107 last printed 942009 70000 pm oil ddw 2012 1 us

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Unformatted text preview: that prescribed solely by economic considerations. Specifically, our analysis shows that one explanation for Russia’s failure to strike new energy coalitions is the ongoing oil-for-security relationship that Saudi Arabia and Qatar have maintained with the United States. Importantly, our analysis also sheds light on how the status quo may change in response to new political developments in the Middle East. We argue that the uprisings and democratization movements in the Middle East may compel Saudi Arabia to pay more attention to its domestic needs and , thus, elevate the importance of economic payoffs from its oil resources above geopolitical payoffs from a special Saudi-U.S. relationship. The consequence could be a Saudi-Russia coalition in the oil market. Saudi Arabia’s incentive to form such a coalition will become stronger if Russia can also help contain Iranian nuclear ambitions. On the other hand, our analysis suggests that the possibility of a gas cartel between Russia and Qatar is less likely. 107 Last printed 9/4/2009 7:00:00 PM Oil DDW 2012 1 US ties with Saudi Arabia prevent Russian oil cartels and expansion Fang, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Rice University, et al., 12 Songying Fang, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Rice University, et al., AMY MYERS JAFFE, TED TEMZELIDES, 1-12, [“NEW ALIGNMENTS? THE GEOPOLITICS OF GAS AND OIL CARTELS AND THE CHANGING MIDDLE EAST ,” JAMES A. BAKER III INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY, http://www.owlnet.rice.edu/~tl5/GasCartel.pdf] E. Liu Historically, the United States’ close security relations with two major energy suppliers in the Mideast—Saudi Arabia (the world's largest oil exporter) and Qatar (the world’s largest liquefied natural gas exporter)—h ave limited Russia’s ability to achieve resource rent-seeking alliances in the Middle East. In recent years, however, Russia has tried to tap its large energy resource endowments to reassert its place as a global superpower .3 However, such exports have not been well received by important members of OPEC, and the public discussion of Russia joining OPEC has made little progress.4 Similarly, Russia’s initial efforts to create a gas cartel have been unsuccessful. In 2009, Russian gas industry leader Alexander Medvedev suggested that a gas troika of Iran, Qatar, and Russia consider joint “projects that could be implemented by the three countries in gas production and transportation.”5 Addressing a December 23, 2008, gathering of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF), a loose grouping of natural gas producers, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin hinted that a gas producer group might be rent-seeking. Because the cost of extracting gas was rising sharply, Putin contended that “the era of cheap energy resources, of cheap gas, is of course coming to an end.”6 Still, while Russia has, at the highest levels, approached the leadership of its biggest liquefied natural gas (LNG) or pipeline gas competitors in Iran, Libya, Algeria, and Qatar,...
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This note was uploaded on 01/30/2013 for the course ECON 101 taught by Professor Burke during the Spring '13 term at Southern Arkansas University.

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