.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
This is the end of the preview. Sign up to access the rest of the document.

Unformatted text preview: erably. NASA’s raison d’être has become less clear following the end of the Cold War and with increased multinational cooperation on projects, such as the ISS, involving Russia and the European Union (Murray 1991), not to mention China’s emerging interest in space exploration. Still, two presidents—George H.W. Bush in 1989 and George W. Bush in 2004—attempted to articulate long-term visions for NASA. Their relative success was contingent not only on congressional action but also their successors’ commitment as party control of the White House changed. George H.W. Bush proposed the Space Exploration Initiative (SEI) in 1989, with the explicit goal of putting mankind on Mars. The large price tag inhibited congressional action in his inaugural year, and the SEI was not taken up by Congress until 1990 for FY 1991, and that year the president’s budget fell apart dramatically in Congress (Eastland 1992). When Bill Clinton won the presidency in 1992, domestic priorities overshadowed plans for space exploration. Still, Clinton did move to bring the Russian Federation into efforts to transform the American space station into the International Space Station. In 2004 George W. Bush proposed the VSE, which called for phasing out the space shuttle program and emphasizing programs designed to use the moon as a launching pad for eventual exploration of Mars. Yet Obama has signaled that such efforts are a low priority on his overall agenda and has attempted to scale back the Constellation project significantly. If presidential commitment to space exploration has been highly uneven in recent decades, NASA’s ability to influence presidential commitment to space policy has been further hampered by bureaucratic intransigence and a failure to alter its own agenda priorities as political control and priorities of the White House and Capitol Hill have alternated. As Klerkx (2005, 57) contends, “the pace of human spaceflight is whatever pace NASA says it should be,” regardless of congressional skepticism or presidents’ “vision” or lack thereof. NASA programs have been criticized for their “path dependency”—programs taking on a life of their own independent of congressional or presidential calls for change (Roberts 1990, 144; Bruggeman 2002). Path dependency obviously inhibits successful liaison with either Congress or the Office of Management and Budget. Gonzaga Debate Institute 2011 17 Mercury Politics 1NC Shell – SKFTA Good (3/4) C. Impacts 1. SKFTA key to US-South Korea alliance, regional stability, global free trade and hegemony Hiatt, Editor of the Washington Post editorial page editor, 10 [Fred, Washington Post, 4-12-10, “Will the U.S. commit to free trade with South Korea?”, , accessed 6-30-11] In a world of dangerously failed states and willful challengers to American leadership, South Korea is an astoundingly successful democracy that wants to be friends. But will America say yes? That seemed to be the question perplexing Presiden...
View Full Document

Ask a homework question - tutors are online