And russell 08 daniel moran professor of national

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Unformatted text preview: ause such conflicts have been limited and rare up to now, [3] there is good reason to be cautious about estimating their likelihood in the future. The probabilities are further muddled by the fact that over-emphasis on the possibilities for great-power conflict favors important, and generally conservative, institutional interests within the defense establishments of developed states, particularly the United States. In a security environment that presents increasingly strong incentives to shift force structure and doctrine toward irregular warfare, counter-terrorism, constabulary operations, and so on, the possibility of war to seize or defend energy resources provides a much-needed rationale for preserving the heavy conventional forces that still consume the lion’s share of defense spending around the world. This is especially true of naval building programs, whose ostensible purpose is always presumed to include securing the sea lines of communication that connect the producers and consumers of oil. [4] The prominence of energy security for military planning and budgeting may be exaggerated compared to its real salience internationally. Yet the anxiety that this issue is capable of inspiring is itself a measure of its significance, irrespective of one’s estimate of the probabilities. There were only two world wars in the entire twentieth century, after all, yet that is scarcely a reason to discount their importance. The possibility that access to energy resources may become an object of large-scale armed struggle is almost incontestably the single most alarming prospect facing the international system today. The political stability of advanced societies, and the continued prospects for economic and social improvement in developing countries, are both irreducibly dependent on avoiding such a conflict. 201 Last printed 9/4/2009 7:00:00 PM Oil DDW 2012 1 Energy wars are more probable – They occur in a context of economic decline and conetntion Moran, Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. and Russell , 08 Daniel Moran, Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. and James A. Russell, Associate Professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, 3-7-08, [“The Militarization of Energy Security,” Saudi-US Relations Information Service, http://www.susris.com/articles/2008/ioi/080307-russell-energy.html] E. Liu In such circumstances the great difficulty, from the point of view of both analysis and action, is to account for the enormous range of secondary effects that may follow once force is used on a significant scale. One must assume, for instance, that war by a major power to protect or to interfere with energy supplies would coincide with, or inaugurate, a period of sharply declining performance by the world economy, a development whose effects would be felt by the states immediately concerned...
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This note was uploaded on 01/30/2013 for the course ECON 101 taught by Professor Burke during the Spring '13 term at Southern Arkansas University.

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