This scenario would become more likely in the future

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Unformatted text preview: aggression autonomously. This scenario would become more likely in the future if Iran demonstrates a desire to build nuclear weapons, as Saudi Arabia would be vulnerable to an aggressive, stronger neighbor without the assurance of U.S. support. Constraints on Saudi Proliferation However, other experts on Saudi Arabia contend that the U.S.-Saudi strategic relationship currently acts as a disincentive that inhibits Saudi Arabia from developing nuclear weapons. Because Saudi Arabia depends on the United States for conventional armaments and military support during crises, Riyadh does not want to proliferate at the present time because doing so would deeply strain the U.S.-Saudi relationship , perhaps to an irrevocable degree. Analysts CabreraFarraj and Salama contend that the desire to maintain U.S. support makes the Saudis unwilling to proliferate in the current Middle Eastern security environment, since procuring unconventional armaments would ruin the U.S.-Saudi relationship and could mean that the United States would not help Saudi Arabia defend itself against an aggressive Iran.[37] Bahgat seconds this view, concluding that no evidence suggests that the U.S.-Saudi relationship will sour in the near future, and the United States and Saudi Arabia are likely to share common interests for many years, creating a strong reason for Saudi Arabia not to develop nuclear weapons.[38] 8 Oil DDW 2012 1 Saudi 1NC 9 Last printed 9/4/2009 7:00:00 PM Oil DDW 2012 1 Saudi prolif is fast and causes regional proliferation and nuclear war – Drawsin great powers Edelman, Hertog Distinguished Practitioner in Residence at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at The Johns Hopkins University, et al., 11 Eric S. Edelman, Hertog Distinguished Practitioner in Residence at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at The Johns Hopkins University. He retired as a career minister from the U.S. Foreign Service in 2009. He has served in senior positions at the Departments of State and Defense as well as the White House, visiting scholar at the Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies at the Johns Hopkins University and a senior associate of the International Security Program at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, as well as a distinguished fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, et al., Andrew F. Krepinevich, and Evan Braden Montgomery, 1/2-11, [“The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran The Limits of Containment,” foreign affairs.January/February 2011, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67162/eric-s-edelman-andrew-f-krepinevich-jr-andevan-braden-montgomer/the-dangers-of-a-nuclear-iran] E. Liu There is, however, at least one state that could receive significant outside support: Saudi Arabia. And if it did, proliferation could accelerate throughout the region. Iran and Saudi Arabia have long been geopolitical and ideological rivals. Riyadh would face tremendous pressure to respond in some form to a nuclear-armed Iran, not only to deter Iranian coercion and subversion but also to preserve its sense that Saudi Arabia is the leading nat...
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