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Through the app as well as their bilateral relations

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Unformatted text preview: alize that the alliance was not such a bad thing after all, and Seoul, fearful of the threat North Korea posed to South Korea, would not only return to high military spending but also reduce or eliminate economic and cultural relations between the two Koreas. Some observers indeed predict that South Korea—and other countries—would even develop nuclear weapons in response to the lost U.S. alliance.6 Second, Pyongyang would need to renew the active destabilization efforts that characterized North Korea’s foreign policy during the Cold War. The North Korean leadership may conclude that confrontation is the best policy, deciding that Pyongyang would be better off in greater isolation—even if from a relatively worse economic and military position than the country experienced during the Cold War. North Korea may feel that the chances for a successful destabilization of South Korea through asymmetric warfare, terrorism, or even outright invasion would be high.7 Furthermore, the North Korean leadership may decide that their halting economic reform efforts were no longer important and that the country could survive in isolation indefinitely. Pyongyang could make such a decision in the event of Kim Jong-il’s death, with the lack of clarity regarding what political structure would arise in North Korea and whether the structure would be comprised of Gorbachevian reformists or Putinesque revanchists drawn from the military. Certainly political chaos in North Korea would render any and all current relations up for renegotiation, depending on how the political situation there is resolved. Finally, Beijing would need to abandon China’s current policy of encouraging North Korea toward economic reform and at least allow, if not actively support, North Korean subversion of South Korea. Although the extent of Chinese influence over North Korea is unclear, the view that China has more influence than any other country over North Korea is widely accepted. Beijing thus would have to conclude that the absence of the U.S. alliance makes South Korea an unimportant country and that turmoil on the peninsula is in China’s interest. Gonzaga Debate Institute 2011 39 Mercury Politics Impact – Alliance Good – Warming (1/2) Alliance solves warming – key to pushing climate initiatives Campbell, John F. Kennedy School of Government public policy and international relations professor, et al. 9 (Kurt M., associate prof of public policy and IR @ John F. Kennedy School of Gov, now Assistant Secretary of State for E. Asian and Pacific Affairs, February, "Going Global: The Future of the U.S.-South Korea Alliance," February, www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CampbellPatel_Going%20Global_February09_0.pdf, accessed 6-3-11, jm) Another potentially fruitful avenue for multilateral energy cooperation involving South Korea and the United States is the strengthening of the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP), a seven-nation partnership that constitutes more than one-half of the world’s energy consumption and a significant fraction of its non-oil energy resources. The APP’s emphasis on the diffusion of energy-efficient technologies and practices is especially appropriate for Asia given the region’s wide variation in energy and environmental practices and its especially pressing need to reconcile economic growth with increasingly acute concerns over environmenta...
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This note was uploaded on 01/14/2013 for the course POL 090 taught by Professor Framer during the Spring '13 term at Shimer.

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