With the 911 attacks it became the central issue in

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Unformatted text preview: at soon (Romm, 2004), those producers outside the OPEC cartel will remain largely unaffected by it. The OPEC nations, however, figure to be the last oil suppliers on the planet, and they will experience the brunt of the transition. 92 Oil DDW 2012 1 ***Saudi Internal Links and Impacts*** 93 Last printed 9/4/2009 7:00:00 PM Oil DDW 2012 1 Oil Key to Relations 94 Oil DDW 2012 1 Oil interests prevent relations collapse – High prices encourage engagement Gause, Professor of Political Science, 09 F. Gregory Gause, III, Professor of Political Science, 10-1-09, [“Saudi-American Relations,” Middle East Institute, http://www.mei.edu/content/saudi-american-relations] E. Liu After al-Qa‘ida’s bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, the Salafi jihadist issue began to cause tensions in the Saudi-American relationship. With the 9/11 attacks, it became the central issue in the greatest crisis the relationship experienced since the 1973-74 oil embargo, if not since the inception of the relationship. The United States expected the Saudi leadership to conduct a searching self-examination about its ideological, organizational, and financial role in the development of Salafi jihadism (conveniently avoiding any public self-examination about its own role in the process). The Saudis went into a defensive crouch, denying any connection between the Kingdom and Usama bin Ladin, his ideas, or his organization. While it was clear that the Saudi government had had nothing to do with the attacks themselves, Riyadh’s unwillingness to confront its indirect role in the development of bin Ladin’s movement inflamed American public opinion. Saudi public opinion, never particularly pro-American because of the Arab-Israeli issue, among other things, reacted very negatively to the American wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. These were the makings of a serious rift, if not a rupture in the bilateral relationship. Yet, such a rupture did not happen, for two reasons. First, in 2003 al-Qa‘ida began a campaign in Saudi Arabia itself against the regime. The 2003 terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia, more than those of 2001, mobilized the Saudi regime to take an active role in confronting the Salafi jihadist movement. The highest profile element of that campaign was a security offensive that started out haltingly but eventually succeeded in taking the fight to its domestic Salafi opponents. Less noticed in the United States was the sustained ideological effort by the regime to delegitimate bin Ladin’s ideas. The Saudis not only mobilized the official religious establishment, but also were able to rally a number of Salafi critics — some who had spent time in jail in the 1990’s — to the regime’s side. With this new commitment to confront Salafi jihadism domestically came greater cooperation with the United States on intelligence sharing and steps to dry up the sources of financial support for jihadist groups. The second reason that the relationship survived the post-9/11 crisis was the perception by leaders in both countries that geopolitical interests necessitated their continued close cooperation. Had the US war in Iraq succeeded in establishing a stable, secure, and pro-American Iraqi government, perhaps Washington might have been able to put some distance betw...
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This note was uploaded on 01/30/2013 for the course ECON 101 taught by Professor Burke during the Spring '13 term at Southern Arkansas University.

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