Some observers indeed predict that south koreaand

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Unformatted text preview: North Korean provocation, such as a third nuclear test or another attack that kills South Koreans, could potentially cause fissures. Alternately, North Korea may cycle away from provocation to negotiation in 2011, in large part driven by the need for food and assistance, in which case Washington and Seoul would need to make hard choices about returning to incremental negotiations or holding out. On the one hand, the Obama administration has maintained that it would not “buy the same horse again” when it came to re-engaging in a nuclear freeze-for-compensation deal, as in 1994 and in 2005. On the other, a refusal to return to the negotiating table would leave the two allies with a runaway nuclear program in the North. Afghanistan South Korea’s decision to dispatch 350 troops to Parwon Province in Afghanistan in Summer 2010 was warmly welcomed by the Obama administration. This deployment was not without controversy in Seoul, however, where opposition parties fiercely protested the plan, citing security concerns. was South Korea’s original deployment of medical and engineering units in 2002 withdrawn in 2007 after the Taliban kidnapped a group of South Korean missionaries (eventually killing two of them) and warned of further “bad consequences” if Korean troops stayed in Afghanistan. If Korea’s new Afghanistan deployment sustains casualties or another hostage incident occurs involving South Koreans, ROK public sentiment against further involvement in Afghanistan will likely increase, placing pressure on President Lee to withdraw the troops. Tensions in other areas of the alliance could also affect South Korean support for the Afghanistan deployment. In conclusion, absent a significant strengthening of relations with Japan or China, President Obama is not likely to downgrade South Korea’s linchpin status. But just as unforeseen regional dynamics set the stage for the ROK linchpin, unforeseen domestic dynamics within South Korea or the U.S. could threaten its permanence. Gonzaga Debate Institute 2011 38 Mercury Politics Impact – Alliance Good – Key to Stability Loss of alliance kills relations on the peninsula, spurs proliferation, and would spark regional warfare. Kang, Dartmouth Government Professor, 08 (David C., Professor in the Government department and Adjunct Professor at the Tuck School of Business, Dartmouth College, January 2008, “Inter-Korean Relations in the Absence of a U.S.-ROK Alliance”,, p. 28, Accessed 7.6.11, SWolff) For a cold war to return to the peninsula would require at least three conditions. First, South Korean policymakers and citizens must be unaware of the importance of the U.S. alliance to their country’s security and hence would miss the alliance only when it is gone.5 That is, although South Korean popular and elite sentiment appears to have crystallized around an engagement strategy, this consensus may be possible only because South Korea can take for granted the benefits of the U.S. military and alliance relationship. If the alliance were to dissolve, the South Korean public might re...
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This note was uploaded on 01/14/2013 for the course POL 090 taught by Professor Framer during the Spring '13 term at Shimer.

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